HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ASSIGNMENT

2. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 163, February 28, 2022, INSTITUTIONALIZING ACCESS TO PROTECTION
SERVICES FOR REFUGEES, STATELESS PERSONS AND ASYLUM SEEKERS

WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines is a State Party to the 1951 United Nations (UN) Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the 1954 UN Convention Relating to the Status
of Stateless Persons, and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness;

WHEREAS, Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 613 or the "Philippine Immigration Act of 1940," recognizes the
admission of immigrants without nationality, and grants the President the power to admit aliens who
are refugees for religious, political or racial reasons, in such classes of cases and under such conditions
as he may prescribe, for humanitarian reasons, and when not opposed to public interest;

WHEREAS, pursuant to the country's obligations under international law and Letter of Implementation
No. 47 (s. 1976), the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued Department Circular No. 058 (s. 2012), which
established the procedure in the determination of the status of refugees and stateless persons, and
created the Refugees and Stateless Persons Protection Unit under the DOJ, with the mandate to
identify, determine and provide protection to refugees, stateless persons and asylum seekers;

WHEREAS, on 12 October 2017, various government agencies, led by the DOJ, entered into an Inter-
Agency Agreement on the Protection of Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Stateless Persons in the
Philippines ("2017 Inter-Agency Agreement"), which outlines their respective roles towards providing a
wide range of protection services, including but not limited to documentation, legal assistance, health
and welfare assistance, education and skills training, practice of profession, employment and livelihood,
and local integration;

WHEREAS, one of the objectives of the Updated Philippine Development Plan 2017-2022 is the
development of a legal framework for the protection of asylum seekers, refugee and stateless persons,
including the institutionalization of their access to social services and creating a favorable protection
environment for them in the country;

WHEREAS, the COVID-19 pandemic has limited the ability of refugees, stateless persons and asylum to
cross borders to seek protection, bringing to fore the need to integrate and institutionalize relevant
polices and programs of government agencies and ensure that these communities of people are
properly protected and accorded the widest possible exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms; and

WHEREAS, Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus and offices, and that he shall ensure the faithful execution of the
laws; 

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by the Constitution and existing laws, do hereby order:

Section 1. Policy. The State recognizes the important and enduring relevance of the 1951 UN Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, 1954 UN Convention Relating to the Status of
Stateless Person, and 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, and has taken steps to
strengthen the existing legal framework and mechanisms for the protection of refugees, stateless
persons and asylum seekers in the country (hereinafter collectively referred to as "persons of concerns"
[POCs]). and address their need for protection, especially in time of public emergencies.

In this regard, the State shall closely monitor and ensure full protection of the rights of POCs to liberty
and security, and freedom of movement. Subject to applicable laws and issuances, the minimum
standards for the treatment of refugees shall be assured. These shall include the provision of access to
socioeconomic services, social security benefits, gainful employment and human working conditions,
education, participation in judicial and administrative citizenship proceedings, legal assistance and
access to courts, and freedom of religion.

POCs have the concomitant obligation to abide by the laws and regulations of the country, inducing
measures relating to the protection of public health, and maintenance of public order and national
security. 

Section 2. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Order, the relevant terms are defined as follows:

a. Asylum Seeker or Applicant refers to a person who has submitted an Application, or a formal written

claim to a refugee or stateless status. In the case of a minor or incapacitated person, the person on
whose behalf the application was submitted, and whose request has not been finally decided on by a
prospective country of refuge.

b. Conventions shall refer to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol, 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, and the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness.

c. Non-refoulement is a principle of customary law which provides that no State shall expel or return
("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever, to the frontiers of territories where his or her life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion.

d. Protection refers to all activities aimed to ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in
accordance with human rights law, humanitarian law, and refugee law.

e. Refugees and Stateless Persons Protection Unit (RSPPU) is the unit in the DOJ with the primary task
of examining and processing claims to refugee or stateless status.

f. Refugee shall mean a person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country
of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his or her
former habitual residence as a result of such events is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it.

g. Stateless Person is one who is not considered a national by any State under the operation of its
domestic law.

Section 3. Inter-Agency Committee on the Protection of Refugees, Stateless persons and Asylum
Seekers. The Inter-Agency Committee on the Protection of Refugees, Stateless Persons and Asylum
Seekers ("Committee") is hereby institutionalized, and tasked with the central role of assuring the
provision of relevant services and assistance to POCs pursuant to the 2017 Inter-Agency Agreement.

The Committee shall be composed of the following:

Chairperson : Secretary, Department of Justice

Vice- : Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development

Chairperson

Members : Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs

Secretary, Department of Education
Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment
Secretary, Department of Health
Secretary, Department of Trade and Industry
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government
Secretary, Department of Transportation
National Statistician and Civil Registrar General, Philippine Statistics
Authority
Chairperson, Commission on Higher Education
Director-General, Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
Director-General, Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines
General Manager, Manila International Airport Authority
General Manager, National Housing Authority
Commissioner, Bureau of Immigration
Chief Attorney, Public Attorney's Office
Chairperson, Professional Regulation Commission
Chairperson, Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
President and Chief Executive Officer, Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation

Members of the Committee may designate an alternate to represent their respective offices, and who
shall be fully authorized to decide for and on behalf of his or her respective department, agency or
office, and perform the functions as hereafter provided. 

In the performance of its functions, the Committee may call upon other government agencies to be part
thereof. As necessary, the Committee may also enlist the assistance of other government agencies and
entities, including state universities and colleges and local government units (LGUs).

The DOJ, through the SPPU, shall serve as the Committee Secretariat, and shall provide technical and
administrative support to the Committee.

Section 4. Functions and Duties of the Committee. The Committee shall have the following functions:
a. Ensure that policies on the protection of, and the services and assistance offered to POCs are
consistent with relevant laws, rules and regulations, and fully implement the same;

b. Improve access of POCs to courts, documentation, health and welfare assistance, primary education,
skills training and livelihood programs;

c. Issue guidelines, including rules on data sharing and confidentiality of information, and direct relevant
agencies to issue corresponding regulations, policies and programs, to effectively implement this Order;

d. Establish an integrated coordination and referral system of requests for protection services and
assistance to POCs, and enhance the existing POC database for the efficient monitoring thereof,
consistent with rules and regulations on data protection and security;

e. Work closely with concerned agencies in coordinating and monitoring the implementation of the
Agreement and this Order, including the identification of focal units/divisions/offices within each
agency;

f. Cooperate with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or any other relevant international body in
effectively implementing the Conventions, and in providing for the protection of refugees;

g. Conduct trainings, information and awareness campaigns, and capability-building activities; and

h. Create committee, or technical workings groups consisting of relevant national government agencies
that will address specific concerns related to the protection and services to POCs, and the
implementation of this Order;

i. Perform other tasks that the President may direct.

Section 5. Access to Courts. The Committee shall continue to coordinate with the Judiciary, in
accordance with the provisions of relevant international laws, to ensure that POCs have access to courts
and the swift administration of justice. 

Section 6. Local Integration of POCs. The LGUs are encouraged to support the integration of the POCs
within their communities, conduct information and awareness campaigns, and make available the
necessary programs and services to facilitate such integration in local development frameworks,
including development programming and emergency response and recovery frameworks.

Section 7. Engagement with non-government entities. The Committee may engage in civil society
organizations, non-government organizations, the private sector, the academe, the communities of
POCs, faith-based organizations, and relevant people's organizations, for the purpose of ensuring
collaborative implementation of this Order, as well as to widen the support network available to POCs.

Section 8. Confidentiality. The Committee shall ensure that the information acquired in the fulfillment of
its mandate shall remain confidential. Subject to rules which may be issued pursuant to Section 4(c) of
this Order, or where the country's national security interests are at stake, the procedure in the
determination of the status of refugees and stateless persons, as well as the asylum procedure, should
in all stages respect the confidentiality of such requests or claims, including the fact that the request or
claims, including the fact that the request ir claim was made.
Section 9. Funding. Funds for the initial implementation of this Order shall be charged against the
respective budgets of concerned agencies. Funding for the succeeding years shall be incorporated in
their respective regular appropriations, subject to the usual budget process.

The Department of Budget and Management shall ensure that the proposed annual National
Expenditure Program shall include initiatives for the protection of POCs in line with the country's
obligations under the Conventions.

Section 10. Separability. If any section or part of this Order is declared to be unconstitutional or invalid,
the other sections or provisions not otherwise affected shall remain in full force and effect.

Section 11. Repeal. All orders, rules, regulations, issuances or any part thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Order, are hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.

Section 12. Effectivity. This Order shall take effect immediately upon its publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.

Done in the City of Manila, this 28 th day of February, in the year of Our Lord, Two Thousand and
Twenty-Two.

3. EO 163
DECLARING THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE CREATION OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AS
PROVIDED FOR IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, PROVIDING GUIDELINES FOR THE OPERATION THEREOF,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, the 1987 Constitution has been ratified by the people;
WHEREAS, the 1987 Constitution has created an independent office called the Commission on Human
Rights; and
WHEREAS, there is an urgent necessity to constitute the Commission on Human Rights to give effect to
the State policy that “the State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.”
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
in me by the Constitution, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. The Commission on Human Rights as provided for under Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution
is hereby declared to be now in existence.
SECTION 2. (a) The Commission on Human Rights shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members
who must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty five years of age and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections
immediately preceding their appointment. However, a majority thereof shall be members of the
Philippine Bar.
(b) The Chairman and the Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall not, during their tenure,
hold any other office or employment. Neither shall they engage in the practice of any profession or in
the active management or control of any business which in any way be affected by the functions of their
office, nor shall be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or
privilege granted by the government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
(c) The Chairman and the Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall be appointed by the
President for a term of seven years without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor.
(d) The Chairman and the Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall receive the same salary as
the Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, which shall not be
decreased during their term of office.
SECTION 3. The Commission of Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions:
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof
in accordance with the Rules of Court.
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the under-privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detentions facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the
primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government’s compliance with international treaty obligations on human
rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents
or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it
or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
SECTION 4. The Presidential Committee on Human Rights, created under Executive Order No. 8 dated
March 18, 1986, as modified, is hereby abolished. The Commission on Human Rights shall exercise such
functions and powers of the Presidential Committee on Human Rights under Executive Order No. 8, as
modified, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
The unexpended appropriations of the Presidential Committee on Human Rights are hereby transferred
to the Commission on Human Rights. All properties, records, equipment, buildings, facilities and other
assets of the Presidential Committee on Human Rights shall be transferred to the Commission on Human
Rights.
The Commission on Human Rights may retain such personnel of the Presidential Committee on Human
Rights as may be necessary in the fulfillment of its powers and functions. Any public officer or employee
separated from service as a result of the abolition of the Presidential Committee on Human Rights
effected under this Executive Order shall receive the benefits to which they may be entitled under
existing laws, rules and regulations.
SECTION 5. The approved annual appropriations of the Commission on Human Rights shall be
automatically and regularly released.
SECTION 6. All laws, orders, issuances, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with this
Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SECTION 7. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of May, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-
seven.
5.

G.R. No. 107383             February 20, 1996

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her
from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a
driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's
clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial,
rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive
owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in
the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to
a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages;
P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of
preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and
representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and
papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Hence this petition.

There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and
consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of private
respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them
in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's decision,
petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the
documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in that case) were
admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did not constitute
malpractice or gross misconduct, For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other
things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the
documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the
injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note
of the following defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed with merit:"2

On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:

4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, there
was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents
Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a
petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set
aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's
request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be
looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of
the questioned annexes, At that point in time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use
petitioner's admission as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not malpractice.

Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under oath,
Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him.
Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission and
use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.

Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration
that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's admission as to their
genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no
means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in
question.

It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents
and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The
TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the
trial court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the
documents and papers became effective again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable"3 is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law."4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

6.

G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO

OCAMPO, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN
DOES, Respondents.

The City Attorney for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

VITUG, J.:

The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into
focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The
petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case
No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."

The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the
petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management
Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being
the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the
respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the
questioned premises of North EDSA. 1Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private
respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the
"People's Park". 2On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint
(Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR
Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of
Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores,
and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. 3On 23 July
1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and
shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission"
and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. 

On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as
CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the
demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, 5the CHR, in its resolution of 1
August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of
the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's
supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that
violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." 

A motion to dismiss, 7dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred,
among other things, that:

1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency
Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition
of the dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;

xxx xxx xxx

3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein refers to
moratorium in the demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;

4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs
even this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed,
vendors;

5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner
North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and

6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether or
not a certain business establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon
City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and
ordinance. 8

During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the
motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested
that they would bring the case to the courts.

On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the
Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of
civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political
rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business."

On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the
contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to
by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved). 
In an Order, 11dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a
fine of P500.00 on each of them.

On 1 March 1991, 12the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental
motion to dismiss, in this wise:

Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the
complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and
constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 

The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper
tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial
body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added:

The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to dignity. All these
brazenly and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for
the basic rights of women and children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have
psychologically scarred and traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to such a violent
demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.

In an Order, 14dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this recourse.

The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated,
however, in our resolution 16of 18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order,
directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580." 

The petitioners pose the following:

Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:

a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls
were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;

b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and

c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.

In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment
for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment, 18through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of
its Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque
Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.

The petition has merit.

The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987

Constitution. 19It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No.
163, 20issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so
superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights. 

The powers and functions 22of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to -

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof
in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the
primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human
rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents
or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it
or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the
intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. 23This
view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cariño v. Commission on Human
Rights, 24the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that
it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication
or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself.
The Court explained:

. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court
or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.

After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this
controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.

It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define
it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium
on human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the
questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The participants,
representing different sectors of the society, have given the following varied answers:

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all
parts of the world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or
Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .

Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of
the press, of religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political
rights, such as the right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political
associations and engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an education, employment, and
social services. 25

Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his
humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be
recognized and protected by it. 26

(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 27

Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural
birth, right, innate and inalienable. 28chanrobles virtual law library

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests
that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual's social,
economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the
universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be
his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.

Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional
Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in creating an independent
commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back at the country's experience under
the martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our
fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the
sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate
of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the
Philippines," 29observes:

But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human
rights expressed in the International Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation
of Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the
thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite periods,
sometimes for years, without charges, until ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this
representative. The right to petition for the redress of grievances became useless, since group actions
were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were subjected to censorship and short
term licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost
independence and security of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to
submit letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort
confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies like Amnesty International and the
International Commission of Jurists.

Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following
discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:

MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the importance of human
rights and also because civil and political rights have been determined by many international covenants
and human rights legislations in the Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights
and subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its
impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.

So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most effective.

MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very broad. The Article
on the Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil
right or his political right. So, where do we draw the line?

MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the language of human
rights advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of
articles on the right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These
are very specific rights that are considered enshrined in many international documents and legal
instruments as constituting civil and political rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend
here.

MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
distinguished this right against torture.

MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights, and there are
other violations of rights of citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and, therefore, in doing
that the commission will be authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this
moment are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the
government. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the specific
parameters which cover civil and political rights as covered by the international standards governing the
behavior of governments regarding the particular political and civil rights of citizens, especially of
political detainees or prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced during martial law which we
would now like to safeguard.

MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say is,
perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and defined as human rights. Those are the rights that we envision here?

MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are
integral parts of that.

MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by
human rights?

MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like to state that in
the past regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with
the defense that, as a matter of fact, they had defended the rights of people to decent living, food,
decent housing and a life consistent with human dignity.

So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights.  Is that the sense of the
committee, so as not to confuse the issue?

MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.

MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the previous
speaker.

There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively:  1) protection
of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public
trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against
the religious.

xxx xxx xxx

The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.

I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make
the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future
expansion.  The coverage of the concept and jurisdictional area of the term  "human rights". I was
actually disturbed this morning when the reference was made without qualification to the rights
embodied in the universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later on, this was qualified to refer to
civil and political rights contained therein.

If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other
human rights specified in other convention which I do not remember. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?chanrobles

virtual law library

MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights of which we are signatory.

MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there
are rights specified in that other convention which may not be specified here. I was wondering whether
it would be wise to link our concept of human rights to general terms like "convention," rather than
specify the rights contained in the convention.

As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the period of
amendments, could specify to us which of these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of
civil and political rights, not for the purpose of including these in the proposed constitutional article, but
to give the sense of the Commission as to what human rights would be included, without prejudice to
expansion later on, if the need arises. For example, there was no definite reply to the question of
Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It
is not a civil right?

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political rights that we felt
must be envisioned initially by this provision - freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of
torture, right to fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings
and collective violations.  So, it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and
political rights of a specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the
definite areas.

MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept
or the concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an
international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.

MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article therein, but only
to those that pertain to the civil and politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on
Human Rights.

MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between civil and social
rights.

MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant
contains all the different rights-the rights of labor to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et
cetera.

MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those that the
Gentlemen has specified.

MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.

xxx xxx xxx

SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I cannot stress more on
how much we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .

. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients
who do not pay. And so, they are the ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases
involved are very delicate - torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre - and
the persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians, men in the military and big
shots. Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must be independent.

I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially for the little
Filipino, the little individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we should
concentrate only on civil and political violations because if we open this to land, housing and health, we
will have no place to go again and we will not receive any response. . . . 30(emphasis supplied)

The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision
empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party,
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).

The term "civil rights," 31has been defined as referring -

(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its
inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of the government. They
include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as
otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or
community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or
redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution,
unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt. 32chanrobles virtual law library

Political rights, 33on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in
the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office,
the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of
government. 34chanrobles virtual law library

Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the
delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe
cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1)
protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3)
fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes
committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any
preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the
tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a
conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to
resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should
fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." 35chanrobles
virtual law library

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land
which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North
EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The
consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that
a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it
is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the
circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the
compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the
Constitution.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and
rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court."
Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold
any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with
the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt,
however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and
rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for
contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who
unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its
investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance
before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it
does not possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights, 36the Court,
speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services
to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be
construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for,
it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only
by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek
from proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the
CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by
the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of
Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is
available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interests
of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).

The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and
recommendations to any appropriate agency of government. 

The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the
vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there
lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly,
the matter lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.

The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become
moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and
that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to
restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished. 38Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR
Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from
precisely doing that. 

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is
hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the
P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made
permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason and
Puno,  JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J.,  dissenting:

I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R. No.
96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my
dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR can issue
a cease and desist order to maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case involving an alleged
human rights violation; that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations involving a
threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to
investigate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as posing  prima
facie a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private
respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the
CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987
Constitution).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at street
corners. Positive action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced
when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by us,
from the start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should be
given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve
human rights violations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further
proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

7.

G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TERESITA VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA and PEDRO
ORDONEZ, respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

On May 30, 1980, P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels of land in Rosario and
General Trias, Cavite, as the "Cavite Export Processing Zone" (CEPZ). For purposes of development, the
area was divided into Phases I to IV. A parcel of Phase IV was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation,
formerly Filoil Industrial Estate, Inc. The same parcel was later sold by Filoil to the Export Processing
Zone Authority (EPZA).

Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted
agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. To convince the
intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981, paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted
the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were Teresita Valles and Alfredo Aledia, father of
respondent Loreto Aledia.
Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita Valles, Loreto Aledia and Pedro Ordoñez filed in
the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint (Pinagsamahang Salaysay) praying
for "justice and other reliefs and remedies" ("Katarungan at iba pang tulong"). The CHR conducted an
investigation of the complaint.

According to the CHR, the private respondents, who are farmers, filed in the Commission on May 10,
1991 a verified complaint for violation of their human rights. They alleged that on March 20, 1991, at
10:00 o'clock in the morning. Engineer Neron Damondamon, EPZA Project Engineer, accompanied by his
subordinates and members of the 215th PNP Company, brought a bulldozer and a crane to level the
area occupied by the private respondents who tried to stop them by showing a copy of a letter from the
Office of the President of the Philippines ordering postponement of the bulldozing. However, the letter
was crumpled and thrown to the ground by a member of Damondamon's group who proclaimed that:
"The President in Cavite is Governor Remulla!"

On April 3, 1991, mediamen who had been invited by the private respondents to cover the happenings
in the area were beaten up and their cameras were snatched from them by members of the Philippine
National Police and some government officials and their civilian followers.

On May 17, 1991, the CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA, the 125th PNP Company
and Governor Remulla and their subordinates to desist from committing further acts of demolition,
terrorism, and harassment until further orders from the Commission and to appeal before the
Commission on May 27, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. for a dialogue (Annex A).

On May 25, 1991, two weeks later, the same group accompanied by men of Governor Remulla, again
bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms
at the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air.

On May 28, 1991, CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating
her order of May 17, 1991 and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the
contractors, and their subordinates. The order reads as follows:

Considering the sworn statements of the farmers whose farmlands are being bulldozed and the wanton
destruction of their irrigation canals which prevent cultivation at the farmlands as well as the claim of
ownership of the lands by some farmers-complainants, and their possession and cultivation thereof
spanning decades, including the failure of the officials concerned to comply with the Constitutional
provision on the eviction of rural "squatters", the Commission reiterates its Order of May 17, 1991,
and  further orders  the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, their Contractors and
representatives to refrain and desist from bulldozing the farmlands of the complainants-farmers who
have come to the Commission for relief, during the pendency of this investigation and to refrain from
further destruction of the irrigation canals in the area until further orders of the Commission.

This dialogue is reset to June 10, 1991 at 9 00 a.m. and the Secretary of the Department of Public Works
and Highways or his representative is requested to appear. (p. 20, Rollo; emphasis supplied)

On July 1, 1991, EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to
issue injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders.

On August 16, 1991, the Commission denied the motion.

On September 11, 1991, the petitioner, through the Government Corporate Counsel, filed in this Court a
special civil action of certiorari  and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the restraining order and injunctive writ; that the private respondents have
no clear, positive right to be protected by an injunction; that the CHR abused its discretion in
entertaining the private respondent's complaint because the issue raised therein had been decided by
this Court, hence, it is barred by prior judgment.

On September 19, 1991, this Court issued a temporary restraining order, ordering the CHR to cease and
desist from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned injunction orders.

In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of this Court's restraining order,
and for an order restraining petitioner EPZA from doing further acts of destruction and harassment. The
CHR contends that its principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, "is not
limited to mere investigation" because it is mandated, among others, to:

a. Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights;

b. Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court;

c. Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and  provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

d. Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human
rights. (Emphasis supplied.) (p. 45, Rollo)

On November 14, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that he be
excused from filing a Comment for the CHR on the ground that the Comment filed by the latter "fully
traversed and squarely met all the issues raised and discussed in the main Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition" (p. 83, Rollo).

Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed
violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of?

In  Hon.  Isidro Cariño, et al.  vs.  Commission on Human Rights, et al., G.R No. 96681, December 2, 1991,
we held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to
the  judicial function  of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.  This function, to
repeat, the Commission does not have.

xxx xxx xxx

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and
should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC
Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in
the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by
the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the
Commission has no power to  "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass
concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited or otherwise
restricted by law;  (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the
failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions and return to their classes despite the order to this
effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting
administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c)
what were the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly
be imposed for said acts or omissions. (pp. 5 & 8.)

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services
to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be
construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for,
if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only
by the Constitution or by law" (Oroso, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76828-32, 28 January 1991;
Bacalso vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October 1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is never derived by
implication (Garcia, et al. vs. De Jesus, et al., G.R. No. 88158; Tobon Uy vs. Commission on Election, et
al.. G.R. Nos. 97108-09, March 4, 1992).

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek
from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice,
the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued
"by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court
of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance
[now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58,
Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending
principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for
no other purpose

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction dated May
17 and 28, 1991 issued by the respondent Commission on Human Right are here by ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE and the temporary restraining order which this Court issued on September 19, 1991, is hereby
made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado, Devide, Jr.,
Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Feliciano and Bellosillo, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J.,  concurring:

I dissent for the reasons stated in my separate opinion in Hon.  Isidro Carino, et al.  vs.  Commission on
Human Rights, et al., G. R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991. In addition, it is my considered view that the
CHR has the unquestioned authority in appropriate cases to "provide for preventive measures and legal
aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection."
(Section 18(c), Article XIII, 1987 Constitution)

If the CHR can not, by itself, issue any cease and desist order in order to maintain the status quo pending
its investigation of cases involving alleged human rights violations, then it is, in effect, an ineffective
instrument for the protection of human rights. I submit that the CHR, consistent with the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, may issue cease and desist orders particularly in situations involving a
threatened violation of human rights, which it intends to investigate, and such cease and desist orders
may be judicially challenged like the orders of the other constitutional commissions, — which are not
courts of law — under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on grounds of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings
(investigation).

8.

G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991

HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports,
DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN
LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor
General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights
by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a
court of justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission
take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is
placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of
trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-
matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication?

The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as
substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action. These
facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise
undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.

1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among them
members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers
(ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their
plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time
and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said
"mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990
without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had
elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from
their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through
their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the
Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the
DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire
their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with
more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed

to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4

2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5)

days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits,

Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5

3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among

others, named respondents, 6

 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for
suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their
application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for
suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later
also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the
respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire
proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cariño dated December 17, 1990,
rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by
the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine
(9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cariño), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit,

Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due

process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9
 Both
petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals,
and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school
teachers too numerous to be impleaded."

5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27,
1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful
mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and
consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 10
6. Their complaints — and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) — were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No.

90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance therein. 11

On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cariño) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the

Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had

been "denied due process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of

the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12
 The Commission thereafter issued an
Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition:

To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its investigation and
resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of
their wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cariño, of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon
Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en banc
on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all documents relevant to the
allegations aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will
resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.

x x x           x x x          x x x

7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cariño sought and was granted leave to file a
motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as
grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over
the case." 14

8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:

a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cariño in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for

nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and

b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual

petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and  inter alia "ruling that it was  prima facie lawful for petitioner Cariño to issue return-to-

work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cariño's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-

affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18
 It held
that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced
without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and
political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost
respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by
the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991
in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).

It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of
petitioner Cariño, has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition.

The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this Court's
joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and
resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other
words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general
issues:

1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the imposition
of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and

2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and)
with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of finality
and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of
Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact,
as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service
Commission on said matters, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the
Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has
jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain
specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant
by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much
less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to
repeat, the Commission does not have. 22

The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.

The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23

 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the
Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its
powers and functions are the following 25

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive

measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any

investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and

categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative

or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in

accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony

or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or

agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the

popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study

closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27
 The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or
intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into
by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry
or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to
find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to
make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the
exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial
or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally

(the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30
 And "adjudge"
means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant
judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To

pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved

in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against

the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power

to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b)

whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this

effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances

complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the

Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33
 and it appears that appeals have
been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court
itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial

evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had

in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration

addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil

Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to
what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which

they anticipated would be adverse to them.

This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.

In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by

Secretary Cariño, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court.

The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that

would be the Civil Service Commission. 35

 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and
the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited
"to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ,
concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.,  concurring:

I concur in the result. The teachers are not to be blamed for exhausting all means to overcome the
Secretary's arbitrary act of not reinstating them.

PARAS, J.,  concurring:

I concur with the brilliant and enlightening decision of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa

I wish to add however that the Commission on Human Rights should concern itself in this case and in
many other similar cases:

(1) not only with the human rights of striking teachers but also the human rights of students and their
parents;

(2) not only with the human rights of the accused but also the human rights of the victims and the
latter's families;

(3) not only with the human rights of those who rise against the government but also those who defend
the same;

(4) not only the human rights of striking laborers but also those who as a consequence of strikes may be
laid off because of financial repercussions.
The defense of human rights is not a monopoly of a government agency (such as the Commission on
Human Rights) nor the monopoly of a group of lawyers defending so-called "human rights' but the
responsibility of ALL AGENCIES (governmental or private) and of ALL LAWYERS, JUDGES, and JUSTICES.

Finally, the Commission should realize that while there are "human rights", there are also
corresponding "human obligations."

PADILLA, J.,  dissenting:

I vote to dismiss the petition for the same reasons stated in my earlier separate opinion filed in this case.

# Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.,  concurring:

I concur in the result. The teachers are not to be blamed for exhausting all means to overcome the
Secretary's arbitrary act of not reinstating them.

PARAS, J.,  concurring:

I concur with the brilliant and enlightening decision of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa

I wish to add however that the Commission on Human Rights should concern itself in this case and in
many other similar cases:

(1) not only with the human rights of striking teachers but also the human rights of students and their
parents;

(2) not only with the human rights of the accused but also the human rights of the victims and the
latter's families;

(3) not only with the human rights of those who rise against the government but also those who defend
the same;

(4) not only the human rights of striking laborers but also those who as a consequence of strikes may be
laid off because of financial repercussions.

The defense of human rights is not a monopoly of a government agency (such as the Commission on
Human Rights) nor the monopoly of a group of lawyers defending so-called "human rights' but the
responsibility of ALL AGENCIES (governmental or private) and of ALL LAWYERS, JUDGES, and JUSTICES.

Finally, the Commission should realize that while there are "human rights", there are also
corresponding "human obligations."
 

PADILLA, J.,  dissenting:

I vote to dismiss the petition for the same reasons stated in my earlier separate opinion filed in this case.