America's Failed North Korea Nuclear Policy: A New Approach

AMERICA'S FAILED NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR POLICY: A NEW APPROACH
Author(s): Gregory J. Moore

Source: Asian Perspective, Vol. 32, No. 4, Special issue on North Korea and Regional
Security (2008), pp. 9-27
Published by: Lynne Rienner Publishers
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ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2008, pp. 9-27.
AMERICA'S FAILED NORTH KOREA

NUCLEAR POLICY:
A NEW APPROACH
Gregory /. Moore
America's North Korea nuclear policy has been a failure.

Instead of achieving its goal of preventing North Korea from
possessing and proliferating nuclear weapons , it has had the
opposite effect. This failure was a result of the George W.
Bush administration's blanket rejection of the previous
administration's approach to North Korea , the tendency to
ignore the advice of experts, neoconservative inñuence on for-
eign policy , and divisions within the administration resulting
in an inconsistent approach. This article suggests a bold new
approach in which the United States offers North Korea full
diplomatic recognition and a formal end to the Korean War as
first steps toward the goals established in the 2007 Six Party
Talks on North Korea , i.e., that North Korea give up its
nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons programs , and cease
its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Taking these
moves as a starting point rather than a reward for compliance
will deepen North Korea's commitment to nuclear disarma-
ment and nonproliferation by removing its gravest external
security threat - the United States.
Key words: U.S. foreign policy in East Asia, North Korea, nuclear
weapons, multilateral security - East Asia
10 Gregory J. Moore
The Failure of U.S. Policy
There can be no denying that America's North Korea nuclear

policy since 2000 has been a failure. U.S. policy goals regarding
North Korea's nuclear programs have focused primarily on
deterring North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, and
preventing North Korea from proliferating technology, know-
how, or materials related to its nuclear program to other states.
Yet since 2000, North Korea has withdrawn from the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), ejected international inspectors
from its plutonium processing facilities and removed monitoring
devices, and declared itself a nuclear-weapons club member by
testing with marginal success a rudimentary nuclear device. It
has shown itself not only willing to proliferate nuclear technolo-
gy and materials, as well as the missile hardware and technology
to potentially deliver them, but to have already done so to Iran,
Pakistan, and Syria.1 In short, the administrations of both Presi-
dents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have failed to deter North
Korea from developing and testing nuclear weapons, and have
failed to keep North Korea from proliferating nuclear weapons
technology and materials to states of concern to the United States.
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Christopher Hill's recent attempts via bilateral meetings within
the Six Party Talks (6PT) to draw North Korea into a bilateral
agreement with the United States have been admirable. More-
over, U.S. flexibility, shown in the 2007 agreement that has been
reached with North Korea, and the October 2008 removal of
North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, are good-
faith efforts on Washington's part, and are certainly moves in the
right direction. Unfortunately, they are still too little, too late.
As has been the case with U.S. policy toward Cuba, the
United States has preferred to isolate North Korea rather than
1. See Dafna Linzer, "U.S. Misled Allies about Nuclear Export: North Korea
Sent Material to Pakistan, not Libya," Washington Post , March 20, 2005;
Seymour M. Hersh, "A Strike in the Dark," The New Yorker , February
11, 2008, p. 58; and Christina Y. Lin, "The King from the East: DPRK-
Syria-Iran Nuclear Nexus and Strategic Implications for Israel and the
ROK," Academic Papers Series, vol. 3, No. 7 (Korea Economic Institute,
October, 2008).
America 's Failed North Korea Nuclear Policy 1 1
pursue the path followed with China in the 1970s, i.e., recogniz-
ing and engaging constructively with it. Despite its imperfec-
tions today, China and Chinese foreign-policy behavior have
changed remarkably since the change in U.S. policy toward it.
This is not true of Cuba, however, nor is it true of North Korea,
which begs the question, why doesn't the United States try
something truly novel in its dealings with North Korea? In this
sense, today's U.S. policy makers have much to learn from
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, who exhibited fortitude
and creativity in forging a radically new policy toward China in
the early 1970s during the height of the Vietnam War and the
cold war.
This article will first provide a brief overview of U.S. policy
toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or
North Korea) regarding the recent nuclear standoff and the 6PT.
Second, it will broach a discussion of the problems within the
Bush administration that led to policy failure. Finally, the study
will conclude with a discussion of a new approach for U.S.
North Korea policy. The new approach embraces two ideas: the
need for a permanent multilateral security mechanism in North-
east Asia, and the need for a preventive U.S. action vis-à-vis
North Korea. Such action should not involve military force but
rather normalization of relations with the DPRK. North Korea
should perceive normalization, moreover, not as a reward for
finally accepting American demands, but as the starting point of
a new bilateral relationship and a means to the end of North
Korean denuclearization.
U.S. North Korea Nuclear Policy and the Six Party Talks
The Lead-up to Agreement in 2007
The first North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in 1993 when

North Korea stopped cooperating with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). Pyongyang had only recently signed the
NPT, which the IAEA enforces. North Korea's action prompted
the IAEA to refer North Korea to the UN Security Council. After
more than a year of ups and downs and grave tensions, the Unit-
ed States and North Korea worked out a compromise in October
12 Gregory J. Moore
1994 called the Agreed Framework. It was agreed that the DPRK
would disable its nuclear reactors and that the South Koreans
(primarily) would provide a number of light water reactors for
North Korea's energy needs - both steps making nuclear prolif-
eration more difficult. The United States would also provide fuel
oil to help meet North Korea's energy needs until the new light
water reactors were operational.
The 1994 Agreed Framework nearly collapsed in the later
years of the Clinton administration and its fate was sealed with
the election of George W. Bush in 2000. Rather than accept Clin-
ton's policy on North Korea, the Bush administration did a com-
plete policy review in 2001 to determine its own options regard-
ing North Korea. When South Korean President Kim Dae Jung
visited Washington in March 2001, President Bush disappointed
and embarrassed him, stating that he had serious doubts about
North Korea's leader and the workability of any deals with his
regime. Bush thus effectively dismissed Kim's "sunshine policy"
toward the North. The Bush administration had decided North
Korea was not a reliable partner and froze talks with it, putting
President Kim in an awkward position, for his policy was ulti-
mately unworkable without Washington's support.
With September 11 and the onset of the U.S. "war on terror,"
U.S. attention focused away from the Korean peninsula and U.S.-
DPRK relations deteriorated once again. Consequently, Kim Jong
II turned to his nuclear-weapons program to serve the threefold
purpose of getting the Americans' attention, giving him a bar-
gaining chip with the Americans, and potentially providing him
with a powerful deterrent and security enhancer regarding any
potential U.S. aggression. This last purpose became even more
important to him in the face of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq,
when Kim reportedly went into hiding for a period of time, fear-
ing an attack with the same bunker-busting munitions the Unit-
ed States was using to ferret out Saddam Hussein.
The tension between Pyongyang and Washington came to a
head even before the Iraq war, when in the fall of 2002 a North
Korean diplomat supposedly told U.S. diplomat James Kelly in
Beijing that North Korea was pursuing a uranium enrichment
program.2 This was the first time that Pyongyang had openly
2. James Kelly, "Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Programs," Statement
America's Failed North Korea Nuclear Policy 13
confirmed what many American observers had concluded for

some time. While Chinese observers were at the time skeptical
of Pyongyang's claim (they became believers only after North
Korea's 2006 nuclear test), the Chinese were worried enough
about the deterioration of U.S.-DPRK ties that they came for-
ward with an initiative to deal with the North Korean nuclear
issue. This initiative became known as the 6PT, which China
hosted, and which included China, North Korea, South Korea,
the United States, Japan, and Russia. While under the Bush
administration the United States had generally taken a rather
unilateral approach to foreign-policy matters, it insisted on a
multilateral approach regarding North Korea. The reason for
this was that U.S. policy makers did not trust North Korea and
had concluded that the only way to make Pyongyang account-
able was in a multilateral context.
The 6PT have been a limited success. The Chinese hosted
round one of the talks in Beijing in August 2003. While this
round did not achieve much in terms of resolving the crisis, the
important precedent of bringing the six parties together in one
place was valuable in and of itself. A second round was held in
Beijing in February 2004, a third in June 2004, and after little
progress a fourth was held in stages in July, August, and Septem-
ber 2005. During this fourth round an apparent breakthrough
was achieved in that North Korea promised to end its nuclear
weapons programs in exchange for a U.S. pledge of nonaggres-
sion, U.S. and South Korean assistance in meeting the North's
energy needs in lieu of its nuclear reactors, U.S. and Japanese
pledges to move toward normalization of relations with the
DPRK, and formal U.S. and South Korean declarations that they
had no nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula (the United
States had removed U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South
Korean soil in 1991 under President George H.W. Bush).
The talks stalled that fall, however, because North Korea
added a new stipulation stating that unless it was first given a
light water reactor it would not begin disabling its nuclear facili-
ties, and because of North Korean unhappiness with U.S. actions
(and Chinese cooperation) against the Banco Delta Asia, a bank
to the Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C., July

15, 2004).
14 Gregory J. Moore
in Macau, China that held North Korean funds. The United

States argued that the funds were acquired by illegal North
Korean activities, including money-laundering and counterfeit-
ing. The 6PT were at an impasse throughout 2006, during which
time the North conducted a series of live-fire missile tests and
the test of a nuclear device, bringing tensions between North
Korea and the United States to a new high.
If negotiations had ended at this point in the saga, the 6PT
would have to have been judged a failure. Yet the talks continued
in 2007 and in the final phase of the fifth round of 6PT an agree-
ment was reached. The details were worked out in a series of
sixth-round meetings later in 2007, giving North Korea a million
tons of fuel oil and the return of its Banco Delta Asia funds in
exchange for the closure of its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and a
commitment to the eventual full disclosure of all its nuclear activi-
ties. The North not only closed and disassembled the Yongbyon
facility, but destroyed its cooling tower in late June 2008. In Octo-
ber 2008, after a series of fits and starts, the United States took
North Korea off its list of supporters of state-sponsored terrorism,
removing an important obstacle to improved relations from the
DPRK perspective. From this negotiating history it is clear that
only when the United States meets North Korea face to face have
the talks made progress.
The Failure of U.S. Policy
Despite the appearance of some measure of success in the

outcome of this process thus far, there are several reasons U.S.
policy toward North Korea since 2000 must be judged a failure.
First, of course, is that the United States did not prevent North
Korea from acquiring and testing a nuclear weapon, despite its
deterrent strategies, its diplomatic efforts, its ultimatums, and
U.S.-sponsored UN Security Council resolutions against it. In
October 2006 North Korea joined the small club of nuclear
nations with a low-yield underground nuclear test that was con-
firmed by Western, Chinese and other sources.
Second, the United States has not prevented North Korea
from transferring its nuclear technology to Iran, Pakistan, and
Syria in recent years. In some cases it did so even as it was par-
ticipating in multilateral talks to disarm, and despite its vows
neither to develop nor transfer nuclear-weapons technology.3

All of this has been well-documented, though it is not, per-
haps, widely known. For example, according to American and
Israeli sources, in September 2007 Israeli intelligence tracked a
North Korean ship laden with nuclear material to a port in
Syria, and then followed the cargo as it was delivered to a site in
northeastern Syria. Israeli commandos snuck into Syria and took
soil samples which they say proved the cargo was nuclear. Israel
then bombed the site a few days later, destroying the building
there and the cargo in question.4 The site had already been
under close surveillance by American and Israeli observers, and
being built there was a facility that had the "structural DNA" of
North Korea's Yongbyon facility. Moreover, North Korean
workers had been spotted at the site. According to the reporting
of Seymour Hersh, a senior Syrian military officer confirmed the
military nature of the site, and this officer as well as a Syrian
government official confirmed the presence of North Korean
construction workers at the site.5 Since the destruction of the
site, Syrian officials have bulldozed it, erected a new structure
on it, and refused to allow international inspectors to visit, all of
which intelligence analysts say Syria would do to erase the site's
nuclear footprint if in fact the site had been nuclear.
North Korea is also on record as having sold uranium hexa-
fluoride, a compound that can be enriched to produce weapons-
grade uranium, to Pakistan. Pakistan then sold it to Libya, though
it is not known if North Korea knew of the final destination of the
product.6 The Pakistan connection went both ways for Pyongyang,
as intelligence now reveals that then-Pakistani Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto had agreed to supply North Korea with the know-
how to develop highly enriched uranium when she visited North
Korea in 1993. 7
North Korea has also been a proliferator of record to Iran,
both in missile and nuclear technology. Reliable sources reveal
3. Lin, 'The King from the East/' p. 2.

4. James Forsyth and Doublas Davis, "We Came so Close to World War
Three that Da y," Spectator (UK), October 3, 2007.
5. Hersh, "A Strike in the Dark."
6. See Linzer, "U.S. Misled Allies about Nuclear Export/7
7. Lin, "The King from the East," p. 2, citing Glenn Kessler, "Bhutto Dealt
Nuclear Secrets to N. Korea, Book Says," Washington Post, June 1, 2008.
16 Gregory J. Moore
that Iran had helped finance North Korea's nuclear program in

exchange for nuclear technology, equipment, and cooperation
on enriching uranium.8 Iran and North Korea have also been
cooperating on the joint development of nuclear warheads that
could be married to North Korean No-dong missiles that North
Korea and Iran were also jointly developing.9 While President
Bush has emphasized that "we are committed to keeping the
world's most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world's
most dangerous people,"10 all of these North Korean activities
took place on his watch, and have the makings of the post-9/11
nightmare scenario U.S. policy makers have been striving to
avoid. They are evidence of nothing less than a grave American
policy failure.
Sources of the U.S. Policy Failure on North Korea
There are a number of reasons for the failure of U.S. policy

toward North Korea under the Bush administration. The first was
its initial ABC (Anything But Clinton) approach to foreign policy,
documented by frustrated sources in the State Department during
the first two years of the Bush administration.11 Continuation of
the Clinton-era Agreed Framework principles was a non-starter
for the new Bush team. Second was what might be called the neo-
conservative takeover of American foreign policy, documented by
many sources.12 Of particular note here are the hawkish and influ-
8. Economist Foreign Report , "An Israeli Lesson for North Korea?" April 22,
1993, p. 2; as cited by Lin, "The King from the East.
9. Lin ("The King from the East") cites the foHowing sources for this informa-
tion: Douglas Frantz, "Iran Closes in on Ability to Build a Nuclear Bomb,"
Los Angeles Times , August 4, 2003; "Military Source: DPRK, Iran Planning
Joint Development of Nuclear Warheads," Sankei Shimbun (Tokyo), August
6, 2003; "Iranian Nuke Experts Visited N. Korea This Year," Kyodo World
Service (June 10, 2003).
10. George W. Bush, "The President's National Security Strategy" (March
16, 2006), www.state.gov/ documents /organization/ 63319.pdf.
11. Interviews, Washington, 2002.
12. For examples, see James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: the History of Bush's
War Cabinet (New York: Penguin, 2004); Bob Woodward, Bush at War
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003).
ential roles of Dick Cheney as vice president, Donald Rumsfeld as

secretary of defense, Paul Wolfowitz as deputy defense secretary,
and Richard Perle as chairman of the Defense Policy Advisory
Board. All of these men exercised important influence over the
U.S. policy process and shared a view of the world that one might
call, colorfully, "democratic peace theory's shotgun wedding with
offensive Realism on steroids." These individuals were too often
successful in pushing the more rational, calculated views of first-
term Secretary of State Colin Powell to the side.
Third was the Bush administration's tendency not to trust
experts in their various fields of expertise. For example, in 2002-
2003, once the decision had been made to invade Iraq, experts
on Iraq were boxed out of Iraq decision making.13 Instead, the
Bush team tended to rely upon inexperienced but loyal "foot
soldiers" of the administration for too many key posts and as
consultants on too many important issues.
Lastly, one of the hallmarks of the Bush administration's
approach to North Korea was a serious division within it on
how to deal with North Korea. During the first four years of the
administration there was a general divergence in views between
Secretary of State Colin Powell and the neoconservatives in the
administration. On North Korea there was perhaps an even
deeper split, personified in the divergence of views held by the
special envoy for talks with North Korea, Charles L. (Jack)
Pritchard, and the hawkish Bob Joseph, Under Secretary of State
for Arms Control at the time.14 In the second four years of the
Bush administration, the divergence in policy opinions on the
DPRK was personified by the State Department's lead DPRK
13. These comments are based upon various reports, but the Iraq example
comes explicitly from the author's attendance at a 2004 panel on the
Iraq war at the American Political Science Association's annual meeting
in Chicago with a number of participants who were among America's
best-known Iraq experts and Iraq consultants in the run-up to the war.
One after another, they recounted how they had been invited to policy
brainstorming sessions chaired by Bush administration officials in 2002.
Once their misgivings about the war became apparent, they were effec-
tively excluded from future such meetings.
14. Pritchard documents these divisions well in Charles L. Pritchard, Failed
Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007).
18 Gregory J. Moore
negotiator, Christopher Hill, and Bush's ambassador to the UN,

arms-control specialist John Bolton, who maintains to this day
that the bilateral meetings, the overall 2007 agreement with
North Korea, and the removal of the DPRK from the list of state
sponsors of terrorism were a mistake and a giveaway.
The divisions within the administration on how to deal with
North Korea certainly played some role in explaining why Wash-
ington seemed engaged at some points and disengaged at others.
Most generally, as has historically been the case with policy
toward China and Cuba, there is a division in Washington over
whether the carrot or the stick, engagement or containment, is
the right approach. Given the lack of presidential leadership on
the issue, the distractions posed by the Iraq and Afghanistan
wars, and these divisions in Washington's North Korea and
arms-control policy circles, U.S. DPRK policy has seemed at
times nuanced and accommodating and at other times harsh and
inflexible.
Moreover, there are diverging goals within the policy com-
munity on North Korea. As Pritchard notes, this has often trans-
lated into confusing and counterproductive policy.
The inexperience of most administration officials in dealing with

North Korea and the discrepancy between the administration's
stated goal of negotiating a peaceful resolution and its desire to
see the regime collapse have been significant contributors to policy
failure.15
Among those administration officials who believe engaging

North Korea and pursuing bilateral dialogue are a waste of time,
there are many who believe regime change in Pyongyang is the
only hope for resolution of the nuclear dispute and peace on the
Korean peninsula. Those who believe engaging North Korea
and meeting North Koreans bilaterally is worthwhile, of course,
believe there is hope of negotiating a peaceful resolution of the
conflict short of regime change. This conflict within the Bush
administration has made it very difficult for Washington to
articulate a logical and consistent policy toward North Korea.
15. Ibid., p. 161.
A New Approach for the United States on North Korea
North Korea has for some time presented the United States
with a true quandary. Allowing North Korea to continue to
develop its nuclear-weapons capabilities is not an option for
Washington given the possibility Kim Jong II might sell such
weapons or technologies to terrorists or those connected to them,
not to mention the possibility that the regime could use them
itself, or threaten to use them for purposes of blackmail. Yet at
the same time it is not feasible to take out North Korea's nuclear
capabilities with military strikes (even if the U.S. military could
be certain where they all are) because of the likelihood that Seoul,
a city of 14 million just thirty miles from the North Korean bor-
der, would be reduced to rubble by conventional North Korean
artillery and missiles. Reducing Seoul to "a sea of fire" is of
course exactly what Pyongyang has threatened to do under such
circumstances.
Sanctions are not an attractive option either. First, they have
not been effective because of "leaks" and because North Korea has
simply "tightened its belt." Second, even if North Korea's neigh-
bors could be persuaded to plug the "leaks," North Korea has
declared that sanctions are the equivalent of a declaration of war
and will respond accordingly, which again is a grave threat to
Seoul. In other words, continuing with the status quo simply gives
Kim Jong II more time to develop his weapons, and resorting to
the military option is at present virtually unthinkable given the
threat to Seoul. Because of the paucity of U.S. options, I propose a
new approach for American policy toward North Korea.
Two New Policy Options
There are two options that would address American interests

in North Korea. First is the institutionalization of the 6PT into a
regional security framework or organization that would serve the
purpose of holding North Korea accountable to regional powers.
China has been leading the way in strengthening the 6PT as a
forum to promote dialogue and avert disaster on the Korean
peninsula. This forum has been a useful way to address Ameri-
ca's concerns with North Korea. The facts that these six parties
include the world's most powerful nation (the United States), the
20 Gregory J. Moore
world's three most powerful nuclear powers (the United States,

Russia, and China), the world's three most powerful economies
(the United States, China, and Japan), and of course the parties to
the world's most potentially explosive unresolved civil war,
underline the importance of such an institution and the impor-
tance of continued discussion among these six parties even if the
immediate crisis of North Korean nuclearization is resolved. The
Bush administration has been correct to argue that ultimately
North Korea needs to be held accountable in a broader multilater-
al framework such as the 6PT, and the 6PT have been instrumen-
tal in facilitating the face-to-face talks North Korea and America
needed to finally seal a deal in 2007.
The call for institutionalization of the 6PT is not new. Many
in China,16 the United States,17 and elsewhere,18 have called for
the 6PT to be extended beyond the present crisis, institutionaliz-
ing them into a nascent regional security framework. Given ten-
sions between China and Japan, the two Koreas and Japan, China
and the United States over Taiwan, and unresolved territorial
disputes between Japan and Russia, the importance of creating
such a regional security framework or organization goes far
beyond the crisis on the Korea peninsula. The 6PT, or something
like them, must remain a factor in Northeast Asian regional secu-
16. See China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, "The Security

Mechanism of Northeast Asia: Reality and Prospect," Xiandai guoji guanxi
(Contemporary International Relations), No. 8 (2002); D. Li, "The Relations
in Northeast Asia: Conflict and Cooperation," Institute of World Economics
and Politics (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2006), at www.iwep.org.
cn/english/ index-2.htm; and Chu Shulong, "Beyond Crisis Management:
Prospects for a Northeast Asian Security Architecture," Council for Secu-
rity Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, Canada (2008), at www.cscap.ca/
Chu%20Executive%20Summary.pdf.
17. For example, Pritchard ( Failed Diplomacy), U.S. Secretary of State Con-
doleezza Rice, the U.S. Department of State's Christopher Hill, and even
President-elect Barack Obama have all argued for such a framework.
18. From Australia, see Peter Van Ness, "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis:
Four-Plus-Two - An Idea Whose Time has Come," in Mel Gurtov and
Peter Van Ness, eds., Confronting the Bush Doctrine : Critical Views from the
Asia-Pacific (New York: Routledge, 2005). From South Korea, see Keun-
sik Kim, "The Prospects for Institutionalizing the Six Party Talks," Policy
Forum Online , Nautilus Institute, July 12, 2007, at www.nautilus.org/
fora /security/ 07051Kim.html.
America 's Failed North Korea Nuclear Policy 21
rity, even after the North Korean issues are resolved.

The second policy recommendation may be viewed as radi-
cal by neoconservatives and others in Washington, but is in fact
a far more effective "preventive" move than those neoconserva-
tives have themselves advocated in recent years. In addition to
all of the details of the agreements worked out in 2007 by way of
the 6PT, so as to pave the way for a real breakthrough in the
North Korea nuclear dilemma, the United States should offer
North Korea full diplomatic recognition, including the opening
of a U.S. embassy in Pyongyang and eventually the opening of a
North Korean embassy in Washington. As a part of this move,
the United States should also offer to turn the 1953 Korean War
armistice into a full-fledged peace agreement, formally ending
the Korean War. These moves should be done without precondi-
tions. At the same time, they do not require a retreat from any of
the other agreements the United States and its partners have in
place presently regarding North Korea's disabling of its nuclear
facilities, full disclosure of all nuclear activities, or ending its
nuclear-proliferation activities.
This new approach should be seen as a confidence-building
measure - another step toward resolution of the North Korean
nuclear issue, an eventual North Korean surrender of its nuclear
weapons programs, and the restoration of a nuclear-free Korean
peninsula. What is new here is that rather than make the normal-
ization of U.S.-DPRK relations and the establishment of diplo-
matic missions in each other's countries a prize to be won when
the nuclear issue is resolved; the proposal is that the United
States should make the first move, as a means to resolving the
nuclear dilemma.
While many in Washington may protest such a policy, it is
not actually as radical as it at first sounds. First, America's closest
ally, Britain, has already opened an embassy in Pyongyang. The
United Kingdom established diplomatic relations with North
Korea in late 2000 after progress in relations between the ROK
and the DPRK, and opened an embassy in Pyongyang in mid-
2001. North Korea reciprocated, opening its own embassy in
London in late 2002. From its mission in Pyongyang the British
operate jointly-funded humanitarian projects in North Korea,
including those in Pyongsong, South Pyongan Province, and
Wonsan. In addition, the British provide three English teachers at
22 Gregory J. Moore
universities in Pyongyang and offer human-rights and English-

language training to North Korean officials in Britain.19 Second,
the United States had already talked about opening a liaison
office in Pyongyang and eventually opening full diplomatic rela-
tions with North Korea as a part of the 1994 Agreed Framework.
In the 2007 agreement, full normalization of relations was stated
as part of the end game for U.S.-DPRK bilateral relations.
Before announcing this new approach the United States
would need to consult closely with its South Korean ally. South
Korea's agreement will not be as easy to achieve under the
hawkish Lee Myung-bak regime as it would have been under the
previous Kim Dae Jung or Roh Moo Hyun administrations. But
South Korean public opinion has been turning against Lee, and as
long as America's South Korean allies are assured that opening a
U.S. embassy in Pyongyang and establishing a peace treaty with
North Korea does not entail any weakening of the U.S. commit-
ment to the defense of South Korea, or rejection of having North
Korea lay down its nuclear weapons and end its proliferation
activities, Seoul might be persuaded. After all, this U.S. position
was what the previous two South Korean presidents had hoped
for from Washington, but could not bring about, and it did enjoy
some level of popular support in South Korea.
The United States will also need to consult closely with Japan
to avoid a replay of the 1971 Nixon Shock, when the Japanese
learned about the U.S. opening toward China via international
news coverage. Moreover, in addressing Japan's primary con-
cerns - i.e., the North Korean missile threat and the resolution of
the abduction issue - the United States will have to reassure the
Japanese that Washington will not retreat from its commitment to
defend Japan or hold North Korea accountable. Moreover, U.S.
policy makers will probably need to invest some extra political
capital in getting the abduction issue addressed, perhaps offering
to host dialogues between North Korean and Japanese authorities
on the matter once the U.S. embassy in Pyongyang is in place.
Washington should stress to Tokyo that recognition of Pyongyang
is not a concession or a compromise, but a confidence-building
19. UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office listing for Korea, DPRK (accessed
November 23, 2008 via www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco /country-
profiles/ asia-oceania/north-korea?profile=all).
measure, a means to the end of finally resolving the issues that

have plagued DPRK-U.S. and DPRK-Japan relations.
Likely Consequences
For several reasons, the United States would have little to

lose in taking this new approach. If North Korea responded
favorably to the new U.S. overtures, two general streams of
events might follow. If the peace treaty were signed, the U.S.
embassy opened in Pyongyang, and all sides continued to meet
their commitments, it would be expected that these new devel-
opments would lead to an environment in which Kim Jong II
might feel secure enough to lay down his nuclear weapons and
terminate the nuclear-weapons programs. However, if North
Korea accepted the new U.S. approach and, as was the case with
the 1994 Agreed Framework, the agreement began to unravel,
the United States would still be better off than it is now. Just as
in the days of the cold-war standoff with the Soviet Union, the
United States would have a listening post inside North Korea
with its embassy. Needless to say, this is something the United
States does not have presently. This U.S. action would also be
viewed favorably in Beijing, Seoul, and Moscow, giving it more
diplomatic capital with China, South Korea, and Russia, which
is important in the wake of the unpopular Iraq war. This could
be particularly strategic if it became clear that sanctions or other
actions were needed toward North Korea at some point in the
future.
If, however, North Korea were to refuse such an American
approach, the United States would find itself with several advan-
tages as well. First, if North Korea refused the U.S. offer to estab-
lish normal diplomatic relations, open embassies in each other's
capitals, and sign a formal peace treaty ending the Korean War,
this would deny what North Korea itself has long said it desires -
to be treated as a normal country by the United States. Therefore,
the U.S. offer could put North Korea in a difficult position. The
U.S. proposal would be difficult for North Korea to refuse, despite
the tension and lack of trust between the two, because rejection
would make North Korea look even more like the intransigent
trouble maker many have made it out to be. The United States, on
the other hand, would look like a better citizen in the international
24 Gregory /. Moore
community, and would find it easier to garner support for a firmer

stand on North Korea in the region and at the United Nations if
necessary down the road. Again, this is important given the low
level of support for U.S. foreign policy in die international com-
munity since the Iraq war.
Discussions with some of China's top strategic thinkers on
North Korea in 2004, 2005, and 2008 indicate that such a U.S.
approach would be welcomed by Beijing, which has increasing-
ly come to see North Korea as a brotherly "pain in the neck/'20
Beijing's patience with Pyongyang is running thin. If Pyongyang
were to reject an American offer this gracious, Beijing might
shift further toward the U.S. side on the matter, further isolating
North Korea. A decision by Beijing to truly put the squeeze on
North Korea is a difficult one given China's proximity to North
Korea and the effect a collapsing North Korea could have on
China's border regions. However, Beijing would have little
choice but to take a firmer stand against North Korea if North
Korea rejected such an American offer, and China does still have
some leverage over North Korea.
In the end, the most favorable outcome of such a fresh
approach to North Korea from the U.S. perspective would be a
reduction of tensions on the Korean peninsula, a standing down
of Kim Jong II on the nuclear issue, a DPRK commitment to cease
proliferation activities to Syria, Iran, and other buyers, a huge
improvement in U.S. -North Korean relations, and a general
relaxation of tensions in the region. This is in fact the most likely
outcome. Kim Jong II has few options left on his plate. He has
stated continuously that his greatest concern is security and that
the United States is the greatest threat to his security. This is the
majority view of China's North Korea experts and the view of
many other North Korean watchers as well, including Jack
Pritchard, Siegfried Hecker, and others.21 A removal or major
20. Gregory J. Moore, "How North Korea Threatens China's Interests: Under-
standing Chinese 'Duplicity' on the North Korean Nuclear Issue," Interna-
tional Relations of the Asia-Pacific (January, 2008).
21. See Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy , pp. 58-59 and Siegfried Hecker, "Report
on North Korean Nuclear Program," Center for International Security and
Cooperation, Stanford University (November 15, 2006), at http://cisac.
stanford.edu / publications / report_on_north_korean_nuclear_program / .
diminishing of the U.S. security threat Kim Jong II's regime faces
would give him the "face" and the political capital to do what
the United States actually wants him to do.
One of the most important advantages this new confidence-
building approach to U.S. North Korea policy could bring is the
establishment of an elementary level of trust between Washing-
ton and Pyongyang. Trust has been lacking between the DPRK
and the United States for the entirety of their relationship, and
this lack of trust has been an enormous obstacle to the resolution
of the recent nuclear dilemma. Arguably, lack of trust is even
the source of the dilemma. Kim Jong II fears the United States
and has concluded that his only source of security is nuclear
weapons. An American policy such as the one outlined here
would be the first step in removing the source of Kim's fear.
This could ultimately lead to a buildup of trust between the two
parties, make it possible to end the North Korean nuclear dilem-
ma, and possibly, in the long run, bring reunification to the
Korean peninsula.
Conclusions
When Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger announced their

rapprochement with communist China in 1971, it was considered
a radical departure from previous U.S. policy. Let us not forget
that in 1971 when Nixon and Kissinger began pursuing this strat-
egy, the United States was mired in a war in Vietnam and the
cold war was still in full swing. Carrying out a broad rapproche-
ment with any member of the communist bloc was not even con-
sidered by most. While Lyndon Johnson was reported to have
discussed such a move with China, it was only the strongly anti-
communist Nixon who had the political capital to make such a
move. As regards North Korea, President Clinton discussed an
opening to North Korea in the late 1990s but was unable to carry
it out because of a combination of North Korean intransigence
and moves in Congress by Republicans that undermined the
1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North
Korea. Because George Bush and the Republican Party controlled
Congress until 2006 and President Bush had the conservative cre-
dentials to preclude any attempts to label him as being soft on
26 Gregory J. Moore
tyranny (having overthrown Saddam), he was in a position to

take a radically different approach to North Korea just as Nixon
did with China. Yet he did not.
It is too soon to know if the Barack Obama administration
will take a new approach to resolving the North Korean nuclear
dilemma. Yet what has been proposed here is an option the
Obama administration should seriously consider. After all, the
U.S. approach to China played an important role in paving the
way for China to embark on the reforms that it undertook only a
few years later after Mao Zedong's death in 1976, allowing the
much more pragmatic Deng Xiaoping to rise and lead China out
of its totalitarian past.
The alternative, of course, is that Washington might continue
to model its North Korea policy on its Cuba policy - relying on
isolation, non-recognition, hostility, and containment - in essence,
a continuation of the status quo. In North Korea's case, however,
this is no longer an option given the proliferation threat North
Korea poses. This article has concluded that the old U.S. approach
to North Korea has not worked. North Korea is a true prolifera-
tion threat and is now a member of the world's club of nuclear
nations. The Obama administration should, therefore, consider
applying the Nixon-Kissinger approach to North Korea, for it is
America's best option today. It worked in China's case. It will
work in North Korea's case as well.
Principal References
Bush, George W. "The President's National Security Strategy,"

March 16, 2006. Online at www.state.gov/documents/
organization/ 63319.pdf.
China Institute of Contemporary International Relations. "The Secu-
rity Mechanism of Northeast Asia: Reality and Prospect,"
Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations),
No. 8 (Beijing, 2002).
Chu Shulong. "Beyond Crisis Management: Prospects for a North-
east Asian Security Architecture," Council for Security
Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, Canada (2008). Online at
www.cscap.ca / Chu%20Executive%20Summary.pdf .
Forsyth, James and Douglas Davis. "We Came so Close to World
War Three that Day/' Spectator (UK), October 3, 2007.

Hecker, Siegfried. "Report on North Korean Nuclear Program."
Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford
University (November 15. 2006). Online at http://cisac.
stanford.edu/publications/ report_on_north_korean_nuclear
_program/.
Hersh, Seymour M. "A Strike in the Dark," The New Yorker , Feb-
ruary 11, 2008.
Kelly, James. "Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Programs,"
Statement to the Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate
(Washington, D.C., Julv 15, 2004).
Kim, Keun-sik. "The Prospects for Institutionalizing the Six Party
Talks," Policy Forum Online , Nautilus Institute (July 12,
2007). Online at www.nautilus.org /fora /security/ 07051
Kim.html.
Li, D. "The Relations in Northeast Asia: Conflict and Coopera-
tion," Institute of World Economics and Politics (Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, 2006). Online at www.iwep.
org.cn/ english/ index-2.htm.
Lin, Christina Y. "The King from the East: DPRK-Syria-Iran
Nuclear Nexus and Strategic Implications for Israel and
the ROK," Academic Papers Series , vol. 3, No. 7 (Korea Eco-
nomic Institute, October, 2008).
Mann, James. Rise of the Vulcans : the History of Bush's War Cabinet.
New York: Penguin, 2004.
Moore, Gregory J. "How North Korea Threatens China's Interests:
Understanding Chinese 'Duplicity' on the North Korean
Nuclear Issue," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific ,
January 2008.
Pritchard, Charles L. Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How
North Korea Got the Bomb. Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 2007.
Van Ness, Peter. "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four-Plus-
Two - An Idea Whose Time has Come," in Mel Gurtov
and P. Van Ness, eds., Confronting the Bush Doctrine : Critical
Views from the Asia-Pacific. New York: Routledge, 2005.
Woodward, Bob. Bush at War. New York: Simon & Schuster,
2003.

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AMERICA'S FAILED NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR POLICY: A NEW APPROACH

Author(s): Gregory J. Moore

AMERICA'S FAILED NORTH KOREA

America's North Korea nuclear policy has been a failure.

The Failure of U.S. Policy

There can be no denying that America's North Korea nuclear

The Lead-up to Agreement in 2007

The first North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in 1993 when

2. James Kelly, "Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Programs," Statement

confirmed what many American observers had concluded for

to the Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C., July

in Macau, China that held North Korean funds. The United

The Failure of U.S. Policy

Despite the appearance of some measure of success in the

neither to develop nor transfer nuclear-weapons technology.3

3. Lin, 'The King from the East/' p. 2.

that Iran had helped finance North Korea's nuclear program in

Sources of the U.S. Policy Failure on North Korea

There are a number of reasons for the failure of U.S. policy

ential roles of Dick Cheney as vice president, Donald Rumsfeld as

negotiator, Christopher Hill, and Bush's ambassador to the UN,

The inexperience of most administration officials in dealing with

Among those administration officials who believe engaging

15. Ibid., p. 161.

A New Approach for the United States on North Korea

Two New Policy Options

There are two options that would address American interests

world's three most powerful nuclear powers (the United States,

16. See China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, "The Security

rity, even after the North Korean issues are resolved.

universities in Pyongyang and offer human-rights and English-

measure, a means to the end of finally resolving the issues that

For several reasons, the United States would have little to

community, and would find it easier to garner support for a firmer

When Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger announced their

tyranny (having overthrown Saddam), he was in a position to

Bush, George W. "The President's National Security Strategy,"

War Three that Day/' Spectator (UK), October 3, 2007.

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