Public Version of HPC PCSR3 Sub-Chapter 5.4 - Components and Systems Sizing PDF

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HPC PCSR3 – Sub-chapter 5.4 – Reference:
HPC-NNBOSL-U0-000-RES-
Components and Systems Sizing 100027
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NNB GENERATION COMPANY
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(HPC) LTD

HPC PCSR3:
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CHAPTER 5 – REACTOR COOLANT
SYSTEM AND ASSOCIATED SYSTEMS
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SUB-CHAPTER 5.4 – COMPONENTS AND

SYSTEMS SIZING
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. MAIN COOLANT PUMPS .................................................................... 1
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1.1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION AND OPERATION................................ 1
1.2. DESIGN BASIS.................................................................................... 7
1.3. MANUFACTURING, PROCUREMENT, TESTING AND
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INSPECTIONS ................................................................................... 10
1.4. HIGH INTEGRITY COMPONENT ...................................................... 13
2. STEAM GENERATORS .................................................................... 15
2.1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION AND OPERATION.............................. 15
2.2. DESIGN BASIS.................................................................................. 20
2.3. PROCUREMENT, MANUFACTURING, TESTING AND
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INSPECTION ..................................................................................... 27
2.4. HIGH INTEGRITY COMPONENTS .................................................... 28
3. MAIN COOLANT LINE ...................................................................... 31
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3.2. DESIGN BASIS.................................................................................. 33
INSPECTIONS ................................................................................... 39
3.4. HIGH INTEGRITY COMPONENT ANALYSIS [REF. 3] .................... 42
4. PRESSURISER.................................................................................. 44
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4.2. DESIGN BASIS.................................................................................. 47

INSPECTIONS ................................................................................... 53
4.4. HIGH INTEGRITY COMPONENTS .................................................... 55
5. PRESSURISER RELIEF LINE ........................................................... 57
5.2. DESIGN BASIS.................................................................................. 60
INSPECTIONS ................................................................................... 61
6. VALVES ............................................................................................. 61

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6.2. DESIGN BASIS.................................................................................. 62

INSPECTIONS ................................................................................... 63
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7. PRESSURISER SAFETY RELIEF VALVES (PSRV) ........................ 63
7.2. DESIGN BASIS.................................................................................. 65
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7.3. COMPLIANCE WITH DESIGN REQUIREMENTS – SINGLE
FAILURE CRITERION ....................................................................... 66
INSPECTIONS ................................................................................... 66
8. PRIMARY DEPRESSURISATION SYSTEM (PDS) VALVES ........... 67
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8.2. DESIGN BASIS.................................................................................. 68
8.3. COMPLIANCE WITH DESIGN REQUIREMENTS – SINGLE
FAILURE CRITERION (SFC)............................................................. 69
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INSPECTIONS ................................................................................... 69
9. PRIMARY COMPONENT SUPPORTS .............................................. 69
9.1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION............................................................. 70
9.2. DESIGN BASIS.................................................................................. 73
INSPECTIONS ................................................................................... 75
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10. REFERENCES ................................................................................... 76

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SUB-CHAPTER 5.4 – COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS SIZING
Sub-chapter 5.4 provides a description of the main reactor coolant systems and components,
including as appropriate:
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 the roles and relevant operating conditions,
 the design criteria to be applied,
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 the materials and their properties, and
 the manufacturing, procurement, testing and inspection details.
The systems and components covered include: the Main Coolant Pumps (MCPs), the Steam
Generators (SGs), the Main Coolant Lines (MCLs), the Pressuriser (PZR) and PZR relief line,
valves associated with the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB), PZR Safety Relief
Valves (PSRVs) and Primary Depressurisation System (PDS) valves, and the primary
component supports.
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1. MAIN COOLANT PUMPS
The supplier for the HPC EPR MCPs is AREVA NP establishment of Jeumont. This company is
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the supplier for the previous EPR project (Flamanville 3 (FA3) and Olkiluoto 3 (OL3)), and has
already manufactured MCPs similar in design to that proposed for the HPC EPR reactor.
The MCPs are Nuclear Pressure Equipment (NPE) and are subject to the associated
requirements.
The MCPs are High Integrity Components (HICs) which satisfy all the design requirements
described in section 1.6 of Sub-chapter 3.4.
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1.1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION AND OPERATION
1.1.1. Role of the Equipment
Normal Operation
The MCP provide a reactor coolant flow rate that is sufficient to remove heat from the reactor
core and limit the temperature of the fuel, thereby maintaining the integrity of the fuel cladding. It
also provides a sufficient flow to ensure the PZR normal spray operation.
During plant start-up, the MCP are used to enable the Reactor Coolant System (RCP [RCS])
temperature increase.
Additionally the MCP seal system acts as a barrier to the release of radioactive material.

Fault conditions
In case the MCP stops, the pump rotating inertia should ensure adequate flow and suitable
margin to boiling crisis before automatic Reactor Trip (RT).
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1.1.2. Description
The general assembly is given in Section 5.4.1 – Figure 1.
Each MCP consists of a mixed flow single-stage vertical pump, designed to pump large volumes
of reactor coolant at high pressure and temperature.
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The three major elements are the pump, the shaft seals and the motor.
 The hydraulic unit is made up of the casing, an impeller, a diffuser and a suction adapter.
The other elements of the pump are the shaft, the main bearing and its auxiliary bearing,
the thermal barrier flange and heat exchanger, the thermal barrier cover fitted with
thermal shields, the main flange, the coupling, the spool piece and the motor support.
 The pump shaft sealing system is made up of three HydroDynamic (HD) seals mounted
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in series and a StandStill Seal System (DEA [SSSS]). The DEA [SSSS] system prevents
leakage when the MCP has stopped and the two seal leak-off lines have been isolated in
case of cascade failure of the three seals (see section 0).
 The motor is a squirrel cage induction motor, protected from water spray, with a solid
shaft, a double thrust bearing of the Kingsbury oil-lubricated type, upper and lower oil film
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radial guide bearings and a flywheel.
All parts in the MCP can be replaced, with the exception of the casing, which is welded to the
reactor coolant loop.
The MCP is supported vertically by three support columns fixed to the three casing support lugs,
and restrained horizontally by two snubbers fixed to the upper flange of the motor support. A
restraint is also fitted in front of the casing support foot opposite the cold leg.
The detailed list of level 1 MCP assembly components is shown in Section 5.4.1 – Table 1.
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1.1.2.1. Pump
Reactor coolant enters the suction nozzle of the casing, is directed towards the impeller by the
suction adapter, passes through the impeller and exits through the diffuser and the discharge
nozzle.
All parts of the MCP in contact with reactor coolant are manufactured from stainless steel,
except for the seals, bearings and some specific parts. The material grades are detailed in
Section 5.4.1 – Table 2.
The casing is an integral casting made from austenitic-ferritic stainless steel. Casting has
previously been successful in producing the complex shape of the pump casing. This method of
producing casings has been selected because it guarantees good in-service behaviour,
manufacturing quality and reliability conditions (see section 1.3.2). The impeller is fixed to the
pump shaft by a Hirth-type tooth gearing and studs (around the perimeter and in the centre).
The diffuser is bolted to the base of the thermal barrier flange.

An injection flow to the seals is supplied by the Chemical and Volume Control System (RCV
[CVCS]) at a pressure slightly above that of the reactor coolant. It enters the pump through a
pipe on the thermal barrier flange, and is directed into the cavity located between the thermal
barrier and the shaft seals. This flow divides into two, one part flowing up the shaft through the
seals, the other flowing down the shaft through the thermal barrier heat exchanger and the
auxiliary bearing, where it mixes with the reactor coolant.
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The Component Cooling Water System (RRI [CCWS]) supplies cooling water to the thermal
barrier heat exchanger. During normal operation the thermal barrier heat exchanger limits the
heat transfer between the hot reactor coolant and the auxiliary bearing and the seals. If a loss of
injection flow to the seals occurs, the thermal barrier heat exchanger cools the reactor coolant
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flowing up the shaft to an acceptable level before it comes into contact with the seals.
The MCP main radial bearing, located on the diffuser, is a hydrostatic bearing and is lubricated
by existing fluid in the casing. An auxiliary hydrodynamic bearing, located on the thermal barrier
heat exchanger, takes over from the main radial bearing if pressure and temperature transients
in the primary circuit impair its operation.
The MCP internal components can be easily removed from the casing.
Particular attention has been taken into account during design for internal components in order
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to integrate feedback from French OPEX, particularly to minimise the risks of loosening and
rupture of the internal bolting of the pump.
The spool piece, located between the pump shaft and the motor shaft, enables maintenance
work on the shaft seals system without removing the motor. Seal maintenance work can
therefore be carried out quickly. (An oil injection method is used to assemble the coupling on the
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pump shaft).
The studs and nuts for the casing and seal No.1 housing are designed to be tightened by
hydraulic tensioning or by a heating technique.
1.1.2.2. Shaft Sealing System
The shaft sealing system, shown in Section 5.4.1 – Figure 2, reduces the pressure from reactor
coolant pressure to ambient pressure.
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The three identical hydrodynamic seal stages each provides one third of the total pressure drop.
Each of these stages is able to withstand full primary pressure on its own.
Each stage is composed of the mechanical seal itself, plus a staging coil (flow restrictor)
arranged in parallel to the mechanical seal, connecting the upstream seal cavity and the
downstream cavity. Each staging coil is calibrated (length and diameter) in order to provide a
constant pressure drop between each stage. Most of flow passing through the sealing system
circulates through these staging coils, enabling a constant and stable system leakage.
Two leak-off lines are needed: one to collect seal No.3 leakage discharged to the Nuclear Vent
and Drain System (RPE [NVDS]), and another to collect the flow after the third staging coil
discharged to the RCV [CVCS] system.
The shaft seal system allows continuous operation of the pump after failure of No.1 or No.2 seal,
until the next scheduled maintenance operation, and permits an orderly plant shutdown without
excessive loss of coolant in the event of degradation of a second stage.

In case of the failure of one seal stage (except the seal No.3), the pump is still operable with the
both remaining seals until the next scheduled re-fuelling.
In case of the failure of No.1 and No.2 seal stages, MCP seals operation must be possible
during 24 hours in rotation (maximal delay for the operator to initiate the return to shutdown)
plus 24 hours pump off (to allow the RCP [RCS] system depressurisation).
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In case of No.3 seal failure, the pump is operable with remaining seals. Shutdown is performed
within 24 hours plus 24 hours pump off.
When cascade failure of all three shaft seals is detected, the staging coil leak off line and the
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No.3 seal leak off line are immediately and automatically isolated, the MCP is immediately and
automatically tripped; and the DEA [SSSS] system actuation sequence is manually launched.
Indeed, in spite of the ability of the hydrodynamic sealing system, to withstand accidental
conditions, the DEA [SSSS] system will be used, as a defence in depth, in order to meet leak
tightness requirement in the event of concurrent failure of all three shaft seals under normal
RCP [RCS] system thermal hydraulic conditions.
The DEA [SSSS] system is located on the upper section of the shaft sealing system, above seal
No.3. Once the pump is shut down, a piston ring, actuated by a low-pressure nitrogen supply,
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closes the air gap between the shaft and this ring, and creates a leak-tight metal to metal
surface contact. This ensures that the shaft is leak-tight once the pump is shut down and all the
leak-off lines are closed
The DEA [SSSS] system is designed to:

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 Close, once activated, in the event of the pressure and temperature resulting from
Station Black Out (SBO).
 Isolate the significant leak which would result from a cascade failure of the shaft seals.
 Prevent damage to the shaft sealing system in the event of inadvertent closure of the
DEA [SSSS] system when the pump is running.
 Prevent auto-closure in the event of a cascade failure of the shaft seal sealing system.
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 Remain leak-tight once activated until a very low reactor coolant pressure is reached,
even if nitrogen supply pressure is lost.
Automatic actuation of the DEA [SSSS] system is not required.
In case of an accident leading to long term loss of seals cooling (simultaneous loss of the RCV
[CVCS] and RRI [CCWS] systems), the MCP is immediately and automatically stopped; the
staging coil leak-off line is automatically isolated. The RCP [RCS] system integrity is then
ensured by HD seal system stage No.3 itself, after isolation of staging coil leak-off line.
Consequently, the shaft sealing system is fitted with ‘O’ rings manufactured with a grade of
material qualified for high pressures and temperatures.

1.1.2.3. Motor
The motor is an air-cooled squirrel cage induction motor, with Class F thermo-elastic epoxy
insulation. A flywheel and reverse anti-rotation device are fitted in the upper section of the
motor.
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The bearings are of standard design. The radial bearings are pad type bearings, and the thrust
bearing comprises a Kingsbury-type double thrust bearing. All bearings are oil lubricated. Water
from the RRI [CCWS] system feeds the external oil cooler for the upper guide bearing and the
integrated oil cooler for the lower guide bearing.
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A high-pressure injection system provides an oil film in the thrust bearing surfaces before and
during start up and shutdown. It also sprays oil into the upper guide bearing.
The motors’ internal components are air-cooled. Integrated fans at each end of the rotor draw air
in through inlets in the frame of the motor. This air circulates within the motor and in particular to
the stator end windings. It is then discharged through the outer water/air heat exchangers
cooled by the RRI [CCWS] system.
Each motor is fitted with two heat exchangers, one each side of the motor frame. Air circulates
from the motor through the heat exchangers, and is then discharged to the pump cell. The heat
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exchangers are designed to maintain the discharged air at an optimal temperature. Any heat not
removed by the coolers is discharged into the containment area, and is extracted by the
Containment Cooling Ventilation System (EVR [CCVS]).
Six holes in the flywheel allow periodic ultrasonic in-service inspection of the most highly
stressed areas, located in the keyway corners, without the need to remove the flywheel by
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removing its cover.
1.1.2.4. Oil Collecting Devices
The total oil inventory contained in the bearings of the MCP motor is distributed in the following
locations:
 upper bearing,
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 oil cooler, and
 lower bearing.
The sectional drawing of the MCP motor in Section 5.4.1 – Figure 3 illustrates these locations
together with corresponding oil volumes.
The MCPs are conservatively designed to reduce the likelihood of an oil leakage. In the event of
a leak occurring, measures are provided to avoid oil release onto the floor, reducing the
likelihood for the outbreak of fire. These are:
 Detection systems in the reactor coolant pumps which monitor parameters that will
provide an early indication of a leak. The level of oil in the bearings of the MCPs is
monitored constantly. A decrease in the level of oil will trigger a ‘low oil level’ alarm in the
Main Control Room (MCR). The affected pump can then be manually switched off, from
the MCR, and the cause of the alarm investigated.

 Oil collection devices which are attached to the coolant pump body at all potential leak
sources. Under normal operating conditions no oil is present in these oil collecting
devices.
1.1.2.5. Instrumentation and Control (I&C)
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Each MCP is fitted with the following instrumentation for monitoring the main operational
parameters:
 three temperature detectors at the No.1 shaft seal inlet,
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 one pressure sensor between No.1 and No.2 seals,
 one pressure sensor between No.2 and No.3 seals,
 two position detectors for the DEA [SSSS] system (open and closed position),
 two shaft displacement sensors at the level of the motor coupling,
 two shaft displacement sensors at the level of the pump coupling,

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 one axial shaft displacement sensor at flywheel,
 one phase sensor at the top of the spool piece,

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 two vibration sensors at the level of the motor upper bearing,
 two vibration sensors on the lower flange of the motor,
 two tachometric sensors for nominal speed measurement, at the level of the motor
coupling,
 one tachometric sensor for low speed measurement, at the top of the spool piece,
 three temperature detectors for the motor lower guide bearing pads,
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 three temperature detectors for the motor upper guide bearing pads,
 three temperature detectors for the lower pads of the motor axial double thrust bearing,
 three temperature detectors for the upper pads of the motor axial double thrust bearing,
 four temperature detectors for each phase of the motor stator,
 one pressure gauge and one pressure switch on the oil injection device for the motor
axial double thrust bearing, and
 on each oil tank:
o one thermometer for local temperature measurement,
o one low / high levels detector,

o one analogue level sensor, and
o one sight level for local verification of the oil level.
1.1.3. Operating Conditions
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The MCPs are designed to operate during the following normal conditions:
 at power, and
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in hot and cold shutdown.
The MCPs are designed to be started up at a minimum pressure of 23.5 bar abs.
They must be able to operate during the RCP [RCS] system overpressure transients.
The MCP is designed to withstand all degraded conditions (PCC-2 to 4 and DEC A, DEC B).
They notably have to ensure their operation and / or integrity in following conditions: overspeed,
degraded coolant, degraded containment conditions, SGTR.
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The main operating conditions of the RCP [RCS] system are described in Sub-chapter 5.1.
1.2. DESIGN BASIS

This section covers the design basis of the equipment [Ref. 1] [Ref. 2].
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1.2.1. Principles and Objectives
The design of the EPR MCPs is based on the N4 MCPs. However, it has been updated in order
to cope with improvement issued from the EPR design.
 Pump operation at low pressure when the Safety Injection System / Residual Heat
Removal System (RIS/RRA [SIS/RHRS]) is connected to the RCP [RCS] system and is
operating in residual heat removal mode.
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 Removal for a need of a back-up system for rapid injection at the shaft seals in the event
of total loss of electrical power.
 HD seals, this a development specific to the HPC EPR.
The main design parameters for the MCPs are given in Section 5.4.1 - Table 3 (manometric
head at nominal flow rate).The pump’s hydraulic casing design is extrapolated from the N4
design. It is able, to withstand additional variations of pressure in the RCP [RCS] system so that
the developed head, at nominal flow rate, is within the design limits indicated in Section 5.4.1 –
Table 3. However:
 The inner diameter is slightly increased, which results in a slight increase in the wall
thickness.
 The suction and discharge nozzle diameters have been adapted to the diameter of the
RCP [RCS] system loop, principally resulting in a slight alteration to the dimensions of
the discharge cone.

 The suction and discharge nozzles length have been extended in order to improve
access for Ultrasonic Testing (UT).
 The radial thickness of the upper flange has been increased, as has the diameter of the
casing studs.
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Design of the EPR MCP hydraulic casing is defined by an advanced flow computation code and
confirmed by many scale tests on a hydraulic model on the MCP supplier’s test loop. During the
plant commissioning phase, initial tests of the RCP [RCS] system will be carried out in order to
verify the hydraulic performance of the MCP.
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A tolerance range for the MCP characteristics, combined with uncertainty about the hydraulic
pressure drop of the RCP [RCS] system loop, results in a defined range of the MCP
performance encompassing the nominal flow rate. The minimum (thermo-hydraulic) and
maximum (mechanical) design flow rates for the RCP [RCS] system bound this range (see
Section 5.4.1 – Table 3).
 The MCP rotor equipped with its flywheel provides sufficient inertia:
o To ensure that the house load operation threshold signal is not activated for at
least one second in the event of loss of motor power supply. In addition, the
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period between reaching this house load operation signal and the automatic
reactor shutdown signal (on MCP low speed) must be greater than
{ SCI removed }.
o To ensure the appropriate flow rate, and therefore sufficient Departure from
Nucleate Boiling (DNB) margins before the automatic shutdown of the reactor
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(triggered by the MCP low speed) in the event of a MCP coastdown transient
condition.
Inertia defined in Section 5.4.1 - Table 3 is provided mainly by a flywheel located at the top of
the motor shaft. The flywheel design integrates several precautions at different levels (material
procurement, integrity analysis, in factory tests, in-service inspections) in order to prevent any
risk of failure which can lead to missile generation.
1.2.2. Mechanical Design

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The pump casing is designed for a 60-year life. The intended lifespan of the other components
is also 60 years, with the exception of certain wear parts which will be replaced periodically
(bearings, shaft seals, O-rings) due to wear.
The mechanical design of the MCPs is compliant with the requirements of RCC-M level 1 (see
Sub-chapter 3.8, section 2).
1.2.2.1. Sizing Calculation
A sizing calculation is performed on the MCP in accordance with the RCC-M Code (see
1.2.2.2. Stress Analysis
The HPC EPR specific fast fracture calculations have been defined in the frame of the safety
demonstration of HICs, as described in section 1.4.

Casing
An elastic analysis of the casing has been carried out in accordance with RCC-M rules, using a
finite element method applied to a three-dimensional model of the casing, in order to verify the
design conditions below:
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 design conditions (Level 0 criterion),
 normal operating conditions (fatigue analysis),
 fault conditions (Level D criterion), and
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 hydrotest conditions.
Flywheel
The flywheel design is justified in a design report which analyses the following failure modes:
 ductile failure,

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brittle fracture, and
 crack depth propagation (performed for the most adverse location, in the keyway).
The most severe situation to be analysed for the flywheel is the rotor over-speed transient that
could lead to a missile the containment area. The three main transient conditions that may lead
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to over-speed are:
 Grid over-frequency,
 Loss Of Off-site Power (LOOP), and
 RCP [RCS] system break combined with a loss of power supply. The most
disadvantageous LOCA for the MCP is a break in the surge line where it is connected to
the RCP [RCS] system loop. With a break of this size, the over-speed of the MCPs
remains below the design value.
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The MCP is designed for an over-speed of { SCI removed } relative to normal speed.
The motor in the MCP (including the flywheel) is tested at this { SCI removed } over-speed.
1.2.3. Material
All materials used in the MCP construction comply with RCC-M requirements. The materials
used for the MCP parts are detailed in Section 5.4.1 – Table 2.
Casing
The pump casing is made in cast austenitic-ferritic stainless steel.
The manufacturing of the pump casing must meet the requirements of the RCC-M as well as the
additional requirements applied for the HPC EPR casings that are listed in Section 5.4.1 –
Table 4. Notably, the excavations and repairs deeper than 25 mm from the final design surfaces
shall be excluded, which is a specific requirement for HPC EPR.

Flywheel
The flywheel is made up of two thick laminated plates bolted together; this is done in order to
limit the size of the potential missiles released in the event of flywheel failure. It is lightly shrunk
onto the shaft, and three special keys provide transmission to the coupling.
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1.3. MANUFACTURING, PROCUREMENT, TESTING AND INSPECTIONS
The procurement, manufacturing, testing (pressure testing) and inspection (inspections during
manufacturing) comply with RCC-M requirements. PSI and ISI requirements are described in
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Sub-chapter 3.4, section 5. Specific testing activities of as functional tests are covered by
specifications.
1.3.1. Manufacturing and Procurement
1.3.1.1. Process
The following procedures are applied to the manufacture of main components (see Section 5.4.1
– Table 2) [Ref. 1]:
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 Casing by casting;
 Thermal barrier flange is forged;

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 Seal and DEA [SSSS] system housing are forged;
 Main flange is forged;
 Pump shaft is forged;
 Flywheel by plate rolling.
1.3.1.2. Focus: Justification of the choice of a Cast Casing

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The main technical choice for manufacturing is the selection of casting in preference to forging.
Explanation of benefits and disadvantages of forging versus casting approach
The primary pump casing is the only cast component in the EPR primary loops, all other
components being forgings. In 1995, a feasibility study was conducted by AFCEN (the French
Association for the Design, Construction and Operating Supervision of equipment for
ElectroNuclear boilers), in order to assess the possibility of manufacturing forged stainless steel
casings that complied with AREVA’s requirements in terms of hydraulics, mechanics,
metallurgy, geometry and controllability; many benefits were anticipated in adopting the forging
solution, including the avoidance of casting defects, the avoidance of weld repairs and the
easier control of the welds with the forged primary piping. However, almost all the suppliers that
were consulted declined the offer because of the weight of the ingot needed and the complex
manufacturing sequence. In addition, the only favourable answer showed that the forging option
had many metallurgical disadvantages:
 The three support feet would have to be welded to the casing, hence creating difficulties
for welding and on-site inspection.

 The outlet nozzle would necessarily be shorter, resulting in a longer cold leg and a weld
closer to the casing which would be harder to control.
 The forging sequence would lead to a low forging ratio.
Consequently, casting appears as the most reasonably practicable option for the manufacturing
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of the pump casing; it must also be emphasised that the casting solution leads to a high quality
product with good mechanical properties and without many major defects – a result that is
achieved by applying the requirements of RCC-M M140 / M160 qualification.
Progress in casting quality compared with earlier designs and experience feedback from
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manufacturing of EPR pump casings
In practice, the supplier must develop an appropriate casting method, in order to control the
solidification of the steel and to remove potential heterogeneities from the casing. The common
defects that can be encountered on cast products are inclusions, porosities and shrinkages.
Many improvements (concerning the manufacturing process, the foundry method, heat
treatment and quench facilities, etc.) have been made in recent decades to reduce the size and
number of such defects. This has led to an improvement of the quality of castings in austenitic-
ferritic stainless steel compared to that achieved previously.
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The results obtained so far on the castings manufactured by two different suppliers for the OL3,
TSN and FA3 EPR reactors (under construction respectively in Olkiluoto, Finland, in Taishan,
China, and in Flamanville, France) confirm the good quality of these parts. The data below
presents the number of major excavations with a depth above 35 mm that were detected from
suppliers for FA3 and OL3. According to the RCC-M code, repairs above 35 mm are classified
as major (for HPC, this criterion has been reduced to 10 mm and repair greater than 25 mm are
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not accepted, as per section 1.2.3). As shown in the table below, the first supplier (A), who has a
long experience of such manufacturing processes, was able to provide a casing without any
defects above 35 mm. The second supplier (B) was qualified more recently to produce EPR
pump casings; after slight modifications of the casting method following results obtained on a
prototype part, this supplier succeeded in manufacturing castings with less than four defects
deeper than 35 mm (and only one defect detectable through radiographic examination on four
casings). In all the EPR casings, the mass percentage ratio between the weld repaired areas
and the mass of the casing with the final profile was lower than 1.5% of the weight of the casing.
In addition, tests showed that the parts had satisfactory and homogeneous mechanical
properties.
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Contract Supplier Pump casing Number of major excavations with depth

reference ≥ 35 mm
From dye From Radiographic
penetrant Testing
testing
OL3 Supplier { SCI removed } { SCI removed } { SCI removed }
B
{ SCI removed } { SCI removed } { SCI removed }
Supplier { SCI removed } { SCI removed } { SCI removed }
A

Contract Supplier Pump casing Number of major excavations with depth

reference ≥ 35 mm
From dye From Radiographic
penetrant Testing
testing
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FA3 Supplier { SCI removed } { SCI removed } { SCI removed }
B
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In line with this technological progress, several criteria are applied to limit the extent of defects
(and associated repairs) and ensure the quality of the final product:
 A supplier whose casting method leads to an unsatisfactory integrity of the casing will not
be qualified under RCC-M M140 / M160 (the qualification process is applied and
validated under the supervision of the Licensee and an independent third party).
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 For the FA3 EPR reactor, the percentage ratio of repairs by welding (performed after the
final quality heat treatment) was limited to { SCI removed } of the weight of the casing (a
limitation that all earlier manufacturers would not have been able to fulfil)

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All excavations are repaired according to approved qualified welding procedures.
1.3.2. Testing and Inspections
The MCPs are inspected and tested in accordance with the RCC-M requirements.
The MCPs are subject to hydrostatic tests performed in accordance with the RCC-M code, and
functional tests.
The flywheel discs are subject to both volumetric and surface examination (both before and after
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final machining) during the manufacturing process.
Details of the Non-Destructives Testing (NDT) techniques used during manufacturing:
The volume of the casing is inspected by radiographic examination. Approximately 600

individual exposures with X-rays are used to cover the entire volume of the casing. The analysis
of the radiographic films is carried out by comparison with ASTM reference boards: cast type
indications are tolerated within limited codified severity levels whereas cracks are unacceptable.
Only two very small areas located near the support feet cannot be inspected using radiographic
examination; these areas are inspected using ultrasonic examination using longitudinal waves in
accordance with RCC-M.
All inner and outer surfaces are inspected by liquid penetrant examination. The notification level
is 2 mm; all linear indications are unacceptable and all rounded indications (such as porosities)
with any dimension greater than 5 mm are also unacceptable.

For casing repair welds both radiographic and ultrasonic examinations will be performed as
described in section 1.4. Extensive tests performed on repair welds of a cast MCP casing mock-
up demonstrated that both these techniques can be used to detect and reject defects within
repairs of structural significance.
As HIC components, the MCPs are subject to in-service inspection detailed in section 1.4.
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1.4. HIGH INTEGRITY COMPONENT
As stated in Sub-chapter 3.1, the MCP is a HIC for which the specific measures described in
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Sub-chapter 3.4, section 0.3.6, concerning prevention, surveillance and mitigation contribute to
its high integrity demonstration.
With regards to the fast fracture risk, the three-legged approach presented in Sub-chapter 3.4,
section 1.6, has been applied to the MCP casing and the MCP flywheel as follows:
 use of fracture mechanics to determine the end of life limiting defect size and
demonstration that the Defect Size Margin (DSM) between this critical defect size and
the qualified detectable defect increased by fatigue crack propagation over the lifetime
meets a target of two as far as practicable;
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 use of suitable redundant and diverse inspections during manufacturing, supplemented
by the use of qualified inspection(s) at the end of manufacturing. Repeat inspections are
planned; and
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 verification of the lower bound fracture toughness values used to determine the critical
defect size by measurements.
This methodology applies to the whole MCP casing, including welds and base metal. However,
considering the higher probability of finding crack-like defects in repair welds than in castings
and considering that the toughness of weld metal is lower, the demonstration on repair welds
covers the demonstration on base metal, assuming that repairs can occur anywhere in the
casing. Consequently, the following sub-sections focus on repair welds.
The methodology also applies to the MCP flywheel; however, as explained in section 1.4.2, the
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manufacturing inspections of the flywheel are not qualified.
{ These paragraphs contain SCI-only text and have been removed }
For the MCP flywheel, the geometry to be considered is shown in Section 5.4.1 – Figure 5: the
flywheel is made up of two alloy steel discs linked by a bolting assembly (no weld).
1.4.1. Fracture Mechanics Analysis
Casing
As part of GDA, a Fracture Mechanics Analysis (FMA) has been performed for major repairs
(above 35 mm deep according to the RCC-M code) of the MCP casing. In addition to residual
stress, two sets of loadings have been considered: mechanical loadings corresponding to the
quadratic combination of connected line break and Design Basis Earthquake (DBE), and
thermal loadings corresponding to the most severe transients of categories A and B firstly, and
C and D secondly [Ref. 3].

These loadings have been applied to the most loaded areas of the pump casing, determined on
the basis of elastic stress calculations. The residual stresses have been established on the
basis of measurements performed on a mock-up with the Deep Hole Drilling (DHD) technique.
The Stress Intensity Factors with plastic correction have been compared to fracture toughness
values specific to repairs performed using Manual Metal Arc Welding (SMAW) with stainless
D
steel weld metal: a lower bound fracture toughness value has been derived from tests
performed using Compact Tensile Specimens (CTS) on a MCP casing mock-up after
3000 hours ageing at 400°C [Ref. 4].
Finally, an End of Life Limiting Defect Size (ELLDS) greater than { SCI removed } has been
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determined in major repair welds for any loading case, using an analytical formula for
mechanical loadings and elastic-plastic Finite Element calculations for thermal loadings. This
result obtained using ductile tearing criteria for the C and D Category bounding transient has
been confirmed with the A and B category bounding transient with initiation criteria.
Considering:
 the lower level of residual stress in shallow repairs (minor and superficial repairs
according to the RCC-M code) compared to deep repairs,
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 the smaller area of reduced toughness in the MCP casing containing shallow repairs
compared to the MCP casing containing major repair weld metal (the toughness of
repairs being lower than the toughness of austenitic-ferritic casting).
Shallow repairs are less sensitive to fast fracture. As a consequence, the ELLDS greater than
{ SCI removed } determined for the major repairs is applicable to shallow repair welds.
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Flywheel
An ELLDS of 450 mm has been calculated from the inner radius of the flywheel for a complete
through thickness radial defect (corresponding to the worst orientation) subject to a MCP
overspeed of 1.25 times normal operating speed [Ref. 3]. Moreover, this Life Fatigue Crack
Growth (LFCG) calculated starting from an initial defect of 20 mm is about 1.5 mm, which is not
significant. This high ELLDS value for a component manufactured using a laminated plate
process with the application of UT controls required by RCC-M ensures that the flywheel is
manufactured without defects of structural concern and that highly unlikely defects will also be
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detected.
1.4.2. NDT
Casing
For the main coolant pump casing, the NDT selected to be qualified is the UT of large area
major repairs (10D mm x 60L mm x 30W mm) as defined in the technical specification [Ref. 1].
Note this is a departure from the RCC-M code as discussed in section 1.4. The qualified UT and
inspection of lesser repair sizes will be also subject to a range of non-qualified inspection
including penetrant, radiography and UT.
As part of the assessment of repairs for GDA, measurements have been made on a MCP cast
casing mock-up; the tests performed using UT and Radiographic Testing enable all embedded
defects to be detected and thus demonstrate that these techniques are capable of detecting and
rejecting defects of { SCI removed } through-wall extent or greater in major repairs welds
[Ref. 5].

Finally, a DSM of { SCI removed } has been attained with fracture mechanics calculations while
considering that the fatigue crack growth for this worst case defect with regards to fast fracture
is negligible; this assumption will be verified during detailed design.
Flywheel
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No qualified NDT has been selected for the MCP flywheel [Ref. 6]. Furthermore, French
experience associated with the MCP flywheel in-situ ultrasonic examinations and hot laboratory
examinations have recorded no defect and have produced satisfactory results for the 58
operating plants [Ref. 7].
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1.4.3. Fracture toughness
Casing
The lower bound fracture toughness values used to determine the critical defect size based on a
3000 hours aged repair mock-up [Ref. 4] will be confirmed by measurements on a repair mock-
up after 10,000 hours ageing at 400°C.
Flywheel
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The verification of the lower bound fracture toughness values used to determine the critical
defect size will be performed by measurements of the fracture toughness using Compact
Tensile specimens.
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2. STEAM GENERATORS
The design of the EPR reactor Steam Generator (SG) is based on that of the N4 SG
{ SCI removed }. It is a natural circulation U-tube heat exchanger fitted with an axial economiser
(see Section 5.4.2 - Figure 1).
The SGs are Nuclear Pressure Equipment (NPE) and are subject to the associated
requirements.
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These components (SG channel head, tubesheet and secondary shell, including elliptical head,
pressure boundary) are High Integrity Component (HIC) which satisfies all the design
requirements described in Sub-chapter 3.4, section 1.6.
The SG is designed to fulfil the following functions:
 Produce steam with no more than 0.25% moisture carry-over at the SG outlet using the
Reactor Coolant System (RCP [RCS]) as the heat source [Ref. 12].
 Provide capability for continuous hot blowdown of the secondary side of the SGs. The
SG blowdown rate permits a transition from cold lay-up water chemistry to hot standby
water chemistry within an eight-hour period.

 Provide secondary side water level indications and automatic control of water level at
any power level from hot no load to full power.
 Provide a leak tight boundary between the reactor coolant and the SG secondary side.
 Serve as the first means for removal of decay heat from the reactor coolant during plant
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shutdown using main feedwater as well as start-up and shutdown feedwater in normal
operation or emergency feedwater in fault conditions. This allows the primary coolant
temperature to be reduced to a value reasonably below the saturation temperature
corresponding to the operating pressure of the residual heat removal system (RRA
[RHRS]).
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 Provide for full wet lay-up of the SG under deoxygenated, pH-controlled conditions.
 Act as an expansion tank for the secondary circuit.
2.1.2. Description [Ref. 13]
2.1.2.1. General characteristics

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The SG is composed of two sub-assemblies. One ensures vaporisation of the feedwater, the
other the mechanical drying of the water / steam mixture produced. It is arranged vertically, the
water/steam mixture flowing upwards by natural circulation. The feedwater enters the SG
through the main feedwater nozzle into a conical shell in order to reduce thermal stratification. It
then passes through the distribution half-ring (cold leg side) equipped with a deflector sheet
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installed at a level above the upper section of the tube bundle.
The operating principle of the axial economiser is to direct all the feedwater to the cold leg of the
tube bundle and about 90% of the recirculated water to the hot leg. This is ensured in practice
by incorporating the following features to the design of a standard natural circulation U-tube SG:
 A double wrapper in the downcomer on the cold side to guide the feedwater to the cold
leg side of the tube bundle.
 A secondary side divider plate (from the tube sheet up to the sixth tube support plate) to
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separate the cold leg and hot leg parts of the tube bundle. In addition, and in conjunction
with the previous design features, the SG feedwater distribution system (ring with
oblong-shaped holes and deflecting sheet) extends over a 180° angular portion of the
wrapper on the cold side.
This design enhances the heat exchange efficiency between the primary and secondary sides
and increases the pressure of the steam produced by 3 bar, compared with a standard SG
having the same heat exchange surface area.
Unlike other economiser designs, this design has two further benefits:
 There is no direct cross flow affecting the tubes and thus risk of vibrations is limited.
 There is no reduction in accessibility of the tube bundle for inspection and maintenance.
The SG is fully shop-built and is transported to the site and installed in its Reactor Building (HR
[RB]) cubicle in one piece.
It is supported vertically by four support legs and laterally guided at two levels (see section 9).

2.1.2.2. Lower Sub-Assembly
The lower sub-assembly is comprised of the following parts:
 The channel head formed by a hemispherical bottom head and a tube sheet [Ref. 14]
[Ref. 15]. A cylindrical section has been added to the upper section of the lower head in
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order to improve access to the peripheral tubes for inspection. This evolution is also due
to the necessity to move away the tubesheet to primary head weld from the tubes in
order not to affect the hydraulic expansion by the stress relief heat treatment applied to
this circular weld. A primary partition plate divides the channel head into two leak tight
compartments. One is connected to the reactor vessel outlet (hot leg) and the other to
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the reactor vessel inlet via the reactor coolant pump (cold leg).
 Each compartment includes a nozzle for connection to the RCP [RCS] system and a
manway provides access for in-service inspection and maintenance operations. Specific
provisions are made to allow plugging of the nozzles, and to carry out inspection and
maintenance operations inside each compartment during refuelling outages.
 The lower sub-assembly of the SG’s secondary shell is comprised of three cylindrical
shell sections [Ref. 16] [Ref. 17]. The lower section is fitted with eight hand holes in for
in-service inspection and maintenance operations on the lower parts of the tube bundle.
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The intermediate section is fitted with two diametrically opposed inspection holes at the
level of the sixth tube support plate on the axis of the central tube lane and a set of
instrument taps to measure the SG water level. The upper section is provided with the
upper lateral SG support brackets welded to the outer surface. The upper section is also
fitted with two diametrically opposite inspection holes at the level of the eighth tube
support plate. Blowdown of the SG is provided by means of three blowdown nozzles
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located in the tube sheet.
 The tube bundle, made up of inverted U-tubes, providing heat exchange between the
primary coolant circulating inside the tubes and the secondary cooling system [Ref. 18].
It also constitutes a radiological barrier between the primary and secondary sides of the
Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS).
 The tube bundle is arranged in a triangular pitch.
The ends of the inverted U-tubes are welded to the protective cladding of the primary
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face of the tube sheet. These welds are helium leak tested and the ends of the U-tubes
are then full-depth expanded into the tube sheet in order to minimise any crevices.
The expansion process is performed according to the RCC-M rules.
Preliminary tests are conducted so as to assess the range of the expansion process
parameters. These tests are performed on blocks which aim at refining the parameters of
the expansion execution. In this frame the residual stress in the transition zone between
the expanded and non-expanded parts of the tube is assessed according to the RCC-M.
Measures are taken to ensure that the expanded length of the tubes stops just below the
secondary face of the tube sheet.
 The role of the lower internal support structures is to support the tube bundle while
ensuring circulation of the secondary cooling fluid [Ref. 19].
Lower internal support structures comprise:

 The bundle wrapper which isolates the recirculation water flow path from that of the
water / steam mixture. It creates an annular zone between the tube bundle and the SG
shell called the downcomer. An annular opening in the lower section allows the
distribution of the water to the tube bundle.
 A semi-annular downcomer on the cold leg side comprises a double wrapper concentric
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with the bundle wrapper, the outlet of which is close to the top face of the tube sheet on
the periphery of the tube bundle on the cold leg side.
 A secondary divider plate, welded to the bundle wrapper, separates the cold leg side
from the hot leg side up to the sixth tube support plate and constitutes the economiser
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area. The joint between the divider plate and the tube sheet is leak-tight.
 Nine tube support plates are spaced over the height of the tube bundle to support the
tubes and thus avoid any vibration/wear effects. Broached Trefoil holes (“high
permeability” broaching) with flat contacts (to remove the risk of dryout) allow the
secondary water / steam mixture to circulate freely.
These tube support plates are centred by means of double slope wedges fixed on anti-
seismic blocks regularly spaced around their periphery, centring the tube-bundle wrapper
in the SG shell.
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The tube support plates are vertically interconnected and spaced by a network of tie-rods
bolted into the secondary side face of the tube sheet.
The tie-rods, the anti-seismic blocks and the tube support plates are designed to
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withstand in-plane and out-of-plane loads even under the faulted conditions
(earthquakes, pipe ruptures), specified in section 2.2.2.3.
Over the full height of the economiser divider plate, each of the tube support plates is
divided into two half-plates.
 Four sets of anti-vibration bars to support the tubes in the U-bend part of the bundle and
thus minimise vibration / wear effects. These bars are supported by clamps and retaining
rings.

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A flow distribution baffle designed to obtain proper distribution of the fluid entering the
tube bundle and to minimise the low flow velocity zone above the tube sheet.
2.1.2.3. Upper Sub-Assembly
The upper sub-assembly (steam drum) is made of two cylindrical shells, a conical shell and an
elliptical upper end [Ref. 20] [Ref. 21]. The cylindrical section is provided with:
 Two manways providing access to the steam/moisture separation equipment. They also
give access to the feedwater devices, the top of the tube bundle via the hatch through
the bundle wrapper and the camera holes installed on the roof of the bundle wrapper.
 A set of water level measurement taps.
The centre of the upper elliptical head contains an integral steam outlet nozzle fitted with a
welded steam flow restrictor. This limits the rate of depressurisation and the forces applied to
the SG tube bundle and internals in the event of a steam line break.

The steam drum is fitted with:
 A main feedwater system comprising:
o The main feedwater nozzle situated in the conical shell.
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o The thermal sleeve (leak tight connection between the main feedwater nozzle
and the feedwater distribution ring).
o The main feedwater half-ring fitted with a deflecting sheet to ensure a uniform
distribution of all the water from the Main FeedWater System (ARE [MFWS]) or
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the Start-up and Shutdown feedwater System (AAD [SSS]) feed water into the
cold leg side downcomer.
o The feedwater half-ring supports.
 An emergency feedwater supply system comprising:
o Its own inlet nozzle.
o The thermal sleeve (leak tight connection between the Emergency FeedWater
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System (ASG [EFWS]), nozzle and the emergency feedwater ring).
o The emergency feedwater distribution ring (equipped on its higher generatrix

with I-shaped tubes orientated towards the interior of the SG to avoid any risk of
cold water impact on the pressure boundary components) to distribute the
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emergency feedwater into both the hot leg side and cold leg side downcomer.
o The support system.
The design and physical separation of the main and emergency feedwater systems removes the
risk of water hammer and minimises the risk of thermal stratification.
 Water/steam separation equipment comprising:
o A first stage of cyclone type separators of { SCI removed } diameter [Ref. 12]
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(connected to the bundle wrapper roof). Each separator is designed to achieve a

very low steam carry-under.
o A single stage “chevron”-type dryer unit (hung on the upper head of the steam
drum) which achieves low water carry-over to the SG outlet.
2.1.2.4. Support Structure
The SG support structure is designed to allow thermal expansion of the RCP [RCS] system loop
and displacement caused by pressure, but limits such displacement during faults. The support
structure is comprised of vertical and lateral supports.

The operating conditions are provided in Section 5.4.2 – Table 1 (SG Data Sheet) for
4524 MWth power.1
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The SGs are able to fulfil their required functions during normal operation and fault conditions,
except for the period when reactor core cooling is carried out by the (RRA [RHRS]) or by its
back-up systems. Therefore it is used in various conditions and operating parameters.
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The SG secondary side water chemistry (including corresponding data table) is detailed in
Sub-chapter 10.7.
2.2. DESIGN BASIS

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2.2.1.1. Main Properties Selected
 Full power steam pressure and capacity:

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The SG is designed to generate, under given primary coolant system pressure and flow
conditions, the pressure and mass flow of steam specified at 100% of the nominal full
power.
 SG water inventory (heat sink reserve):
The SG supplies the reactor with a minimum heat sink reserve of cold water (SG water
inventory) to ensure the mitigation of all normal operation and fault conditions with
respect to their associated criteria and taking credit for the operation of dedicated
systems – such as the ARE [MFWS] system, AAD [SSS] system, ASG [EFWS] system,
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Safety Injection System (RIS [SIS]) and pressuriser safety valves.
In particular, the SG is designed to hold a sufficient volume of water such that should all
feedwater systems (ARE [MRWS], AAD [SSS] and ASG [EFWS]) be lost, the SG
secondary side will not dry out in less than 30 minutes.
 Total volume of the SG (overfilling requirement):
The SG serves as an expansion tank for secondary feedwater systems, and

consequently protects the steam equipment against water inflow (including the turbine)
after isolation of the source of the overfill.
1 The values presented in Table 1 are not the parameters used in the Reference Plant Design Basis fault studies
presented in Chapter 14.

In the event of sudden Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) (double-ended guillotine
break or a break of equivalent surface area) of one or two SG tubes, the Medium Head
Safety Injection (MHSI) pump discharge head is below the pressure setpoint of the non-
isolatable main steam safety valves, which prevents these valves opening. In addition,
the increased volume of the secondary side SG { SCI removed } allows the flow of fluid
from the primary to secondary side to be accommodated without the risk of overfilling the
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SG, at the same time taking account of the capacity of the primary and secondary side
isolation devices and the primary circuit monitoring systems.
It should also be noted that in association with the SG high level setpoint, the Chemical
and Volume Control System (RCV [CVCS]) charging line is isolated in order to avoid
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overfilling the SG.
 Moisture separation equipment:
The design of the moisture separation equipment provides steam with a moisture carry-
over not exceeding 0.25% (SG outlet) under normal operating conditions with the turbine
in operation.
Testing on models and thermo-hydraulic analysis has resulted in a new separator model
design 1.5 times larger than that of the SG for the N4.
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 SG elevation compared with the reactor vessel:
The SGs are installed at a height relative to the reactor vessel which ensures that
primary side drainage of the SG plenum permits inspection and/or tube plugging without
reducing the water level in the reactor vessel below the reactor core or affecting reactor
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coolant circulation in shutdown state.
 Tube bundle inspection activities (Non Destructive Testing (NDT)):
On the shutdown critical path they will be carried out in parallel on the four SGs, which
significantly reduces the overall outage time. The ability to undertake primary side SG
tube inspections from the plenums using protection plugs / dams in the nozzles to the
RCP [RCS] system loops is at the design stage. It is anticipated that the inspection would
be performed on EPR reactor plant units only when the core is unloaded. During these
inspections, it is planned to ensure double isolation between the spent fuel pool and the
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vessel pool using transfer tube isolation valves or various other sluices and gates.
The use of SG plugs / dams with fuelled core is not authorised on the EPR reactor at this
stage in the analysis.
Over a 60-year plant life, for operational requirements, the use of SG plugs / dams with a
fuelled core is not ruled out. A further safety assessment relative to the risk of pool
drainage will be provided prior to any proposed use of plugs / dams (see section 3 of
Sub-chapter 9.1).
 SG blowdown:
Drains are provided for the SG primary and secondary sides. The drain system is
designed to drain the SG at any temperature up to and including hot standby. Blowdown
system equipment is utilised to provide this hot drain capability.
 Provisions for secondary side cleaning:

Precautions are taken to minimise the formation of sludge in the SG (see

sections 2.2.3.3 and 2.1.3.).
However, the lower section of the secondary side of the SG is designed to allow the
removal, if necessary, of any sludge that may have accumulated on tube sheets in low
flow velocity areas by sludge lancing.
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The following properties have been adopted, based on experience feedback from
French, German, and other international plants:
 Design of the tube-to-tube sheet junction:
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o The tubes are fully expanded inside the tube sheet and welded on the tube sheet
primary side.
o The tube expansion is made using a single step high pressure hydraulic process.
 Feedwater distribution system:
o The main and emergency feedwater distribution systems are separate (two
nozzles [Ref. 22] [Ref. 23] and two rings).
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o The water distribution systems are connected to the feedwater nozzles by
leak tight connections.
o Provisions are made to limit the thermal stratification in the main feedwater
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nozzle regions (location of the feedwater nozzle in the conical shell and under
the feedwater distribution ring).
 Design of upper and lower internal components:
The lower internal components (tube bundle, tube support system, bundle wrapper and
associated supports, equipment installed above the tube sheet) and upper internal
components (cyclone separators, main and emergency feedwater systems, moisture
separators) are designed in such a way as to enable free thermal expansion between
them as well as between them and the bundle wrapper and between them and the SG
pressure containment under PCC-1 to PCC-3 scenarios.
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2.2.1.2. Requirements for Inspection, Repair and Replacement
The SG pressure boundary is designed to minimise the number of welds and optimise their
location in order to facilitate in-service inspections.
 The upper end and the steam outflow nozzles of the steam drum are manufactured from
a single forging.
 The conical shell is forged and has straight ends of sufficient length to facilitate
inspection of connecting welds.
In addition, thermal insulation can be removed locally. Both permanent and temporary measures
are provided to ensure convenient access to welds.
Measures are also taken to ensure adequate access for inspection and maintenance of SG
internals.

On the primary side, the support columns allow easy access to the manways with which each
compartment of the channel head is fitted. Special equipment allows inspection of the internal
surface of the plenum in contact with primary coolant, the tube welds on the tube sheet cladding
and the SG tubes.
On the secondary side, special attention has been paid to allow access to the lower section of
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the tube bundle and the tube sheet as follows:
 Eight hand-holes are distributed around the secondary shell.
 The mechanical and thermo-hydraulic design of the lower SG support structure has been
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optimised (geometry of the waterway flow blocks, design of the blowdown system) to
facilitate sludge lancing operations.
 Two inspection ports above TSP 6 and two inspection ports above TSP 8 provide access
inside the SG.
Access to the SG upper internals inside the steam drum is provided by two large-diameter
manways. From this position, it is also possible to access the tube bundle Anti-Vibration Bars
(AVBs). A hatch has been installed in the bundle wrapper for this purpose.
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In addition, although maintenance and repair operations are not anticipated during the SG
design life, the dryer vanes may be replaced through the manways in the upper part of the SG.
They are held in place by screw jacks inside the U-shaped frames. By loosening the screws,
dismantling is possible through openings in each.
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A monitoring programme will be drawn up during the detailed design phase. It will describe the
arrangements for periodic inspections, as well as the objectives, nature and frequency of non-
destructive inspections implemented to detect defects harmful to the integrity of the SGs.
The SGs are designed for a 60-year life. However, they are replaceable before the end of the
60 years operation time.
The mechanical design of the SGs primary and secondary coolant pressure boundaries is made
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in accordance with the RCC-M code (see Sub-chapter 3.8, section 2). When the implementation
of RCC-M is not required, dedicated specification with equivalent requirements can therefore be
used [Ref. 24] [Ref. 25].
In general terms, the mechanical design of the SG takes place in two steps:
 Sizing, to define the general arrangement of the component and its main dimensions.
 Design of the main sub-assemblies and justification of their capacity to withstand, under
all circumstances, the loads and combinations of transient conditions provided for over
the component's life including reactor coolant side and secondary side hydrostatic tests
in the conditions defined in Section 5.4.2 – Table 1.
The following degradation mechanisms are studied [Ref. 12]:
 excessive deformation and plastic instability,
 fatigue,

 progressive deformation,
 fast fracture,
 flow induced vibration, and
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 tube wearing.
The most sensitive primary and secondary weld zones are identified and specifically studied
with respect to Fast fracture concerns. HPC EPR specific fast fracture calculations have been
defined in the frame of the safety demonstration of HIC, as described in section 2.4.
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Design features and material selection ensure that other degradation mechanisms such as
corrosion mechanisms (flow assisted corrosion, stress corrosion cracking, generalised
corrosion) are addressed.
The combined transient conditions and load conditions applicable to mechanical components
and systems (in particular to the SG) are dealt with in Sub-chapter 3.4 (topics specific to
mechanical components, including the list of events).
Sizing calculations are performed for design conditions, according to the RCC-M code Level 1,
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to determine the minimum acceptable thickness of the pressure shells and to demonstrate the
adequacy of the tube dimension, the main pressure retaining parts. For the secondary
compartment, a corrosion allowance is taken into account.
The SG and its internal components are designed to withstand deadloads as well as dynamic
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loads which may result from an earthquake or a guillotine break of a pipe connected to the RCP
[RCS] system or depressurisation caused by a steam pipework break or a break in the
feedwater pipework. The integrity of the SG tubes and the tube support structures has been
demonstrated for all these events.
2.2.3. Thermo-Hydraulic Design
2.2.3.1. Operating Parameters

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Section 5.4.2 – Table 2 gives additional operating parameters not included in the SG Data Sheet
[Ref. 26].
2.2.3.2. Thermodynamic Criteria
The SG is designed so that level fluctuations at the steam-water interface as well as structural
vibrations do not occur during operation.
The circulation ratio is defined as the ratio of total flow rate across the tube bundle to steam flow
rate output of the SG. It reaches 3.52 [Ref. 26] when the SG is operating at full load for
4524 MWth power. This value offers a satisfactory compromise between efforts to obtain steam
as dry as possible and stable operation of the SG. This circulation ratio also improves the SG
transient behaviour by minimising water level shrinkage in the event of large transients (turbine
or reactor trip) and reduces low velocity area above the top of the tube sheet.

2.2.3.3. Thermal Design
The heat exchange surface and tube bundle configuration adopted are similar to those used in
the N4 SG and therefore this SG belongs to a wide range of proven designs. The selected tube
diameter { SCI removed } [Ref. 27] is one of the current international standardised diameters
and is a good compromise between compactness, vibration behaviour and ease of manufacture.
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The triangular pitch { SCI removed } comes from the same desire for compactness, while
providing the capability to carry out high-quality cleaning operations with the usual technique of
sludge lancing [Ref. 28]. This has been clearly demonstrated by the first lancing operations
performed on the first N4 plants at Chooz and Civaux.
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Proof that the required steam mass flow rate and pressure can be achieved at full power for the
specified reactor coolant flow and temperature conditions has been obtained using physical
models and correlations qualified on the basis of the intensive test program performed on the
25 MW MEGEVE test loop at Cadarache C.E.A. Research Centre, and verified in Chooz
and Civaux.
Absence of water level fluctuations at the steam-water interface was demonstrated using the
physical models qualified from the MEGEVE test results. This is mainly achieved by an
adequate ratio between single-phase pressure drop and total pressure drop in the recirculation
loop.
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2.2.3.4. Hydraulic Design
Hydraulic design has been carried out to obtain:

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 An acceptable flow distribution in the SG secondary side, particularly regarding the risk
of sludge deposits, the effects of erosion/corrosion and tube bundle vibrations.
 Secondary water inventory in accordance with cooling water requirements.
To limit the possible accumulation of secondary side sludge and the risk of stress corrosion
cracking of the tube bundle, particular attention is paid to reducing low flow velocity areas as
much as possible, particularly above the tube sheet.
This has been achieved by suitable design of the flow blockers as well as the distribution baffle.
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The primary result of this is that sludge deposits in operation may affect only a very low number
of tubes, and these are close to the centre of the tube lane. It should be noted that these
measures are in addition to the general measures described in section 2.1.3, intended to reduce
sludge generation in the secondary circuit.
No specific problems are expected regarding erosion/corrosion due to the choice of materials
selected for the feedwater distribution systems, the tube support plates and the separation
equipment.
Tube bundle vibrations are addressed in section 2.2.3.5.
{ This paragraph contains SCI-only text and has been removed }
2.2.3.5. Tube Bundle Vibrations
In the design of SGs, the possibility of degradation of tubes due to either mechanical or flow-
induced excitation is thoroughly evaluated. This evaluation includes detailed analysis of the tube
support system as well as an extensive research program of tube vibration model tests [Ref. 29].

In evaluating failure due to vibration, consideration is given to such sources of excitation as

those generated by the primary fluid flowing within the tubes, mechanically induced vibration,
and secondary fluid flow on the outside of the tubes. During normal operation, the effects of
primary fluid flow within the tubes and mechanically induced vibration are considered to be
negligible and should cause little concern. Thus, the main source of tube vibrations is the
hydrodynamic excitation by the secondary fluid on the outside of the tubes. In general, three
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vibration mechanisms were identified:
 Vortex shedding:
Vortex shedding does not produce detectable tube bundle vibration. There are several
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reasons why this happens:
o Flow turbulence in the downcomer and tube bundle inlet region inhibits the
formation of Von Karman's vortex train.
o The spatial variations of cross flow velocities along the tube preclude vortex
shedding at a single frequency.
o Both axial and cross flow velocity components exist at the tubes. The axial flow
component disrupts the Von Karman vortices.
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 Fluid-elastic excitation:
Concerning fluid-elastic excitation, the tube bundle supporting system was designed to
obtain a margin with respect to tube instability according to quasi-steady Blevins-
Connors model based on numerous experimental data.
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 Turbulence:
Levels of turbulent responses, determined by using umbrella turbulent force spectrums

obtained from mock-up results for various fluids, are small and the contribution of the
resulting stresses to fatigue is negligible.
2.2.4. Materials
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All materials [Ref. 22] [Ref. 23] [Ref. 30] [Ref. 31] for pressurised retaining parts of SGs are
selected in accordance with the RCC-M requirements. When the implementation of RCC-M is
not required, dedicated specification with equivalent requirements can therefore be used.
All materials for non-pressurised retaining parts of SGs are selected in accordance with the
Technical Standard of Internals [Ref. 23] requirements.
2.2.4.1. Pressure Retaining Parts
{ This section contains SCI-only text and has been removed }
2.2.4.2. Non Pressure Retaining Parts

2.3. PROCUREMENT, MANUFACTURING, TESTING AND INSPECTION

Sub-chapter 3.4, section 5. When the implementation of RCC-M is not required, dedicated
specification with equivalent requirements can therefore be used.
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2.3.1. Procurement and manufacturing
The SGs manufacturing and supply must be carried out with the provision of the RCC-M
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[Ref. 22]. When the implementation of RCC-M is not required, dedicated specification with
equivalent requirements can therefore be used [Ref. 24] [Ref. 25].
Materials procurement complies with the general specifications of the RCC-M code (Section II),
the qualification datasheet of filler material and, where appropriate, with additional requirements
(see Section 5.4.2 – Table 1).
The following procedures are applied to the manufacture of main components [Ref. 22]:
 Lower hemispherical head by forging.

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 Tube sheet by forging.
 Cylindrical shells by forging.
 Conical shell by forging.

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 Upper elliptical head by forging with integral steam outlet nozzle.
 Heat transfer seamless tubes by cold drawing and annealing.
 A final heat treatment is carried out on all straight tubes in the tube bundle to relieve
stress and improve corrosion resistance. A similar stress-relief heat treatment is carried
out on the smaller U-bends.
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 The corrosion-resistant cladding in contact with the primary cooling system is deposited
by a welding technique.
 The tube-to-tube sheet welding process is automatic Tungsten Inert Gas (TIG) welding.
 The tubes are expanded along the full thickness of the tube sheet.
During manufacture, the SG primary and secondary surfaces are cleaned.
The internal surfaces of the SG channel head are to be specially treated, by electropolishing, to
minimise activation and contamination retention.
An eddy current inspection is performed before erection and during PSI to control the quality of
the tube assemblies.

The SGs are inspected and tested in accordance with sections III "Inspection methods" and IV
"Welding" of the RCC-M code. When the implementation of RCC-M is not required, dedicated
specification with equivalent requirements can therefore be used.
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The SGs are notably subject to hydrostatic tests, performed in accordance with the RCC-M
code, with specific procedures and water cleanliness and quality requirement.
HPC EPR specific inspections have been defined in the frame of the safety demonstration of
HIC, as described in section 2.4. UT inspections on all HIC forgings – procedures and
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inspections are supported by Capability Statements.
Additional specific UT scanning must be performed, during manufacturing, on the main

components of the SG conical shells: SG tubesheet, channel head, elliptical head and SG
cylindrical shells.
2.4. HIGH INTEGRITY COMPONENTS

As stated in Sub-chapter 3.1, the SG (pressure boundary parts) is a HIC for which the specific
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measures described in Sub-chapter 3.4, section 0.3.6, concerning prevention, surveillance and
mitigation contribute to its high integrity demonstration.
With regards to the HIC, the three-legged approach presented in Sub-chapter 3.4, section 1.6,
has been applied to the SG as follows:
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 Use of fracture mechanics to determine the end of life limiting defect size and
meets a target of two as far as practicable.
 Use of suitable redundant and diverse inspections during manufacturing, supplemented

planned.
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 Verification of the lower bound fracture toughness values used to determine the critical
This methodology applies to the whole component, including welds and base metal. However,
considering the higher probability of finding crack-like defects in welds than in forgings, and
considering that the toughness of weld metal or associated Heat Affected Zone (HAZ) is lower,
the majority of the locations assessed are likely to be the welds.
The HPC methodology requires a margin (DSM between the ELLDS and the Qualified
Examination Defect Size (QEDS)) taking into account the lifetime fatigue crack growth.
The type of analysis depends on the component and area studied. The following types of
analyses are defined:
 full analytical scheme (analytical formulation of stress and use of influence function),

 semi analytical scheme (stress assessment with a crack free finite element analysis, use
of influence functions),
 complex elastic plastic finite element analysis.
In a first step, bounding locations are analysed so as to provide confidence in the design. In a
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second step (to be performed as part of the detailed design), fast fracture mechanics analyses
will be performed in sensitive regions.
For the SG, the HIC methodology applies to the eight pressure boundary circumferential welds,
to the primary nozzle Dissimilar Metal Welds (DMWs) and to three main nozzles welds (main
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feedwater, emergency feedwater, and secondary manhole) [Ref. 3]. Three bounding cases have
been identified and fracture mechanics calculations have been performed on the most severe
transients:
 Tubesheet to primary head weld,
 Tubesheet to secondary shell weld, and
 High shell to conical shell weld.

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The smallest ELLDS is obtained for the Tubesheet to secondary shell weld based on a mixed
methodology using a Finite Element (FE) calculation for primary and secondary stresses, and an
analytical calculation for the Stress Intensity Factor J. This bounding case corresponds to an
inner skin defect submitted to a Total Loss Of Feedwater transient which gives an ELLDS
slightly greater than 20 mm in the ductile range. It has to be noted that this result corresponds to
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an initiation criterion without taking benefit from ductile tearing.
The limiting defect size calculated ensures that the size of a critical defect that would lead to
failure is above 20 mm. This defect size will be used for any of the SG welds, DMW included, to
define the requirements of inspections which will be applied at the end of manufacturing.
Fast fracture mechanics analyses will be per-formed in sensitive regions of the main forgings in
the detailed design stage, to check whether these are limiting.
2.4.2. Qualified Non Destructive Testing

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At the end of manufacturing, qualified UT inspections of HIC welds shall be performed.
Ferritic welds
The NDT selected to be qualified for SG homogeneous welds are [Ref. 36]:
 the pulse echo UT technique required by RCC-M code supplemented with additional
beam angles, and
 a UT tandem technique.
The specular reflection Tandem technique can be applied to all the main circular welds and is
used to detect certain type of plausible defects such as mainly smooth embedded near vertical
planar defects which may not be detected otherwise with conventional UT.

The Radiographic Testing inspection required by the RCC-M code will continue to be applied
extensively but as a non-qualified inspection before heat treatment on all of the main component
welds.
The geometry and reflection angle of nozzle and manhole welds do not enable inspection with
the UT tandem technique. For these welds inspection will be made by qualified pulse echo UT,
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including longitudinal waves 0° from inside the nozzle.
For circular welds the qualified UT tandem technique increases the detection capability for
smooth vertical defect through the whole thickness. The sensitivity of the inspections shall be
determined to ensure the highly reliable detection of defects of QEDS size.
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This UT tandem technique is supplemented by a 0° Longitudinal Waves (LW) from inside the
nozzle which enables a specular reflection with good coverage of the weld.
DMW
The NDT selected to be qualified for the inspection of DMW is the manual pulse echo UT
technique using longitudinal waves up to 70° refraction angle, deployed from inside the pipe for
the detection of defects located on the inner half thickness of the weld and from outside the pipe
for the detection of defects located on the outer half thickness of the weld, supplemented by a 0°
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LW reflection technique from the pipe end [Ref. 37]. These techniques can cover the volume of
all welds and detect all defects of structural concern.
The demonstration of the performance of the UT selected for the inspection of DMWs, and in
particular their capability to detect the hypothetical narrow near-vertical planar weld defects,
relies on the following evidence [Ref. 37]:
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 Tests performed in the Sizewell qualification frame showing that defects embedded in a
mock-up, including lack of fusion, could be detected using longitudinal waves up to 70°
even when scanning only from the austenitic side of the weld.
 Tests performed in the 1990’s and in 2011 on an AREVA DMW mock-up concluding that
detection of the defects could be successfully achieved with the pulse echo technique,
and that the detection of lack of fusion at the two fusion faces could be achieved when
scanning with LW 0° from the end of the safe end; this inspection from the safe end
provides a robust form of specular detection, and has been recognised as useful
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[Ref. 37].
An As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) analysis [Ref. 38] summarised in

Sub-chapter 17.3, section 3, has been performed to support the adequacy of the UT proposal.
The capability of this UT proposal to detect and reject defects whose QEDS derived from the
fracture Mechanics Analyses is 10 mm or greater can be achieved with a high level of reliability;
smaller defects can also be detected with reasonable capability.
Conclusion
Finally, a DSM (ratio between the ELLDS and the QEDS) of two has been attained with Fracture
Mechanics Calculations while considering that the fatigue crack growth for these worst case
defects with regards to fast fracture is negligible, either with ferritic homogeneous weld or
DMWs; this assumption will be verified during detailed design.
2.4.3. Fracture Toughness
Base Metal – Ferritic welds

defect size will be performed [Ref. 8]:
 For the base metal by measurements of the fracture toughness on HPC HIC forgings, in
the ductile range; and
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 For the weld material on a mock-up using Compact Tensile (CT) specimens in the ductile
range. The mock-up will be representative of the EPR material, both base metal and
weld wire/flux.
DMW
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The lower bound fracture toughness value used to determine the critical size will be taken equal
to the value used for DMW on Olkiluoto project.
3. MAIN COOLANT LINE

This section describes the Main Coolant Lines (MCLs), including the Pressuriser Surge Line of
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the EPR. The design of the EPR MCL is based on that of the N4 MCL.
The MCLs are Nuclear Pressure Equipment (NPE) and are subject to the associated
requirements.
The MCLs, except the pressuriser surge line, are High Integrity Components (HICs) which
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involves satisfying all the design requirements described in Sub-chapter 3.4, section 1.6.
3.1.1. Role of Equipment
The MCLs (including the pressuriser surge line) are a set of pressure retaining components
forming a portion of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB).
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The MCLs conveys reactor coolant from the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to the Steam
Generators (SGs) and then to the Main Coolant Pumps (MCPs). The fluid is then returned to the
RPV.
The pressuriser surge line connects the hot leg surge line nozzle of Loop 3 to the bottom of the
pressuriser.
The MCLs acts as a barrier to the release of radioactive material.
3.1.2. Description
3.1.2.1. Generic Description
The MCLs, the pipes of the four reactor coolant loops and the surge line, are located in the
Reactor Building (HR [RB]) and form part of the RCPB belonging to the Nuclear Steam Supply
System (NSSS).

There are four reactor coolant loops, each comprising:
 A Hot Leg (HL),
 A Cross-Over Leg (COL), and
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 A Cold Leg (CL).
Large and small branch connections are provided on each leg respectively for auxiliary lines (the
Safety Injection System (RIS [SIS]), the Chemical and Volume Control System (RCV [CVCS])
and the Extra Boration System (RBS [EBS]) lines) and measurement systems.
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HL (see Section 5.4.3 – Figure 1)
Each HL connects the RPV to a SG. It is made of two forged pieces and comprises three
straight sections and two elbows [Ref. 40] (dimensions are presented on Section 5.4.3 –
Table 1).
COL (see Section 5.4.3 – Figure 1)
Each COL connects a SG to a MCP. It is made of three forged pieces and comprises straight
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sections and three elbows (dimensions are presented on Section 5.4.3 – Table 1).
The design of the HPC EPR crossover leg [Ref. 40] has been modified [Ref. 41] to improve the
inspectability of the welds as described in section 3.4 (see evolution of design in Section 5.4.3 –
Figure 2).
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CL (see Section 5.4.3 – Figure 1)
Each CL connects a MCP to the RPV. It is made of one forged piece and comprises two straight
sections and one elbow [Ref. 40] (dimensions are presented on Section 5.4.3 – Table 1).
Dimensions
Sections 5.4.3 – Tables 2 to 4 give further dimensions for each leg (nominal dimensions).
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The inside diameter of the COL, HL and CL was primarily sized to minimise pressure drop in the
MCLs and to reduce flow velocity.
The nominal dimensions of the MCLs are [Ref. 42]:
 { SCI removed }
The Section 5.4.3 – Figure 3 shows all the branch connections on the primary piping.
Surge line (see Section 5.4.3 – Figure 4)
The surge line is comprised of seven sections welded together, constructed of forged austenitic
stainless steel [Ref. 43]. Each section contains one elbow.
The nominal dimensions of the surge line are:
 { SCI removed }
Additional dimensions are given in Section 5.4.3 – Table 5.

3.1.2.2. Sub-Assemblies (Nozzles and Sleeves)
General design (see Section 5.4.3 – Figure 1)
Each reactor coolant loop contains homogeneous welds made with austenitic materials.
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The connecting welds between auxiliary lines and the primary pipework are also homogeneous
welds.
Dissimilar metal welds between the nozzles in ferritic steel on heavy components (RPV and
SGs) and safe-ends in austenitic stainless steel are shop welded (see Sub-chapter 5.3).
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Branch connection design
Large branch connection (nominal diameter > 150mm)
Large branch connections are integrated with the MCLs. They are machined out of forgings.
Between one and three large branch connections are integrated in the same loop.
Small branch connection (nominal diameter < 150mm)

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Small branch connections and bosses are attached to the MCLs by welding. An exception to this
is for the RCV [CVCS] and the RBS [EBS] systems charging / injection nozzles, which are
integrated with the MCLs (machined out of a forging), to take into account the experience
feedback regarding the thermal mixing zone.
Thermal sleeves
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If the fatigue analysis of a branch connection leads to a Cumulative Usage Factor (CUF)
exceeding the RCC-M criteria (see section 2 of Sub-chapter 3.8), then it is protected by the
installation of a thermal sleeve. The sleeve is machined from an intermediate forging and is
shop welded to the nozzle.
Based on past experience, only the RCV [CVCS] system charging nozzles require a penetrating
thermal sleeve. This sleeve was designed by AREVA for the French EPR, to avoid any risk of
thermal mixing and fatigue damage in the RCV [CVCS] system nozzle corner. The fatigue
analysis will be performed in the Detailed Design Phase.
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3.2. DESIGN BASIS
Compared to the N4 design, the main improvements are:
 A reduction in the risk of manufacturing defect:
o the number of welds is significantly reduced,
o the welding process is improved (narrow gap Tungsten Inert Gas (TIG) welding),

o good mechanical properties of the filler materials used for manufacturing and on
site welding (high toughness), and
o the inspectability of the welds is improved,
 A reduction in the risk of fatigue and local hydraulic phenomenon:
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o the large nozzles are integrated into the piping (forged),
o a surface treatment is performed with specified inside surface roughness

parameter, and
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o the RCV [CVCS] system flowrate in the charging line is decreased.
 A reduction in the risk of thermal ageing effect:
o grade of the forged base metal is not sensitive to thermal ageing.
Additional leak detection measures are considered:
 Leak detection function measures:

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Leak detection contributes to the prevention of Reactor Coolant System (RCP [RCS])
loop breaks by detecting any through-wall cracks that may appear in service before they
reach a critical size.
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The safety function of the leak detection system is consequently similar to a line of
defence associated with limiting the consequences of a loss of integrity. Leak detection
will initiate alarms in the event that the flow rate exceeds certain defined limits.
The main operating parameters of the RCP [RCS] system are described in Sub-chapter 5.1.
The MCLs are designed for a 60-year life. However, some parts of the lines are replaceable
before the end of the 60 years operation time.
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The mechanical design of the MCLs is compliant with the requirements of the RCC-M Level 1
(see Sub-chapters 3.8, section 2).
3.2.2.1. Sizing Calculation [Ref. 42]
A sizing calculation is performed on the primary pipework, the surge line, and the integrated and
welded branch connections, in accordance with the RCC-M Code (see Sub-chapter 3.8,
section 2).
The reinforcement of branch connections is not on the run side, but on the branch side.
The thicknesses of the straight sections and the outside bends are determined in accordance
with the RCC-M Code section B3600. The thickness of the inside bends are increased to ensure
a suitable stress level.

Furthermore, straight (90°) or inclined (45°) integrated branch connections are checked by
calculation according to the rules for the reinforcement of openings of the RCC-M Code section
B3600.
HIC Requirements
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The design and manufacture for the MCLs, excluding the surge line, complies with the HIC
requirements as defined in Sub-chapter 3.4.
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The loads used for stress analysis are dependent on the operating conditions and RCC-M
criteria level.
The MCLs are analysed with loads corresponding to normal, upset, emergency and faulted
conditions in accordance with the RCC-M requirements. The stress analysis performed depends
on the operational mode under consideration.
The loads used for the stress analysis are listed in Sub-chapter 3.6, section 1, and are
dependent on the operating conditions under consideration and on the criteria level.
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Stress Analysis Methods
Calculations are carried out in accordance with the RCC-M Code sections B3600 and B3200.
The RCC-M requirements concern the range of primary plus secondary stresses and total
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stresses, which require the calculation of temperature transients through the thickness of the
component wall.
The transients, as defined in Sub-chapter 3.6, section 1, are used to compute these thermal
variations.
The outer surface of the pipework is assumed to be adiabatic, while the inner surface boundary
experiences the temperature of the coolant fluid. Fluctuations in the temperature of the coolant
fluid produce a temperature distribution through the pipe wall thickness, which varies with time.
This temperature distribution is sub-divided into four parts; following RCC-M requirements:
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 Average temperature in Zone A of the discontinuity (TA) is the average through-wall

temperature of the pipe which contributes to general expansion loads;
 Radial linear thermal gradient which contributes to through-wall bending moment (T1);
 Radial non-linear thermal gradient (T2) which contributes to peak stress associated with
shearing of the surface; and
 Discontinuity temperature (TA - TB) representing the difference in average temperature at

cross sections on each side of a discontinuity (TB.is the average temperature in Zone B
of the discontinuity).
Each transient is described by at least two load sets representing the maximum and minimum
stress state during each transient. The construction of the load sets is accomplished by
combining the following factors, to calculate the maximum (minimum) stress state during each
transient.

 T1;
 T2;
 ATA - BTB are thermal expansion of sections on each side (A and B) of the geometric or
material discontinuity;
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 Moment loads due to TA; and
 Pressure loads.
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The ranges of primary plus secondary stresses and total stresses are computed following the
equations of RCC-M section B3653.
For all relevant load set combinations, the primary-plus-secondary and peak stress intensities,
elasto-plastic stress correction factors (Ke) and CUF, are calculated in accordance with RCC-M
section B3650.
The incremental usage factor is calculated for the combination of load sets yielding the highest
alternating stress intensity range. The next most severe combination is then determined and the
incremental usage factor calculated. This procedure is repeated until all fatigue relevant load
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combinations have been covered. The CUF is the summation of the incremental usage factors.
HPC EPR specific fast fracture calculations have been defined in the frame of the safety
demonstration of HICs, as described in section 3.4.
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3.2.2.3. Status of Analysis
Deformation and elastic-plastic instability:
A simplified stress analysis based on primary stress is undertaken in the sizing report [Ref. 42].
It demonstrates that the criteria of the RCC-M Code to prevent damage due to excessive
deformation and elastic-plastic instability are fulfilled in each area of the primary pipework.
Fatigue
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In order to justify the fatigue behaviour of the MCLs during operation, stress analysis will be
performed as part of the detailed design, following the method described in section 3.2.2.2,
using secondary and total stress. For all the MCLs studied, criteria regarding the risk of crack
initiation by fatigue (CUF lower than 1) will be analysed considering the geometry, the thermal
loads and the number of cycles. Fulfilment of the criteria defined in the RCC-M code for
secondary stresses will also be verified.
Based on past experience, only the RCV [CVCS] system charging nozzles require a penetrating
thermal sleeve to avoid any risk of thermal mixing and fatigue damage in the RCV [CVCS]
system nozzle corner.
3.2.3. Thermo-Hydraulic Design
The design has the following general characteristics:
 { SCI removed } It is determined on the basis of pressure drop (to be minimised) and flow
velocity criteria.

 The leg geometry must minimise thermal expansion effects.
The four HLs (one per loop) connect the RPV to the SGs. Their design has the following
characteristics:
 The tops of HLs must be lower than the bottoms of primary-side SG plenums to allow
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natural circulation in the RCP [RCS] system and to facilitate operation at ¾ loop
condition. The hot leg is installed horizontally.
 The HL geometry must allow the Residual Heat Removal Mode (RRA [RHRS]) to
continue operating (sufficient water level) even when a SG is undergoing maintenance
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with access via the manhole.
The four COLs (one per loop) connect the SGs to the MCPs. Their design is defined as follows:
 The relative position of the COL and the RPV is calculated to limit core uncovering in the
event of a small break, and
 The geometry of the COL takes into account the vertical orientation of the reactor coolant
pumps suction.
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The four CLs (one per loop) connect the MCPs to the RPV. Their design is defined as follows:
 the CL is installed horizontally.
The surge line is designed to avoid excessive thermal loads, in particular thermal stratification
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under steady state operating conditions.
Surge line geometry is adapted to thermal expansion and thus minimizes this phenomenon.
3.2.4. Material
All materials used for the MCLs are selected in accordance with the RCC-M requirements.
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3.2.4.1. Base metal
The selection of the base metal is the result of significant feedback and manufacturing
improvements [Ref. 44], taking the following requirements into account, in accordance with the
technical rules drawn up for the fabrication of the RCP [RCS] system:
 excellent mechanical properties with a significant margin (according to the design

requirements),
 high toughness values in all situations (even in the event of cold water injection),
 corrosion resistance,
 ease of manufacturing, and in-service inspections,
 good weldability and significant reduction in the number of welds, and

 easy replacement after long operating periods (if necessary before the end of the 60 year
operating time).
All these requirements are satisfied when forged legs are used, with forged nozzles and elbows,
in austenitic stainless steel with very low carbon content.
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In addition to the technical rules above, these materials present the following benefits:
 uniformity of material for all pipework (including connected lines),
 ease of on-site welding, no heat treatment needed,
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 ease of on-site connection of numerous auxiliary lines and the surge line,
 improved manufacturing and associated non-destructive tests, and
 specific manufacturing methods must be applied to obtain a homogeneous

metallographic structure and the adequate grain size index required to perform
Ultrasonic Test (UT) inspections.
Grade
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The materials grades, used to manufacture the MCL including the surge line, are selected in
such a way as to minimise various forms of corrosion and ensure compatibility with the
environment in which they are used.
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The specified materials are austenitic stainless steels (see Section 5.4.3 – Tables 6 and 7).
For the HLs, CLs and COLs, a single grade is selected: { SCI removed }
For the surge line, another grade is used: { SCI removed }
For the welded branch connections and thermal sleeve, the grade is { SCI removed }
These grades have very low carbon content and therefore require no stabilisation.
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Parts produced are obtained by forging, with a global forging ratio higher or equal to 3. Specific
measures are taken during manufacturing to obtain homogeneous metallographic structure and
adequate grain size index required to UT. The parts are delivered already heat-treated in order
to remove any risk of intergranular corrosion in-service [Ref. 45].
As they are made of low carbon stainless steels, the parts can be welded with no risk of
sensitisation to intergranular corrosion and with no loss of mechanical properties even in the
heat-affected zone.
3.2.4.2. Filler metal
3.2.4.3. Mechanical properties
The values specified for base forged metals in the MCL and surge line are given in the RCC-M
Code (STR M3321), with any further requirements detailed in the equipment specifications
[Ref. 44].

The filler metals used for welding (in-shop and on-site) are assessed to meet qualification
procedure requirements
3.3. PROCUREMENT, MANUFACTURING, TESTING AND INSPECTIONS
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The procurement, manufacturing, testing (pressure testing) and inspections (inspections during
Sub-chapter 3.4, section 5.
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3.3.1. Procurement and Manufacturing [Ref. 44]
3.3.1.1. Procurement
The loop design and applicable manufacturing technology require the following forged parts to
be supplied:
 A HL, comprising two separate forged sections: one has the integrated large nozzles
{ SCI removed } and the other { SCI removed } at the SG inlet.
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 A CL, comprising a single-piece forged section: this is a straight section (with large
integrated nozzles (nominal diameter ≥ 150 mm), RCV [CVCS] system charging nozzle
and RBS [EBS] system nozzle) { SCI removed } at RPV inlet.
 A COL, comprising three forged sections: each consisting of a straight section and an
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elbow.
 A surge line, using induction-bent sections when required, made of seven straight
sections.
The forging operations are optimised to obtain the required mechanical properties.
The material grain size and ultrasonic attenuation need to be such as to support inspections:
i) during manufacture of the forgings themselves;

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ii) during shop-fabrication of MCL pipework sub-assemblies, welds;
iii) during site erection of MCL pipework, welds; and
iv) PSI and ISI.
Previous French manufacturing experience and qualification results demonstrate that the
properties will be achieved if the forging ratio is greater than or equal to 3 and the grain size is
greater than or equal to ASTM 1.
Hot and cold legs
Seamless sections are produced by forging a solid ingot. Heating is carried out several times to
permit the successive operations such as blooming, drawing, nozzles forging and final shaping.
A significant amount of machining is needed to bore the inside of the pipes and produce the
required shape for the nozzles.

Final machining is carried out before acceptance testing and associated non-destructive tests,
which are as follows:
 Liquid-penetrant testing of inside and outside finished machined surfaces, and
 UT on the entire volume by longitudinal and transverse beams (UT inspection on all HIC
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forgings are supported by capability statements).
Crossover leg
The COL is produced from a hollow ingot. Forging sequences are significantly reduced because
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of the simple design (no nozzles). Only a few heating cycles are necessary to perform the
sequences of hot drawing. Three parts are obtained by sawing the rough product.
Each part is machined before induction bending of the elbow.
After the final solution heat treatment, the exact geometry is achieved either by machining or
grinding, before performing the acceptance tests and associated non-destructive examinations.
The same examinations are used as for the cold and hot legs.
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3.3.1.2. Manufacturing
Workshop manufacturing
Shop manufacturing is limited to welding the small nozzles and welding the seamless parts
together, to form sub-assemblies.
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The provision of welded hydrotest blanks is necessary to perform tests at the required pressure
according to RCC-M Code.
After removal of the hydrotest blanks by mechanical means, final cleaning shall be performed
before packaging and shipment to the plant for field erection.
In the thermal mixing zones with significant temperature variations, the inside surface treatment
of RCV [CVCS] system / CL, RIS [SIS] system / CL, surge line / HL and RBS [EBS] system / CL
branch connections must be carried out to minimise the risk of local thermal hydraulic
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phenomena (turbulent flow) and to have specific roughness values lower than the usual practice
{ SCI removed }. Polishing will be performed on the inner surface in areas of thermal mixing with
a fine-finish flapper wheel.
In order to limit the risk of damage caused by impurities in fluid systems, a degree of cleanliness
is defined as a required cleanliness of a given surface prior to testing and start-up of the facility.
Verification tests and different level of criteria, as defined in the RCC-M code, are associated
with each degree of cleanliness.
Field erection
Assembly of primary loop pipework requires only a small number of welds between similar
metal. Such welds need no preheating or post-weld heat treatment and are carried out by
narrow-groove orbital TIG automatic welding. For one primary loop (see Section 5.4.3 –
Figure 3), there are nine homogeneous welds, including six on-site. The intermediate welds of
the HL (one weld) and the crossover leg (two welds) are carried out in shop.
Subsequent inspections of the welds are:

 Liquid-penetrant testing,
 Radiographic Testing, and
 UT.
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The surge line is composed with seven sections of pipe starting from the HL nozzle to the safe-
end of the pressuriser. There are six butt welds made using narrow gap TIG. There is one
nozzle weld onto the HL and one weld onto the safe-end of the pressuriser using orbital TIG
welding on site (see Section 5.4.3 – Figures 4 and 5).
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All welds on the MCLs, including the surge line, that are accessible must be ground flush
internally and externally.
3.3.2. Testing and Inspection
Testing and inspections are done in accordance with RCC-M requirements.
3.3.2.1. Inspections During Manufacturing

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Materials used for the MCL must intrinsically be able to be inspected during manufacturing:
 The austenitic forged base material of MCL and surge line will be inspected by ultrasonic
examination.
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 The MCL and surge line welds will be inspected by both radiographic and ultrasonic
examination.
Main Coolant Lines:
 surface inspection = 100% liquid-penetrant testing of inner and outer surfaces, and
 volumetric inspection = 100% UT from the outer surface (inspection from the inner
surface may also be carried out for some zones, in particular for single-piece nozzles).
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Surge line:
 surface inspection = 100% liquid-penetrant testing of outer surfaces, and
 volumetric inspection = 100% ultrasonic testing from the outer surface.
Connection welds and set-in nozzle welds:
 Surface inspection = 100% liquid-penetrant testing of inner (where accessible) and outer
surfaces.
Note: Liquid-penetrant testing must be carried out after the welds have been ground
flush.
 Volume inspection = 100% radiographic and ultrasonic testing of the weld and an area of
10mm each side of the weld, supplemented at the end of manufacturing by specific
inspections defined in the frame of the safety demonstration of HIC, as described in
section 3.4.

3.3.2.2. Testing
The MCLs are subject to a regulatory hydrostatic test performed according to the requirements
of RCC-M. Primary pipework containing:
 HLs,
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 CLs,
 COLs, and
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 Surge line sections.
are tested as a sub-assembly in the workshop prior to transfer to the construction site.
For the hydrostatic test, blanking plates are welded onto the equipment.
3.3.2.3. In-Service Inspections
The typical areas for in-service inspections [Ref. 44] are:

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 welds, and
 base metal areas with a high usage factor (UF > 0.5).
All welds, whose location is indicated in Section 5.4.3 - Figures 1 and 4, can be inspected in-
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service, in particular by ultrasonic testing (see Section 5.4.3 - Tables 8 and 9).
The procurement requirements applying to base metals (forging ratio and grain size) associated
with the welding process used for the main welds (narrow-groove orbital TIG) ensures that the
resulting ultrasonic permeability achieves the necessary sensitivity for in-service ultrasonic
inspection.
The in-service inspection of the MCLs, except for the surge line, ensures compliance with the
HIC requirements (see section 3.4.2).
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3.4. HIGH INTEGRITY COMPONENT ANALYSIS [REF. 3]

As stated in Sub-chapter 3.1, the MCLs are a HIC (except for the pressuriser surge line) for
which the specific measures described in Sub-chapter 3.4, section 0.3.6, concerning prevention,
surveillance and mitigation contribute to its high integrity demonstration. With regards to the fast
fracture risk, the three-legged approach presented in Sub-chapter 3.4, section 1.6, has been
applied to the MCL as follows:
 Use of fracture mechanics to determine the End of Life Limiting Defect Size (ELLDS) and
 Use of suitable redundant and diverse inspections during manufacturing, supplemented

planned.

This methodology applies to the whole pipework, including welds and base metal. However,
considering the higher probability of finding crack-like defects in welds than in forgings, and
considering that the toughness is very high in the austenitic base metal, the majority of the
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locations assessed are likely to be the welds. Consequently, the following sub-sections focus on
welds, and the full demonstration including base metal will be provided in the detailed design
stage.
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For the MCL, the HIC methodology applies to the nine girth welds [Ref. 3]. Two bounding cases
have been identified and fracture mechanics calculations have been performed on the most
severe mechanical loadings and transients:
 RPV Outlet safe-end to HL weld, and
 Reactor Coolant Pump Outlet nozzle to CL weld.

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failure is near 20 mm. This defect size will be used for any of the MCL homogeneous welds to
define the requirements for inspections which will be carried out at the end of manufacturing.
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3.4.2. Non Destructive Testing (NDT)
The NDT selected to be qualified for the inspection of MCL welds is the UT technique used in
addition to the non-qualified RT technique [Ref. 36]. This UT technique is made up of automatic
phased array UT using longitudinal and transverse waves up to 70° refraction angle, deployed
from outside the pipe, supplemented by a self-tandem UT technique also deployed from outside
[Ref. 37]. These techniques can cover the volume of all welds and detect all defects of structural
concern, including pipe to the MCP casing inlet and outlet nozzle welds, which are only
inspectable from the pipe side.
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The demonstration of the performance of the UT selected for the inspection of homogeneous
welds, and in particular their capability to detect the hypothetical narrow near-vertical planar
weld defects, relies on the following evidence [Ref. 37]:
 Tests performed in the Sizewell qualification frame showing that defects embedded in a
mock-up, including lack of fusion, could be detected with longitudinal waves up to 70°
even when scanning only from one side of the weld.
 Tests performed in Olkiluoto Pre-Service / In-Service Inspection qualification frame

concluding that defects with a size of 5 x 50mm located in the inner third thickness of the
weld are detectable using automated phased-array UT when scanning from outside the
pipe.
 Tests performed in the 1990’s and in 2011 on an AREVA Dissimilar Metal Welds (DMW)
mock-up concluding that all defects can be detected either by phased-array or self-
tandem UT. In particular, the use of tandem UT technique provides a robust form of
specular detection, and has been recognised as useful especially for mainly smooth
embedded near vertical defects.

In order to enable a 70° incidence angle to be achieved at all weld locations a modification of the
COL geometry has been implemented and its feasibility verified [Ref. 46]: as presented in
Section 5.4.3 – Figure 2, the straight pipe sections adjacent to the welds connecting the COL to
primary components have been extended by approximately 250 mm by lowering the COL. This
modification enables also to overcome the problem of surface profile undulation arising from the
fabrication bending process by ensuring that such effects would be outside the UT scanning
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region.
Moreover, in order to limit the interference between the beam reflecting from the probe and the
inner surface when using the self-tandem technique, a modification of the weld preparation has
been implemented and its feasibility verified [Ref. 47]: the length of counterbores of the MCL
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pipework have been increased from 25 mm to approximately 100 mm from the weld centreline.
This modification also enables the interpretation of UT results to be made more easily when
scanning from the outside with the phased-array UT technique.
An ALARP analysis [Ref. 38] summarised in Sub-chapter 17.3, section 3, has been performed to
support the adequacy of these two modifications. The capability of this UT proposal to detect
and reject defects whose Qualified Examination Defect Size (QEDS) derived from the fracture
Mechanics Analyses is 10 mm or greater can be achieved with a high level of reliability; smaller
defects can also be detected with reasonable capability.
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In conclusion, a DSM of { SCI removed } has been attained with Fracture Mechanics
Calculations while considering that the fatigue crack growth for these worst case defects with
regards to fast fracture is negligible; this assumption will be verified during detailed design.
The UT techniques to be applied at the end of manufacturing will be qualified for any HPC EPR
project.
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3.4.3. Fracture toughness
The lower bound fracture toughness value used to determine the critical size will be taken equal
to the value used for DMW Olkiluoto project. Fracture toughness test will be conducted on both
welds and parent material.
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4. PRESSURISER
The HPC Pressuriser (PZR) is designed on the basis of the EPR basic design, which originated
from the N4 design but with an increased volume { SCI removed } due to the higher Reactor
Coolant System (RCP [RCS]) volume, a lateral spray instead of a top spray, and three lateral
bracket supports instead of a skirt.
The PZR is a Nuclear Pressure Equipment (NPE) and is subject to the associated requirements.
The PZR is a High Integrity Component (HIC), which satisfies all the design requirements
described in section 1.6 of Sub-chapter 3.4.

The PZR main role is to control the reactor coolant pressure. To that end:
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 For normal operation:
o It compensates the volume variations resulting from water expansion or

contractions of the RCP [RCS] system.
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o It keeps reactor coolant pressure constant during normal Nuclear Steam Supply
System (NSSS) operation, ensures pressure control and takes part to volume
control during normal and upset conditions.
 For fault conditions:
o It protects the RCP [RCS] system against overpressure by relief valves through
the upper head of the pressuriser.
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o It controls reactor coolant pressure during accident and post-accident conditions.
In addition, the PZR is a part of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) which acts as a
barrier to the release of radioactive materials.
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4.1.2. Description
The general drawing of the PZR is shown in Section 5.4.4 – Figure 1 and Figure 2.
The PZR is a pressure vessel forming part of the RCPB. It consists of a vertical cylindrical shell,
closed at both ends by hemispherical heads [Ref. 48]. It is made of ferritic steel, with austenitic
stainless steel cladding on all internal surfaces in contact with the reactor coolant.
 The upper hemispherical head is a hot forged single-piece unit. It is equipped with:
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o Three nozzles connected to the pressure relief valves.
o One nozzle connected to the Primary Depressurisation System (PDS) valve line.
The first three nozzles are each equipped with a scoop inside the PZR in order to
maintain a water seal below each valve seat.
o A manhole providing access inside the PZR, the cover of which is drilled to allow
a stand-alone active cool down line with a spray to go through.
o A vent nozzle
 The forged cylindrical shell consists of three sections. It is equipped with:
o Upper (steam phase) instrument nozzles.
o Lateral bracket supports.

o The lateral spray system consists of three separate nozzles welded laterally near
the top of the upper cylindrical shell:
 Two nozzles for the main spray lines (connected to two cold legs).
 One nozzle for the auxiliary spray line (connected to the Chemical and
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Volume Control System (RCV [CVCS])).
The three spray nozzles have integral welded thermal sleeves. Each thermal sleeve is
extended by a lance. The end of each lance holds a spray box with screwed spray heads
which inject spray flow into the PZR steam space.
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 The lower hemispherical head with integrated axial surge line nozzle is a forged
single-piece unit. It is equipped with:
o Lower (water phase) instrument nozzles.
o Heater sleeves equipped with connecting flanges.
o A screen installed at the surge line nozzle in the bottom head which prevents the
passage of loose parts from the PZR to the reactor coolant pipework.
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The PZR is equipped with { SCI removed }, arranged vertically, inserted into the heater sleeves.
There are no spare sleeves without heaters. The heaters are mounted using flanged
connections for easy replacement. They are similar in manufacture to spare heaters currently
produced for existing plants.
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Section 5.4.4 – Table 1 presents the main characteristics of the heaters.
The heater flanged connections are comprised of the following parts:
o Heater sleeves, welded to the inner cladding of the bottom head after the final
post weld heat treatment of the PZR;
o Open flanges of austenitic stainless steel with threaded holes (replaceable);
Slip-on flanges (upper flange) of austenitic stainless steel, installed prior to

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o
welding the heater sleeves;
o Heater flange attachments, welded on the heater sheath, containing grooves for
O-ring seal;
o Metal O-ring seals;
o Slip-on flanges (lower flange) of austenitic stainless steel; and
o Studs and nuts.
Two areas are free of heater penetrations, these being the central area around the surge line
nozzle and the area located above the surge line routing. This allows access to the heaters for
maintenance and replacement.
The PZR has thermal insulation on the outside surface.

The PZR controls the main coolant pressure and volume in all reactor states during normal
operation and accidental conditions.
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4.2. DESIGN BASIS
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The design objectives and main characteristics of the PZR are as follows:
o Reliable operation and suitability for all operating conditions and loading, by
choosing an appropriate structural design which minimises as far as possible the
stress levels and the stress distribution.
o Reduced fatigue in all loaded points for the EPR requirement of 60 years design
life.
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o Selection of acceptable and proven materials.
o Use of good manufacturing practice, following industrial techniques used by

traditional manufacturers and complying with manufacturing and in-service
inspection requirements.
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o A design which allow easy access for maintenance and in-service inspections.
o A design which reduces personnel radiation exposure.
The PZR functions are provided by:
o The presence of water and steam phases in the PZR vessel;
The normal and auxiliary spray systems;

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o The heaters; and
o The PZR pressure relief valves.
The interfaces providing these functions are:
o Interface with the RCP [RCS] system hot leg: the PZR is connected to hot leg
No. 3 of the RCP [RCS] system through the surge line. This connection allows
continuous adjustment of the volume and pressure between the RCP [RCS]
system and the PZR.
o Interface with the RCP [RCS] system cold legs: two main spray nozzles are
connected to two spray lines from two cold legs of the RCP [RCS] system. One
of the cold legs belongs to the same RCP [RCS] system loop as the one
connected to the surge line. The spray water is injected into the steam volume
as fine droplets, creating an instantaneous condensing surface.

o Interface with the RCV [CVCS] system: an auxiliary spray pipeline is connected
to the RCV [CVCS] system. The auxiliary spray water, connected to RCV
[CVCS] system, has a much lower temperature than the normal spray,
connected to the cold legs, water.
o Interface with the PZR relief tank: three nozzles are connected to the PZR relief
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valves which discharge into the PZR relief tank and into the reactor building if the
PZR relief tank rupture disc fails. An additional nozzle is connected to the PDS
line in the event of a severe accident.
4.2.1.1. Main Characteristics
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Surge Line Nozzle
The surge line is connected to the PZR via the surge line nozzle which is located vertically in the
centre of the bottom head.
This design limits the effects of excessive thermal loads on the nozzle under normal operations
and excursions. The surge nozzle is equipped with a thermal sleeve opened at the lower end to
avoid the accumulation of radioactive particles.
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Loads resulting from thermal expansion of the PZR vessel are minimised by the short distance
between the nozzle and the lateral supports, the vertical position and the surge line route.
The axial location of the nozzle at the lowest point of the PZR helps continuous sweeping of the
PZR bottom area to avoid stagnant areas and the deposition of radioactive particles.
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The surge line nozzle, which is part of the bottom dome of the PZR, is made of ferritic forged
steel, and provided with an austenitic safe end. The welding metal used for the dissimilar metal
weld { SCI removed }. The nozzle is clad with austenitic stainless steel on all surfaces in contact
with the primary coolant.
Spray System
The spray system is located at the top of the PZR upper shell and comprises three spray
nozzles [Ref. 49]:
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 Two lines are connected to two of the RCP [RCS] system cold legs (one of these two
loops being the surge line loop) and provide the normal spray function in the PZR.
 One line is connected to the RCV [CVCS] system.
In order to protect the spray pipelines against excessive thermal loads and to reduce fatigue
damage as much as possible, the spray nozzles are fitted with thermal sleeves.
Each spray lance is extended with a water box equipped with screwed spray nozzles, which
provide a fine droplet spray.
The distance between the spray nozzles and the area where the spray fluid hits the PZR wall is
relatively large. The size of droplets is relatively small due to the choice of small spray nozzles,
which ensure an optimal heat exchange surface and heat transfer before the droplets reach the
PZR wall. This design limits the risk of thermal fatigue in the spray/PZR wall contact area.
The spray system and its component parts are easily accessible for inspection and
maintenance. The entire replacement of a spray lance with its spray nozzles can be carried out.

Relief Valve and PDS Valve Connections
Three nozzles are connected to the pressure relief valves. An additional nozzle is connected to
the PDS line used in the event of a severe accident. They are located on the upper
hemispherical head of the PZR on which are also provided three taps for the safety valve pilots.
The relief valves are shielded from spray pipeline radiation by a concrete floor.
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A scoop is welded onto the cladding at the inlet of each of the three pressure relief valve
nozzles. Its aim is to create a water plug upstream from the pressure level.
Connection to Heaters
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The PZR heaters are installed vertically in the bottom of the PZR. They are connected by bolted
flanges to the PZR heater sleeves.
The flanged connection is a design proven on the Konvoi PZR [Ref. 50].
The flanged connection allows easy, quick and reliable replacement of defective heaters.
A heater support plate is installed in the PZR bottom head. It is designed with a wide central
opening which allows access to the surge line nozzle retaining screen for inspection purposes.
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Supports
The PZR is supported by three brackets welded to the lower cylindrical shell. These brackets
rest on the supporting floor by means of an intermediate supporting structure which allows free
radial thermal expansion.
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These supports accommodate all operating loads from normal to fault conditions. For fault
loads, eight radial stops fixed on the civil works at the level of the PZR centre of gravity provide
stability to the PZR.
These upper lateral supports allow free radial and vertical thermal expansion of the vessel.
See also the section dedicated to primary equipment support in section 9.
Instrument Lines
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The instrument taps are small diameter nozzles welded to the pressure retaining wall cladding.
The PZR is equipped with:
 Eight taps used for PZR level measurement
Four of the eight taps are all installed at the same level, near to the top of the cylindrical shell
(steam volume). The other four taps are all installed at the same level in the bottom end (water
volume).
The distance between the two levels represents the level measuring range (scale).
The taps are designed and configured to provide reliable level-measurements:
 One sample line tap provides samples for water chemistry analysis; and

 Two temperature measurement taps, one located in the steam volume and the other in
the water volume, are provided at the same levels as the pressure / level measurement
taps.
Manway
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The manway flange is located on the upper hemispherical head, on the PZR centreline.
Rigid construction combined with a rigid blank cover limits deformation due to pressure in the
sealing area and ensures proper leak tightness of the closure.
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The sealing elements are an “expanded graphite” type gasket or some other proven seal.
The manway opening provides access to the interior of the PZR for inspection and maintenance.
A small degassing tap is provided in the manway nozzle as a complement to the venting nozzle
to allow the complete removal of non-condensable gases.
An additional stand-alone active cool down line with a spray (Top PZR Homogenisation Line
(TPHL)) is inserted through the manhole cover. This homogenisation line facilitates faster
cooling of the upper dome for the monophasic shutdown.
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4.2.1.2. Main Dimensions
The main dimensions, characteristics, and nozzles connected to the PZR are listed in
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4.2.1.3. Functional Requirements
The functional requirements for the PZR are (see Sub-chapter 5.1):
a) { SCI removed }
b) { SCI removed }.
c) RCP [RCS] system volume control: The PZR volume is sufficient to meet the following
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requirements:
 The volumes of water and steam combined are sufficient to meet the desired pressure
response caused by changes in RCP [RCS] system volume.
 The water volume is large enough to prevent the heaters being uncovered in PCC-2,
PCC-3, and PCC-4 conditions and at the same time large enough to accommodate
coolant expansion between 0% and 100% of the power level under normal operating
(PCC-1) conditions.
 The steam volume is large enough to accommodate overpressure protection

requirements in respect of the RCP [RCS] system overpressure criteria in PCC-2 to
PCC-4 conditions.
 Fluctuation in steam pressure during normal operation should avoid frequent actuation of
the pressure regulation devices.
 The PZR will not empty following reactor trip or turbine trip.

 The safety injection signal will not actuate during reactor trip or turbine trip.
d) PZR pressure regulation:
 Three spray nozzles are located in the upper section (two separate nozzles for normal
spray, and one for auxiliary spray).
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 The heaters are located in the lower section of the PZR (water volume).
 Three nozzles for the relief valves connection and one for the PDS valves connection are
located in the upper part of the PZR head (steam volume).
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e) Surge line requirements:
 The surge line connects the PZR to the RCP [RCS] system hot leg No. 3. The surge line
is connected vertically to the nozzle at the bottom of the PZR.
 The surge line differential pressure (P) during overpressure transient conditions (rising
flow) is within the maximum allowable pressure loss.
{ SCI removed }
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4.2.1.4. Requirements for Inspection, repair and replacement
Inspection
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The PZR design does not require the presence of personnel inside the PZR to carry out in-
service inspections. All inspections are possible from the outside and some may be
accomplished using automatic inspection tools.
For inspectability purposes, the surge line nozzle is integrated to the lower hemispherical head.
More information on inspectability is provided in section 4.3.2.
Repair
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The repair of the PZR is made possible for the following components or areas where fatigue,
corrosion, seizing or ageing may occur:
 Manway threads (mechanical damage, threading tearing): repair by threaded inserts.
 Manway sealing surfaces (scratches, tearing or corrosion): the flat surface design of the
sealing surface and cladding extra thickness allow easy repair by machining
Replacement
The following components or parts can be replaced if necessary:
 manway studs and nuts,
 spray lances,
 spray heads,

 heater rods (flanged connection), and
 heater rods studs, nuts and threaded open flange
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The PZR is designed for a 60-year life. However, some parts are replaceable before the end of
the 60 years operation time.
The mechanical design [Ref. 50] of the PZR is compliant with the requirements of RCC-M
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Level 1 (see Sub-chapter 3.8, section 2).
4.2.2.1. Sizing calculations
a) The thicknesses of the pressure retaining walls are determined on the basis of the design
pressure and design temperature.
b) The manway closure assembly is sized taking into account the design conditions (pressure
and temperature) and the mechanical characteristics of the gaskets, as provided by the
gasket manufacturer: a graphite expanded type gasket or other proven design is used for the
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manway assembly (relatively frequent openings).
HPC EPR specific fast fracture calculations have been defined in the frame of the safety
demonstration of HIC, as described in section 4.4.
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The sections below cover the sub-assemblies [Ref. 49].
Analysis of the Surge Nozzle Behaviour
A fatigue evaluation of the surge nozzle was performed in order to verify the acceptability of
usage factors for the 60-year design life. The fatigue calculation was based on the most onerous
transients for the thickest section (during heat-up and shutdown of the plant unit). The results
demonstrate that the usage factor is acceptable at each point in the nozzle.
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Pressure Relief Valve Nozzles
The relief valves nozzle loads were calculated considering the discharge forces. Safe end
calculations have been carried out; this area being considered to be the most stressed due to
the geometry and materials properties.
The stresses in nozzle safe ends have been calculated for pressure, temperature and external
moments (using the set of loads given for second category conditions and for fault conditions)
resulting from the pipework calculations. The calculated stresses are acceptable with very large
margins in the weakest points of the structure.
Lateral Fastening Support Welds
The stresses in brackets support welds on the PZR shell were calculated based on the loads
given by the loop analysis results. Stresses induced in the welds are acceptable for all operating
conditions and fault situations.

4.2.3. Material
All materials ([Ref. 33] [Ref. 50]) used in the PZR pressure vessel construction comply with
RCC-M requirements.
The materials used in PZR construction are given in Section 5.4.4 – Table 3.
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Samples of representative material will be subjected to laboratory accelerated thermal exposure
testing over the lifetime of the plant. These will be periodically tested using Charpy V-notch
specimens and any evidence of temper embrittlement monitored.
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The PZR has a design temperature of 362°C. The ferritic material is exposed to the greatest
operational temperature of any component within the primary circuit. The effects of thermal
ageing degradation have been considered during operation as part of the design.
Basic Materials
Low-alloy ferritic steel { SCI removed } is selected for the pressure boundary parts of the PZR,
which are the shells, hemispherical heads, main nozzles and the lateral bracket supports.
The determination of the initial Reference Transition Temperature (nil-ductility) (RTNDT) is based
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on both Pellini and Charpy V notch tests.
The initial RTNDT for the PZR shells and nozzles is less than -20°C.
Studs and Nuts

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The PZR studs are small diameter studs (D < 60 mm) made of high-strength bolting steel.
PZR Safe Ends, Heater Wells and Instrument Nozzles
The safe ends are welded to the PZR nozzles during manufacture in the factory. The safe ends
are manufactured from austenitic stainless steel forged bars.
The welding of safe ends onto the nozzles is carried out with { SCI removed } without previous
buttering.
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Cladding Material
The internal cladding of the PZR is applied in two successive layers using austenitic stainless
steel welding.
The Heater Wells, TPHL and Instrument Nozzles Welding
The heater wells, TPHL and instrument nozzles are welded to the internal cladding. The
cladding thickness is locally increased in the weld area.


4.3.1. Procurement and Manufacturing
The PZR vessel is manufactured from the following parts:
 forged cylindrical shells,
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 hot-formed hemispherical heads,
 forged nozzles,
 forged plates for covers,
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 forged safe ends,
 forged bars for small diameter branch pipes,
 plates for lateral supports, and
 plates for heater support.

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Section 5.4.4 – Table 5 lists procurement conditions for the main components and parts.
Cladding of parts in the pressurised vessel utilises stainless steel which are deposited using
automatic welding with manual finishing of the circumferential welds.
The PZR shells and heads are welded together using a submerged arc welding process with a
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low alloyed steel welding material.
The safe ends are welded to the ferritic forged parts using a narrow groove welding process
using a { SCI removed }
The surge nozzle to safe end welds are ground flush internally and externally.
Pre- and post-welding heat treatment and final heat treatment of welds must comply with
RCC-M requirements.
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During the final stage of the manufacturing process, the weld surfaces and transitions must be
prepared in order to allow a surface inspection to be carried out (liquid penetrant testing,
magnetic particle inspection) and volume inspections (radiographic, ultrasonic).
The testing and inspection of the PZR must be carried out in accordance with the RCC-M
requirements.
HPC EPR specific inspections have been defined in the frame of the safety demonstration of
HIC, as described in section 4.4.
The PZR is subject to hydrostatic tests, performed in accordance with the RCC-M code.
Inspection
The outer surface of the PZR around the butt welds can be fully inspected.

The shape and slope of welded parts, including safe-end-to-nozzle welds, allow radiographic
examination.
The thermal insulation can be removed from all areas subject to in-service inspection such as:
 Circumferential welds on the body of the pressurised vessel (there are no longitudinal
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welds);
 Nozzle welds on hemispherical heads; and
 Lateral support bracket welds.
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The nozzle-to-head welds are sufficiently remote from other welds so as not to affect required
ultrasonic examinations.
Inspection of the heater sleeve welds can be carried out through the sleeve after heater
removal.
The inner cladding inspection may be performed from the outside by a remote-controlled
camera. Access is via the manway opening.
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For inspectability purposes, the final surface finish of the cladding must be suitable to allow
inspection by liquid penetrant and ultrasonic tests. PZR shell and ends have no longitudinal
welds.
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4.4. HIGH INTEGRITY COMPONENTS

As stated in Sub-chapter 3.1, the PZR (pressure boundary parts) is a HIC for which the specific
measures described in Sub-chapter 3.4, section 0.3.6, concerning prevention, surveillance and
mitigation contribute to its high integrity demonstration.
With regards to the HIC, the three-legged approach presented in section 1.6 of Sub-chapter 3.4
has been applied to the PZR as follows:
 Use of fracture mechanics to determine the End of Life Limiting Defect Size (ELLDS) and
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 Use of suitable redundant and diverse inspections (repeat inspections are planned)
during manufacturing, supplemented by the use of qualified inspection(s) at the end of
manufacturing.
This methodology applies to the whole pressure boundary component, including welds and base
metal. However, considering the higher probability of finding crack-like defects in welds than in
forgings, and considering that the toughness is lower in the weld metal or associated Heat
Affected Zone (HAZ), the majority of the locations assessed are likely to be the welds.
Consequently, the following sub-sections focus on welds, and the full demonstration including
base metal (e.g. nozzle corners) will be provided in the detailed design stage.

For the PZR, the HIC methodology applies to the four circumferential welds and to the nozzles
welds [Ref. 3]. Two bounding cases have been identified and fracture mechanics calculations
have been performed on the most severe transients:
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 Spray line nozzle set-in weld;
 Medium shell circumferential weld.
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failure is above 20 mm. This defect size will be used for any of the PZR welds to define the
requirements for inspections which will be carried out at the end of manufacturing.
Fast fracture mechanics analyses will be performed in sensitive regions of the main forgings in
the detailed design stage, to check whether these are limiting.
The Life Fatigue Crack Growth (LFCG) calculation will be performed at the detailed design
stage.
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4.4.2. Non Destructive Testing (NDT)
The NDT selected to be qualified for PZR welds are [Ref. 36]:
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 The pulse echo Ultrasonic Testing (UT) technique required by the RCC-M code
supplemented by additional beam angles; and
 The specular reflection Tandem technique shall be applied to all the main circular welds
and is used to detect certain type of plausible defects such as mainly smooth embedded
near vertical defects which could not be detected otherwise using conventional UT.
The Radiographic Testing inspection required by the RCC-M code will continue to be applied
extensively but as a non-qualified inspection before heat treatment on all of the main component
welds.
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The geometry and reflection angle of nozzle and manhole welds do not enable inspection with
the UT tandem technique. For these welds inspection will be made using qualified pulse echo
UT with zero degrees longitudinal waves from inside the nozzle.
The UT examination will be qualified and it will be demonstrated that the inspection is able to
detect a defect of 10 x 60 mm.
For circular welds, the qualified UT tandem technique increases the detection capability for
smooth vertical defect through the whole thickness. Its sensitivity is based on a flat bottom hole
of 6 mm and it has been demonstrated that this technique can detect and reject defects with
5 mm and 10 mm through wall extent.
For the nozzle welds, the UT tandem is replaced by 0° longitudinal waves from inside the nozzle
which enables a specular reflection for the detection of near vertical defects.

Finally, a DSM of { SCI removed } has been attained with Fracture Mechanics Calculations while
considering that the fatigue crack growth for these worst case defects with regards to fast
fracture is negligible; this assumption will be verified during detailed design.
The UT techniques (to be applied at the end of manufacturing) will be qualified for HPC EPR
Units 1 and 2.
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4.4.3. Fracture Toughness
defect size will be performed [Ref. 8]:
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 For the base metal by measurements of the fracture toughness on the forgings of any
HPC EPR project, in the ductile range; and
 For the weld material on a mock-up using Compact Tensile (CT) specimens in the ductile
range. The mock-up will be representative of the EPR material, both base metal and
weld wire / flux.
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5. PRESSURISER RELIEF LINE
The design of the pressuriser relief lines is based on that of the N4. The Pressuriser Safety
Relief Valves (PSRV) and Primary Depressurisation System (PDS) valves are described in
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section 7 and section 8.
5.1.1. Role of Equipment
The pressuriser relief line collects and transports steam and water discharged by the three
PSRVs to the Pressuriser Relief Tank (PRT). In the event of that the PRT system pressure
reaches the rupture discs burst pressure, steam is discharged into the Reactor Building (HR
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[RB]) at the level of the Main Coolant Pump (MCP) bunkers. Therefore, steam thus discharged
into the HR [RB] building dilutes hydrogen produced in the event of a severe accident (inerting
concept). In the event of a severe accident, the pressuriser relief line also collects fluid released
by the two PDS valves.
In order to prevent reactor coolant discharge into the HR [RB] building during the PSRVs testing,
the PRT collects, condenses and cools the entire volume of steam discharged during such tests.
The PRT is also used to collect potential leaks from the PSRV’s and from PDS valves during
reactor normal operation.
The pressuriser relief line supports are designed to sustain transient loads induced by flow of
sub-cooled water from the water seal and / or steam following the opening of the PSRVs and
PDS valves.
5.1.2. Description
The functional diagram for the pressuriser relief line is given in Sub-chapter 5.1 – Figure 2.

The Section 5.4.5 – Figure 1 presents the layout of the pressuriser (PZR), pressuriser relief lines
and PRT.
5.1.2.1. Discharge Pipework
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The PSRVs and PDS valves (description given in section 7 and section 8) discharge together
into a common header routing the water, steam or steam / water mixture towards the PRT.
Rupture discs are installed in outlet nozzles of the PRT. The discs isolate pressuriser valves
from the HR [RB] building during normal reactor operation.
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Nitrogen is injected into the relief line, via the Gaseous Waste Processing System (TEG
[GWPS]), immediately downstream of each PSRV and PDS valves.
5.1.2.2. Pressuriser Relief Tank (PRT)
The PRT design data are given in Section 5.4.5 – Table 1. The tank is connected to the
discharge header through a dedicated pipe. The pipe terminates inside the PRT. Pipe geometry
inside the tank is designed to accomplish steam condensation during pressuriser safety valve
testing.
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The PRT is provided with the following connections:
 TEG [GWPS] system connection to remove gases from the PRT gaseous phase.

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Drain line to the Nuclear Vent and Drain System (RPE [NVDS]) for cooling or draining
the tank.
 Return line from the RPE [NVDS] system for cooling of the tank.
 Filling line from the Nuclear Island Demineralised Water Distribution System (SED) to
adjust water volume in the tank.
 Vacuum breaker line connecting the PRT gaseous phase to the discharge header.
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 PZR discharge lines to collect water (or steam) from the PSRVs or the PDS.
 PRT discharge lines to discharge coolant inside the HR [RB] building.
The return line from the RPE [NVDS] system and the filling line from the demineralised water
distribution system join in a spray header located inside the PRT.
The PRT is an embedded tank installed during the civil work erection.
5.1.3.1. Normal Reactor Operation
The PSRVs and the PDS valves are normally closed.

The rupture discs isolate the discharge header and the PRT from the HR [RB] building.
The PRT is partially filled with water.
Sweeping of the discharge header and the PRT gaseous phase is carried out by:
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 Nitrogen injection from the TEG [GWPS] system connections downstream of the PSRVs
and PDS valves.
 Nitrogen removal to the TEG [GWPS] system connection on the PRT (via nitrogen
sparging in the PRT water content).
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Pressuriser Relief Tank Cooling
Once the pressuriser relief valve testing has been completed, the PRT is cooled by a closed
loop using the RPE [NVDS] system pumps and the heat exchanger.
5.1.3.2. Fault Condition
Pressuriser Discharge Transient

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The discharge fluid is first routed to the PRT until the pressure in the system reaches the rupture
discs burst pressure.
After the discs rupture, reactor coolant is discharged inside the HR [RB] building and the PRT
has no further function, except a pressure boundary to prevent the reactor coolant from
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discharging directly into the containment.
In the event of repeated pressuriser safety valve openings, the vacuum breaker line on the
discharge header prevents a vacuum forming in the pipe following steam condensation after
each safety valve closure.
Opening of the PSRVs (Category 3 or 4 Overpressure Transient Conditions)
There are three different opening modes for each PSRV:

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 During Category 3 or 4 the Reactor Coolant System (RCP [RCS]) overpressure

transients in hot conditions, each PSRV is automatically actuated when pressure
reaches the set point of its spring-loaded pilot valve.
 During Category 3 or 4 the RCP [RCS] system overpressure transients in cold

conditions, the PSRVs are opened by a dedicated instrumentation and control system
including:
o Set point determination according to reactor parameters.
o PSRV opening by electrical control activation of the solenoid pilot valve if the set
point is reached.
Opening of the PDS Valves in DEC-A Faults (Feed and Bleed) and in Severe Accidents
(DEC-B)
These specific valves are opened remotely by the operator from the main control room.

5.2. DESIGN BASIS
The valves discharge lines are sized for PSRV and PDS valves respectively. The common relief
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line is sized for the most penalising conditions.
5.2.1.1. Pressuriser Safety Relief Valves (PSRVs) Lines
The design basis for the RCP [RCS] system overpressure protection sizing is given in
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Sub-chapter 5.2.
5.2.1.2. PDS Valves Lines
The PDS lines are divided into two parallel lines (one PDS line is provisionally allocated to
severe accident and one to feed and bleed). Each line contains two valves. { SCI removed }
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The sizing of each line and associated valves ensures:
 the fulfilment of the feed and bleed functions during PCC and DEC-A sequences, and
 the depressurisation of the RCP [RCS] system during DEC-B sequences.

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Nevertheless, both PDS lines can be used either for the feed and bleed function or for the
depressurisation function during a severe accident.
5.2.1.3. Pressuriser Relief Tank
The design of the PRT is based on the requirement to condense and cool the volume of steam
discharged during pressuriser relief valves tests without exceeding a final given operating
temperature / pressure in the PRT.
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The PRT is swept with nitrogen by the TEG [GWPS] system to prevent hydrogen from
accumulating. This sweeping maintains the pressure in the PRT. Moreover, the volume of
Nitrogen contained in the PRT is used to dampen any pressure transients.
The pressure and temperature reached during PSRV testing are below the PRT design
conditions.
If the expected final operating pressure / temperature values in the PRT are exceeded, fluid is
discharged to the HR [RB] building in the MCPs n°2 and n°3 bunkers, following rupture of
bursting discs installed in the outlet nozzle. This discharge only occurs during Category 3 or 4
over-pressure faults. The discs are designed to withstand the pressure increase due to
pressuriser relief valve testing. The PRT collects any fluid that may leak from the pressuriser
relief valves. There is no discharge towards the PRT during Category 2 overpressure events
except that due to pressuriser relief valve tests.
During normal operation, the PRT collects any gas, mainly hydrogen, leaking from pressuriser
relief valves. Gas collected is purged to the gaseous waste treatment system.

5.2.2. Mechanical and Thermo-Hydraulic Design
The mechanical design of the PZR relief lines and the PRT is compliant with the requirements of
RCC-M level 3 (see Sub-chapter 3.8, section 2). The tank design data are given in Section 5.4.5
– Table 1.
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The minimum volume of water in the PRT is determined by the energy content of the steam to
be condensed and cooled by the water between its initial and final operating temperatures.
The minimum volume of gas (nitrogen) in the PRT is determined by the variation of water
volume during the transient, assuming an initial gas temperature and the expected final
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operating pressure.
5.2.3. Material
All materials used in the PZR relief lines and PRT comply with RCC-M requirements. The PZR
relief line and the PRT are made of austenitic stainless steel.

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The relief lines and the PRT are notably periodically tested during the PSRV test. These tests
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include verification of the set point and operability of the PSRVs.
6. VALVES
The valves included in this section are valves with a Nominal Diameter (ND) above 25. This
section deals notably with the first and second isolation devices of the Reactor Coolant Pressure
Boundary (RCPB). The largest diameter valves (ND above 50) are located in the Safety
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Injection System / Residual Heat Removal System (RIS/RRA [SIS/RHRS]), Chemical and
Volume Control System (RCV [CVCS]) and the Extra Boration System (RBS [EBS]).
The valves are Nuclear Pressure Equipment (NPE) and are subject to the associated
requirements.
The role of valves is to provide isolation to ensure the integrity of the RCPB (for example:
RIS/RRA [SIS/RHRS] isolation valves), to control pressure or flow (e.g. spray flow).

6.1.2. Description
The first and second isolation devices are located within the Reactor Building (HR [RB]). They
are located in areas such that their temperature during normal operation is as low as possible.
First and second isolating valves from the Reactor Coolant System (RCP [RCS]) for auxiliary
systems are actually considered as part of that system (for example: the RCV [CVCS] system).
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The systems considered are fitted with angle or straight globe valves, angle or straight check
valves, or gate valves or other technologies (ball valves, diaphragm valve, etc.).
Angle check valves are lift type check valves. All other check valves are of the swing type for
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sizes larger than ND 50. Check valve can be equipped, if necessary, with a locking device. The
swing check valves do not have body penetrations for the hinge. Maintenance is performed
through access openings in the valve bodies.
The valves are connected to the pipework by butt-welding.
Valves are generally fitted with an actuator (electrical, pneumatic, manual…) and potentially
sensors (position).
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6.2. DESIGN BASIS
6.2.1. Principles
The basic design of the valves is based on the functions required by the various systems. The
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arrangement and choice of valves (type of valve, technology, etc.) is based on the FA3 design.
The design requirements as well as the required operating conditions are detailed in the
descriptions of the corresponding systems.
The selection rules applied to "standard" valves are defined in valve catalogues. However,
valves defined as "specific" can be used when usual design / manufacture does not provide the
required function and / or when the choice of the valve does not comply with the selection rules.
The valves carrying highly radioactive fluid are fitted with stem bellows seal or by packing with
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leak-recovery in order to ensure external leak tightness [Ref. 56].
The capability of the valves to function correctly in normal and fault conditions has been
demonstrated by analysis which takes account of the system requirements.
The design requirements and installation principles discussed above, coupled with the devices
previously described to reduce leakage to a minimum, enable the valves to function during the
specified conditions.
The mechanical design of the valves is compliant with the requirements of RCC-M (see
All valves that ensure the integrity of the RCPB are classified M1 or M2 (for ND25 valves) and
subject to the nuclear construction code RCC-M (see Sub-chapter 3.8, section 2).

6.2.3. Material
Pressure boundary part materials are generally selected according to the provision of the
RCC-M code. The pressure boundary parts in contact with the coolant are in stainless steel and
the internal components are based on non-corrosive materials.
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The specification of materials should minimise so far as is reasonably practicable elements that
could be eroded or corroded and result in activation products where it is in contact with primary
coolant and which could be returned through the reactor core (cobalt in steel, antimony in
bearings and seals, silver in seals, etc.). The use of cobalt-based hard-facings should be
excluded and shall be replaced by material qualified on RCPB radiological safety classified
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valves and circuits injecting into the RCPB (see Sub-chapter 19.3 regarding radioprotection).
The chemical composition of the reactor coolant is given in valve equipment specifications to
ensure materials compatible with the reactor coolant are selected. The chemical composition of
the reactor coolant is periodically analysed to verify that it conforms to the specifications.

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The body, bonnet, disc, seat and bolting are submitted to 100% NDT testing on the raw
materials and / or after machining and after any repairs, according to the RCC-M requirements.
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The safe ends and the welds can be inspected through NDT.
Analytical studies and testing are carried out to ensure that active valves with its actuator and
sensors will fulfil its required function and operate under required normal and accident
conditions (see Sub-chapter 3.6 regarding qualification).
All valves are subjected to hydrostatic tests, leak tests to verify the leak-tightness of the valves
to the atmosphere, leak tests across the valve seats, operability tests and inspections as
required by the equipment specifications.
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The valve actuators and sensors are generally supplied and tested according to RCC-E.
7. PRESSURISER SAFETY RELIEF VALVES (PSRV)

The overpressure protection function of the primary circuit is based on N4 and Konvoi. The
Pressuriser Safety Relief Valve (PSRV) design is a special to the EPR design. The requirements
and characteristics are specified in the Flamanville 3 (FA3) and Olkiluoto 3 (OL3) Nuclear Power
Plant (NPP) design for the primary circuit overpressure protection.
The PSRV valves are Nuclear Pressure Equipment (NPE) and are subject to the associated
requirements.

The safety functions of PSRVs are as follows:
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 Protection of the Reactor Coolant System (RCP [RCS]) against overpressure in
Category 3 or 4 conditions: PSRVs work in automatic mode via spring-loaded pilots.
 Protection of the RCP [RCS] system against overpressure events in shutdown
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conditions: PSRVs work in remote control mode via two solenoid pilots mounted in
series.
 Long-term depressurisation of the RCP [RCS] system: PSRVs are controlled by their
solenoid valves.
7.1.2. Description
The PSRVs are pilot-operated safety and relief valves. Each PSRV is fitted with (see
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Section 5.4.7 – Figure 1):
 One “solenoid” pilot which is made up of two solenoid actuated pilot valves in series;
 Two spring-loaded mechanical pilots in parallel (with one pilot isolated in normal
operating conditions); and
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 One position sensor on the main valve.
The operating conditions for the control devices are the same as those of the pressuriser.
Three lines of protection are installed between the dedicated nozzles on the pressuriser (one
per line) and the common relief line discharging into the pressuriser relief tank. Each line
comprises a PSRV welded onto each nozzle on the pressuriser dome (see Section 5.4.7 –
Figure 1). They are welded directly onto the nozzle safe-ends. A scoop is welded inside the
pressuriser, upstream of each inlet line, to insure the presence of a water plug and to avoid
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accumulation of hydrogen in the PSRV. The valves are connected downstream to the
pressuriser relief lines by flanges.
The main valve operates as per the “relieving” principle. It opens by depressurisation of the
control volume above the disc, under the action of the pilots. Each valve is fitted with two parallel
spring-loaded pilots (with a pilot isolated in normal operating conditions) and a solenoid pilot
valve which is made up of two solenoid actuated pilot valves in series.
The “solenoid” pilot is a pilot fixed rigidly to the body of the valve. The connections between the
pilots and the main valve control volume are made through internal passages within the body of
the valve. The spring loaded pilots are rigidly fixed on the body of the valve and are linked to the
main valve control volume through connection blocks equipped with manual valves. The position
of these manual valves is secured to assure that one spring loaded pilot is in operation, in any
case.
The position of each PSRV is indicated in the control room.

Temperature measurements are provided downstream of the PSRVs pilot discharge ports. An
increase in the temperature of a relief line is an indication of a leaking pilot.
A temperature measurement is provided upstream of each PSRV. An increase in temperature

indicates the loss of the water seal.
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The design characteristics of the PSRVs are given in Section 5.4.7 – Table 1.
The PSRVs protect the RCP [RCS] system against overpressure transients under hot conditions
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and cold conditions.
The PSRVs operate under PCC-3 and 4, DEC-A and severe accident conditions and remains
closed and leak-tight in all other conditions, in line with the operating parameters of the PZR and
isolated by a water plug.
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7.2. DESIGN BASIS
7.2.1. Principles
The design of the PSRVs is directly linked to the requirements concerning protection of the
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primary circuit in the event of over-pressurisation.
Under hot conditions, the PSRVs operate in automatic (safety) mode, i.e. they are actuated by
spring-loaded pilots, which cause them to open when a predetermined pressure setpoint is
reached. Staggered pressure setpoints are necessary to limit the number of valves challenged
and minimise valve discharge flow during most of the anticipated transients.
Under cold conditions, the valves operate in relief mode, i.e. they are remotely-opened by
electrical signal acting on solenoid pilots. When the Safety Injection System / Residual Heat
Removal System (RIS/RRA [SIS/RHRS]) is connected in RHR mode, the RCP [RCS] system
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overpressure protection is initially afforded by safety valves of the RIS/RRA [SIS/RHRS] system.
The PSRVs, whose opening pressure is higher than that of the RIS/RRA [SIS/RHRS] system
safety valves can compensate where necessary for failure of the latter. If the RIS/RRA
[SIS/RHRS] is isolated, the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) is protected by the
PSRVs. Only one PSRV is needed to limit the pressure for all pressure transients.
The PSRVs are fitted with position indicators that are independent of the control devices. Two
valve stem position indicators are provided for each solenoid pilot.
Water plugs temperature measurements taken upstream of the PSRVs and their pilots enable
detection of any valve leakage. Temperature measurements downstream of the valve pilots also
allow valve leakage detection.
Both valves and associated piping are designed to discharge steam, water or a mixture of both.
For the long-term depressurisation of the RCP [RCS] system, the PSRVs are operated remotely
from the control room using the solenoid pilots.

To protect the RCP [RCS] system against overpressure events at power, the opening pressures
of the main safety valves on each line of protection are staggered. The first line of protection is
set at the lowest pressure to limit the number of valves which will open and to minimise the
discharge flow during the majority of the transients expected.
{ These paragraphs contain SCI-only text and have been removed }.
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To protect the RCP [RCS] system against overpressure events when the reactor is in shutdown
condition at least two safety valves are actuated (to cope with a single failure). Their automatic
opening is triggered by a specific Instrumentation and Control (I&C) system which activates the
solenoid pilots. The opening and closing times (stroke and dead time) of the safety valves in
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cold conditions will be compatible with process requirements.
{ These paragraphs contain SCI-only text and have been removed }.
Section 5.4.7 – Table 1 gives the design characteristics for PSRV.
The valve is classified M1 and subjected to the nuclear construction code RCC-M Level 1 (see
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Sub-chapter 3.8, section 2) for sizing and mechanical analysis requirements.
7.2.3. Hydraulic Design
The hydraulic design of the main safety valve, linked to the over pressure protection
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requirements, allows to fulfil the flow capacity requirement in saturated steam as indicated in
To avoid PSRV pilots or discs fluttering during opening or closing, the sensing lines of the pilots
are directly connected to the pressuriser steam phase.
7.2.4. Material
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7.3. COMPLIANCE WITH DESIGN REQUIREMENTS – SINGLE FAILURE

CRITERION
Protection against a single failure for opening is provided by having at least two pressuriser
valves available.
The single failure criterion is not applied to the piloted closing of the PSRVs. An analysis is
currently on going to demonstrate the reliability of the PSRVs closing.


7.4.1. Procurement and Manufacturing
The safety valve design is tested (flow rate, response time) in fault conditions (discharge of
steam, saturated and sub-cooled water) on a full flow test rig. Cycling tests (endurance) of the
pilot have also been carried out.
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The correct operation of the PSRVs is demonstrated during the qualification tests with the main
valve and both its spring loaded and solenoid pilot at full pressure, temperature and flow. A
separate qualification of the solenoid pilot has also been conducted.
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The testing and inspection of the pressure boundary parts is carried out in accordance with the
provisions of the RCC-M code, notably through the hydrostatic tests.
Each PSRV will be subject to periodic functional testing during plant operation. { SCI removed }
8. PRIMARY DEPRESSURISATION SYSTEM (PDS) VALVES

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The PDS valves are a special EPR design feature. The requirements and characteristics are
specified in the Flamanville 3 (FA3) and Olkiluoto 3 (OL3) Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) design for
the severe accidents and Feed and Bleed (F&B) valves.
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The PDS valves are classed as Nuclear Pressure Equipment (NPE) and are subject to the
associated requirements.
The PDS valves must contribute to the following safety roles:

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 Ensure fuel heat removal by F&B operation in relevant DEC-A sequences.
 Ensure the depressurisation of the Reactor Coolant System (RCP [RCS]) during DEC-B
sequences.
8.1.2. Description
PDS valves are installed in two parallel lines connected to a common specific nozzle on the
dome of the pressuriser: one PDS line is provisionally allocated to severe accidents and one to
F&B. Each line contains two valves in series (one gate and one globe valve).
The general layout is shown in Section 5.4.7 – Figure 1.
A cold water seal upstream of the valves prevents the valves becoming hot during normal plant
operation.

Each PDS line is connected to the main discharge line between the Pressuriser Safety Relief
Valves (PSRVs) and the pressure relief tank.
All valves are closed under normal conditions.
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The PDS operates in DEC-A sequence accidental conditions (see Sub-chapter 14.5, section 4)
and during severe accident (DEC-B) conditions (see Sub-chapter 14.6, section 2.2).
In all other conditions, the PDS valves remain closed and leak-tight, under the operating
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parameters of the PZR, isolated thermally by a water plug which enables the valve to be subject
to ambient temperature.
8.2. DESIGN BASIS
8.2.1. Principle and Objectives

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The operation of the PDS valves is governed by depressurisation requirements to prevent core
melting under pressure in the event of severe accidents (DEC B). The design of the PDS is
directly linked to the prevention of high pressure core melt sequences in DEC-B events.
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PDS valves are manually operated to perform severe accident depressurisation when the
relevant severe accident criterion is reached. This depressurisation allows Safety Injection
System (RIS [SIS] accumulators’ injection before serious fuel rod oxidation takes place, and
minimises hydrogen production.
The PDS valves also ensure fuel heat removal by F&B operation in DEC-A conditions.
The PDS are separated from the PSRVs. To preclude core melting at high pressure, the PDS
are designed to discharge a flow rate of 900 te/hour of saturated steam at a pressure of
176 bar abs, which allows a depressurisation of the RCP [RCS] system below 20 bar abs before
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the eventual Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) failure.
The PDS are fitted with position indicators which are available in the control room.
The mechanical design of the PDS valves is compliant with the requirements of RCC-M Level 1
(see Sub-chapter 3.8, section 2).
The design characteristics are given in Section 5.4.8 – Table 1.
The PDS valves must be closed following F&B in DEC-A event.

8.2.3. Material
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8.3. COMPLIANCE WITH DESIGN REQUIREMENTS – SINGLE FAILURE
CRITERION (SFC)
The PDS do not need to comply with SFC in DEC-A and DEC-B conditions. This criterion is
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therefore not claimed in the safety demonstration. In all PCC conditions, the SFC is only claimed
for the function of “remain closed” to ensure the isolation of the RCP [RCS] system (two valves
in series). In addition, as there is redundancy in having two lines (even though one line is
provisionally allocated to DEC-A and one to DEC-B conditions, both are technically
interchangeable), the functions of “opening” and “remain open” have a high robustness level.
The valves are supplied by two different electrical trains. In case of a Total Loss of AC Power
(TLAP), electrical control and power to the valves is provided by the 24-hour severe accident
batteries.
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The valves are submitted, in addition, to qualification for operability under seismic and severe
accident conditions. The qualification of the actuator for severe accident conditions is performed
by tests.
The qualification for these valves has not yet been finalised as the qualification on its actuator
and position-sensors is still ongoing (see Sub-chapter 3.6).
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9. PRIMARY COMPONENT SUPPORTS

Primary component support design is based on the design principles of the N4 unit.
Main evolution, which originates from the EPR reactor basic design break preclusion principle
applied for the Flamanville 3 (FA3) EPR reactor, is the removal of the restraining supports on
the Main Coolant Line (MCL).
An important change resulting from the implementation of measures originating from the EPR
reactor generic basic design break preclusion principle applied for the FA3 EPR reactor is
removal on the constraint on the MCL.
Primary component supports are not HICs.

9.1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION
In normal operating conditions, primary component supports maintain the integrity of primary
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components and Reactor Building (HR [RB]) by limiting normal system loadings imposed by
equipment weight, pressure, temperature and flows.
In fault and hazard operating conditions the normal systems loadings may be supplemented by
loads due to seismic hazard, pipe breaks or severe accident.
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9.1.2. Description
The primary component supports are fabricated from steel sections.
Plate and shell type structures are used for the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) support. All
other supports are of the linear type (struts, support columns, snubbers).
Attachments to the supported equipment are non-integral except for the Steam Generator (SG)
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upper lateral support and for pressuriser lower vertical supports. They are bolted to or bear
against the components. The supports are fixed to the concrete structures by anchor bolts or
embedded tie rods.
Primary component support structure designs are adjustable to enable correct mounting,
alignment and construction, allowing for manufacturing and construction tolerances. This
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adjustment is achieved by grouting at the support / concrete interface and by shimming at the
support/equipment interface. Primary pipework does not have support and the loads are spread
between the RPV, the SGs and the Main Coolant Pumps (MCP) supports.
9.1.2.1. RPV Support
The RPV support is shown in Section 5.4.9 – Figure 1.
The vessel is supported through pads on support blocks incorporated into a support ring.
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The support ring is a welded structure made up of a lower plate resting on the edge of the
reactor pit, a cylindrical shell and an upper plate made up of eight support blocks. The various
parts are welded together.
The eight support blocks each contain a recess, machined parallel to the nozzle axes, to allow
free radial movement of the vessel due to thermal expansion and pressure.
The support ring is held in place against horizontal loads (Design Earthquake, Loss of Coolant
Accident (LOCA)) by means of eight vertical keys incorporated in the lower plate and fitting into
grooves in the concrete.
Openings are provided in the keys and stiffener plates located above them to allow the passage
of the guide-tube for the measuring chamber for external core instrumentation.
In the event of a severe accident, the overall rigidity of the Reactor Coolant System (RCP
[RCS]) loops allows the vertical loads acting on the reactor vessel to be taken by the primary
loops. Consequently, it is not necessary to have a specific device to restrain the support ring in
the vertical direction.

The support ring is cooled by the reactor pit ventilation system (EVR [CCVS] system).
9.1.2.2. SG Supports
The SG supports are shown in Section 5.4.9 – Figure 2.
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Vertical Supports
Four articulated columns support the SG vertically. Each column is made up of a tube with ball
joint clevises at each extremity. The female clevises are welded to each end of the tube.
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The upper part of each column is fixed by screws to the lower head of the SG. { SCI removed }
The lower parts of the columns (male clevis) are fixed to the heavy-duty floor via four tie rods.
After final mounting, the tie rods are pre-tensioned using hydraulic cylinders to a value that will
prevent the columns lifting should accident loads be imposed on the supports.
The design of clevises is able to accommodate the thermal expansion of the loop and of the
base of the SG. This allows free movement of the SG during primary loop temperature changes.
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The columns are vertical in normal operating conditions. This is achieved by the position of the
lower clevises.
The SG height can be adjusted on site by two methods:
 Base adjustment is made by injecting grout between the base plate and the floor.
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 Accurate adjustment is made using shims located between the upper male clevises and
the lower head of the SG.
Lower Lateral Supports
Two lower lateral restraints accommodate lateral movement of the SG during normal thermal
expansion and limit its movement in fault conditions.
A lower front restraint is located on the hot leg centre-line direction; this is designed to ensure
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the stability of the SG in the presence of the conventional “2pA static load” (2 = dynamic load
factor; p = operating pressure; A = surface of the line break).
All three restraints are constructed from steel plates, to which are fixed either two jack screw
systems (for the lateral restraints) or three jack screws systems (for the front restraint), which
provide a gap between themselves and the flats machined on the lower head of the SG. One
side of the plate is fixed to the bunker wall by embedded anchor bolts.
Upper Lateral Supports
The upper lateral supports are installed at the level of the centre of gravity of the SG.
Two sway struts guide the SG movements in a radial direction from the centre of the reactor
vessel during thermal expansion of the reactor primary system.

Two snubbers, placed in the axis of the hot leg, limit sudden movements caused by an
earthquake or a pipeline break. They allow slow movements caused by the thermal expansion of
the RCP [RCS] system loops. The sway struts and the snubbers have ball clevises to avoid
stresses from off centre loads.
The sway struts and snubbers are anchored into the structure of the building. These four lateral
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supports are fixed directly on the outer surface of the SG.
9.1.2.3. MCP Supports
The MCP supports are shown in Section 5.4.9 – Figure 3.
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Vertical Supports
Three vertical articulated columns support the MCP. These columns are of the same design as
those for the SG (apart from their length). They have an upper cylindrical part linked by a stud to
the MCP casing lug.
The three columns are located around the pump casing support. This location takes the pump
outlet nozzle direction into account.
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They are anchored by tie rods to the heavy-duty floor.
Lateral Supports
Two hydraulic snubbers, located at the centre of gravity of the pump, give the pump stability in
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fault conditions.
These snubbers are attached at one end to the lower part of the motor frame and at the other
end are anchored to the building structure by tie rods.
These snubbers are identical in design to those used for limiting sudden movements of the SGs.
A restraint, with a gap, is located on the axis of the cold leg. This is designed to ensure the
stability of the MCP in the presence of the conventional “2pA static load” (2 = dynamic load
factor; p = operating pressure; A = surface of the line break).
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9.1.2.4. Pressuriser Supports
The pressuriser supports are shown in Section 5.4.9 – Figure 4.
Lower Vertical Supports
The pressuriser is supported by three brackets welded to its lower shell resting on structures
fixed to the floor by pre-tensioned tie rods. The design allows free radial movement caused by
pressure and thermal expansion. However, the central axis of the pressuriser remains fixed in
relation to the bunker.
Upper Lateral Supports
A lateral support device is installed at the level of the centre of gravity of the pressuriser. This
provides stability in fault conditions. The lateral support is made up of eight equally-spaced
restraints. The gap between each restraint and the pressuriser allows free radial and axial
expansion.

9.1.2.5. Surge Line Supports
The surge line supports are shown in Section 5.4.9 - Figure 5.
The pressuriser surge line is supported by spring devices. These absorb normal operational
forces due to the weight of the surge line (pipework, fluid content and thermal insulation).
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9.1.2.6. Relief Line Supports
The relief lines supports are shown in Section 5.4.9 – Figure 6.
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The pressuriser relief line is supported with the following devices:
Variable Spring hangers: intended to sustain dead weight loads
Snubbers: intended to sustain seismic and hydraulic loads
Axial restraint and lateral restraint: intended to sustain thermal and seismic loads
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9.2. DESIGN BASIS
Supports are mainly designed to meet the mechanical requirements, as described in

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section 9.2.2.
In addition:
 Primary component supports design allows virtually unrestrained thermal movements of

the RCP [RCS] system loops and components during plant operation. They provide
restraint to the loops and components during fault and hazard conditions (earthquake,
auxiliary and secondary pipe break, etc.).
 Primary circuit supports do not impede work on the primary circuit components, including
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component modifications and possible replacements.
 The primary component supports will not impede access for in-service inspection of the
primary components and the RCP [RCS] system pipework.
The nominal design lifetime of the primary circuit supports is 60 years.
Primary circuit support design conforms to the specification RCC-M Section I, Sub-section H.
(see Sub-chapter 3.8, section 2).
9.2.2.1. Load Conditions
The load conditions defined for the study of the supports are as follows (see Sub-chapter 3.4):
Weight

The weight of the RCP [RCS] system components is transmitted to the building structure by
vertical supports and the RPV support.
Thermal Loading
Thermal loads correspond to normal operating and hot shutdown conditions.
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Seismic Loads
Seismic loads are evaluated by basing them on the floor response spectrum. The methodology
is described in Sub-chapter 3.1.
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Breaks
Guillotine breaks are postulated in the lines connected to the RCP [RCS] system main lines or
connected to the Main Steam Lines (MSLs) (part of the Main Secondary System (CSP [MSS])).
HIC requirements do not apply to these connected lines.
2pA Loading
The 2A-LOCA event is discounted from the design basis assessment criteria, as the HPC EPR
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MCLs are HIC. However, as a conservative measure, a static load equivalent to a rupture of the
RCP [RCS] system main lines, or a rupture of the MSLs, known as “2pA”, is considered to
ensure the stability of the large components.
Severe Accident
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The resulting vertical stress applied to the reactor vessel is described in Sub-chapter 14.6. The
support ring of the reactor vessel is not designed specifically for this event, and reactor vessel
restraint is assumed to be only provided by the RCP [RCS] system pipework.
Pressure Loading:
Pressure loads correspond to normal operating conditions and hydraulic test conditions of the
loops.
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9.2.2.2. Design Rules
The loading combinations and design stress limits are described in Sub-chapter 3.4.
The design adequacy and structural integrity of the reactor coolant loop and of the primary
component supports is ensured by detailed evaluation (and high quality manufacture and
inspection). This detailed evaluation is made by comparing analytical results with established
criteria for acceptability. Structural analyses are performed to demonstrate design adequacy for
safety and reliability of the plant in the event of seismic disturbance or LOCA conditions. Loads
that the system is expected to encounter frequently during its lifetime (thermal, weight, pressure)
are applied and stresses are compared to allowable values as described in Sub-chapter 3.4.
Calculations of static and dynamic loads applied on components, component supports and
concrete are described in Sub-chapter 3.4, section 1.1.
Seismic Design
Primary component supports are designed to limit the seismic load transmitted to the primary
components (see section 9.1.1).

Seismic analysis methods are described in Sub-chapters 3.1 and 3.4.
Design Relative to Pipework Ruptures
Primary components supports are designed to limit the load, relative to pipework rupture,
transmitted to the primary components (see section 9.1.1).
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Pipework rupture analysis methods are described in Sub-chapter 3.1.
9.2.3. Material
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The material selection must be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the RCC-M.
When the implementation of RCC-M is not required, dedicated specifications with equivalent
requirements can therefore be used.
The materials used for primary components supports are detailed in Section 5.4.9 – Table 1 to
Table 9.

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The main welds are submitted to volume and surface examination according to the RCC-M
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requirements during manufacturing. In-service Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) and maintenance

are carried out, as necessary, during scheduled shutdowns. Moreover, all functional gaps
between supports and components can be checked.
Primary circuit support replacement is possible, with the exception of reactor vessel support.
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10. REFERENCES
[1] EPR UK – Reactor coolant pump specification. D02-ARV-01-004-384 C. February 2016,
AREVA.
D
[2] EPR UK – Reactor Coolant Pump Characteristics. PEEO-F DC 167 Revision A. August
2012, AREVA NP.
[3] Demonstration of integrity of High Integrity Components against fast fracture. Fracture
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Mechanic Analyses – Non Destructive Testing – Fracture Toughness. PEER-F 10.2070
Revision D. August 2012, AREVA NP.
[4] Fracture toughness properties of repair welds in cast pump casing. PEEM-F 11.0567
Revision A. March 2011, AREVA NP.
[5] EPR UK – Technical proposition for the NDT examination of major repair welds of the
primary pump casing. PEEM-F 10.2218 Revision B. September 2011, AREVA.
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[6] Non Destructive Tests performed on the Reactor Coolant Pump flywheel during
manufacturing. PEEO-F 10.0715 Revision C. December 2011, AREVA.
[7] Principles for the RCP Flywheel In-Service Inspection. ECEMA111847 Revision A.
August 2011, EDF.
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[8] EPR UK – Avoidance of fracture: Fracture mechanics and minimum toughness aspects
– Material data. NEEM-F 10.0179 Revision E. November 2010, AREVA NP.
[9] EPR FA3 – Reactor Coolant Pumps – Outline drawing. JSPM JSR 1GA20230
Revision D. 2008, AREVA NP.
[10] EPR UK – Steam Generator – Outline. D02-ARV-01-006-560 D. July 2016, AREVA NP.
[11] EPR UK – Steam Generator – Outline Bottom Views. D02-ARV-01-006-561 B. July

2016, AREVA NP.
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[12] Definition of the hierarchy of the main reports relating to design and manufacture
primary component. PEER-F 100134 Revision A. March 2010, AREVA.
[13] EPR UK – Steam Generator – General Assembly. D02-ARV-01-006-559 E. July 2016,

AREVA NP.
[14] EPR UK – Steam Generator – Channel Head – General View and Details. D02-ARV-01-
006-563 B. July 2016, AREVA.
[15] EPR UK – Steam Generator – Channel Head – Bottom View. D02-ARV-01-006-564 C.

July 2016, AREVA.
[16] EPR UK – Steam Generator – Secondary Side Pressure Vessel – General View and
Sections. D02-ARV-01-006-567 E. July 2016, AREVA.
[17] EPR UK – Steam Generator – Secondary Side Pressure Vessel – Sections. D02-ARV-
006-568 B. January 2016, AREVA.

[18] EPR UK – Steam Generator – Channel Head – Tubesheet Drilling. D02-ARV-01-006-

565 A BPE – February 2013, AREVA.
[19] EPR UK – Steam Generator – Lower Internals – Details. D02-ARV-01-006-573 C. July

2016, AREVA.
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[20] EPR UK – Steam Generator – Upper Internals – Assembly. D02-ARV-01-006-584 E.
July 2016, AREVA.
[21] EPR UK – Steam Generator – Lower Internals – Section. D02-ARV-01-006-585 E. July

2016, AREVA.
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[22] G.V. EPR – 79/19 TE – Steam Generator Main Feedwater Nozzle – Assessment of
Fatigue Damage. NEEG-F DC 155 Revision D. August 2009, AREVA.
[23] G.V. EPR – 79/19 TE – Steam Generator Emergency Feedwater Nozzle – Assessment
of Fatigue Damage. NEEG-F DC 88 Revision D. August 2008, AREVA.
[24] EPR UK – Steam Generator – Equipment Specification. D02-ARV-01-004-320 F. July

2016, AREVA.
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[25] EPR UK – Technical Standard of Internals (STI). D02-ARV-01-019-029 C. April 2015,
AREVA.
[26] EPR TM – Steam Generator - Operating Parameters. D02-ARV-01-004-337 D. June

2015, AREVA.
PR
[27] EPR TM – Steam Generator – Primary and Secondary Sizing Calculation Report. D02-
ARV-01-004-340 E. June 2015, AREVA.
[28] Steam Generator Cleaning – Lancing (SNL) System Specification. ECEMA0051005

Revision A1. December 2009, EDF.
[29] EPR UK – Steam Generator – Linear Vibration Analysis of the Tube Bundle – D02-ARV-
01-035-219 B. April 2015, AREVA.
[30] EPR UK – Steam Generator – Channel Head – Part List – D02-ARV-01-006-566 C. July
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2016, AREVA.
[31] EPR UK – Steam Generator – Secondary Side Pressure Vessel – Part List – D02-ARV-
01-006-570 D. July 2015, AREVA.
[32] Contribution of materials investigation to the resolution of problems encountered in

PWR plants - Steam generator session, p270-279 - International Symposium, Royal
Abbey of Fontevraud, 1985.
[33] "Proceedings: Workshop on thermally treated Alloy 690 Tubes for Nuclear Steam
Generators". EPRI - Special report n°NP-4665-MSR. July 1986.
[34] "U.S. Operating Experience With Thermally Treated Alloy 690 Steam Generator Tubes".
Document NRC NUREG-1841. 2006/2007.
[35] EPR UK – Design Change Management stage 2 – CMF017 - 20MND5 characteristics.

PEEG-F 10.0403 Revision 1. April 2010, AREVA.

[36] Manufacturing Non Destructive Testing to be qualified. PEEM-F 10.1134 Revision D.

December 2010, AREVA.
[37] Ultrasonic examination of MCL homogeneous and dissimilar metal welds. PEEM-F
11.0505 Revision C. March 2012, AREVA.
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[38] EPR UK - ALARP justification of manufacturing inspection techniques proposed for
Main Coolant Line welds of the UK EPR. PEER-F DC 78 Revision A. March 2012,
AREVA.
[39] Steam Generator components – Volumes and masses. NEEG-F DC 30 Revision B.–
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FA3 project. September 2006, AREVA NP.
[40] EPR UK – Primary Loop Layout – Assembly. D02-ARV-01-004-362 Revision D.

February 2015, AREVA.
[41] EPR UK – MCL Crossover lowering. PEER-F DB 0022 Revision A. 2011, AREVA.
[42] EPR UK – Main Coolant Lines – Sizing report. D02-ARV-01-004-349 D. January 2015,
AREVA NP.
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[43] EPR UK – Primary Loop Layout – Surge Line. D02-ARV-01-004-363 A. March 2012,
AREVA NP.
[44] EPR UK – Main Coolant Lines Procurement Equipment Specification – D02-ARV-01-

004-357 E. October 2015, AREVA NP.
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[45] EPR UK – Technical Manufacturing Program – Crossover legs (BU) / Elbows 50° -
PTF354 E – October 2015.
[46] EPR UK - MCL Optimisation – U-leg lowering feasibility study. PEER-F DC 73 Revision
B. February 2012, AREVA.
[47] EPR UK - MCL optimisation – counterbore length increase feasibility study. PEER-F DC
79 Revision A. March 2012, AREVA.
[48] EPR TM – Pressurizer – Part List. D02-ARV-01-004-427 B. December 2014, AREVA.

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[49] PZR Sizing report. D02-ARV-01-004-415 D. March 2015, AREVA.
[50] PZR Equipment Specification. D02-ARV-01-004-421 D. November 2014, AREVA.
[51] EPR TM - Pressurizer - General assembly. D02-ARV-01-004-423 C. December 2015,

AREVA.
[52] EPR FA3 – Valves datasheet for pressurizer safety relief valves (PSRV). NEEG-F DC
74 Revision H. April 2015, AREVA.
[53] EPR FA3 – Data sheet - Situations and loads for dedicated PZR globe valve. NEEG-F
DC 55 E. November 2008, AREVA.
[54] EPR FA3 – Data sheet - Situations and loads for dedicated PZR gate valve. NEEG-F
DC 52 E. November 2008, AREVA.

[55] EPR UK – Pressurizer Relief Tank – Data Sheet. D02-ARV-01-004-347 D. March 2016,
AREVA NP.
[56] Equipment Specification Valves - Level Q1/Q2 - RCC-M. D02-ARV-01-023-988 C. April

2016, AREVA.
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[57] RPV Support - Assembly and Details. D02-ARV-01-004-393 C. April 2016, AREVA.
[58] SG Supports - General Assembly. D02-ARV-01-004-394 B. November 2015, AREVA.
[59] RCP Supports - General Assembly. D02-ARV-01-004-404 B. March 2015, AREVA.
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[60] PZR Supports - General Assembly. D02-ARV-01-004-410 B. December 2015, AREVA.
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SECTION 5.4.1 – TABLE 1 : LIST OF CLASS 1 COMPONENTS FOR MCPS

[REF. 1]
 Casing,
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 Casing studs, nuts and gasket,
 Thermal barrier flange and coils,
 RRI [CCWS] inlet and outlet piping on the thermal barrier including the flanges,
 First seal injection line-up to the supply boundary, including the flange, counter-flange
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and bolting,
 First seal housing,
 First seal housing thermowell,
 Second seal housing
 Seal housings studs and nuts,
 Staging coil leak off piping up to the supply boundary, including the flange, counter-
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flange and bolting,
 No. 3 seal leak off piping up to the supply boundary, including the flange, counter-flange
and bolting,
 Flushing flow piping up to the supply boundary, including the flange, counter-flange and
bolting,
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 Seals insert support

 Seals insert
 Seals ring and runner assemblies
 Cartridge sleeves and screws
 Main flange,
 Motor stand,
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 Impeller with bolting,

 Suction adapter and bolting,
 Shafts and couplings,
 Hydrostatic bearing and bolting,
 Auxiliary bearing, and
 Motor bearings

SECTION 5.4.1 – TABLE 2 : DESIGN PARAMETERS FOR MCP MATERIALS

[REF. 1]
ELEMENTS { SCI removed } COMMENT
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CASING { SCI removed } CAST
THERMAL BARRIER { SCI removed } FORGED
FLANGE
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SEALS AND DEA [SSSS] { SCI removed } FORGED
HOUSING
MAIN FLANGE { SCI removed } FORGED
CASING NUTS AND STUDS { SCI removed } FORGED BAR
PUMP SHAFT { SCI removed } FORGED BAR
FLYWHEEL { SCI removed } ROLLED PLATE
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SECTION 5.4.1 – TABLE 3 : DESIGN PARAMETERS FOR MCPS [REF. 1]
{ This table contains SCI and has been removed }
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SECTION 5.4.1 – TABLE 4 : MATERIAL PROPERTIES FOR THE MCPS

CASING AND FLYWHEEL
SECTION 5.4.2 – TABLE 1 : { SCI REMOVED }

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SECTION 5.4.2 – TABLE 1 (CONT.) : { SCI REMOVED }





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SECTION 5.4.3 – TABLE 8 : INSPECTABILITY FOR PSI AND ISI OF THE

PRIMARY LOOP
DESCRIPTION ITEM INSPECTION
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RPV outlet nozzle / Hot Leg H1 RT-UT-LT-VT
Hot Leg / Elbow 50° H2 RT-UT-LT-VT
Elbow 50° / SG inlet nozzle H3 RT-UT-LT-VT
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SG outlet nozzle / COL section A U1 RT-UT-LT-VT
COL section A / COL section B (1) U2 UT-LT-VT
COL section B / COL section C (1) U3 UT-LT-VT
COL section C / RCP inlet nozzle (1) U4 UT-LT-VT
RCP outlet nozzle / Cold Leg (1) C1 UT-LT-VT
Cold Leg / RPV inlet nozzle C2 RT-UT-LT-VT
Set-in Branch Connections welds - UT partial-LT-
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VT
Branch Connections Auxiliary welds - UT-LT-VT
Abbreviations: UT (Ultrasonic Testing)

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RT (Radiographic Testing)
LT (Liquid-penetrant Testing)
VT (Visual Testing)
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(1): Radiographic inspection not used owing to access difficulties, other than for U4 and C1
welds if the reactor coolant pumps hydraulics are removed.

SECTION 5.4.3 – TABLE 9 : INSPECTABILITY FOR PSI AND ISI OF THE

SURGE LINE
DESCRIPTION INSPECTIONS (2)
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Hot Leg nozzle / Section A UT-LT-VT
Section A / Section B UT-LT-VT
Section B / Section C UT-LT-VT
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Section C / Section D UT-LT-VT
Section D / Section E UT-LT-VT
Section E / Section F UT-LT-VT
Section F / Section G UT-LT-VT
Section G / Pressuriser surge nozzle UT-LT-VT
Abbreviations: UT (Ultrasonic Testing)

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RT (Radiographic Testing)
LT (Liquid-penetrant Testing)
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VT (Visual Testing)

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(2) Radiographic inspection not used owing to access issues

SECTION 5.4.4 – TABLE 5 : MAIN PARTS [REF. 50]
PARTS { SCI removed } PRODUCT

Cylindrical shells Forged
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Spherical heads Hot formed plates
{ SCI removed }
or forgings
Main nozzles Forged
Safe ends { SCI removed } Forged
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Manhole cover Plate
Lateral supports { SCI removed } Plates
Heater support { SCI removed } Plate

Small nozzles and Forged bars
{ SCI removed }
heater sleeves
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Bolts { SCI removed } Forged bars
Heater flanges { SCI removed } Rolled or forged bars

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SECTION 5.4.8 – TABLE 1 : DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS

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SECTION 5.4.9 – TABLE 1 : RPV SUPPORT MATERIALS
Components { SCI removed }

Support blocks { SCI removed }
Shell and gussets { SCI removed }
Keys { SCI removed }

SECTION 5.4.9 – TABLE 2 : MATERIALS FOR SG VERTICAL SUPPORTS
Component { SCI removed }
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Leg tubes { SCI removed }
Male and female clevis { SCI removed }
Pins
{ SCI removed }
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M48 screws
Tie rods and nuts { SCI removed }
Washers for tie rods { SCI removed }
SECTION 5.4.9 – TABLE 3 : MATERIALS FOR SG LOWER HORIZONTAL

RESTRAINTS
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Base plate { SCI removed }
Jack screws { SCI removed }
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Nuts for jack screws { SCI removed }

Bars (energy absorber bars
{ SCI removed }
assembly)
SECTION 5.4.9 – TABLE 4 : MATERIALS FOR SG UPPER HORIZONTAL

SUPPORTS
AP
For Hydraulic Tie rods and

{ SCI removed }
nuts
Snubbers
Washers for tie
and { SCI removed }
rods
connecting rods Pins (SG side) { SCI removed }
Civil works side
{ SCI removed }
clevis
For connecting
Connecting rod { SCI removed }
rods
Pins (civil works
{ SCI removed }
side)

SECTION 5.4.9 – TABLE 5 : MATERIALS FOR MCP VERTICAL SUPPORTS

Leg tubes { SCI removed }
D
Upper male clevis
{ SCI removed }
(cast)
Female clevis and lower
VE
male clevis { SCI removed }
(forged)
Pins { SCI removed }
Studs { SCI removed }
O
SECTION 5.4.9 – TABLE 6 : MATERIALS FOR MCP HYDRAULIC
SNUBBERS (ATTACHMENT)
PR

SECTION 5.4.9 – TABLE 7 : MATERIALS FOR MCP FRONT RESTRAINT

AP
Protective bumper and plate { SCI removed }
SECTION 5.4.9 – TABLE 8 : MATERIALS FOR PZR LOWER BRACKETS
Support saddles and

{ SCI removed }
Anti-lift-off blocks

SECTION 5.4.9 – TABLE 9 : MATERIALS FOR PZR RADIAL RESTRAINTS
Stop body and adjusting

{ SCI removed }
D
screw
Support plate { SCI removed }
O VE
PR
AP

SECTION 5.4.1 – FIGURE 1 : MCPS – GENERAL ASSEMBLY [REF. 9]

{ This figure contains SCI and has been removed }
D
SECTION 5.4.1 – FIGURE 2 : SHAFT SEALING SYSTEM
VE
SECTION 5.4.1 – FIGURE 3 : LOCATIONS OF OIL VOLUMES WITHIN THE
MCP
SECTION 5.4.1 – FIGURE 4 : MCPS – CASING

O
SECTION 5.4.1 – FIGURE 5 : MCPS – FLYWHEEL
PR
AP

SECTION 5.4.2 – FIGURE 1 : SG SECTION [REF. 13]
D
O VE
PR
AP

SECTION 5.4.3 – FIGURE 1 : { SCI REMOVED }

D
VE

O
{ This figure contains SCi and has been removed }
PR


AP





D
VE

O
PR
AP

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SUB-CHAPTER 5.4 – COMPONENTS AND

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1. MAIN COOLANT PUMPS .................................................................... 1

3.1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION AND OPERATION.............................. 31

4.2. DESIGN BASIS.................................................................................. 47

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6.2. DESIGN BASIS.................................................................................. 62

10. REFERENCES ................................................................................... 76

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SUB-CHAPTER 5.4 – COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS SIZING

 the design criteria to be applied,

 the manufacturing, procurement, testing and inspection details.

1.1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION AND OPERATION

1.1.1. Role of the Equipment

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The general assembly is given in Section 5.4.1 – Figure 1.

radial guide bearings and a flywheel.

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1.1.2.2. Shaft Sealing System

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The DEA [SSSS] system is designed to:

Automatic actuation of the DEA [SSSS] system is not required.

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removing its cover.

1.1.2.4. Oil Collecting Devices

 oil cooler, and

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1.1.2.5. Instrumentation and Control (I&C)

 three temperature detectors at the No.1 shaft seal inlet,

 one pressure sensor between No.2 and No.3 seals,

 two shaft displacement sensors at the level of the motor coupling,

 two shaft displacement sensors at the level of the pump coupling,

 one phase sensor at the top of the spool piece,

 two vibration sensors at the level of the motor upper bearing,

 two vibration sensors on the lower flange of the motor,

 four temperature detectors for each phase of the motor stator,

 on each oil tank:

o one thermometer for local temperature measurement,

o one low / high levels detector,

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o one analogue level sensor, and

o one sight level for local verification of the oil level.

1.1.3. Operating Conditions

1.2. DESIGN BASIS

1.2.1. Principles and Objectives

 HD seals, this a development specific to the HPC EPR.

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1.2.2. Mechanical Design

1.2.2.1. Sizing Calculation

1.2.2.2. Stress Analysis

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 normal operating conditions (fatigue analysis),

 fault conditions (Level D criterion), and

 Loss Of Off-site Power (LOOP), and

The pump casing is made in cast austenitic-ferritic stainless steel.

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