Willy Brandt School of Public Policy

Course Name: Natural Resources in the Global World

Lecturer: Dr. Petra Gümplová

Winter Semester 2019/2020

Lifting Congo’s Resource Curse: Initiatives by the International Community

Andrew Kisekka – 47019

Justina Chilaka - 47018

John Chrysostom Kamoga - 45138

Table of Contents

1.0 Introduction………………………………………………………………...………………2

2.0 The resource curse theory and how it resonates with the Democratic Republic of Congo’s

experience………………………………………………………………………………….3

2.1 The resource curse vis-à-vis low economic growth………………………………..4

2.2 Resource Curse vis-à-vis Civil Conflict……………………………………………5

2.3 Resource Curse vis-à-vis Authoritarian Governments…………………………….6

3.0 The conflict minerals “3TGs” in the Eastern province of the DRC……………...………...6

4.0 Initiatives by the International Community………………………………….…………….8

4.1 The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme………………………………….….8

4.2 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)…………………….……9

4.3 The Clean Trade Act…………………………………………….…………………9

4.4 Publish What You Pay……………………………………………………………10

4.5 Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act 2010, Section 1502……………………….…11

4.6 Multinational Corporations……………………………………………………….12

4.7 Activism and Popular Campaigns………………………………………………...13

5.0 General limitations…………………………………………….………………………….13

6.0 Recommendations………………………………………………………………………...14

7. 0 Conclusion………………………………………………………………….……………15

1
1.0 Introduction

Countries rich in natural resources are undoubtedly expected to benefit more from their
wealth. But on the contrary, many are wrecked by conflict, tyranny, and economic stagnation
compared to their non-resource-rich counterparts. Against this backdrop, many of world’s
most corrupt nations are both rich in natural resources and home to some of the World’s
poorest. A report published by the American Security Project (2015) indicates that in 2010, in
Equatorial Guinea, a surprising 75% portion of the populace survived on less than $2 a day,
“yet the per capita annual income was $35,000 per person”. The obvious conclusion is that the
elite have “collected returns from the country’s oil windfall for themselves” leaving the vast
majority of the population to languish in abject poverty. Indeed, in the last 30 years, a
minimum of 18 vicious conflicts have been driven by the misuse of natural resources.
Additionally, at least 40% of all in-country conflicts over the past 60 years are connected to
natural resources (UNEP, 2009; UNEP, 2015). Deeply embedded in the United Nations
declaration on sovereignty over natural resources, is the affirmation that the “right of peoples
and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be
exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of
the State concerned” (NRGI, 2015; UN Assembly, 1962). This begs for the question; why do
countries with abundant natural resources face frequent economic and political instability?

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the largest country in Sub-Saharan Africa with
a “surface area equivalent to that of Western Europe” (The World Bank, 2020). The DRC is
among the world’s wealthiest countries with nearly every treasured natural resource available.
It rests on approximately “$24 trillion worth of natural resources”, in addition to “3.2 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas, large deposits of iron ore (Tin), platinum, diamonds, gold and
uranium” among other minerals, alongside “106270 square kilometres of arable land”
(Keowen, 2017). Despite all this available natural wealth, in 2018, 72% of the population,
especially in the North West and Kasaï regions, was living in extreme poverty surviving on
less than $1.90 a day according to the World Bank. This vast natural wealth has not only
failed to offer economic advances and growth but has also frequently fuelled conflict and
human rights violations (Diouf, 2018; Witness, 2009). The DRC is a true reflection of the
“resource curse” theory and has been extensively discussed in both the political and academic
spheres.

Indeed, the recurring question is, given Congo’s huge mineral fortune and natural resources,
why is it still poor? Certainly, the time has come to change this unpleasant situation, but as
2
vital as it is to contemplate the compelling “why” question, it is comparably imperative to
explore the steps being taken by the international community to change the existing state of
affairs. The Congolese people own the natural resources and they have indisputable rights to
benefit equally from them. To this end, several initiatives have been established by the
international community to address the resource curse predicament, including the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) initiative, Kimberley Process Certification Scheme,
Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act 2010, Clean Trade Act, Publish What You Pay and Cash
Transfers among others. Do these initiatives apply to the context of the DRC? What are the
limitations and successes registered particularly in the DRC? and what are the implications?
To analyse the considerations behind these important questions, the study will focus on the
three “conflict minerals” also known as the “3TGs” found in the Eastern province of the
DRC. Building on existing research, the study will seek to explore the steps taken by the
international community to change this paradoxical narrative, analyse the flaws and strong
points, and finally make recommendations on what should be done to lift the ‘resource curse’
in the DRC. But at the outset, we explore the ‘resource curse’ in the context of the Eastern
DRC.

2.0 The Resource Curse Theory and how it resonates with the Democratic Republic of
Congo’s experience

Various scholars have linked the natural resource conundrum to the theory of the “resource
curse”. The “resource curse” also commonly described as the “paradox of plenty” illustrates
the failure of various “resource-rich countries” to profit substantially from their natural
resource fortune, and for governments in the said countries to effectively meet the welfare
needs of their citizens. The notion that poorly governed countries are afflicted by their natural
resources is quite prevalent and “it sometimes influences international policies toward trade in
resources with those countries” (NRGI, 2015; (Vadheim, 2016; Olsson, 2004). Discovery of
gold or tantalum would be expected to yield economic benefits to the citizens of a poor
country like the DRC. Instead, natural resources have sparked off “conflict, corruption and
poverty”. The Revenue generated from the extraction of minerals is prone to gross
mismanagement and embezzlement by the political elite. This also has a “crowd-out” effect to
investments in other sectors of the economy making goods and services more costly. Yet still,
the unpredictable global commodity prices also have a “perverse impact” on the economies of
resource-rich countries (Mittelman, 2017; Alberola & Benigno, 2017).

3
There is compelling evidence to support the “resource curse” theory but the hypothesis has
been taken with a pinch of salt, with some authors suggesting that natural resources are
neither “curse nor destiny”, it's a “mixed bag”. Certainly, resource-rich countries like the
DRC explain the resource curse philosophy, but the theory remains far from absolute given
some success-story scenarios like Botswana and Norway, that have defied the odds (Stott,
2015; Tran, 2012). But scholars like Wenar (2008) subscribe to the “resource curse” thesis
noting that low developed countries that derive a large share of their national revenue from
“extractive resources” are prone to three intersecting “curses.” They are more at risk of
authoritarian governments, civil conflict, and lower growth rates.

2.1. The Resource Curse vis-à-vis Low Economic Growth

The Democratic Republic of Congo is a vivid example of a country which falls foul of the
resource abundance and poverty paradox. The recent World Bank estimations rate extreme
poverty in the DRC at 73% in 2018, remaining at a record high even among other sub-
Saharan African countries. Armed groups have supported trade in tin, tantalum, tungsten, and
gold to sustain violent conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Amid conflict,
the DRC is still one of the world’s poorest countries in a land of plenty. The Human
Development Index (UNDP, 2018) positions the DRC at 176 out of 189 countries, and among
the most prominent challenges according to the IMF (2019), is the problem “of corruption in
managing resources given the typically large rents”. Indeed, the corruption perception Index
(2019) by Transparency International ranks the DRC 168th out of 180 countries with a mere
18% score. The DRC struggles with this endemic problem at all levels of society, endangering
“social and political institutions with failure”. Corruption in revenue collection and
management, alongside a failure to preside over parastatals, weakens the power of the
government to control “mismanagement, conflict and poverty” (Chêne, 2010). Similarly, the
political elite have a strong hand in the country’s wealth, and often control the country’s
economic activities to serve their interests. Overall, “clientelism, rent-seeking, and patronage”
have undermined transparency and fairness especially in the public sector and the mining
industry. Influential multinational corporations have also taken advantage of resources
because they often have mileage over the state in terms of “expertise and access to
information in the negotiation and implementation of contracts, and in dealing with complex
natural resource taxation” (GAN, 2016; Chene 2010). Even though 29 out of the 51 countries
classified by the IMF as resource-rich countries are low- and lower-middle-income, the blame
cannot be cast on natural resources, but rather poor institutions that hamper effective resource

4
management. So, taking the example of Botswana and other successful resource-rich
countries, what can the international community do to lift the resource curse in the
Democratic Republic of Congo.

2.2 Conflict and the Role of Minerals

Many scholars have talked about the strong connection between natural resources and civil
conflict. Popular opinion has it that natural resources give armed groups the much-needed
financial means to acquire arms and weapons and bring fighters on board, theoretically
strengthening their military might and sustaining the war for longer periods (Conrad, Greene,
Walsh, & Whitaker, 2018). In light of this argument, Ross (2004) analysed 13 conflicts and
concluded that there was convincing evidence that natural resources made the likelihood of
armed conflict to arise higher, prevail for a longer period, and cause more fatalities in the
event that it occurs. Disputes can arise over the management and control of resources and the
distribution of the generated income. Potential future resource streams can alter the
motivations of political actors as they fuel conflict to gain control over imminent “resource
rents” (Norman, 2008).

The Democratic Republic of Congo suffered state downfall in the “1990s, culminating into a
civil war from 1996 to 1997, and from 1998 to 2003”. The root cause of the two wars was the
country’s resource fortune also attracting the involvement of neighbouring countries like
Uganda (IMF, 2019). The most conflict-stricken regions in the eastern province of the DRC
are located on the borderline neighbouring Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. Illegitimate actors
in the extractive industry together with insurgent groups have been at large in Ituri region
which was also a scene of the 2000 resource-fuelled conflict. For the past ten years, violence
and lawlessness were the order of the day also leading to “socio-economic” breakdown for
locals of eastern DRC. Truly, the war in the eastern DRC created “a large number of armed
militias, motivated by a mix of political aims and communal or ethnic self-defence, criminal”
and other agendas. Among other reasons are the inequitable “resource distribution, criminal
opportunism, pillage, and predation of civilian populations, often by elements of state security
forces”. This has also allowed in “foreign state military interventions in Congo in the early
2000s” (Cook, 2012; Global Witness, 2015).

Till now, conflict wreaks havoc on the eastern part of the DRC, and it is from such a context
that minerals in question the “3TGS” derived the name “conflict minerals”. There were over
“2.7 million internally displaced” people in the DRC owing to the unending war in the eastern
province in 2014 (Global Witness, n.d). Additionally, conflict and economic instability have
5
left 13.1 million in desperate need of humanitarian aid in 2017 (IRC). The DRC’s fortune has
led to its misfortune, having the world’s most desired minerals and precious metals that have
not only failed to bring economic advances and growth but also undoubtedly became a trigger
for numerous human rights violations. To the citizens of the DRC, natural resources have
become less a gift than a curse.

2.3 Resource Curse vis-à-vis Authoritarian Governments

The late Congolese president Joseph Mobutu ruled the country in a “kleptocratic fashion” for
32 years. To hold a grip on power, Mobutu needed unobstructed control over the resources of
the country, which also helped him win the “Congolese elite and the armed forces” to his side.
His tenure was infiltrated with record corruption and by estimation, Mobutu and his allies
embezzled “between $4 billion and S10 billion of the country's wealth”. A “rentier state” was
created in which “resource rents” were never brought back into the public coffers, “in 1982
only 10% of the official budget was spent on education and health services” (Matt, 2010).
Yet according to Wantchekon (2002) reliance on natural resources and “rentier economies”
may destabilize democratic dispensation and pave way for autocratic regimes.

The span of Mobutu’s successor, Laurent-Desire Kabila, was tainted with outright corruption
and in equal breadth, Kabila gave unprecedented power over state resources to his political
allies. While the country’s economy was collapsing, the few elites and close allies to Kabila
were pocketing fortunes (Nichols, 2018). Certainly, not every resource-rich country follows
this trend, in countries such as Botswana and Norway, the effect of resource reliance on
democracy has not been cited. This provokes the question, why does reliance on resource
wealth challenge democratic systems in the DRC but not in Botswana and Norway.

3.0 The Conflict Minerals “3TGs” in the Eastern Province of the DRC

‘Conflict minerals’ are “ores whose trade and sale fuels conflict and grave human rights
violations, since the last 20 years in the eastern province of the DRC”. The said, ‘conflict
minerals’ also referred to as the “3TGs”: are “minerals of tantalum, tin, tungsten, and gold,
and their derivatives” (Cook, 2012; Dodd-Frank Section 1502). Tantalum is used in several
industries, in the “semiconductor industry for high-performance capacitors”. Tin is applied to
generate “solder which is used to hold components on circuit boards and is also used in other
industries”. Tungsten is used in “cell phones” and gold is used as “wire bonding material in
integrated circuits” (Gonzalez-Prida & Raman 2015). Trade-in conflict minerals generate
revenue for those who have ownership over the “mines or the trading routes”.

6
Armed disputes erupt when “different groups both local and neighbouring countries try to
gain control over the mines and the transit routes”. The money from these minerals is used to
finance the purchase of other weapons used to create fuel conflict, intimidate, and terrorize
the citizens. The major violent activities include “mass rapes, child labour and slavery-like
conditions”. The trade can also be used as a tool to aid “corruption and money laundering”
(Armstrong, 2017; EU Commission, 2017; BGR, n.d). International efforts made to cut the
link between mineral trade and conflict in the DRC include “government and industry-led
mineral tracking and certification schemes”. The purpose is to examine the trade in these
minerals to stop insurgent groups gaining financial benefits from the trade (Cook, 2012).

This is a comprehensive structure for “due diligence” as a starting point for accountable and
transparent “global supply chain management of the conflict minerals”. Companies are
assisted to comply with human rights and minerals tainted with conflict by making informed
decisions about their suppliers among others. Adding to the requirements of the Dodd-Frank
Act, the OECD framework is intended to serve as a universal standard for all stakeholders and
suppliers contributing to the mineral supply chain. It is a concerted effort “among
governments, international organisations, industry and civil society to promote accountability
and transparency in the supply chain of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas”
(OECD, 2013). Other frameworks include the “Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition
(EICC), Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI) Conflict-Free Smelter (CFS) Assessment
Program” which also advocate for “conflict-free mineral sourcing” (Cook, 2012).
Transnational corporations have also come up with specific ‘due diligence’ frameworks with
Intel being the first one to take such a step.

Table 1: List of products using conflict minerals

Metal Ore Extracted Major uses

Mineral
Columbite- Tantalum “Electrical components (including those used in
tantalite mobile phones, computers, videogame consoles),
aircraft and surgical components
Cassiterite Tin Plating and solders for joining pipes and
electronic circuits
Gold Gold Jewellery, electronic, communications and
aerospace equipment

7
Wolframite Tungsten Metal wires, electrodes, and contacts in lighting,
electronic, electrical, heating and welding
applications”
Source: Ernest & Young (2012)

4.0 Initiatives by the International Community

Several initiatives geared towards lifting the “resource curse” have been established to
confront the governance questions related to natural resources. These diverse “global public-
private partnerships” exist in a policy vacuum between “states and markets”. They are mostly
based on the “self-interest” of involved stakeholders and for that reason they are voluntary.
The initiatives seek to set up a stable system that entrusts “civil society with monitoring and
whistle-blowing to constrain the power of the political and economic elite” (Carbonnier, Fritz,
& Jana, 2010). The most prominent initiatives include but not limited to the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for
diamond trade (KPCS), the Clean Trade, the Publish What You Pay initiative and the Dodd-
Frank Financial Reform Act 2010, Section 1504 inspired by the “conflict minerals” in
question. By extension are efforts made by activists, international corporations such as Intel
and apple and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals
from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas. Many of these initiatives have the backing of
the World Bank, the G20, the United Nations Development Program, the United States and
the European Union (Ross, 2015). The DRC resource-curse conundrum is at the centre of all
the initiatives with some even specifically targeting the 3TGs “conflict minerals” in the
eastern province. These initiatives have yielded positive results in some countries but their
effectiveness in the DRC lives a lot to be desired. To understand the role of the international
community in changing the Congo situation, we analyse these initiatives to understand what
progress has been made, what the flaws and prospects are, and what the best-suited strategy
for the Eastern DRC “conflict minerals” quandary is.

4.1 The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme

Global Witness in conjunction with other like-minded NGOs brought to light the dilemma of
“blood diamonds” 1998 and spearheaded the establishment of the Kimberley Process, a
“government-led certification scheme, initiated in a bid to clean up the diamond trade”
(Global Witness, 2013). Non-compliance triggers legal penalties on anyone importing
diamonds without certification. Undoubtedly, the Kimberley Process has helped limit

8
Diamond-fueled-wars in Angola and Sierra Leone, but some subscribing states have been
unable to agree on denouncing state-backed violence and other human rights violations. Other
challenges include its narrow definition and scope explained by the fact that it only applies to
“rough diamonds”. (Wenar, 2016, Global Witness, 2013). As (Rayner, 2018) states the
growing Tech industry does not trade in blood diamonds, but other minerals like the 3TGs.
Therefore, in its current state, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme cannot address the
‘conflict minerals’ dilemma because its scope has not yet been broadened to include other
minerals like the 3TGs.

4.2 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) promotes transparent and

accountable management of oil, gas and other mineral resources and has attracted significant
attention from “oil- and gas-exporting countries and companies” (Stevens, Lahn, &
Kooroshy, 2015). The EITI is embedded in the notion that the natural resources of a country
are a prerogative of its citizens. The EITI model necessitates that information pertaining to the
“extractive industry value chain from the point of extraction, to how revenues make their way
through the government, and how they benefit the public” be revealed (EITI, n.d). The
Democratic Republic of Congo subscribed to the EITI in 2004 and some progress has been
made in enhancing “accountability and transparency” as per the EITI Board decision on the
validation of the Democratic Republic of Congo (2018). The EITI is backed by a partnership
of governments, corporations, and the civil society in making fundamental decisions on how
the EITI system can be best applied in their countries. But as (Stevens, Lahn, & Kooroshy,
2015) point out, greedy elites still weaken the improvement of transparency in the sector. The
Angolan government is cited as an example, and by extension, the political landscape in the
DRC does not also permit efficiency. It should also be noted that the major focus of the EITI
initiative is oil and gas, and just like the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, its limited
scope leaves the conflict minerals unattended to.

4.3 The Clean Trade Act

A Clean Trade Act is intended to end importation of resources from countries whose
governments fail to be accountable to their citizens. A country implementing a Clean Trade
Act does not interfere with the laws of any other country, it changes its laws, in its territory
for its citizens. A Clean Trade country will end its resource imports form all disqualified
exporters. The Clean Trade Act has already been tested in some countries with Brazil
becoming the first country to introduce a veto on all authoritarian oil imports in 2017 (Wenar,
9
et al., 2018). The principal advocate of this Act is a voluntary organization called Clean
Trade, whose major objective is to get rid of obsolete laws that put everyone into “business
with oppressive, violent, and corrupt actors in resource-rich countries”. The “shopping and
investment” choice we make should encourage harmony, good governance, and inclusive
growth (Clean Trade, n.d). The market for tantalum, tin, tungsten, and gold is high in
developed countries who also can implement such fundamental policies. Though not much is
mentioned regarding the application of Clean Trade in the DRC, the Eastern province can
undoubtedly benefit from such stringent measures. Clean Trade continues to engage
Governments, Investors, Firms, Lawyers, NGOs, Consumers and Citizens, through peaceful
and responsible processes skewed towards redefining global trade in natural resources.

4.4 Publish What You Pay

The Publish What You Pay (PWYP) alliance was launched in 2002 by a consortium of
London-based NGO representatives fostering obligatory, as opposed to voluntary, “the
disclosure of extractive industry revenues from multinational companies to host
governments”. The initiative makes an ardent call to the G8 developed countries to assume
the mantle of encouraging “transparency over oil, gas and mining revenues” globally. One
strategy would be that “stock market regulators” demand extractive industries to “publish net
taxes, fees, royalties and other payments to all national governments” as a prerequisite for
appearing on “international stock exchanges and financial markets” list. Companies have over
time proved too unreliable in the disclosure of information for fear of losing the competitive
edge over rival companies. In the end, citizens of the afflicted developing countries can hold
their leaders accountable for the management of resource income. Among the many
organisations supporting the PWYP initiative include Human Rights Watch, Save the
Children, Oxfam America, Global Witness, the Open Society Foundation, and others. The
United Nations Development Programme and the and the International Finance Corporation
of the World Bank also rallied behind this cause. Additionally, PWYP engaged prominent
figures like George Soros and the Catholic Church (Gray & Lynn Karl, 2003; Global Witness,
2002; (Oranje & Parham, 2009). Essentially, ‘Publish What You Pay’ has played a
complementary role to the EITI by bringing NGOs and the civil society on board since EITI
majorly focused on governments and companies. PWYP has registered success but the most
active members have been the US and EU, the reason being that most of the world’s “oil, gas
and mining companies are only listed on stock exchanges in the US and EU”. Other
governments and companies have been hesitant to partake of the regulatory adjustments that

10
the PWYP initiative advocates for. The Democratic Republic of Congo has gained effortless
access to funds from China and private financial institutions with easier conditions “in terms
of the good governance and accountability of lender countries” (Oranje & Parham, 2009).
This has hampered the successful implementation of the initiative and against this backdrop,
the ‘Publish What You Pay’ has not registered much success in solving the Eastern Congo
‘conflict minerals’ problem specially the 3TGs.

4.5 Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act 2010, Section 1502.

The persistent conflicts and human rights violations within the DRC provoked action from
activist factions, like the “Global Witness and the ‘Enough Project”. They lobbied for a
reduction in global demand for minerals obtained from the DRC with the participation of
insurgent groups. A report by the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate depicted the
“Resource Curse” as a threat to US’ “Foreign Policy and Humanitarian interests” both
domestic and abroad. The Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act 2010, Section 1502, requires all
businesses involved in the “oil, natural gas, or minerals sector all over the world to reveal all
“payments made to foreign governments” (Holland, 2015). More interesting is “Section 1502
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” in the U.S legal system
that was enacted to stop the acquisition of ‘conflict minerals’ explicitly the ‘3TGs’ in the
Eastern province of Congo”. Among other requisites ‘Section 1502’ demands that businesses
controlled by the U.S Securities and Exchange Commission that use ‘conflict minerals’ in
their products declare “whether their products contain minerals from the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC), or one of its neighbouring countries” (Cook, 2012; Woody, 2019).

The regulation has set the ball rolling for “due diligence” efforts by various companies to
closely inspect their full “supply chains” to establish whether any of their products comprise
of tin, tantalum, tungsten, or gold (3TGs). Companies had to submit a “Form SD” with the
Securities Exchange Commission and, if it so happened that 3TGs exist in the products, such
corporations would have to submit a supplementary “Conflict Minerals Report” giving a clear
description of the ‘due diligence’ carried out to trace the source of the minerals. Since the
finalisation of the regulation in 2012, over 1,400 companies have filed yearly forms with the
Securities Exchange Commission detailing due diligence undertakings (Woody, 2019). This is
one initiative specifically designed to solve challenges associated with the 3TGs in Eastern
DRC. But how effective was the Dodd-Frank Act since its implementation? The Dodd-Frank
Act is said to have worked as an “intended or unintended boycott” on procurement of
Tantalum, Tin and tungsten from the eastern DRC. The act did not deliver the expected results
11
“instead it increased the likelihood that armed groups looted civilians and committed violence
against them” (Parker & Vadheim, 2016). Also, (Pöyhönen, Areskog Bjurling, & Cuvelier,
2010) add that it was the “unintended embargo” to minerals coming from Eastern Congo.
Chinese companies also took advantage of the restrictions and continued the purchase of
unverified 3T minerals after the unintended the boycott and made a huge profit out of it.
Many extractors were anxious about “losing their livelihoods and were willing to sell their
product at significant discounts of up to 80 per cent compared to world market valuations”
(Carisch 2012).

To this end, (Parker & Vadheim, 2016) conclude that the ‘resource curse’ is a convoluted
notion that cannot be easily solved by trade restrictions or certification frameworks.

4.6 Multinational Corporations

Intel was the earliest mover in ensuring that its supply chain does not source the 3TGs within
the “Democratic Republic of the Congo (or adjoining countries) from mines under the control
of armed groups who exploit mine workers to fund crimes against humanity”. Intel has since
then widened its scope to promote transparent “sourcing of all minerals” used in their
products and is dedicated sourcing undertaken in an ethically sound way that upholds the
rights of everyone in “global supply chain”. In a rather complementary fashion, Intel
incorporated a “policy and due diligence program” that stretches beyond conflict minerals
adding to the existing Dodd-Frank and OECD due diligence frameworks.

Google’s Alphabet has also developed a “Conflict Minerals Policy” backing the establishment
of “validated, conflict-free sources of 3TG” within the countries in question to aid a
production process that promotes economic progress and development those countries.
Alphabet requires that supplier source from “certified conflict-free smelters”, like those
inspected by “Responsible Mineral Initiative’s and Responsible Minerals Assurance Process
(RMAP) (Alphabet, n.d). GSK world renown ‘British multinational pharmaceutical company’
is also committed to upholding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and recognises
that businesses have a role to play in helping to address any adverse human rights impacts
associated with their activities (GSK, 2019).

Apple is also dedicated to promoting responsible mineral sourcing and has also supported the
development of a clean minerals trade in Congo through its engagement with four different
projects namely; “the Public-Private Alliance on Responsible Minerals Trade, or PPA, the
Conflict-Free Tin Initiative, or CFTI, mines at Nyabibwe, Solutions for Hope, and the Kemet

12
Partnership for Social and Economic Sustainability” (Lezhnev, 2014). It is a big step that
Multinational corporations have also launched ‘due diligence’ frameworks intended to clean
the global supply chain. But it should also be noted that these are voluntary measures with no
external body enforcing them. The question is whether companies can observe these ‘due
diligence’ frameworks even adherence lowers their competitive edge in the business.

4.7 Activism and Popular Campaigns

A deep analysis of the initiatives associated with lifting the ‘resource curse’ in afflicted
countries reveals that there is an embedded spirit of activism regardless of who rallies behind
them. Indeed, a paradigm shift in “political economies” has claimed space across the
developing world, comprising of the emerging strong wave of activism and the unprecedented
upsurge of private actors in controlling resources at the global scale (SINGH, 2012). U.S
activists in conjunction with the ‘Raise Hope for Congo (of the Enough Project)’ campaign,
backed the Change.org petition by a Congolese activist Delly Mawazo Sesete to get Apple to
produce a conflict-free product that includes verified clean minerals from Congo. The petition
gained over 71,000 signatures (Sesete, 2011). As the case with apple, activism can help in
adding a strong voice to existing initiatives to hold big corporations accountable and compel
them to take action following the pace set by Intel and other organisations. The voices of
activists can be amplified by rejuvenated media coverage to inform the public and create
awareness.

5.0 General Limitations

Efforts by the international community, through initiatives to restructure the management of

natural resources in eastern DRC, have added new layers of regulations without necessarily
“overriding” existing ones, which in turn creates more institutional complexities. Unintended
aftereffects such as those created by the implementation of the Dodd-Frank act 1502 forcing
insurgent groups in the DRC to look for others sources of income “including the timber trade,
trading cannabis and palm oil” are also a serious concern. Moreover, “Congolese big men” in
control of the eastern DRC’s extractive business “do not operate in isolation”. They have
stable connections with the world economic spectrum through their relations with so-called
“shadow transnational networks composed of private companies, brokers and entrepreneurs”
who desire to do business in conflict-torn areas where they can easily twist the law to serve
their interests. The Congolese elite has overtime managed to bypass the established
regulations aimed at reforming the extractive sector through various initiatives (Hilhorst,

13
2013; Wilson, 2018). This behaviour has a long history from the reign Mobutu, where
management of parastatals was handed over to the ruling elite who lacked the requisite
management and technical skills (Matti, 2010).

China has also provided an easy stream of money to the political elite making them worry less
about the restrictions by the international community. Chinese investors deal directly with
“local authorities” in the DRC to acquire minerals even though such dealings do not benefit
the citizens (Nhantumbo, Njumboket, Nkanda, & Boli, 2019). Surely, “transparency” is the
right path to “accountability”. The EITI, Publish What You Pay, Clean Trade and other
initiatives peddle transparency to help citizens know how much revenue is generated from
their resources in order to hold their governments accountable. But, “transparency may not
“necessarily mean accountability and that better management of revenues will follow”.
Similarly, elites can sabotage the efforts made to foster transparency in the resource sector
(Stevens, Lahn, & Kooroshy, 2015).

The increasing power of corporations versus the state leaves governments at the mercy of big
corporations. Foreign companies like Banro Corporation, Anglogold Ashanti and Anglo
American wield more power over resources than Gecamines a government-run mining
company (Eric Onstad, 2008).

Most of these initiatives have not yet past the test of time to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
they can eventually succeed in the establishment of “sustainable accountability frameworks
and governance mechanisms in producer states” (Carbonnier, Fritz, & Jana, 2010). Moreover,
the objective of reforming the resource sector is a long-term goal involving different
stakeholders with different layers of regulation. It takes longer to achieve tangible results yet
illegal mining and extraction of resources amidst conflict is happening in the DRC.

Most of these initiatives are voluntary and largely depend on the self-interest of governments
and companies. The perpetrators are the most disincentivised to participate and yet there is no
strong enforcement arm. Also, there is limited coverage of these injustices in the Western
media which leaves the public uninformed.

6.0 Recommendations

There is a need to create a comprehensive framework that links up all the initiatives in a
properly coordinated manner since their major objective is the same. The EITI and the Publish
What You Pay initiative to have a strong correlation just like the Dodd-Frank and OECD due
diligence frameworks. The struggle to lift the resource curse in eastern DRC ‘3TGs’ can
14
benefit from a coordinated reformation structure involving other initiatives such as the
“Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC), Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI)
Conflict-Free Smelter (CFS) Assessment Program which also advocate for conflict-free
mineral sourcing” (Cook, 2012). The CFS is still a voluntary initiative covering “tantalum
and gold”, but the Dodd-Frank Act, on the other hand, has already been implemented. So, in
the ideal setup, the CFS compliments the Dodd-Frank guided by the OECD due diligence
framework.

However, in the absence of such a comprehensive framework, civil society can fill this
vacuum once motivated by the strong voice of activists. Building on successful campaigns
such as Raise Hope for Congo (of the Enough Project) and the Change.org petition, by a
Congolese activist Delly Mawazo Sesete, activists can continue to mobilise the public to rally
behind this cause. In the end, governments and big corporations will follow. But to achieve
this milestone, “coverage in the western media” could significantly reactive the public.
Indeed, it would be impractical to anticipate that an uninformed public will demand
accountability from their governments or that “uninformed consumers or shareholders” will
change the rules of the big transnational corporations (Carpenter, 2012). Once the public is
informed and aware of these injustices with the help of activism and robust media coverage, it
will be less cumbersome for the initiatives to enforce accountability and transparency. If
governments and companies become more transparent the seemingly incoherent ‘Cash
Transfers’ initiative by the Centre for Global Development can also be implemented because
the institutions of government will be much stronger and there will be more revenue in the
public coffers.

7.0 Conclusion

Greed, violence, corruption and indifference have perpetuated the ‘resource curse’ in the
eastern province of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Illicit trade in the 3TGs ‘conflict
minerals’ continues even with several initiatives to enforce transparency and accountability in
place. The main conclusion is that initiatives by the international community only address the
resource curse predicament to a limited extent. There is still a vacuum in the sense that each
initiative targets a particular aspect of the ‘resource curse’ theory yet their major objective is
arguably the same. While the global technology industry flourishes, with new inventions
flooding the global market relentlessly, the Democratic Republic of Congo owning the
resources that this growth desperately craves for, put up with the worst of this progress.

15
This is not a new phenomenon; the Congolese people have for years faced the peril of the
curse. Governments and transnational corporations continue to fuel conflict, and the media
coverage, especially in western countries, is still minimal. Once the public is uninformed,
lifting the resource curse remains a far-fetched reality even with several initiatives by the
international community in place. Therefore, only a blend of strategies and awareness can
bring about the much-desired change. But over-reliance on self-interest and voluntary
commitments is not enough and creates unexpected bottlenecks as the DRC government may
neglect its fundamental regulatory role. Also, the success of the initiatives by the
international community is not only dependent on enforcing transparency and accountability,
but also on how they appreciate the local context of the Eastern DRC and how they interact
with all aspects of the ‘resource curse ‘quandary.

16
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Africa, M. (Ed.). (2017). The Democratic Republic of Congo. Retrieved April 19, 2018, from
https://www.miningafrica.net/mining-countries-africa/democratic-republic-of-congo/

Alberola, E., & Benigno, G. (2017, February). Revisiting the commodity curse: a financial
perspective. Retrieved from Bank for International Settlements:
https://www.bis.org/publ/work609.pdf

Armstrong, C. (2017). Judge Not. Bloomington, Indiana: Xlibris Publishing.

Assembly, U. G. (1962). Sovereignty over natural resources in the OPT – SecGen report.
Retrieved from United Nations: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-177754/

BGR. (n.d). Conflict Minerals. Retrieved from BGR - Mineral certification:

https://www.bgr.bund.de/EN/Themen/Min_rohstoffe/CTC/Concept_MC/Conflict-
Minerals/cmc_conflict_minerals_node_en.html

C.I.A. (Ed.). (2018). The World Factbook: CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE
CONGO. Retrieved May 17, 2020, from
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html

Carbonnier, G., Fritz , B., & Jana , K. (2010). Global and Local Policy Responses to the resource
trap. Retrieved from Global Governance:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23033733.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A14985814a69a5bf1f7f
575576c3148b8

Carish, E. (2012, November). Conflict Gold to Crimminal Gold. The new face of artisanal Gold
mining in Congo. Retrieved from Research Gate:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290604316_CONFLICT_GOLD_TO_CRIMINAL_
GOLD_-_The_new_face_of_artisanal_gold_mining_in_Congo

Carpenter, L. (2012). Conflict Minerals in the Congo: Blood minerals and Africa's under-
reported first world war. Suffolk University.

Chêne, M. (2010, October 08). Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. Retrieved from Anti-Corruption Resource Centre:
https://www.u4.no/publications/overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-in-the-drc.pdf

17
Clowes, W. (2017). Congo Halts Sicomines Copper Exports, Orders Local Refining. Retrieved
May 17, 2020, from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-08/congo-
haltssicomines-copper-exports-orders-local-processing

Commission, E. (2017, December 13). Conflict Minerals. Retrieved from European

Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/conflict-minerals-
regulation/regulation-explained/

Conrad, J. M., Greene, K. T., Walsh, J. I., & Whitaker, B. E. (2018). Rebel Natural Resource
Exploitation and Conflict Duration. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 63(3) 591-616.
Retrieved from Journal of Conflict Resolution.

Cook, N. (2012, July 20). Conflict Minerals in Central Africa: U.S. and International Responses.
Retrieved from Congressional Research service: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42618.pdf

Demissie, Meaza Zerihun, "The Natural Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa: Transparency
and International Initiatives" (2014). Dissertations. Paper 6.

Diouf, A. (2018, December 26). We need to change the management of natural resources in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. Retrieved from Business and Human rights Resource centre:
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/we-need-to-change-the-management-of-natural-
resources-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo

EITI IS THE GLOBAL STANDARD. (n.d). Retrieved February 1, 2020, from EITI Interact
https://eiti.org/

Eric Onstad, D. M. (2008, May 14). FACTBOX-Mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/congo-democratic-mining/factbox-
mining-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-idUSL1464465520080514

GAN. (2016, August). DR Congo Corruption Report. Retrieved from GAN Business Anti-
Corruption Portal: https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/democratic-republic-
of-the-congo/

Global Witness. (2002, June 13). Publish what you pay (Press Release). Retrieved from
https://www.globalwitness.org/

Global Witness. (2013, April 1). The Kimberley Process (Briefing). Retrieved from
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/conflict-diamonds/kimberley-

18
 process/?gclid=Cj0KCQiA4NTxBRDxARIsAHyp6gAdZZ1HZKfoF9yav01TKi4sZ1htL6d6
XN8ArW8AHZc6l_kxDZxn2tIaAhvKEALw_wcB

Global Witness. (2013, April 1). The Kimberley Process. Retrieved from Global Witness:
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/conflict-diamonds/kimberley-process/

Global Witness. (n.d). Conflict Minerals in Eastern Congo. Retrieved from Global Witness:
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/conflict-minerals/conflict-minerals-eastern-
congo/

Global Witness. (n.d.) The Kimberley process. The Kimberley Process.

Gonzalez-Prida, V., & Anthony, R. (2015). Promoting Sustainable practises through Energy
Engineering and Asset management. Hershey: IGI Global.

Gray, I., & Lynn Karl, T. (2003). Bottom of the Barrel. Africa's Oil Boom and the poor.
Maryland: Catholic Relief Services.

Havranek, T., & Horvath, R., & Zeynalov, A (2016). Natural Resources and Economic Growth:
A Meta-Analsis. World Development 88: 134-151. doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.07.016

Hilhorst, D. (2013). Disaster, Conflict and Society in Crises. Everyday politics of Crisis
response. New York: Routledge.

Holland, A. (2015). Alleviating the resource curse: The opportunity presented by Section 1504
of Dodd-Frank. USA. American Security Project. Retrieved from
https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Ref-0196-
Alleviating-the-Resource-Curse.pdf

Intel. (n.d). Our choices can Impact the lives of millions. Retrieved from Intel:
https://www.intel.de/content/www/de/de/corporate-responsibility/responsible-minerals.html

International, T. (2019). Corruption Perceptions Index. Retrieved from Transparency

International: https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo#

Keowen, C. (2017, August 01). Rich in resources but why is the Democratic Republic of Congo
Poor? Retrieved from The Borgen Project: https://borgenproject.org/why-is-the-democratic-
republic-of-congo-poor/

19
Lezhnev, S. (2014, February 14). Apple makes progress on conflict minerals, should build on
work in Congo. Retrieved from Enough Project: https://enoughproject.org/blog/apple-makes-
progress-conflict-minerals-should-build-work-congo

Matt, S. (2010). Resources and Rent-Seeking in the Democratic Republic of the Cong. Third
World Quarterly, 401-413.

Matti, S. (2010). Resources and Rent-Seeking in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Retrieved
from JSTOR:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27867932.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A87822c0b5933f8baf39
aea95a5a01e6c

Mittelman, M. (2017, May 19). The Resource Curse. Retrieved from Bloomberg:
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/resource-curse

Mongabay (Ed.). (2006). Democratic Republic of Congo: Environmental Profile. Retrieved May
17, 2020, from https://rainforests.mongabay.com/20zaire.htm

Ndoki, C. N. (2013). Paradox of abundance and scarcity of water in Kinshasa, Democratic

Republic of the Congo. Retrieved May 17, 2020, from http://www.ecojesuit.com/paradox-of-
abundance-and-scarcity-of-water-in-kinshasademocratic-republic-of-the-congo/5578/

Nhantumbo, I., Njumboket, I., Nkanda, J.-M., & Boli, A. (2019, March). Chinese investment in
DRC: a view from the forest. Retrieved from IIED: https://pubs.iied.org/17640IIED/

Nichols, Erin (2018) "The Resource Curse: A Look into the Implications of an Abundance of
Natural Resources in the DemocraticRepublic of Congo," Scholarly Horizons: University of
Minnesota, Morris Undergraduate Journal: Vol. 5: Iss. 2, Article 6.
https://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/horizons/vol5/iss2/6

Norman, C. S. (2009). Rule of Law and the Resource Curse: Abundance Versus Intensity.
Environ Resource Econ, 43:183–207. Retrieved from
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10640-008-9231-y.pdf

NRGI (Ed.). (2015). The Resource Curse the Political and Economic Challenges of Natural
Resource Wealth. Retrieved May 17, 2020, from
https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/nrgi_Resource-Curse.pdf

NRGI. (2015, March). The Resource Curse. Retrieved from Natural Resource Governance
Institute: https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/nrgi_Resource-Curse.pdf

20
OECD. (2013). OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals
from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas. Retrieved from OECD:
https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf

Olsson, O. (2004, June 8). Conflict Diamonds. Retrieved from Journal of Development
Economics: http://degit.sam.sdu.dk/papers/degit_09/C009_013.pdf

Oranje, M. V., & Parham, H. (2009). Publishing What we learned, an assessment of the Publish
What You Pay coalition. Judit Kovacs l Createch Ltd.

Parker, D. P., & Vadheim, B. (2016). Resource Cursed or Policy Cursed? US Regulation of
Conflict Minerals. Retrieved from University of Chicago Journals:
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/689865

Pöyhönen, P., Areskog Bjurling, K., & Cuvelier, J. (2010, October 01). Voices from the inside.
Local vies from mining reform in DR Congo. Retrieved from Good Electronics :
https://goodelectronics.org/voices-from-the-inside/

Rayner, T. (2018, July 15). You would not buy a blood diamond, but do you own a conflict
phone? Retrieved from Android Authority: https://www.androidauthority.com/conflict-
minerals-883973/

Ross, M. L. (2004). How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen
Cases. Retrieved from International Organisation Foundation:
https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge
core/content/view/07D4E5A57CF028F3EEC65326241001CD/S002081830458102Xa.pdf/ho
w_do_natural_resources_influence_civil_war_evidence_from_thirteen_cases.pdf

Ross, M.L. (2015). What have learned about the resource curse? Annual Review of Political
Science 18, 239-259. doi: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359

Sautter, G. F., & Pourtier, R. (2014). Congo River. Retrieved May 17, 2020, from
https://www.britannica.com/place/Congo-River

Sesete, D. M. (2011, December 30). Apple: time to make an apple conflict-free iphone.
Retrieved from The Guardian:
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/dec/30/apple-time-make-
conflict-free-iphone

21
SINGH, J. N. (2012, January 09). The resource curse: Governing extractive industries in the
Global South. Retrieved from E-International relations: https://www.e-ir.info/2012/01/09/the-
myth-of-the-resource-curse-governing-extractive-industries-in-the-global-south/

Stevens, P., Lahn, G., & Kooroshy, J. (2015, August). The Resource Curse Revisited. Retrieved
from Energy, Environment and Resources:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/20150804ResourceCu
rseRevisitedStevensLahnKooroshyFinal.pdf

STOTT, L. (2015, JULY 3). Are Natural Resources More of a Curse than a Blessing? Retrieved
from E-international relations: https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/57032

The World Bank. (2020, May 4). The World Bank in DRC. Retrieved from The World Bank:
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview

Tran, M. (2012, October 25). Are natural resources a blessing or a curse for developing
countries? Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2012/oct/25/natural-resources-blessing-curse-developing-countries

UNDP. (2018). Human Development Index. Retrieved from United Nations Development
Programme: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/COD.pdf

Vadheim, D. P. (2016, December 7). Resource Cursed or Policy Cursed? US Regulation of

Conflict Minerals and Violence in the Congo. Retrieved from Journal of Agriculture and
resource economics: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/689865

Venerables, A. L. (2016). Using Natural Resources for Development: Why has it proven so
difficult. Journal of Economics Perspectives 30(1) 161-184. doi:10.1257/jep.30.1.161

Wenar, L. (2008). Property Rights and the Resource Curse. Philosophy & Public Affairs 36 (1).
Retrieved from https://www.biicl.org/files/4363_wenarpapafinal.pdf

Wenar, L. (2016). Blood oil: tyrants, violence, and the rules that run the world. New York, N.Y.
Oxford University Press.

Wenar, L., Blake, M., James , A., Kutz , C., Mehdiyeva, N., & Stilz , A. (2018). Beyond Blood.
Philosophy, Policy, and the future. London: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group,
Inc.

Wilson, R. K. (2018). More legislation, more violence? The impact of Dodd-Frank in the DRC.
Retrieved from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6084930/
22
Witness, G. (2009, December 17). Natural resource exploitation and human rights in the DRC
1993-2003. Retrieved from Global Witness:
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/natural-resource-exploitation-and-human-rights-
drc-1993-2003/

Woody, K. (2019, November 12). Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act: Past, Present & Future.
Retrieved from ASSENT: https://blog.assentcompliance.com/index.php/dodd-frank-past-
present-future/

23