Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Part 1 : The introduction of European colonial law to Asian and African colonies
Part 2: Racial and colonial difference under the law
Part 3: Adjudication of indigenous laws - a dual system of laws
Part 4: The search for indigenous authority, the rigidification of such law, and repugnancy
clauses
Part 5: Critiques of colonial treatment of indigenous laws, the status of indigenous law in
post-colonial states, and forum shopping
Legal Pluralism in colonial states
Colonialism and legal orientalism denied the social, religious and political norms in Asian and
African countries.
Colonial powers took the function of the states and their approach to the indigenous laws took 2
main forms:
- Colonialism took the notion of terra nullius to deny any existence of pre-colonial law
- Dealing with the increasing legal pluralism.
Brian Tamanaha (2008) notes the three basic strategies used to incorporate indigenous laws within the
legal systems of the colonial states:
• The codification of customary or religious laws;
• State courts apply unwritten religious laws in a manner similar to common law; and
• Creation or recognition of customary ‘courts’ run by local leaders.
Legal Pluralism in colonial states
• The problem of percolation - no matter what laws existed at the national level, they may not have
been effective at the local level.
• However, ‘foreign’ state based laws were not always seen as an imposition, they could be
strategically used by people who may not have found the customary law to be in their favour.
Introducing colonial law to the colony
• Most important thing to remember: There was/is no universal experience of colonial law.
• While indigenous laws were tolerated, the colonial authorities displayed a deep mistrust of the
indigenous elite who were tasked with making such laws intelligible to the authorities.
• ‘For example, the common practice of qadis of charging both plaintiff and defendant for
judgment in a case struck the British as corrupt, but the practice may have been partly
understood as a way of penalizing both sides for allowing conflict to escalate and returning both
parties to the community without the aggravating stigma of “loser” attached to either side.’
• Soon the colonial judges determined that the courts had built enough case-law to decide on
future cases, and at least in India they did away with religious leaders that had so far been
attached to the courts.
• In the colonies, indigenous law, which so far had been oral and fluid, now took on the
characteristics of common law, and as each case looked towards the past for precedent, the
fluidity of customary and religious laws was soon lost.
Repugnancy clauses
• Indigenous laws were to be tolerated only if they were not repugnant to colonial values.
• In British territories the clause could take the form of ‘repugnant to justice, equity and good
conscience’ or ‘repugnant to natural justice and morality’.
• If there was any doubt as to whose morality or ideas of good conscience should be taken into
account, in Waghela v Sheikh Masludin (1887) in India the court equated ‘justice, equity and
good conscience’ with ‘English law if found applicable to society and circumstances.’
• Similarly in Gwao bin Kilimo v Kisunda bin Ifuti (1938) a British judge in Tanganyika Territory
(part of present day Tanzania) ruled: ‘I have no doubt whatever that the only standard of justice
and morality which a British court in Africa can apply is its own British standard. Otherwise we
should find ourselves in certain circumstances having to condone such things, for example, as
the institution of slavery.’
• Repugnancy clauses were used against polygamy and ‘wife purchase’ in Kenya in R v Amyeko
(1917), to free fathers from the liability for debts raised by their adult sons in Tanganyika, and to
prevent the use of mutilation or torture in punishment authorised under customary law in
Nigeria.
• At the same time, Victorian morality forced certain ‘repugnant’ laws on Asian and African legal
systems such as criminalising homosexuality or restitution of conjugal rights.
Creation of the categories of ‘judicial customary law’ or ‘judicial religious laws’ for all
customs or religious practices were not equally recognised or given the status of ‘law’ by
the courts.
While indigenous laws were accepted, indigenous law enforcing institutions were mostly
set aside.
On issues where gaps in indigenous law were found, courts were encouraged to use
‘justice, equity and good conscience’ to create new laws.
The need for repeated translations to make local laws intelligible to British officials led to many
translation errors, these were rarely corrected. Thus, distortions were accepted as law.
Today countries continue to rely on colonial interpretations of indigenous law, especially where
pre-colonial law was mostly oral in nature.
Many argue that Hindu and Muslim laws in the Indian subcontinent are best described as Anglo-
Hindu and Anglo-Mohammedan law for they bear the heavy imprint of British colonialism. As
Derrett (1961) noted: ‘the administration of what is called Anglo-Hindu law proceeds upon lines
which merely prolong those laid down well before Independence.’
Or as Ebrahim Moosa has argued in the context of Islamic law, transculturation has altered
these laws forever.
‘The ultimate irony of customary law is that although state law must recognise and apply custom in
order to make itself a part of the culture, state law cannot use custom without turning it into something
else.’
• Some sought to expand the scope of religious laws from purely personal matters to even
commercial and criminal laws. For instance the turn to Islamic Law in Pakistan.
• Most others have maintained the uneasy truce between customary/religious laws and
state law that was established in the colonial period.
Forum Shopping
• Faced with overlapping jurisdictions and multiple (often competing) legal institutions that they
could access the indigenous people often chose the forum that they believed would be the most
advantageous for their case.
• Benton refers to this process as ‘jurisdictional jockeying’ and through the cases of Naderah
Begam in India in the 18th C and Kwame Kangah in the Ivory Coast in the 20 th C she shows us how
the indigenous elites were able to use colonial legal pluralism for their own benefit.
We must not forget that due to their close connections with the colonial state, the indigenous
elites had far more access to forum shopping than the vast majority of the population who
tended to mistrust the colonial courts.
For instance, in their study of local courts in Tanganyika Territory in the 1930s two
anthropologists found that ‘colonial subjects were ready to suffer an injustice they understood
rather than seek an impartial justice which they did not understand.’
Conclusions
• Colonial law took different forms at different times and in different colonies.
• Indigenous laws - both religious and customary - underwent significant changes in the colonial
period, the impact of which can be felt in post-colonial states even today.
• Colonial law was both an instrument of domination as well as the site of subversion and
strategic manoeuvrings.