Tunisia gained its independence from France in 1956.

As in
the case of Morocco and Algeria, the origin of Islamist groups
can be traced back to domestic and international
circumstances during the 1960s and 1970s. In the following
discussion, the primary role-players will be briefly presented,
as will the similarities and differences in the conditions
contributing to these developments. In the same way as
Morocco and Algeria, Tunisia faced socio-economic
challenges while its government faced a growing legitimacy
crisis.

During the 1970s, Tunisia began to experience economic

difficulties, resulting in high unemployment, particularly of the
youth. A growing gap between the younger and older
generations followed this increasing unemployment and the
student unrests of 1971 and 1972. Universities joined
mosques as breeding grounds for Islamists. During the 1970s
the government also allowed schools and factories to build
their own mosques on their premises thus enabling Islamists
to increase their influence on the youth. While the Algerian
bread riots of October 1988 and the earlier riots in Morocco in
1965 had served as landmark events, Tunisia’s own
economic crisis culminated in its own bread riots in 1984
(Hermassi 1995:107).

Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami, or the Islamic Liberation Party (ILP) –

which was founded in Jerusalem in 1948 and which aimed at
the establishment of an Islamic state and the restoration of
the Caliphate – had a branch in Tunisia. The government
became aware of its activities and prosecuted 29 members in
a military court in August 1983 for ‘establishing a clandestine
organisation with a political objective’. Nineteen of the 29
were army officers, making this the first trial involving military
personnel since 1962 (Shahin 1997:81-82).
Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami, or the Islamic Tendency
Movement (MTI), was influenced by a search for an
ideological alternative of the state and became a strong
breeding ground for Islamism, particularly after the Tunisian
government had, in the same way as Algeria, incorporated
secular ideological principles. Rashid al-Ghannoushi, the MTI
leader who had been influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood
in Syria and by Salafism when he was at university in
Damascus, was convinced that social reform based on the
true principles of Islam was the only option for his country.
Reflecting a similar frustration to one that had led to the
Arabisation process in Algeria, Ghannoushi made the
following observation when he returned to Tunisia: ‘I
remember we used to feel like strangers in our own country.
After having been educated as Muslims and Arabs, we found
our own country totally moulded in the French cultural
identity’ (Shahin 1997:69-70). Still apolitical, Ghannoushi
joined Abdel Fattah Mourou in giving lectures at secondary
schools and mosques based on three issues:
 Promoting Islamic principles, such as studying
the Qur’an, Sunna and other religious texts

 Explaining the differences between Islamic principles

and those considered to be un-Islamic, including
Western democracy and Marxism

 Demonstrating differences between what is practised

and what is preached
During this stage, the government generally tolerated Islamic
movements, which were not considered a threat. Leftist
elements were then regarded as the primary threat, with
Islamist movements counterbalancing the left, particularly in
mosques, schools and universities. In its early days, the MTI
focused on moral issues and was considered as a ‘religious
association with reformist tendencies’ (Shahin 1997:71). With
the government presenting itself as favouring Islamic
principles, the MTI was free to broaden its support base. The
MTI was well structured and included:
 Usar maftuha, or open cells, at the base, with an
average of five members each. These open cells acted
as study groups, tasked with discussing religious,
political and economic issues. From them, committed
members could be selected for integration into closed
cells

 Usar multazima, or committed or closed cells. These

were clustered around 18 regional councils. Each
regional council was headed by an amil or governor,
who in turn was appointed by the MTI’s emir. The amil’s
own organisational apparatus was responsible for the
religious and political grouping of members in the open
and closed cells

 In 1987 the militant core of the MTI, headed by Al-Jibali,

was estimated as having between 4 000 and 6 000
members (Shahin 1997:90-91;94)

 Al-Maktab al-Siyasi, or the political bureau, was

responsible for issuing public statements and liaising
with other political actors
In the aftermath of the Iranian revolution, the Tunisian
government began to question the motives of the Islamist
movements, and this often led to open confrontation.
Becoming defensive, the Tunisian government then tried to
project the state as the guardian of Islam. Former Interior
Minister Driss Guiga stated in 1981:
We are six million Tunisian Muslims. We are all the Islamic
Tendency. No one can accept that certain individuals claim the
monopoly of Islam and pretend to act under its name or its sacred
values in order to hide their political goals (Shahin 1997:84).
During its conference in May 1981, the MTI decided to
continue with its double strategy. Keeping its clandestine
base, it also worked to achieve broader recognition by
forming alliances with other political role-players (Mahmoud
1996:250). At the same time, President Bourguiba began to
experience difficulties, particularly because of the lack of well-
defined economic and social policies. The government
introduced authoritarian policies, moving towards a
domination of power and control, while Islamists saw an
opportunity to take control. Opting for a political non-violent
approach, the MTI asked for recognition as a political party.
The government reacted in July 1981 by arresting 60
members, including the MTI leadership, charging them with
forming an illegal organisation, defaming the president and
publishing false news reports (Shahin 1997:87).

In the mid 1980s Tunisia had a favourable climate for the

growth of extremism. As well as poor socio-economic
conditions and in particular a high unemployment rate, the
government was weak and disorganised and open to direct
challenges. These led it to ban radical fundamentalist groups,
and this action in turn led to feelings of marginalisation. After
decades of relative prosperity, the Tunisian economy was in
crisis in the early 1980s. Revenue from oil was halved in
1986 due to the fall in world prices. Income from tourism
dropped by 11 per cent after the Israeli raid on the Palestine
Liberation Organisation (PLO) headquarters in Tunis. And the
substantial income flow from Tunisians working in Libya was
cut after Colonel Gadaffi expelled 40 000 Tunisian workers
in 1985. Also, following the drought of 1986, food imports
doubled (The Times 1987).

From 1985 to 1987, the Tunisian government, particularly

under Interior Minister Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, cracked down
more severely on opposition groups, adding to the growing
political crisis. Helping to justify harsher counter-measures
were events including:
 The arrest in France of a group that included seven
Tunisians suspected of planning bombings in Paris in
March 1987 (Shahin 1997:97;99). Possible links with
Iran were suggested, playing into the hands of the
Tunisian government in its campaign against the MTI

 In July 1987 violent demonstrations organised by the

MTI left eight policemen and a demonstrator injured.
Approximately 200 young people carrying MTI banners
threw petrol bombs and stones. A police car was burnt
out before riot police managed to restore order
(MacDonald 1987)

 On 2 August 1987 bombs exploded injuring 13 people at

Hana Beach, Hannibal Palace, Le Kuriat and Sahara
Beach in Sousse and Monastir. The Tunisian
government implicated the Iranian government (Middle
East Economist Digest 1987). Notwithstanding these
claims, a group calling itself Jihad Islamique, or Islamic
Jihad, claimed responsibility for the attack (Ghiles 1987)
In the aftermath of these developments, the MTI was
implicated in a plot to overthrow the Tunisian government and
replace it with a new government based on the Iranian model.
Subsequently, in August 1987, 99 MTI members were
charged with ‘forming an illegal organisation; plotting
subversive actions with Iran; and attempting to overthrow the
government’. Five of the seven members sentenced to death
were Hamadi Jebali, Ali Laaridhi and Salah Karkar, accused
of organising the violent street protests in July; Fethi
Maatoug, accused of planting bombs in a hotel on 2 August;
and Abdelmajid Mili, charged with direct involvement in the
blasts. Another 69 received sentences ranging from two
years to life imprisonment. These sentences had international
repercussions. For example, in Beirut on 28 September 1987,
Islamic Jihad, a pro-Iranian Lebanese group which was
holding Western hostages, threatened to kill Tunisian
government officials if the death sentences were carried out
(The Globe and Mail 1987).

On 7 November 1987, the retired General Ben Ali, who by

then had become Prime Minister Ben Ali, replaced President
Bourguiba as the head of state due to medical reasons. In an
attempted reconciliation with moderate Islamists, President
Ben Ali introduced measures including:
 The reinstatement and reaffirmation of Islam as the
country’s religion

 The adoption of a more conciliatory attitude towards

what for the first time was considered moderate
Islamism

 Strict legal measures against all types of subversive

activity in the name of Islam (Hermassi 1995:109-110)
On the political level the following concessions were made:
 A general amnesty for MTI members then imprisoned

 The inclusion of the MTI and its secretary-general,

Sheikh Abdelfattah Mourou, in the High Islamic Council,
a consultative body created by the government to deal
with religious matters (Reuters 1988)

 The inclusion of the MTI in the the National Pact, which

brought together all political parties to draft rules of
political participation
  The participation of Islamists in the elections of 2 April
1989 as independents

 The legalisation of an Islamist student organisation

 The legalisation of the publication al-Fajr, an Islamist

newspaper (this legalisation was, however, withdrawn in
January 1991)
The MTI expressed its willingness to adhere to the new party
law of 1988 which prohibited the formation of political parties
on the basis of religion, region or language and changed its
name to Harakat an-Nahda or the Renaissance Movement
(Wright 1988). In essence, an-Nahda hoped to
introduce Shari’a law through participating in the electoral
process, in the same way as other organisations, such as the
FIS, had done in Algeria. Other ideals included ‘distributing
the wealth of the country, transparency, modernising Islam,
and rebuilding an Islamic identity and civilisation in Tunisia
and the world’.

In the elections of April 1989, an-Nahda candidates attracted

tremendous support for the party’s ideals, gaining a position
as the opposition (Carroll 2007). Although an-Nahda’s
application to be a political party had been turned down, its
candidates stood as independents and won 15 per cent of the
total vote, with up to 40 per cent in major cities including
Tunis. However, instead of being admitted to parliament
the an-Nahda independents were arrested on suspicion of
attempting to overthrow the government.

Subsequently, the government introduced harsher measures

against Islamists, including banning Middle Eastern Islamic
clothing, changing the curriculum of Islamic subjects, closing
mosques after prayer and controlling mosques with
government-appointed imams (Shahin 1997:100-101). For
example, on 16 November 1987, 76 people including middle-
ranking police, army and customs officers were arrested in
connection with a plot to assassinate members of the
government. According to Interior Minister Habib Ammar, the
suspects obtained arms from Mohamed Chammam, a leader
of the MTI. Chamman was sentenced in absentia to 20 years
in jail at a mass trial in September. Sayed Ferjani, a Tunis
video-club owner who had been among those arrested, was
believed to have assisted two MTI leaders also sentenced to
flee the country. According to security forces, tear gas bombs
were bought from France with money from Habib Mokni, a
prominent MTI leader living in exile in Paris (Dick 1987).

During the government crackdown:

 On 16 April 1988 Fatah Deputy Commander Khalil al-
Wazir, alias Abu Jihad, was assassinated in Tunis (the
PLO in Tunisia had previously been targeted in October
1985) (Dick 1988)

 On 17 February 1991 the office of the Rassemblement

Constitutionnel Democratique in Bab Souika was
attacked and one guard was killed

 On 21 May 1991 a court in Tunis sentenced eight of the

accused in the Rassemblement Constitutionnel
Democratique attack to life imprisonment and 19 others
to between two and 20 years in jail (Reuters 1991)

 In May 1991 the interior ministry announced the

discovery of a plot initiated by an-Nahda to overthrow
the government. Subsequently 300 suspects were
arrested, including some 100 senior military officers.
According to prosecutors, the officers had met in the
region of Hammamet, 60 km south of Tunis, on 6
January to plot their coup. Among other targets, they
 planned to seize the defence and interior ministries, take
over radio and television stations and take over the
security force barracks around the capital before
occupying the presidential palace (Reuters 1991a)

 In August 1992 a plot to assassinate President Ben Ali

by a suicide attack was uncovered. There was a later
indication that the plot had a transnational dimension
after Italian police intercepted a letter written in 1993
while he was in custody by Mondher Ben Mohsen
Baazaoui, alias Hamza the Tunisian. Baazaoui, a
member of an-Nahda and also a Bosnian Mujahideen,
had written to Imam Mohamed Saidani in Bologna, who
in turn knew Anwar Shaaban of the European Shura
council and Osama bin Laden (Kohlmann 2004:76)
In summary, while an-Nahda presented itself as a non-violent
political party, it was implicated in clashes with security
forces, sporadic violence against government institutions and
plotting the violent overthrow of the government and replacing
it with an Islamic state. While neighbouring Algeria was
experiencing similar but more extensive activities, it was to be
expected that Tunisia feared a similar path. In reaction,
President Ben Ali declared an-Nahda illegal and jailed its
leaders and many of its adherents. Although they had
attracted support, the Tunisian Islamists, in contrast to their
counterparts in Algeria, had underestimated the strength of
the country’s government and overestimated their own
strength.

Subsequently, a proactive anti-terrorist policy effectively

safeguarded Tunisia from Islamist extremism until 2002.
However, in spite of a rigid anti-terrorism campaign a number
of Tunisians along with other North Africans became involved
in transnational terrorism. Some examples:
  The identification of Fakhit, a Tunisian, as the
mastermind of the Madrid train bombings

 Tarek Maaroufi, a Tunisian headed the GSPC’s network

in Belgium.

 In Afghanistan the assassination of General Ahmad

Shah Mas’ud, an anti-Taliban Afghan leader, was the
responsibility of two Tunisian suicide bombers – former
residents of Belgium who had disguised themselves as
journalists in order to interview Mas’ud. When they
finally did, they detonated their booby-trapped camera
However, apart from the Tunisian involvement in Algeria, the
majority of suspects involved in transnational terrorism used
European countries as a base.

One of 12 Tunisians captured in Afghanistan and Pakistan

was Nisar Sassi (28), who had been handed over by the US
in 2004 and was subsequently arrested in France. According
to Abdallah al-Hajji, who was handed over to Tunisian
authorities by the US in 2006, Sassi had worked in a fabric
store in Pakistan since 1990. Pakistani authorities had
arrested Al-Hajji in 2003 and had turned him over to the US.
Back in Tunisia, Al-Hajji was being prosecuted for his
suspected affiliation with the Tunisian Islamic Front (FIT).
Earier, in 1995, a Tunisian court had tried Al-Hajji in absentia
and sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment for joining a
terrorist organisation in Pakistan (BBC Monitoring Middle
East 2007dd). The involvement of Tunisian nationals in Iraq
will be discussed in a later chapter.

On 11 April 2002, a Tunisian, Nisar Naouar (24), alias Nisar

Seif Eddin al-Tunisi, drove a truck loaded with cooking gas
cylinders into the El Ghriba synagogue in Djerba, the oldest in
Africa, killing 16, including 11 Germans, one Frenchman and
three Tunisians, and injuring a further 26 Germans. The
Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Sites claimed
responsibility. This group was allegedly connected to al-
Qa’eda and claimed responsibility for the attack in letters to
Arabic newspapers in London. Authorities in Tunisia and
France arrested relatives and friends of Naouar after the
attack, including Belgacem Naouar, his uncle, who was later
prosecuted and convicted in Tunisia. Two accomplices, a
Polish convert to Islam and a Moroccan, were arrested in
Paris (Henley 2002). The attack was also linked to Germany
through a telephone call Naouar had made an hour before
the explosion to Christian G. According to German
authorities, Christian G was a Polish-born German living in
Duisburg, Germany (Financial Times 2002).

The Tunisian Combatant Group, founded in 2000 by Tarek

Maaroufi and Saifallah Ben Hassine, is linked to al-
Qa’eda and other extremist groups in Europe. Some of its
associates are suspected of plotting to attack the US,
Algerian and Tunisian embassies in Rome in December
2001. The group functions mainly as a recruiter for Muslim
fighters and a false document facility. Maaroufi himself was
arrested and charged by Belgian authorities with providing
assistance to the assassins of Ahmad Shah Mas’ud, an
Afghan rebel leader and ally of the US, by giving them stolen
passports and fake visas (AFP 2002a).

The Zarzis group is named after the town Zarzis in southern

Tunisia close to the Libyan border, from where members of
the group originated. In April 2004, a Tunis court sentenced
six suspects, mainly high school and university students and
identified as Hamza Mahroug, Abdelghaffar Guisa, Aymen
Mcharek, Omar Rachedun, Omar Farouk Chalendi, and a
teacher, Ridha Haj Brahim, to jail terms totalling 19 years and
three months for their roles in a defused terror plot. The
group’s suspected leader, Tahar Guemair, who was believed
to be in Sweden, and another suspect, Ayoub Sfaxi, said to
be living in France, received sentence in absentia totalling 26
years and three months.

Under questioning, members of the group, also known as the

Prophet Brigades, acknowledged having prepared attacks in
and around Zarzis. One attack was planned to target a port
security official using a rocket launcher. The group also used
the internet to get access to instructions on how to construct
explosive devices. According to Tunisian officials, several
accomplices left Tunisia in 2002 to establish links with al-
Qa’eda (Dow Jones International News 2004a). A week after
the previous trial, the Tunis court sentenced Abderrazak
Bourguiba (18) to 25 months in prison for terrorist activities
(Ben Bouazza 2004). Three months later the appeal court
reduced the longer jail sentences to 13 years as the state had
failed to show evidence of the materials and equipment used
to prepare explosives. However, the men confessed to having
planned the attack (Reuters 2004a). In February 2006 the
Tunisian government released members of the Zarzis group
as part of a mass pardon to mark the 50th anniversary of the
country’s independence from France (AP 2006).
Tunisian Nationals linked to GSPC/AQLIM in Algeria

The GSPC operated in the Tebessa region along the

Tunisian border, an area also used to train Tunisian
extremists. On the Tunisian side of the border, the Kasserine
region proved to be a centre of activities that included
attacks, as well as cross-border smuggling networks involving
both Algerians and Tunisians. During 2001 it was estimated
that approximately 200 Tunisian extremists linked to the
Ennahda group led by Rached El Ghannouchi, in exile in
London, had been trained by GSPC members in the region
(AFP 2001a).
The border area with Tunisia had remained active since the
start of the conflict in Algeria. For example, on 25 October
2001 a group of terrorists suspected of being associated with
the GSPC attacked a border post near Oum Ali in the
Kasserine region close to the Algerian border. Three soldiers
were killed when two explosive devices were detonated.
While only Algerians had been implicated in previous attacks,
this attack indicated the involvement of Tunisians as two of
the bombs that were defused had been constructed with gas
bottles from Tunisia (BBC Monitoring Middle East 2001).
Again on 28 October 2001, three Tunisian soldiers were killed
and several others were injured when their truck hit a home-
made bomb at Oum Ali (AFP 2001a). The Kasserine region
again attracted attention in early November 2002 when
Tunisian security forces seized 200 kg of explosives and
ammunition. As part of a weapons trafficking network active
between Algeria and Tunisia, seven people were arrested but
three managed to get away including two Algerians. This
Algerian-Tunisian network was previously implicated in the
trafficking of red mercury and the printing of counterfeit
banknotes (BBC Monitoring Middle East 2002).

However, security cooperation between Algeria and Tunisia is

well established. Cooperation was initiated in 1991 when the
Tunisian authorities allowed Algerian special forces to search
for Emir Djaffer al-Afghani’s GIA group inside Tunisia (Emir
Djaffer al-Afghani was later killed in March 1994 in
Bouzerea). The cooperation was still in place when
Abderezak El Para’s group attacked a Tunisian border post,
killing two Tunisian soldiers, in May 2000. Algeria was
interested in the GSPC’s Tunisian connections, as was
confirmed in the matter involving Busto Arsisio, when four
Tunisian logistics experts claimed to be working on behalf of
the GSPC were arrested in 2002. Algeria in turn did not stand
in the way of Tunisia when in 2001 it expelled the FIT’s Zaid
Bachir, who had tried to join the GSPC in the east of Algeria
(BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2005e).

A number of Tunisians were killed or arrested in Algeria on

suspicion of attempting to join the GSPC. For example, in
November 2001 Algerian security forces killed seven armed
extremists, two of them Tunisians and one  Mauritanian, in
the Zbarbar Mountains near Bouira, 120 km southeast of
Algiers (AFP 2001a). In another example, Algerian security
forces arrested six Tunisians in Annaba in March 2005 for
attempting to join the GSPC. The Tunisian government
suspected that the six may have been part of a regional al-
Qa’eda network planning attacks on Western targets in
Tunisia. The eldest was 28 and had already received training
in the Meftah Mountains. The discovery of home-made
explosive devices further supported the suspicion that those
arrested were preparing a large-scale attack against Western
interests in Tunis or other Tunisian resorts. The security
forces also found satellite images accessed through Google
Earth of both the British High Commission and the US
embassy, as well as the names of diplomats representing
both countries (AFP 2007l).

Islamist extremism in Tunisia proved to be better organised

than the Tunisian agencies suspected (BBC Monitoring
Middle East 2005e). Algerian security forces also claimed on
25 April 2005 to have arrested 24 terrorist suspects, among
them four Tunisians, en route to a meeting with GSPC
militants close to Algiers (De Bendern 2005). In August 2005
five Tunisians were arrested after they had received
paramilitary training in the Ain Barbar region and were about
to rejoin one of the small GSPC groups active in the Edough
Mountains (BBC Monitoring Middle East 2005f).

In October 2006 the Tunisian authorities also charged

Hichem Essadi, a medical student, on suspicion of belonging
to the GSPC and attempting to participate in the insurgency
in Iraq. Essadi had already been serving three years’
imprisonment for attempting to join the insurgency in Iraq
before he was freed in terms of the February 2006 amnesty
(Reuters 2006b).

Jumping to 2007, in January, Zied Ghodhbane, a Tunisian,

was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment in Tunisia after he
had been arrested in Algeria in May 2005. The court also
sentenced two other unidentified Tunisians to two years in
prison in the same case. One was convicted on a charge of
financing Ghodhbane’s trip to Algeria and the other for
attempting to join a terrorist organisation (AP 2007f).

During 2007, after the alignment of the GSPC with al-Qa’eda,

the involvement of Tunisians again received attention. In
March 2007, for example, 14 Tunisians aged between 20 and
25 were convicted in Tunisia for having links with the GSPC
in Algeria. Seven had been arrested in Algeria before being
handed over to Tunisian authorities in April 2005, while the
others were accused of planning to travel to Algeria to
prepare for jihad in Iraq. Among them were Ghaith
Ghazouani, Mahar Bezyouch and Mohammed Amine Aoun,
each of whom was sentenced to ten years in prison (AFP
2007k).

In April 2007 a further five Tunisians, including Mohamed

Moncef Baghdadi, a computer expert, were convicted in two
separate cases. In the first, Baghdadi was found guilty of
raising funds to send new recruits to the GSPC. In the
second, he was convicted for training in explosives – skills he
planned to use in Iraq. Baghdadi received sentences totalling
26 years’ imprisonment. In the first case an additional two
suspects were sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment each,
while another person was sentenced to 16 years’
imprisonment in the second case (Dow Jones International
News 2007i). A fifth accused, Mehdi Mabrouk, a student, was
sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for planning to join
the insurgency in Iraq (AP 2005g).

On 1 August 2007 six foreigners – three Tunisians, two

Libyans and one Moroccan – were killed in a large-scale
security operation in the Bir El-Ater Mountain in the province
of Tebessa. It was officially estimated that some 70 terrorists
were operational in the Bir El-Ater region (BBC Monitoring
Middle East 2007de). Several attacks were also directed
against members of the security forces in the Tebessa area.
For example, on 17 March 2007 a home-made explosive
device in Tebessa seriously injured an officer of the ANP. The
incident occurred during a search operation in the
mountainous Doukhane chain, in Djebel Anwel (BBC
Monitoring Middle East 2007df).

Algeria and Tunisia have strengthened their joint border

surveillance, using electronic sensors and drones. This
heightened security aims to improve the monitoring of the
covert terrorist withdrawals across both sides of the border.

In addition to the involvement of Tunisians in Algeria,

Tunisian security officials uncovered Algerian involvements in
threats to its security on 23 December 2006 and 3 January
2007. The first incident was near the forested area of
Solimane at Hammam-Lif, 25 km south of Tunis. In an
exchange of gunfire between Tunisian security officials and a
group of extremists, one soldier, one policeman and 14 of the
suspects were killed and a further 15 suspects were arrested
(Reuters 2007). Six of the group were believed to have come
from Algeria. The head of the group, Lassaad Sassi, a former
Tunisian policeman, was killed. Originally from Bir el-Bey,
near Hammam-Lif, Sassi had apparently spent time in
Afghanistan and Italy where he headed a cell in Milan before
travelling to Algeria. The Milan cell was believed to be
providing military clothing and money to the GSPC and
financing and planning suicide bomb attacks in Italy.
According to Tunisian security forces, Sassi and five other
men – four Tunisians and one Mauritanian – had crossed the
border from Algeria to organise a terrorist cell in Tunisia
(Smith 2007). They had established a training camp in
mountains in Djebel Ressass and Boukornine, south of the
capital.

In a follow-up engagement on 3 January 2007 Lassaad

Sassi’s deputy, Bacha, was killed in Solimane, a small town
near Nabeul, 40 km south of Tunis (BBC Monitoring Middle
East 2007dg). The terrorists had apparently planned to split
into two groups, targeting Hammam-Chott in the southern
suburb of Tunis, and Grombalia on the road to Cap Bon
(Maghreb Confidential 2007).

In November 2007 charges including plotting an attack

against the security of the state, attempted aggression aimed
at overturning the regime and inciting the population to kill
one another were brought against 30 suspected Islamist
extremists, reportedly belonging to a group called Soldiers of
Assan Ibn Al Fourat, the name of its leader, who had been
involved in clashes with security forces in December and
January. The suspects had been arrested after police had
launched an attack against the group in the town of Soliman,
40 km south of the capital. Zouhair Jridi was charged with
failing to provide information to security forces about planned
acts of terrorism and an attack on Ain Tbornok, more than 30
km outside Tunis (AP 2007i).

On an Islamist website, the Youth of Tawhid and Jihad in

Tunisia declared a jihad on President Ben Ali, accusing him
of harming Muslims in general and Muslim women in
particular – a reference to a recent campaign against the
wearing of head scarves (AP 2007(h) and BBC Monitoring
Middle East, 2007dh). Tunisia and other Muslim countries
striving to enhance women rights have been confronted by
extremist organisations that consider these practices ‘un-
Islamic’. In countering any additional threat, Tunisian
authorities decided to ban all Algerian males under 30 years
of age from entering the country (Guitta 2007).

On 18 February 2007, 14 Tunisians were tried on charges of

joining a terrorist organisation and receiving military training
outside Tunisia. Although a few denied these accusations, a
number of the accused admitted to have travelled to Algeria
in order to receive military training ahead of joining the
resistance in Iraq. Seven of the accused had been arrested in
Algeria two years previously and had been handed over to
Tunisia (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2007di).
Conclusion

Tunisia’s domestic and international circumstances were

similar to those of Algeria and Morocco. However, until
President Ben Ali took over in November 1987, Tunisia’s
political development was remarkably different from that of
the other two countries in this North African region. Although
the MTI in Tunisia could be described as one of the more
developed parties in the region – in addition to the FIS in
Algeria – subsequent developments influenced a different
outcome.

President Ben Ali’s dual strategy was to address both the

current and the potential threats. In addition to arresting those
implicated in terrorism, his government embarked on a
programme to address the country’s socio-economic needs.

Its closed political scenario has had the greatest influence on

developments in Tunisia. Whereas in Morocco the prime
factor for the increase in unrest has been socio-economic, in
Tunisia the inability of the younger generation to participate in
the country’s political life has been the main concern. The
growth of radicalisation, especially among university students,
has often been on an individual basis rather than through
underground organisations. The involvement of Tunisians in
transnational terrorism operations in Europe, Iraq and Algeria
also manifest an apparent inability and lack in support to
direct its operations to Tunisia.

More than six years after the revolution that ousted

former president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisia’s
border regions remain hotbeds of social discontent and
agitation. Aggrieved youth increasingly express their
anger through fiery protests, street violence, and in
some cases violent extremism. In response to this
ongoing social unrest and terrorism, the Tunisian
government has developed hardline security policies,
whose effects often exacerbate social tensions, political
violence, and militancy. Breaking this vicious cycle
requires Tunisia’s government to rethink its approach to
the border regions.
THE STATE OF TUNISIA’S FRAGILE BORDERS
 Many youth in Tunisia’s border regions
have lost confidence in the democratic
transition and have developed feelings of
 deep frustration, anger, and hostility
toward state authority.
 Years of protests are hardening into
demands for a new social contract that
would produce a more equitable
redistribution of state resources as well as
a transparent and inclusive process to
manage Tunisia’s natural resources.
 The state’s inability or unwillingness to
reform its modes of governance—as well
as its tendency to attack and stigmatize
protesters as troublemakers, smugglers
and terrorists—has contributed to the
growing politicization and radicalization
of youth.
 The prolonged disconnect between the state
and Tunisia’s marginalized regions is
dangerous, threatening to plunge the
country into violence that could see the
country slide back into repressive
authoritarianism.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TUNISIAN
AUTHORITIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY
 Acknowledge the border regions’ decades-
long experiences of socioeconomic
discrimination and political abuse and
validate their historical figures, symbols,
and contributions to Tunisia. If
accompanied by a genuine regional
 development program, such gestures can
contribute to reconciliation between the
aggrieved periphery and the dominant
eastern Mediterranean coast.
 Support strategies that increase agricultural
competitiveness, reform landownership,
and improve the management of natural
resources. The investment of a fair portion
of the profits from local resources into
local projects can improve the livelihoods
of local communities.
 Reform the internal security apparatus and
criminal justice sector, and design
rehabilitation and reintegration programs
for the hundreds of Tunisian fighters
returning from foreign theaters of conflict.
 Support and empower the work of the
National Authority for the Fight Against
Corruption (INLUCC) and the Truth and
Dignity Commission. Reducing
corruption, restoring justice, and
providing compensation to victims of
repression will bolster lasting and
sustainable stability.

INTRODUCTION

Anouar Boukhars
Boukhars is a nonresident fellow in Carnegie’s Middle East Program. He is a professor of
countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies,
National Defense University.
 Social inequality and regional asymmetries are
deepening the chasm between Tunisia’s restless
periphery and its eastern Mediterranean coast, with the
potential to undermine the country’s democratic
transition. Tunisian coastal elites fear and
misunderstand the bitter resentment in the border
communities, making it harder to secure the country
from continuing terrorist threats. The violent extremist
groups based in these communities feed on a deep well
of disillusionment with the democratic transition and
prey on the growing sense of emasculation,
disempowerment, and helplessness among Tunisian
youth. The Tunisian government’s narrow focus on
combating extremist ideology is distracting from
addressing the real drivers of radicalization. Studies
show that the lure of violent extremist groups, such as
the self-proclaimed Islamic State, has more to do with
the promise of empowerment and restored dignity than
with ideology or religious conviction.1 Since the 2011
revolution, Tunisia has experienced an evolving array of
security threats, particularly along the country’s fragile
borders. This paper will evaluate Tunisia’s security-
based approaches to border control and provide
recommendations for addressing the dangerous divide
between the youth in Tunisia’s border regions and the
state.

DYNAMIC THREAT OF MILITANCY

Since the end of former president Zine el-Abidine Ben

Ali’s authoritarian rule in January 2011, the Tunisian
government has been playing catch up against a
continually shifting terror threat. The Tunisian
revolution greatly disrupted the security landscape,
initially marked by political disorientation andregional
upheaval. The postrevolutionary period provided
disparate Salafi groups with a sudden opportunity to
sow the seeds of another revolutionary movement in the
soil of poor neighborhoods and allowed them to take
advantage of the widespread disillusionment among the
youth, particularly in the border regions. Salafists of
every stripe came to the fore, but it was the so-called
Salafi jihadists who most took advantage of the political
transition. Powered by the release of hundreds of
Salafists from prison and the return of several
prominent sheikhs to Tunisia from their sanctuaries in
Western Europe, they began spreading their roots in the
poor and marginalized areas where state authority was
lacking.2
One of the challenges that faced the Salafists was how to
transform the heterogeneous Salafi-jihadi networks into
a fixed structure with a central authority and identified
leadership. Many radical Salafists coalesced around the
hardline group Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST),
founded in late April 2011 by former prisoner Seifallah
Ben Hassine, known as Abu Ayadh. Abu Ayadh
prioritized central control over the growth of Salafi
jihadism, fearing counterproductive actions might hurt
the movement.3 These concerns were quickly realized
when the movement became mired in controversies over
vigilante violence against art shows, mausoleums, and
liquor stores.4 Despite claims by Abu Ayadh that Tunisia
was no longer a land of jihad, Salafi proselytizing and
violent discourse became increasingly combative toward
other Tunisians whose lifestyles the Salafists rejected.
The rise of this violence reached its culmination in
September 2012 when raging mobs set fire to the U.S.
embassy and the American Cooperative School of Tunis.
Salafi vigilantism proved destructive to the movement as
Tunisia’s main Islamist party, Ennahda, which led a
governing coalition from October 2011 to January 2014,
hardened its security approach, targeting AST’s
structures, grassroots organizations, and social
activities. The tougher approach prompted the Salafi
jihadists to shift their focus away from aggressive,
sometimes violent, proselytizing to directly challenging
state authority and attacking its key institutions. By
doing so, the Salafi jihadists hoped to weaken the
credibility of the state security forces by proving to
disgruntled Tunisians that their government was unable
to stop the Salafi-jihadi attacks.
This attrition strategy escalated in 2013, with a vicious
cycle of provocation, retaliation, and
repression. Tunisia’s then prime minister, an Islamist
named Ali Larayedh, blamed AST militants for the
assassinations of two Tunisian political figures and the
killings of several members of the security
forces.5 Nationwide reprisal operations against
suspected militants’ hideouts and safe houses revealed
weapon caches for future attacks. In the midst of this
escalating war between the state and AST, small and
violent militant groups connected to al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) were upping the ante in the
western regions bordering Algeria. After the
classification of AST as a terrorist organization in August
2013 and the resultant massive security crackdown on
the movement and its sympathizers, groups such as the
Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade (an AQIM affiliate) positioned
themselves as a rampart against the state’s policy of
criminalization of Salafism and suppression of dissent.
They did this especially in the most disenfranchised
neighborhoods and regions of the country.
The defeat of AST accelerated the fragmentation of the
Tunisian militant landscape. Under the assault of state
forces, AST ceased to exist by late 2014. This left behind
an ideological void and a large, disgruntled constituency,
whose members either went dormant, operated
underground by integrating smuggling networks and
building social linkages in Ben Guerdane close to the
border with Libya, or joined the Syrian or Libyan
theaters of war.6 Other Salafists continued the fight
against the government’s “tyranny” by linking up with
the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade near the Algerian border.
The Tunisian government must adopt a new approach that analyzes the risks of militancy in
the political, social, and economic context in which they occur.

Up until AST’s defeat, the focus of the Salafi-jihadi

movement was on destabilizing state institutions while
mobilizing the legions of Tunisians dissatisfied with the
democratic transition. The failure of this political
strategy led to a dramatic shift in approach that
embraced hitting civilian as well as military targets. 7 This
new strategy was amplified by the deepening reach of
the Islamic State franchise into Libya. In 2015 alone,
three major attacks in Tunisia were claimed by the
Islamic State—at the Bardo National Museum in the
capital of Tunis (twenty-two deaths), a beach resort at
Sousse (thirty-eight deaths), and on a
Tunisian presidential guard bus in downtown Tunis
(twelve deaths). And in March 2016, dozens of Islamic
State–trained sleeper cells staged a dramatic assault on
Tunisian security forces in Ben Guerdane.
 The Tunisian security forces successfully repelled this
attempt to seize Ben Guerdane and to inflame a
rebellious populace into open revolt. However, the scale
of the attempt and the collusion of some Ben Guerdane
residents illustrate that militant groups have the
potential to expand in Tunisia’s border regions. Such an
evolution requires the Tunisian government to adopt a
new approach that is not limited to law enforcement and
military actions. The key is to analyze the risks of
militancy in the political, social, and economic context in
which they occur. In Tunisia, socioeconomic triggers
(alienation, discrimination, and stigmatization) and
regional asymmetries are important predictors of youth
violence and radicalization, particularly in the border
regions.8

UNDERPINNINGS OF RADICALIZATION

The current government’s approach to terrorism has the

potential to fuel further radicalization.
President Beji Caid Essebsi likes to dismiss violent
militancy as something induced by alien fanatic
barbarism.9 Such an ideology-focused approach ignores
the underlying drivers of militancy. It also limits the
government’s ability to assess the threat in a systematic
way. Government actions that ignore the social,
economic, and regional underpinnings of militancy will
influence the trajectories of terrorism in Tunisia.10
A dispassionate assessment of Tunisia’s problem with
militancy points more toward socioeconomic and
regional factors than it does to religious
fundamentalism. The rare sociological studies
conducted on militancy in Tunisia show that the young
Tunisians most sympathetic to AST hailed from the
poorest neighborhoods and were the least religiously
observant.11 Aggrieved youth sympathize with jihadists
because they tend to share the same underprivileged
socioeconomic backgrounds and inhabit the same
blighted neighborhoods.12
Radical ideologies might be influenced by regional
context and geopolitical grievances, but they are an
expression of their local environs. This is especially true
for the latest generation of Tunisian militants who were
not around for the first wave of battles in Afghanistan in
the 1980s and were too young for the second round of
major fights, which began after the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks in the United States and intensified with
the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. This third generation of
militants, who came of age with the 2010–2011 Tunisian
revolution, is best exemplified by the perpetrators of the
dramatic terrorist attacks that hit Tunisia in 2015. They
were born in the 1990s, had a taste of repressive
authoritarianism, and then stumbled into the politics of
revolt that put an end to the repressive rule of Ben Ali.
They were disappointed by the inability of the
postrevolutionary government to deliver for them, and
the revolutionary thrill quickly gave way to the embrace
of Salafi jihadism as the primary vehicle of resistance. 13
SUMMARY

Sharan Grewal

Sharan Grewal is a PhD candidate at Princeton University.

Alongside Tunisia’s political revolution has been the

beginning of a transition in its civil-military relations.
Marginalized for decades under former president Habib
Bourguiba and especially under the police state of
former president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, the military
after the 2011 revolution has begun to see its fortunes
reverse. The political transition has produced changes in
five aspects of civil-military relations:
 Management of the military has
transitioned from the personalized rule of
previous autocrats to more decentralized
channels.
 
 The changing face of Tunisia’s political

leadership has spelled the end of

privileging officers from the wealthy
coastal regions from which Bourguiba and
Ben Ali hailed.
 
 Tunisia’s grave security threats have forced

postrevolution governments to enhance

the military’s budget, weapons,
international linkages, institutional
capacity, and political influence.
 
 Ex-military officers have enjoyed more

transitional justice than other Tunisians.

 
  Retired officers have become active
members of Tunisia’s robust civil society,
providing the military with a new lobby to
advance its interests.
As of 2016, the increase in the military’s strength
appears to be a healthy phenomenon for Tunisia’s young
democracy, considering the security challenges and the
lack of military expertise among the country’s civilian
leaders. After the military was sidelined in Ben Ali’s
police state, these developments seem aimed at
correcting the historical imbalance. However, Western
governments and other domestic and international
actors should be attentive to encouraging the military’s
growth in line with democratic principles.

INTRODUCTION

Considered the one success story of the Arab Spring,

Tunisia has managed to steer its rocky political
transition toward democracy. When the transition
appeared to be on the verge of collapse in the summer of
2013, political forces pulled together, producing a
constitution by near consensus and a second peaceful
election and transition of power.
Among the most commonly cited reasons for the relative
success of Tunisia’s transition is the nature of its
military. The Tunisian armed forces are the smallest in
the Arab world, numbering only 40,500 active duty
personnel in a population of nearly 11 million. They have
fought in no major wars, largely remaining (in the words
of one retired officer, “imprisoned”1) in the barracks.
 Underfunded, underequipped, and sidelined from
political and economic power under former presidents
Habib Bourguiba and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, the
military as an institution never developed deep
corporate interests that would tie it to the fate of
Tunisia’s autocratic rulers. This lack of vested interests
allowed it to quickly move beyond Ben Ali following his
ouster in January 2011 and then stand much more
removed from domestic political developments than
other militaries in the region.
While much ink has been spilled about how the nature of
the Tunisian military has affected the revolution and
subsequent transition,2 little has been written about how
the transition has affected the military. Behind the
scenes, there have been significant changes in civil-
military relations, potentially spelling a gradual
restructuring of the polity away from Ben Ali’s police
state and toward one in which the various security
apparatuses are more evenly balanced.

A HISTORY OF MARGINALIZATION

Unlike in neighboring countries, the army in Tunisia has

historically been weak militarily and politically.
Tunisia’s first president, Habib Bourguiba, having
witnessed the wave of postindependence coups
peppering the region in the 1950s, sought to deprive the
Tunisian military of the capacity to carry out a coup.
Bourguiba’s task was made easier by the fact that the
Tunisian armed forces were established after
independence: there was no national army to inherit
from the colonial era, as there had been in
Egypt.3 Relatedly, Tunisian troops had played only a
minor role in the nationalist movement and were thus
deprived of the legitimacy to govern that the military in
Algeria, for instance, had gained through its role in the
war for independence from France. When Bourguiba
created the Tunisian armed forces on June 30, 1956,
combining 850 men from the Beylical Guard, 1,500 from
the French army, and 3,000 conscripts, he was able to
keep the military small and removed from political
power.
After a brief skirmish with France in the Battle of Bizerte
in 1961, and a failed coup attempt the following year by
officers loyal to Bourguiba’s political rival Salah Ben
Youssef, the military remained confined to the barracks
and relatively aloof from politics. Over the next two
decades, Bourguiba also had other priorities, spending
40 to 50 percent of the budget on education and social
services, leaving few resources for the military.
Bourguiba preferred to ensure Tunisia’s security through
alliances and diplomacy rather than war.
Beyond underfunding, Bourguiba also pursued a series
of other measures designed to prevent a coup. He placed
the Tunisian National Guard, a paramilitary force
typically housed in the Ministry of Defense, in the
Ministry of the Interior to undermine collusion between
the national guard and the military. He also prohibited
military officers and soldiers from voting or joining
political parties in order to lessen their interest in
politics. Finally, he promoted loyal officers to command
the armed forces. In 1956, Bourguiba instructed his Neo-
Destour Party to conduct background checks on the first
cohort of Tunisian officers sent to the French military
academy Saint-Cyr.4 Officers from this one vetted cohort
—self-styled the Bourguiba promotion—would go on to
occupy the top military posts for the next three decades,
ensuring the military’s loyalty to the regime. 5
However, growing internal and external threats forced
Bourguiba to change course and strengthen the armed
forces in the late 1970s and 1980s. A nationwide general
strike by the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) in
1978, a Libyan-backed insurgency in the interior town of
Gafsa in 1980, and large-scale bread riots in 1983–1984
overwhelmed the police and national guard, which
“shocked Bourguiba out of his complacency and obliged
him to reconsider the . . . modernization of the armed
forces,” wrote L. B. Ware, the foremost scholar on the
Tunisian military.6 Military spending quadrupled and
arms imports—especially from the United States—
skyrocketed during this period (see figures 1 and 2).
 

As Bourguiba became increasingly reliant on the military

for security, military officers began to assume a larger
political role. Brigadier General Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali,
a member of the aforementioned Bourguiba promotion
who had created the Directorate of Military Security in
1964,7 was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior in
1977 as director general of national security. He then
began to climb the civilian ranks, beginning as the
ambassador to Poland in 1980, secretary of state for
national security in 1984, interior minister in 1986, and
finally prime minister a year later. In 1984, Ben Ali’s
classmate, military Colonel Habib Ammar, also assumed
control of the 6,000-strong national guard in the
Ministry of the Interior.
In the end, it seems the ailing Bourguiba had been right
to be wary of appointing military officers to such high
nonmilitary positions:8 on November 7, 1987, Ben Ali
deposed Bourguiba in a soft coup.9 With Habib Ammar’s
national guard surrounding the presidential palace,
doctors assembled by Ben Ali declared Bourguiba
 medically unfit to govern.10 Bourguiba remained under
house arrest until his death in April 2000.

THE MILITARY UNDER BEN ALI

The ascendance of a military officer to the presidency

raised expectations among members of the officer corps
that their time had finally come. Within weeks of taking
office, Ben Ali elevated four officers to the rank of
general and then rebranded Bourguiba’s National
Defense Council into a National Security Council (NSC)
that now included two military officers: the chief of staff
of the armed forces and the director general of military
security.11 Moreover, while Bourguiba’s council had been
explicitly consultative, Ben Ali’s NSC was legally
mandated to meet weekly and tasked with “collecting,
studying, analyzing, and evaluating information related
to domestic, foreign, and defense policies with the aim of
safeguarding internal and external state security.”12
Senior officers then began to fill the ranks of
traditionally civilian posts. Ben Ali appointed Habib
Ammar as minister of the interior in 1987, Abdelhamid
Escheikh as minister of foreign affairs in 1988 and then
of the interior in 1990, Mustapha Bouaziz as minister of
justice in 1989 and then of state domains in 1990, Ali
Seriati as director general of national security in 1991,
and a number of other military officers to top security
posts. These appointments meant that military officers
in the late 1980s held a majority in the NSC, and a
dominant voice in policymaking. As L. B. Ware wrote at
the time, “the military now enjoys a higher degree of
visibility and influence than ever before.”13
Yet these moves did not go unnoticed by the military’s
institutional rivals: the ruling party (renamed the
Constitutional Democratic Rally) and the
police.14 Threatened by the military’s rise, they concocted
a plan to play on Ben Ali’s paranoia and undercut both
the military and the most threatening opposition actor,
the Islamist group Ennahdha, in one fell swoop. In May
1991, the Ministry of the Interior announced the
discovery of a coup plot between the military and
Ennahdha. Airing the testimony—extracted under
torture—of Captain Ahmed Amara on live television,
then interior minister Abdullah al-Qallal accused
elements of the military of meeting with Ennahdha
leaders in the coastal town of Barraket Essahel. In what
became known as the Barraket Essahel affair, the
Interior Ministry proceeded to round up, torture, and
remove from the military some 244 officers,
noncommissioned officers, and soldiers, including three
of the six assistants to the army chief of staff.
While officials involved in the investigation now admit
that there was neither a meeting at Barraket Essahel nor
any coup plot,15 Ben Ali’s trust in the military had been
shaken. He immediately forced those officers he had
previously named ministers into retirement or out of the
country as ambassadors. For the rest of Ben Ali’s rule,
members of the military would not receive a single
civilian or security post. At the same time, Ben Ali
neglected the armed forces materially, lavishing new
weapons and higher salaries instead on the Ministry of
the Interior. The budget of the Interior Ministry, which
was smaller than that of the Defense Ministry for most
of Bourguiba’s reign, jumped to 165 percent of the
defense budget in 1992 and remained near that level for
the next two decades. Tunisia had become a police
state.16
“Bourguiba did not like the army, but he respected it,”
claimed former chief of staff of the armed forces General
Said el-Kateb. “The military under Bourguiba were
treated better than the police, as far as budget,
equipment, and training. Under Ben Ali, the budget
allocated to the police was higher than the military’s; the
number of police officers increased dramatically. We
could feel our marginalization.”17
Ben Ali simultaneously tightened his control over the
military, moving toward a system of personalized rule
over the armed forces. After General el-Kateb retired in
1991, Ben Ali refused to appoint a new chief of staff of
the armed forces, depriving the military of its most
senior position and leaving it without a general to
coordinate the army, navy, and air force. Ben Ali instead
took on this role himself, making most decisions about
the military on his own and calling upon the NSC only
after rare natural disasters. As a retired major colonel
observed:18 “Ben Ali worked directly with the military as
if he was the minister of defense! We [senior officers]
often sent reports directly to [the presidential palace in]
Carthage. This was the old system. It was a personal
rule, not a rule by the state.”19
Another aspect of this personalized system was
appointing to the top of the armed forces officers that
Ben Ali either knew from his time in the military or
through personal connections. At first this meant his
classmates from the Bourguiba promotion. Afterwards,
given the nature of personal networks, Ben Ali appeared
to privilege officers from Tunis and from the Sahel—the
region on the eastern coast including Sousse, Monastir,
and Mahdia from which Bourguiba and Ben Ali both
hailed. These areas amounted to just 24 percent of
Tunisia’s population yet claimed nearly 40 percent of the
officers promoted to the Supreme Council of the Armies
under Ben Ali.20
Citing Rachid Ammar (army chief of staff from 2002 to
2013, hailing from the Sahel) as a paradigmatic example
of connections trumping merit, retired Major Colonel
Mohamed Ahmed observed: “If you are from Kairouan,
Gafsa, or Kef, you are just an average officer. But if you
are from the Sahel, you have a big chance of being
promoted more quickly.”21 Another retired army major
colonel suggested that when two officers of equal merit
were under consideration for promotion, the post would
be given to the one from the Sahel.22 A former director
general of military security, who wielded veto power
over promotions, also confirmed that while the majority
of soldiers and junior officers were from the interior
regions, the majority of senior officers hailed from the
coast.23
Beyond promotions, officers in the leadership’s favor
also received more desirable posts as military attachés
abroad. While those with connections were sent to Paris
or Washington, those disliked by Ben Ali or the top
generals were punished with assignments in Libya or
Egypt, with whom Tunisia had little military
cooperation.
Underpaid, underequipped, and deprived of political
influence, the bulk of the officer corps resented Ben Ali
and felt betrayed by those generals who benefited from
the system. When a popular uprising began in December
2010 and eventually ousted Ben Ali, the majority of the
officer corps felt no remorse.
 Those at the very top who owed their positions to Ben
Ali’s favoritism, however, like army chief of staff Rachid
Ammar, remained loyal until the end. While General
Ammar was widely rumored to have refused Ben Ali’s
order to fire upon civilians during the uprising, military
officers categorically denied this rumor, explaining that
Ben Ali never issued an order to fire upon civilians.24 By
contrast, a former minister of defense revealed that at 3
p.m. on January 14, 2011, just hours before Ben Ali fled
to Saudi Arabia, the president asked Rachid Ammar to
take over the operations room of the Interior Ministry,
an order with which Ammar complied.25

THE RISE OF RACHID AMMAR

The rumor that General Rachid Ammar refused the

order to fire on protesters made him hugely popular
among the Tunisian people. That reputation, coupled
with the visible role the military played to ensure
security immediately after the revolution, made him,
according to the New York Times, “the most powerful
and the most popular figure in Tunisia” in the wake of
Ben Ali’s ouster.26 Seeking to use his popularity, the
interim government asked him on January 24 to
disperse the remaining protesters. At the Kasbah, in
what seemed more like a campaign rally than a call to
disperse, he declared that “the army will protect the
revolution,” fueling speculation that he sought a political
role.
However, there was no need to assume an official
political position: for all intents and purposes, Rachid
Ammar had become the center of power. “All
governmental institutions were protected by the
military,” explained Fathi Jerbi, vice president of the
Wafa Movement. “For any problem, everyone would
refer to Rachid Ammar. He was governing the country.” 27
“The army was very well-positioned,” added a retired
brigadier general. “Most of the politicians from the
period of Ben Ali had gone; Rachid Ammar was the only
figure that knew how to run the government. And at the
time, the problems were security matters: how to
confront the deteriorating situation in the south, what to
do with Libyan refugees, how to respond to a large strike
or protest. In practice, though not legally, Rachid
Ammar was the man calling the shots.”28
With the police and the former ruling party reeling after
the revolution, Ammar sought to elevate the relative
political position of the military. In February 2011, Army
Brigadier General Ahmed Chabir was appointed the
director general of national security in the Ministry of
the Interior, while Colonel Moncef Helali assumed
command of the National Guard. Major Colonel
Mohamed Abdennaceur Belhaj was later appointed the
director general of customs, which had been civilian-led
throughout the 2000s. The military thus assumed
command of the nation’s top security posts. Likewise,
having held no provincial governorships under Ben Ali
between 1991 and 2010, seven military officers were
appointed as governors in 2011; two other governors
were civilians who had studied alongside officers at the
Tunisian National Defense Institute.
The transitional period brought changes in the military
as well. Most significant was the revival of the position
of chief of staff of the armed forces in April 2011, with
Ammar assuming this role in addition to heading the
 land army. With this move, Ammar acquired near
hegemony over military decisions, and reportedly
consulted with no one. Ammar “had infinite self-
confidence,” claimed retired Major Colonel Mahmoud
Mezoughi, president of the Association of Former
Officers of the National Army. “To him, no one in his
staff understood the situation better than him. So he did
everything by himself.”29 General Mohamed Ali el-Bekri,
who served as inspector general of the armed forces
during this time, noted that Rachid Ammar largely took
over the role of minister of defense as well: “Everybody
knew that the real minister of defense was Rachid
Ammar, and not Mr. Abdelkarim Zbidi.”30
Rachid Ammar now enjoyed much the same personal
control over the military that Ben Ali had before him.
However, this tradition of personal control over military
affairs would soon be challenged by Tunisia’s first
democratically elected government.

FROM PERSONAL TO INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL

Following the 2011 National Constituent Assembly

elections, the Islamist movement Ennahdha formed a
governing coalition with two secular parties, the
Congress for the Republic (CPR) and Ettakatol. In this
troika government, Ennahdha’s Hamadi Jebali became
the prime minister, CPR’s Moncef Marzouki assumed
the role of the presidency, and Ettakatol’s Mustapha Ben
Jaafar headed the assembly. This division of
responsibilities reflected Tunisia’s transition to a
parliamentary system, in which the most powerful
position was the prime minister.
The previous presidential system had facilitated Ben
Ali’s personal control over the military, as the
constitution had granted the president exclusive
responsibility for military matters. However, in the
temporary constitution promulgated by the troika
government at the start of its term in December 2011,
management of the military became a shared
responsibility between the president and the prime
minister. The president was tasked with appointing the
top military positions “in consultation with the prime
minister.”31The 2014 constitution kept this phrasing with
regards to military appointments and defined the
sharing of powers more clearly, naming the president
the commander in chief of the armed forces responsible
for declaring war and “setting the general state policies
in the domains of defense, foreign relations, and
national security.”32 This implied that the prime minister
and his minister of defense would be responsible for
managing more routine military and defense affairs.
The line between general policies and more routine
decisions is open to interpretation. This loose division of
responsibility, coupled with a delicate institutional
arrangement in which the minister of defense is loyal to
the prime minister and not necessarily to the
commander in chief, the president, was a source of
tension between Marzouki and Jebali. These
institutional factors were then compounded by differing
personal strategies toward the military. While Marzouki
wanted to remove Ben Ali–era figures like General
Ammar and then defense minister Zbidi, Jebali refused,
arguing that maintaining the military as it was “was
pivotal to the stability of the country.”33 The rivalry
between Jebali and Marzouki inadvertently pushed each
executive to appoint military advisers and advisory
councils to help them manage the military,
institutionalizing decentralized channels for governing
the armed forces.
Instead of reactivating the NSC (which by law would
have been chaired by Marzouki), Jebali created and
presided over a Security Council. This council was
composed of the ministers of defense, the interior, and
foreign affairs; the top Interior Ministry officers; and the
top two military officers—the chief of staff of the armed
forces (at the time Rachid Ammar) and the director
general of military security (then Kamel Akrout). The
president was notably absent from the Security Council,
nor was he represented. Jebali did not promulgate a law
governing the council, but it continued in 2013 under
the subsequent prime minister Ali Larayedh. The council
was renamed the Crisis Cell in 2014 under then prime
minister Mehdi Jomaa and has persisted under current
Prime Minister Habib Essid.
When the troika government first took office, the center
of power in the military was still Rachid Ammar. Ammar
appeared to ally with Jebali34 leaving Marzouki feeling
relatively isolated from decisionmaking. This sentiment
came to the fore in the summer of 2012 in the case of
Baghdadi Mahmudi, a former Libyan official who had
served under Colonel Muammar Qaddafi and fled to
Tunisia during his country’s revolution. In November
2011, a Tunisian court ruled that Mahmudi should be
extradited per the request of Libya’s National
Transitional Council. Marzouki, a former human rights
activist, opposed this decision on the grounds that
Mahmudi would be subject to torture if returned to
Libya. In June 2012, however, Jebali extradited
Mahmudi to Tripoli, over the opposition of Marzouki. 35
Furious at being sidelined in this fashion, Marzouki
threatened to resign but was convinced to remain in
office after receiving an apology from Ennahdha head
Rached al-Ghannouchi.36 Marzouki also blamed General
Rachid Ammar, whom he claimed was aware of the
extradition but did not inform him.37 The episode
heightened Marzouki’s distrust of Jebali and Ammar
and convinced him to push back simultaneously against
Jebali’s domination of decisionmaking and Ammar’s
control over the military.
Marzouki began by creating a position for a military
adviser in September 2012, for the first time
institutionalizing a role for the military in the president’s
office.38 While Marzouki was already head of the
Supreme Council of the Armies (a body dominated by
Ammar), he—now distrustful of Ammar—felt the need to
interact with other officers. Marzouki’s intent was
simply to remain informed of military matters, but this
caused friction with General Ammar, who according to
the presidential spokesman “wanted sovereignty over
the information about the military” given to the
president.39
Worse yet for Ammar was the particular selection of
Major Colonel Brahim Ouechtati as the military adviser.
Hailing from Jendouba in the northwest, and rising
through the ranks of the air force, Ouechtati was outside
the personal network of Rachid Ammar, who was from
the Sahel and a member of the land army. Ammar had
also been refusing to promote Ouechtati to general
despite him satisfying the relevant requirements. 40 Both
civilian and military contacts suggested that Ouechtati
was chosen as the military adviser precisely because he
did not have a good personal relationship with Ammar:
it was an explicit attempt to undermine Ammar’s
hegemony over the military.
At Ouechtati’s advice, Marzouki revived the National
Security Council, which after 1991 had met only once or
twice a year. The NSC included all members of Jebali’s
Security Council plus the president, allowing Marzouki
to regain a voice in defense policy. According to
administration officials, the NSC convened almost
monthly under Marzouki. The president, perhaps to
further dilute Ammar’s influence, also increased the
number of military officers present in the council.
Beyond Ammar and Akrout, Marzouki routinely invited
the next top three generals as well: the chiefs of staff of
the navy and air force and the inspector general of the
armed forces.41
With Jebali’s creation of a Security Council, and
Marzouki’s appointment of a military adviser to the
president and reactivation of the NSC, decisionmaking
over military matters had become increasingly
dispersed. “Before, only one person was managing all
the army,” observed Imed Daimi, Marzouki’s chief of
staff. “First it was Ben Ali, then General Ammar.” 42 Since
2012, management of the military has become more
decentralized, with the president, prime minister,
minister of defense, parliament, military adviser, NSC,
and Security Council all offering their input. The
influence of each institution has varied tremendously in
successive administrations, with then president Moncef
Marzouki for instance playing a much larger role during
Ali Larayedh’s government in 2013 than during Hamadi
Jebali’s in 2012 or Mehdi Jomaa’s in 2014. But the
crucial point is that management of the military has
become a shared responsibility between multiple actors,
 transforming it, as a retired Major Colonel put it, “from
personal rule to institutional rule.”43

COUP-PROOFING THROUGH POSITIVE DISCRIMINATION

The new system of managing the military gave senior

officers direct and regular input into national security
policy. But the top generals and the troika government
did not always agree, prompting Marzouki to fear the
potential for a coup. A major sticking point was how to
deal with the Tunisian branch of the jihadi movement
Ansar al-Sharia, especially in the wake of its September
2012 attack on the U.S. embassy in Tunis. The troika
favored dialogue, and Marzouki invited the leaders of
Ansar al-Sharia to the presidential palace in October
2012. Ammar and other senior officers disagreed.
“Marzouki accepted in Carthage people who are
terrorists!” exclaimed a former director general of
military security. “During that period Ammar saw some
contradictions [between Marzouki’s words and deeds].
Some generals believed that Marzouki, his party, and
Ennahdha, by their conduct, helped terrorism grow.” 44
These disagreements intensified after the assassination
of the leftist politician Chokri Belaid in February 2013.
During Belaid’s funeral, then defense minister Zbidi lent
military helicopters for the first time to a private
television station, Nessma TV, to help film the service.
As Nessma TV had been vehemently anti-troika,
Marzouki interpreted this move as the beginning of a
Zbidi-Ammar coup and lobbied Ennahdha to replace
Zbidi in a cabinet reshuffle. His replacement, Rachid
Sabbagh, a specialist in Islamic jurisprudence who was
previously head of the Higher Islamic Council, proved to
be a much more loyal defense minister to the troika
government.
Marzouki also worked to maneuver Ammar out of his
post. Over the next several months, the military became
increasingly involved in operations in the Chaambi
Mountains, where the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, a cell of
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, had set up camp.
These operations gave Marzouki the opportunity he
needed. On June 6, 2013, two soldiers were killed and
two others wounded by a roadside bomb.
Parliamentarian Mohamed Abbou, president of the
Democratic Current (a splinter party from Marzouki’s
CPR), publicly called for Ammar’s resignation, arguing
“it is not logical for a manager to keep his job when he
failed in his mission.”45 As Marzouki began to consider
retiring the general, Ammar himself chose to resign on
June 27 to avoid the image of being fired.46
However, the fear of a coup did not dissipate with
Ammar’s resignation—indeed, it was just beginning. One
week later, the Egyptian military ousted the Muslim
Brotherhood–backed president Mohamed Morsi,
emboldening opposition members in Tunisia to believe
that their military could do the same. After a second
political assassination on July 25, the opposition
abandoned the ongoing process of drafting a new
constitution. It took instead to the street, explicitly
calling for a repeat of the Egyptian scenario and
demanding the troika government’s departure and the
dissolution of the country’s only elected body, the
National Constituent Assembly. Tunisia’s transition
appeared set to follow Egypt’s path.
Retired Major Colonel Mokhtar Ben Nasr, president of
the Tunisian Center for Global Security Studies, noted
that the Tunisian military in the summer of 2013 felt
pressure to intervene: “The street and conditions were
calling for a coup. The people feared Ennahdha would
install a new type of dictatorship. They wanted a coup,
and events in Egypt sent a message that maybe it is
possible that our army would do the same.”47 A former
director general of military security agreed, noting that
the warnings from opposition politicians to Ennahdha
leaders to “look at Egypt” were an implicit “call for the
military to intervene.”48
Fearing an Egyptian scenario, the troika government,
and Marzouki in particular, pursued a series of measures
designed to prevent a coup. The first order of business
was choosing a replacement for Rachid Ammar as the
chief of staff of the land army. In selecting a
replacement, Marzouki sought to appoint a general from
outside of Ammar’s personal network and thus from
outside the historically privileged regions. Mindful of the
symbolism, Marzouki appointed Mohamed Salah Hamdi
of Sidi Bouzid, where the revolution began in December
2010. Hamdi had also previously been punished by
Ammar with an assignment as a military attaché in
Libya in 2011, signaling to Marzouki that he would be
unlikely to work with Ammar.
When opposition protests peaked in mid-August,
Marzouki made further changes to the leadership of the
military to ensure its loyalty. Each of these
appointments followed the positive discrimination
pattern of Hamdi, bringing in officers who originated
from outside of Tunis and the Sahel, and outside of Ben
Ali’s and Ammar’s personal networks. Bechir Bedoui of
Bizerte became chief of staff of the air force; Nouri Ben
Taous of Sfax—another former military attaché in Libya
—became director general of military security; and
Mohamed Nafti of Gafsa—formerly a military attaché in
Egypt—became inspector general of the armed forces.
“The promotion of the generals from the regions was like
transitional justice in the army,” argued former
presidential chief of staff Daimi. “The goal was not to
make a gap between the regions, but rather because the
officers from the interior regions were deprived of or
banned from the high ranks. Marzouki gave them their
deserved ranks, and when Hamdi was appointed, all of
the mid-level officers from the interior regions said
finally, the end of the privileging of the Sahel!” 49
In the words of retired Major Colonel Mohamed Ahmed,
these appointments “marked an important turning
point. Now it doesn’t matter if you’re from the Sahel or
from the center, south, or north. It was a very personal
position of Marzouki to mark a difference with the
past.”50
However, while Marzouki’s appointments signaled the
end of favoritism toward the Sahel, they did not
necessarily indicate that appointments were becoming
more professional or meritocratic. The new leaders were
still chosen, in some sense, for their political loyalties.
Officers from the interior regions, just like electorates in
these disadvantaged regions,51 were more likely to
support the revolution and the troika. As a retired major
colonel from the army pointed out, the top officers after
the revolution appeared to be beholden to party instead
of region.52
Marzouki and the troika government pursued two other
strategies to avoid an Egyptian scenario. First, the
position of chief of staff of the armed forces was left
vacant following Rachid Ammar’s resignation, and
remains so as of early 2016. Without a general to
coordinate the army, navy, and air force, the military
may be less effective, but it may also be less able to
coordinate a coup, a trade-off that Tunisia’s
postrevolution leaders have thus far been willing to
make.
Second, the troika government sought to alleviate
friction with the military through substantive policy
changes. It took a stronger stance on terrorism, labeling
Ansar al-Sharia a terrorist organization on August 27,
following its earlier ban on the organization’s activities
in May. Then, on August 29, the troika government at
the NSC’s suggestion established military zones along
Tunisia’s southern borders with Libya and Algeria,
placing local police and customs officers under the
military’s command.53
These changes, Daimi claimed, “guaranteed the
professionalism” of Tunisia’s armed forces, ensuring
they continued to defend state institutions in the face of
the implicit calls for a coup. When protesters attempted
to storm the National Constituent Assembly in August
and September, the military defended the building, even
while some police officers openly defected to the side of
the protesters.54 As the opposition came to realize that
the military would not intervene and thus an Egyptian
scenario was not in the cards, it shifted gears, turning
instead to negotiations mediated by civil society.
ARMING THE ARMY

As the political crisis subsided, Marzouki and the troika

turned their attention again to national security. The
growing terrorist threat forced the government to
enhance the military’s capabilities, increasing its budget,
upgrading its weapons and equipment, and developing
its international linkages, institutional capacity, and
political influence. The growing material and political
strength of the military suggests that the previous
institutional arrangement—skewed heavily toward the
police—is beginning to be recalibrated.
Consider first the military’s budget. From 2011 to 2016,
the budget of the Ministry of Defense has grown more
quickly than any other ministry, increasing by an
average of 21 percent each year (see table 1). What
military officers were particularly bitter about under Ben
Ali was how quickly the Ministry of the Interior’s budget
had grown during the 1990s and 2000s relative to the
military’s. This trend has reversed after the revolution:
while the military still receives a smaller percentage of
the general budget, its share has grown more quickly
than that of the Interior Ministry. In 2011, the defense
budget stood at just 56 percent of the Ministry of the
Interior’s, but just five years later the ratio has increased
to 72 percent.
“Now when I meet a soldier or officer, the first thing he
says is that ‘we are very thankful for Mr. Marzouki for
improving our situation,’” claimed Daimi. “We hear the
opposite among the police—they say Marzouki cared for
the military and not for us!”55 According to retired
General Said el-Kateb: “Without a doubt, things have
improved. Ben Ali relied on the police. Now, each
institution has seen its capabilities enhanced. The
military has importance, the police has importance, the
national guard has importance. Each has a unique
mission to fulfill.”56
With trusted generals now at the helm, the troika felt
comfortable supplying the armed forces with new
weapons and equipment. A presidential spokesman
recalled that Marzouki summoned the NSC in the fall of
2013 to discuss the military’s needs in the Chaambi
Mountains. At the top of the list were mine-resistant,
ambush-protected vehicles. “Marzouki immediately
called [then Turkish president Abdullah] Gul, who sent
eight vehicles and began production for more right
away.”57
After the NSC meeting, the number of defense contracts
climbed steadily. In 2014, Tunisia signed two military
contracts with U.S. companies for land cruisers and
heavy-duty trucks. Since President Beji Caid Essebsi
assumed office in 2015, Tunisia has signed an additional
ten contracts with the United States, including for Black
Hawk helicopters, armored personnel carriers, and
Hellfire missiles.58 Deliveries in 2015 from previous
contracts included 52 Humvees, three patrol boats, and
two C-130J transport planes.
The post-2011 transition has brought increased military-
to-military cooperation with foreign countries. Tunisia
ratified security cooperation agreements with the United
Arab Emirates in October 2011, Turkey in October 2013,
and Qatar in June 2014. Relations with the United
States have also increased dramatically since the
revolution. In April 2014, the United States hosted the
first annual U.S.-Tunisia Strategic Dialogue and then
tripled its military aid to Tunisia the following year. In
July 2015, the United States designated Tunisia its
sixteenth major non-NATO ally, a label that comes with
“tangible privileges including eligibility for training,
loans of equipment for cooperative research and
development, and Foreign Military Financing for
commercial leasing of certain defense articles,”
according to the U.S. State Department.59
In addition, the Tunisian armed forces have enhanced
their own production capabilities. The navy, for
example, produced its first patrol boat in August 2015,
symbolically named Istiqlal, meaning independence.
“We aim to develop the military industry in Tunisia,”
noted Captain Zouhayr al-Joundil. “Today we produce a
patroller ship, tomorrow, why not equipment for the
army, the air force, or the joint services. This [will] give
us the ability . . . to be self-sufficient for our military
industry.”60
Governments after the revolution have also sought to
enhance the military’s institutional capacity. In
November 2014, then president Marzouki rebranded the
Directorate of Military Security as the Agency for
Intelligence and Security for Defense, charging it with
collecting intelligence on “potential threats to the armed
forces and the security of the country in general.”61 While
the directorate had been collecting intelligence since its
creation in 1964, this change gave it the legal jurisdiction
to do so. The 2014 decree granted the agency financial
independence from the armed forces, with President
Essebsi providing it a starting budget of 1 million
Tunisian dinars in the draft 2016 budget. While
enhancing the military’s intelligence capacity,
postrevolution governments have also been keen to do
this in line with democratic principles, consulting the
Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed
Forces throughout the process.62
Finally, the growing security threat has pushed Tunisian
civilian leaders to appoint military officers to several
civilian and security posts. Brigadier General Mohamed
Meddeb, for instance, was appointed director general of
customs by the troika government in 2012. Moreover,
while only one military officer was appointed as a
governor during Ben Ali’s twenty-three-year reign,
eleven officers have already assumed governorships
after the revolution, and some for multiple terms in
different governorates, especially in the interior and
border regions where security threats are greatest. Other
than in 2013 (when the troika feared the potential for a
coup), military officers have comprised about 11 percent
of new governors each year (see figure 3), a relatively
high percentage considering that the Ministry of the
Interior nominates candidates for governor.

These material and political developments suggest that

the historically marginalized Tunisian military has
begun to see its situation improve. Undoubtedly, the
armed forces remain overextended and underequipped
—their slow progress in the Chaambi Mountains is
testament to that. But what has changed since the
revolution is that the military is becoming a priority for
politicians. Tunisia’s major security threats have forced
successive governments to devote increasing time and
money to fund and equip the armed forces. As retired
Major Colonel Hedi Kolsi observed: “The army was
neglected in the time of Ben Ali, completely. After the
revolution, everything has changed. The military has
become valued by the authorities. From Marzouki until
now, all military interests—equipment, weapons,
logistical support, salaries—everything has improved.” 63
REPARATIONS FOR THE BARRAKET ESSAHEL AFFAIR

The 2011 revolution has also brought major changes for

those 244 individuals unjustly removed from the
military in the 1991 Barraket Essahel affair, a symbolic
recognition of the military’s shifting fortunes. Following
their expulsion from the armed forces, they were
deprived of their salaries, access to military hospitals,
and basic human rights. “The right to expression, to
work, to a passport, to public life, even to freely see our
friends and family,” listed retired Colonel Amor Ben
Romdhane. “All of our rights were stripped from us.” 64
After the revolution, seventeen of these officers formed
the Association of Justice for Military Veterans to lobby
for their rights. They began by filing a case against Ben
Ali, former interior minister Abdullah al-Qallal, and
twelve others on charges of misusing power, using
violence to extract false confessions, and imprisoning
officers without a court judgment. In November 2011, a
military court sentenced Ben Ali, al-Qallal, and four
other defendants to four to five years in prison, which in
April 2012 was reduced on appeal to two years. On June
23, 2012, on the armed forces’ fifty-sixth anniversary,
Marzouki delivered an official state apology for the
Barraket Essahel affair, clearing the 244 individuals of
any wrongdoing, and later hosted them at the
presidential palace in December.
In June 2014, the National Constituent Assembly passed
law 2014-28 returning to the officers their uniforms and
elevating their ranks by two or three promotions, up to
where they would have been had they not been expelled.
Their pensions were also made commensurate with their
new ranks. “With the rehabilitation of the group of
 military officers of Barraket Essahel,” announced
Marzouki after this law, “Tunisia today turns a dark
chapter in its history and in the history of the
relationship between the state, the army, and human
rights.”65
“After the revolution, a new era began, everything has
changed,” exclaimed retired Major Colonel Ali Hajji,
who was among those expelled in 1991. “We have gotten
back many of our rights during these four years.” 66 In a
further symbolic act, Major Colonel Hedi Kolsi, who had
been similarly expelled in 1991, was appointed the head
of a regional branch of the Truth and Dignity
Commission in 2015.
For the officers of the Barraket Essahel affair, perhaps
more so than for other Tunisians, the revolution has
truly brought transitional justice. Moreover, as the 1991
incident signaled the beginning of the police’s
dominance over the military,67 the official state apology
for this event also represents, in some sense, an apology
for the marginalization of the military under Ben Ali.

THE OFFICERS IN CIVIL SOCIETY

Perhaps the sharpest break with the Ben Ali era has been
the entrance of retired officers into Tunisia’s robust civil
society. Retired officers have taken an active role in
educating the public and politicians about the military
and its needs, providing the armed forces with a new
lobby to advance their interests in a democratic age.
In part, this has taken place through retired officers who
have capitalized on the newfound freedom of association
to form civil society organizations. Besides the
Association of Justice for Military Veterans, these
include the Association of Former Officers of the
National Army (formed in March 2011), the Tunisian
Center for Global Security Studies (November 2013),
and the Association of Veterans of the National Defense
Institute (July 2015).
Whether through these organizations or as individuals,
retired officers have played an important role in
advancing and shaping the public debate over the armed
forces. “The best thing we got after the revolution is the
liberty of expression,” praised retired General Said el-
Kateb. “Sometimes I write articles for [the
magazine] Leaders, sometimes I am invited to
conferences at the Temimi Foundation [for Scientific
Research and Information]. We were not permitted to
do this under the regime of Ben Ali.”68
During the drafting of Tunisia’s postrevolution
constitution, for instance, a former director general of
military security advised members of the National
Constituent Assembly on article 9, about military
conscription, and article 36, about the right to trade
unions and the right to strike, particularly the exceptions
carved out for the army and security forces. He was also
sought out by two presidential candidates in 2014 for
advice on defense policy. Likewise, former inspector
general of the armed forces Mohamed Ali el-Bekri
advised Beji Caid Essebsi during his presidential
campaign. In February 2015, retired brigadier general
Mohamed Meddeb published a book
with Leaders containing several specific proposals for
reforming the armed forces, including cutting down on
draft dodging, appointing a chief of staff of the armed
forces, and extricating the military from basic police
functions.69
Among these retired officers’ top proposals is the
development of a comprehensive defense policy to be
produced by the Ministry of Defense and then approved
by the parliament. In February 2015, the Association of
Former Officers of the National Army held a conference
putting forth this proposal, pressuring the Ministry of
Defense to then reach out to its international partners
for advice on how to draft a white paper on defense
policy. Although terrorist attacks in March, June, and
November 2015 have pushed the government back into a
reactionary mode, retired officers remained optimistic
that the Ministry of Defense would soon present a white
paper to parliament for review.
While these retired officers will have to be cautious not
to drown out civilian voices on military matters, most
observers contend that their entrance into civil society
represents a healthy phenomenon for Tunisia’s young
democracy. Given the country’s history, and in
particular the military’s minor role and Ben Ali’s
personalized rule over its affairs, there are few experts
let alone politicians who are knowledgeable about the
military or military matters. Retired officers can play a
critical role in expanding public knowledge about “the
institution of the military, the needs of this period, and
how to transform an institution that traditionally
occupied a very marginalized role in the country to the
risks and challenges for the military today,” as one
retired major colonel put it.70
Maxime Poulin, deputy head of the Tunis office of the
Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed
Forces, suggests that the entrance of retired officers into
 civil society “could have a positive impact. There are
shortcomings in terms of policy planning within the
government and also in civil society. These organizations
of retired officers still have trust and connections with
the Ministry of Defense, and they could eventually act as
government think tanks on security issues while officials
are caught up for the moment at managing urgent daily
matters.”71
The involvement of retired officers in civil society also
provides the institution with a new lobby to help prevent
a future president from once again sidelining the
military. Given President Beji Caid Essebsi’s links to the
Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes, some retired officers
have expressed concerns that the progress the military
has made following the revolution may be rolled back.
Some fear a return to the old patterns of marginalizing
the military and privileging the officers from the Sahel.
Yet these officers remain optimistic that in this new era
of freedom they will at least be able to fight back. Said
retired Major Colonel Mohamed Ahmed: “If all
appointments come from the Sahel, for instance, nobody
will stay silent—we will say something about it! With the
new constitution, new parliament, and new liberty of the
press, things have changed, and we will at least
denounce a reversion to the old ways.”72

CONCLUSION

The ousting of Ben Ali in 2011 initiated a restructuring of

the Tunisian polity away from a police state. The
military, historically underfunded and underequipped,
has begun to see its position improve. Tunisia’s growing
security threats have forced successive governments to
increase the military’s budget, equipment, international
linkages, institutional capacity, and political influence.
At the same time, retired officers in civil society have
pushed Tunisia’s leaders to recognize past injustices
toward the military as well as to consider further
reforms to make the armed forces more effective. The
enhancement of the strength and influence of the
military in the last five years suggests that the historical
imbalance between the military and police is beginning
to be corrected.
As of early 2016, President Beji Caid Essebsi seems to
support this trend, despite his past links to Bourguiba
and Ben Ali. How far Essebsi continues on this path,
however, depends on a number of factors, prominent
among them the reactions of the yet-to-be-
reformed73 Ministry of the Interior and the powerful
police unions, which appear envious of the military’s
growth74 Essebsi may give in to these unions, but he
could conceivably use the strengthened armed forces to
counterbalance the Ministry of the Interior and even put
pressure on the police to initiate internal reforms.
Essebsi could additionally prioritize reforms designed to
maximize the efficacy of the armed forces. A
comprehensive defense strategy, formulated in
consultation with civil society, parliament, and
international partners, would help guide budgetary and
procurement decisions. Providing the NSC and the
military adviser with a permanent staff would enhance
their institutional capacity and enable a shift from
reactive to more forward-looking policymaking.
Actors interested in democracy may naturally fear the
growing influence of the military in the new Tunisia.
Retired officers, at least in interviews, have expressed
deep respect for the principle of civilian control over the
military and the concept of democracy. In encouraging
further restructuring among the Tunisian security
apparatuses, however, Western governments and
nongovernmental organizations should be conscious of
managing the rise of the military in accordance with
democratic principles. At least three reforms seem
worthwhile in this regard. The first is to enhance the
capacity of the parliament to oversee the armed forces.
The second is to reform the system of military justice,
which will soon receive a critical test when the officers of
the Barraket Essahel affair file a case against those
military officers they believe were complicit in the affair.
The final reform is to develop civilian nongovernmental
organizations working on defense policy to compete with
the associations of retired officers, ensuring they do not
achieve a monopoly over the public discourse on
military matters.
 TUNISIA
 
(Profile added on August 2009)

1. GENERAL INFORMATION

1.1. Country overview

Tunisia is a small country of 162 155 km², located at the northernmost part of Africa. It
is bordered on the west by Algeria and on the south by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
(Libya) and the Mediterranean Sea to the northeast and north with a 1300 km of
coastline. Despite its small size, Tunisia offers a remarkably diverse natural landscape.
The country is divided into three distinct physical regions, the Tell Atlas Mountains and
the Dorsale Ridge separated by the fertile valley of the Medjerda River in the north. A
wide and barren plateau south of the Dorsale Ridge with the western half of the plateau
called the High Steppe and the eastern half the Low Steppe. The southern flat coastal
plains and salt lakes, and beyond to the vast Sahara Desert region cover forty percent of
the total area. The principal river is the Medjerda River which flows to the Gulf of Tunis
from Algeria.

 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       

  Figure: Map of Tunisia

    Source: UN Statistics Division

1.1.1. Governmental System

Tunisia is a republic, presidential, multi-party system, where executive power is
exercised by the government. The President is elected to 5-year terms and elections are
planned for October 2009. The President appoints a Prime Minister and cabinet, who play
a strong role in the execution of policy. The President is both head of state and head of
government
Legislative power is characterized by bicameral parliamentary system, the Chamber of
Deputies and the Chamber of Advisors. Members serves respectively 5 and 6 years
terms.
The judiciary is independent. The military is professional and does not play a role in
politics.

1.1.2. Geography and Climate

Tunisia has a temperate Mediterranean climate characterized by warm dry summers and
wet winters influenced by sea breezes. The inland regions experience hotter summers
and more rainfall while there are two distinct seasons, a cool wet season from October to
May and a warm dry season from May to September. Average annual precipitation varies
from 420 mm in the north to more than 900 mm in the Tell Atlas Mountains while the
southern desert region receives less than 350 mm annually. Average temperature
ranges in Tunis are from 6 to 14 degrees Celsius in January to 21 to 33 degrees Celsius
in August.

1.1.3. Population
Tunisia made a forceful commitment to demographic change earlier than most other
developing countries. As a result, Tunisia's fertility rate declined from a high of more
than seven children per woman in 1960 to two children currently. The country's
population growth rate has likewise dropped from 2.6 percent in the late 1970s to about
1 percent at the beginning of this century( 2008 figures). General health has improved
as well, with life expectancies climbing from less than 50 years in the 1950s and early
1960s to above 70 years today. Population growth in Tunisia is projected to be the
lowest rate among the Arab countries, due to having both the lowest fertility rate and
the oldest age pyramid. Population Projection estimate are 11.210 million by 2019 and
11.763 million by 2029.
The population of Tunisia is approximately 10.4 million inhabitants and  is over 65%
urban as shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1. POPULATION INFORMATION

Average
annual growth
              rate (%)

Year 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 2008 2000 to 2008

Population (millions) 5.1 6.4 8.2 9.6 10.0 10.3 0.97

Population density (inhabitants/km²) 31.6 39.4 50.3 59.0 61.8 63.7 0.97

Urban Population as % of total 44.5 51.5 59.6 62.6 65.2 65.8 0.63

Area (1000 km²) 162.155  

Source: National Statistics Institute (INS : www.ins.nat.tn)

1.1.4. Economic Data
Tunisia has limited mineral raw materials. This factor mainly determines the economic
structure of the republic. The manufacturing sector has a prevailing share (19,2 % in
2007) in GDP despite a very little heavy industry. Table 2 shows the historical
information of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP per capita and their growth rates.  
 

TABLE 2. GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP)

  Average
annual growth
          rate (%)

  1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 2007 2000 to 2007

 GDP (millions of current US$) 1446 8486 12385 19430 29082 37077 9.7

 GDP (millions of constant 1990

4.9
US$) 4338 8831 12385 19678 24472 27457

 GDP per capita (PPP* US$/capita)

- 1710 2872 4768 6460 7534 6.8
(1)

 GDP per capita (current

8.6
US$/capita) 282 1328 1519 2032 2900 3626

* PPP: Purchasing Power Parity

Source:    National Statistics Institute (INS : www.ins.nat.tn) (1) World Bank

1.2. Energy Information

1.2.1. Estimated available energy

Proven natural gas and petroleum reserves are limited. Tunisia has moderate uranium
resources mainly in phosphate mineral. The main sources of energy used in Tunisia, are
mainly oil products and natural gas. Few rivers could be exploited for hydroelectricity
production. But despite these limitations water resources have been fully used in Tunisia.
Wind resource for electricity supply is also available and is currently being exploited with
an increasing share. To meet its energy requirements, Tunisia has to import gas and oil
products.
The energy reserves are shown in Table 3. Energy statistics are summarized in Table 4.
 

TABLE 3. ESTIMATED AVAILABLE ENERGY SOURCES

  Estimated available energy  sources

   Fossil Fuels Nuclear  Renewables

Other

  Solid Liquid Gas Uranium Hydro Renewable

 Total amount in
- 3.579 3.275 14.000 0.6 0.2
specific units*
 Total amount in
Exajoule (EJ)            
*   Solid, Liquid: Million tons; Gas: Billion m3; Uranium: Metric tons; Hydro, Renewable: GW

Source: ANME, GCT, APEX Conseil

1.2.2.  Energy Statistics

TABLE 4. ENERGY STATISTICS (in EJ)

Average
annual
growth rate
            (%)

2000 to
  1980 1990 2000 2005 2007 2007

 Energy consumption**            

       - Total 0.1174 0.1814 0.2738 0.3042 0.3213 +2.3 

- Solids*** 0.0037 0.0029 0.0034 0.0038 0.0089 +14.5 

- Liquids 0.0972 0.1286 0.1610 0.1641 0.1669 +0.5 

- Gases 0.0164 0.0497 0.1091 0.1357 0.1452 +4.2 

- Nuclear 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  

- Hydro 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 -3.8

- Other
Renewables 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 +9.2 

 Energy production            

       - Total 0.2586 0.2261 0.2801 0.2827 0.3158 +1.7 

- Solids*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  

- Liquids 0.2416 0.1931 0.1566 0.1457 0.1953 +3.2 

- Gases 0.0169 0.0328 0.1232 0.1363 0.1202 -0.3 

- Nuclear 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  

- Hydro 0.0001 0.0129 0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 -3.8

- Other
Renewables 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 +9.2 

 Net import (Import -

Export)            

       - Total -0.1260 -0.0408 0.0007 0.0254 0.0218 +64.4 

* Latest available data

** Energy consumption = Primary energy consumption + Net import (Import - Export) of secondary energy.
*** Solid fuels include coal, lignite

Source: Tunisian National Observatory of Energy

1.2.3. Energy policy

Despite limited hydrocarbon resources, Tunisia has enjoyed a favourable energy

situation characterized by a largely surplus energy balance until the middle of the
Eighties. Thus, the energy sector played during this period a key role in financing the
economic growth of the country, representing in 1980 approximately 13 % of the
national GDP and 16 % of the national exports. The contribution of the energy sector in
the economic growth has been decreasing since 1986. Currently, the energy sector
accounts for approximately 5 % of the GDP of the country and less than 7 % of the total
national exports.  Since the end of the Eighties, the favourable situation started to
deteriorate due to the joint effect of two major factors which are:

·         The stagnation of the national hydrocarbon resources,

·         The sharp increase of energy demand, notably electricity, as induced by economic

and social growth.

Thus, the energy balance moved from a surplus situation of approximately 3 Mtoe in
the beginning of the Eighties to a slightly deficit situation starting early year 2000.
In order to address this deficit, the Tunisian authorities have engaged an energy
policy that is compatible with sustainable development. The main components are:

·         Intensification and reinforcement of the efforts made for the development of the
country's hydrocarbon resources including an extension of exploration activities
(the Hydrocarbons Code). That allowed the discovery and exploitation of new
reserves allowing the compensation of the old layer's decline;

·         Ensuring energy supply at lower cost in order to facilitate access to energy by the
whole population;

·         Stepping up electricity production, including network rehabilitation and extension,

energy use management and promotion of renewable energies;

·         The continuation of rural electrification which is also amongst Tunisia's priorities.

As a result of governmental policies during the three decades of 1980's, 90's and
00's the electricity sector has been characterized by:

 
§         Diversification of energy source technologies; The utilization of gas and solar
resources and the development of wind energy; reduced the share of oil fuels to
52% of the total in 2007 compared to 82% in 1980.

§         Increase of the total installed capacity that was fulfilled mainly through the
erection of new combined cycle gas turbine plants.

§         Reduction of consumption of oil in thermal power stations even though power

generated by thermal stations has increased fivefold - as a result of intensive use
of natural gas.
  
The concerns related to improving the energy balance has also led the public
authorities to set in October 2000 a National Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Energies Commission whose missions included in particular the drawing up of a
national programme aimed at rationalising energy consumption and promoting
renewable energies. This programme comprises two types of actions: a set of priority
actions to be undertaken on the very short term, and a set of actions to be
undertaken under a medium term programme.

 
A short-term programme relying on some twenty presidential decisions was
announced in May 2001, which attests to the government's determination to engage
fully in favour of a rational use of energy and of the development of renewable
energies. These decisions have related to:

 
·         Enhancing awareness raising and information;

·         Setting out the appropriate legal framework to encourage the private sector to
invest in the field of energy efficiency;

·         Involving the public sector in making profitable use of the energy efficiency
potential;

·         Mobilising the financial resources necessary to the development of the sector;

·         Building local capacities and providing support to research and development

programmes.

As for medium term programme, its objectives include in particular: large-scale

dissemination of solar water heaters, optimisation of rural electrification based on
photovoltaic systems and development of wind energy for electric power generation.

Despite all these efforts, Oil and natural gas are the most important source of energy
covering more than 95% of the total energy supply. Oil products are mostly utilized for
transport and industry and as heavy fuel in thermal power plants. Imported Gas comes
mainly as royalties from the 370 km long section of the TransMed gas pipeline, which
ensures the Algerian gas delivery to Italy. The quota of Tunisia will be increased from 6
to 7 billion m3/year by 2010.

 
To ensure a consistent and sustainable energy policy, Tunisia undertook a preliminary
strategic study on the development of renewable energies. According to this study,
which was completed in April 2004, Tunisia has a considerable potential of renewable
sources of energy especially wind. As a southern Mediterranean country, Tunisia has a
good solar potential and biomass one.  It led to drawing up an Action Plan for developing
the whole range of sectors at horizon 2011, as well as setting out strategic options for
each sector for the three coming decades.

 
The wind energy sector, though still presenting a cost overrun with respect to
conventional power plants, seems to be today as the closest solution to economic
competitiveness for power production. Indeed the Onshore wind potential in Tunisia is
estimated, referring to preliminary studies, to 1000 MW with an average producible
energy of about 3 MWh per year and by kW installed. Tunisia’s wind power energy
objectives aim at increasing the total electricity production from 20 to 175 MW by 2010,
thus amounting to some 4,2% of the electricity production in the country. The
government plans also to install by 2011, 740 000 m2 of solar captor for domestic use.

In Tunisia, the energy consumption per capita is around 0.75 toe/capita and the
country’s total energy consumption shows a steady increase of 5%/year, as shown in
Table 5.

Aware of the importance of global environmental issues, Tunisia took part in a number of
international agreements in the fields of: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-
Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification,
Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship
Pollution, Wetlands. On the ground, the government continues to plan and implement a
number of national programs to meet the challenges of sustainable development.

1.3. The electricity system

1.3.1. Electricity policy and decision making process

 
After its independence, Tunisia established a state-owned energy company, (STEG) and
defined energy plans to fully integrate electricity within the global energy system. The
electricity access expanded significantly from 1970 when it covered 54% of the
population to today's 96% of the population. An interconnected electrical grid system
now supplies 99% of the country's requirements. Local energy resources are being
utilized, particularly renewable sources, thus diversifying the mix of primary energy
sources.

Tunisia has started to open up electric power production to the private sector by virtue
of Law N° 96-27, dated April 1st 1996, which authorises the State to grant electricity
production licences to independent producers with a view to its exclusive sale to STEG.
The conditions and modes of granting the licence are stipulated in Decree n° 96-1125,
dated 20 June 1996. Tunisia has thus undertaken, first of all, to adapt the legal and
institutional framework to this option. Then it entered into force with the construction of
the IPP type plants (Independent Power Production) of Rades and of El Bibane. As a
result, an average annual growth in the total electricity generation increased by around
5 % in the period 1990-2007.

A special attention was also paid by the Tunisian Government in restructuring the
Electricity sector. Measures for improvement of metering, billing and collection of
payments for electricity and natural gas were also implemented.

 
Owing to a highly integrated interconnected system, the electrification index is 99.4% in
urban areas and above 95% at the national level.  These improvements allowed Tunisia
to initiate both electric energy and expertise exports to other countries.

 
1.3.2. Structure of electric power sector

 
Tunisia has provided, since the early 1980s, an appropriate institutional framework for
the administration of the sector. As regards public institutions, the major actors are:

     The Ministry of industry, energy and small and medium enterprises

which is responsible for the sustainable electric energy supply to the
consumers. It also undertakes the implementation of the country's energy
policy. Two dedicated agencies, the National Agency for Energy Efficiency
(ANME) and the Tunisian National Observatory of Energy (ONE), have
been set up to supervise the implementation of the government’s energy
policy.

     The Tunisian Electricity and Gas Company (STEG) which has monopoly
on the transport, transmission and distribution of electricity and which is,
therefore, the sole buyer of this energy. It is also the main producer;

     The Ministry of Environment, together with several institutions that are

under its authority, such as the National Environment Protection Agency
(ANPE) and the Tunis International Centre for Environmental Technologies
(CITET),  which address the environmental  aspects of the national
electricity policy;

     The Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Technology

whose missions cover the research & development related aspects in this
field, via several institutions, of which the National Centre for Energy
Research (NCER) the National Centre for Nuclear Science and Technology
(CNSTN) and various schools of engineers;

     The Ministry of Equipment, Housing and land Use Planning;

     The Ministry of Communication Technologies.

In addition to STEG, several independent minor companies generate electricity.   

The electricity transmission network and capacity of Tunisia are considered sufficient for
the current and forecasted loads. The high-voltage transmission network has the
interconnections with the two neighbouring countries Algeria and Libya. Tunisia and
Algeria agreed to increase the electric power interconnection capacity up to 400 KV as
from 2010, against 220 KV currently. An interconnection with Italy (Cecelia) is also
planned.

 
1.3.3. Main indicators
In 2009, the total STEG installed capacity of the generating stations in Tunisia is 3 050
MW. Table 8 shows the historical statistics of the electricity production, the electrical
energy balance and the annual electrical energy consumption per capita.
 
TABLE 5. ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND CAPACITY
Average
annual growth
              rate (%)

  1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 2007 2000 to 2007

 Capacity of electrical plants

(MW)              

       - Thermal   832  1265  2313  3170  3232  +4.9 

       - Hydro   28  64  61.2  62  62  +0.2 

       - Nuclear   0  0  0  0  0  

       - Wind    0  0 10.6  19  19  +8.7 

       - Geothermal   0  0  0  0  0   

       - other renewable    0  0 0  0  0   

       - Total   861  1329  2385 3251  3313  +4.8 

 Electricity production (GW.h)              

       - Thermal   2406  4854  10008  12857  13054  +3.9 

       - Hydro   23.5  43.6  64.4  145.2  49  -3.8 

       - Nuclear   0  0   0  0  0  

       - Wind   0  0  23.1  42.4  43  +9.3 

       - Geothermal   0  0  0  0  0   

       - other renewable   0  0  0  0  0   

       - Total (1)   2430 4898  10095 13044 13146  +3.8 

 Total Electricity consumption

(GW.h)    2250  4400  8979  11244 12071   +4.3
(1) Electricity transmission losses are not deducted.

* Latest available data

Source:  Tunisian National Observatory of Energy

TABLE 6. ENERGY RELATED RATIOS

  1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 2007

 Energy consumption per capita (ktep/ capita)   0.439  0.537  0.684  0.725  0.748 

 Electricity consumption per capita (GW.h/capita)   0.352  0.545  0.939  1.121  1.177 

Electricity production/Energy production (%)   3.4  7.7  12.9  16.4  14.9 

Nuclear/Total electricity (%)   0  0  0  0  0 

Ratio of external dependency (%) (1)   0  0  0.3  8.8  8.7 

(1) Net import / Total energy consumption.

* Latest available data

Source:   Tunisian Company of Electricity and Gas (STEG : www.steg.com.tn)

 
2. NUCLEAR POWER SITUATION

2.1. Historical development and current organizational structure

2.1.1. Overview
It was on November 03, 2006, that his Excellency the President of the Republic
commanded the Tunisian Company of Electricity and Gas (STEG) to conduct, in
collaboration with the Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Technology,
a techno-economic feasibility studies for NPP (Nuclear Power Plant) implementation. This
occurred in an energy context marked by the dwindling production at Tunisia's oil fields
and the surge in hydrocarbon prices that make country spending heavily on energy
imports to power its electricity network. This decision comes in favour of further research
and development of country’s nuclear option in order to reduce the reliance on oil and
gas.
Various studies for the introduction of nuclear power in the electricity supply system
were conducted since 1982. The last one was carried by CNSTN in collaboration with
STEG and SONED (National Water Distribution Utility), and with the assistance of the
French CEA, and supervision of IAEA from 2000 to 2004. The aim of this study was the
investigation of the economic feasibility of an NPP implementation for electricity
generation and water desalination. Various technologies were considered including 2 nd ,
3rd and 4th generation NPP models. The study showed that taking into account  the local
condition in Tunisia, the nuclear option was competitive for the price of several energies
among which a barrel of crude oil higher than 38 $. 
Also, a feasibility study for the implementation of a research reactor at CNSTN on the
site of Sidi-Thabet was carried in collaboration with FRAMATOME and CEA. The study
dealt with the implementation of a TRIGA MARK II research reactor and the associated
labs. CNSTN an STEG agreed that the implementation of a research reactor is a
cornerstone of the human resource development program to be put in place for NPP
project.

2.1.2. Current organizational chart(s)

 
     Ministry of Industry, Energy and Small and Medium Enterprises:
responsible for devising and implementing government policy in various areas
among them energy and mining. To this end, the Ministry Addresses all
subjects related to the implementation of government policy on these sectors.
 The ministry is directly concerned and has a key role in the implementation of
the nuclear power programme.   
     Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Technology:  is
in charge of establishing the legislative and regulatory framework for nuclear
activities in the context of a nuclear power program. The ministry is also in
charge of the development of the human resource, especially in the nuclear
field by developing a training and education program able to provide qualified
manpower for a nuclear power program.  
    National Atomic Energy Commission (CENA) : headed by the Minister of Higher
Education, Scientific Research and Technology and composed by members from
different ministries and national institutions. It was created in 1990 and works on the
elaboration and implementation of national programs promoting peaceful uses of
nuclear energy and identification of future priorities and orientation. The CNEA is
acting as NEPIO in the context of the NPP project. It is assigned for the following
tasks:  
             

§         To develop, promote and implement nuclear technologies, methods and

instruments in  the country in different fields of agriculture, industry, power
energy, ecology and medicine;
§         To advise the Executive Power in the definition of nuclear policy and the adoption
of international treaties and agreements related to the nuclear field;
§         To promote the education of highly specialised human resources and the nuclear
science and technology development;
§         To implement basic and applied research programs in sciences related to nuclear
technology;
§         To follow the technical cooperation programs specially with the IAEA.
The National Centre for Nuclear Science and Technology (CNSTN) assures the
Permanent Secretary of this commission. 
 
      Tunisian Company of Electricity and Gas (STEG) : as a public
company, has the essential role of electricity and LPG production. It is also
responsible for transmission and the distribution of electricity and natural gas.
The STEG was tasked by the government to conduct feasibility study of the
nuclear power programme and expected to play the role as the operator of the
Tunisia’s first nuclear power plant.
      National Centre for Nuclear Science and Technology (CNSTN) : is a
governmental institution created by the law n°93-115 dated on 22 November
1993. It is in charge of carrying out studies and research work in various
peaceful uses of nuclear energy and techniques in different sectors. CNSTN is
directly involved in the feasibility study and maintain a solid cooperation with
the STEG and other concerned departments for these purposes and acts for
the government as a centre of expertise in the nuclear field by providing
advices.  
     National Centre for Radiation Protection (CNRP) :  established in
1981, acts as regulatory authority at the national level for all what concerns
use of radioactive sources in the context of radiation protection, except
nuclear installations. According to its attributions, CNRP is not legally able to
act as a Nuclear Regulatory Authority. A new Nuclear Safety Agency will be
created to carry out these regulatory functions in connection with the NPP
project.
      Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development: and its
relevant agencies will be involved on matters related to environment al
protection, especially the radioactive waste management.
     Ministry of the Interior and Local Development: will be involved in
matters related to the physical protection, nuclear security, preparedness
process and intervention in case of radiological emergency.
     The ministry of Transport : will be involved in matters related on the
transport of radioactive materials, atmospheric and seismic relevant studies
on selected sites.

2.2. Nuclear power plants: Overview

2.2.1. Status and performance of nuclear power plants

Not applicable.

2.2.2. Plant upgrading, plant life management and license renewals

Not applicable.

2.3. Future development of Nuclear Power

2.3.1. Nuclear power development strategy

 
The implementation of a first NPP has been planned in four phases:
       Phase 1: Undertaking of sitting activities and the techno-economic
feasibility studies necessary for the government decision (2008 -   2011),
         Phase 2: Launching the Call for Tender, bid evaluation and contract
award (2012 - 2015),
         Phase 3: Construction  and Commissioning of the NPP (2016 - 2023),
         Phase 4: Operation of the NPP (2024 - 2084).
The STEG has undertaken the preparation of a strategic action plan, addressing the 19
issues of the IAEA Milestones Guideline (NG-G 3.1). This plan has been reviewed and
validated by IAEA experts on April 2009 for Phase 1. Undertaking of the feasibility
studies for the implementation of the NPP is crucial and involves many topics which
relate to energy planning, economic and financial studies, the integration of the NPP into
the national and regional electric grid, the assurance quality program and the
development of human resources. These aspects will be carried out in two separated
lots. The first lot deals with the actions requiring technical assistance, to benefit from the
experience of countries that have already adopted the nuclear technology. The second
lot concerns the actions that require the services of the specialized Engineering
consulting firms. The studies related to technologies of reactors, fuel cycle and
radioactive waste management will be entrusted to an international specialized
engineering firm by the end of 2010. Regarding the local industrial involvement, the
STEG has awarded two Contracts in 2009 to national specialized Organisations in order
to assess the local industrial capabilities.
In parallel with technical activities of the Phase 1, the legal and institutional framework is
under preparation by a legal group involving national institutions and working under the
auspices of the National Atomic Energy Commission (NAEC). The target of this group in
particular is the ratification of international laws on the peaceful use of the nuclear
energy and its applications, the establishment of the National Nuclear Energy Agency
(NNEA) and the National Nuclear Safety Agency (NNSA) by the end of 2010.
 
TABLE 8. PLANNED NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
Expected
Expected
Station/Project Name Type Capacity Construction Start
Commercial Year
Year

To be defined - 700-1000 2016 2023

To be defined - 700-1000 2024 2030

         

         

2.3.2. Project management

 

A Task Force headed by the Ministry of industry, energy and small and medium
enterprises, was conferred the supervision of the project.  STEG, CNSTN and other
relevant organisations and administrations are member of this task force. Also a working
group set up by the CNEA was charged with elaborating the legal and institutional
framework of the project. Also STEG created a project team to conduct the studies and
field operations.

2.3.3. Project funding

Not applicable.

2.3.4. Electric grid development

This is expected to be considered under the ongoing activities of Phase 1and STEG has
undertaken some feasibility studies, which estimated that the grid size will double by
2020.

2.3.5. Site Selection

Under the Phase 1 of NPP two candidate sites have been selected and approved by
authorities among about one hundred initially identified. The geological, geotechnical and
geophysical investigations, seismic hazard evaluation, meteorological and oceanographic
studies, risk of floods evaluation, dispersion of radioactive materials and induced human
activities assessment of these two sites are planned for 2009-2010. These studies will be
carried out by national specialized organisations and engineering firms, with foreign
assistance.

2.4. Organizations involved in construction of NPPs          

Not applicable.

2.6. Organizations involved in decommissioning of NPPs

Not applicable.
2.7. Fuel cycle including waste management
Not applicable.

2.8. Research and development

2.8.1. R&D organizations

 
The CNSTN is tasked by the government to conduct the R&D works in this field. It has to
master, develop and use these technologies for economic and social purposes,
particularly in energy, agricultural, industrial, environmental and medical
applications. Its main activities are:
     conducting theoretical and practical research studies and projects in the
peaceful applications of nuclear sciences and technologies;
     providing training and services to educational institutions, public and
private companies including training;
     implementing nuclear safety techniques and good radiation protection
practices, and safeguarding the environment while running its
installations;
     supporting all activities contributing to the development of nuclear
sciences and the promotion of its different peaceful applications;

2.8.2. Development of advanced nuclear technologies

Not applicable.

2.8.3. International co-operation and initiatives

Tunisia and France signed a cooperative agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear
energy. Under the accord, the two countries will conduct cooperation on the peaceful use
of nuclear technology in areas of environmental protection, desalination of seawater,
health and power generation.
Tunisia has also bilateral agreements with institutes from South Africa and Canada.

2.9. Human resources development

Aware of the need to establish a strategy to sustain and enhance nuclear science and
technology activities in the country, CNSTN initiated in 2001 a Sandwich Fellowship
program in collaboration with the French institute INSTN. The program aimed to train 10
students per year in nuclear engineering. Unfortunately the lack of appropriate funds
caused the collapse of the programme. Since 2008 STEG restarted the program relaying
on its proper financing.  A human resource development plan is being undertaken by a
working group led by CNSTN, integrating the assessment of skills and competences
needed throughout the project life of the planned NPP. This plan shows the strategy to
timely fill the need of skills for each phase of the project, including the training and the
foreign assistance program.
 
On the other hand the Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Technology
set up a committee with the mandate to device a national human resources development
program leading to higher Degrees (Technicians, engineers, PhD).  The program is
expected to start gradually since 2010.
2.10. Stakeholder Communication
Not applicable.

 
3. NATIONAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS

3.1. Regulatory framework

3.1.1. Regulatory authority(s)

According to law No. 81-100 and decree No. 82-1389 related to the creation and
organization of the National Centre for Radioprotection (CNRP), CNRP has been
acting since 1981 as a regulatory authority for radiation applications. In connection
with the NPP project, it has been decided to establish a new regulatory body called
National Nuclear Safety Agency (ANSN) which may carry out regulatory functions for
safety, security, safeguards, radiation protection, physical protection, radioactive
material transport, and radioactive waste management. It has also been decided that
ANSN will be established with such regulatory functions for nuclear installations and
radioactive sources.  It will be an independent authority that should report only to
the prime minister. Once created, ANSN will:
      Authorise all nuclear activities
      Control and inspect nuclear activities and installations
      Enforce the application of relevant legal requirements  
      Inform the public about safety issues

3.1.2. Licensing Process

The definition of the licensing process for nuclear facilities is being covered by the
project of nuclear law on peaceful uses of nuclear activities and its decrees of
application. It is expected that the creation of nuclear installation require a decree of
the president of the republic proposed by the ANSN after fulfilling all the related legal
requirements. It is also expected that the licensing requirements and process to be
implemented should be based on the relevant international standards especially
those adopted and recommended by the IAEA.

3.2. Main national laws and regulations in nuclear power

1.     32 of the Constitution last paragraph: The treaties ratified by the president of the
republic and approved by the Chamber of Deputies have a higher authority than
the laws Article

2.     Law No. 57-10 of 09/08/1957 related  on the ratification of the Statute of the
International Agency of Atomic Energy

3.     Law No. 70-5 of 03/02/1970 related to the ratification of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

4.     Law No. 71-31 of 28/07/1971 related to the ratification of the treaty prohibiting
the placement of nuclear weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the
Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the subsoil

5.     Law n°81-51 of 18 /06/ 1981 related to the  radiation protection

  Decree No. 86-433 of 28/03/1986 related to the protection against
ionizing radiation

6.     Law No. 88-67 of 16/06/1988 related to the ratification of the Vienna Convention
on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

7.     Law No. 88-68 of 16/06/1988 related to the ratification of the Vienna Convention
on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or   Radiological Emergency

8.     Law No. 90-15 of 12/02/1990 related to the ratification of the agreement between
the Republic of Tunisia and the International Atomic Energy and on the
application of safeguards under the Treaty on the Non - Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons

  Decree No. 90-1399, 03/09/1990, establishing a National Atomic

Energy Commission as amended by Decree No. 95-2566 of
25/12/1995

9.     Law n° 96-41 dated on 10 June 1996, related to the Hazardous Waste control its
management and elimination

   Decree No. 2000-2339 of 10/10/2000 establishing the list of

hazardous waste

   Decree No. 2005-1991 of 11/07/2005, relating to the study of 

impact on the environment

10.    Law n° 97-37 dated of 02/06/ 1997 related to the transport by road  of

hazardous materials

   Decree No. 2000-439 of 14/02/2000 establishing the list of

dangerous substances which transported by road must be under
the control and with the accompaniment of security units

   Decree No. 2002-2015 of 04/09/2002 fixing the technical rules

related to the equipment and the design of vehicles used in the
transport of hazardous materials by road

11.     Decree No. 2004-1615 of 12/07/2004 related to the ratification of the Nuclear-

Test-Ban Treaty

REFERENCES

APPENDIX 1:

INTERNATIONAL, MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS\

Treaty/Convention Position of Date of
Tunisia ratification/

signature

Treaty of non proliferation Signed and ratified Law No. 70-5 of

 03/02/1970

Comprehensive safeguard agreement Signed and ratified Law No. 90-15 of

12/02/1990

Additional protocol Signed (ratification 2005-05-24

in process)

Convention on early notification of Signed and ratified Law No. 88-67 of

nuclear accident 16/06/1988

C. On assistance in the case of a nuclear Signed and ratified Law No. 88-68 of
accident 16/06/1988

Convention on nuclear safety Signed  (ratification 1994-09-20

in process)

Joint convention on the SSFM and on (ratification in  

the  SRWM process)

Convention on physical protection of Signed and ratified accession:

nuclear material
1993-04-08

Amendment of the CPPNM (ratification in  

process)

Vienna convention on civil liability for Under evaluation  

nuclear damage

Joint protocol relating to the application Under evaluation  

of the Vienna convention and Paris
convention

Protocol to amend 1963 Vienna Under evaluation  

convention

Convention on Supplementary Under evaluation  

compensation for nuclear damage

Comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty Signed and ratified Decree no 2004-
1615 of
12/07/2004

IAEA Codes  of conduct and practice and In process  

guidance

 
APPENDIX 2:

 
MAIN ORGANIZATIONS, INSTITUTIONS AND COMPANIES INVOLVED IN
NUCLEAR POWER RELATED ACTIVITIES

 
Institution Contacts

location Institution Name Fields of Activity

Sidi Centre National des Sciences et Technologies Nuclear Research

Thabet Nucléaires (CNSTN)

Pôle Technologique, 2020 Sidi-Thabet, TUNISIA

Fax : +216 71 537 555

Phone : +216 71 537 410

E-mail : official@cnstn.rnrt.tn

Web Site: www.cnstn.rntn.tn

Tunis Centre National de Radioprotection (CNRP) Radiation

Protection
Hôpital d'Enfants Bab Sâadoun 1006 Tunis, TUNISIA

Fax : +216 71 571 697

Phone : +216 71 577 774

Tunis Société Tunisienne de l’Electricité et du Gaz Electricity and Gas

(STEG)

38 rue Kamel Ataturk 1080 Tunis

BP 190, 1080 Tunis cedex, TUNISIA

Fax : +216 71 330 174 - +216 71 349 981

Phone :+216 71 341 311

E-mail : dpsc@steg.com.tn

Web Site: www.steg.com.tn

Tunis Groupe Chimique Tunisie (GCT) Phosphate industry

7, Rue DU Royaume D'Arabie Saoudite, 1002, Tunis

Belvédère , TUNISIA

Fax : +216 71 783 495

Phone : +216 71 784 488

E-mail : gct@gct.com.tn

Web Site: www.gct.com.tn

Tunis Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur, de la Higher education

Recherche Scientifique et de la Technologie

Avenue Ouled Haffouz - 1030 - Tunis, TUNISIA

Fax : +216 71 786 711

 Phone : +216 71 786 300

Web Site: www.mes.tn

Tunis Ministère de l'Industrie, de l'Energie et des Industry

petites et moyennes entreprises

63, rue de Syrie, 1002 Tunis Belvédère, TUNISIA

Fax : +216 71 791 132

Phone : +216 71 782 742

E-mail : api@api.com.tn

web Site: www.industrie.gov.tn

Tunis Institut National de la Statistique (INS) Statistics

70, Rue Ech-cham BP 265 CEDEX, TUNISIA

Fax : +216 71 792 559

Phone : +216 71 891 002

E-mail: INS@mdci.gov.tn

Web Site: www.ins.nat.tn

Name of report coordinator

 Adel TRABELSI

 Directeur Général

 Centre National des Sciences et Technologies Nucléaires

 Pôle Technologique, 2020 Sidi-Thabet, TUNISIA

 Tel : +216 71 537 803

 Fax: +216 71 537 555

 e-mail: adel.trabelsi@cnstn.rnrt.tn
Environmental issues
Abstract
Since the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held its
Rio meeting in 1992, where participants discussed the necessity of fighting against
the hazardous effects of pollution and climate change, these issues have become
even more pressing world-wide. The ever-increasing consumption of energy is
depleting the planet’s natural capital to a degree that could impact our future
prosperity. According to the 2008 Living Planet Report, if demands for energy
were to continue to grow at their current rates, by the mid-2030s we would need
the equivalent of two planets to meet our global supply needs. 1
The rising level of energy consumption that is occurring internationally also is
being mirrored at regional and national levels. An interesting case study along
these lines is Tunisia, which is one of the high-growth economies in the Middle
East and North African area yet lacks sufficient energy supply to satisfy its
growing demand. Tunisia looks like many nations around the world with a young
population, growing economy, increasing domestic energy consumption, and the
need to balance economic development with environmental concerns.

Keywords
Energy

Pollution

Economic development

Tunisia

Relationship

1. Introduction
Climate change has received great attention during the last decade for its impacts
on human ecosystem and on the economy. One of the most questions worried out
the researchers is: How can we attenuate negatives effects of climate change
caused by CO2 emissions? The world wide has discover the danger of climate
change and the necessity to develop meaningful and rigorous policies and
procedures whose primary objective is protecting environment and attenuating gas
emissions at the atmosphere. The Johannesburg Summit 2002 on sustainable
development reaffirmed the central role of energy as an engine of economic
development, social equality and poverty alleviation. In this Summit, it was
pointed out the disastrous and harmful impact of energy as a cause of pollution and
over exploitation of resources on human health and the environment. The action
plan of Johannesburg Summit 2002 has reaffirmed after the commission on
sustainable development in its ninth session in 2001, the necessity of developing
policies and regulatory frameworks that create economic, social and institutional
conditions required for expanded access to reliable energy services and
environmental friendly. Research in the link between energy consumption,
economic growth and CO2 emissions has widely analyzed and it was been center
of controversial and debate. Energy and climate change are intrinsically linked.
The way in which we consume energy largely determines society’s environmental
impact. For this reason, examining energy use is one of the most fundamental ways
that can help in obtaining sustainable development. The awareness on climate
change and its repercussions makes it essential that there is some understanding of
the causal effects of energy consumption on development. This paper begins with a
brief review of the literature on causality link between economic growth, energy
consumption and CO2 emissions. The next section highlights data and
methodology and empirical results and the last one concludes and states the policy
implications of the results.
2. Literature review
The relationship between energy consumption and economic growth, as well as
economic growth and environmental pollution, has been one of the most widely
investigated in the economic literature in the three last decades. However, existing
outcomes have varied considerably. Whether energy consumption stimulates,
retards or is neutral to economic activities has motivated curiosity and interest
among economists and policy analysts to investigate the direction
of causality between energy consumption and economic variables. The pioneer
study by Kraft and Kraft (1978) found a uni-directional Granger causality running
from output to energy consumption for the United States using data for the period
1947–1974. The empirical outcomes of the subsequent studies on this subject
which differ in terms of the time period covered, country chosen, econometric
techniques employed, and the proxy variables used in the estimation, have reported
mixed results and supports and is not conclusive to present policy recommendation
that can be applied across countries. Depend upon the direction of causality; the
policy implications can be considerable from the point of view of energy
conservation, emission reduction and economic performance. Most of the analyses
on this topic have recently been conducted using Vector Autoregression (VAR)
models. Earlier empirical works have used Granger (1969) or Sims (1972) tests to
test whether energy use causes economic growth or whether energy use is
determined by the level of output (Akarca and Long, 1980a, Akarca and Long,
1980b, Yu and Hwang, 1984). Their empirical findings are generally inconclusive.
Where significant results were obtained they indicate that causality runs from
output to energy use. With advances in time series econometric techniques, more
recent studies have tended to focus on vector error-correction model (ECM) and
the cointegration approach. Masih and Masih (1996) used cointegration analysis to
study this relationship in a group of six Asian countries and found cointegration
between energy use and GDP in India, Pakistan, and Indonesia. No cointegration is
found in the case of Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. The flow of causality
is found to be running from energy to GDP in India and from GDP to energy in
Pakistan and Indonesia. Using trivariate approach based on demand
functions, Asafu-Adjaye, 2000a, Asafu-Adjaye, 2000b tested the causal
relationship between energy use and income in four Asian countries using
cointegration and errorcorrection analysis. He found that causality runs from
energy to income in India and Indonesia, and a bidirectional causality in Thailand
and the Philippines. Stern (2000) undertakes a cointegration analysis to conclude
that energy is a limiting factor for growth, as a reduction in energy supply tends to
reduce output. Yang, 2000a, Yang, 2000b considers the causal relationship
between different types of energy consumption and GDP in Taiwan for the period
1954–1997. Using different types of energy consumption he found a bi-directional
causality between energy and GDP. This result contradicts with Cheng and Lai,
1997a, Cheng and Lai, 1997b who found that there is a uni-directional causal
relationship from GDP to energy use in Taiwan. Soytas and Sari (2003) discovered
bidirectional causality in Argentina, causality running from GDP to energy
consumption in Italy and Korea, and from energy consumption to GDP in Turkey,
France, Germany and Japan. Paul and Bhattacharya, 2004a, Paul and Bhattacharya,
2004b found bidirectional causality between energy consumption and economic
growth in India. Wolde-Rufael (2005) investigates the long-run and causal
relationship between real. Using cointegration analysis, Wietze and Van Montfort
(2007) show that energy consumption and GDP are co-integrated in Turkey over
the period 1970–2003 and found a unidirectional causality running from GDP to
energy consumption indicating that energy saving would not harm economic
growth in Turkey. The relationship between output and pollution level has also
been well discussed in the literature of Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) where
environmental degradation initially increases with the level of per capita income,
reaches a turning point, and then declines with further increases in per capita
income (Grossman and Krueger, 1991a, Grossman and Krueger, 1991b, Shafik and
Bandyopadhyay, 1992). The conclusions of Hettige et al. (1992), Cropper and
Griffiths (1994), Selden and Song (1994) and Grossman and Krueger (1995) are
consistent with the EKC hypothesis. Martinez-Zarzoso and Bengochea-Morancho
(2004) find evidence that CO2 emissions and national income are negatively
related at low income levels, but positively related at high-income levels.
However, increased national income level does not necessarily warrant greater
efforts to contain the emissions of pollutants. The empirical results of Shafik
(1994) and Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) show that pollutant emissions are
monotonically increasing with income levels. The existing literature reveals that
empirical finding studies differ substantially and are not conclusive to present
policy recommendation that can be applied across countries. In addition, few
studies focus to test the nexus of output–energy and output–environmental
degradation under the same integrated framework. Given that energy consumption
has a direct impact on the level of environmental pollution, the above discussion
highlights the importance of linking these two strands of literatures together (Ang,
2007 and 2008). Consequently, to avoid problems of misspecification, these two
hypotheses must be tested under the same framework. This study for the case of
Tunisian economy tries overcoming the shortcoming literature related with the
linkage between economic growth, energy consumption and pollutant emissions
under the same integrated framework, following the idea of Ang (2007 and 2008).
Tunisia appears to be an interesting case study given that it is one of the highest
growth economies in Middle East and North Africa region and energy supply in
this country is insufficient to meet the increasing demand. Also, this empirical
country study may be useful to formulate policy recommendation from the point of
view of energy conservation, emission reduction and economic performance.
3. Tunisian economic and energy situations
The Energy and Environmental Situation in Tunisia: Tunisia is a country with
limited natural resources confronted not only with continually increasing domestic
energy demand but also with geopolitical and geo-economic upheavals that this
sector has experienced. The energy sector is strategic and indispensable to Tunisian
socioeconomic development, where the energy balance has started to show a
deficit after having maintained a surplus for a period of four decades. Fig. 1 shows
the trend of Tunisian demand outstripping resource supply. According to
predictions, Tunisia’s energy needs will continue to increase at a steady pace,
which can be partially explained by the improvement in citizens’ standard of
living, whereas the national production is decreasing, which means that any
durable development in Tunisia should rely, in the years to come, on new growth
sources.

1. Download : Download full-size image

 Fig. 1. National resources and domestic demand for primary energy in Tunisia, 1990–
2010.
Compiled by the authors based on data from Tunisia, National Agency for Energy Conservation
(ANME), The National Agency for Energy Conservation Report, 3rd edition (Tunis, Tunisia: ANME,
June 2011).

Fig. 2 provides an overview of Tunisia’s greenhouse gas emissions by source; it

highlights that the energy sector is the largest, man-made contributor to greenhouse
gas emissions. As a developing country, Tunisia is not committed to a reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions as stipulated by the Kyoto Protocol, but it is alarming to
see that the level of per-capita carbon dioxide emissions has increased dramatically
over time.

1. Download : Download full-size image

Fig. 2. Sources of greenhouse gas emission in Tunisia, 1990–2009.
Compiled by the authors based on data from Tunisia, National Agency for Energy Conservation
(ANME), The National Agency for Energy Conservation Report, 3rd edition (Tunis, Tunisia: ANME,
June 2011).

The relationship between energy consumption and economic growth, as well as

economic growth and environmental pollution, has been one of the most widely
investigated topics in the economic literature during the three last decades.
However, existing outcomes have varied considerably. Whether energy
consumption stimulates, delays or is neutral to economic activities has motivated
curiosity and interest among economists and policy analysts to find out the
direction of causality between energy consumption and economic variables. The
pioneering study by Kraft and Kraft (1978) found a unidirectional Granger
causality running from output to energy consumption for the United States using
data for the 1947–1974 time frame. The empirical outcomes of the subsequent
studies on this subject, which differ in terms of time period, country, econometric
techniques, and proxy variables, have reported mixed results and are not
conclusive to offer policy recommendations that can be applied across countries.
Depending upon the direction of causality, the policy implications can be
considerable with regards to energy conservation, emission reduction and
economic performance viewpoints. Most of the analyses on this topic have recently
been conducted using Vector Autoregression (VAR) models. Earlier empirical
works have used Granger (1969) or Sims (1972) tests to test whether energy use
causes economic growth or whether energy use is determined by the level of
output. 1. Their empirical findings are generally inconclusive. But when significant
results are obtained, they indicate that causality runs from output to energy
use. Erol and Yu (1987) tested the data of six industrialized countries and found
some indications of a causal relationship between energy and output in a number of
industrialized countries with the most significant relationship being for Japanese
data between 1950 and 1982. However, when the sample was restricted to 1950–
1973, the relationship was no longer significant. Yu and Choi (1985) also found a
causal relationship running from energy to GDP in the Philippines economy, but
causality is reversed in the case of South Korea. Ebohon (1996) examines the
causal directions between energy consumption and economic growth for two
African economies (Nigeria and Tanzania). The results show a simultaneous causal
relationship between energy and economic growth for both countries. With
advances in time series econometric techniques, more recent studies have focused
on the vector error correction model (VECM) and the cointegration
approach. Masih and Masih (1996) used cointegration analysis to study this
relationship in a group of six Asian countries and found that cointegration does
exist between energy use and GDP in India, Pakistan, and Indonesia. No
cointegration is found in the case of Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. The
flow of causality is found to be running from energy to GDP in India and from
GDP to energy in Pakistan and Indonesia. Using trivariate approach based on
demand functions, Asafu-Adjaye, 2000a, Asafu-Adjaye, 2000b tested the causal
relationship between energy use and income in four Asian countries using
cointegration and error-correction analysis. He found that causality runs from
energy to income in India and Indonesia, and a bi-directional causality in Thailand
and the Philippines. Stern (2000) undertakes a cointegration analysis to conclude
that energy is a limiting factor for growth, as a reduction in energy supply tends to
reduce output. Yang, 2000a, Yang, 2000b considers the causal relationship
between different types of energy consumption and GDP in Taiwan for the period
1954–1997. Using different types of energy consumption, he found a bi-
directional. See for example, Akarca and Long, 1980a, Akarca and Long,
1980b and Yu and Hwang (1984). 4 causality between energy and GDP. This
result contradicts with Cheng and Lai, 1997a, Cheng and Lai, 1997b who found
that there is a unidirectional causal relationship from GDP to energy use in
Taiwan. Soytas and Sari (2003) discovered bi-directional causality in Argentina,
causality running from GDP to energy consumption in Italy and Korea, and from
energy consumption to GDP in Turkey, France, Germany and Japan. Paul and
Bhattacharya, 2004a, Paul and Bhattacharya, 2004b found bi-directional causality
between energy consumption and economic growth in India. The empirical results
by Oh and Lee (2004) for the case of Korea suggested the existence of a long-run
bidirectional causal relationship between energy and GDP, and short-run
unidirectional causality running from energy to GDP using VECM. Based on a
production function approach, Ghali and El-Sakka (2004), develop a VECM model
to test the existence and direction of causality between output growth and energy
use in Canada. Their empirical findings indicate that the long-run movements of
output, labor, capital and energy use in Canada are related by two cointegrating
vectors and the short-run dynamics of the variables indicate that Granger-causality
is running in both directions between output growth and energy use. Wolde-Rufael
(2005) investigated the long run and causal relationship between real GDP per
capita and energy use per capita for 19 African countries for the period 1971–2001.
This work provides evidence of a long run relationship between energy
consumption and economic growth for only eight of the 19 countries and a causal
relationship for only 10 countries. Using cointegration analysis, Wietze and Van
Montfort (2007) showed that energy consumption and GDP are cointegrated in
Turkey over the period 1970–2003 and found a unidirectional causality running
from GDP to energy consumption indicating that energy saving would not have a
negative impact on economic growth in Turkey. On the other hand, the relationship
between output growth and pollution level has also been well discussed in the
literature of Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) where environmental
degradation initially increases with the level of per capita income, reaches a
turning point, and then declines with further increases in per capita income
(Grossman and Krueger, 1991a, Grossman and Krueger, 1991b). 2. Whether
continued increase in national income brings more degradation to the environment
is critical for the design of development strategies for an economy (Ang, 2007).
Hence, a number of studies have attempted to assess the tie and to test for linear, as
well as quadratic and cubic relationships between per capita income and CO2
emissions. These studies deal with environmental degradation measure(s) as the
dependent variable(s) and income as the independent variable and provide mixed
results. On the other hand, there are several studies that realize the problem of
omitted variables bias and therefore include different explanatory variables ranging
from macroeconomic variables such as prices, population, income distribution and
trade balances to education, technology, and human development indicators
(Soytas et al. 2007). Including labor and gross fixed capital formation in their
model, (Soytas et al. 2007) examined the effect of energy consumption and output
on carbon emissions in the United States and explored the Granger 2 Antweiler
et al. (2001) and Coxhead (2003) postulate that this non-linear relationship
between environmental pollution and income levels can be explained by three
factors: scale, composition, and technique effects. The scale effect occurs as
pollution increases with the size of the economy. The composition effect refers to
the change in the production structure of an economy from agriculture-based to
industry and service-based which results in the reallocation of resources. Finally,
the pollution–income relationship also depends on techniques of production. An
improvement in techniques of production, i.e., the technique effect, may reduce the
amount of pollutant emissions per unit of production. 3. For a review of the
Environmental Kuznets Curve research see for example the works of Stagl (1999),
Yandle et al. (2002), Dinda (2004) and Stern (2004). 5 causality relationship
between income, energy consumption, and carbon emissions. They found that
income does not Granger-cause carbon emissions in the US in the long run, but
energy use does. Hence, income growth by itself may not become a solution to
environmental problems. The existing literature reveals that empirical finding
studies differ substantially and are not conclusive enough to offer policy
recommendations that can be applied across countries. In addition, few studies
focus on testing the nexus of output–energy and output–environmental degradation
under the same integrated framework. Ang (2007 and 2008) attempted to
investigate dynamic causal relationships between pollutant emissions, energy
consumption, and output using cointegration and vector error-correction modeling
techniques. Considering annual data for France for the period 1960–2000, Ang
(2007) provided empirical evidence of the existence of a fairly robust long-run
relationship between these variables. His causality results support the argument
that economic growth exerts a causal influence on growth of energy use and
growth of pollution in the long run. His results also point to a unidirectional
causality running from growth of energy use to output growth in the short-run. In
his other empirical work, Ang (2008) examined the relationship between output,
pollutant emissions, and energy consumption in Malaysia during the period 1971–
1999. His empirical results provide support for a robust long-run equilibrium
relationship between the variables, indicating that carbon emissions and energy use
are positively related to output in the long-run. The causality results support the
argument that economic growth exerts a positive causal influence on energy
consumption growth, both in the short-run as well as the long-run. The results also
provide some support for a feedback relationship in the long-run. With regards to
the output–pollution link, only a weak causality running from CO2 emissions
growth to economic growth was found in the long-run. Following the idea
of Ang (2007 and 2008) and given that energy consumption has a direct impact on
the level of environmental pollution; the above discussion highlights the
importance of linking these two strands of literatures together. The aim of this
country specific study is to understand long and short-run linkages between
economic growth, energy consumption and carbon emission using Tunisian data.
These linkages were largely under considered and unanswered for policy makers in
Tunisia and this empirical research attempts to present some findings to better
integrate the environment into economic development decisions. Also, this case
study for the Tunisian economy attempts to overcome the shortcomings in
literature related with these linkages in developing economies. Tunisia is an
interesting case study given that it is one of the highest growth economies in the
MENA region and energy supply in this country is insufficient to meet the
increasing demand. This research may be useful to formulate policy
recommendations from conservation, emission reduction and economic
performance viewpoints. Conclusions for Tunisia may be applied to several
countries, which have to go through a similar development path, increasing the
pressure of the current energy resources scarcity. In fact, having a better view on
the longrun equilibrium relationships and the short-run dynamics between GDP,
energy consumption, Without applying the cointegration techniques, Sari and
Soytas (2007) explore the inter-temporal link between energy consumption and
income in six developing countries, namely, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan,
Singapore, and Tunisia, within a multivariate framework that incorporates labor
and capital as in a production function. These authors employ the generalized
variance decompositions and generalized impulse response techniques to see if the
growth of income and energy consumption contains considerable information to
predict each other. In all countries, energy appears as an essential factor of
production. Results indicate that energy may be a relatively more important input
than labor and/or capital in some countries.
4. Conclusion
The aim of this country specific study is to understand long and short-run linkages
between economic growth, energy consumption and CO2 emission using Tunisian
data over the period 1971–2004. Statistical findings indicate that economic growth,
energy consumption and CO2 emission are related in the long-run and provide
some evidence of inefficient use of energy in Tunisia, since environmental pressure
tends to rise faster than economic growth. In the short run, results support the
argument that economic growth exerts a positive “causal” influence on energy
consumption growth. In addition, results from impulse response do not confirm the
hypothesis that an increase in pollution level induces economic expansion.
Although Tunisia has no commitment to reduce Greenhouse Gas emissions, energy
efficiency investments and emission reduction policies will not hurt economic
activities and can be a feasible policy tool for Tunisia.
The aim of this country specific study is to understand long and short-run linkages
between economic growth, energy consumption and CO2 emission using Tunisian
data over the period 1971–2004. Statistical findings indicate that economic growth,
energy consumption and CO2 emission are related in the long-run and provide
some evidence of inefficient use of energy in Tunisia, since environmental pressure
tends to rise faster than economic growth. In the short run, results support the
argument that economic growth exerts a positive “causal” influence on energy
consumption growth. In addition, results from impulse response do not confirm the
hypothesis that an increase in pollution level induces economic expansion.
Although Tunisia has no commitment to reduce Greenhouse Gas emissions, energy
efficiency investments and emission reduction policies will not hurt economic
activities and can be a feasible policy tool for Tunisia.
Hence, neutrality of energy does not seem to hold. 6 and CO2 emissions in Tunisia
may provide an answer to the question: to which extent can economic development
be sustained under various energy supply constraints and pollution scenarios?

With its annual GDP growth rate exceeding 5% since 1995, Tunisia is among
North African countries with the strongest growth potential. The improvement in
Tunisian major macroeconomic indicators is the result of a series of economic
reforms and prudent macroeconomic management (principally since the adoption
and implementation of the structural adjustment program). The Tunisian economy
is now diversified and less vulnerable than in the past to external shocks such as
climate hazards. Agriculture accounted for 12% of GDP in 2006. The
manufacturing sector accounted for more than 60% of industrial production, about
20% of the working population and 18.2% of GDP. The services sector represents
about 40% of GDP and half of the working population. It has expanded
significantly in the past few years and has driven Tunisian growth upwards. At
the sectoral level, growth in the last years was driven by strong domestic and
European demand. It was primarily stimulated by services (telecommunications in
particular), machinery and electricity industries, and construction and civil
engineering. Over the years, the manufacturing and tourist sectors have gained a
few percentage points of GDP to the detriment of the primary sector (agriculture,
oil and phosphates). In Tunisia, demand for energy, notably electricity, has risen
sharply during the last years. Household consumption has been the main engine of
growth; it represented 63.8% of GDP in 2006 (up 8.8% from 2005). The increase
of total primary energy consumption for the 1990–2005 period was very strong due
to the rapid economic growth caused by increased tourism, transportation and
industrial activities, as well as the increase in the standard of living of the Tunisian
population.
Global intergration
Executive Summary i. Tunisia’s past integration policies brought important economic benefits to the
country. However, significant challenges remain. Thanks to a policy of gradual opening to the global
economy, Tunisia’s exports, particularly manufactures, have become more competitive in global
markets, and trade costs have been falling steadily towards all partners since 1995.The country saw
also a significant increase in FDI flows in the manufacturing sector, including substantial rise of the
textiles/clothing and mechanical/electrical components through participation to EU production
networks. Increased exports and FDI inflows were the main drivers1 of economic growth, which
averaged over 5 percent following the opening of the country to international trade2 . These
changes, however, have remained limited. Tunisia’s integration with the global economy remains
superficial, both in quantities and sophistication of exports. In a sense, Tunisia does not ‘produce’ its
manufacturing exports. It is mostly serving as a re-exporting hub for products originated and sold
elsewhere —mainly France and Italy3 . This highly skewed trade pattern reflects the duality of the
Tunisian economy, which has become increasingly concentrated towards low value added activities4
. Geographic diversification of exports has also been very limited, with the EU absorbing nearly 80
percent of Tunisia’s exports and, within the EU, France and Italy accounting for more than 55
percent of total exports. ii. Policy related obstacles to competitive trade in both goods and services
persist. Heavy and pervasive intervention by the State in the economy continues to limit competition
in the onshore sector and trade integration, particularly in services sectors. Widespread restrictions
to the number of firms allowed to operate in the market have been coupled with many legal (public)
monopolies and undue regulatory constraints, severely limiting competition. In fact, sectors in which
investment faces restrictions account for over 50 percent of the Tunisian economy, whether through
the Investment Incentives Code, the Competition Law or specific sectoral legislation5 . Many of these
sectors at present remain de facto closed to competition6 . In this context, the onshore sector is
operating at a low-efficiency/productivity levels and is preventing other sectors and the economy as
a whole from increasing productivity and value added7 . iii. These challenges put the country at risk
of gradually losing ground vis-à-vis its competitors. The framework for international trade has
changed dramatically in the past decade. Traditional trade implied the exchange of goods produced
in one country that were to be sold in another. Today the world is rapidly moving towards global
supply-chain trade, where goods are produced globally. This type of trade, which involves strong
complementarities at the international 1 Together with large public investments and private
consumption 2 Real GDP growth from 1995 to 2008 (source: WDI) 3 Tunisia DPR, WB 2013 4
Companies from Europe have outsourced the assembly tasks and other low value added tasks to
Tunisia, taking advantage of the very favorable offshore tax regime, the availability of cheap low-
skilled human resources and the subsidized energy. This has made extremely difficult to move
beyond assembly tasks and low value added processes. 5 See Chapters two and three of this report 6
Tunisia DPR, WB 2013 7 A forthcoming study (Weak links in Tunisia 2014) shows the role of low
productivity sectors, mostly located onshore and characterized by lack of market access and
consequent distorted market power, as a constrain to the overall productivity of the economy. This
is particularly the case for downstream sectors that provide intermediate inputs to final production,
which then act as a drag on increasing productivity of the upstream sectors and hurt also prospects
to climb up the value added chain. vi level (with production processes split across countries), has
rendered obsolete the old model of “exchange of market access” between FTA partners (which has
largely driven Tunisia’s opening to the world). The political economy of regionalism has changed and
the new ‘trade-investmentservice” nexus made possible by the IT revolution has ushered a new
bargain, one of “foreign factories for domestic reforms” (Baldwin 2011). In this context, protection in
goods and services markets leads to exclusion from partaking in the growing supply-chain trade.
Behind-the-border reforms and institutions are more than ever necessary to attract FDI to obtain the
‘backbone’ services necessary to participate effectively in the world trading system. Openness in
services is therefore key to benefit from openness in goods markets since these services are bundled
in goods trade. Countries that have realized this have progressed much faster than Tunisia and have
become more competitive in global markets8 . iv. Tunisia needs to re-assess its global integration
strategy. While the perception in Tunisia is that economic growth has been characterized by trade
integration and strong export performance, in fact trade integration remains highly limited and
export performance has been deteriorating. Tunisian export growth during 2000 to 2010 was
positive (3.3 percent) but slower than export growth in many other countries and also slower than
Tunisian GDP growth. In fact Tunisia’s share of goods exports in world trade has been declining over
the past decade. As shown in this report, Tunisia’s trade costs have declined regularly over the past
two decades, but the trade costs of competitors have generally fallen faster so that Tunisia has not
increased its competitiveness vis-à-vis comparator groups and, if anything, it might have lost ground
over the period. As a small economy of just over 10 million people, greater integration in the global
economy remains critical to Tunisia’s economic success. Hence, the need to re-assess its global
integration: the ultimate objective is for Tunisia to strategically use its preferential partners to break
into global markets, particularly in a context where production takes place increasingly through
global value chains. v. With the neighboring European Single Market accounting for a quarter of
world trade and outward investment, deeper integration with the EU should remain a core element
of Tunisia’s integration strategy. The European Neighborhood Policy (2004) offers the EU's neighbors
the prospect of a significant measure of economic integration through gradual integration in the
internal market and deepening of political, cultural and social cooperation. Beyond the ongoing
negotiations, or preparations for negotiations in the areas of trade in agriculture and trade in
services, the EU formally opened discussion on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements
(DCFTA) with Tunisia. The DCFTA will be a comprehensive agreement on trade and economic
relations covering a full range of regulatory areas, such as trade facilitation, technical barriers to
trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, investment protection, public procurement and
competition policy. The main objective will be the progressive integration of the economy of Tunisia
into the EU single market. This constitutes an opportunity to further open Tunisia and make it more
competitive in global markets. Further integration with the EU would require the implementation of
comprehensive policy reforms to improve the investment climate, raise productivity, and eliminate a
host of trade barriers. Main Findings Gains from deep and multilateral trade liberalization are
estimated to be substantial for Tunisia, considerably above those from shallow liberalization.
Estimates from an economy-wide 8 These countries, considered as a benchmark to Tunisia based on
either the economic structure, similar factor endowments or the range of income level, include
Chile, Slovak Republic, Poland, Turkey, Malaysia and Korea. vii simulation model for this report- that
takes into account the linkages between goods trade and services trade- show that deep integration
(i.e. including the removal of non-tariff barriers) and multilateral goods trade liberalization would
generate a significant increase in output and in household welfare (respectively 10 and 12 percent).
The greatest benefits are likely to come from deep (in contrast with shallow) liberalization of both
goods and services. The EU remains the preferred partner for Tunisia and the EU market likely to
generate the largest gains from deeper integration9 . More specifically: • Significant benefits would
accrue from the reduction in non-tariff measures (NTMs). NTMs are a drag on trade in commodities
and do not result in government revenues. Thus, eliminating NTMs substantially improves the
outcomes of either MFN or preferential trade agreements. For instance, while shallow MFN
liberalization was found to improve welfare from 1 to 5 percent, deep MFN liberalization that
includes NTMs improves welfare between 8 and 9 percent. • Services trade magnifies the gains from
deep goods trade liberalization and is particularly beneficial for wage and salary earners. Welfare
gains from liberalization in services are in the range of 2-3 percent but could reach 11-14 percent in
the case of joint MFN in goods and services trade. Foreign investment into services would result in
increased local demand for labor, pushing up wages and salaries significantly, by about 18
percent10; vi. The cost of non-reform is therefore very high. The background papers prepared for
this report assess the main regulatory and institutional bottlenecks that still prevent the country
from reaping the benefits from greater and deeper integration with regional partners, primarily the
EU. In the case of services, this report identifies both horizontal and sectoral policies to move
towards a more competitive environment and identifies the potential costs (in terms of lost benefits)
of not moving forward with this agenda. A number of reform options to the current competition
policy framework have also been identified that would broaden the country’s engagement with the
global economy. Most of the reforms to remove these bottlenecks are domestic ones and the key
ones could be undertaken unilaterally. However, international and regional trade integration would
strengthen this process by helping to build consensus and locking in these necessary reforms. vii.
The sequencing of reforms is very important: trade liberalization should be preceded by reforms of
the business environment and competition at large. Opening a services sector to 9 In all
liberalization scenarios, the greatest gains would come either from multilateral liberalization or from
regional integration with the EU 10 Positive welfare implications of services liberalization are even
larger if competition can be allowed and guaranteed between providers. It is important to note
though that these scenarios do not take into account the specific nature of services trade
liberalization. Studies by Konan and Maskus (2003a) and Konan and van Assche (2007) indicate
market structure and regulations play a significant role in the liberalization of services, particularly
for Mode 3. For instance simulation of welfare implication of allowing foreign providers to enter
Tunisia's key services sectors (in this case telecommunication) shows that the welfare implications
are clearly positive if competition can be guaranteed between providers. Welfare gains can be up to
0.65 percent if the foreign provider is 15 percent more efficient than the domestic incumbent and
does not shift its profits abroad. In contrast, services liberalization would be welfare deteriorating if
the foreign provider colludes with the domestic incumbent. These findings highlight the importance
of implementing services liberalization in a suitable regulatory (competition enhancing) framework.
viii domestic (e.g. privatization or suppression of a public monopoly) and/or foreign competition
without paying attention to the domestic regulatory and competition environment could have
negative effects, allowing for example anti-competitive behaviors and price increases. Transitioning
from a rent system, the government needs to ensure that regulatory reforms are effective to
guarantee greater competition and remedy market failures. The scope of the reforms goes beyond
negotiations in preferential trade agreements and should be on the agenda of the government at
large, and include all line Ministries involved in the reform process, with the Ministry of Trade
playing a pivotal role. viii. It is essential to coordinate reforms under multiple ongoing agreements
and negotiations. Multilateral concessions (engagements) are seen as a first best, topped up by
some “open regionalism”. Tunisia is under pressure to carry out reforms in multiple spheres:
domestic reform agenda; bilateral/ regional trade negotiations; WTO negotiations, etc. Sometime,
the concessions asked from individual countries could be conflicting – for instance if market access is
granted on a preferential basis. There is a risk that the multiplication of Preferential Trade
Agreements (PTAs) will generate conflicting rules or add to the complexity of trade (e.g.
administrative burden attached to conflicting rules of origin across PTAs). Greater transparency and
information sharing should help the prevention of such conflicts. It is however recommended to
favor multilateral concessions (i.e. in the GATS) that could be topped-up by some “open regionalism”
and avoid discrimination. ix. The international dimension of market access must be reflected also in
the ongoing reform of the national public procurement system. Public procurement plays an
increasingly important role in the global economy. Each year, it can be estimated that approximately
US$4,000 billion is devoted to purchases through public procurement, including 2,288 billion Euros
in 2009 for the countries of the European Union and US$535 billion in 2010 for the U.S Federal
Government. The stakes are thus quite sizeable, as on average public procurement represents 15
percent of the GDP in these countries. The figures are even higher in developing countries where
public investment remains the key driver of national growth. Public procurement bears economic
leverage through targeted social and economic actions, offers market prospects to the private
sector, can help to generate budget savings through adequate reforms, and has a key role in
development and in the fight against corruption. For these reasons it has been given increasing
international attention during the recent years, and several countries have launched national reform
programs. x. For Tunisia, the negotiations for access to its public procurement and of its own
companies’ access to public procurement in other countries clearly show these stakes. The
preliminary discussions with the European Union and the United States have shown the same to be
true for its partners. Therefore the topic requires all the more attention, especially as the
assessment of Tunisia’s public procurement system that launched in 2011, after regulations of public
procurement had been revised to boost public investment, is currently at the recommendation
phase for comprehensive reforms in national procedures, while the introduction of e-signature
procedures for procurements are also being planned. At this stage, it is important to include an
international component into the public procurement reform in Tunisia. At the moment, however,
there is no international or regional dimension in terms of access to public procurement. The US and
EU currently rely on an international model (the UN General Agreement on Public Procurement, or
GPA) which could also inspire future bilateral negotiations. To the extent some countries in the
region are also in bilateral negotiations with the EU or the US, the regional dimension will inevitably
emerge. ix xi. Tunisia might ensure the consistency of the conditions to access its public
procurement system to avoid the stacking of different rules that would be specific to specific
agreements. It is also recommended to reduce any risk of misinterpretation due to lack of clarity in
the legal texts and regulations of the country in this field. The current regulatory framework does in
fact hesitate between openness and protectionism. It is important to reduce any uncertainty and
spell out the conditions for access of foreign companies. Conclusion xii. The political and economic
events since January 2011 have contributed to change the context in which Tunisia is shaping its
own global integration agenda. This changing landscape presents new challenges but also
opportunities to advance integration in a rapidly globalizing world trade environment. On one side,
Tunisia has a great deal to gain from deepening trade and economic integration with its regional and
global partners: trade and investment are in fact a key engine of sustainable growth and
employment creation. On the other side, this report argues that Tunisia won’t be in the position to
fully gain from deeper integration if trade and investment restrictions, a legacy from the old
economic and political model, persist and continue to prevent a more efficient allocation of
resources. Firms and economic agents, and by extensions Tunisians households, cannot benefit from
increased market opening if competition remains stifled and market opportunities limited by an
uneven domestic regulatory environment.