III. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE OF LAW (MAR.

22)

Power to Admit to Practice of Law

● In Re Cunanan, March 18, 1954, 94 Phil. 534

Resolution March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to
1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as
Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of
Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may
be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general
average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule
127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different
bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the
examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates
who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in
1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this
court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to
R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than
those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate
Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to
70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill.
Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written
comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not
override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the
provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable
views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his
signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-
FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred
twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of
seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to
the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar
examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be
allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar:
Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction,
shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any
bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have
passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the
passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that
he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to
the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination
papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission.
There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without,
however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first
reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked
Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If
they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if
declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or
not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a
more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as
Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data
are set forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No.
972 total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946 (August)

206

121

18

1946 (November)

477

228

43

1947

749

340

1948

899

409

11

1949

1,218

532

164

1950
1,316

893

26

1951

2,068

879

196

1952

2,738

1,033

426

1953

2,555

968

284

TOTAL

12,230

5,421

1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have
filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said
Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but
failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades
in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to
reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of
which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had
individually presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful
candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending
because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although as has been
already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal
profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as
to its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the
members of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in
which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente
J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law,
and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz,
Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de
Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of
counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio
Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped
us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and
American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation
for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority
opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all
suspicion of prejudice or partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator
Pablo Angeles David stated:

The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap
which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome
such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students
who took up law soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now
it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because
they suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as
was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of
legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem
evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital
requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To
the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To
approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a
delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an
insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials.
Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the public during
those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual
digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books and magazines published
abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised
and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine
Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition
of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable
principles, but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of
similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any
precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the
judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and
which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history
of more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a
case in which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its validity
cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240
NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of
Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of
the original bill and which the postponement of the contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been
promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our
power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.

To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been
cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of
Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the
petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute
concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was
declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them
for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the
people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any
male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the
requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the
courts of this State. (p. 93).

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously
rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The
convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised,
and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to practice before them.
The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion
of the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the
Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of this prohibitory clause. There
is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of
their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from
the use of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of
must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting
necessarily implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the
applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.

These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that
the possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of
Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of
applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law,
which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the
Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:

The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of
established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors, the
students in which department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a
diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this
examination, together with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test
of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the latter
examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and
burdensome.

The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for
the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that of
the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its
provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain
and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate
an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of
the students before granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits
is, that it was intended to make the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal
attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification
of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the
Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)

xxx xxx xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that
has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that question.
(p.93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be
clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in
the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.

(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court
its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the
admission of any lawyer.

(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on
the matter of admission of the practice of law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute,
its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been
demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of
titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter
supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law,
to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement
of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable.
The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether
past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it
becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the
petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been
undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a
legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was
discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:

This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the
English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr.
Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of legislative
power. (p. 444)

Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art.
4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in
character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and
prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)

But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the
purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and further
exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)

Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and
coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty
which properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the
other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of the
people setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis.,
525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)

The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state
government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the
judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache
of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the
integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration
of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)

Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least
in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption
of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the
Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice
of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235,
"constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be regarded as an entity,
the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that
entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of
the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power exercised by the
court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign
institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the government.
They took this institution along with the power traditionally exercise to determine who should
constitute its attorney at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates
an intent that this traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be subject to
legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make
the three great departments of government separate and independent of one another. The idea
that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate
qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the
judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in
the absence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect
to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power
to protect the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required
of attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do not
constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the court must make its
selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond
which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course of
the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel courts to
admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at
law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true
that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a
legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit
attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re
Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their
formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the court so
admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall.
333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan,
843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St.
Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts,
it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is
the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such
right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an
attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to
determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of
the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:

It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be
members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This
arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the
knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and
vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L.,
in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851:
"Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for
something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like the court
itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is
due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys
at law the judicial department of government would be hampered in the performance of its
duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and
England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to
be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking
judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision
of the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial
department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate
department of government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government
ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for
assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient
learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly
and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by
the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine
who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause
he ought to be removed." (p.727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the
legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:

In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for
attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They
are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing
sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the general practice in this
country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the
admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which they, respectively, belong
for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession
of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient
evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of admission is the
judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and
counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the
parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They
hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained
and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex
parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is
the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the
court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re
Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the
court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and
hence their appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in
performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate
judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the

exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point.
Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of
the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of
the court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on
Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is
the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of
transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights
and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of
the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or
change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.

The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by
settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of
offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. —
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.

In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a
general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in
mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment
revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for
justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive
department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a
clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the
rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid
argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed
as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter
and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and
responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress
found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over
which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the
Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit
that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on
the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar
or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law.
Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according
to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power
does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys
at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them
may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful
consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers
have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation
being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission
to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high
virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal,
amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power,
which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the
supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the
minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the
lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending,
disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within
their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in
attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting
necessities of the administration of justice.

The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination and
failed by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one
who had been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without
a previous examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of
Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous
examinations. The court said:

Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the
office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled
"An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the
Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the
sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members
of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any
person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the
authority of the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of
First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine
Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General,
assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of
Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the
Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in
the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme
Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.

The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to
pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907,
shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning
upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of 75. We
would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of
this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of
learning in the law at the time when he presented his former application for admission to the
bar, we should grant him license to practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first
satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now
"possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability."

But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as
of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before
the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the
office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object
which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the
earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the fact that the
amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically
provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is contented that this
mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention
of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2,
16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:

Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it
by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under
consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power
conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful
limits and authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions
enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:

In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of
this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such
appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But
in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing attorneys
prior to the date of their appointment.

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and
never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his
appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the
required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that his
appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for
license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.

In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of
the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since
that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and
presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office
that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to
retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think
we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the
ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his
proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon
his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at
any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer
from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a
classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until
December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began
studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma
issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an
examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after
the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being,
among others, a class legislation. The Court said:

This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas
from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899,
under which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An
act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force
July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the
addition to the section of the following: "And every application for a license who shall comply
with the rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such
applicant commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or college, shall be
granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules". — In re
Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.

. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December
31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma
regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose
regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the student of at least
36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of law prior to
November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The other
branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or
part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose course of
study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by
the examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to
admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial
rights and privileges upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative
creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)

Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited

by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to
practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the
character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of the requisite
learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a general law, persons or
classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license
for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to
appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain
exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court. The
law conferring such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in
framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing
classes in general, and has some reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be some
difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to the
subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs.
People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a
basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such
physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary
discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18
Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the
profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have some reference to learning,
character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons
who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes
— First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December 31,
1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of
the time in a law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the
subjects specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems
to be no limit of time for making application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of
the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions and limits of time are
fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the
completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be
anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the
mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those
who began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as
well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two
years in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although
they would complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If
possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899, and
without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed course must be
pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any natural
reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for
the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature
attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to
its aspect of being a class legislation:

But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to
prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license
those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here
attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and
accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of
those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia,
129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every
citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession he may choose,
subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and
condition." This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our
republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may
be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for their
successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in
them — that is, the right to continue their prosecution — is often of great value to the
possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or personal
property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that all similarly
situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes
regulating the practice of medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the
part of the application of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have
been challenged, and courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such
examinations of those practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered
such law unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas
Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis.
172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.

This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and
to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not
material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed
the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter
affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual upon
whom it would confer its favors.

A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to
admit to the practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval
forces of the United States during the World War and received a honorable discharge therefrom
and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress approved
June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least
ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held |
unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution of
that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-

153 as follows:

The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid
must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded and,
furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided
the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as
distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to
one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference between the situation
of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on
which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between the situation
and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all
other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as
presents a just and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in
their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a clause unless
there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally on
all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject,
have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5
per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5
per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75
per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature
indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none
has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general
average indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful
candidates of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of
unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the
exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that
this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned
may prove by some other means his right to an equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it
is argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972
intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted
admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in
1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more;
in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per
cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the
Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the
passing averages during those years were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is
desired to undo what had been done — cancel the license that was issued to those who did not
obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to
do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented
is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946
to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of
judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the
effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955,
increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates
be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the
law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the
Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have
done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power
exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was
done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has
granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power
corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals.
The grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may
happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this
manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case,
however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect
only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite
time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls
article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity
affect the entire law.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the
legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second,
because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic
principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is
unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons,
to wit:

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations
of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was
exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these
candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already
prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary
to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional
responsibility of the Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of
these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and
although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable
reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly
Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they
ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to
improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum
norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers
to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial
functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and
inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be
admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is
contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of
law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a
class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is
void.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the
examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in
those years, shall continue in force.

RESOLUTION

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and
impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of
the debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two
of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take
part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted
and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946
to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without
force and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the
examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid
and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have
filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted
to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or
dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Requirements to Practice Law

● In re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562)

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.

VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,

vs.

VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:

Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of

Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great
injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his
own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice,
who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply
aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims
before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of
justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by
the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb."
He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people
may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes,
wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his
petition with a prayer that

... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time
in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our
title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition.
Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him,
as follows:

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the

tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or
appeals without any reason.

Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.

xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our
Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who
ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity.

xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living,
the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought
to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and
obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)

Atty. Almacen's statement that

... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic]
justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity

was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of
September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had
"accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and
that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay
vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial
court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty.
Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he
moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion,
but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile,
on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of
service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse
party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17,
1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry
return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by
the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who,
earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the
plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the
appeal, in the following words:

Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee
praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-
appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for
the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed
record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is,
therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the
running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.

Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the
Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the
Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30,
1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration, thus:

Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement
thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the
resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.

Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and
that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-
16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967.
Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May
30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's
motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co., Inc. case.

There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the
appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26,
1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila
Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case
was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's
restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza
the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior
decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the
Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on
the matter in issue.

Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and
by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for
reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8,
1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was
ordered expunged from the records.

It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his
"Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading
that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as
well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is
unprofessional.

Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on

his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited
for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn
over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this
Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending
petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is
now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require
him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he
"chose to pursue the negative act."

In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and
gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to
show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the
charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give
reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open
and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to
state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral
argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this
resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and
Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and
public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked
for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in
person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written
explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.

His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology.
Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations,
this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:

At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —

"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall
be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why
dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy
own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye";
and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from
thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's
eyes."

"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for this is the
Law and the Prophets."

xxx xxx xxx

Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition.
On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath
that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously
DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are
insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members
of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without justification, into disrepute;
and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been
asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with
the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have
shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this
matter, ...

xxx xxx xxx

To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, —
what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and
insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in
simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.

xxx xxx xxx

Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in
the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your
respondent for acts he said in good faith.

Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY,
GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial
with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the
opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir.
Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President, said: — "the
story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in
the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war. There are those who
have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in
the Philippines."

xxx xxx xxx

We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack
the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled
by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We
waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the
performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed
finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not performed
your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your
Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional
right of free speech.

xxx xxx xxx

The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we
sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .

xxx xxx xxx

What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us.
Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty,
what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what
technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what
injustices are committed in thy name."

xxx xxx xxx

We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would
correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public
opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.

xxx xxx xxx

The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and
dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for
charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense,
that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our
appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human
defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of
things and nothing more.

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court
and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY.
Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended
as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our
self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and
confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the
Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we
must uphold the latter.

But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as
a studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.

He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of
the criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute
resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and
to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought.
For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for
many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts
rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by
this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all.3 The rest do
exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large,
this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.

Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition
we reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the
Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the
U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present
questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts
and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:

A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition
different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .

Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for
denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court
indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court
may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control
of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three
terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the
same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for
discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give
reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required
is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not
infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at
a particular time makes review undesirable.

Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60
O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its
considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit"
resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice
Bengzon:

In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before;
and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional
requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in
view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have
all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion;
and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the
law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in alleviating
its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein
petitions for review are often merely ordered "dismissed".

We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the
Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for
compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting
them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the
Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is
implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:

Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a matter of right but
of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring
the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:

(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord
with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;

(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call
for the exercise of the power of supervision.

Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing

examination of the pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and
correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable
decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of
decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen
knew — or ought to have known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the
running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion
upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and
place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in
Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:

The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15,
Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time,
and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three
days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted
upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a
case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v.
Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic
Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45
Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing
the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the
motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do
not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition.

If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment,
he has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of
appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the
consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure
that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional
certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor
on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his
scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.

Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect
consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each
time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers
are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts'
rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.

Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of
public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a
judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially
recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the
court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our
official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the
press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and
censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for
their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."

The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity,
competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the
reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their
actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as
members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.

Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their
actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave
durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every
lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to
expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of
their performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is
rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the
citizens whom it is expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts
of courts and judges. The reason is that

An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a
fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary,
has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .

Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the
bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for
law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and
fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v.
Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte
Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:

No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or

publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members
of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct
judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can
only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived
of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty
to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .

Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise
the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this
right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the
judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of
Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).

Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become
conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to
abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an
able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)

To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal
the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to
speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a
sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence."
(State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism,
on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is
Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not
mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders
no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful
behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ...
to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain
the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal
ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake
of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration
take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to
the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice
and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of
courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley,
v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers
— even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the
judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as
incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of
justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be
obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times
be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his
privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a
belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-
honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of
the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an
attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political,
campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.

Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel

precedents.

1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public
criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102
So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into
scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and the
application of appropriate penalties," adding that:

It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond
bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and
truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system
as such. However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct
product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.

2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and
circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal
judge of having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a
fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a
prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal
Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find
that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.

The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and
besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.

3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-
year suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that
time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two
decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office
to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:

We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism
members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the
courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of
correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the
highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann
Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case
mentioned it was observed, for instance:

"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney,

directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the
disbarment of its author."

Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than
those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which
requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest
observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their
criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of
justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re
Collins, 81 Pac. 220.

4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney,
representing a woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set
aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the
press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began:

Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is

protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be
compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.

Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly
work to go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not
irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's
disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:

... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for
serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his
grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the
law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the people.
Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally
by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into
disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The
letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the
discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with
the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into
disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being
influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were
bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or
decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was
ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:

A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court
against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its
influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the
administration of justice. ...

Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary
proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a
citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached
final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only
when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held
responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an
independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil
rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.

6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for
submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the
court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes
unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully
retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of
an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:

We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of
criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and
thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the impression that
judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court,
as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the
authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act
of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an
inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered the duties devolved
upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be
encouraged, and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided
against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or
the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in
the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers
whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in
the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when such charges are
made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration
of justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct.

7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:

I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary
observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were
foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor
against a widow residing here.

The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:

... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and
privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and
innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case
of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and
who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his
client.

The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.

8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a

newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to
try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days,
saying that:

The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the
public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of
the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...

The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime
importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would
concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public
officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by
denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its
corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both with
their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at all, could
ever properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating facts or
carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in
such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a
polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward the
judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the
confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal
with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his
strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the
members of the bar the law itself demands retribution — not the court.

9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by
an attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal
corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident
insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar
phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of
the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.

10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that
greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in
those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief
Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been
attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the
letters contained this paragraph:

You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the
burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court
acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of
assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and
faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank,
or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of
bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate
a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not require fumigation
before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen
of the state to read it.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six
months, delivered its opinion as follows:

The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in
sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have
found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the
insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and
his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never
subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an
angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever
enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise
by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable
attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No
judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than
by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile,
or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action
triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the
person defamed does not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law
(2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief
Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we
have said, wholly different principles are applicable thereto.

The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised
the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations
of public policy, to which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from
the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were
paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When,
however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no
right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation
to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This obligation is not
discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it
includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward
the judges personally for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L.
Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved,
between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official
act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the
judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct
wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The
distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was
recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been shown,
fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are
ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in
that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it
in the power of any person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because
of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the
building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the
people by tame submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil
example of punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded,
manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions."

That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes

professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has
been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal
letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a
justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim
133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7
and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney
had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was
stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result
is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a
contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme
Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned
in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with
ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will
not be long before the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied
grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one,
and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute."

The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the
same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to
the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not
holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause
wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney
was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge]
as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the
same principle, and in support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the
following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark.
149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3
Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's
Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.

Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to
make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a
suitable warning to others. ...

11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18
months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being
under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.

12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack
against the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the
attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general
claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general
conduct of a case.

13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the
trial of cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this
sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal
profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case,
prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a
member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention
to resign from the bar.

The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by
lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime
or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism
and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their
integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional
misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary
sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the
duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.

Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted
outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases
of comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to
punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a
different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable
practices.

A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.

1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his
motion for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the
rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the
polls," this Court, although conceding that

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and
never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding
without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for
this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation,

found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made
disclosed

... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of
its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in
utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences,
or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco's client ... .

2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom
Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking
said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be
published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal
has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that
"In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last
years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the
Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and
democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable
times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists
who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that
one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress
would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him
in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free
speech, this Court declared:

But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press,
the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case,
which was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel
Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation
of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the
Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the
members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement,
are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case
by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the
respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose
of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. of
justice ... .

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in
favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party
and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided
during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people
in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or
degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines
is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to
obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled
upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members
of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven
to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the
result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any
other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes
fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust
in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that

... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his
conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken
from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586,
594.)

3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce

Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen"
into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in
disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our
condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of
the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:

As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of
one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this
Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes
a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings
without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute
governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this
Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has
committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It
pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on
jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of
this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those
statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into
question the capability of the members — and some former members of this Court to
render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel
labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."

Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the
interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved
contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with
the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only
against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending
case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep
the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is
now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to his
appeal. This is of no moment.

The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of
its vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for
a modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief
Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru
Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete
disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a
contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in
contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were
conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations
had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view
expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them may
still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief
Justice Moran in Alarcon:

A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in

administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt
which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any
way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by
courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence
of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in
the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of
justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring
them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no
contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any
way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists,
with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and
its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.

Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his

statements and actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment
in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt
therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.

More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for
contempt for such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the
tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here
presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn
duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the
disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics
of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and
unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-
pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this
proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a
member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.

Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is
the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of
law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude
from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued
membership in the Bar. Thus —

The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and
incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge
of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct
of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without
support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right
to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has the
inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from
practice. 23

This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all
that he is worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that —

... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the
trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but
the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of
ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held
that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is
admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right,
but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound
judicial discretion. 24

Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a
mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the
Rules of Court. 25

Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an
assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in
question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on
Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its
way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse
language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against
this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to
drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his
client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the
justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With
unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons,
imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at
the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his
announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he caused the
publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle
the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to
make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with
characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and,
alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as
inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose
disciplinary sanctions upon him.

The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral
argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous
innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism.
They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract
public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members
into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming
feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It
is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the
lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot
be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus
laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.

We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any
other Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be,
above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to
its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism
is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and
disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain
them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be
informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the
premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the
"complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an
utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at
hand but also of our role therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not
involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer
of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who
by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture,
there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any
tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the
individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts
as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members.
Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not
as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are
lost in the majesty of their office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any
complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members
thereof — as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay,
even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be
threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn
responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident
of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is
vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot
unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be
conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact
alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because
public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases
which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined
anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and
judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited
upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these
may range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to
assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and
despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by
the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously
guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.

That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be

overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be
decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it
may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty.
Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate
and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of
respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His
demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor
offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension
should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be
indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us
discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of
precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the
practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree
and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit
of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to
determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time
after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again
fit to resume the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as
he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to
take effect immediately.

Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General
and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.

Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee,

Barredo and Villamor JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Docketed as Civil Case 8909 on September 17, 1965 in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal.

2 See e.g. "Mounting Discontent against the Supreme Court's Minute Resolution," 32
Lawyers J. p. 325; "Lack of Merit Resolutions are Obnoxious," 31 Lawyers J. p. 329.

3 In the years 1966, 1967 and 1968, this Court rejected by minute resolutions 803, 682
and 848 petitions, respectively, and resolved by extended decisions or resolutions 584,
611 and 760 cases, respectively. For the period covering the first six months of the year
1969, this Court rejected by minute resolutions 445 petitions, and resolved by extended
decision or resolutions 279 cases.

4 U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918); In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376; Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, 61 Phil. 736 (Malcolm, J., dissenting); Austria vs. Masaquel, G.R. L-22536,
Aug. 31, 1967; Cabansag vs. Fernandez, et al., G.R. L-8974, Oct. 18, 1957.

5 In re Gomez, supra.

6 In re Gomez, supra; In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 (1930) ; In re Abistado 57

Phil. 668 (1932); People vs. Alarcon; In re Contempt Proceedings, Mangahas, 69 Phil.
265 (1939). See Pennekamp v. State of Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 90 L. ed. 1295; In re
Bozorth, 118 A. 2d 432; In re Jameson, 340 Pac. 2d 432 (1959) ; In re Pryor, 26 Am.
Rep. 474; Hill vs. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286; Caig v. Hecht, 68 L. ed. 293 (Concurring
opinion of Justice Taft).

7 Strebel v. Figueras, 96 Phil. 321 (1954).

8 State v. Bee Pub. Co., 83 N.W. 204, Sullivan, J. See also State ex rel Atty. Gen. v.
Circuit Ct., 72 N. W. 193.

9 In re Jameson, 340 Pac. 2d 432 (1959).

10 U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918) ; In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376; Cabansag v.
Fernandez, L-18974, Oct. 18, 1957; Austria vs. Masaquel, L-22536, Aug. 31, 1967; Re
Troy (1920), 111 Atl. 723; State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Circuit Ct. (1897), 65 Am. St. Rep.
90; Goons v. State, 134 N.E. 194; State vs. Sweetland, 54 N.W. 415; Hill vs. Lyman, 126
NYS 2d 286; Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dec. 657.

11 State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (NS) 585; Re Pryor, 26 Am.
Rep. 747; Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 637; Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dec. 657;
Brannon v. State, 29 So. 2d 918; Medgar Evers v. State, 131 So. 2d 653; Re Ades, 6 F
2d 467.
12 "A judge as a public official," said Justice Thornal in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d
604, "is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in office."

13 In re Bozorth, 118 Atl. 432: "The harsh and sometimes unfounded criticism of the
members of any of the three branches of our Government may be unfortunate lot of
public officials ..., but it has always been deemed a basic principle that such comment
may be made by the public ... . Nor should the judicial branch ... enjoy any more
enviable condition than the other two branches."

In Bridges v. California, 86 L. ed. 192, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, said:
"... an enforced silence, however, limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of
the bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more
than it would enhance respect." Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the minority opinion,
said: "Judges as persons, or courts as institutions, are entitled to no greater immunity
from criticism than other persons or institutions. Just because the holders of judicial
office are identified with the interest of justice they may forget their common human
frailties and fallibilities. There have sometimes been martinets upon the bench as there
have sometimes been wielders of authority who have used the paraphernalia of power in
support of what they called their dignity. Therefore judges must be kept mindful of their
limitations and of their ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous stream of criticism
expressed with candor however blunt "A man cannot be summarily laid by the heels
because his words may make public feeling more unfavorable in case the judge should
be asked to act at some later date, any more than he can for exciting public feeling
against a judge for what he already has done." ... Courts and judges mast take their
share of the gains and pains of discussion which is unfettered except by laws of libel, by
self- restraint, and by good taste. Winds of doctrine should freely blow for the promotion
of good and the correction of evil. Nor should restrictions be permitted that cramp the
feeling of freedom in the use of tongue or pen regardless of the temper of the truth of
what may be uttered."

14 Sec. 3, Rule 138.

15 Sec. 20(b), Rule 138.

16 See e.g. Re Chopac, 66 F. Supp., where an attorney was suspended for three years
for writing a judge a letter in which he said that the judge in signing an order took
"advantage of your office to rule with passion and vehemence." Also People v. Green, 3
P. 65, where an attorney was disbarred for stopping a judge upon the street and
addressed abusive, insulting language to him. See also Johnson v. State, 44 So. 671; In
re McCowan, 170 P. 1101; State v. Calhoon, 102, 2d 604; Re Huppe, 11 Pac. 2d 793;
State v. Rhodes, 131 NW 2d 118; Re Rogers, 212 Pac. 1034; In re Griffin, 1 NYS 7; In
re Wilkes, 3 NYS 753; Re Manheim, 99 NYS 87; Re Greenfield, 262 NYS 2d 349; In re
Klein, 262 NYS 2d 416; In re Smith, 36 A 130.
17 In re Humphrey, 163 P. 60; In re Thatcher, 89 N.E. 39; In Snyder's Case, 76 ALR
666; Re Troy, 111 A. 723; State v. Sprigs, 155 P. 2d 285.

18 Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; In the matter of the Intestate Estate of Rosario Olba,
Contempt proceedings against Antonio Franco, 67 Phil. 312, 315; People vs. Carillo, 77
Phil. 579; People vs. Venturanza, et al., 85 Phil. 211, 214; De Joya, et al. vs. CFI of
Rizal, 99 Phil. 907, 914; Sison vs. Sandejas, L-9270, April 29, 1959; Paragas vs. Cruz,
L-24438, July 30, 1965; Cornejo vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 772, 775.

19 In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376; In re Lozano, 54 Phil. 801; In re Abistado, 57 Phil. 668;

People vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 1965; Cornejo vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 772, 775. State vs. Dist.
Court, 151 Pac. 2d 1002; In re Shannon, 27 Pac. 352; State ex rel. Grice vs. Dist. Court,
97 Pac. 1032; Weston vs. Commonwealth, 77 S.E. 2d 405; State vs. Kaiser, 13 P. 964;
State vs. Bee Pub. Co. 83 N.W. 204; Patterson vs. Colorado. 51 L. ed. 879; Re Hart,
116 N.W. 212.

20 69 Phil. 265.

21 42 O.G. 59.

22 Article VIII, Section 12, Constitution.

23 Re Simpson, 83 N.W. 541.

24 Re Thatcher, 89 N.E. 39, 84.

25 Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

26 See Norman Dorsen, Frontiers of Civil Liberties, pp. 60-61; Griswold, "Of Time and
Attitudes," 74 Harvard Law Review, 81, 94; Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court of the
United States, (1961) pp. 176-177; see also Freund, On Law and Justice (1968) ch. 4.

27 In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577; De Durant, 10 Ann. Cas. 1913, 1220.

28 State vs. Peck, 91 Atl. 274; 286; Fairfield County Bar vs. Taylor, 22 Atl. 441.

29 Ex Parte Tyler, 40 Pac. 33, 34; Treadwell's case, 7 Pac. 724; Deles vs. Aragona,
March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 634, 644, and the cases therein cited.

30 Sarcos vs. Castillo, et al., L-29755, January 21, 1969.

 31 Cf. Radiowealth, Inc. vs. Agregado, 47 O.G., No. 12 (Supp) pp. 87, 89, citing Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 2, P. 870; Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil. 552, 553; Ex parte
Alabama State Bar Ass'n., 8 So. 768.

32 Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

33 Melville vs. Wettengel, 57 Pa. 2d 699; People vs. Winogard, 287 Pac. 864; People
vs. Kelly, 285 Pac. 767; People vs. Harris, 112 N.E. 978; People vs. Anderson, 112 N.E.
273; In re Gullickson, 181 Atl. 716; Haitmanek vs. Turano, 158 A. 878; Grimsell vs.
Wilcox, 98 A. 799; States vs. Kern, 233 N.W. 629; In re Borchardt, 192 N.E. 383; State
vs. Trapley, 259 Pac. 783; State vs. Jennings, 159 S.E. 627; In re Jacobson, 126 S.E.
2d 346; Mulvey vs. O'Niell, 44 Atl. 2d 880; State ex rel Oklahoma Bar Ass'n vs. Hatcher,
209 Pac. 2d 873; Cleveland Bar Ass'n vs. Wilkerson, 156 N.E. 2d 136 N.E. 2d 136; In re
Eddy, 292 N.Y.S. 619.

● In re: Lanuevo (66 SCRA 245)

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court,
respondent.

A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975

IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee,

respondent.

A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975

IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL

TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members,
1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E.

Galang, alias Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon
Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and
Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions during
the 1971 Bar Examinations.

In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-
correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar
Landicho — who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of
70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively — invited the attention of the Court to "The
starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate
was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released this year"
(Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil
Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio
D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the
grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations —
to raise the grades — prior to the release of the results. Note that this was without any
formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If
the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no
reason why they may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is
made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say that some
candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be
reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason
for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide
the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar
Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public
International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a
successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which,
however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned.
Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is
one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964,
1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%,
56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade
of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was
considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.

Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar
Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their
sworn statements on the matter, with which request they complied.

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought
the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to
the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances
under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-
evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the
representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same
and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the
Court required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to
show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-
evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was
unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar
examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show
cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were
also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70,
rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs
on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38,
rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on
March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court
to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp.
106-110,) rec.).

In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo
Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No.
954 in Political Law and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a number of examination notebooks
in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-
24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise
included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo
remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law
and Public International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This
notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another successful
candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the
discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of
Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook
bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name of
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned
to testify in the investigation.

An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the

Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that
one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of
Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of
slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de
Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with this information at the
hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared
that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries
in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).

Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make
mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to do.

The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated
on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their
memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective
memorandum on November 14, 1973.

Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in
Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned
to testify.

At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as
evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral
testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted
by them to the Court. The same became the basis for their cross-examination.

In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct
testimony in the investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners
recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the
examination notebooks in question.

In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:

2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the
examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the
practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the
grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary
high grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring back the latter to
the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;

3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the owner
of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate
concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy
of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation
in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;

5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation
and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;

6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based on
the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4
with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7
with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).

His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11,
1972 affidavit with following additional statements:

xxx xxx xxx

3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no
longer to make the reconsideration of these answers because of the same evaluation
and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;

4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did not
know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme
Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects;

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am
authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the
following circumstances:

a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971, relationship
between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the point that with respect to the
correction of the examination booklets of bar candidates I have always followed him and
considered his instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme
Court with respect to the same; that I have no alternative but to take his words;

b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation to me as

reflecting the real and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more
to get the consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at
that time, I was isolating myself from all members of the Supreme Court and specially
the chairman of the Bar Committee for fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;

xxx xxx xxx

e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such
recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in
Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the original correction of
the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political
Law and Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:

On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the last
bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which
according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at about
7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two
companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code
number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to
review and re-examine the said notebook because it appears that the examinee
obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had
obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly,
in remedial law.

I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as I
had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so
because the same was still within my control and authority as long as the particular
examinee's name had not been identified or that the code number decode and the
examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the
examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had not been identified or
revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a particularly low grade to
said examinee.

Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as it
was humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-
examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in accordance with the
same standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the
result that the examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing with
the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and as he had assured me that the
code number of the examinee in question had not been decoded and his name
known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the grade card
attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades
(from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy
thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar
Confidant brought with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation",
respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts
stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged that:

xxx xxx xxx

3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international law, code
numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name
only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to
state that I do not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up to the
present;

4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such review,
and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such
revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of the examinee had not yet
been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently
regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of express prohibition in the rules
and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison
with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as much as possible from frequent
personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner. ...;

5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at
my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not
appear to me that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar
Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel,
accompanied by two companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit
to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used to see me:

xxx xxx xxx

7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when I
submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661, my
aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not to make the examinee pass
the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected
that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades
in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of
course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the
examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular in that:

8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with
notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points,
resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the subject, and, as
heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the
representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...

9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee consensus
was that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the
examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular.
At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names of the
candidates.

10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no knowledge of
the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know the
examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or rather the review
and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April
12, 1972:

1. xxx xxx xxx

2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to
my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.

3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in
Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another subject,
the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying that that
particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and
that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he would
make the general passing average.

4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I
remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark
and revised also the mark in the general list.

5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the
word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity
of the examinee in question who up to now remains a total stranger and without
expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14,
1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx

2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney
Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854
Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's notebook in Remedial
Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me that he and
others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to
review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I had previously given.
He explained that the examine concerned had done well in other subjects, but that
because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his
general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the
paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar.
As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his
answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr.
Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had
previously given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.

3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address
such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr.
Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item of the paper in
question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some
items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the same grades in other items.
However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had
given after re-evaluation, the total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the
passing mark of 75% in my subject.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the
contents of his sworn statement, adding the following:

xxx xxx xxx

5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade of
the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent
acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not having verified from
the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by
Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that
—

a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not aware, not having
been apprised otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court to request or suggest that the grade of a particular examination
notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to the highly
fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the request was legitimate.

xxx xxx xxx

c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent

carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answers
by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt
in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that the
said examine failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee
deserved a higher grade than that previously given to him, but that he did not deserve, in
herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. It should
also be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein respondent downgraded a
previous rating of an answer written by the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April
17, 1972:

xxx xxx xxx

That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar
Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all other
subjects except Mercantile Law;

That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate the
paper of this particular Bar candidate;.

That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No.
1613) showing a grade of 61%;

That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular
Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;

That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade
sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his
sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and

xxx xxx xxx

2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-evaluated

the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good
faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made during one of the deliberations
of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a candidate fails in only one subject, the
Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate
concerned, which I did.

3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned re-
evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this time this
particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:

xxx xxx xxx

As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the
posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers on the
first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that those five
merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the examiners
shortly earlier to the effect that

... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to clarify of
language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),

I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation
and/or re-checking.

It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the results of
the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be
shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and have them checked
by their professors. Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for re-
correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or
requests which we are reading for submission to the Honorable Court.

Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be
denied because the result of the examinations when released is final and irrevocable.

It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to bring
those notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No.
1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:

That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his hotest
belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to
forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the contrary to do
justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner,
because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the
examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does not remember having made the
alleged misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought to the attention of the
Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another examinee who obtained a
passing general average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the
Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by way of raising the grade in said
subject, respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who
thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers
right, the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".

Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such serious
charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed
another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing that
the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being
that the notebooks in question were submitted to the respective examiners for re-
evaluation believing in all good faith that they so merited on the basis of the Confidential
Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked
as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them
entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order,

2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question:

Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of February, 1972, on my
way back to the office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I
have always made it a point that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from
any object and the first number that comes into my sight becomes the basis of the ticket
that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I saw was "954" boldly printed on an
electrical contribance (evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing
along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the Supreme Court building from San
Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence of the
Araullo High School(photograph of the number '954', the contrivance on which it is
printed and a portion of the post to which it is attached is identified and marked as
Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that
would contain such number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last
three digits corresponded to "954". This number became doubly impressive to me
because the sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was "27", a number that is so
significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to link or connect it with
said number whenever possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on the Master
List of examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the examinations as Bar
Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with said
number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure
"27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-
Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970
Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-
a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end
of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).

The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these incidents in my life, to
wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was
hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the
last Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still confined at the
hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941
resulting in many casualties. From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the
beginning of a new life for me having been saved from the possibility of being among the
casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army byway of
honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got married and since then we
begot children the youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957.

Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I resumed my work
which at the time was on the checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I came
upon the notebooks bearing the office code number "954". As the number was still fresh
in my mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of the
notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language and the apparent
soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in all good faith on the basis of the
aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that
they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to the
respective examiners for possible review recalling to them the said Confidential
Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.

3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of the
two cases which I brought to the attention of the committee during the meeting and
which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective examines, namely:

(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below
50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No.
110, identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law
bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade of 4% increased to 50%
after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and

(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of 73.15% with a
grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having
inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political
and International Law under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of
this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo
and the notebook in Political and International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661
with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-
Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and International Law is precisely the same
notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo
Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).

4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only one
(1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the
former; and only Political and International Law in the latter, under the facts and
circumstances I made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the Committee
authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners concerned;

5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-check
some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that there was
very little time left and that the increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly
substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the weight of only 10%
(Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).

The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that
Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led
to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed
of the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he "was going over those
notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of
ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco
post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of respondent Galang
"bearing office code number '954."

Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;

1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo
and never met him before except once when, as required by the latter respondent
submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.

xxx xxx xxx

4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider "failure"
cases; after the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing" case,
especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar confidant do not know each
other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary course of official business?

It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a
reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?

5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated
March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio
Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In fact, the
respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized
anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.

But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the
Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having redounded to the benefit of
herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's
examination papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or especially for him
and not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates who are
supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's grades was done among
those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of policy of the Committee to
increase the percentage of passing in that year's examination and, therefore, the
insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar
Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that
BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an evidence
per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done
in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect because that would be
presuming all the members of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity,
unfit for the bar themselves and the result of their work that year, as also unworthy of
anything. All of these inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in the
resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence,
or consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this Respondent
Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the
actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy between
them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the
Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties and that they should be regarded
as such in the consideration of this case.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I

The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo

systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation
and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and
individually the respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior
authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been submitted to
the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for
and in behalf of the Court.

It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just
before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian
while the latter was in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and
there made the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades
obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an
extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring
back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of
grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation,
representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline
of passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said
examine will get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent
Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the practice and policy of the
Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in doing
so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to
75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code
Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at
the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-
Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects
including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and
could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.

Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972,
respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at
1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law,
which respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo
then requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly to
reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the
said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but that
because of the comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent Manalo in
Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent
Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he thought that if the notebook
were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of being
admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of
respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself
clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of
respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as
follows:

4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal

fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a test of
memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to clarify of
language and soundness of reasoning.

Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo,
believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such
request and further believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate
the examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the
examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%.
Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made by him in the
notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136,
instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39,
74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).

But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the
passing grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.

Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo
went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of
examination papers in Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected,
respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code
Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent
Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all
other subjects except in Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said
notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%, said
examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that
this is possible — the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of
the Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject — respondent Pablo
acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said
notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with
leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an
increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the
grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office
Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V,
pp. 43-46, rec.).

After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still
below the passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.

Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo

brought back to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the
former informing the latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political
Law and Public International Law, as he had already finished correcting the examination
notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal Law — that the examinee who owns that
particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and
that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee
would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing
the justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure of the
examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he
initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in the general list and likewise
initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code
Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2
& 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent
Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he
remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the
passing average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court,
leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He
recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this
was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was
received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).

However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a
passing grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile
Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent
Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme — by securing
authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law
tore-evaluate said notebook.

At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the
rest, the examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as
irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-
Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was
informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except
Mercantile Law. This information was made during the meeting within hearing of the
order members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made
known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent
Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's
Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the
whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to
71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for
consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-
71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the
particular examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not
have consented to make the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33,
rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he
remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change the
grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook of
examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number
1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).

A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent
Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of
the Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent
Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of
the Bar Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an
examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the
usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the
said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that
particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84%
in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the
grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting
in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office
code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).

II

Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E.
GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.

Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five
examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from
66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points,
more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution
of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination without any
grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath.
It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to
initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other
examinees.

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent

Galang failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing,
Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted
paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases
Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the
members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith
and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not
his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the
contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order
was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp.
35-37, rec.).

But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential
memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial
correction of the examination papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the
examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23,
rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the
norms of delicacy.

We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and

Pamatian — whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions
committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each
other.

For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm.
Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the
investigation and hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly
maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the
1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo
too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the
Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence
that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971
Bar Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the
answers of only respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his
grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's
well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each
of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his
particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the
unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and
in two (2) minor subjects while his general average was only 66.25% — which under no
circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in
one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang
was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one
passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with
grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of Galang before and after the
unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:

BAI

1. Political Law Public

International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
BAI

Labor Laws and Social

Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.

2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points

or 33 weighted points.

Taxation 74% 74% = no re-

evaluation made.

3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.

or 30 weighted points.

4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or

22 weighted points.

5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =

11 pts. or 44 weighted points.

Legal Ethics and Practical

Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in
the five (5) subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average
of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great
damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage
of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible
addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one
notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who — Political Law and Public
International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.

The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the
re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the
passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After
the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to
tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter
compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data
showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be
submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will
determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no
business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of
passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all
Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for re-
evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the
Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative,
exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image
of the Court.

Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any
intention of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar
Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled
out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90)
examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully
aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline
cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in
referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as
against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any
dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more
deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by
respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971
Bar examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained
failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar
Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase
of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of
Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his
actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety
examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the
re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the
agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when
the examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in
four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown.

The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's
notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn
statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the
investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant
consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the wind
for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only
on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on
March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it
was just an after-thought.

REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN

MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER
MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN
POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION,
RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO
66%.

Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid
notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and
Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.

The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela
Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent
Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination
Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer
them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case of
Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-
39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two cases
were contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the
Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every
meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The
alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and record of the dates of the
meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to
him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on
leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears,
however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room
of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No.
1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).

Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one
notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated
by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this
notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47%
in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the
notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner
Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the
notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number
110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed
out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-
Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but
Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an

examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects
except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the
notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot
recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16,
rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an examinee who was
on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was
taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613
(belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed
to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case
of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him
said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office
Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law
that was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the
Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an
examinee that was referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re-
evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation
made by respondent Lanuevo to him.

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the
members of the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and
passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-
evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was
referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3)
subjects, as follows:

Labor Laws 3%

Taxation 69%

Mercantile Law 68%

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade
in Political Law are as follows:

BA

Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27

weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
————————————————

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to
Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two
(2) other failing grades. These are:

Political Law 70%

Taxation 72%

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as
follows:

BA

Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation

Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela
Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in
February, 1971, which violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent
Lanuevo.

It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to
Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar
Examination Committee because even at the time of said referral, which was after the
unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing
grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law
was considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the
record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner
Montecillo was 71%.

Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed the

trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of
the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be
disbarred.

As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their
names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to
show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted.

III

Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
respondent.

The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized
re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and
International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.

The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal
profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous
established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting
determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by
the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar --
94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the
required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice
Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).

In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee,
composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of
the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to
each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one
hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant
who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the
Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to
membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court
and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar
Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his
functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and
circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.

The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of

respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by
Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust
and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-
evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be
admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any
discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not
clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-
evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is
correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto
is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led to the
candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.

Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among
others, with the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides
that "every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules
of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every
applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case,
pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine
applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is
for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing
the Court of one's personal record — whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted,
convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending — becomes more compelling. The
forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court
beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral
turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of
which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by
respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly
require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated,
implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his
obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court
can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his moral character. And
undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a better
position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that an
applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its
dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or
fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the
Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by the
Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he
has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense
involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against him."
By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application
form prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his
criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the
applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any
offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or
convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a
pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang
continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight
physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and
thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the
Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently
concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries
in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in
court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court,
respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7)
times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of
the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for
revocation of his license to practice law is well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS
741). Thus:

[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in withholding
from the board of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he applied
for admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an indictment for a felony,
was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).

[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he
applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of the
board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law
Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710).

The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to
surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from
the roll of attorneys (p. 710).

Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:

[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the Appellate
Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and
frankly of matters tending to show the character of the applicant and his standing at the
bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of indictments against him, one of
which was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts which should have been
submitted to the court, with such explanations as were available. Silence respecting
them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis
supplied).

Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case

despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of
the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it
when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his
continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the
present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good
demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of
law.

While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court
requiring him to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys,
respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to
the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such
omission.

Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.

Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in
which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his
attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as
WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:

The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it,
but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The
standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one
to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to
receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with
all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a duly
authorized member of the bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].

What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this
present case is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several
occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful bar candidates to the
membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or
false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel
vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico
from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators
contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7
SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and
(c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis
Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe,
54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the
grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of
falsification of public documents.

IV

RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI
Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now
deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and
Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.

All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or
re-correction of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent
BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or
increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who
owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration or
expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion
and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-
correcion in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of
members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should
have exercised greater care and caution and should have been more inquisitive before
acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked
the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter to
the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have required
respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the average
of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their
respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy
themselves that the examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could
have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations could have been avoided.

Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared
under oath that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the
increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of
Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and
Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective
subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the
words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that this
particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60
something, I cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a few points
higher, he would get a passing average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be
the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh.
1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo:
"... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject
except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase
the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I
believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be
done before to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily
acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he
left it with me and what i did was to go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I could.
While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be more
lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade so I
had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet
accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).

It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by
respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations
that the increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were
to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by
respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:

Montecillo —

Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the paper?

A Yeas, your Honor.

Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the absence of such
information?

A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.;
see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-
Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).

Pamatian —

3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him the owner of
the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate
concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy
of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..."
(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am
authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..."
(Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Manalo —

(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent
carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answer
by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of the
doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject
that said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee
deserved a higher grade than that previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein
respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Pardo —

... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that
particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the representation of
the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to

induce the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them
can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any
improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades
given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case
No. 1163).

At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-
examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the
re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the
imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory.
Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners that their
participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest
consideration of public interest — absolute purity of the proceedings — and so are
required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their
duties relative thereto.

Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973,
claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or
lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to
respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend — a
participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar
Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9,
Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).

It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the
late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore
cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this
out during the investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His
pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation when Justice
Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian
and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until
this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being
intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or
an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the
five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he
deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their
respective subjects.

It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations,
Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law
examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar
Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971
Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that
an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the
said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was divulged by
respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an
indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit
restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His
unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to impair
public faith in the Supreme Court.

VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of
respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was
committed for valuable consideration.

There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the
official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of
proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme
Court.

1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc.
a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount of
P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on April
5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two
(2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total
amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of
instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972: Second mortgage —
P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription —
April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment
the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or
less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00
of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his
sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through a niece before
Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]

It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from his
sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets
and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.

In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in the
amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets
was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank
deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used
or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his 1971
statement was not realized because the transaction therein involved did not push
through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972;
Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married sister
in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is
not reflected in his 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972.
Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his sister at the time he
received the $200 was not even presented by respondent during the investigation. And
according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did
not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was agreed upon
by them. And furthermore, during the investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to
furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not
fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister,
who has a family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of
money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent
Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing
circumstances.

On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes
house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14,
1972 — date of instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of inscription). On February 28,
1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by
respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143.
Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No.
90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled on March
20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS
remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to respondent
Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that
since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation and retirement (filed October
13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90.
Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS real
estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).

2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car
valued at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and
November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any car was listed in
his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It
appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971
Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his
listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said 1956
VW car worth P5,200.00.

The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations
and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said
acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by respondent Lanuevo with respect
to respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the money used by
respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties came from respondent
Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.

During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent
Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar
Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April
12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent
Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in
view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show cause on
March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a
consciousness of guilt.

It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16,
1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of
P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a
down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he
bought on April 5, 1972.

Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a

& e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:

(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act

constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority
or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be
presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.

Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public
officer once it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to
his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act
3019).

It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements

of Assets and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they
were examined as they are part of the records of this Court.

B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent
Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter
become the bar Confidant.

1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational
program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days — 1951 to 1955 —
up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) —
1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with
the Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency entrusted with the
affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From
1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of Junior Investigator,
Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims
Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time,
therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of
the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16,
1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing
(A, Vol. IV, rec.).

It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time
attended to the availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was
already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to
1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he
was employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80,
86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was the private
secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a
copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the
MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from
Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the
school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E.
Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).

Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the
Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not
even know the location of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of
the G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans
Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang
admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that
he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.).
The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is
obliquely across the City Court building.

2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board,

he investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits
and disability benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his
duties as veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for
educational benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and
has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).

3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry

operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol.
VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with
the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).

He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father
belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar
only and he had no communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the
country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only
and does not remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was
employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of
Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army
stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with
pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and
was still confined there when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes
on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27,
1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).

German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla
Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted
as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His
unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div.,
US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division,
US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies,
from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of
demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks
to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without
prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong
disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as
above delineated.
 WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D.
LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM
THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163,
RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY
LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE
ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ.,
concur.

Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.

Antonio, J., is on official leave.

Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.

● Mane vs. Judge Belen ( 30 June 2008)

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119 June 30, 2008

[Formerly A.M. O.C.A. IPI No. 07-2709-RTJ]

ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 36,
CALAMBA CITY, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By letter-complaint dated May 19, 20061 which was received by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) on May 26, 2006, Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane (complainant) charged
Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen (respondent), Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional
Trial Court, Calamba City, of "demean[ing], humiliat[ing] and berat[ing]" him during the
hearing on February 27, 2006 of Civil Case No. 3514-2003-C, "Rural Bank of Cabuyao,
Inc. v. Samuel Malabanan, et al" in which he was counsel for the plaintiff.

To prove his claim, complainant cited the remarks made by respondent in the course of
the proceedings conducted on February 27, 2006 as transcribed by stenographer Elenita
C. de Guzman, viz:

COURT:

. . . Sir, are you from the College of Law of the University of the Philippines?
ATTY. MANE:

No[,] [Y]our Honor[,] from Manuel L. Quezon University[,] [Y]our Honor.

COURT:

No, you're not from UP.

ATTY. MANE:

I am very proud of it.

COURT:

Then you're not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me because there is a
saying and I know this, not all law students are created equal, not all law schools are
created equal, not all lawyers are created equal despite what the Supreme Being that we
all are created equal in His form and substance.2 (Emphasis supplied)

Complainant further claimed that the entire proceedings were "duly recorded in a tape
recorder" by stenographer de Guzman, and despite his motion (filed on April 24, 2006)
for respondent to direct her to furnish him with a copy of the tape recording, the motion
remained unacted as of the date he filed the present administrative complaint on May
26, 2006. He, however, attached a copy of the transcript of stenographic notes taken on
February 27, 2006.

In his Comments3 dated June 14, 2006 on the complaint filed in compliance with the Ist
Indorsement dated May 31, 20064 of the OCA, respondent alleged that complainant filed
on December 15, 2005 an "Urgent Motion to Inhibit,"5 paragraph 36 of which was
malicious and "a direct assault to the integrity and dignity of the Court and of the
Presiding Judge" as it "succinctly implied that [he] issued the order dated 27 September
2005 for [a] consideration other than the merits of the case." He thus could not "simply
sit idly and allow a direct assault on his honor and integrity."

On the unacted motion to direct the stenographer to furnish complainant with a copy of
the "unedited" tape recording of the proceedings, respondent quoted paragraphs 4 and
37 of the motion which, to him, implied that the trial court was "illegally, unethically and
unlawfully engaged in 'editing' the transcript of records to favor a party litigant against
the interest of [complainant's] client."

Respondent thus claimed that it was on account of the two motions that he ordered
complainant, by separate orders dated June 5, 2006, to explain within 15 days8 why he
should not be cited for contempt.
Complainant later withdrew his complaint, by letter of September 4, 2006,9 stating that it
was a mere result of his impulsiveness.

In its Report dated November 7, 2007,10 the OCA came up with the following
evaluation:

. . . The withdrawal or desistance of a complainant from pursuing an administrative

complaint does not divest the Court of its disciplinary authority over court officials and
personnel. Thus, the complainant's withdrawal of the instant complaint will not bar the
continuity of the instant administrative proceeding against respondent judge.

The issue presented before us is simple: Whether or not the statements and actions
made by the respondent judge during the subject February 27, 2006 hearing constitute
conduct unbecoming of a judge and a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

After a cursory evaluation of the complaint, the respondent's comment and the
documents at hand, we find that there is no issue as to what actually transpired during
the February 27th hearing as evidenced by the stenographic notes. The happening of
the incident complained of by herein complainant was never denied by the respondent
judge. If at all, respondent judge merely raised his justifications for his complained
actuations.

xxxx

. . . [A] judge's official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties
should be free from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. A
judge must at all times be temperate in his language. Respondent judge's insulting
statements which tend to question complainant's capability and credibility stemming from
the fact that the latter did not graduated [sic] from UP Law school is clearly unwarranted
and inexcusable. When a judge indulges in intemperate language, the lawyer can return
the attack on his person and character, through an administrative case against the
judge, as in the instant case.

Although respondent judge's use in intemperate language may be attributable to human

frailty, the noble position in the bench demands from him courteous speech in and out of
the court. Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in
conduct and language.

xxxx

Judge Belen should bear in mind that all judges should always observe courtesy and
civility. In addressing counsel, litigants, or witnesses, the judge should avoid a
controversial tone or a tone that creates animosity. Judges should always be aware that
disrespect to lawyers generates disrespect to them. There must be mutual concession of
respect. Respect is not a one-way ticket where the judge should be respected but free to
insult lawyers and others who appear in his court. Patience is an essential part of
dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. If a judge
desires not to be insulted, he should start using temperate language himself; he who
sows the wind will reap a storm.

It is also noticeable that during the subject hearing, not only did respondent judge make
insulting and demeaning remarks but he also engaged in unnecessary "lecturing" and
"debating". . .

xxxx

Respondent should have just ruled on the propriety of the motion to inhibit filed by
complainant, but, instead, he opted for a conceited display of arrogance, a conduct that
falls below the standard of decorum expected of a judge. If respondent judge felt that
there is a need to admonish complainant Atty. Mane, he should have called him in his
chambers where he can advise him privately rather than battering him with insulting
remarks and embarrassing questions such as asking him from what school he came
from publicly in the courtroom and in the presence of his clients. Humiliating a lawyer is
highly reprehensible. It betrays the judge's lack of patience and temperance. A highly
temperamental judge could hardly make decisions with equanimity.

Thus, it is our view that respondent judge should shun from lecturing the counsels or
debating with them during court hearings to prevent suspicions as to his fairness and
integrity. While judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can
competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and
behave in such manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their
impartiality.11 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The OCA thus recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violation of Canon 3 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt
with more severely.12

By Resolution of January 21, 2008,13 this Court required the parties to manifest whether
they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings already
filed. Respondent complied on February 26, 2008,14 manifesting in the affirmative.

The pertinent provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct reads:

Rule 3.04. - A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially
the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge
should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for
the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
An author explains the import of this rule:

Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be courteous to
counsel, especially to those who are young and inexperienced and also to all those
others appearing or concerned in the administration of justice in the court. He should be
considerate of witnesses and others in attendance upon his court. He should be
courteous and civil, for it is unbecoming of a judge to utter intemperate language during
the hearing of a case. In his conversation with counsel in court, a judge should be
studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the merits of the dispute
between litigants and lead to its unjust disposition. He should not interrupt counsel in
their arguments except to clarify his mind as to their positions. Nor should he be tempted
to an unnecessary display of learning or premature judgment.

A judge without being arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust may endeavor to hold counsel to
a proper appreciation of their duties to the courts, to their clients and to the adverse
party and his lawyer, so as to enforce due diligence in the dispatch of business before
the court. He may utilize his opportunities to criticize and correct unprofessional conduct
of attorneys, brought to his attention, but he may not do so in an insulting manner.15
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The following portions of the transcript of stenographic notes, quoted verbatim, taken
during the February 27, 2006 hearing show that respondent made sarcastic and
humiliating, even threatening and boastful remarks to complainant who is admittedly "still
young," "unnecessary lecturing and debating," as well as unnecessary display of
learning:

COURT:

xxx

Sir do you know the principle or study the stare decisis?

ATTY. MANE:

Ah, with due respect your…

COURT:

Tell me, what is your school?

ATTY. MANE:

I am proud graduate of Manuel L. Quezon University.

COURT:

Were you taught at the MLQU College of Law of the principle of Stare Decisis and the
interpretation of the Supreme Court of the rules of procedure where it states that if there
is already a decision by the Supreme Court, when that decision shall be complied with
by the Trial Court otherwise non-compliance thereof shall subject the Courts to judicial
sanction, and I quote the decision. That's why I quoted the decision of the Supreme
Court Sir, because I know the problem between the bank and the third party claimants
and I state, "The fair market value is the price at which a property may be sold by a
seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy."
Sir, that's very clear, that is what fair market value and that is not assessment value. In
fact even you say assessment value, the Court further state, "the assessed value is the
fair market value multiplied. Not mere the basic assesses value. Sir that is the decision
of the Supreme Court, am I just reading the decision or was I inventing it?

ATTY. MANE:

May I be allowed to proceed.

COURT:

Sir, you tell me. Was I inventing the Supreme Court decision which I quoted and which
you should have researched too or I was merely imagining the Supreme Court decision
sir? Please answer it.

ATTY. MANE:

No your Honor.

COURT:

Please answer it.

xxxx

COURT:

That's why. Sir second, and again I quote from your own pleadings, hale me to the
Supreme Court otherwise I will hale you to the bar. Prove to me that I am grossly
ignorant or corrupt.

ATTY. MANE:
Your Honor when this representation, your Honor . . .

COURT:

No, sir.

ATTY. MANE:

Yes your Honor . . .

COURT:

No sir unless you apologize to the Court I will hale you to the IBP Because hindi naman
ako ganon. I am not that vindictive but if this remains. You cannot take cover from the
instruction of your client because even if the instruction of a client is "secret." Upon
consideration, the language of the pleader must still conform with the decorum and
respect to the Court. Sir, that's the rule of practice. In my twenty (20) years of practice
I've never been haled by a judge to any question of integrity. Because even if I believed
that the Court committed error in judgment or decision or grave abuse of discretion, I
never imputed any malicious or unethical behavior to the judge because I know and I
believe that anyone can commit errors. Because no one is like God. Sir, I hope sir you
understand that this Court, this Judge is not God but this Judge is human when
challenge on his integrity and honor is lodged. No matter how simple it is because that is
the only thing I have now.

Atty. Bantin, can you please show him my statement of assets and liabilities?

ATTY. MANE:

I think that is not necessary your Honor.

COURT:

No counsel because the imputations are there, that's why I want you to see. Show him
my assets and liabilities for the proud graduate of MLQU. Sir, look at it. Sir, I have stock
holdings in the U.S. before I joined the bench. And it was very clear to everyone, I would
do everything not be tempted to accept bribe but I said I have spent my fifteen (15) years
and that's how much I have worked in fifteen (15) years excluding my wife's assets
which is more than what I have may be triple of what I have. May be even four fold of
what I have. And look at my assets. May be even your bank can consider on cash to
cash basis my personal assets. That is the reason I am telling you Atty. Mane. Please,
look at it. If you want I can show you even the Income Tax Return of my wife and you will
be surprised that my salary is not even her one-half month salary. Sir, she is the Chief
Executive Officer of a Multi-National Publishing Company. That's why I have the guts to
take this job because doon po sa salary niya umaasa na lamang po ako sa aking asawa.
Atty. Mane, please you are still young. Other judges you would already be haled to the
IBP. Take that as a lesson. Now that you are saying that I was wrong in the three-day
notice rule, again the Supreme Court decision validates me, PNB vs. Court of Appeals,
you want me to cite the quotation again that any pleadings that do not conform with the
three-day notice rule is considered as useless scrap of paper and therefore not subject
to any judicial cognizance. You know sir, you would say but I was the one subject
because the judge was belligerent. No sir, you can go on my record and you will see that
even prior to my rulings on your case I have already thrown out so many motion for non-
compliance of a three-day notice rule. If I will give you an exception because of this, then
I would be looked upon with suspicion. So sir again, please look again on the record and
you will see how many motions I threw out for non-compliance with the three-day notice
rule. It is not only your case sir, because sir you are a practitioner and a proud graduate
of the MLQU which is also the Alma Mater of my uncle. And I supposed you were taught
in thought that the three-day notice rule is almost sacrosanct in order to give the other
party time to appear and plead. In all books, Moran, Regalado and all other
commentators state that non-compliance with the three-day notice rule makes the
pleading and motion a useless scrap of paper. If that is a useless scrap of paper, sir,
what would be my ground to grant exception to your motion? Tell me.

xxxx

COURT:

Procedural due process. See. So please sir don't confuse the Court. Despite of being
away for twenty years from the college of law, still I can remember my rules, In your
motion you said . . . imputing things to the Court. Sir please read your rules. Familiarize
yourself, understand the jurisprudence before you be the Prince Valiant or a Sir
Gallahad in Quest of the Holy Grail. Sir, ako po ay mahirap na tao, karangalan ko lang
po ang aking kayang ibigay sa aking mga anak at iyan po ay hindi ko palalampasin
maski kanino pa. Sir, have you ever heard of anything about me in this Court for one
year. Ask around, ask around. You know, if you act like a duck, walk like a duck, quack
like a duck, you are a duck. But have you ever heard anything against the court. Sir in a
judicial system, in a Court, one year is time enough for the practitioner to know whether
a judge is what, dishonest; 2), whether the judge is incompetent; and 3) whether the
judge is just playing loco. And I have sat hear for one year sir and please ask around
before you charge into the windmill. I am a proud product of a public school system from
elementary to college. And my only, and my only, the only way I can repay the taxpayers
is a service beyond reproach without fear or favor to anyone. Not even the executive, not
even the one sitting in Malacanang, not even the Supreme Court if you are right. Sir,
sana po naman inyo ring igalang ang Hukuman kasi po kami, meron nga po,
tinatanggap ko, kung inyo pong mamarapatin, meron pong mga corrupt, maaari pong
nakahanap na kayo ng corrupt na Judge pero hindi po lahat kami ay corrupt. Maaari ko
rin pong tanggapin sa inyong abang lingcod na merong mga Hukom na tanga pero hindi
po naman lahat kami ay tanga. Ako po ay 8:30 or before ay nandito po ako sa husgado
ko. Aalis po ako dito sa hapon, babasahin ko lahat ang kaso ko para ko po malaman
kung any po ang kaso, para po pagharap ko sa inyo at sa publiko hindi po ako
magmumukhang tanga. Sir, please have the decency, not the respect, not to me but to
the Court. Because if you are a lawyer who cannot respect the Court then you have no
business appearing before the Court because you don't believe in the Court system.
That's why one of my classmates never appeared before Court because he doesn't
believe in that system. He would rather stay in their airconditioned room because they
say going to Court is useless. Then, to them I salute, I give compliment because in their
own ways they know the futility and they respect the Court, in that futility rather than be a
hypocrite. Atty. Mane hindi mo ako kilala, I've never disrespect the courts and I can look
into your eyes. Kaya po dito ko gusto kasi di po ako dito nagpractice para po walang
makalapit sa akin. Pero kung ako po naman ay inyong babastusin ng ganyang handa po
akong lumaban kahit saan, miski saan po. And you can quote me, you can go there
together to the Supreme Court. Because the only sir, the only treasure I have is my
name and my integrity. I could have easily let it go because it is the first time, but the
second time is too much too soon. Sir, masyado pong kwan yon, sinampal na po ninyo
ako nung primero, dinuran pa po ninyo ako ng pangalawa. That's adding insult to the
injury po. Hindi ko po sana gagawin ito pero ayan po ang dami diyang abugado. I
challenge anyone to file a case against me for graft and corruption, for incompetence.

xxxx

COURT:

I will ask the lawyer to read the statement and if they believe that you are not imputing
any wrong doing to me I will apologize to you.

Atty. Hildawa please come over. The Senior, I respect the old practitioner, whose
integrity is unchallenged.

Sir you said honest. Sir ganoon po ako. You still want to defend your position, so be it.

Atty. Hildawa I beg your indulgence, I am sorry but I know that you are an old
practitioner hammered out by years of practice and whose integrity by reputation
precedes you. Please read what your younger companero has written to this Honorable
Court in pleading and see for yourself the implications he hurled to the Court in his
honest opinion. Remember he said honest. That implication is your honest opinion of an
implication sir.

Sir 1, 2 and 3. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. If that is your honest opinion. Remember the word
you said honest opinion.
Alam mo Atty. Mane I know when one has to be vigilant and vigorous in the pursue of
pride. But if you are vigilant and vigor, you should never crossed the line.

Sir, what is your interpretation to the first three paragraphs?

ATTY. HILDAWA:

There will be some . . .

COURT:

What sir?

ATTY. HILDAWA:

. . . indiscretion.

COURT:

Indiscretion. See, that is the most diplomatic word that an old practitioner could say to
the Court because of respect.

Sir, salamat po.

xxxx

COURT:

Kita po ninyo, iyan po ang matatandang abogado. Indiscretion na lang. Now you say that
is your honest opinion and the old practitioner hammered through years of practice could
only say indiscretion committed by this judge. Much more I who sits in this bench?

Now is that your honest opinion?16 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court thus finds the evaluation by the OCA well-taken.

An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By

hurdling the Bar Examinations which this Court administers, taking of the Lawyer's oath,
and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge
his functions and duties as, inter alia, an officer of the court, irrespective of where he
obtained his law degree. For a judge to determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer
primarily on the basis of his alma mater is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad
hominem.
A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel. If
respondent felt that his integrity and dignity were being "assaulted," he acted properly
when he directed complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He
went out of bounds, however, when he, as the above-quoted portions of the transcript of
stenographic notes show, engaged on a supercilious legal and personal discourse.

This Court has reminded members of the bench that even on the face of boorish
behavior from those they deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in a manner
befitting gentlemen and high officers of the court.17

Respondent having exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge, classified as a light

charge under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is penalized
under Section 11(c) of the same Rule by any of the following: (1) a fine of not less than
P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; and (4) admonition with
warning, the Court imposes upon him the penalty of reprimand.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba City, is found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming
of a judge and is REPRIMANDED therefor. He is further warned that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Footnotes
 1 Rollo, pp. 8-10.

2 Id. at 15.

3 Id. at 34-36.

4 Id. at 33.

5 Id. at 37-38.

6 Paragraph 3 read:

Without imputing any wrongdoings to the Honorable Presiding Judge, the content of the
said Order [dated September 27, 2005] of the Honorable Presiding Judge has induced
doubt as to his competence to handle this case.

7 Should have been paragraph 6.

8 Both dated June 5, 2006, rollo, pp. 44-46.

9 Id. at 47-48.

10 Id. at 1-7.

11 Id. at 2-7.

12 Id. at 7.

13 Id. at 51-52.

14 Id. at 54.

15 Agpalo, Legal And Judicial Ethics 558-559 (2002 ed).

16 Rollo, pp. 17-27.

17 Re: Anonymous Complaint dated Feb. 18, 2005 of a "Court Personnel" against Judge
Francisco C. Gedorio, Jr., RTC, Br. 12, Ormoc City, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1955, May 25,
2007, 523 SCRA 175, 181-182; Bravo v. Morales, A.M. No. P-05-1950, August 30, 2006,
500 SCRA 154, 160.

● In re: Haron S. Meling (43 SCRA 146)

B. M. No. 1154 June 8, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S.

MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS
MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ,
petitioner.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe
while the other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.

The antecedents follow.

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the
2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a
member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the
2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa.
15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for
Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001,
when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front
of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the
face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is
not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows
that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s R E S O L U T I O N2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his

Answer with the OBC.

In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against
him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor,
advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that
the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he
being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases
that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as "closed and
terminated." Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of
do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his
communications really contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him,
typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the
charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition
to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of
competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact,
the cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that
these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the
Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are
made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act
of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished
from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in
which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal
and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person
to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common
honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also
answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that
"a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a
material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar."5

As regards Meling’s use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of
Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid
reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he
is signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well that he is not
entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the
appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.6

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s
Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations.
Further, it recommended that Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar be suspended until
further orders from the Court.7

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did
not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to
prevent Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot
and academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the
appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar is ripe for resolution and
has to be acted upon.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right
but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but
who are also known to possess good moral character.8 The requirement of good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.9

The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with
any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or
administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of,
any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge
against him/her." Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that
he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment,
done under oath at that.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is

satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant.10 The nature of whatever
cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he
is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of
such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately
proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of
the applicant.
Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against
him speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture
of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar.

Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled
to its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had the occasion to
discuss the impropriety of the use of the title "Attorney" by members of the Shari’a Bar
who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, used the title
"Attorney" in several correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract
entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:

…persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence, may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to
the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered "counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law
in this jurisdiction.12

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case.
The solemn task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be
part of service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only
be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and
integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary
and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.

In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his
application to take the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the
Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the
practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate

sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly,
the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED
until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as
the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing
the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for
having become moot and academic.

Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari’a Courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
 SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 2-25, with Annexes.

2 Id. at 27.

3 Id. at 28-32.

4 Supra, note 1 at 34-38.

5 Id. at 35-36, citing Bar Matter 1209, Petition to take the Lawyer’s Oath of Caesar
Distrito and Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859.

6 Id. at 36-37, citing Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court and Bar Matter
1209, supra.

7 Id. at 38.

8 Tan v. Sabandal, Bar Matter No. 44, February 24, 1992, 206 SCRA 473.

9 Leda v. Tabang, Adm. Case No. 2505, February 21, 1992, 206 SCRA 395.

10 See In Re: Victorio D. Lanuevo, Adm. Cases No. 1162-1164, 29 August 1975, 66
SCRA 245, 281.

11 A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997, 268 SCRA 628.

12 Id. at 638-639.

● In re: Ramon Galang (00 SCRA 202)

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court,
respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975

IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee,

respondent.

A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975

IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL

TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members,
1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E.

Galang, alias Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon
Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and
Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions during
the 1971 Bar Examinations.

In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-
correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar
Landicho — who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of
70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively — invited the attention of the Court to "The
starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate
was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released this year"
(Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil
Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio
D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the
grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations —
to raise the grades — prior to the release of the results. Note that this was without any
formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If
the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no
reason why they may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is
made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say that some
candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be
reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason
for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide
the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar
Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public
International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a
successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which,
however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned.
Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is
one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964,
1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%,
56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade
of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was
considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.

Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar
Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their
sworn statements on the matter, with which request they complied.

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought
the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to
the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances
under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-
evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the
representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same
and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing.

Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the
Court required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to
show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-
evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was
unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar
examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show
cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were
also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70,
rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs
on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38,
rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on
March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court
to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp.
106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo
Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No.
954 in Political Law and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a number of examination notebooks
in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-
24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise
included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo
remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law
and Public International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This
notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another successful
candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the
discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of
Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook
bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name of
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned
to testify in the investigation.

An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the

Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that
one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of
Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of
slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de
Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with this information at the
hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared
that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries
in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).

Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make
mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to do.

The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated
on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their
memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective
memorandum on November 14, 1973.

Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in
Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned
to testify.

At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as
evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral
testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted
by them to the Court. The same became the basis for their cross-examination.

In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct
testimony in the investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners
recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the
examination notebooks in question.

In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:

2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the
examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the
practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the
grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary
high grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring back the latter to
the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;

3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the owner
of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate
concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy
of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation
in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;

5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation
and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;

6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based on
the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4
with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7
with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).

His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11,
1972 affidavit with following additional statements:

xxx xxx xxx

3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no
longer to make the reconsideration of these answers because of the same evaluation
and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did not
know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme
Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects;

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am
authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the
following circumstances:

a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971, relationship
between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the point that with respect to the
correction of the examination booklets of bar candidates I have always followed him and
considered his instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme
Court with respect to the same; that I have no alternative but to take his words;

b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation to me as

reflecting the real and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more
to get the consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at
that time, I was isolating myself from all members of the Supreme Court and specially
the chairman of the Bar Committee for fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;

xxx xxx xxx

e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such

recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in
Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the original correction of
the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political
Law and Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:

On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the last
bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which
according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at about
7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two
companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code
number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to
review and re-examine the said notebook because it appears that the examinee
obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had
obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly,
in remedial law.

I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as I
had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so
because the same was still within my control and authority as long as the particular
examinee's name had not been identified or that the code number decode and the
examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the
examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had not been identified or
revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a particularly low grade to
said examinee.

Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as it
was humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-
examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in accordance with the
same standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the
result that the examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing with
the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and as he had assured me that the
code number of the examinee in question had not been decoded and his name
known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the grade card
attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades
(from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy
thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar
Confidant brought with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)

In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation",

respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts
stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged that:

xxx xxx xxx

3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international law, code
numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name
only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to
state that I do not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up to the
present;

4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such review,
and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such
revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of the examinee had not yet
been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently
regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of express prohibition in the rules
and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison
with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as much as possible from frequent
personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner. ...;

5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at
my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not
appear to me that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar
Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel,
accompanied by two companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit
to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used to see me:

xxx xxx xxx

7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when I
submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661, my
aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not to make the examinee pass
the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected
that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades
in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of
course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the
examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular in that:

8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with
notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points,
resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the subject, and, as
heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the
representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...

9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee consensus
was that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the
examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular.
At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names of the
candidates.

10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no knowledge of
the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know the
examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or rather the review
and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April
12, 1972:

1. xxx xxx xxx

2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to
my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.

3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in
Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another subject,
the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying that that
particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and
that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he would
make the general passing average.

4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I
remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark
and revised also the mark in the general list.

5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the
word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity
of the examinee in question who up to now remains a total stranger and without
expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14,
1972, that:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney
Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854
Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's notebook in Remedial
Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me that he and
others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to
review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I had previously given.
He explained that the examine concerned had done well in other subjects, but that
because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his
general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the
paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar.
As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his
answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr.
Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had
previously given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.

3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address
such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr.
Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item of the paper in
question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some
items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the same grades in other items.
However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had
given after re-evaluation, the total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the
passing mark of 75% in my subject.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the
contents of his sworn statement, adding the following:

xxx xxx xxx

5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade of
the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent
acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not having verified from
the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by
Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that
—

a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not aware, not having
been apprised otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court to request or suggest that the grade of a particular examination
notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to the highly
fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the request was legitimate.

xxx xxx xxx

c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent

carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answers
by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt
in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that the
said examine failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee
deserved a higher grade than that previously given to him, but that he did not deserve, in
herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. It should
also be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein respondent downgraded a
previous rating of an answer written by the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April
17, 1972:

xxx xxx xxx

That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar
Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all other
subjects except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate the
paper of this particular Bar candidate;.

That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No.
1613) showing a grade of 61%;

That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular
Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;

That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade
sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his
sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and

xxx xxx xxx

2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-evaluated

the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good
faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made during one of the deliberations
of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a candidate fails in only one subject, the
Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate
concerned, which I did.

3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned re-
evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this time this
particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:

xxx xxx xxx

As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the
posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers on the
first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that those five
merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the examiners
shortly earlier to the effect that

... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to clarify of
language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation
and/or re-checking.

It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the results of
the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be
shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and have them checked
by their professors. Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for re-
correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or
requests which we are reading for submission to the Honorable Court.

Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be
denied because the result of the examinations when released is final and irrevocable.

It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to bring
those notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No.
1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:

That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his hotest
belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to
forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the contrary to do
justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner,
because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the
examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does not remember having made the
alleged misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought to the attention of the
Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another examinee who obtained a
passing general average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the
Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by way of raising the grade in said
subject, respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who
thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers
right, the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".

Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such serious
charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed
another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing that
the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being
that the notebooks in question were submitted to the respective examiners for re-
evaluation believing in all good faith that they so merited on the basis of the Confidential
Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked
as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them
entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order,

2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question:

Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of February, 1972, on my
way back to the office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I
have always made it a point that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from
any object and the first number that comes into my sight becomes the basis of the ticket
that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I saw was "954" boldly printed on an
electrical contribance (evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing
along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the Supreme Court building from San
Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence of the
Araullo High School(photograph of the number '954', the contrivance on which it is
printed and a portion of the post to which it is attached is identified and marked as
Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).

With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that
would contain such number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last
three digits corresponded to "954". This number became doubly impressive to me
because the sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was "27", a number that is so
significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to link or connect it with
said number whenever possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on the Master
List of examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the examinations as Bar
Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with said
number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure
"27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-
Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970
Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-
a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end
of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).

The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these incidents in my life, to
wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was
hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the
last Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still confined at the
hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941
resulting in many casualties. From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the
beginning of a new life for me having been saved from the possibility of being among the
casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army byway of
honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got married and since then we
begot children the youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957.

Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I resumed my work
which at the time was on the checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I came
upon the notebooks bearing the office code number "954". As the number was still fresh
in my mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of the
notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language and the apparent
soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in all good faith on the basis of the
aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that
they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to the
respective examiners for possible review recalling to them the said Confidential
Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.

3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of the
two cases which I brought to the attention of the committee during the meeting and
which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective examines, namely:

(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below
50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No.
110, identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law
bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade of 4% increased to 50%
after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and

(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of 73.15% with a
grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having
inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political
and International Law under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of
this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo
and the notebook in Political and International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661
with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-
Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and International Law is precisely the same
notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo
Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).

4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only one
(1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the
former; and only Political and International Law in the latter, under the facts and
circumstances I made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the Committee
authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-check
some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that there was
very little time left and that the increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly
substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the weight of only 10%
(Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).

The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that
Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led
to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed
of the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he "was going over those
notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of
ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco
post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of respondent Galang
"bearing office code number '954."

Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;

1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo
and never met him before except once when, as required by the latter respondent
submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.

xxx xxx xxx

4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider "failure"
cases; after the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing" case,
especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar confidant do not know each
other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary course of official business?

It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a
reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?

5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated
March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio
Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In fact, the
respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized
anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.

But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the
Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having redounded to the benefit of
herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's
examination papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or especially for him
and not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates who are
supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's grades was done among
those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of policy of the Committee to
increase the percentage of passing in that year's examination and, therefore, the
insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar
Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that
BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an evidence
per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done
in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect because that would be
presuming all the members of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity,
unfit for the bar themselves and the result of their work that year, as also unworthy of
anything. All of these inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in the
resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence,
or consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this Respondent
Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the
actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy between
them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the
Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties and that they should be regarded
as such in the consideration of this case.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).

The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo

systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation
and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and
individually the respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior
authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been submitted to
the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for
and in behalf of the Court.

It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just
before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian
while the latter was in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and
there made the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades
obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an
extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring
back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of
grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation,
representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline
of passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said
examine will get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent
Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the practice and policy of the
Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in doing
so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to
75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code
Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at
the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-
Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects
including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and
could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.

Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972,
respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at
1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law,
which respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo
then requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly to
reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the
said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but that
because of the comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent Manalo in
Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent
Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he thought that if the notebook
were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of being
admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of
respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself
clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of
respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as
follows:

4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal

fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a test of
memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to clarify of
language and soundness of reasoning.

Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo,
believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such
request and further believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate
the examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the
examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%.
Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made by him in the
notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136,
instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39,
74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).

But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the
passing grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.

Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo
went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of
examination papers in Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected,
respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code
Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent
Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all
other subjects except in Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said
notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%, said
examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that
this is possible — the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of
the Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject — respondent Pablo
acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said
notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with
leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an
increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the
grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office
Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V,
pp. 43-46, rec.).

After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still
below the passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.

Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo

brought back to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the
former informing the latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political
Law and Public International Law, as he had already finished correcting the examination
notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal Law — that the examinee who owns that
particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and
that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee
would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing
the justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure of the
examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he
initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in the general list and likewise
initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code
Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2
& 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent
Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he
remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the
passing average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court,
leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He
recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this
was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was
received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).

However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a
passing grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile
Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent
Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme — by securing
authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law
tore-evaluate said notebook.

At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the
rest, the examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as
irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-
Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).

At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was

informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except
Mercantile Law. This information was made during the meeting within hearing of the
order members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made
known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent
Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's
Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the
whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to
71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for
consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-
71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the
particular examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not
have consented to make the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33,
rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he
remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change the
grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook of
examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number
1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).

A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent
Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of
the Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent
Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of
the Bar Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an
examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the
usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the
said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that
particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84%
in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the
grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting
in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office
code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).

II

Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E.

GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.

Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five
examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from
66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points,
more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution
of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination without any
grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath.
It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to
initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other
examinees.

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent

Galang failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing,
Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted
paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases
Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the
members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith
and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not
his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the
contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order
was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp.
35-37, rec.).

But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential
memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial
correction of the examination papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the
examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23,
rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the
norms of delicacy.

We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and

Pamatian — whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions
committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each
other.

For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm.
Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the
investigation and hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly
maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the
1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo
too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the
Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence
that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971
Bar Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the
answers of only respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his
grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's
well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each
of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his
particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the
unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and
in two (2) minor subjects while his general average was only 66.25% — which under no
circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in
one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang
was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one
passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with
grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of Galang before and after the
unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:
BAI

1. Political Law Public

International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
BAI

Labor Laws and Social

Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.

2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points

or 33 weighted points.

Taxation 74% 74% = no re-

evaluation made.

3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.

or 30 weighted points.

4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or

22 weighted points.

5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =

11 pts. or 44 weighted points.

Legal Ethics and Practical

Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in
the five (5) subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average
of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great
damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage
of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible
addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one
notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who — Political Law and Public
International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the
re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the
passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After
the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to
tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter
compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data
showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be
submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will
determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no
business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of
passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all
Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for re-
evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the
Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative,
exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image
of the Court.

Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any
intention of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar
Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled
out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90)
examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully
aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline
cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in
referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as
against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any
dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more
deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by
respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971
Bar examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained
failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar
Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase
of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of
Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his
actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety
examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the
re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the
agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when
the examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in
four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's
notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn
statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the
investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant
consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the wind
for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only
on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on
March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it
was just an after-thought.

REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN

MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER
MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN
POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION,
RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO
66%.

Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid
notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and
Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.

The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela
Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent
Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination
Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer
them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case of
Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-
39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two cases
were contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the
Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every
meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The
alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and record of the dates of the
meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to
him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on
leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears,
however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room
of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No.
1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).

Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one
notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated
by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this
notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47%
in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the
notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner
Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the
notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number
110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed
out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-
Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but
Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an

examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects
except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the
notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot
recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16,
rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an examinee who was
on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was
taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613
(belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed
to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case
of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him
said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office
Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.

Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law
that was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the
Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an
examinee that was referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re-
evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation
made by respondent Lanuevo to him.

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the
members of the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and
passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-
evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was
referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3)
subjects, as follows:
Labor Laws 3%

Taxation 69%

Mercantile Law 68%

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade
in Political Law are as follows:

BA

Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27

weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
————————————————

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)

Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to
Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two
(2) other failing grades. These are:

Political Law 70%

Taxation 72%

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as
follows:

BA

Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation

Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela
Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in
February, 1971, which violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent
Lanuevo.

It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to
Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar
Examination Committee because even at the time of said referral, which was after the
unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing
grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law
was considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the
record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner
Montecillo was 71%.

Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed the

trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of
the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be
disbarred.

As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their
names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to
show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted.

III

Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
respondent.

The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized
re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and
International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal
profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous
established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting
determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by
the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar --
94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the
required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice
Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).

In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee,
composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of
the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to
each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one
hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant
who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the
Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to
membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court
and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar
Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his
functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and
circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.

The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of

respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by
Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust
and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-
evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be
admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any
discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not
clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-
evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is
correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto
is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led to the
candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.

Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among
others, with the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides
that "every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules
of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every
applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case,
pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine
applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is
for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing
the Court of one's personal record — whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted,
convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending — becomes more compelling. The
forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court
beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral
turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of
which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by
respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly
require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated,
implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his
obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court
can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his moral character. And
undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a better
position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that an
applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its
dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or
fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the
Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by the
Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he
has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense
involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against him."
By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application
form prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his
criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the
applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any
offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or
convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a
pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang
continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight
physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and
thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the
Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently
concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries
in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in
court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court,
respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7)
times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of
the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for
revocation of his license to practice law is well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS
741). Thus:

[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in withholding
from the board of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he applied
for admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an indictment for a felony,
was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).

[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he
applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of the
board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law
Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710).

The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to
surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from
the roll of attorneys (p. 710).

Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:

[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the Appellate
Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and
frankly of matters tending to show the character of the applicant and his standing at the
bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of indictments against him, one of
which was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts which should have been
submitted to the court, with such explanations as were available. Silence respecting
them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis
supplied).

Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case

despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of
the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it
when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his
continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the
present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good
demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of
law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court
requiring him to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys,
respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to
the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such
omission.

Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.

Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in
which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his
attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as
WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:

The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it,
but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The
standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one
to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to
receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with
all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a duly
authorized member of the bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].

What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this
present case is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several
occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful bar candidates to the
membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or
false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel
vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico
from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators
contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7
SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and
(c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis
Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe,
54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the
grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of
falsification of public documents.

IV

RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI
Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now
deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and
Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.

All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or
re-correction of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent
BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or
increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who
owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration or
expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion
and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-
correcion in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of
members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should
have exercised greater care and caution and should have been more inquisitive before
acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked
the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter to
the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have required
respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the average
of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their
respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy
themselves that the examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could
have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations could have been avoided.

Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared
under oath that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the
increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of
Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and
Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective
subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the
words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that this
particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60
something, I cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a few points
higher, he would get a passing average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be
the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh.
1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo:
"... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject
except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase
the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I
believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be
done before to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily
acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he
left it with me and what i did was to go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I could.
While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be more
lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade so I
had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet
accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by
respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations
that the increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were
to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by
respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:

Montecillo —

Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the paper?

A Yeas, your Honor.

Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the absence of such
information?

A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.;
see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-
Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).

Pamatian —

3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him the owner of
the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate
concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy
of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..."
(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am
authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..."
(Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Manalo —

(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent
carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answer
by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of the
doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject
that said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee
deserved a higher grade than that previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein
respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Pardo —

... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that
particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the representation of
the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to

induce the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them
can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any
improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades
given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case
No. 1163).

At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-
examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the
re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the
imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory.
Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners that their
participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest
consideration of public interest — absolute purity of the proceedings — and so are
required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their
duties relative thereto.

Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973,
claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or
lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to
respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend — a
participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar
Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9,
Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).

It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the
late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore
cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this
out during the investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His
pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation when Justice
Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian
and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until
this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being
intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or
an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the
five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he
deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their
respective subjects.

It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations,
Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law
examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar
Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971
Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that
an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the
said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was divulged by
respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an
indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit
restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His
unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to impair
public faith in the Supreme Court.

VI

The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of
respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was
committed for valuable consideration.

There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the
official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of
proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme
Court.

1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc.
a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount of
P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on April
5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two
(2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total
amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of
instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972: Second mortgage —
P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription —
April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment
the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or
less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00
of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his
sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through a niece before
Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]

It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from his
sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets
and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.

In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in the
amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets
was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank
deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used
or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his 1971
statement was not realized because the transaction therein involved did not push
through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972;
Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married sister
in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is
not reflected in his 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972.
Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his sister at the time he
received the $200 was not even presented by respondent during the investigation. And
according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did
not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was agreed upon
by them. And furthermore, during the investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to
furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not
fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister,
who has a family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of
money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent
Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing
circumstances.

On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes
house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14,
1972 — date of instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of inscription). On February 28,
1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by
respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143.
Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No.
90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled on March
20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS
remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to respondent
Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that
since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation and retirement (filed October
13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90.
Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS real
estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).

2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car
valued at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and
November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any car was listed in
his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It
appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971
Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his
listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said 1956
VW car worth P5,200.00.

The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations
and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said
acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by respondent Lanuevo with respect
to respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the money used by
respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties came from respondent
Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.

During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent
Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar
Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April
12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent
Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in
view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show cause on
March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a
consciousness of guilt.

It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16,
1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of
P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a
down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he
bought on April 5, 1972.

Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a

& e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority
or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be
presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.

Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public
officer once it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to
his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act
3019).

It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements

of Assets and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they
were examined as they are part of the records of this Court.

There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent

Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter
become the bar Confidant.

1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational
program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days — 1951 to 1955 —
up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) —
1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with
the Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency entrusted with the
affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From
1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of Junior Investigator,
Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims
Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time,
therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of
the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16,
1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing
(A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time
attended to the availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was
already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to
1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he
was employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80,
86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was the private
secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a
copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the
MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from
Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the
school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E.
Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).

Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the
Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not
even know the location of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of
the G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans
Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang
admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that
he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.).
The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is
obliquely across the City Court building.

2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board,

he investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits
and disability benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his
duties as veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for
educational benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and
has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).

3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry

operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol.
VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with
the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).

He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father
belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar
only and he had no communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the
country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only
and does not remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was
 employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of
Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army
stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with
pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and
was still confined there when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes
on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27,
1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).

German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla
Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted
as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His
unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div.,
US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division,
US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies,
from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of
demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks
to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without
prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong
disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as
above delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D.

LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM
THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163,
RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY
LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE
ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ.,
concur.

Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.

Antonio, J., is on official leave.

Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.

● Philippine Lawyers’ Association vs. Agrava (105 PHIL 73)

G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office,
respondent.

Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for
respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and
injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent
Office.

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had
scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are
qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said
examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said
office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other
persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said
examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding
similar examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has
passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director
requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an
examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to
practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and
prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of
the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the
prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but
includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so
that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not
only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and
technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . .
. that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial
body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to
handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph,
requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere
application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in
accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the
Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the
United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed
by respondent. . . .

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America
authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to
who practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly
authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.

Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have
been holding tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required
qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time
that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the
bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it
careful thought and consideration.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine
Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial
or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to
whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the
prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare
of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all
times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of
the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile
Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office,
the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of
their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights
in patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent
Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and
training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as
well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent
Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office
involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as
the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and
procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not
be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare.
Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was
known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor
named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one
year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale
in the Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor.
Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his
heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any
mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that
although any person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor
General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the
requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of
hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the
said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three
years from the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such
as, if the patented invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial
scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale,
or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an
adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant
a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the
license, purchase or use of the patented article or working of the patented process or
machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is
prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to
public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal
principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and
experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.

In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and
decisions of the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct
evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:

. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a
proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any
other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or
decision of the director.

In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the
Patent Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved
exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the
appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists,
engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions
and acts of the Head of the Patent Office.

. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and

extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the
duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the
legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).

. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the
granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new
and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a
patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should decide
not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior
public use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is

reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and
training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further
examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it
advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him enlist
the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and
documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine
sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the
registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and
technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.

But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require
persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even
if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act
No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent
Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent)
has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said
Rules of Practice:

Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a register agents

are kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized
as entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and
prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the
provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the
Patent Office.

(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before
any United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United
States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may
be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the
register of attorneys.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and register
unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form
supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and
shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character
and of good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications
necessary to enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is
otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of
their application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine
whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the registers has the
qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of
sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted and an
examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an
examination may be waived in the case of any person who has served for three years in
the examining corps of the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States
Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which
reads as follows:

The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce

may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or
other persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require
of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of
applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in
good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to
applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise
and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their
applications or other business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may,
after notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any
particular case from further practice before his office any person, agent or attorney
shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses
to comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any
matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or other
person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or
prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The
reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the
Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition
or so suspended by the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia
under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules
determine. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to
the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and
regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and
pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes
of comparison:

SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with
law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions
of the United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine
the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S.
Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that
they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to
and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a
test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent
on this important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our
Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to
practice before the Patent Office.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to
prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to
secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to
carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau.
Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of
the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the
provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon
recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules
and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We
understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau of
Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern
the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of
law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on
examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent
Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less
complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures,
confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any
lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of
clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar
authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their
profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said
office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the
Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to
establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or
quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law,
taken to the Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent
Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to
an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and
practice before the Patent Office. No costs.
 Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 In re: Albino Cunanan, 50 Off. Gaz. m, 1617, prom. March 18, 1954.

● Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay, B.M. No.
1678, December 17, 2007

[B.M. NO. 1678 : December 17, 2007]

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY,

Petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to
resume the practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he
migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada's free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he
took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General
in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to
resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M.
Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine
citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule
138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. - Every applicant
for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and
must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character,
and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the
qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyer's oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain
modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affected

with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of

morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in
good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a
lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which
the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. - Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member
of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule,
and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance
with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to
practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that
an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also
produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory
proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8
taking the lawyer's oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of
court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a
continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly,
payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional
tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful
observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject
to judicial disciplinary control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law
in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be
limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is
a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen

of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because
"all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost
his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is
also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no
automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and
he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise,
before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his
law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education;
this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner's knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer's oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED,

subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such
compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the
Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-

Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de
Castro, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.

Endnotes:

1 As evidence thereof, he submitted a copy of his Identification Certificate No. 07-16912

duly signed by Immigration Commissioner Marcelino C. Libanan.

2 In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Deliquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon, A.C.
No. 1928, 19 December 1980, 101 SCRA 612.

3 Heck v. Santos, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 329.

4 In re Atty. Marcial Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, 03 August 1978, 84 SCRA 554.

5 Section 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

6 Id.

7 Sections 2, 5 and 6, id.

8 Sections 8 to 11 and 14, id.

9 Section 17, id.

10 Sections 18 and 19, id.

 11 In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 09 January 1973, 49 SCRA 22; In re
Atty. Marcial Edillon, supra note 3.

12 Section 139, RA 7160.

13 Resolution dated August 8, 2000 in Bar Matter No. 850 (Rules on Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education for Members of the IBP).

14 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., G.R.
No. L-23959, 29 November 1971, 42 SCRA 302.

15 See last paragraph of Section 14, Article XII.

16 In re Bosque, 1 Phil. 88 (1902).

17 Section 2, RA 9225. Emphasis supplied.

18 Section 5(4), id.

● Tan vs. Sabandal, 126 SCRA 60 (1983)

B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992

EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant,

vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992

MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant,

vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992

HERVE DAGPIN, complainant,

vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent.

Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.

RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of law
filed against respondent Sabandal and accordingly denied the latter's petition to be
allowed to take the oath as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of
Attorneys.

From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the aforesaid

Resolution, all of which were either denied or "Noted without action." The Court,
however, on 10 February 1989, after considering his plea for mercy and forgiveness, his
willingness to reform and the several testimonials attesting to his good moral character
and civic consciousness, reconsidered its earlier Resolution and finally allowed him to
take the lawyer's oath "with the Court binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly
abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath and the
highest standards of the legal profession" (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170
SCRA 211).

However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking, complainants Tan,
Dagpin and Boquia each filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Resolution of
10 February 1989. These were acted upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder
quoted, in part, for ready reference:

On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and Complainant Moises
Boquia in SBC No. 609 also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution
allowing respondent to take his oath. They alleged that respondent had deliberately and
maliciously excluded them in his Petition of 28 June 1988. That, of course, is without
merit considering that in his Petition of 28 June 1988, respondent had discussed said
cases quite lengthily.

On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that Complainant Benjamin Cabigon
in BM No. 59 and Complainant Cornelio Agnis in SBC No. 624, had passed away so that
they are in no position to submit their respective Comments.

One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing respondent to take his
oath, was a testimonial from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, dated 29 December
1986, certifying that respondent was "acting with morality and has been careful in his
actuations in the community."

Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed only by the then
President of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, without
authorization from the Board of Officers of said Chapter; and that Atty. Angeles was
respondent's own counsel as well as the lawyer of respondent's parents-in-law in CAR
Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached to Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration was
a Certification, dated 24 February 1989, signed by the IBP Zamboanga del Norte
Chapter President, Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas, stating that "the present Board of Officers
with the undersigned as President had not issued any testimonial attesting to the good
moral character and civic consciousness of Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."

In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989, respondent states that the
IBP testimonial referred to by Complainant Tan must have been that signed by the
former IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, addressed
to the Chief Justice, dated 29 December 1986, and that he himself had not submitted to
the Court any certification from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter Board of Officers
of 1988-1989.

Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require the present Board of
Officers of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, to MANIFEST whether or not it is
willing to give a testimonial certifying to respondent's good moral character as to entitle
him to take the lawyer's oath, and if not, the reason therefor. The Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte is likewise required to submit a
COMMENT on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.

Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from notice.

Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4 August 1989,
and received on 25 August 1989, pertinently reading:

The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the respondent, is not
aware of any acts committed by him as would disqualify him from admission to the Bar.
It might be relevant to mention, however, that there is Civil Case No. 3747 entitled
Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the Director of Lands, Plaintiff, versus
Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte and Rural Bank of Pinan,
(Zamboanga del Norte), Inc., for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion pending in this
Court in which said respondent, per complaint filed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land
which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible of
acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Pinan
(ZN) Inc. The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land sold at public auction and
respondent has not redeemed the land until the present. (Emphasis Supplied)

The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification, dated 2 February
1990, signed by its Secretary Peter Y. Co and attested to by its President Gil L. Batula,
to wit:
This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court
—Municipal Trial Court in the City of Dipolog; Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del
Norte and the Office of the Provincial and City Prosecutors, Mr. Nicolas E. Sabandal has
not been convicted of any crime, nor is there any pending derogatory criminal case
against him. Based on the above findings, the Board does not find any acts committed
by the petitioner to disqualify him from admission to the Philippine Bar.

We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP Certification and to reply
to Executive Judge Pelagio Lachica's comment in our Resolution of 15 February 1990.

On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement objections of

complainants Tan (in BM 44) and Boquia (in SBC 616) and the Certification by Executive
Judge Lachica, dated 4 August 1989, that there is a pending case before his Court
involving respondent Sabandal, this Court resolved to DEFER the setting of a date for
the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and required Judge Lachica to inform this Court
of the outcome of the case entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747), pending
before his "Sala" as soon as resolved.

In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another Comment, dated 13
March 1990, by complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the
oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747 as
manipulative and surreptitious. This comment was Noted in the Resolution of 22 May
1990.

In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990, complainant Tan in
Bar Matter 44, informed the Court that her relationship with Sabandal has "already been
restored," as he had asked forgiveness for what has been done to her and that she finds
no necessity in pursuing her case against him. Complainant Tan further stated that she
sees no further reason to oppose his admission to the Bar as he had shown sincere
repentance and reformation which she believes make him morally fit to become a
member of the Philippine Bar. "In view of this development," the letter stated, "we highly
recommend him for admission to the legal profession and request this Honorable Court
to schedule his oath-taking at a time most convenient." This letter was Noted in the
Resolution of 2 October 1990, which also required a comment on Tan's letter from
complainants Boquia and Dagpin.

Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their comment, dated 5
November 1990, stated thus:

Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private personal disposition which
raises the question whether personal forgiveness is enough basis to exculpate and
obliterate these cases. On our part, we believe and maintain the importance and finality
of the Honorable Supreme Court's resolutions in these cases. . . .
It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and discretion of any party to
change or amend said final resolutions which are already res judicata. Viewed in the
light of the foregoing final and executory resolutions, these cases therefore should not in
the least be considered as anything which is subject and subservient to the changing
moods and dispositions of the parties, devoid of any permanency or finality.
Respondent's scheming change in tactics and strategy could not improve his case.

The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.

In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico M. Garcia,

Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch 8, Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded Judge
Pelagio Lachica, the latter having availed of optional retirement on 30 June 1990)
submitted to this Court, on 17 December 1990, a copy of the "Judgment," dated 12
December 1990, in Civil Case 3747, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas
Sabandal et al" for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion, which, according to him, was
already considered closed and terminated.

Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October 1990, had been
reached between the principal parties, approved by the Trial Court, and conformed to by
the counsel for defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.

Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate of Title under Free
Patent in Sabandal's name and the latter's mortgage thereof in favor of the Rural Bank
of Pinan; provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the Register of Deeds for
proper annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by the
aforesaid Certificate of' Title with defendant Sabandal refraining from exercising acts of
possession or ownership over said land; caused the defendant Sabandal to pay
defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of P35,000 for the loan and interest; and the
Rural Bank of Pinan to waive its cross-claims against defendant Nicolas Sabandal.

Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were NOTED in our
Resolution of 29 January 1991. In the same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia and
Dagpin were required to comment on the same.

Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990, was sent by

Executive judge Jesus Angeles of the RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that
Sabandal has no pending case with his Court and that he has no cause to object to his
admission to the Philippine Bar. This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 26 February 1991.

Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in a
Motion dated 8 June 1991. In our Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action on
the aforesaid Motion pending compliance by the complainants with the Resolution of 29
January 1991 requiring them to comment on the letter of Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.
To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution by submitting a
Comment, dated 29 August 1991, stating that the termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is
"proof of Sabandal's sincere reformation, of his repentance with restitution of the rights
of complainants he violated," and that "there is no more reason to oppose his admission
to the Bar." This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 24 September 1991.

In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his plea to be allowed

to take the Lawyer's Oath.

His plea must be DENIED.

In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take the oath, ten (10)
years having elapsed from the time he took and passed the 1976 Bar examinations,
after careful consideration of his show of contrition and willingness to reform. Also taken
cognizance of were the several testimonials attesting to his good moral character and
civic consciousness. At that time, we had not received the objections from complainant
Tan to Sabandal's taking the oath nor were we aware of the gravity of the civil case
against him.

It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas
Sabandal" was instituted by the Government in 1985 and was brought about because of
respondent's procurement of a certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging
to the public domain and its use as security for a mortgage in order to obtain a loan. At
that time, Sabandal was an employee of the Bureau of Lands. He did not submit any
defense and was declared it default by order of the RTC dated 26 November 1986. The
controversy was eventually settled by mere compromise with respondent surrendering
the bogus certificate of title to the government and paying-off the mortgagor, "to buy
peace and forestall further expenses of litigation incurred by defendants" (Rollo,
Judgment in Civil Case No. 3747). The Office of the Solicitor General interposed no
objection to the approval of the said amicable settlement and prayed that judgment be
rendered in accordance therewith, "as the amicable settlement may amount to a
confession by the defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must also be stressed that in 1985, at the
time said case was instituted, Sabandal's petition to take the lawyer's oath had already
been denied on 29 November 1983 and he was then submitting to this Court motions for
reconsideration alleging his good moral character without, however, mentioning the
pendency of that civil case against him.

In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its termination, the
Court now entertains second thoughts about respondent's fitness to become a member
of the Bar.

It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands.
Said employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over property which
he could not but have known was public land. This was manipulative on his part and
does not speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty
while in the public service, which can not be erased by the termination of the case filed
by the Republic against him where no determination of his guilt or innocence was made
because the suit had been compromised. Although as the Solicitor General had pointed
out, the amicable settlement was tantamount to a confession on his part. What is more,
he could not but have known of the intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet he took
advantage of it by securing a bank loan, mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding
the foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the land at public auction, he did not lift a
finger to redeem the same until the civil case filed against him was eventually
compromised. This is a sad reflection on his sense of honor and fair dealing. His failure
to reveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him
during the period that he was submitting several Motions for Reconsideration before us
also reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness.

There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these were
confined to lack of knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against him and
were obviously made without awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
case instituted by the Government against him. Those testimonials can not, therefore,
outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack of good moral character.

That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and Herve Dagpin (in
SBC 619) have not submitted any opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no
moment. They have already expressed their objections in their earlier comments. That
complainant Tan has withdrawn her objection to his taking the oath can neither tilt the
balance in his favor, the basis of her complaint treating as it does of another subject
matter.

Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also
known to possess good moral character:

The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard
for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training as well as in
honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally
interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to
admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be
honest and to possess good moral character. . . . (In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230).

Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been
defined as "including at least common honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376,
April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has also been
held that no moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness
or candor (Fellner v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).
 WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a member of the
BAR, this Court's Resolution, dated 10 February 1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to
be allowed to take the lawyer's oath is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* In Bar Matter No. 44 (Eufrosina Yap Tan and Nicolas El. Sabandal) Bar Matter No. 59
(Benjamin Cabigon v. Nicolas El Sabandal) & SBC 624 (Cornelio Agnis and Diomedes
Agnis v. Nicolas El. Sabandal) [126 SCRA 60].

● In Re: Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys, Michael Medado, B.M. No. 2540,
September 24, 2013I

B.M. No. 2540 September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS

MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael
A. Medado (Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of
Laws in 19791 and passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted
average of 82.7.2

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention
Center (PICC) together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign
in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date,
allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by
the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a vacation.6
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the
Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in
the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an
attendance record.7

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was
mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in
litigation practice. Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had
already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as
crucial to his status as a lawyer";8 and "the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost
its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten."9

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)

seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances
to be credited.10

Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition,
praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the
matter on 21 September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this
Court on 4 February 2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied
for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained
that, based on his answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no
valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition,
subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension
from the practice of law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be
akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have
reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally
filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third
party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado
himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30
years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant
petition, Medado very candidly replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka
kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time,
it’s a combination of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s
the right thing to do. I have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as
necessary.16

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the
practice of law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were
successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact
demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of
the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the character
required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having
held various positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the
Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.19

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the

Philippine Bar.1âwphi1 While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this
Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown
mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his
years of inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more
than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior
by characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken
belief and an honest error of judgment."22

We disagree.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal
consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law
cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the
law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under
an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC
entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment
he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no
longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado
should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because
of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that
would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue
practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for
admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an
attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute
indirect contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28
Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached
after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case, while it appears
quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging
in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect
contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of

'the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of
law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to
prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and
Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves
in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged
lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose
upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition
against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount
of ₱32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to
engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes
practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by
this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED.
Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1)
YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of
₱32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is
NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that
constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will
be severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar

of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.,

Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
(On leave)
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice (On official leave)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA**
Associate Justice
(On official leave)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN**
Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice (On leave)
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice (On official leave)
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Footnotes

* On leave.

** On official leave

1 Rollo, p. 1; Petition dated 6 February 2012.

2 Id.

3 Id. at 2.

4 Id.

5 Id. at 10.

6 Id. at 2.

7 Id.

8 Id.

9 Id.

10 Id. at 3.

11 Id. at 4.

12 Id. at 20; TSN, 21 September 2012.

13 Id. at 35-43; Report and Recommendation of the OBC dated 24 January 2013.

14 Id. at 42.

15 Id.

16 Rollo, p. 28; Report and Recommendation of the OBC dated 24 January 2013.

17 Id. at 3; Petition dated 6 February 2012.

18 Id. at 22; TSN, 21 September 2012, p. 3.

 19 Id. at 34; id. at 15.

20 Barcenas v. Alvero, A.C. No. 8159, 23 April 2010, 619 SCRA 1, 11.

21 Rollo, p. 35; TSN, 21 September 2012, p. 16.

22 Id. at 3; Petition dated 6 February 2012.

23 Wooden v. Civil Service Commission, 508 Phil. 500, 515 (2005).

24 Manuel v. People, 512 Phil. 818, 836 (2005).

25 Id.

26 Aguirre v. Rana, 451 Phil. 428, 435 (2003).

27 RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, Sec. 3(e).

28 Tan v. Balajadia, 519 Phil. 632 (2006).

29 Id.

30 RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, Sec. 3.

31 See Tapay v. Bancolo, A. C. No. 9604, 20 March 2013; Noe-Lacsamana v.

Busmente, A. C. No. 7269, 23.

● In Re: Petition to re-acquire the privilege to practice law in the Philippines,

Epifanio Meneses, Bar Matter No. 112, July 24, 2012

● Caronan v. Caronan, A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016

A.C. No. 11316

PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant

vs.
RICHARD A. CARONAN a.k.a. "ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN," Respondent

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by complainant Patrick A.

Caronan (complainant), before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan,"
whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for purportedly
assuming complainant's identity and falsely representing that the former has the required
educational qualifications to take the Bar Examinations and be admitted to the practice
of law.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio2 R. Caronan, Jr. and Norma
A. Caronan. Respondent is the older of the two, having been born on February 7, 1975,
while complainant was born on August 5, 1976.3 Both of them completed their
secondary education at the Makati High School where complainant graduated in 19934
and respondent in 1991.5 Upon his graduation, complainant enrolled at the University of
Makati where he obtained a degree in Business Administration in 1997.6 He started
working thereafter as a Sales Associate for Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC), the
operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores.7 In 2001, he married Myrna G. Tagpis with whom
he has two (2) daughters.8 Through the years, complainant rose from the ranks until, in
2009, he was promoted as a Store Manager of the 7-11 Store in Muntinlupa.9

Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan
ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one (1) year before transferring to
the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in 1992.10 In 1993, he was discharged from the
PMA and focused on helping their father in the family's car rental business. In 1997, he
moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their three (3) children.11 Since
then, respondent never went back to school to earn a college degree.12

In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told complainant that the
former had enrolled in a law school in Nueva Vizcaya.13

Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant that respondent passed the
Bar Examinations and that he used complainant's name and college records from the
University of Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's College of Law in Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar Examinations.14 Complainant brushed these aside as
he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to him.15

In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and identity
when he saw the name "Patrick A. Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission to the Bar
displayed at the latter's office in Taguig City.16 Nevertheless, complainant did not
confront respondent about it since he was pre-occupied with his job and had a family to
support.17

Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager, complainant
was ordered to report to the head office of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon
arrival, he was informed that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was requesting
his presence at its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an investigation involving
respondent who, at that point, was using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."18
Accordingly, on May 18, 2009, complainant appeared before the Anti-Fraud and
Computer Crimes Division of the NBI where he was interviewed and asked to identify
documents including: (1) his and respondent's high school records; (2) his transcript of
records from the University of Makati; (3) Land Transportation Office's records showing
his and respondent's driver's licenses; (4) records from St. Mary's University showing
that complainant's transcript of records from the University of Makati and his Birth
Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's University's College of Law; and (5) Alumni Book
of St. Mary's University showing respondent's photograph under the name "Patrick A.
Caronan."19 Complainant later learned that the reason why he was invited by the NBI
was because of respondent's involvement in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by
Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the principal sponsors at respondent's
wedding.20

Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit
unlawful activities, complainant took it upon himself to inform other people that he is the
real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent's real name is Richard A. Caronan.21
However, problems relating to respondent's use of the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan"
continued to hound him. In July 2013, PSC received a letter from Quasha Ancheta Peña
& Nolasco Law Offices requesting that they be furnished with complainant's contact
details or, in the alternative, schedule a meeting with him to discuss certain matters
concerning respondent.22 On the other hand, a fellow church-member had also told him
that respondent who, using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," almost victimized his
(church-member's) relatives.23 Complainant also received a phone call from a certain
Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how respondent tricked her into believing
that he was authorized to sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when in fact, he was not.24
Further, he learned that respondent was arrested for gun-running activities, illegal
possession of explosives, and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.25

Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A. Caronan,"
complainant developed a fear for his own safety and security.26 He also became the
subject of conversations among his colleagues, which eventually forced him to resign
from his job at PSC.27 Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop
respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and illegal practice of law.28

In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the allegations against him and invoked res
judicata as a defense. He maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an
issue as it had already been resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of
Governors dismissed30 the administrative case31 filed by Agtarap against him, and
which case had already been declared closed and terminated by this Court in A.C. No.
10074.32 Moreover, according to him, complainant is being used by Reyes and her
spouse, Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit,
and harass him because he filed several administrative and criminal complaints against
them before the Ombudsman.33

On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory conference where
both parties failed to appear.34 Instead, respondent moved to reset the same on April
20, 2015.35 On such date, however, both paiiies again failed to appear, thereby
prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an Order36 directing them to file their respective
position papers. However, neither of the parties submitted any.37

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera

(Investigating Commissioner) issued his Report and Recommendation,38 finding
respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming complainant's name, identity, and
academic records.39 He observed that respondent failed to controvert all the allegations
against him and did not present any proof to prove his identity.40 On the other hand,
complainant presented clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan."41

Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when
he disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio Ramos
Caronan and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.42 However,
based on the Marriage Certificate issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO), "Patrick
A. Caronan" is married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.43

The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that the photograph
taken of respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012
shows the same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick
A. Caronan."44 These, according to the Investigating Commissioner, show that
respondent indeed assumed complainant's identity to study law and take the Bar
Examinations.45 Since respondent falsely assumed the name, identity, and academic
records of complainant and the real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither obtained the bachelor
of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.46 He also recommended that respondent and the
name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a member of the Bar; and
finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was directed to institute
appropriate actions against respondent.47

On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-607,48
adopting the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name
"Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A.
Caronan" be barred from being admitted to the Bar.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb
the findings and recommendations of the IBP.

As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and

overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent,
whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name, identity, and
academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a law
degree, and take the Bar Examinations.

As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings
when he disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio
Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo.49 Respondent himself also stated that he is married
to Rosana Halili-Caronan.50 This diverges from the official NSO records showing that
"Patrick A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.51
Moreover, the photograph taken of respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A.
Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the photograph in
the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."52 Meanwhile, complainant submitted
numerous documents showing that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan," among which
are: (a) his transcript of records from the University of Makati bearing his photograph;53
(b) a copy of his high school yearbook with his photograph and the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" under it;54 and (c) NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013.55

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used
complainant's name, identity, and school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since
complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP
correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A.
Caronan," be barred from admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he
had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, VIZ.:

Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be

admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education
that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in
an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the
completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a
bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subject as major or field of
concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history, and economics.
(Emphases supplied)

In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled
at the PLM in 1991, he left a year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged
in 1993 without graduating.56 Clearly, respondent has not completed the requisite pre-
law degree.

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his
college education and earn a law degree under his real name.1âwphi1 However, his
false assumption of his brother's name, identity, and educational records renders him
unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it.57 Rather, it is a privilege
limited to citizens of good moral character.58 In In the Matter of the Disqualification of
Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary Action
as Member of the Philippine Shari 'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez,59the Court
explained the essence of good moral character:

Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation
or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the
public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one
which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional
integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the
penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.60
(Emphasis supplied)

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member
of the Bar when he assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own brother
and dragged the latter into controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his
safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral
character is essential in those who would be lawyers.61 This is imperative in the nature
of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists between him and his client, as
well as between him and the court.62

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the
necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his
alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases
against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal
profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity and
dignity.63

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan"

(respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name, identity, and academic
records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law degree and
take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil
and/or criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves that:

(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is ordered
DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any
representations as a lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the
future;

(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent
under the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education Certificates issued in such name are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and

(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in
the bulletin boards of all courts of the country a photograph of respondent with his real
name, " Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that he is not a member of the Philippine
Bar and a statement of his false assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A.
Caronan."

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
On Official Leave
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA*
Associate Justice On Official Leave
BIENVENIDO L. REYES**
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice

Footnotes

* On official leave.

** On official leave.

1 Dated October 10, 2013. Rollo, pp. 9-18.

2 "Porfirio" in some parts of the record.

3 Rollo, pp. 9-10.

4 Id. at 10.

5 Id. at 11.

6 Id. 10.

7 Id.

8 Id. at 11.

9 See id. at 10-12.

10 Id. at 11.

11 Id. at 10-11.

12 Id. at 11.

13 Id.

14 Id. at 12.
15 Id.

16 Id.

17 Id.

18 Id.

19 Id. at 12-13.

20 Id.at 13.

21 Id. at 13-14.

22 Id. 14.

23 Id. at 13.

24 Id. at 14.

25 Id. Entitled "Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a Check Without
Sufficient Funds or Credit and for Other Purposes," approved on April 3, 1979.

26 Id. at 16.

27 Id.

28 Id. at 17.

29 Dated May 5, 2015. Id at 77-80.

30 See Notice of Resolution in Resolution No. XX-2012-649 dated December 29, 2012
issued by National Secretary Nasser A. Marohomsalic; id. at 110.

31 See complaint for disbarment dated December 18, 2008, entitled "Joseph Garcia
Agtarap v. Atty. Patrick Atillo Caronan"; id. at 81-90.

32 See Minute Resolution dated October23, 2013; id. at 111-112.

33 See id. at 77-79.

34 See Minutes of the Hearing; id. at 71.

35 See Motion to Cancel/ Reset Mandatory Conference/ Hearing dated March 9, 2015;
id. at 72-73.

36 Dated April 20, 2015 issued by Commissioner Jose V. Cabrera. Id. at 76.

37 Id.at 127.

38 Id. at ll7-134.

39 Id. at 131.

40 Id. at 130.

41 Id. at 129.

42 Id. at 130.

43 Id. See also id. at 30.

44 Id. at 129. See also id. at 50-51 and 59.

45 Id. at 131.

46 Id. at 133.

47 Id.

48 Id. at 115-116.

49 Id. at 130. See also id. at 49.

50 Id at 130.

51 Id. See id. at 38.

52 Id. at 129. See also id. at 51 and 59.

53 Id. at 23-25.

54 Id. at 29.

55 Id. at 45-46.

56 See id. at 11. See also Application for the PMA; id. at 36-37.
 57 In the Matter of the Admission to the Bar of Argosino, 316 Phil. 43, 46 (1995).

58 Id.

59 See B.M. No. 1154, June 8, 2004.

60 Id.

61 Supra note 56, at 46-50.

62 See Lizaso v. Amante, 275 Phil. I, 11 (1991).

63 Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

● Andres v. Cabrera, 127 SCRA 802

G.R. No. 585 December 14, 1979

EMILIA E. ANDRES, petitioner,

vs.
STANLEY R. CABRERA, respondent.

GUERRERO, J.:

In a resolution of this Court dated October 11, 1979, respondent Stanley R. Cabrera. a
successful bar examine in 1977 and against whom a petition to disqualify him from
membership in the Bar is pending in this Court in the above-entitled case, was required
to show cause why he should not be cited and punished for contempt of court.

The above citation for contempt against the respondent was issued by the Court
following the persistence of the respondent in the use of, abusive and vituperative
language despite the Court's admonition implicit in Our previous resolution of June 5,
1979 deferring the oath-taking of respondent pending showing that he has amended his
ways and conformed to the use of polite, courteous and civil language.

The petition to disqualify respondent from admission to the Bar was filed by Atty. Emilia
F. Andres, Legal Officer II in the Office of the Minister, Ministry of Labor on the ground of
lack of good moral character as shown by his propensity in using vile, uncouth, and in
civil language to the extent of being reprehensively malicious and criminally libelous and
likewise, for his proclivity in filing baseless, malicious and unfounded criminal cases.
It appears that Atty. Emilia E. Andres, designated as Special Investigator to investigate
the administrative charge filed by Mrs. Presentacion R. Cabrera, mother of the
respondent, against one, Atty. Benjamin Perez, former Hearing Officer of the defunct
Workmen's Compensation Unit, Region IV, Manila, for alleged dishonesty, oppression
and discourtesy, recommended the dismissal of the charge even as the records of two
relevant Workmen's Compensation cases were not produced at the hearing,
notwithstanding the request of the respondent. When the Minister of Labor dismissed the
charges upon Atty. Andres' recommendation, respondent filed with the City Fiscal of
Manila criminal charges of infidelity in the custody of documents. falsification of public
documents, and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against the
investigator.

Supporting these criminal charges are affidavits of respondent Stanley R. Cabrera

wherein Atty. Andres. now the petitioner, points to the vile, in civil and uncouth language
used by respondent, as shown in the following excerpts:

9. That the moronic statements of Atty. Ernesto Cruz and Atty. Emilia Andres are the
product of moronic conspiracy to conceal the said falsified, fraudulent and unauthorized
document in the sense that how can the CARS conduct a diligent search tor the
aforesaid document when according to the moronic excuse of the Chief of the said office
which took over the functions of the defunct WCC considering that it is easier to resort to
the list of the inventory of cases before conducting a diligent search unless both are
morons with regards to their public office ... (emphasis supplied).

10. That due to the fact that Acting Referee Benjamin R. Perez, Alfredo Antonio, Jr.,
Atty. Ernesto Cruz and Atty. Emilia Andres has perpetrated a moronic but criminal
conspiracy to conceal the falsified fraudulent and unauthorized petition ... (emphasis
supplied).

... And to show beyond reasonable doubt that that the letter is a manufactured evidence
respondent Atty. Andres in another demonstration of her unparalleled stupidity in the
discharge of her public functions moronically failed to affix her signature to further
aggravate matters said manufactured evidence was moronically received upon unlawful
inducement by respondents Atty. Cruz and Atty. Andres in furtherance of the criminal
conspiracy by the Idiotic with regards to the discharge of public functions ... (emphasis
supplied)

The same words and phrases are used in respondent's other affidavits supporting the
criminal cases against the petitioner such as the following:

Her moronic but criminal participation as a conspirator

another demonstration of her unparalleled stupidity in the discharge of her public

functions moronically failed to affix her signature
said manufactured evidence was moronically received by unlawful inducement by
respondents

idiotic receiving clerk of CAR

unparalleled stupidity of chief respondent

On April 28, 1977, this Court required respondent to file an answer to the petition to
disqualify him from admission to the Bar and ordered at the same time that his oath-
taking be held in abeyance until further orders. In his answer, respondent admits the
filing of criminal cases in the City Fiscal's Office against the petitioner but he claims that
his language was not vile uncouth and un civil due to the simple reason that the same is
the truth and was made with good intentions and justifiable motives pursuant to
respondent's sense of justice as cherished under the New Society, aside from being
absolutely privileged. Respondent's answer, however, repeats his former allegations that
"Atty. Emilia Andres is not only a moron" and reiterates "the moronic discharge of public
functions by complainant Atty. Emilia Andres."

The records show repeated motions of respondent dated October 21, 1977 and
February 22, 1978 for the early resolution of his case and in his letter dated April 11,
1978 addressed to then Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, respondent sought, in his very
words "some semblance of justice from the Honorable Supreme Court of the Philippines"
and another letter to the Chief Justice dated August 17, 1978 making reference to the
"avalance of the sadistic resolution en banc," "the cruel and inhuman punishment the
Court has speedily bestowed upon undersigned respondent," "the Court does not honor
its own resolution," and closing his letter thus — "A victim of the Court's inhuman and
cruel punishment through its supreme inaction."

We referred the petition of Atty. Emilia Andres to the Legal Investigator of the Court for
investigation, report and recommendation which was submitted on May 24, 1979. Acting
on said report, the Court resolved to defer the oath-taking of respondent pending
showing that he has amended his ways and has conformed to the use of polite,
courteous and civil language. Thereafter, respondent filed on September 3, 1979 an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to annul Our resolution of June 5, 1979 and to reinvestigate the
case, preferably giving opportunity to respondent to argue his case orally before the
Court or to allow him to take his oath of office as an attorney. We denied the motion.

On September 11, 1979, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt of Court,
praying the Supreme Court to cite complainant Atty. Emilia Andres for contempt of court,
alleging that her false and malicious accusations coupled with her improper and
obnoxious acts during the investigation impeded, obstructed and degraded the
administration of justice. Under paragraph 2 of said motion, he states:
2. That with all due respect to this Court, the aforestated resolution en banc to DEFER
my oath-taking as an attorney pending showing that "he has amended his ways and has
conformed to the use of polite, courteous, and civil language" is a degradation of the
administration of justice due to the fact that the same is bereft of legal foundation due to
the fact that the investigation conducted by Atty. Victor J. Sevilla, whose supreme
stupidity in the discharge of his official functions is authenticated by his overt partiality to
the complainant as authenticated by the transcript of records of this case thus depriving
undersigned respondent-movant of the "Cold and neutral impartiality of a judge"
tantamount to lack of due process of law; (emphasis supplied).

We noted that the above paragraph is a repetition of paragraph 4 in respondent's

previous Urgent Ex-Parte Motion dated September 3, 1979 which also states:

4. That with all due respect to this Court, the aforestated resolution en banc to DEFER
my oath-taking as an attorney pending showing that "he has amended his ways and has
conformed to the use of polite, courteous and civil language" is a degradation of the
administration of justice due to the fact that same is bereft of legal foundation due to the
fact that the investigation conducted by Atty. Victor J. Sevilla, whose supreme stupidity
in the discharge of his official functions is authenticated by his overt partiality to the
complainant as authenticated by the transcript of records of this case thus depriving
undersigned respondent-movant of the "cold and neutral impartiality of a judge, "
tantamount to lack of due process of law: (emphasis supplied).

We also took note in respondent's Urgent Motion for Contempt of Court the language
used by him in praying this Court "to impose upon said Emilia E. Andres imprisonment
commensurate to the humiliation and vomitting injustice undersigned respondent-movant
suffered and still suffering from this Court due to complainant Atty. Emilia E. Andres'
wanton dishonesty."

It is obvious and self-evident that respondent has not amended his conduct despite the
Court's admonition. Respondent persists and keeps on using abusive and vituperative
language before the Court. Accordingly, We resolved in Our resolution of October 11,
1979 to require respondent to show cause why he should not be cited and punished for
contempt of court.

Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated September 27, 1979
wherein he tried to assure the Court that he has amended his ways and has conformed
to the use of polite, courteous and civil language and prayed that he be allowed to take
the lawyer's oath. We denied it on October 16, 1979.

Thereafter, respondent submitted a pleading entitled "Subrosa" dated October 22, 1979
and answered the citation for contempt against him in the following wise and manner:
3. That without prejudice to my Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 27, 1979,
undersigned respondent respectfully states to this Court that the respondent charges
that the Court's Resolution of June 5, 1979 is a "degradation of the administration of
justice, " was never intended as a defiance of this Court's authority. nor to scandalize the
integrity, dignity, and respect which this Court enjoys, but was an statement made with
utmost good faith out of frustration out of respondent's inability to take his lawyer's oath
since April, 1977 and in justifiable indignation at the illegalities perpetrated by both
complainant Emilia E. Andres and Legal Investigator Victor Sevilla, both members of the
Bar which are evident with a cursory perusal of the typewritten transcript of the
stenographic notes of the hearings conducted by Legal Investigator Sevilla which this
Court adopted; (emphasis supplied).

We reject totally respondent's supposed humble apology "for all his non-conformity to
the use of polite, courteous and civil language in all his pleadings filed with the Court and
on his solemn word of honor pledges not to commit the same hereinafter" and his
disavowal of intent of "defiance of (the) Court's authority nor to scandalize (its) integrity,
dignity and respect which this Court enjoys." Such apology and disavowal appear to be
in sincere, sham and artful for respondent in the same breadth contends that his
statement calling the Court's resolution of June 5, 1979 as "a degradation of the
administration of justice" was made "with utmost, good faith out of frustration of
respondent's inability to take his lawyer's oath since April, 1977 and in justifiable
indignation of the illegalities perpetrated by both complainant Emilia E. Andres and Legal
Investigation Victor Sevilla."

Although respondent is not yet admitted to the legal profession but now stands at the
threshold thereof, having already passed the Bar examinations, it is as much his duty as
every attorney-at-law already admitted to the practice of law to ..observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20, (b), Rule 138, Rules
of Court) and "to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial
to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged" (Sec. 20, (f), Rule 138). According to the Canons of
Professional Ethics, it is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the Judicial office, but
for the maintenance of its supreme importance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend
themselves, are particularly entitled to receive the support of the Bar against unjust
criticism and clamor. This duty is likewise incumbent upon one aspiring to be a lawyer
such as the respondent for the attorney's oath solemnly enjoins him to "conduct myself
as a lawyer according to to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well to the Courts as to my client.

The power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt is inherent and extends to suits
at law as well as to administrative proceedings as in the case at bar for it is as necessary
to maintain respect for the courts, in administrative cases as it is in any other class of
judicial proceedings. Under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person guilty of any
 improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice may be punished for contempt, and the reason is that respect
for the courts guarantees their stability and permanence Without such guaranty, the
institution of the courts would be resting on a very loose and flimsy foundation, such
power is essential to the proper execution and effective maintenance of judicial authority.

Respondent's use of vile rude and repulsive language is patent and palpable from the
very words, phrases and sentences he has written and which are quoted herein. 'They
speak for themselves in their vulgarity, insolence and calumny. Specifically, respondent's
direct reference to the Court on the ..sadistic resolution en banc, " "the cruel and
inhuman punishment the Court has speedily bestowed" upon him, that "the Court does
not honor its own resolution," that he is "a victim of the Court's inhuman and cruel
punishment through its supreme inaction," and that he is suffering "humiliation and
vomitting in justice" from this Court is not only disrespectful but his charges are false,
sham and unfounded.

'There is no excuse, much less plea or pretext to brand ultimately the Court's resolution
deferring oath-taking of the respondent as a new lawyer issued June 5, 1979 as "a
degradation of the administration of justice." By his improper conduct in the use of highly
disrespectful insolent language, respondent has tended to degrade the administration of
justice; he has disparaged the dignity and brought to disrepute the integrity and authority
of the Court. He has committed contempt of this Court.

WHEREFORE respondent Stanley Cabrera is found guilty of contempt and he is hereby

sentenced to pay this Court within ten days from notice hereof a fine of Five Hundred
Pesos (P500.00) or imprisonment of fifty (50) days.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to respondent's personal record in the Office of
the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,

Santos, Fernandez, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

● Santos vs. Llamas, 322 SCRA 529 (2000)

A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS,

Respondent.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed
against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M.

Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the
matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated
the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings.
If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three
years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in
1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)

Annex A .......-

"Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-
95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC

Annex B .......-

"Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-
030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM

Annex C .......-

"An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required Comment and
Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th
Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that
only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled
to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar
standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP,
especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does
not indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney
may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:

1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ
En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )

2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No.
11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14,
1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on
appeal in the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November
13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof,
what appears to be respondents signature above his name, address and the receipt
number "IBP Rizal 259060."1 Also attached was a copy of the order,2 dated February
14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
66, Makati, denying respondents motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal
Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then
president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that
respondents "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or
remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days
from receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation,
report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum,4 dated June 3, 1998,
respondent alleged:5cräläwvirtualibräry

3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and
1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer
a member in good standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar
who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.

The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good
standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of
dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC,
concealment of encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and
reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional
Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a
Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a
light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would
surrender his right or privilege to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his
dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to
the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return,
his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and
pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992,
is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the
payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe
in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the
subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such
exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted
upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only
to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused
compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even
with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such
fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and
frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act
of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and
honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary.

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution6 adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which
found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for
three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration
of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,7 dated April 22, 1999.
Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final
action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondents suspension for three months.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of the proper IBP
O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter
complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter
President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondents last payment of his IBP dues was in
1991."

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he
has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt
under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of
taxes, income taxes as an example."

....

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact,
respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the
"undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the
present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents
Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his
standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six
years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not
discuss this issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without
having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings
submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings
he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that
such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those
pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice
and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as
income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual
dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court.
A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall
be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the
compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this
Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only
by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true
that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual
income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty
level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for
that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting

to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter,
respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND

DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE

COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court;
nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he
filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents
advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law,8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice
of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice

of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a
 copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
1 Rollo, pp. 4-9.

2 Id., p. 11.

3 Id., p. 13.

4 Records, pp. 35-42.

5 Id., pp. 39-40.

6 Records, p. 57.

7 Rollo, p. 38.

8 Comment-Memorandum, pp. 6-7; Records, pp. 40-41.

● In re: Petition to take Lawyer’s Oath of Arthur Cuevas, Jr., Bar Matter No. 810,
January 27, 1998

B.M. No. 810 January 27, 1998

IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations 1. His oath-
taking was held in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution dated August 27, 1996
which permitted him to take the Bar Examinations "subject to the condition that should
(he) pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the lawyer's oath pending approval
of the Court . . ." due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide. The conviction stemmed from petitioner's participation in the initiation rites of
the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW,
sometime in September 1991, where Raul I. Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of
the personal violence inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was
granted probation. On May 10, 1995, he was discharged from probation and his case
considered closed and terminated.

In this petition, received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner prays that "he be
allowed to take his lawyer's oath at the Court's most convenient time"2 attaching thereto
the Order dated May 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique
discharging him from his probation, and certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful
and law abiding character issued by: (a) the Mayor of the Municipality of Hamtic,
Antique; (b) the Officer-in-Charge of Hamtic Police Station; (c) the Sangguniang
Kabataan of Pob. III, Hamtic, through its chairman and officers; (d) a member of the IBP
Iloilo Chapter; (e) the Parish Priest and Vicar General of St. Joseph Cathedral, San
Jose, Antique; and (f) the President of the Parish Pastoral Council, Parish of Sta.
Monica, Hamtic, Antique. On July 15, 1997, the Court, before acting on petitioner's
application, resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the deceased hazing
victim Raul I. Camaligan, to comment thereon. In compliance with the Court's directive,
Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan filed his comment which states as follows:

1 — He fully appreciates the benign concern given by this Hon. Court in allowing him to
comment to the pending petition of Arthur M. Cuevas to take the lawyer's oath, and
hereby expresses his genuine gratitude to such gesture.

2 — He conforms completely to the observation of the Hon. Court in its resolution dated
March 19, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 712 that the infliction of severe physical injuries which
approximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan was deliberate (rather
than merely accidental or inadvertent) thus, indicating serious character flaws on the part
of those who inflicted such injuries. This is consistent with his stand at the outset of the
proceedings of the criminal case against the petitioner and his co-defendants that they
are liable not only for the crime of homicide but murder, since they took advantage of the
neophytes' helpless and defenseless condition when they were "beaten and kicked to
death like a useless stray dog", suggesting the presence of abuse of confidence, taking
advantage of superior strength and treachery (People vs. Gagoco, 58 Phil. 524).

3 — He, however, has consented to the accused-students' plea of guilty to the lesser
offense of reckless imprudence resulting to the homicide, including the petitioner, out of
pity to their mothers and a pregnant wife of the accused who went together at his house
in Lucena City, literally kneeling, crying and begging for forgiveness for their sons, on a
Christmas day in 1991 and on Maundy Thursday in 1992, during which they reported
that the father of one of the accused died of heart attack upon learning of his son's
involvement in the case.
4 — As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and his co-defendants in the criminal
case for the death of his son. But as a loving father, who lost a son in whom he has high
hope to become a good lawyer — to succeed him, he still feels the pain of his untimely
demise, and the stigma of the gruesome manner of taking his life. This he cannot forget.

5 — He is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner, since then has become
morally fit for admission to the noble profession of the law. He politely submits this
matter to the sound and judicious discretion of the Hon. Court.3

At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan and
commiserates with the untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D.
Camaligan admits that "[h]e is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner since
then has become morally fit . . ." and submits petitioner's plea to be admitted to the
noble profession of law to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court.

The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing or
allowing petitioner's admission to the noble profession of law. His deliberate participation
in the senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte which resulted to the latter's untimely
demise indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar. And as
the practice of law is a privilege extended only to the few who possess the high
standards of intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty bound to prevent the
entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but
have become a disgrace to the profession. The Court, nonetheless, is willing to give
petitioner a chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al Caparros Argosino,
petitioner's co-accused below, to take the lawyer's oath.4

Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.'s discharge from probation without any infraction of the
attendant conditions therefor and the various certifications attesting to his righteous,
peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge
himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate death of Raul I.
Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial
notice of the general tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. 5
Let it be stressed to herein petitioner that the lawyer's oath is not a mere formality recited
for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence of select
witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and to
live strictly according to his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to
paraphrase Mr. Justice Padilla's comment in the sister case of Re: Petition of Al
Agrosino To Take Lawyer's Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997, "[t]he Court
sincerely hopes that" Mr. Cuevas, Jr., "will continue with the assistance he has been
giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal
and other services to the more unfortunate members of society"6.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M.. Cuevas, Jr., to
take the lawyer's oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court,
 subject to the payment of appropriate fees. Let this resolution be attached to petitioner's
personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban and Martinez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Held on September 7, 14, 21, and 28, 1996, at De La Salle University, Taft Avenue,
Manila, with Associate Justice Ricardo J. Francisco as Chairman of the Bar Committee.

2 Manifestation With Motion To Take The Lawyer's Oath, p. 2.

3 Comment, pp. 1-2.

4 Re: Petition of Al Argosino To Take The Lawyer's Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19,
1997.

5 Id.

6 Id., at p. 5.

IV. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Background
CPR Binding on All Lawvers
Sources of Legal Ethical Standards
Primary and Secondary
v Four-Fold Duties of a Lawyer