SNSL Merged 1-20 PDF

Strategic Negotiation Skills
Satish Duryodhan
Puzzle-Poll
Unstoppable Cone
Immovable post
Typical Real World Negotiations
Negotiation “Empty set” in action
Role Character Actor
01 Business Michael
Al Pacino
owner Corleone
02 Corleone’s Thomas Robert

Lawyer Hagan Duval
0
Patrick
3 Senator
Geary
Spradlin
My offer is…
$250K to get license

01 5% of all 4 hotel revenue Nothing 02
as commission
Negotiations
Why Why? 04
03 Do not like underworld Normal licensing $20K
intend to squeeze! Lawyers agreement
Empty Sets in real world negotiations-Poll
Read Understanding the reservation point scenario 1
What do you think of these statements?
“Don’t you think

Firm A ….
veiled advocacy for a particular position

but can’t you see
that Firm B …
Understanding the reservation point scenario 1-1
Empty Sets in real world negotiations
you want to hire an

inexperienced firm ….
opinionated words to corner other party
we can’t afford to
spend the fortune …
Understanding the reservation point scenario 2
Read Understanding the reservation point scenario 2
What impressed you

about Firm B? …
neutral question aimed at information

gathering and defining priorities.
Why it is a better fit

for us…
requires you to look beyond own biases

open yourself up to being persuaded by other party
Anxiety in Negotiation
anxious negotiators made initial offers that were 7.5% lower on

average than those from non-anxious participants
A study by Wharton professors Alison Wood Brooks and Maurice Schweitze
Anxiety: concerned, nervous, restless, fearful or tense
How many of you get anxious with thought of

Negotiating?-Poll
Strategy to minimise impact of anxiety on Negotiations
Reframe Anxiety as opportunity

01 to focus on ways to succeed
Control
severity
02 Harness anxious rumination with

thorough preparation
Channel
03 Build confidence through practice Optimize

Course Assessment
Component Mode Details Wt

Mid term Online 40 min 20%
online Test
End Term 120 min 40%
Exam Online
Sim analysis Pre Negotiation report (5 No) 8-10 hours 10%

effort
Negotiation Videos/post
30%
reports (5No)
Total 100%
What do you think are most important negotiation skills?
% Negotiation situations
FOCUS ON IMPLEMENTATION 20
Critical Negotiation Skill set
EMPATHY-EMOTIONS & PERCEPTIONS 40
FRAMING / OPTIONS 60
ASSERTIVENESS 80
PREPARATION 100
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Top 5 skill sets across

Negotiation
situations
Source of Anchor case study
€22 MN
Experience case study
DL 3 year project contract 2002
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Total
Requirement,
Milestones 60% 25% functionality,
Design, Prototypes,
delivery functionality Implementation, Training
15% functionality
Milestone linked
6 12 8 26
Pmt $M
Year 1 delivery a grand success!!!

DL Project at end of Year 1-Poll
Revenue MN 6 12 8 26
Est. Effots MY 100 300 200 600
1-MY cost $K 40 25 25
Est. Cost $MN 4 7.5 5 19
Est. PBT $MN 2 4.5 3 9.5
Actual efforts MY 170

Actual cost $MN 6.8
HW Corp. 2001
Original Est. vs actual Y1 Org. Level P&L Revenue $ MN PBT $ MN
50 6/ (3.2)
What will you do (poll)?

Establishing feasibility –setting your range
Lowest point Target point Highest point
Resistance point Aspiration point Dream point

beyond which negotiator negotiator would like to Keep reaching target
is unwilling to settle conclude negotiations point a possibility
Our Range
DL Project at end of Year 1-Poll
Revenue MN 6 12 8 26
Est. Effots MY 100 300 200 600
1-MY cost $K 40 25 25
Est. Cost $MN 4 7.5 5 19
Est. PBT $MN 2 4.5 3 9.5
Actual efforts
170
MY
Actual cost
$MN 6.8
Poll
Our Best Value?

Our Minimum
acceptable value?
Their acceptance range
Est. Their Best Value?

Est. Their Minimum
acceptable value? Poll
Is ZOPA always as continuous range?
Depends on possible values/options issue can take
Issue option Will Elizabeth

Will goes Elizabeth fills up
unilaterally Ideal Not acceptable
Will goes after acceptable help

to Elizabeth (0, 1..n) and
Elizabeth fills up Acceptable Acceptable
Will does not go Not acceptable Ideal

Outgoing
3% 11%
Task Focussed
People Focus
DISC
17% 69%
Reserved general population breakdown

How D and I differ in “action”?
May feel alienated or
misunderstood by the rest
Team represented on the Everything DiSC Workplace® map

Strategy to adapt personality to be successful negotiator
01 Master negotiation skills
02 positive attitudes, confidence,

Initiative without Aggression
03 Adapt strategy to other party

personality
Negotiating with a D personality type
Characteristics So you…
Present the bottom

Prioritizes Action line – briefly
& Results
Fears being taken Focus on solutions

than problems
advantage of
Values
Competence & Compliment them
Accomplishments publicly
Negotiating with a I personality type
Allow time for them

Fears loss of to ask questions
influence
Values freedom Don't interrupt

of expression them
Limited by lack of
follow through Don't overload
with details
Negotiating with a S personality type
Express your
Values loyalty interest in them
and security
Prioritizes Avoid
support and confrontation
collaboration
Fears loss of Explain what is

stability expected of them
Negotiating with a C personality type
Motivated by Focus on Facts and

details
expertise &
quality work
Prioritizes
analysis and Be precise and
challenging correct
assumptions
overcritical, over
analyzing Be patient and
diplomatic
Distributive negotiation Characteristics
Single issue Fixed Pie
Objective: Motivation:
Claim Max.. Self interest
Compete
strategy Win-lose
Est. other party
reservation value Explain how costly
Est. DL Minimum are your concessions
acceptable value Poll?
01 03
Distributive
negotiation
strategies
02 04
Avoid unilateral Tie your concession to

concessions specific other party action
Salt Harbor Part A-common information
Original Plot
Carved out parcel
Legal 3month ago

commercial use
illegal Now for

commercial use
Negotiating Parties
Party 1:Easterly owner and Lawyer
Party 2: Brims Manager and Lawyer
Defendant est. ZOPA at Preparation stage for Out of court settlement
-Ignore Lawyer or potential lawsuit costs
Est . Claimant walk away revised during negotiation 380K

Negotiation stages
Negotiation Simulation activities
Breakout rooms
Role Group Negotiation Team
(owners/Owner’s lawyer)
STEP B
01 03
START
Video Recording STEP D

Preparation Analysis
Video playback /
Debrief
STEP A
02 04
Conclude
Role specific CI, STEP C
Preparation Template Poll/
Negotiation Post agreement Reflection
Analysis template
03 04
Role execution Objection
handling
02 05
Group Personality
Coordination adaption
Relative team
performance
01 06
Preparedness Strategy
execution
Team#_SH
Negotiation evaluation
Post Negotiation Poll analysis
discussions
Why some teams reached agreement as low as 100-120K

and some over 220K+ when total information for teams was identical?
Exercise
Why wide range when each Team has same info.?
People have different aspirations or targets?
Some gather more information than others?
Some are willing to risk impasse than others?
First offer influenced the outcome

Powerful effect of Anchoring (first offer) Poll FS-FO
$135K
Expert Gr estimate
$130K
$125K
$120K
$115K
$110K
$105K
A1
e1
e1 A2
e2
e2 A3
e3
e3 A4
e4
$119K $129K $139K $149K
Appropriate list price Anchor Value

Willingness to pay Source: Survey by Greg Northcraft and Margaret Neale
Poll – folding paper 50 times
Poll – folding paper 50 times
23 folds will get you to one kilometer—3,280 feet.

30 folds -Your paper will be now 100 kilometers high.
42 folds will get you to the Moon
The Two Systems
System1: Fast System2: Slow
Continuous Used only if

necessary
Fast but Efforts - solve

error prone complex
problems / Self
control
Shortcuts
Impulse Slow but
Intuition reliable
Daniel Kahneman (winner of the 2002

Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics)
Heuristic: cognitive shortcut for fast “good enough” decisions
Available Association and

information priming
Substitution
Ex: sample for Stories &
population Causes
Judgement Emotion
Ex: Confidence affect
level
SO_P Identify letter in place of “ _ “
If we are thinking about food we will fill in _ with “U” and relate to SOUP
If we are thinking about cleanliness we will fill in _ with “A” and relate to SOAP
Bias-”Error that may occur when we use heuristics for a decision”
Poll: Range of final settlement
Exercise
How do you counter Anchoring?
anchoring bias tendency to

give too much weight to the
first offer put forth in a
Negotiation
“Breath-taking isn’t it?

The seller wanted $5000
But I got it just for $4500
Extreme anchoring tactics
Buyer ZOPA range 9-11M Seller ZOPA range 10-12M
Lowballing Highballing
Some more hardball tactics..
Bogey- make non issue a issue

Intimidation- How do you deal with extreme aggressions?
175-
Expected Diminishing concessions
for subsequent offers
Price USD K
Parties may use strategy to exploit the expectation

Leveraging power of Justification
I: I believe 10% raise would be fair
II: …..because my performance over past 1 yr was exceptional
III: …because my performance over past 1yr has been exceptional.

Here are project performance reports that support my claim
Salary negotiation offer success

100
80
60
40
20
0
I. offer II. offer with Justification III. Offer with
Justification & evidence
Exercise
Strategy : Separating influence and Info.
Information Influence
Offer
X Y
Scenario 1 0 1
Scenario 2 0.5 0.5
We have spoken to other companies with whom we do
business. Hence We want you to lower price to ABC value
We have recd a better offer from company “A”. Hence We

would like you to lower your price to ABC value
Strategy : Separating influence and Info.
Information Influence
Offer
X Y
Scenario 1 0 1
Response options: Ignore offer (discuss other topic),
Aggressive counter offer-propose moderation
Scenario 2 0.5 0.5

Response options:
Re-evaluate your assumptions , seek more info.
Video Analysis Salt Harbor-Part A
3. How personalities
impacted negotiation?
4. Has any party falsified facts?
5. Other-Ex: New conflict areas

Should we Lie in Negotiation?
“Lies” Legal perspective
lie - a knowing misrepresentation of a material fact.
in an insurance fraud case, a material fact would relate to the

insurer's liability, policy, or coverage
•https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/when-is-it-legal-to-lie-in-negotiations/
Ranbaxy Daiichi post negotiation “lie” legal battle
Negotiation “Lies” Legal perspective
No legal rule bounds the run of business interest.
No particular demand in negotiations could be termed dishonest.
It is best to walk away, not sue for “bad faith” in negotiations.
•https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/when-is-it-legal-to-lie-in-negotiations/
Lying tactics in Negotiation
Concealment
(withhold / Hide info)
Half Concealment Tell truth falsely
Dodge -Incorrect
Misdirection inference
Falsification
(False info. As true)
Understanding deception
Which Lying technique is being used?
This is the
Is this the lowest price
lowest price we
you can sell to us?
ever sold the
product.
Buyer
Diff. views
Of data
Facial Expression
Hostile/Defensive Micro change, Don't blink
lie getting detected Look toward the door. ...
Evading Body language

Touch face/mouth/throat
•“Why you want to know?” Lie detection
•“That’s not important” Cues
Hot Spot Voice
“I am not angry” while Anxiety / nervousness
clenching jaw and raising voice change in voice pitch
Verbal content Verbal style

•“To tell you the truth” / “Believe me” Pause before answering
•“Let me be clear” / “The fact is” Repeat themselves
Consequences of lying in negotiation
Protecting A negotiator’s precious resource “Reputation”
Intrusive Question for strategic reasons you Move to

are not ready to discuss another topic
tempted to lie
about options that express your opinion, your
you don't have your optimism opportunities
"This is my
make more offers that Keep momentum
final offer" going but leave
contain smaller concessions room to move.
NEGOTIATION BATNA FRAMEWORK
Satish Duryodhan
Negotiation -Confer with others to reach agreement -Concise Oxford Dictionary
Third Party in control

Most evaluative/structured/ formal No common interest -nothing to negotiate for
H
Perceived Conflict
Litigation Let court of Law decide
Arbitration Let trusted party decide
Mediation Talk through third party
Consultant One/both to strengthen position
Negotiation
Partnering
L L Without Conflict -nothing to negotiate
-Parties in control Resolution approach H

-least evaluative/structured/formal
Types of 3rd Party Interventions
LOW Court of Law Mediation

Level of negotiator control
over procedure
HIGH
Arbitration Negotiation
LOW HIGH
Level of Negotiator control over outcome
Types of Mediation
Facilitative
Evaluative
Transformative
Court Mandate
Types of Arbitration
To Litigate or not to Litigate?
Owner of Manhattan apt. spent $999 to
install child proof window guard and
presented bill to Society co-op board
Board refused to pay. Law

was unclear
Six years and USD 100K legal feels later the two
parties were still fighting in the court
The fourfold pattern of preference
Gains Losses
95% chance of losing

95% chance of winning $1MN-Risk seeking
$1MN-Risk averse
High Probability
(Certainty effect) 01 02
5% chance of winning 5% chance of losing

$1MN-Risk seeking $1MN- averse
Low Probability
(possibility effect) 03 04
Personal Experience: Real life Negotiation
Apollo
Domain
workstation
Satish plan to sell business of CAD Products
Offer USD 0.9

Inter National
MN+ 3 YR
Giant Work bond
What should Satish do?

Introducing BATNA
Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement
Agree
Walk Away
Best
alternative
value
Why should we be ready to walk away-Video

Satish Looks for walk Away position
$ 0.9 MN+
Agree 3YR Work
bond
Inter National
Giant
Regional
Walk Away
Co:$ 0.5
MN
What is Satish’s BATNA

How BATNA influences walkaway point
Satish Original BATNA-Bankrupty
Satish Revised BATNA-Accept

Value to MNC (Buyer)
regional 0.5MN offer
Value to Satish (Seller)

Satish Walkaway 0.6M Satish dream 0.9M
plus 1 year Bond plus 1 year Bond
What shapes Satish perception Walkway value?
Price
Relationship
Ease of
deal
Walkaway
Time
Value pressure
Risk
Tolerance
BATNA Quiz Poll
You are negotiating a purchase on unique

equipment with the supplier who won tech bid.
Which of following could be your BATNA
A. Accept only if they lower price to your budget
B. Meet another supplier and find their offer
C. Buy used equipment instead of leasing new

BATNA Strategies
Decide your BATNA before negotiation
Improve your BATNA by seeking alternatives that

don’t require the other side’s cooperation
How will you apply this strategy?

Case study: other party BATNA analysis
1912 US Presidential campaign brochure
Problem: Realization after printing 3MN copies......

Photographer permission not taken
What should be
negotiation value?
Pay photographer USD

1/brochure as per
Roosevelt copyright laws
campaign
managers
options
Negotiate a royalty value
with the photographer
BATNA Destroy and reprint (USD

1MN+3 Wk delay)
Strategy: identify your
counterpart’s BATNA
Strategy: Do not disclose

your BATNA
Challenge:identify your counterpart’s BATNA
Work to identify your counterpart’s BATNA
What should be
negotiation value now?
Analyse other party BATNA
No monetary gain
Estimating
Photographer
BATNA
Lose opportunity for
national publicity
Planning 3MN copies of campaign speech with
photograph. Excellent national level publicity
opportunity for photographers!
Appreciate opportunity,
but can afford Only $250.
Decide Discover
Offer / counter /
04 alternatives to
reject/ accpt 01 agreement
Applying BATNA
strategies
Improve BATNA Select
• More alternatives 03 02 the best
• Est. Other Party alternative-BATNA
BATNA
Seller BATNA Buyer BATNA

Case Scenario 1: Find Phadake’s BATNA
Case study: Work Out BATNA1 –Breakout rooms

Case study: Work Out BATNA
Case Scenario 2: Find Phadake’s BATNA
Case Scenario 3: Possible outcomes

Decision Model
Decision model for distribution company on whiteboard

Decision Trees- Decision making with multiple scenario
Decision trees have two types of branching points or nodes

Outcome 1
Decision Node
Outcome 2
At decision nodes-
alternatives decision-
maker can choose. Outcome 3
Outcome 4
Chance Node
At chance nodes-branches because the uncertainty of the business

world. permits multiple possible outcomes.
Exercise
Step1: Predict outcome

as green or Red
Step 2: Spin a wheel of
fortune that has a
"green" outcome and a
"red" outcome.
Offer: $100 if you correctly predict the
outcome. If you choose the wrong color, you
receive nothing.
Draw a decision tree and find expected value
Exercise
The wheel of fortune has a 75% chance of a "green"

outcome and a 25% chance of a "red" outcome.
Draw decision model and find expected value

Exercise
Which trees
is right?
Create a decision tree for Distribution company?
Which tree is right for a Distribution company?
Exercise
Probability in Decision trees
Producers Seth & Chaplin

(S&C) boasts that when Cloven
is released in theatres, it will
become an instant classic.
If asked how confident he is that Cloven will

achieve at least modest success, he might
reply with a percentage: "80%.
Options poll
Options I: Flat fee Options 2: Profit Sharing
"Blockbuster":$6 MN Chance:30%
“Lackluster":$0 MN Chance: 50%
“Flop“: - $2 MN Chance: 20%
•Sony Owns Cloven
•S&C gets $10 MN flat •Paramount & S&C split
•S&C pays $9 MN ownership and revenue
production cost •S&C pays production costs
•S&C profits: $ 1 MN •S&C profits =F(film success)
Which option to choose?
The EMV of $1.40 is the long-

term average value of
outcomes of a large number
spins.
Exercise
S&C are uncertain about the estimated

value for the movie becoming blockbuster
What is the profit value of the movie

becoming blockbuster at which the
company will be indifferent between
Paramount and Sony deal?
Salt Harbor -negotiation Part B
Brims Loses
Brim Wins
CCb=0
LRB appeals Court case
LRB costs Court Cost
CCe=0
Easterly Loses
easterly Wins
Lets develop a decision model for Brims and Easterly
Lets understand the Brims and easterly analysis templates

EVW-Easterly=pw*(X1*(LRBe+Ie)+(1=X1)*(LRBe+Pr))) Easterly
Easterly Frozen out
LRBe+Implication for
Probability = X1 Easterly Ie
Win: Commercial use Not OK
W pw
Easterly outbids other
Residential buyers
Easterly LRBe+ Pr
Probability = (1-X1)
Brim sells to other
LRBe+CCe+Implication
L Probability = X2 for Easterly Ie
Lose: Commercial use OK
(1-pw)
Commercial buyers
LRBe+CCe+ Pc
Probability = (1-X2)
EVL-Easterly= (1-pw)*X2(LRBe+Cce+Le)+ (1-X2)*(LRBe+Cce+Pc))))
Brims
Easterly Frozen out
Pro-LRBb-CCb
Probability = Y1
lose: Commercial use Not OK
L pb
Residential buyers
Brims Pre-LRBb-CCb
Probability = (1-Y1)
Brim sells to other
Prc-LRBb
W Probability = Y2
win: Commercial use OK
(1-pb)
Commercial buyers
LRBb+ negotiated cost of
Probability = (1-Y2) land Cc
Analysis of data of 30 Yrs. of Parties/Lawyers predictions of success
Why such a wide difference between positive vs

negative prediction vs actual?
Break out room
Salt Harbor B–Evaluate court options
Analyze your model template and arrive at

conclusion if court or out of court is better
At what price you will be indifferent between

court case and out of court settlement
Salt Harbor A, B–Integrated report
01
Easterly-Pre
Brims-Pre
Integrated Single 02
E B
report for team
Post Negotiation
Analysis
E
B
04 Easterly-BATNA
BRIMs-BATNA
E B 03
Value creation with Multiple issues
Satish Duryodhan
Puzzle
17 camels and 3 sons

1/3
1/2 1/9
Value creation approach?

$2MN Tax benefit of acquisition
23M
-Additional Value
ease
Big Pharma (BP) acquirer (Buyer)
22M
W
21M
T 20M
SP BATNA-MP Offer 21 M
19M BP BATNA- Valuation 18.5M

I 18.5M
TP
WA 21.5M 22M Ideal 23M
Small Pharma (SP) target (Seller)

Distributive
Compete Explore
H
Value claiming opportunity
Balance
M
Integrative
Avoid Problem solving

L
L M H
Value creation opportunity
What if diff. Parties have diff. Perceptions?
The Negotiator’s Dilemma
More Value Claiming More Value Creating
Pure Jt. Prob.

Integrative
Distributive Solving
Salt Harbor Complete

Creative thinking mutual trust
Adding New variable
Distributive bargaining
Multiple
Single issue Issues-
Fixed Pie expand Pie
Motivation: Motivation:
Self interest Mutual interest
Compete - Collaborate
behaviour -behaviour
Distributive negotiation Integrative negotiation

DEAD BEAT DEAD END:
A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW U.S. PLAN FOR PAYMENT OF U.N. ARREARS
Breakout room
UN and US role:
Agree on two “Negotiation issues”
Each party to get one argument acknowledged in your favour
US UN dispute 2000- In favour of UN
What US wants What US

owes UN
25%
22% 1.0 B
US share of UN
54M
1.8BN budget
US GDP EU GDP
27% 27%
US share 25% EU share 36%
Y-2000 Y-2000
US share of UN peacekeeping budget
What US owes UN
What US wants
31% UN Budget
25% $0.6 BN
0.6 B
36M 31%
Y-2000
US UN dispute 2000- In favour of US
UN Budget
$1.8BN
50%
40%
30%
25% 25%
L-1940’s L-1950’s M-1960’s E-1970’s Y-2000
US share of UN budget
What should Holbrooke do?
UN did not accept
Helm-Biden bill
Pay US100MN
to keep vote 926M over 3 years
800M contested
Japan-wanted
Proportionate
reduction
20%
Holbrooke first
round of
negotiation
189 countries
refuse to ratify US
US side-lined
Can you UN meetings
guess “Why”
Impact of new variable
Holbrooke asked each country why they can not raise their
contribution and gain more influence in UN?
2000 2001
Budgets frozen Budgets available

Can not increase Can increase UN
UN contribution contribution
Who will pay the 3% in 2000?

Who Paid the cut?
Who Pays UN’s regular Yearly budget
Intolerable cruelty movie
100+ countries US
01 02
Range-not fixed value Range – not fixed value
Negotiation
Variable
02 04
Willing to admit for Willing to admit for
negotiation negotiation
Anchor case-Hexware-DL Negotiation variable Example

Strategy: Making Package Value (PV) Offer
Customer to seller: Start Time Price

July ?
Seller to Customer Start Time Price USD

Approach A: July 650K
Seller to Customer Approach B:
Start Time Std. Service Premium Package
Price USD Services Value (PV)
July 650K No 650K
July 650K Yes-50K 700K
March 635K Yes-45K 680K
Buyer seller Negotiations Creating Package Value (PV) Offer
Value Price
01
Schedule delivery
02
Negotiation 03 Product Quality
Variables
04 Support Warranty
05 Terms Payment
( 15-13.5) / 1.5 (11.5-13) / 1.5
0.5 0.3
0.3 + 0.9
0.2 +.5
0.4 0.5
PV1: Price + Delivery (15.5-14) (11.8-13.3)

PV2: Price + Delivery+ Specs (15.8-14.3) (12.7-14.2)
PV 3: Price + Specs (15.3-13.8) (12.3-13.9)
04 01
ISSUES ONE BY ONE
ISUUES TOGETHER
03 02
Promotes Promotes trust

competition
Many win lose some win-win

outcomes outcomes
Supports distributive Supports integrative

negotiation negotiations
Negotiation Challenges due to uncertainty
Buyer- Construction company in residential and commercial projects
Plot value for commercial construction USD 150k

Plot value for Residential construction USD 100k
Chances estimated that Property will be eligible for commercial

construction based on info. Available
Seller 20% Buyer 80%

Potential uncertainty, mistrust..
Plot value for commercial construction USD 150k

Plot value for Residential construction USD 100k
Expected Value
Buyer 0.8*150+0.2*100= 140K
Seller 0.2*150+0.2*100= 110K
agreement value USD 110K

Value left on the table by seller USD 30K
Seller suspects Buyer leading to potential walkout..

contingency contract
Does happen
a contract to do or not to do something if
some event, collateral to such contract occurs.
does not happen
The event must be occurrence of the event

minor to the.. is not controlled by the
promising party’s..
contract
will or desire
Framing contingency contracts
If plot is eligible for If plot is not eligible for

commercial within “X” yrs.. commercial within “X” yrs..
Buyer will pay $30K to seller
Seller will pay $10K to Buyer
Contingency contracts can be risky if both parties are not in

agreement of how to measure objectively.
Team paid 9M salary in 96 to NBA star
Year Total Missed Payment for
Games game % missed games
1996 82 27 $3M
Reason: unpredictable, disdain for professional norms
Strategy: contingency laden contract
Component Amount $M
Guaranteed money 4.5
Per game played above 59 0.185
Winning title 0.5
Play all playoff 1.0
Total max. possible earnings 10.5
Frameworks to select Negotiation generic strategy
Five Generic strategies for buyer seller negotiations
Assertive ness Segmented Negotiating
H Behavior Matrix
Dominating / Collaboration
Competing (win /Win)
(Win / Lose)
L Compromising H Cooperation
Avoiding Accommodating
(Lose / Lose) / Yielding
(Lose / Win)
L
Kraljik matrix as basis of buyer negotiation strategy development
High
( Impact of Purchasing )
( Impact on profits )
❖Scarcity
❖New Technology
S ❖Difficult to produce
❖Monopoly / Oligopoly
Low
Low ( Complexity of Supply Market ) High

Fasteners -bolts, screws, studs..
Car Bodies
Rare Earth Material High tech Windshield

Kraljik matrix as basis of Car Manufacturer negotiation strategy
Fasteners Std. Parts Rare Earth Mtl. High tech Windshield
Q2 Q4
Profitability impact
Leverage Items Strategic Items

“Negotiate Low prices” “Form partnerships”
Q3
Q1
Non Critical Items Bottleneck items
“Efficiency” “Contracts”

Kraljik matrix as basis of Car Manufacturer negotiation strategy
Abundant Supply Natural Scarcity

Strategic Items
Profitability impact
Leverage Items “Form partnerships”

“Negotiate Low prices” ((High Tech
(car Bodies) windshields)
Product standardization Unique products
Bottleneck items
Non Critical Items
“Contracts”
“Efficiency”
(Rare raw materials)
( Fasteners )

Supplier preference Table
Provide superior service and quality

Willing to Invest time and Keep customer at all cost
( Attractiveness of account )
Effort in the relationship
Development Core Business

( Get further business ) (Retain and Expand)
Low Priority No Reason to Develop

No Development Potential relationship, No Priority
Nuisance Exploitable
(Withdraw) (Maximize profits)
Low ( Relative value of account) High

Negotiation Strategy selection for buyer
H Assertive ness
Dominating /
Competing Collaboration
(Win / Lose) (win /Win)
L H
Compromising
Cooperation
Avoiding Accommodating
(Lose / Lose) / Yielding
(Lose / Win)
L
If supplier is powerful and dominant and relationship is very
important (Bottleneck), then use a yielding strategy for that particular negotiation.
For negotiating on highly important category where the supplier relationship is

low-importance (Leverage), it might be appropriate to use a competing style
Negotiation Strategy selection for buyer
The Myers-Briggs Personality Type Indicator (MBTI)
Favorite world
Mind
I
E interact with surroundings
Extrovert Introvert
• action-oriented • thought-oriented
• feel energized by • feel recharged after

spending time with others spending time alone
• enjoy frequent social • enjoy deep meaningful

interaction social interactions
The Myers-Briggs Personality Type Indicator (MBTI) scale-1
Ambi vert
Personality
continuum scale Extrovert
Introvert
Information
Energy
S N
Sensor INtuition
• hands-on experience • patterns and impressions
• Reality-learning from • think possibilities,

their own senses imagining future, and
abstract theories.
Decisions F
T Nature
Thinker Feeler
• facts and objective data • personal value system

and social considerations
• consistent, logical, and • Feelings and emotions

impersonal
J Structure P
Tactics
Judger
Perceiver
• want things to be neat, • wants things to be

orderly and established flexible and spontaneous
• want things settled • want thing open-ended

Pass ive
AT-Identity
Assertive continuum scale Turbulent
(A) (T)
self-assured, even- self-conscious,

tempered, resistant to stress sensitive to stress
The Myers-Briggs Personality Type Indicator (MBTI) scales
Favorite world Information Decisions Structure
Mind Energy Nature Tactics
S T J
E
Extrovert Sensor Thinker Judger
I N F P
Introvert INtuition Feeler Perceiver
Check understanding
Group-Roles (goals, interests, and preferred activities)
Analysts Diplomats Sentinels Explorers
N N S S
INtuition INtuition Sensor Sensor
T F J P
Thinker Feeler Judger Perceiver
Rationality Rationality Guard / Rule spontaneou

impartiality sensitive Hierarchy s
Group-Strategies (preferred ways of doing things)
People Improvement Social

Confident
Mastery Engagement
I E I E
Introvert Extrovert Introvert Extrovert
A A T T
Assertive Assertive Turbulent Turbulent
Private /alone Outgoing improve Like in Group

Self communicatio Self doubt People
concern
Confident 16 Personalities Constant
Individualism Improvement
Assertive Turbulent
People Mgmt.
Social
Engagement
A/T
Poll on your personality
Take 16 personality test using the link https://www.16personalities.com/personality-types
Link Also available in salary negotiation template. Take poll on what is your personality
after test
Which personality is most common
Which personality role group is most common
Which personality strategy group is most common
Your observation on your personality

NT Analyst 10.4%
(SJ)
(SJ)
NF Diplomats 16%
(SJ)
(SP)
(SJ)
(SP) I S T J
(NF) E N F P
(SP)
(NF)
(SP)
(NT)
SJ Sentinels 46.4%
(NT)
SP Explorers 27%
Roles Group
Salt Harbor A, B–Faculty debrief
What are Brim’s assumptions
chances of winning 80:20
What is lost if case is Losing only blocks

lost? business
what still could be built Residence
Residential value of lot $ 125K +/- 20%

What are Brim’s assumptions
$100K plus $10K in

How much Brims paid?
related expenses
Cost of litigation Brims $20K
Alternate site cost $165K
Court case desirable? No (why?)

What are Easterly (buyer) assumptions
chances of winning 50:50
what still could be built Residence
Residential value of lot $ 100K
What is lost with case? $350K +/- 10%
Cost of litigation Easterly $25K

Why diff. agreements possible
Brims bought as commercial property

/ Buyers scared due to legal issue
90-
100
Easterly
potential loss 120-
140
Fair price for Brim
220
+
200- 140- Brim Alternate site cost
220 170
170-
200
Easterly Est. Alternate

site cost for Brim
Opportunity cost (OC) - the next best alternative foregone
Limiting fixed resource: 2 hours available before exam
Last Min. revision Relax with a game of tennis
OC – alternative to last
min. revision foregone
What is the opportunity cost-Poll?
New car price $12K?
3 years ago bought a

Old car price $10K? new car for $10K -Now
depreciated value $3K
Old car dep. price $3K?

Opportunity cost (OC) – for keep the car
sell old and buy new car Buy new while Keeping the old car
OC – 3K that could be
realised by selling old car
forgone
Salt Harbor Opportunity cost (OC)
Brims: OC – alternative of bought

parcel foregone
Bought Parcel:100K Alternate location: 170K
Easterly: OC – alternative of bought

parcel foregone
Bought Parcel:100K Alternate location: 200K

How easterly could have strategized?
Do not anchor ZOPA
on OC estimate
01
02
E
OC not relevant
for negotiation
(larger than parcel Try to find other
size)? party OC
B
04
Offer joint search
+ 03
E B
Working out Easterly’s BATNA
+ves -ves
saving legal Abandon legal Challenge absorbing -Ve impact

costs of Brim’s coffee shop
Keep Pursue regulatory claims Escalate potential

pressure settlement value
Get out of business Lose future

Save potential
business
Losses
Easterly frozen out Expected cost to Easterly
Easterly BATNA
(=$350K+$25K)
Win: commercial use LOW
not ON=> Brim sells
pw
High $125K
(=$25K+$100K)
Go to residential bidders
Court Brim builds/sells to (=$350K+$75K)
others
LOW
pl
Lose: commercial
use is OK High
$75K+S2
Brim settles for S2
Discounted S 235K
Notional court
case nuisance
cost=10K
Walkaway
value= 245K
Brim’s BATNA?
Forced? defend the suit Purpose?
Chances? hold on to property for Property

future appreciation business?
Selling on residential
Alternate site Start business
market
asap
What is Brim’s BATNA

Brim’s court Sell in commercial Expected Financials
market
option (=$140K-$25K)
Win: commercial use LOW
OK
pw
High X (=$X-$25K)
Sell to Easterly at “X”

Go to
Court Brim sells in residential (=$100K-$75K)
market
LOW 100K- $75K

pl
Lose: commercial
use is not OK High
110K- $75K
Brim Sells to easterly
Brim’s court option
145k -25K
-25K
-125K
125 K -125K
X= 0.8 (10+0.9X)=8+0.9X
Discounted 80K
court case nuisance cost=10K
Walkaway value= 70K
BATNA- Sale in residential market
Post analysis: Barriers to agreement
What really Happened
Exercise
What Really happened
Easterly lost early challenge
Easterly makes $120K offer..Brims rejects…No counter.
Easterly loses more appeals..goes to court
Responding to call Brim asks Easterly for best offer
Easterly offers USD220K…Brim refuses
Deal at USD 250K plus extras (USD 25K)

Hindsight..Brims had stronger case / less pressure
Exercise
Lesson’s learnt: Brim’s lawyer

Never underestimate risks of escalation
They (buyer) transformed a business matter

into emotional battle
“Avoid day-late-pound short” problem
Its easy to get greedy
Watch out for Principal-agent conflict

The (MBTI) grouping of scales: team Roles in Negotiation
Information Decisions Structure

Energy Nature Tactics
S Sentinels J
T
Thinker Sensor Judger
F N P
Diplomat
Feeler INtuition Perceiver
Check understanding
Group-Strategies (preferred ways of doing things)
People Social
Confident Improvement Mastery Engagement
I I E E
Introvert Extrovert Extrovert

Introvert
A T A T
Assertive Turbulent Assertive Turbulent
Private /alone improve Outgoing Like in Group

Self confidence Self doubt communication People concern
NT Analyst 10.4%
(SJ)
(SJ)
NF Diplomats 16%
(SJ)
(SP)
(SJ)
(SP) I S T J
(NF) E N F P
(SP)
(NF)
(SP)
(NT)
SJ Sentinels 46.4%
(NT)
SP Explorers 27%
Roles Group
Mommies show –Simulation background
Producer
Syndicate Market – relation between number of reruns,
ratings & ad revenue
Expectation of Show Ratings based
7
on research Of target audience
4
3
2M 4M 6M 8M 10M 12M
Expected Ad Revenue
Mommies show –Negotiation
Expected Ad revenue
Seller share Negotiated Seller Price USD

(uncertainty)
(Not % of Ad revenue)
Syndicate
channel profit
Syndicate Negotiated Syndicate
channel cost channel share
Mommies show (MS) –Negotiation issues
MS Licensing fee MS Licensing fee
Runs per episode

4
Junior
show
Charles:Seller
David:Buyer
Poll Analysis Mommies show
Per students per team to take poll

Student negotiation insights
Simulation Survey insights
Faculty insights
How do Charles and David view diff. research findings
Cognitive illusion with difference frames based in info
Average NHL player Salary
2
Can you guess key issue in NHL
1.8
Management and Player
1.6
Association conflict in 2005?
1.4
1.2
USD MN
0.8
NHL Player Salary as % Team revenue
0.6
per player
0.4 80
0.2 70
0 Percentage 60
93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99 99-00 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04
50
40
30
20
10
0
93-9494-9595-9696-9797-9898-9999-0000-0101-0202-0303-04
NHL Revenue trend 1993-2004
NHL lockout 2004-5
NHL Negotiations December 2004
Issue NHL mgmt. NHLPA

Current avg. Salary/player USD MN 1.8 1.8
1
Proposed avg. Salary/player USD MN 1.3
Negotiated avg. Salary USD MN 1.36
current salary to Revenue % 75

2 Proposed Max. salary to Revenue % 55 None
Negotiated salary to Revenue % None
to be so close they have to make a deal

-mighty ducks player mike Leclerc
NHL Management and Player Association (PA) Negotiations 2005
Salary cap 39 MN
Sal. Cap. 55% Team rev.
NHL Mgmt Player Association
Sal Cap 52MN
No Sal link to Team Rev.
Salary cap 42.5 MN

NHL Mgmt Player Association
Sal Cap 49 MN
70% (400) players defected

to European teams
NHL Negotiation 2004-5 what happened?
Entire season was lost!
USD 2BN loss in Revenue
USD 1BN loss in salaries

NHL agreement July 2005 after one year loss of season
Salary cap 54% after lockout season
New leadership came to the NHLPA in 2005- Goodenow was

replaced as executive director by Ted Saskin
Why did player association agreed lower than

what was proposed by NHL Mgmt!
NFL Negotiations 2011
You guys keep talking past each
Other instead of to each other
NFL Owner Position

Off-the-top credit from revenue before any split USD 2 BN
Split of revenue after the off-the top-credit Players : Owners 58:42
NFL Player association Position

Off-the-top credit from revenue before any split 0
Split of revenue Players : Owners 50:50
NFL Agreement achieved by splitting Revenue variable in to 3 variables
Players Each Party Victory speech
Revenue spilt Owners share
share
TV rights 55% 45%
Stadium Owner expected stadium revenue
40% 60%
collection
Other related
share to increase over a period
45% 55%
business
Why Players agreed?
Players expected Ad
revenue share To
increase over a period
Fine print: If Player share > 48% it will be reduced to 48%

If Player share < 47% it will be increased to 47%
NFL negotiation success tactics
Negotiation Tactic #1) Establish relationships of trust.
Negotiation Tactic #2) Generate options for mutual gains.
Negotiation Tactic #3) Convince your side to make concessions at key

moments.
Negotiation Tactic #4) Negotiate for the long term.

Why you think this happened?
Fixed pie
bias
57%
75%
NBA NHL
Framing
Systematic NHL Player Salary as % Team
Bias
Vividness revenue per player 2004
Irrationality
Bias
Commitment
bias
Reactive
devaluation
Two mountaineer team who lost everything in avalanche
–find and fight for one rope
Guys! Lest just untie the knot
Fixed pie bias Flexible rope=8

Fixed rope=6 runs
runs
Framing Original frame: Charles - we are not
bias interested in giving more than 4 runs
How Charles could have reframed it?

Impact of number of runs
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
-0.5 4 5 6 7 8
-1
-1.5
-2
Impact Charles MN Impact David MN
% responding its good for US
100
80
60
40
20
0
Reagan-US President Independent analyst Gurbachav-Russia
Premier
Arms disarmament Plan by Reactive

devaluation
Commitment
bias
admit our initial strategy was wrong?

Admit we held on position too long?
Do we agree to what we said was unfair?
Pareto Improvements
Changes to a deal that make at least one party

better off without making any other party worse off.
Logrolling (the
trading of favours, or
quid pro quo)can
lead to Pareto
Improvements
Personal Experience
Post Settlement Settlement (PSS)

PSS are agreements that are reached after the
initial Agreements are signed
Software delivery in 24 Months,
3M Warranty
A: Software development project B:

U&I Negotiation NRSA
USD 1MN : 10% Adv.+80% on Delivery+10%

after warranty
Satish Called up Client 2 days after agreement & requested 40% advance
Satish: 300K needed to deliver project on time -loans
would take min 3 month;
Would help attracting angel investors (Future Proj.)
Satish proposed 1 Yr free support in return
Client agreed: Satish saves 18% interest;
client gets software in time and 1 year free support
PSS: 40% advance, 1 year free support
Mommies show: Licensing fees- 6 Episodes
Charles
$3.5MN $9.6 MN
$ 4 MN $ 6.5MN
David
Charles David
Lowest Price $3.5MN Highest Price $ 6.5MN
Highest Price $9.6 MN Lowest Price $ 4 MN
Target Price $7MN Target Price (vary) $ 5 MN
A possible likely negotiated price : 5.5 MN
Value gain for Charles: $ 2 MN ($5.5MN-$ 3.5MN)
Value Gain for David: $ 1.0 MN ($ 6.5 – MN- $ 5.5 MN)

Financial impact of number of runs
Runs Effect on Holymedia Effect on Champion
/episode Revenue USD MN TV Revenue USD MN
4 Save 0.5 Lose 1.6

5 Save 0.25 Lose 0.8
6 No effect No effect
7 Lose 0.25 Save 0.8
8 Lose 0.5 Save 1.6
Creating value through logrolling (Exchange)
Original Agreement (O)- Licensing fees $5.5MN -6 runs
Alternate agreement (A)- Licensing fees $6.5MN -8 runs
Agreement Value to Value to David Total value

Charles created
Original (O) $ 2MN $ 1MN $ 3MN
Alternate (A) $ 2.5 MN $ 1.6 MN $ 4.1 MN

Creating value by adding issues
Juniors Licensing fees
Party A-Charles Party B-David
Lowest Price $1MN Highest Price $ 2.0MN
Highest Price $ 2 MN Lowest Price $ 1 MN
Target Price $1.5MN Target Price (vary)$ 1.5 MN

Charles created
With Junior (J) $ 3MN $ 2.1 MN $ 5.1 MN

Mommies show continency contract
Handling information asymmetry
Winners’ curse
Satish Duryodhan
Mommies show: Licensing fees- 6 Episodes
Charles
$3.5MN $9.6 MN
$ 4 MN $ 6.5MN
David
Charles David
Lowest Price $3.5MN Highest Price $ 6.5MN
Highest Price $9.6 MN Lowest Price $ 4 MN
Target Price $7MN Target Price (vary) $ 5 MN
A possible likely negotiated price : 5.5 MN
Value gain for Charles: $ 2 MN ($5.5MN-$ 3.5MN)
Value Gain for David: $ 1.0 MN ($ 6.5 – MN- $ 5.5 MN)

Financial impact of number of runs
Runs Effect on Holymedia Effect on Champion
/episode Revenue USD MN TV Revenue USD MN
4 Save 0.5 Lose 1.6

5 Save 0.25 Lose 0.8
6 No effect No effect
7 Lose 0.25 Save 0.8
8 Lose 0.5 Save 1.6
Pareto Improvements
Changes to a deal that make at least one party

better off without making any other party worse off.
Logrolling (the
trading of favours, or
quid pro quo)can
lead to Pareto
Improvements
Creating value through logrolling (Exchange)
Original Agreement (O)- Licensing fees $5.5MN -6 runs
Alternate agreement (A)- Licensing fees $6.5MN -8 runs

Charles created

Creating value by adding issues
Juniors Licensing fees
Party A-Charles Party B-David
Lowest Price $1MN Highest Price $ 2.0MN
Highest Price $ 2 MN Lowest Price $ 1 MN
Target Price $1.5MN Target Price (vary)$ 1.5 MN

Charles created

Personal Experience
Post Settlement Settlement (PSS)

PSS are agreements that are reached after the
initial Agreements are signed
Software delivery in 24 Months,
3M Warranty
A: Software development project B:

U&I Negotiation NRSA
USD 1MN : 10% Adv.+80% on Delivery+10%

after warranty
Satish Called up Client 2 days after agreement & requested 40% advance
Satish: 300K needed to deliver project on time -loans
would take min 3 month;
Would help attracting angel investors (Future Proj.)
Satish proposed 1 Yr free support in return
Client agreed: Satish saves 18% interest;
client gets software in time and 1 year free support
PSS: 40% advance, 1 year free support
contingency contract
Does happen
a contract to do or not to do something if some
event, collateral to such contract,.
does not happen
The event must be occurrence of the event

minor to the.. is not controlled by the
promising party’s..
contract
will or desire
> 70% Market share-
Monopolistic behaviour
DOJ
1969 U.S.
Department of
Justice (DOJ) filed
suit against IBM Many Players Fair
competition
IBM
Can you guess “Why”
➢ USD 10 MN cost
➢ 30+ MN pages
Documentation
DOJ
A decade later- ➢ USD 20 MN

continued ➢ 35+ MN pages
litigation Documentation
IBM
In 1982 IBM Market shared rapidly dropped <50% and DOJ quietly
dropped the case!
Can you guess “Why”
How could you have framed contingency contract in 1969?
Possible
contingent
contract
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3
If by 1975 IBM MS> If by 1975 IBM MS If by 1975 IBM

70% —it would pay <50% -government MS between
a set fine and divest would not pursue 50-70% pay
certain businesses antitrust actions only set fine
Intel wants to build
Regulators and Neighbors demand no
plant in outskirts of
pollution or reduction in property value
Denver
Intel hired consultant to Regulators and Neighbors hired

produce study report that consultant to produce study report that
supported its position supported their position
Why frame contingency contract?
Option Implication
Walk away Blaming Mistrust/ calling each other a liar –
This is what actually happened
Ignore research Valuable research data no considered.

Negotiation is more of bargaining
Independent joint research Cost, time lost
Compromise to 4=5 rating One or other party will lose potential value
Frame Contingency contract Research info. Used, equitable distribution

Under future uncertainty
Mommies show: Expected Ad revenue for 6 shows
Ad revenue Holymedia Champion TV
Rating
USD MN $ projection projection
2=3 7 10% 20%
3=4 8 10% 50%
4=5 9 10% 10%
5=6 10 50% 10%
6=7 11 20% 10%
Highest value 9.6 8.4
Gap of MN 1.2
Target % for Champion TV 27% 52%

Target Margin for Champion TV 2.6 4.4
Target Price 7.0 4.0
Min profit for Champion TV 23%

Champion TV Highest Price
6.5
out of ZOPA?
Seller Charles' estimates Buyer David's estimates
Ad revenue Expected Ad revenue ($ Expected
Rating Likelihood Likelihood Diff.
($ Million) value Million) value
2-3 10% 7 0.7 20% 7 1.4 - 0.7
3-4 10% 8 0.8 50% 8 4 -3.2
4-5 10% 9 0.9 10% 9 0.9 0
5-6 50% 10 5 10% 10 1 4
6-7 20% 11 2.2 10% 11 1.1 1.1
9.6 8.4 1.2
70% confidence Rating >5 70% confidence Rating <4
Bias if rating 4 agreed

Diff.
Rating Charles David
value
<4 20% 50% 3.9
4 10% 10% 0 Gap of MN 1.2
>4 70% 20% 5.1
Contingency clause:
If rating less than 4, Champion TV to get $ 1.2 MN rebate
If rating more than 5, Champion TV pays $ 1.2 MN Surcharge
Rating >5 Rating =4 Rating < 4 Exp. value of

contingency
contract
Holymedia 0.7x $1.2M 0.1 X $ 0 0.2 X $-1.2M $ 0.6 MN
Champion 0.2X$-1.2M 0.1X$0 0.7*$1.2M $0.6MN

TV
All values in $MN

Summary of value creation options
Agreement Value to Charles Value to David Total value

created
Contingency clause $ 3.6 MN $ 2.7 MN $ 6.3 MN

agreement (C)
contingency contract creation
If the ratings next year are less than 4 Campion TV receives a

1.2 MN rebate
If the ratings next year are greater than 5 Campion TV pays a

1.2 MN surcharge to Hollyville
Company Acquisition Bid
Each group to read confidential information
Each group to deliberate with team members
Each group to write a bid
group Poll for placing bid followed by Poll analysis

Acquisition Game: Information blind spot
Global/International Refinery Inc. Oil Explorers Inc. (OEI)

Acquisition Bid
You Me
Market Valuation After Current Market Valuation=X=50

Merger=1.5X
You must submit bid now. 100
0
Project Status Failure Success
All values equally likely
I can decide to accept or reject after project completion

What is the right bid?
Probability of acceptance
1.2
Probability of acceptance
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Bid Value $
Bid value Chance of bid Average Average worth

by GRI acceptance by OEI worth to OEI to GRI (1.5X)
50 50% 50/2=25 37.5
60 60% 30 45
75 75% 37.5 54.75
100 100% 50 75
OEI information advantage has created the paradox (blind spot)

Boston Scientific’s (BS) acquisition of Guidant (G)
G Market
J&J drops out Cap$20 BN
BS wins price war New player BS
At $80/S or $27BN $72/s..Price war! J&J offer $63/s J&J offer $76/S J&J offer $68/S
Acceptable! or $25.4BN or $21.4BN
Jan 06 Nov 05 June 05 March 05 Y-2004
winners’ curse situation for BS; In March, a patient equipped

Their stock steadily declined &they with a Guidant pacemaker died.
bought a host of quality and other Co. recalls 0.3 MN devices
problems
tendency for winning bid to Compete
True worth exceed the intrinsic value Emotions
Fortune magazine in 2006 B-G deal the worst

merger since AOL bought Time Warner in 2000
Your gain depends on +ve for Seller

-ve for Buyer
other side acceptance
The other side knows

Less info for buyer More info for seller
more than you
Value creation barriers-Information asymmetry
Lack of Misinformation
information
Information
asymmetry
Diff. views
Of data Diff. interpretation
of data
Strategy: Handling Information asymmetry
Sustainable
peace
Power Balance
Negotiation
Confrontation
Conscientization
Conflict awareness
ICON-R Model for principled negotiations
Dynamics of “Shadow negotiation” for

getting breakthrough in stalled Negotiations
Satish Duryodhan
How to collaborate in for integrative negotiations?
P2
Friends
Agreement Goal
02 Is it collaborative?
Give concessions
Soft-Soft Does it always lead to wise agreement?

Alfred
Hellen
Nature of issues impact negotiations approach
Distributive (perception) Integrative (perception)
1 Indivisible 2 Large Small 3 Divisible 4
Fixed position -e.g. Huge Insignificant Flexibility-

Job security consequences- consequences –Easy opportunity to
Values, ethics merger of 10K concessions, too for win-win
people tradeoffs approach
organizaions
Hard-Hard most likely Soft-soft may lead to compromises

More factors may inpact nature and complexity…
substantive
complexity of issues Human Characteristics
01 Nature of industry Personality types 02
Interests of parties Interpersonal relations
Negotiations
Process
03 Structural Barriers
Criteria used by parties
When, where, who 04
Steps to follow
Relative balance of power Ground rules
Negotiator motives
ICON-R Principled
Negotiation
Interest
No
agreemnt Relationship Criteria
(BATNA)
Options
Position and interest
Positions Positions What we want
Demands /
P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 Fixed solutions
Interests Interests
Fears / Concerns / Hopes- Why we want
Party 1 Party 2
Types of interest
I
O
C
Interests
N
Substantive Process Relationship Principle
Manner Price resources Goodwill
Long
term Fairness Ethical
Scenario 2:Elizabeth and Will…..
Is there a deadlock?
Can there be alternatives?
Who will give in?

Understanding Moves
What is Elizabeth trying to do? What Will trying to do?

Agreement without giving in Strong sense of what he wants
Elizabeth
Will
Makes Perceives
Sign of Weakness
Collaborative Moves
Prelude to concession
“Position-Interest-Need (PIN) Onion” Model
POSITION
What we say we want
INTEREST
What we really want
NEED
What we Must have
Elizabeth PIN onion model
POSITION-1
Shift mother
POSITION-2
First dibs in summer
INTEREST
coworker Relationship
NEED
Equality / Respect
future
expected
Past and behavior
interactions
and behavior
Present interactions
behaviour
Will Elizabeth
Relationship ID Coworkers
Relationship meaning
No unilateral decisions, mutual respect for
opinions
Unity, collective identity, kindness
Community
Feeling common gr. membership
Asymmetric differences
Relationship
Authority ranking
types Hierarchical status, precedence
Balanced reciprocity
Relationship ID Equality Matching
Equal share, identical, turn taking
Exchange value
Relationship meaning Market pricing
Cost benefit analysis
Pitfalls of Assuming when relationship matter
Breakout rooms analysis sequence: 20 Min
Poll and Class discussion

Underlying interests-Pitfalls of Assuming when relationship matter
Client Org. Position: Accounting Firm

What you say you want
Change Lead No change in

auditor lead auditor
Reduce total No reduction
fee 15% in fee
New lead with new Protect reputation

Skills for new business
% of lead auditor
Grow Business
Maintain relationship
Different interest Mutual common interest Different interest

The Situation Matrix
Q6
Q3 Collaborative Negotiation
Accommodating Negotiation (Business Partnership, Int.
( Concern for Relationship)
(Friendship, Work team) diplomacy)
Q2 Q5
Contractual Negotiation Persuasive Negotiation
Q1 Q4
Tacit coordination
(Right of way at Traffic Signal) Opportunistic Negotiation
(House sale, Divorce)
Low ( Conflict over Substance) High

Protect, Repair and rebuild relations
Plan Be flexible Find common Build / apply

ground tactics toolkit
What’re their Say “sorry”,
underlying “What we both
admit mistakes, want? help customer
needs? safe test adapt style to open-ended Qs business and
likely positions climate for deeper better relationship
NEEDS & with client rep.
EXPECTAT
IONS
client insight
Touchpoint
Touchpoint Touchpoint
Preparation Repair Rebuild pathway to long

VOICE OF stage relations relations term relations
CUSTOMER
Case Analysis: Shadow Negotiation
Conflict Negotiation
Substance With Will
Relationship Self
Add Issues
Explore interests
Distributive bargaining
Both parties Transparent Mutual

exploration
Both Not Transparent Mediator
Either unwilling Specific Move

Both parties Transparent Mutual
exploration
Both Not Transparent Mediator
Oil Companies
Post Saddam era conflict in Iraq
P1 Vacate the land

P2 will get Police
P3 will get Military
Farmers
P3 Will take up arms
P2 will fight Police
P1 Will Not
Oil Companies
INTEREST
Studies for 3-6M
Seismic tests-2-3Y
Oil extraction after 3yrs
NEED
Set up Derricks
NEED
Means Livelihood
Farmers
INTEREST
- Harvesting in 3M
Either unwilling Specific Move
Case 2:Work Out Elizabeth I

O
options to no agreement C
another job? N
own clinic? BATNAs
Involve Boss? Alternate Doc?
Elizabeth choice Will choice
Agree with Get his

Will way
Power Moves
1. Incentives
• Benefit of Negotiation
• Create value - make
visible
3. Enlist Allies Get them to

GOAL
• Gain credibility negotiation table
• Turn up volume of 1 /2
• Price to status quo

• Consequences
2. Pressure
Inside Shadow negotiation Scenario 3
Elizabeth and Will
Which Power move Elizabeth made?
I
Why there a change in dynamics? O
C
Level
Playing
field
What objectives Elizabeth achieved?
Self Advocacy
What can be power move against Hard Negotiators will work?
The financial director of a large customer is abusive & Domineering

Negotiator. She expects you to sit there and take it and theatrically waves
her arms about & throws papers around when she wants to make
point. Do you:
a. Agree to what she wants?

Never! Do not give in to her intimidation.
b. Behave in a contrasting manner and keep your cool?
To contrast her behaviour only shows her that her behaviour is

working, she’ll put on more pressure until you give in.
Dealing with Difficult Negotiators What should you do?
c. Wait to say your piece?

Yes, but only if you are sure her behaviour will not affect outcome.
Ignore their behaviour, this is what they choose – not you. focus on
outcome and don't let their behaviour influence you
Consider what ‘trades’ you are going to make. What you give up
reflects consideration of the merits of their case, in exchange for what
you insist on getting from them.
This shows and forces them to give recognition to the merits of your
case
Process Moves
1. Seed idea early when decisions are being made without your input
• Negate negative,
defensive reactions
• Prelim work (one on
one meet)
3. Build consensus
Influence How
• creates momentum behind
GOAL Negotiation will
an agenda
• Isolate Blockers Take place
• Position as advocate
• Move focus away
from competition
2. Reframe process
Case study: Reframe process to influence Negotiation
Week 23:1983
Agreement 1:
Sun Microsystem Cofounders Investment USD 10 MN
Agreement 2:
Post Valuation USD 100 MN
Fortune 100 CEO
Agreement 3:
Meet Wk 24 in Chicago to
Finalize Remaining terms
CEO: SM Key Technology critical for his Fortune 100 Company

Leverage Power of Process
Week 24:1983
Sun Microsystem Cofounders Negotiation 1:

Investment size?
Fortune 100
Battery of Lawyers &
Negotiation 2: Bankers
Post Negotiation Valuation? CEO (silent)
Negotiation “De Novo” or Walkaway?

Sun Microsystem growth story
Revenue tops
USD 1.5BN
Appreciative Moves
1. Help save face
• Groundwork to trust
• Sensitivity
3. Solicit new perspectives

• Break stalemate foster open
GOAL
• Deepen understanding communication
• without pushing for

immediate agreement
• Let new info come in 5+1W Technique
2. Keep Dialogue
going
3. Help save face Identifying appreciative moves…
1. Solicit new perspectives
2. Keep Dialogue going

5+1W Technique
Identify other party strategy
Negotiator’s strategy sim
Cooperate until opponent Cooperate until opponent cooperate.

compete twice in row Never cooperate again
Always Tit for Tat Random Slow to anger Slow to trust Grudge Grim Trigger Always
Cooperate compete
Compete until opponent

cooperates twice in row
Cooperate until opponent compete.
Cooperate again only when opponent
cooperate twice in row
other party strategy. Inside shadow negotiations scenario 4
ICON-R Model for principled negotiations
Union Management Negotiations
Satish Duryodhan
Identify other party strategy
Negotiator’s strategy sim
Cooperate until opponent Cooperate until opponent cooperate.

compete multiple in row Never cooperate again
Always Tit for Tat Random Slow to anger Slow to trust Grudge Grim Trigger Always
Cooperate compete
Compete until opponent

cooperates multiple in row
Cooperate until opponent compete.
Cooperate again only when opponent
cooperate multiple in row
other party strategy. Inside shadow negotiations scenario 4
Avoid compromises..
By inventing Proposal options for mutual gains

Framing proposal options
We will give you 10% discount Unilateral

concession
If (condition..Then..Offer)
Proposal
If you increase order
Sign of
Assertive format
size then we can give Vague-

some discount Vague
concrete
Proposal
If you order 10 K units
then we can give 10% Specific-
discount Specific
Change proposals into a assertive option format
‘If we secure and fence the site,

will you expedite the purchase Non Assertive
date by 90 days?’
‘If you expedite the purchase date

by 90 days, then we will secure Assertive
and fence the site.’
Property
Commission 3%
Dealer
Whispering Palms Kandivali Time 3 Month
Bottle Neck
Commission 2 %
Me
Time 1 Month
Proposal Proposal Proposal

option 1 option 2 option 3
Time 1 Month Time 2 Month Time 3 Month
Commission 3% Commission 2.5% Commission 2%
Multiple Simultaneous Equivalent offers (MESO)

Multiple Simultaneous Equivalent offers (MESO) benefits
claim more value by Improve

01 efficiently meeting satisfaction, 02
other side needs comfort, power
MESO
benefits
Begin/Mid/End- Get Info/Anchor/

03 Respond/reframe 04
improve on go
Explore Interest + Frame options →Value creation
Lack of
info.
Diff.
constraints Barriers
Diff. Views
of data
Delivery Logistic costs
4M 1 Price Delivery
3M 1.5 USD MN Time M
2M 2
Supplier- Mechanical
17 4
components
Buyer- Large
16.5 2
appliances company
Delivery Logistic costs
2M 1
Framing proposal option for mutual gain
If you offer price of USD 16.25MN

and delivery of 2M we can offer our Assertive
logistic partner services at $1MN
Value gain Buyer save $0.25M

Seller saves $0.25M
Logrolling- Trading of favours- Quid Pro Quo
Logrolling- Process
during negotiations
Party 2
Party 1
High Priority issue Y
High Priority issue X
Logrolling Mid Priority Issues

Mid Priority Issues
Low Priority Issue Y Low Priority Issues X

Interest + Options
1978 peace treaty
negotiations
Egypt Position: All of Sinai
Israel Positions:
1. 1967 status or
2. Part of Sinai
(Multiple Maps)
1978 peace treaty
negotiations
Israel Security
Max interest Level
20KM Demilitarization zone

CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS
demilitarize the area

Interest Level Egypt Israel
1.Maximum Sovereignty Options Security
2. Medium -Obtain Peace -Obtain Peace

-Leader Prestige -Leader Prestige
3. Mínimum Having armed forces in Sinai Sovereignty in Sinai

Framing proposal option for mutual gain
If Egypt agrees for 20KM demilitarised

zone at Sinai border then Israel will Assertive
withdraw from Sinnai
Egypt get Sovereignty, Value gain Israel get Security,

Peace, Leader prestige Peace and leader prestige
Egypt Interest: Israel Interest:
Sovereignty Security at Border
Agreement : Egypt gets Sovereignty but large area of

Sinai will be demilitarised to provide security to Israel
Challenges with compromises
Using Objective criteria to handle distributive issues

I
O
C
I went with you for
Steel girdles for roof N
I think the reinforced
silent issues in fixed price

concrete foundation
Should be 5 ft
Its your turn to go with

me for 2 ft shallow
foundation
contract
Construction Contractor Buyer
Characteristics of objective criteria RICE -U
Credible / Verifiable
Industry std published by Govt. Fair
Just
Independent Relevant
Party A:I want $$ Objective Compare cars of similar
Party B:I want $$$ Criteria design and features
Up-to-date Ease
Current year industry data Competitor prices
in place of 5 year old one instead of mileage and
inflation rates to set car
price
I agree it’s a good idea
to use independent
Standards to settle our
disputes. Let me check
with Govt. office
The foundation should be strong to

Hold the house. Does Govt. Have
standards for it?
Buyer Construction Contractor
Objective criteria - factual pieces of info, independent of the parties

Objective criteria case study
Deep sea mining: Minerals at deep sea

the value of all the gold deposits alone on the seafloor is
estimated to be $150trn
Initial fee /
sea bed
USD MN
India representing
17
third word block
USA represent deep

0
sea mining companies
MIT Model for the economics deep seabed mining
Phases and timeframe
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
Cum. Costs MIT Model for the economics deep seabed mining
USD MN
Costs involved for each phase
paying $ 60MN/sea bed as initial fee is unviable
8K
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article
4K /pii/S0308597X1730903X
Exploration Exploitation
2K
1K
500
A B C D E F G Phase
Objective criteria
MIT model for the economics of deep seabed mining
model based Impact of different levels of a financial payment
regime (FPR) on the internal rate of return
Value creation for distributive issue
No Fixed advance payment
Negotiation range 2%-6%
Value creation: 4%+ up to 2.5%
Contingency contract to handle future uncrtainity

Must Search Path Focus Goal Parties Soft Hard Principle-Based
Friends Enemies Explore each party interests

to creating value
Agreement The goal is victory The goal is a wise outcome

reached efficiently
soft on people and hard on problem and Be soft on people, hard on

problem people problem
Accept one-sided Demand one-sided gains Invent options for mutual
losses gain
Single answer: one they Single answer: one you Develop multiple options to
will accept will accept choose from; decide later
Agreement Your position objective criteria

Evolving Integrative Negotiation Process Template
Propositioning
Envision value
Classify MSEQ-Options-Priority
Explore Interests
Pareto improve
Add issues
Similar Priority Exch.
Structural constraints Post implemntn
Different Break issues
Positions
Deadlock Explore Creation Claiming value created
Prob. Solving
Trust building- Opposing MSEO-other Relatn analysis
Proactive sharing W5+H party pref.
Unaware
Diff. Constraints MSEO- Sp.
W5+H Learning
Offer
MSEO- Diff. Priority
Bargain-Obj. Criteria
Union Management Negotiations
Strategy to provide stability, continuity and direction for tactical behavior
Build and maintain

Describe your interest
productive relationship
open ended Q
Active listening to
Strategy Tactics understand other side
Invent & propose option
Create value Joint exploration prob. solving

Union Management negotiation - Preparation
# Issue Management Union Description of Value Description Wt. for Issue

proposition Proposition financial USD/Worke of Non non Points to
r/Month Financial financial you
1 XYZ “A” “B” ABC 50 Goodwill 50% 20
Example Non financial- more time with family, work life balance, risk of work injury,
future post retirement financial security
If issue points are least signification the issue can be classified as “Low importance”
Prepare
Identify Issues as Compatible, Exchange, or Distributive using
confidential information
Issue No Financial Weight for Relative Issue Position Strategy

interest non financial Issue classification
implication ($ implication Points (H/M/L)
value)
1 50 10% 2 L hanging fruit Exchange
2 100 10% 4 L hanging fruit Exchange
3 100 75% 16 M Open to Create/claim
explore value
4 200 25% 10 LM Low impact compromise
5 200 50% 16 M Open to Create/claim
explore value
6 100 90% 52 VH Stubborn No compromise
100
Issue No Mgmt Priority Union Priority
A High Low (Economic Low

returns , Uncertain)
B Medium Medium (Economic
Medium value,
Certain)
C Low High (Economic,
Security, future
protection)
Prepare
Identify Issues as Compatible, Exchange, or Distributive using
confidential information
Issue No Mgmt Union Position Decision: Rationale

Position Compatible/Exchange issue Mgmt- To
# mgmt position with Issue board
# Union For Union –
Position/Distributive X:Y workers
1 C
2 E MF-2 > LF-7
3 D
H
Assertiveness Results Seeker Excitement Seeker
Detail Seeker
DOPE Harmony seeker
L Emotionality H
Roles Negotiators Play
DOPE
Which personality is this? Harmony seeker
supportive tend to conform

respectful unsure
dependable dependent
agreeable awkwardness
Which personality is this? Detail Seeker
industrious overly critical

orderly overly picky
exacting moralistic
persistent stuffy
Which personality is this? Excitement Seeker
enthusiastic overly excitable

ambitious manipulative
friendly egotistical
stimulating undisciplined
Which personality is this? Results Seeker
strong willed overly dominating

independent Tough/severe
decisive pushy
practical harsh
My Dope Personality-“Harmony Seeker”
People-oriented, loyal, great team
player but tends to avoid change,
50% confrontation, and assertiveness
Detail oriented
30%
Ambitious
10%
Decisive
10%
Anchor case-Hexaware Team composition
Corporate Relation Manager
1 Goal priority: Relations
Project Managers
2 Goal priority: Schedule
Sales Manager
3 Goal priority: Commission
Division Head
4 Goal priority: Profits
Explore Interests
Rule: look for Exchange of two issues to create

additional value for one or both parties
Stage 2: Negotiation with Recording
Mgmt Negotiation Union
Stage 3: Report Preparation

Post negotiation analysis
Possible exchange
Issue Workers Management

Additional paid Leave 1 0
Clothing allowance (USD / Year) 900 600
Implication workers
Non Financial Issue Rank and

Issue Financial USD Non Financial
Weight Points Imp.
paid Leave 100 Time with family 50% 150 2 (L)
Clothing allowance
(USD / Year) 300 NIL 0% 300 1 (H)
How to prepare-Management Example
Issue Workers Management

Additional paid Leave 1 0
Clothing allowance (USD / Year) 900 600
Implication Mgmt
Non Non Financial Rank and
Issue Financial USD Financial Weight Issue Points Imp.
100→Salary Expense
paid Leave 900→ Production Loss Nil 0% 1000 1 (VH)
Clothing
allowance
(USD / Year) 300 NIL 0% 300 2 (L)
“Position-Interest-Need (PIN) Onion” Model Pension
POSITION “What”
INTEREST “Why”
NEED
Management 10%
Union 12%
Diff: 2%
Interests underlying “Union Pension position impact analysis” for management
PENSION ISSUEINTEREST
POINTS TO MANAGEMENT opposite 0%
Zero Contract period
Salary 5k (+/- 5%) outflow
Position Diff: 2% Financial
25 year Def out different
20%
$100/W/M
NPV $20
Contract period
cash outflow $ 0 Common
80%
25 Year deferred
outflow Fin. Pt: -20 Long term worker care
No. Fin. +80
Financial Net: +60 Non Financial
Issue Imp: V Low
Decision: Exchange in
favor of Union
Understanding why issues are compatible- No lockout
Union Management
Maintain relations Common

interest”100% Maintain relations
Resolve issues with dialog
Production should not Resolve issues with dialog
be disrupted Production should not
be disrupted
Need: Profit Share Need: Growth/Profitability/Shareholder

value/Customer satisfaction
Union Management post negotiation poll and analysis
Exploring mutual interests: Job security
Union Management
Job security No Job security
Save cost
Save family life No unutilised workers
Agreement within budget
Maintain cordial relations

Avoid renegade of no lockout position
Exploring mutual interests : Subcontracting
Subcontracting (SC) 15% subcontracting 10%
Union Management
Prevent fatal injury Save cost
Worker safety As indicated by mgmt. decision to invest 50K

Invent options: make time a variable
6 Sr at Work
8 Jr replace
3,4,7,10 Use 15% Sr. workers to Job Security
Month
train 15% Junior workers 15 Jr available
Y2/Y3 training
Improve Incentive
Distribute
Productivity Wages linked to
overtime
70% Sr W in productivity
over more
3 years improvement
Sr. workers
eliminate outsourcing Reduce work fatigue Average wages will improve.

over 3 years and fatal injuries Will help wage negotiation
10 sr workers can
Target Net train 10 Jr workers by year end min
subcontracting by in each of the 5 60% Sr workers
Improvement in months (no extra improving
productivity by training 0 shift months) productivity
Savings from less outsourcing (35% of 10M) -3.5 can offset Job Security cost 0.3. Additional
value 3.2MN ($2600/worker).
If no utilization:H
Job security If utilization high: L
High Imp:
Financial stability
Exchange
Mgmt
Union
Work life
balance:M
Subcontracting 5% saving of
subcontracting: H
Negotiate distributive issue with industry standards as criteria: Wages
Average Salary of workers at our company / Month 4760 4224

working hours/month 176 176
per hour salry 27.0 24.0 3.0
Y1 salary (5.5% for sheet metal 2% for industry) 28.5 24.5 4.1
Y2 salary (0% for sheet metal 2% for industry) 28.5 25.0 3.5
Industry average
Union wage Diff.
Average Salary of workers at our company / Month 4760 4224
working hours/month 176 176
per hour salry 27.0 24.0 3.0
Management could provide contingency contract: will maintain $3 diff,

between Industry Average and our company
Leveraging mutual gains to improve life standard: Wages
Improve average wages with training
Impact of training on trained Sr Workforce average Salary (assuming Sr

average wages workforce % % workers are paid 10% more)
Now 0 50 28.5
year 1 10 60 29.1
year 2 20 70 29.7
year 3 30 80 30.2
Use outsourcing reduction savings for worker benefits:

1. Pay Sr workers bonus for doing training up to 30% over normal salary for
training months based on resulting productivity improvement
2. Increase safety budget (50K to 100k/year)..
Unit: Per worker/year
Clothing
allowance Low cost: Low
Financial gain 25,
less injury: High
Exchange
Mgmt
Union
Time with
family; paid
leave: Low Production cost,
Funeral leave profitability impact :
High
Pension
Future payment
increase -Low
Future security -
High
Exchange
Mgmt
Union
Financial gain
(Medium) Shift Budget
differential challenge: High
Equal opportunity. Can
defer till productivity gap Overtime Low productivity :
bridged-Low assignment High
Exchange
Mgmt
Union
Variable profits,
Financial;
sharing, no immediate
sharing:High Profit Sharing
cash flow : Low
Exercise
Distributive Integrative
Issues
Goal
Focus
Outcome
Compromise We Win Fixed
I Win Variable Creative Short Term Long Term

Framing option by Mapping of interests
Dynamics of Multiparty Negotiations
Negotiating Corp. Change case-breakout room
Rosewell Corp. Financial performance

Company Challenges for CEO
Unique characteristics Division Head

of each Division Sales/profits comparisons
What CEO really want? New system as

Means to an end?
Poll after breakout room case analysis

Video Session: Negotiating Corporate change
Segment 1: Beauers (CEO) and David Carlson (MIS)
What? Why?
Tasks given by CEO Each Task Priority?
Task force composition?
David reaction “one word” for

David reaction?
CEO and David meeting analysis
duration for New system appear flexible?
Duration to “iron out bugs” “too generous”?

What does it signify?
What CEO really want? New system as

Means to an end?
Exercise: questions on each segment
Video analysis: First Task Force meeting and Poll
Observe: Sequence of events

Technical presentations reactions Who?
When?
How Disagreements are signaled

Transition words
Video analysis: First Task Force meeting
Why David selected Hellen to Paul and Morris

lead analysis and design? reaction?
Why Paul Not willing to commit

Own goals?
Why Morris Not willing to commit conflict?
Integrated Information system (IIS) Health & Beauty
IBM Server
Fin Data
Centralised Fin data
Central
Server
Foods Small Appliances
Morris: Better data faster data

Paul/Morris against
what’s there not to like but…
sharing data? Why?
Why different systems? For whom?
Ad Hoc reports
Executive Information System
Integrated Reports
Integrated Information system (IIS)
Transactions
Department servers
(EIS) drill down
Corporate P&L
“One word” - reaction of

Paul / Morris?
COGS by Division
Degree of specialization as
“Structural” barrier
Costs by product line

Paul/Morris
Reactions?
Video Session: Negotiating Corporate change
Segment 3: 2nd Task force meeting
Nature/type of conflict
Good /Bad
communication Verbal
Non Verbal
Poll after the 2nd task force meeting video

-Communication barriers, dysfunctional conflicts
Negotiation Communication Distortions
Message in medium
Encoding in
language Receive &
interpret
Receive & interpret

perception/Cognitive
Errors, diff. Interpret Encoding affected
by personality, goals,
Skills,
Message-Verbal, Non
Verbal, Symbolic,
Complexity
Language levels in negotiation
Additional, veiled info. Intended,

conveyed or perceived by receiver Subsurface
information
Semantics, syntax, style (How?) Pragmatic Level
Process/Proposals / Offers/ options

(what?) Logical Level
Example : Subsurface info: 5 linguistic dimensions of threats
Language intensity
My system has one advantage. Its faithful Don’t tell me I am being defensive.
EIS will drown 10th floor in irrelevant details
Polarized language
Lexical diversity
EIS is totally state of Art..
you can drill down to any
level just like that!
Power of language style Paul:you can (uncertain)?
High Power- verbal dominance, Verbal immediacy

firmness of expression, self
assurance Guys Guys..you have to make time for this…
we have set up demo workstation you have to
Low power- hesitation, politeness make people available for it
to level of subordination
Eye
squinting
Which no gestures Paul Strokes exhibits

What type of listening David demonstrates..
David: In Small Appliances Mfg.. we cut 18% costs in 1st year of new system
Paul… My costs are in distribution
C David: you have to make time available for the new system
Restate/Rephrase sender message Active

in own language Listening
Eye contact, nod, I see, Really?, Go Acknowledgement

on (sometimes misinterpreted as
agreement)
No feedback on accuracy or
Completeness of reception Passive
Active listening elements
Respond to specific (feeling, position) & not abstract pts.
O Why do you feel so?
Allow speaker to frame conversation process
O How do you think it can be addressed?
Clarifying what is said rather than questioning
O So we understand you major concern is distribution costs?
To know the unknown you have to listen to the unsaid-Ayesha

Communication Challenges in negotiations
Perception of alignment of goals 07
Different level of Tech. skills 06
Interpersonal perceptions 05
Emotions entangled with subs. issues 04
Preconceived perceptions 03
No attention to body language 02
Poor listening 01
Using open ended manageable questions..
Paul: Take my financials. Implement in all divisions
C Morris: That’s the oldest system in existence!
O How it will provide the information that CEO needs?
Morris: I don’t have time for the new System for a year!
C David: One year! That’s impossible!
O Why do you take that position in these deliberations?
Paul: EIS will drown 10th floor in irrelevant details!
C David: No it won’t!
O Why do you feel so?

The most powerful “three words Phrase” in negotiation..
Paul: Everybody blames my division for bad quarter last year. But let me tell all of you..
H&B is Mfg. still a profit engine here
C David: You don’t have to be defensive!
C Paul: Don’t tell me I am being defensive!
O David-I am sorry if we came across that way... There was no

intention.. All of us feel H&B is crucial division for Mfg. Rosewell
Acknowledge feelings/
recover a spoiled relationship
Avoid blame game / I am sorry

Melt armour/
leads to forgiveness heal indignity
Handlin tough situations
C Paul: For all the hardware and software my division takes the biggest hit
O David: If we can come up with more equitable distribution of costs,

will you be willing to look at implementing the new system?
C David: The deadline of 7 months for implementing system is fixed
O Other: If you are under pressure to meet that deadline what can we
do to help remove some of the pressure?
C Morris: I don’t have time for new system at least for a year
O David: Specifically what concessions do you need form me so that

system implementation is not delayed
Video Session analysis: 2nd Task force meeting
Conflict signals? No manpower

Goal is to cut cost
not impl. tech. boom Dom
Goal is growth
communication extreme Emotions

challenges signals? Not listening
Pre conceived perceptions
Roots of high level conflicts-BIG-REC
Goals
R
David: The goal is crystal clear Jack..
G to design and implement new system
Rigid 06 01 Jack: The goal burnt in here (mind)

commitments Is growth. Growth overrides everything!
I
05 Dysfunctional 02
conflict Bias and
B Misperception
Blurred Paul: My system has one big advantage...
issues 04 03 Its faithful!
C
E Paul: Everybody blames my division
for bad quarter last year..
Decreased but let me tell all of you..
Emotionality H&B is imply still a profit engine here
communication
Developing functional conflicts strategy if conflicting goal
Explore mutual interests

Creative solutions
Functional conflict Manage concessions
Independent criteria
Goal alignment
avoid conflict
Give up position
Avoid issues
abstain
Conflict
continuum scale Win-Lose
Lose -win
Low conflict Dysfunctional conflicts High conflict

Which dysfunctional conflicts are on display?
Magnified diff. min similarities 07
Rigid Commitments 06
Blurred issues 05
Lack of communication 04
Emotionality 03
Misperception and bias 02
Competitive win lose goals 01

The Energy Pot :Strategy-I cannot avoid my emotions, but
I can manage them
Wasted Energy:
Maintaining self control,
Monitoring Body language etc.
Energy left for productive

Listening Processing and
Responding.
Under Stressful
Under benign conditions
conditions
Negotiation power is relational
Expertise (can be +ve or –vs)
Accumulate
Information & data Goal interdependence
Referent – appeal based

on respect, Experience etc.
Personality / Individual diff.

Psychological/cognitive/
Motivational/Moral/Mood
Legitimate
BATNA
Resource control
Reward/Coercive power
Organizational or national Culture
Location in network
Availability of agents who can influence
Communication techniques
Triangulation-process of gathering and validating information
When did you receive the offer?
What exactly is the offer?

Conversational
Assessment Did you get offer in writing?
Observational Written May I see it?
Voice tone Responses that do not answer questions asked
Body language Set a trap-Q which you already know answers

STRATEGY
Coalition in Multi Party Negotiation
Unconventional
alliance Allies
Adversaries Opponents
Assertiveness Results Seeker Excitement Seeker
Detail Seeker
DOPE Harmony seeker
Emotionality
Roles Negotiators Play
DOPE
Harmony seeker
supportive tend to conform

respectful unsure
dependable dependent
agreeable awkwardness
Detail Seeker
industrious overly critical

orderly overly picky
exacting moralistic
persistent stuffy
Excitement Seeker
enthusiastic overly excitable

ambitious manipulative
friendly egotistical
stimulating undisciplined
Results Seeker
strong willed overly dominating

independent Tough/severe
decisive pushy
practical harsh
My Dope Personality-“Harmony Seeker”
Relationship
Supporting
Patient
Your Score: Dove (40%)
•Here's how you scored on the other Detail oriented

types:
•Owl (40%) Process driven
•Peacock (10%)
•Eagle (10%)
Logical
Your type's description is:
People-oriented, loyal, friendly, hard working and a great team player but tends to avoid
change, confrontation, risk-taking, and assertiveness..
Anchor case-Hexaware Team composition
Anchor case Corporate Project Sales Division

Member Relations Managers Manager Head
Manager
Role / Personality Dove Owl Parrot Eagle
type
Goal Priority #1 relations schedule commission profits
https://richardstep.com/dope-personality-type-quiz/dope-bird-4-personality-types-test-questions-
online-version/
Barriers to negotiation
Ex: who participates,
No of parties, Channels of
Ex: Highball, Low ball
communication
Structural Strategic (Tactical)

impediments because the way
negotiation is structured choices we make
Barriers to
Negotiation
Psychological Cultural Barriers

Barriers of mind Diff. in communication styles,
norms of members of diff. cultures
Ex: Biases such as Anchor, Ex: Russia- this is final position

Vividness bias (invitation to negotiate)
China- Verbal communication
(offended if asked to give in writing)
Strategy and tactics
T-01 T-03
Stonewall High-Lowball
On other issue we want 10
We are not interested in times more than your offer
discussing any other issue Strategy:
Focus on
one issue
Lets discuss other
Can we focus on the issues later
main issue
Refocus Deflect
T-02 T-04
Negotiation Barriers
Strategic (Tactical) Cultural
Psychological (Cognitive) Structural
Choose Aggressive
approach BATNA Participants degree of specialization
Choosing not to share
Time Pressure information ethnicity Lack of information
Publicly committing overconfidence
Emotions Lack of ZOPA to a position
Focus only on Focus only on own Judgment

interest
one issue
Dislike of
Wrong parties at table Wanting to be liked other party
Original Govt plan- dam to be completed in 5 years with $100M budget
Agreement “We will pay USD 100MN you…
complete
Completion Completion
Completion
project ASAP
in 1 years in 5, 70% in
in 5 years
1 2 3 4 3 years
contract: payment of 50% upon
signing, an additional 30% halfway
and the final 20% on completion Will lose substantial payments
•How difficult will it be for us •How difficult will it be for

to back out of the deal if other side to back out?
conditions change?
Commitment
to agreement
•What will happen to other •What will happen to us if the

side if we backs out? other side backs out?
cabinets are misaligned. We Keep the 20%

will not pay balance 20%
Your Kitchen project commitments

9 Wonder Pillars for “wise Negotiated agreement”
Wise Agreement
Meet legitimate interest, Durable
Implementation
Communication
Commitment
Relationship
Criteria
BATNA
Interest
Option
Preparation
STRATEGY
Coalition in Multi Party Negotiation
Temporary Established
Unconventional
alliance Allies
Adversaries Opponents
3 types of Power related coalition formation
Availability of Better coalition

Strategic
01
02
Normative
Coalition based on “just & fair”
Relationship-
Based
03
Compatibility of preferences
Negotiation power is relational
Expertise (can be +ve or –vs)
Accumulate
Information & data Goal interdependence
Referent – appeal based

on respect, Experience etc.
Personality / Individual diff.
Psychological/cognitive/
Motivational/Moral/Mood
Legitimate
BATNA
Resource control
Reward/Coercive power
Organizational Culture
Location in network Availability of agents who can influence

Communication techniques
Triangulation-process of gathering and validating information
When did you receive the offer?
What exactly is the offer?

Conversational
Assessment Did you get offer in writing?
Observational Written May I see it?
Voice tone Responses that do not answer questions asked
Body language Set a trap-Q which you already know answers

Applying The Situation Matrix-Negotiating Corporate Change
Q6
Collaborative Negotiation
( Concern for Relationship)
Q5
Persuasive Negotiation
Low ( Conflict over Substance) High

Intersection of Persuasive and collaborative Negotiations
Framing Persuasive negotiation message
Will you support the initiative if we can propose something to guarantee

your participation without needing to spend much personal time?
Make offer attractive
Make the message Normative

(Right/appropriate/ aligned to values)
You will agree -we need to ensure min. TCO of a

Message content system for The organization in the long run?
Frame message so that other side will say yes
will you support something that will ensure

massive reduction in your distribution cost?
Phases
Workflows Rosewell IIS/EIS project lifecycle
Business
reengineering
Functional analysis
Design
Develop
Test / Implement
Automate and
implement Understand
existing process
06 01
Evaluate / test BPR
new process
cost
05 Cycle time 02
Bottleneck
competitive Identify process
for reengineering
Redesign new
04 03
process
Identify changes for
improvement
Issue weight
Relative pts.
Preferences
100 30%
Issue 80
a) Effort
C) Cost b) Revenue 60
Basis c) Profit 10
Ratio
d) Equal
Interval
Nominal Ordinal
Levels of measurement
Score=weight
Negotiating Corporate Change Template X points
Points Score after

Issue / Sub issue Weight Options agreement
A1. Capabilities (15%) A1. Uniform 100

20% A2-a) Open Corp 100
A2. Access(5%)
A2-b) Local variation 50
a. IIS+EIS 100
B) Basic system 30% b. IIS only 60
architecture and EISB c. E-SAS+EIS 40
d. E-H&BS+EIS 20
a) Effort 100
30% b) Revenue 80
60
C) Cost Basis c) Profit
10
d) Equal
D) Leadership 20% a) FA-Hellen, TF-David 100
50
b) FA-Paul, TF-David30%
Force Field Analysis
Driving forces Restraining forces
New Initiative
H Pro System P & M stalling
H-Hellen, P-Paul, M-Morris
01 Raise support Reduce Hurdles 02
Four
Actions
Framework
03 Eliminate Create new 04

Bottlenecks opportunities
Hexaware KM customer Service centre case study
four-step process to bring about long lasting change

Face to Face
Isolate / with Problems
Silence
VP Cust.
Hurdles
for
corporate Hot spot
change
Put the stage KM

light / Reframe Customer
Service
BI Cold spot
Strategy: Controlling Frame of Negotiations
Salary per episode USD Friends Negotiation: Season 2
Dr. Ross Geller
:David Schwimmer
A1:N1
Rachel Green
: Jennifer Aniston
A2:N2
Phoebe Buffay-Hannigan
A3:N3
: Lisa Kudrow
A3:N4
Chandler Bing
Matthew Perry
A4:N5
Joseph Francis Tribbiani
: Matt LeBlanc
A5:N6
Monica Geller-Bing
: Courteney Cox Why diff. Salaries?
Who has Max. Bargaining Power?
How the rules of engagements be changed?
Friends Negotiation: Season 3_ Schwimmer proposition to change of engagement
Individual Negotiation
• TV network and Producer have tremendous negotiation power
• They can replace any member any time
• Actors do not get the share show success
Collective Negotiation
• Same salary for all
• Schwimmer will ask lower salary so that all get same salary
• Actors overlook Individual value add, star value, market value, popularity
• Collective leverage
Friends Negotiation: Result of collective negotiations
Season Salary / episode for each actor USD

Season three (when they began collective $75,000
bargaining)
Season four $85,000
Season five $100,000
Season six $125,000
Seasons seven, eight $750,000
Seasons nine, ten $1,000,000
Schwimmer made sacrifies when USD 10K was at stake

paid off in long term in USD 1 MN
Best Signals for Persuasive Negotiations
Commitment-pledge regarding a future course of action
01 Degree of finality
how and when the

02 Degree of specificity
agreement is to be fulfilled
the performance measure
Negotiations
04 Degree of monitoring
03 Statement of consequences and follow up
what will happen if the outcome does failure may result in loss of
not materialize as proposed future credibility, trust or belief
Commitment-pledge C
regarding a future
course of action' I Interest- “why”
06 01 behind position
Relationships
-Long Term
R 07
05 02
C
C Criteria-Objective,
Independent
04 03
N
O Options-choices, conditions,
contingencies, and trades
BATNA-Best Alternative to
Negotiated Agreement
Interest
Criteria
Option
BATNA
Relationship
Preparation
Communication
Commitment
Implementation
Criteria
Group report 15 min
Group Name/Members
Group decisions: Decision and Rationale
Overall Approach
System Architecture / EIS
Capabilities, specifications,
functions and access:
Rollout and Time:
Costs and allocation:
Task for leadership and role:
Other elements of
approval/agreement:
Any dissents (Role/Dissent):
Any requests to CEO
Players
01
Consequences 02
Insights from Game

Rules Theory for
Negotiations
Payoffs
04
03
Seller Two parties with a Fixed Pie (Zero
Seller 1st strategy for Sum game): Ex: Salt Harbor
Strategy # max price
S1 S2 Brims
Seller selects S1
Strategy # Mkt price Alternate site
B2 6 5 Buyer
Buyer
Mkt price
2nd strategy to 120 160
B1 pay Min price
Easterly
5 4
Buyer selects B1
Alternate site
Outcome : 200
140
Price
pick the strategy where the max advantage
of your opponent is minimized
Outcome :
John von Neumann Minmax theory Price USDK
Different payoffs (Non-Zero-sum games) Mommies show runs
Charles
Strategy # Seller 4 runs 6 runs
S1 S2 4 runs
1 0
David
2 1 -1.6 -1.6
B1
Buyer
1 2 6 runs -1 0
B2 1.6 1.6
0 0
0 0
Threat strategies
Buyer gets the payoff colored in red
Seller gets the payoff colored in green Buyer threatens to pick strategy #2
(EX:BATNA) if Seller picks #1
Does seller have a better hand?

Two parties with multiple options- (Non-Zero-sum games)
Seller strategy (No of runs)

4 5 6 7 8
4 (1,-1.6) (-0.5,-1.6) (0,-1.6) (0.5,-1.6) (1,-1.6)

Buyer runs
5 (1,-0.8) (-0.5,-0.8) (0,-0.8) (0.5,-0.8) (1,-0.8) Best strategy ?

6 (1,0) (-0.5,0) (0,0) (0.5,0) (1,0) Reduce your options and keep
(1,0.8) (-0.5,0.8) (0,0.8) (0.5,0.8) (1,0.8) More options for other party
7
(1,1.6) (-0.5,1.6) (0,1.6) (0.5,1.6) (1,1.6)
8
Mommy's show
Buyer refers to industry std to show her options are limited
strategy: Reduce options

Promise strategies (Non-Zero-sum games)
a promise of a side payment turns a

Strategy # very bad position into a big winner.
Seller
S1 S2 Seller S2
S1
B1 2 1
2 4
Buyer
0 10 B1
Buyer Promises 3 0 7
Buyer
B2 3 0
3 0
1 2 B2 1 2
With side payment, Seller payoff for strategy #2 is superior to his strategy #1. So, Seller will
gain 4 and Buyer will gain 7.
Ex: In Mommies show offering a high price of USD 1.5MN for Junior show (side payment)
David can make the package of Mommies show and Junior show attractive to Charles
Nash Equilibrium-Best response function
Bob
B1 B2 By (Am, Bn) is a Nash equilibrium if Alice
has no other strategy available that
does better than Am at maximizing her
A1 (A1,B1) (A1, B2) (A1, By) payoff in response to Bob choosing Bn
A2
A2, B2 (A2, By)
Alice
A2,B1)
and Bob has no other strategy
available that does better than Bn
at maximizing his payoff in
response to Alice choosing Am
Ax
Ax,B1) Ax, B2 (Ax, By)
Nash Equilibrium with stag hunting game
2
Nash Equilibrium with stag hunting game
Bob
Hunt Stag Hunt Rabbit
If Alice hunts stag best response for
Hunt Rabbit Hunt Stag
bob is to hunt stag and vice versa

(2,2) (0,1)
Alice
If Alice hunts Rabbit best response for bob

(1,1) is to hunt stag and vice versa
(1,0)
Nash equilibrium with less than optimal payoff

-neither party has incentive to change strategy due
Nash equilibrium with optimal payoff to a reduction in the immediate payoff
A Cournot equilibrium - when each party maximizes its gains (units of meat) given
the output of the other firms, which is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Nash Equilibrium Example-The driving game
payoffs 10 meaning no crash and 0 meaning a crash
Drive on Left Drive on Right
Drive on Left (10,10) (0,0)
Drive on right (10,10)

(0,0)
There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, when

both choose to either drive on the left or on the right.
NE
Player 2
P2- A P2-B P2-C
Player 1
P1-A (0,0) (25,40) (5,10) How many NE
P1-B (40,25) (0,0) (5,15) Cournot equilibrium?
P1-C (10,5) (45,45)

(15,5)
NE NE
CE
Prisoner’s Dilemma
4 If both turn approver (defect) both get 2 year term

Prisoner’s Dilemma: incentive to Defect
Prisoner 2 (P2)
Cooperate Defect If P1 cooperates best response for
P2 is to defect and vice versa
Defect Cooperate
Prisoner 1 (P1)
(1,1) (3,0)
If P1 defects best response for

P2 is to defect and vice versa
(0,3) (2,2)
The prisoner's dilemma has a single Nash

equilibrium: both players choosing to defect.
both would be better off if they both chose to "cooperate" instead of choosing to defect.
However, each could improve their own situation by breaking the mutual cooperation
unilaterally set the other player's score
If Pepsico Advertises the best
response for Coca-Cola is to Advertise
If Pepsico does not Advertises the best

decision for Coca-Cola is to Advertise
Pre simulation information
Oligopoly Market
compete on price
A
Supermarket OLIGOPOLY MKT
A type of market structure where
there are a small number of firms
B
Loyalty schemes
dominating the market, all selling
Advertising and similar goods-e.g. Supermarket
C
marketing
Home delivery
D
options
Extension of
E
opening hours
Lateral growth in
F
other industries
World 1 World 2 World n
Unknown Unknown Unknown
Alba Batia Capita Alba Batia Capita Alba Batia Capita
Each world Oil production board: Alba, Batia, Capita with no diplomatic relations
Price P= 70-0.3 (Qa+Qb+Qc)=70-0.3 Q
Max Qi=75 Million Barrels
Where Qi is Qa, Qb or Qc
Min Qi=0
Production cost=1 per barrel
Profit= Qi(P-1)
Target for each country: Maximize own profit. Each team will be assessed based On Profit made
Each Country
Each round=1
Same Obj:Max Production Yr Pay attention to
Info. Profit messages
Compete(D) Timed Fixed rounds

No diplomatic
within world New Player
relation initially
Year advances only
Compete (I) after all within a
with other world enter decision Chats
worlds
Available info may
vary from year to year F2F
Post simulation faculty debrief
Price P= 70-0.3 (Qa+Qb+Qc) Optimal cooperation vs optimal defection strategy
Profit= Qi(P-1)
Cooperation Model-→Maximize total profit
Max ( Q (70-0.3*3Q)-Q)
First order condition (70-1.8 Q)-1=0
Simplifying:
Q=115
Qa=Qb=Qc=38.33;
P=40.5
Profit of a=profit=profit c=1552.5M
Price P= 70-0.3 (Qa+Qb+Qc) Optimal cooperation vs optimal defection strategy
Profit= Qi(P-1)
Optimal Defection If Qa=Qb=38.33 and C defects
Max (Qc(70-0.3 (Qc+76.66))-Qc)
First order condition (70-0.6Qc-23)-1=0
Simplifying 46=0.6 Qc => Qc=76.67
Qa+Qb+Qc=153.33;
P=24; Profit a,b=920M; Profit c=1840M

Best Response Function
Best response function: C maximizes profit given some Qab=Qa+Qb)
Max Qc(70-0.3 (Qc+Qab))-Qc
First order condition (70-0.6Qc-0.3Qab)-1=0
Simplifying Qc=(69-0.3Qab)/0.6
Qc=115-Qab/2
Nash Equilibrium→ set of production quantifies such that each player chooses
a best response to each other’s actions
Qa=Qb=Qc
Qc=115-Qab/2=115-2Qc/2
Qc=57.5
Relational Frame
I am Alone and Frightened
afraid
Goes Into
say the woods
am
action
action See
Run away I Snake
action
Perceive feels Moves
quickly
Heart Need for safety
accelerate
Stimulus Response Meaning

Relational Frame-different parties associate different meaning to same signal
Party 1 Verbal OK Party 2
agreed
Considered Can renege
Relational Frame
Party 1 Handshake Party 2
unshakable agreement
Cooperation intention
Consistent action Only if self interest protected
Can renege
Self expectations
Other’s expectation of you Impact of self fulfilling assumptions

Stages of distrust
Self protection-action contrary to agreement
Fear-someone will defects
Suspicion-Is it new player or one of us?
Doubt-Wil someone defects?

Escalating Relational Frame
Code
violation
1. Sees
coaching Game
Penalty
1.Cheat
accusation
3. Abusive
Umpire Serena
language
3 Gender
inequality
2. Racquet
breaking
2 Self
frustration
Point
Penalty
Rebuilding Trust
S1 Reaction stage
S3 Commitment stage
Searching for why-
Empathy development Commit to one another
S5 Long term trust
Repeated demonstrations
0 Discovery stage S2 Recovery stage S4 Demo commitment

Learning what happened Processing forgiveness Demonstrate thru. action

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Strategic Negotiation Skills

Role Character Actor

02 Corleone’s Thomas Robert

$250K to get license

Read Understanding the reservation point scenario 1

What do you think of these statements?

“Don’t you think

veiled advocacy for a particular position

Empty Sets in real world negotiations

What do you think of these statements?

you want to hire an

opinionated words to corner other party

Read Understanding the reservation point scenario 2

What do you think of these statements?

What impressed you

neutral question aimed at information

Why it is a better fit

requires you to look beyond own biases

anxious negotiators made initial offers that were 7.5% lower on

How many of you get anxious with thought of

Reframe Anxiety as opportunity

02 Harness anxious rumination with

03 Build confidence through practice Optimize

Component Mode Details Wt

Sim analysis Pre Negotiation report (5 No) 8-10 hours 10%

EMPATHY-EMOTIONS & PERCEPTIONS 40

Top 5 skill sets across

Year 1 delivery a grand success!!!

Actual efforts MY 170

What will you do (poll)?

Lowest point Target point Highest point

Resistance point Aspiration point Dream point

Our Best Value?

Est. Their Best Value?

Depends on possible values/options issue can take

Issue option Will Elizabeth

Will goes after acceptable help

Will does not go Not acceptable Ideal

Reserved general population breakdown

Team represented on the Everything DiSC Workplace® map

01 Master negotiation skills

02 positive attitudes, confidence,

03 Adapt strategy to other party

Present the bottom

Fears being taken Focus on solutions

Allow time for them

Values freedom Don't interrupt

Fears loss of Explain what is

Motivated by Focus on Facts and

Single issue Fixed Pie

Avoid unilateral Tie your concession to

Legal 3month ago

illegal Now for

Est . Claimant walk away revised during negotiation 380K

Video Recording STEP D

Why some teams reached agreement as low as 100-120K

Why wide range when each Team has same info.?

People have different aspirations or targets?

Some gather more information than others?

Some are willing to risk impasse than others?

First offer influenced the outcome

Appropriate list price Anchor Value

23 folds will get you to one kilometer—3,280 feet.