Conflicts - Spring 2023 - Code Booklet

Book IV.
Conflict of Laws
Title I. General Provisions

La C.C. BK. IV, T. I, Refs & Annos
Art. 3515. Determination of the Applicable Law; General and Residual Rule
Art. 3516. Meaning of “State”
Art. 3517. Renvoi
Art. 3518. Domicile
Title II. Status

La C.C. BK. IV, T. II, Refs & Annos
Art. 3519. Status of Natural Persons; General Principle

Art. 3520. Marriage
Art. 3521. Divorce or Separation
Art. 3522. Effects and Incidents of Marriage and of Divorce
Title III. Marital Property

La C.C. BK. IV, T. III, Refs & Annos
Art. 3523. Movables
Art. 3524. Immovables Situated in this State
Art. 3525. Termination of Community; Immovables in Another State Acquired by a Spouse
While Domiciled in this State
Art. 3526. Termination of Community; Movables and Louisiana Immovables Acquired by a
Spouse While Domiciled in Another State
Art. 3527. Louisiana Immovables Acquired by a Spouse While Domiciled in Another State;
Death of the Acquiring Spouse While Domiciled in Another State
Title IV. Successions

La C.C. BK. IV, T. IV, Refs & Annos
Art. 3528. Formal Validity of Testamentary Dispositions

Art. 3529. Capacity and Vices of Consent
Art. 3530. Capacity of Heir or Legatee
Art. 3531. Interpretation of Testaments
Art. 3532. Movables
Art. 3533. Immovables Situated in this State
Art. 3534. Immovables Situated in Another State
Title V. Real Rights

La C.C. BK. IV, T. V, Refs & Annos
Art. 3535. Real Rights in Immovables

Art. 3536. Real Rights in Corporeal Movables
Title VI. Conventional Obligations

La C.C. BK. IV, T. VI, Refs & Annos
Art. 3537. General Rule
Art. 3538. Form
Art. 3539. Capacity
Art. 3540. Party Autonomy
Art. 3541. Other Juridical Acts and Quasi-Contractual Obligations
Title VII. Delictual and Quasi–Delictual Obligations

La C.C. BK. IV, T. VII, Refs & Annos
Art. 3542. General Rule
Art. 3543. Issues of Conduct and Safety
Art. 3544. Issues of Loss Distribution and Financial Protection
Art. 3545. Products Liability
Art. 3546. Punitive Damages
Art. 3547. Exceptional Cases
Art. 3548. Domicile of Juridical Persons
Title VIII. Liberative Prescription

Art. 3549. Law Governing Liberative Prescription
Douglas, Vionne 3/13/2023
For Educational Use Only
Bk. IV, Refs & Annos, LA C.C. Bk. IV, Refs & Annos
West's Louisiana Statutes Annotated

Louisiana Civil Code
Book IV. Conflict of Laws
LSA-C.C. Bk. IV, Refs & Annos

Currentness
Editors' Notes
1991 REVISION AND REDESIGNATION

<Former Chapter 3 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code (“Conflict of Laws”, C.C. arts. 14 and
15) was amended and reenacted by Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, effective January 1, 1992, to consist of
C.C. arts. 14 to 49 as designated into Sections 1 to 8 of Chapter 3. Section 2 of Acts 1991, No. 923
directed the Louisiana State Law Institute to redesignate existing C.C. arts. 24 to 85 in Titles I, II, and
III of Book I. Pursuant to the statutory revision authority of the Louisiana State Law Institute, C.C. arts.
15 to 49 as set forth in Act 923 were redesignated as C.C. arts. 3515 to 3549, comprising Book IV of
the Civil Code, and Sections 1 to 8 of Chapter 3 as set forth in Act 923 were redesignated as Titles I
to VIII of Book IV. Civil Code articles 24 to 85 were not redesignated. Pursuant to the same authority,
C.C. art. 3556, relating to general definitions and comprising Title XXV of Book III, was redesignated
as C.C. art. 3506.>
<Section 4 of Acts 1991, No. 923 provides:>
<“This Act shall become effective on January 1, 1992, and shall apply to all actions filed after that
date.”>
LSA-C.C. Bk. IV, Refs & Annos, LA C.C. Bk. IV, Refs & Annos
The Revised Statutes and the Codes are current through the 2023 First Extraordinary Session.
End of Document © 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
© 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

Bk. IV, T. I, Refs & Annos, LA C.C. Bk. IV, T. I, Refs & Annos

Title I. General Provisions
LSA-C.C. Bk. IV, T. I, Refs & Annos

Currentness
LSA-C.C. Bk. IV, T. I, Refs & Annos, LA C.C. Bk. IV, T. I, Refs & Annos

Art. 3515. Determination of the applicable law; general and residual rule, LA C.C. Art. 3515

Louisiana Civil Code (Refs & Annos)
Book IV. Conflict of Laws (Refs & Annos)
Title I. General Provisions (Refs & Annos)
LSA-C.C. Art. 3515
Art. 3515. Determination of the applicable law; general and residual rule
Currentness
Except as otherwise provided in this Book, an issue in a case having contacts with other states is governed by the
law of the state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to that issue.
That state is determined by evaluating the strength and pertinence of the relevant policies of all involved states in
the light of: (1) the relationship of each state to the parties and the dispute; and (2) the policies and needs of the
interstate and international systems, including the policies of upholding the justified expectations of parties and of
minimizing the adverse consequences that might follow from subjecting a party to the law of more than one state.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
REVISION COMMENTS--1991
(a) The residual and general nature of this Article. This Article applies only to cases that fall within the
scope of this Book and that are not “otherwise provided [for] in this Book”. Thus, this is the residual
article. If any other article in this Book is found to be applicable to a particular case or issue, that article
prevails. However, Article 3515 also serves as the general article, in the sense that it contains the general
principles from which the other articles of this Book have been derived and in light of which they should
be applied.
(b) The objective. The first paragraph of this Article enunciates the objective of the choice-of-law
process. The objective is to identify “the state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its
law were not applied to that [particular] issue”, that is, the state which, in light of its relationship to
the parties and the dispute and its policies rendered pertinent by that relationship, would bear the most
serious legal, social, economic, and other consequences if its law were not applied to that issue.
The negative phrasing of this objective is deliberate and is intended to disassociate the approach of this
Article and of this Book from the so-called “governmental interest analysis” and other modern American
approaches that seem to perceive the choice-of-law problem as a problem of interstate competition rather
than as a problem of interstate cooperation in conflict avoidance. Because of this negative formulation,
the approach of this Book bears some resemblance to the “comparative impairment” approach originally

advanced by Professor William F. Baxter and since followed by the courts of California. However, to
the extent it is anything more than acoustic, this resemblance is confined to the most basic premise,
namely, that the choice-of-law process should strive for ways to minimize impairment of the interests
of all involved states, rather than to maximize the interests of one state at the expense of the interests of
the other states. See Symeonides, “Problems and Dilemmas in Codifying Choice of Law for Torts: The
Louisiana Experience in Comparative Perspective”, 38 Am.J.Comp.L. 431, 436-41 (1990).
(c) The process. The second paragraph of this Article prescribes the process or method for achieving the
objective enunciated in the first paragraph. The process will begin by identifying, through the resources
of statutory interpretation, the various state policies that might be implicated in the conflict. This should
include not only the policies embodied in the particular rules of law claimed to be applicable, but also
the more general policies, domestic as well as multistate, of each involved state that might be pertinent
to the particular issue. The “involved states” include ex hypothesi the forum state, as well as any other
state having pertinent contacts with the parties or the dispute.
The next step of the process is to evaluate the “strength and pertinence” of these policies in light of
“the relationship of each state to the parties and the dispute”, and in light of “the policies and needs of
the interstate and international systems”. What is to be evaluated is not the wisdom or goodness of a
state policy, either in the abstract or vis-a-vis the policy of another state, but rather the “strength and
pertinence” of this policy in space. A legislative policy that is strongly espoused by the enacting state for
intra-state cases may in fact be attenuated in a particular multistate case that has only minimal contacts
with that state. Similarly, the same policy may prove to be far less pertinent if the case has sufficient
contacts with that state, but not contacts of the type that would actually implicate that policy.
The evaluation of state policies is to be conducted in light of “the relationship of each state to the parties
and the dispute”. The relationship with the parties may consist of anything from the formal bond of
citizenship or domicile, past or present, to habitual or mere residence. The relationship to the dispute
may consist of any factual or legal connection to the events or the transaction giving rise to the dispute
or to its subject matter.
Finally, the evaluation of state policies is also to be conducted “in the light of ... the ... needs of
the interstate and international systems”. Obviously, this admonition goes beyond the self-evident
requirement of complying with the limits prescribed by the federal Constitution for state choice-
of-law decisions. See, e.g., Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). What might be
constitutionally permissible may not necessarily be appropriate from the perspective of choice of
law. The court should strive for decisions that not only stay within the limits prescribed by the
federal Constitution but also are deferential and sensitive to the needs and policies of the interstate
and international systems. Some of these policies, like the policy of discouraging forum shopping or
favoring interstate uniformity of result, are so universally acknowledged that they need not be mentioned
expressly. Other policies, however, are more susceptible to being overlooked if they are not brought
to the attention of the decision-maker. This is why this Article expressly mentions “the policies of
upholding the justified expectations of the parties and of minimizing the adverse consequences that
might follow from subjecting a party to the law of more than one state.”
“[U]pholding the justified expectations of parties” is a self-explanatory policy that is imbedded in the
internal law of all states, but it is also an important multistate policy. It is in this latter sense that it is
invoked here. All other factors being equal, the parties should not be subjected to the law of a state that

they had no reason to anticipate would be applied to their case. In some instances, however, the parties
may have had, or should have had, reason to anticipate the application of the law of a certain state, but
they may have had no way of complying with that law. For example, a corporation may have reason
to anticipate that the laws of states in which it does business may be applicable to some aspects of its
internal organization, but that corporation might have no way of complying with the law of all of those
states, short of reincorporating in each such state. See Order of Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S.
586 (1947). Similarly, the parties to an ordinary juridical act intended to be performed in more than one
state may find it difficult to comply with the requirements of each state. Even complying with the most
stringent of these laws may sometimes be problematic if what is required by that law is outlawed by
the law of another state. In these and similar instances, the court should try to “minimiz[e] the adverse
consequences that might follow from subjecting a party to the law of more than one state.” Sometimes it
will not be possible to minimize, much less eliminate, these consequences. But striving to do so should
be one of the goals of the choice-of-law process, especially when all of the other factors are equal.
(d) Issue-by-issue analysis and dépeçage. The use of the term “issue” in the first paragraph of this Article
is intended to focus the choice-of-law-process on the particular issue as to which there exists an actual
conflict of laws. When a conflict exists with regard to only one issue, the court should focus on the
factual contacts and policies that are pertinent to that issue. When a conflict exists with regard to more
than one issue, each issue should be analyzed separately, since each may implicate different states, or
may bring into play different policies of these states. Seen from another angle, each state having factual
contacts with a given multi-state case may not have an equally strong interest in regulating all issues in
the case, but only those issues that actually implicate its policies in a significant way.
This so-called issue-by-issue analysis is an integral feature of all modern American choice-of-law
methodologies and facilitates a more nuanced and individualized resolution of conflicts problems. One
result of this analysis might be that the laws of different states may be applied to different issues in
the same dispute. This phenomenon is known in conflicts literature by its French name of dépeçage.
Although infrequently referred to by this name, this phenomenon is now a common occurrence in the
United States and has received official recognition in Europe. This Article does not prohibit dépeçage.
However, dépeçage should not be pursued for its own sake. The unnecessary splitting of the case should
be avoided, especially when it results in distorting the policies of the involved states.
Notes of Decisions (128)
LSA-C.C. Art. 3515, LA C.C. Art. 3515


Art. 3516. Meaning of “State”, LA C.C. Art. 3516

LSA-C.C. Art. 3516
Art. 3516. Meaning of “State”
Currentness
As used in this Book, the word “state” denotes, as may be appropriate: the United States or any state, territory,
or possession thereof; the District of Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; and any foreign country or
territorial subdivision thereof that has its own system of law.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
This Article defines the term “state” for the purposes of this Book by using language similar to that
employed by most uniform statutes in the United States. By way of illustration, a Canadian province or
an Australian state is a “territorial subdivision” of a foreign country which, with regard to most private
law matters, has “its own system of law.” If the conflict at issue involves one of those matters, then the
particular province is to be treated as a “state” for the purposes of this Book.
With regard to matters governed by federal law, the United States may also be considered a “state” for
the purposes of this Book. The question as to which matters are governed by federal law is determined by
federal rather than state law. Since this “vertical” delineation between these two sets of laws is beyond
the scope of state conflicts law, it is also beyond the scope of this Book. However, American federal
law may well conflict with the law of a foreign country, as in the area of maritime or bankruptcy law.
In these cases, the United States may be considered a “state” for the purposes of this Book.


Art. 3517. Renvoi, LA C.C. Art. 3517

LSA-C.C. Art. 3517
Art. 3517. Renvoi
Currentness
Except as otherwise indicated, when the law of another state is applicable under this Book, that law shall not
include the law of conflict of laws of that state.
Nevertheless, in determining the state whose law is applicable to an issue under Articles 3515, 3519, 3537, and
3542, the law of conflict of laws of the involved foreign states may be taken into consideration.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Renvoi. This Article addresses the question of renvoi. Translated as “remission” or “transmission”,
this French word has become an internationally accepted term of art in conflicts literature. This term is
generally used as short-hand for the question of whether the forum state should follow the conflicts law
of another state. The answers given to this question by the various national conflicts systems range from
a complete disapproval of renvoi to its enthusiastic endorsement. This Article is based on the following
two premises: (1) when the choice-of-law decision is made expressly by the legislature of this state,
renvoi should be excluded unless the legislature indicates otherwise; and (2) when the choice-of-law
decision is left to the discretion of the court, renvoi should not be excluded.
(b) Premise 1: renvoi excluded. The first premise is implemented by the first paragraph of this Article,
which articulates the basic rule. When the legislature of this state expressly designates that the law of
another state is applicable to an issue, as in Articles 3523, 3528-3532, 3536, 3538, 3539, 3543, 3544,
and 3546, that designation prevails over any contrary wishes of the courts or legislature of that other
state. To that end, the application of the foreign law is confined to the internal or substantive law of the
foreign state and does not include its law of conflict of laws, “except as otherwise indicated”.
(c) The exception: renvoi authorized. The phrase last quoted articulates the exception to the rule of
excluding renvoi. According to this exception, renvoi is authorized when the articles of this Book so
indicate. These articles do so by authorizing the application of “the law that would be applied by the
courts” of the foreign state (see, e.g. Art. 3528, subpar. (4); Art. 3534, first par.; Art. 3535, second par.)

Art. 3517. Renvoi, LA C.C. Art. 3517
or by referring to a particular result that may be obtainable “in” the foreign state (see, e.g., Art. 3520 and
Art. 3549, second par., subpars. (1) and (2)). Since in both instances the courts of that foreign state would
operate in accordance with the conflicts rules of that state, the courts of the forum should do likewise.
(d) Premise 2: renvoi considered. When this Book does not expressly designate the applicable law but,
as in Articles 3515, 3519, 3537, and 3542, simply lists the factors to be used by the court for determining
that law, there is no compelling reason to prohibit renvoi. Since the objective of the choice-of-law process
prescribed by these Articles is to identify “the state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if
its law were not applied”, and since the conflicts rules of each state reflect that state's own delineation
of the territorial scope of its policies, those rules can be a very helpful factor in “evaluating the strength
and pertinence of ... [these] policies”. This is why the second paragraph of this Article provides that in
these cases “the law of conflict of laws of the involved foreign states may be taken into consideration.”
The flexible phrasing of this directive is intended to indicate that the court is not bound to follow the
conflicts rules of the foreign state.


Art. 3518. Domicile, LA C.C. Art. 3518

LSA-C.C. Art. 3518
Art. 3518. Domicile
Currentness
For the purposes of this Book, the domicile of a person is determined in accordance with the law of this state. A
juridical person may be treated as a domiciliary of either the state of its formation or the state of its principal place
of business, whichever is most pertinent to the particular issue.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Purpose of this Article. This Article designates the law under which domicile is to be determined
and establishes a special rule for determining the domicile of juridical persons. As indicated by the
introductory phrase, the scope of this Article is co-extensive with the scope of this Book. Thus, for
instance, this Article does not apply for determining domicile for purposes of jurisdiction in this or
another state.
(b) Domicile determined according to the law of the forum. This Article provides that the place where
a person, natural or juridical, is domiciled is to be determined according to Louisiana law (see, e.g.,
La.Civ.Code Arts. 38-46 (1870)), even in cases where that person is ultimately found to be domiciled in
another state. This provision is consistent with present jurisprudence as well as with the principle that
characterization is normally conducted in accordance with the law of the forum. See, e.g., Restatement
Second, Conflict of Laws, § 13.
(c) Domicile of juridical persons. This Book employs domicile as a connecting factor both for natural and
for juridical persons. Because the concept of domicile of a juridical person is not defined by Louisiana
statutory law, this Article defines this concept for the purposes of this Book. Article 3548, infra, contains
an additional definition for the purposes of the Title on the law applicable to delictual obligations.
Although it is often said that a juridical person has its domicile in the state of its incorporation, closer
examination reveals that such an assertion is usually confined to matters pertaining to the internal affairs
of corporations. Even in this context, the assertion is subject to exceptions. When the issue pertains to the
external relations of a corporation with third parties, the place of incorporation is usually less important

Art. 3518. Domicile, LA C.C. Art. 3518
than the principal place of business. Rather than choose a priori between the places of incorporation
and principal place of business, this Article leaves the choice to the court. The choice will be guided
by the principles of Article 3515 and will depend on the issue involved and the circumstances of the
particular case.
For the definition of a juridical person, see La.Civ.Code Art. 24 (Rev.1987). Because this term
encompasses corporations, partnerships, and other associations that possess a personality distinct from
that of their members, this Article uses the term “formation” rather than the more narrow term
“incorporation”.


Bk. IV, T. II, Refs & Annos, LA C.C. Bk. IV, T. II, Refs & Annos

Title II. Status
LSA-C.C. Bk. IV, T. II, Refs & Annos

Currentness
LSA-C.C. Bk. IV, T. II, Refs & Annos, LA C.C. Bk. IV, T. II, Refs & Annos

Art. 3519. Status of natural persons; general principle, LA C.C. Art. 3519

Title II. Status (Refs & Annos)
LSA-C.C. Art. 3519
Art. 3519. Status of natural persons; general principle
Currentness
The status of a natural person and the incidents and effects of that status are governed by the law of the state whose
policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to the particular issue.
That state is determined by evaluating the strength and pertinence of the relevant policies of the involved states
in the light of: (1) the relationship of each state, at any pertinent time, to the dispute, the parties, and the person
whose status is at issue; (2) the policies referred to in Article 3515; and (3) the policies of sustaining the validity
of obligations voluntarily undertaken, of protecting children, minors, and others in need of protection, and of
preserving family values and stability.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope of this Article. The scope of this Article encompasses the “status of a natural person and
the incidents and effects of that status”. The meaning of the term “status” is defined by doctrine
and jurisprudence. Planiol defines status as “those attributes of a person which the law takes into
consideration in order to attach juridical effects to them. Thus the attributes of Frenchman, major,
husband, legitimate son are juridical statuses.” M. Planiol, Traite elementaire de droit civil v. 1 § 419
(English translation by the Louisiana State Law Institute 1959). Traditionally, at least the following
sub-topics are subsumed under the rubric of status: “personality” or “capacity to have rights and
duties” (see La.Civ.Code.Arts. 25, 27 (Rev.1987)); capacity to enter into juridical acts (La.Civ.Code Art.
28 (Rev.1987)); citizenship; the name of a person; marriage (including its formation, validity, incidents,
and termination); legitimacy, filiation, and adoption; and generally the relationship between parents
and children, including parental authority, custody, and support. As stated in Civil Code Article 3514
(Rev.1991), supra, this and the following Articles of this Title apply to those of the above sub-topics
for which the law of this state does not provide otherwise.
By way of illustration, this Article does not apply to citizenship, which is regulated by federal law, or
child custody and child support, which are covered by more specific Louisiana statutes. See, e.g., R.S.
13:1700 et seq.; 28 U.S.C. 1738A; and R.S. 13:1641 et seq. Similarly, this Article does not apply to

the issue of capacity to make a testament, to inherit or to receive as legatee under a testament, or to
enter into a contract or another juridical act, because all of these issues are covered by other articles. See
respectively Arts. 3529, 3530, 3539, and 3541, infra. However, this Article does apply to other aspects
of capacity or personality, such as the existence, beginning and termination of personality, the capacity
to own property in general and the capacity to sue or to be sued.
Similarly, and again by way of illustration only, this Article applies to: the validity of marriages that
do not fall under Article 3520 (see comments under Article 3520, infra); the effects and incidents
of all marriages, “unless otherwise provided by the law of this state” (see the cross reference in
Article 3522, infra); the effects and incidents of divorce, except as otherwise provided by law (see
id.); the establishment, existence, proof, and contestation of a parent-child relationship, whether such
relationship is legitimate or illegitimate, or has been created by adoption; and, except as otherwise
provided by law, the effects and incidents of the parent-child relationship.
Finally, this Article, as well as the other articles of this Title, is applicable not only in proceedings seeking
a direct determination of status, such as a filiation or disavowal action or an action to annul a marriage,
but also in proceedings where the issue of status is merely incidental to the resolution of another issue.
The most typical example of this is a wrongful death or similar action in which the plaintiff's status
as the surviving spouse or a child of the deceased is subject to dispute. Such dispute is to be resolved
according to the law selected under this Article.
(b) Relation to Article 3515. The first paragraph of this Article prescribes the objective of the choice-of-
law process for issues of status in language that is purposefully identical to the language used in Article
3515 for the objective of the choice-of-law process in general. For the meaning of this language, see
comment (b) under Article 3515, supra. Similarly, the second paragraph of this Article prescribes the
method or process for attaining this objective in language that is slightly more specific than that of the
second paragraph of Article 3515. For a step-by-step description of this method, see comments (c) and
(d) under Article 3515.
This Article adds specificity to this description in two respects. First, this Article adds to the list of
“policies referred to in Article 3515” an illustrative list of some general policies that are likely to be
implicated in many status conflicts even when such policies are not evidenced by any particular language
in the specific laws competing for application in the particular case. It is in order to ensure that they will
not be overlooked by the court that these policies are mentioned expressly in this Article.
Second, this Article describes in more specific terms the relationship in light of which to evaluate the
strength and pertinence of the implicated state policies. Thus, the language “the parties, and the person
whose status is at issue” serves as a reminder that the two may or may not coincide. For example, in
a suit to declare the nullity of a marriage brought by one spouse against the other, the parties and the
person[s] whose status is at issue would coincide. This would also be true, for instance, in a filiation
action, a disavowal action, or an emancipation action. However, in many other instances, the outcome of
the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant depends on the status of a third person. For example,
the plaintiff's right of inheritance through representation may depend on the status of the plaintiff's father
as a child of the de cujus. Similarly, the right of a person to an action for the wrongful death of his
brother might depend on the validity of that brother's marriage or divorce, the validity of that brother's
adoption by another person, or the validity of the adoption of a child by that brother. In these cases,
the outcome of the dispute between the parties will depend on the status of another person. Similarly,

the phrase “at any pertinent time” ensures that the court's examination of the parties' relationship to the
forum and to other involved states should not be confined to the time of litigation but should extend to
any other pertinent time, such as the time of the events from which the dispute originated. For example,
in a filiation action or in any other action in which the paternity of a child is at stake, the court should
consider not only the present domicile of the child and the parents but also their respective domiciles at
the time of the child's conception. Similarly, in a dispute about the validity of marriage, the court should
consider the spouses' domicile not only at the time of the trial but also at the time of the marriage.


Art. 3520. Marriage, LA C.C. Art. 3520

LSA-C.C. Art. 3520
Art. 3520. Marriage
Currentness
A. A marriage that is valid in the state where contracted, or in the state where the parties were first domiciled as
husband and wife, shall be treated as a valid marriage unless to do so would violate a strong public policy of the
state whose law is applicable to the particular issue under Article 3519.
B. A purported marriage between persons of the same sex violates a strong public policy of the state of Louisiana
and such a marriage contracted in another state shall not be recognized in this state for any purpose, including the
assertion of any right or claim as a result of the purported marriage.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992. Amended by Acts 1999, No. 890, § 1.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope. This Title draws a distinction between the validity of marriage and the “effects and incidents”
of marriage. This Article applies only to the validity of the marriage. Article 3522, infra, applies to the
incidents and effects of marriage. The reasons for this distinction are explained in the comments under
Article 3522.
This Article is confined to marriages that are “valid in the state where contracted, or in the state where the
spouses were first domiciled as husband and wife” and purposefully does not encompass marriages that
would not be valid in either one of these states. The validity or invalidity of these marriages will therefore
be determined under the law designated by Article 3519, which is the residual article for all matters of
status that are not otherwise provided for in this Title or elsewhere by Louisiana legislation. Although
these marriages will not benefit from an a priori presumption of validity, their eventual validation need
not be precluded in advance.
(b) Favor matrimonii. Based on the universally espoused policy of favoring the validity of marriages
if there is any reasonable basis for doing so (favor matrimonii), this Article authorizes the validation
of marriages that are valid either in the state where contracted or in the state where the spouses were
first domiciled as husband and wife. The word “contracted” as opposed to the word “celebrated” is

used so as not to exclude common-law marriage from the scope of this Article. Similarly, the use of the
words “in the state” rather than “under the law of the state” is intended to include consideration of the
conflicts law of that state (i.e., renvoi, see Art. 3517, supra). This ancient policy of favor matrimonii and
favor validatis is well entrenched in the substantive law of every state of the United States. This policy
is equally important at the multistate level, where it is reenforced by the policy of avoiding “limping
marriages”. This Article enunciates this policy of validation and defines its limits. These limits are co-
extensive with the “strong public policy of the state whose law is applicable to the particular issue under
Article 3519.” In order to rebut the presumptive rule of validation established by Article 3520, the party
who asserts the invalidity of the marriage must prove that: (1) under Article 3519, the law of a state other
than the one where the marriage was contracted or where the parties were first domiciled as husband
and wife would be applicable to the particular issue; and (2) that law would invalidate the marriage for
reasons of “a strong public policy”.
VALIDITY; ENFORCEMENT
<The validity of this Article was under consideration with the United States Court of Appeal, Fifth
Circuit, in Robicheaux v. Caldwell, when the Supreme Court of the United States decided Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2015 WL 2473451 (U.S. June 26, 2015). In light of Obergefell, the Fifth
Circuit concluded and ordered in Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 791 F.3d 616, 2015 WL 4032118 (July 1,
2015)(footnotes omitted): >
<“In summary, the Court declared that>
<“the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not
be deprived of that right and that liberty. The Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the
fundamental right to marry. No longer may this liberty be denied to them. Baker v. Nelson [, 409 U.S.
810, 93 S.Ct. 37, 34 L.Ed.2d 65 (1972),] must be and now is overruled, and the State laws challenged
by petitioners in these cases are now held invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil
marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples. >
<“ ‘ Id. at *41-42. It follows that the Court must also hold--and it now does hold--that there is no lawful
basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the
ground of its same-sex character. Id. at *50.>
<“Having addressed fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court, importantly,
invoked the First Amendment, as well:>
<“Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may
continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should
not be condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper
protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths,
and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered. The same is
true of those who oppose same-sex marriage for other reasons. In turn, those who believe allowing same-
sex marriage is proper or indeed essential, whether as a matter of religious conviction or secular belief,
may engage those who disagree with their view in an open and searching debate. The Constitution,

however, does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded
to couples of the opposite sex.>
<“Id. at *48-49.>
<“Obergefell, in both its Fourteenth and First Amendment iterations, is the law of the land and,
consequently, the law of this circuit and should not be taken lightly by actors within the jurisdiction of
this court. We express no view on how controversies involving the intersection of these rights should
be resolved but instead leave that to the robust operation of our system of laws and the good faith of
those who are impacted by them.>
<“This court sought and promptly received letter advisories from plaintiffs and the state, asking their
respective positions on the proper disposition in light of Obergefell. They are agreed that the judgment
should be reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs.>
<“Because this court agrees that that is the required result, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED,
and this matter is REMANDED for entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The district court must
act expeditiously on remand, especially in view of the declining health of plaintiff Robert Welles. The
court should enter final judgment on the merits (exclusive of any collateral matters such as costs and
attorney fees) by July 17, 2015, and earlier if reasonably possible. >
<“The mandate shall issue forthwith.” [Footnotes omitted].>
<The United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana, 2015 WL 4090353, by judgment dated July 2, 2015,
ordered in part:>
<“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Article XII, Section 15 of the Louisiana Constitution, Article 89 of
the Louisiana Civil Code, and laws enacted pursuant thereto, violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and may not be enforced against the Plaintiffs or any other same-sex couple;>
<“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Article XII, Section 15 of the Louisiana Constitution, Article
3520(B) of the Louisiana Civil Code, and laws enacted pursuant thereto, violate the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and may not be enforced against the Plaintiffs or any other
same-sex couple;”>
<See Constanza v. Caldwell, 167 So.3d 619 (La. 2015) and Notes of Decisions in LSA.>


Art. 3521. Divorce or separation, LA C.C. Art. 3521

LSA-C.C. Art. 3521
Art. 3521. Divorce or separation
Currentness
A court of this state may grant a divorce or separation only for grounds provided by the law of this state.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope. This Article is confined to the narrow question of the right to obtain a divorce or separation
and the grounds on which they may be obtained. This Article does not extend to other claims or remedies
that might arise in an action for divorce or separation, such as the claim for alimony, child support,
or property settlement. To the extent they are incidents of marriage or divorce, these other remedies
are covered by Article 3522. This Article also does not apply to an action to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Since nullity is simply the other side of validity, nullity actions are governed by the same law
that governs the validity of marriage, namely the law designated by Articles 3520 and 3519, supra. Act
1009 of 1990, effective January 1, 1991, repealed Civil Code Article 138 which provided for separation
from bed and board. Since such separation is no longer available under the law of this state, then, under
Article 3521, a Louisiana court may not grant a separation under the law of another state.
(b) Operation. This Article may be read in both a positive and a negative way. The positive reading is
that, as long as it has jurisdiction, “[a] court of this state may grant a divorce ... for grounds provided
by the law of this state”, even if another state or states involved would not allow divorce on the same
grounds. The negative reading is that “[a] court of this state may [not] grant a divorce ... for grounds
provided by the law of ... [another] state”, unless of course those grounds are also recognized by the law
of this state. Both readings are permissible and both are interrelated with the existence of jurisdiction.
Under present Louisiana law, a Louisiana court has jurisdiction to grant a divorce “if, at the time of
filing, one or both of the spouses are domiciled in this state.” La.Code Civ.Proc.Art. 10(7) (Rev.1990).


Art. 3521. Divorce or separation, LA C.C. Art. 3521

Art. 3522. Effects and incidents of marriage and of divorce, LA C.C. Art. 3522

LSA-C.C. Art. 3522
Art. 3522. Effects and incidents of marriage and of divorce
Currentness
Unless otherwise provided by the law of this state, the effects and incidents of marriage and of divorce with regard
to an issue are governed by the law applicable to that issue under Article 3519.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope. This Article applies to the “effects and incidents of marriage” as distinguished from the
validity of marriage, which is governed by Articles 3520 and 3519, supra. This Article also applies
to the “effects and incidents” of divorce as distinguished from the right to obtain a divorce, which is
governed by Article 3521.
(b) Incidents of marriage. The definition of the term “effects and incidents of marriage” is left to
judicial interpretation. In a broad sense, this term may include any legal consequence of marriage,
whether pertaining to the status and rights of children, the reciprocal rights and duties of spouses during
marriage, or their respective rights following dissolution of the marriage by divorce or death. Act 886 of
1987, which revised the pertinent provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code, subsumes under the heading
“Incidents and Effects of Marriage” the reciprocal duties of “fidelity, support, and assistance” (C.C. Art.
98 (Rev.1987)), the rights and obligations stemming from parental authority (C.C. Art. 99 (Rev.1987))
and the effect of marriage on a spouse's name (C.C. Art. 100 (Rev.1987)). See also C.C. Art. 97
(Rev.1987) which uses the roughly synonymous term “civil effects” of marriage.
(c) The reason for differentiating between validity and incidents of marriage. The distinction between
validity and incidents of marriage can be justified by the fact that these two categories of issues often
implicate different policies and needs. For instance, with regard to validity, there seems to be a universal
consensus in favor of upholding the validity of marriage whenever reasonably possible. On the other
hand, it is almost meaningless to speak of a policy of “favor matrimonii” with regard to the effects or
incidents of a --valid or invalid--marriage. One need only be reminded of the concept of putative spouses
to realize that the effects and incidents that a state chooses to attribute to a particular marriage need not
depend on the validity of that marriage. States may agree on the validity of a particular marriage but

Art. 3522. Effects and incidents of marriage and of divorce, LA C.C. Art. 3522
may disagree on its incidents, and vice versa. The policy of “favor matrimonii” has little to contribute
to a rational resolution of such conflicts. To resolve these conflicts, it is necessary to consider values
beyond validation and factual contacts other than, or in addition to, the place of the marriage or the place
of the first matrimonial domicile, such as policies that are pertinent and the contacts that are present at
the time of the events from which the particular incident flows and at the time the particular incident is
asserted. See comment (b) under Article 3519, supra. By differentiating between validity and incidents
of marriage and relegating the latter to Article 3519, Article 3522 facilitates a separate consideration
of these policies and factual contacts.
(d) Right to divorce and its incidents. Similar reasons may be advanced for differentiating between the
right to obtain a divorce and the effects and incidents of divorce. The former is an issue on which the
laws of the various states, at least in this country, are uniform, except perhaps in matters of detail. Thus,
to equate jurisdiction with choice of law with regard to that issue, as is done in Article 3521, seems to be
not only acceptable but also efficient. On the other hand, the effects and incidents of divorce are matters
on which the various states continue to differ, not only in details but also in basic policy. Because of these
differences and the multitude of law-fact patterns that might come before Louisiana courts, it would
have been unwise to assign a priori all of these incidents to the law of the forum, or, for that matter, to
any single law. By referring these issues to the flexible approach of Article 3519, Article 3522 seeks to
ensure that each such issue will receive the flexible, individualized treatment prescribed by that article.
(e) Residual nature of this Article. As indicated by its introductory phrase, this Article becomes operable
only when the law of Louisiana, including applicable federal law, does not provide otherwise. Among
the instances in which Louisiana law does provide otherwise are: Civil Code Article 2334 (Rev.1979)
with regard to the matrimonial regime; the Title in this Book on marital property (infra); the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) enacted in Louisiana as La.R.S. 13:1641 et seq.; and
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (La.R.S. 13:1700 et seq.).


Bk. IV, T. III, Refs & Annos, LA C.C. Bk. IV, T. III, Refs & Annos

Title III. Marital Property
LSA-C.C. Bk. IV, T. III, Refs & Annos

Currentness
LSA-C.C. Bk. IV, T. III, Refs & Annos, LA C.C. Bk. IV, T. III, Refs & Annos

Art. 3523. Movables, LA C.C. Art. 3523

Title III. Marital Property (Refs & Annos)
LSA-C.C. Art. 3523
Art. 3523. Movables
Currentness
Except as otherwise provided in this Title, the rights and obligations of spouses with regard to movables, wherever
situated, acquired by either spouse during marriage are governed by the law of the domicile of the acquiring spouse
at the time of acquisition.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Relationship with Civil Code Articles 2334 and 2329. The articles of this Title presuppose and
complement Articles 2334 and 2329 of the Civil Code (Rev.1979), which are not affected by this
revision, as well as Article 3522, supra, which designates the law applicable to the incidents of marriage
and divorce. Article 2334 provides that “[t]he legal regime of community of acquets and gains applies
to spouses domiciled in this state, regardless of their domicile at the time of marriage or the place of
celebration of the marriage.” Thus, this article codifies the principle of the mutability of the matrimonial
regime, that is, the notion that the matrimonial regime changes when the matrimonial domicile is moved
from one state to another. This principle has been part of Louisiana and American conflicts law since
Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. (n.s.) 569 (La.1827), which, however, confined the application of the new
regime to “future acquisitions,” namely assets acquired after the change of domicile. See Symeonides,
“Louisiana's Draft on Successions and Marital Property”, 35 Am.J.Comp.L. 259, 270-72 (1987). Article
3523 is consistent with Saul and the principle of partial or prospective mutability. However, this principle
is subject to exceptions provided in the following articles of this Title. One of these exceptions is
the one established by subparagraph (1) of Article 3526, infra, which essentially authorizes a total or
retrospective mutability for the cases falling within the scope of that subparagraph. Another exception
to the principle of partial mutability is established by Article 2329 of the Civil Code (Rev.1979), which
recognizes the freedom of spouses to “enter into a matrimonial agreement ... as to all matters that are not
prohibited by public policy” and allows spouses who move to Louisiana “[d]uring the first year after
moving into and acquiring a domicile in this state ... [to] enter into a matrimonial agreement without
court approval.” As long as they remain within the limits of public policy, these spouses may agree to
preserve their previous matrimonial regime in whole or in part, or may replace it in whole or in part,
prospectively or retrospectively.

(b) Comparison with previous law. Articles 2334 and 2329 of the Civil Code (Rev.1979) were
complemented by paragraph 4 of Civil Code Article 15 (Redesignated 1987), which addressed the rights
and obligations of spouses with regard to particular property. The Articles of this Title replace that
paragraph. The first sentence of that paragraph provided for immovables situated in Louisiana. That
sentence is replaced by Articles 3524 and 3526-3527, infra. In addition, Article 3525, infra, provides
for one category of immovables situated outside Louisiana that were not heretofore provided for by that
paragraph.
With regard to movables, the second sentence of paragraph 4 of Civil Code Article 15 (Redesignated
1987) provided that “[m]ovables, wherever situated, are subject to the law of the domicile of the
acquiring spouse.” That provision is replaced by Articles 3523 and 3526 of this Title. Article 3523
restates that provision and adds the necessary clarification that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this
Title,” the pertinent domicile of the acquiring spouse is the domicile at the time of acquisition and not
later. This Title “provides otherwise”, inter alia, in Articles 3524 and 3526, infra, which authorize the
application of Louisiana law as the law of the situs of an immovable, rather than that of the domicile,
in classifying funds (i.e. movables) used for the acquisition of a Louisiana immovable, and in Article
3526, infra, which authorizes the application of Louisiana law as the law of the domicile at the time of
the termination of the marriage. Thus, Article 3523 is the general and residual rule of this Title.
(c) Application. Unlike Articles 3525, 3526, and 3527, infra, but like Article 3524, infra, this Article
designates the law applicable not only upon the termination of, but also during the marriage. This Article
is primarily a rule of classification and functions as a rule of distribution only when it is not displaced
by Article 3526, infra. For example, if the acquiring spouse was domiciled in this state at the time he
acquired the movable, then regardless of its location, this movable will be classified as community or
separate property according to the law of this state. If the spouses retain their Louisiana domicile until
their marriage terminates by divorce or death, Louisiana law will continue to be applicable through
this Article, which will then function as a rule of distribution. If the spouses move their domicile to
another state where their marriage terminates, this Article will not, of course, be binding on the courts
of that state, but will remain as a statement of the policy of this state for foreign courts that care
to inquire. On the other hand, if the acquiring spouse was domiciled in another state at the time he
acquired the movable, then the respective rights of the spouses to that movable during marriage are to
be determined under the law of that state. However, if at the time the marriage terminates one or both
spouses are domiciled in Louisiana, Article 3526, infra, becomes applicable as a rule of distribution that
displaces this Article. If Article 3526 is inapplicable for whatever reason, this Article continues to be
applicable. For a general discussion of the provisions of this Title, see Symeonides, “Louisiana's Draft
on Successions and Marital Property”, 35 Am.J.Comp.L. 259, 266-85 (1987); Symeonides, “In Search
of New Choice-of-Law Solutions to Some Marital Property Problems of Migrant Spouses: A Response
to the Critics”, 13(3) Comm.Prop.J. 11 (1986).



Art. 3524. Immovables situated in this state, LA C.C. Art. 3524

LSA-C.C. Art. 3524
Art. 3524. Immovables situated in this state
Currentness
Except as otherwise provided in this Title, the rights and obligations of spouses with regard to immovables situated
in this state are governed by the law of this state. Whether such immovables are community or separate property
is determined in accordance with the law of this state, regardless of the domicile of the acquiring spouse at the
time of acquisition.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Comparison with present law. According to paragraph 4 of Civil Code Article 15 (Redesignated
1987), which was added to the article during the 1979 revision of the law of matrimonial regimes,
“[i]mmovables situated in this state ..., acquired by a married person, are subject to the legal regime
of acquets and gains regardless of his domicile.” However, the comments to the 1979 revision provide
that “this provision does not require that immovable property acquired in the name of a married
nonresident be classified as community property in all instances. When a nonresident purchases an
immovable situated in Louisiana with separate funds, the immovable is his separate property.” Thus,
besides correcting what was obviously an overstatement in the text of paragraph 4, the 1979 comments
authorized the courts to follow the principle known as the “source doctrine” and to classify the property
as community or separate depending on the source of the funds used for its acquisition. However, neither
these comments nor the text of paragraph 4 of Civil Code Article 15 (Redesignated 1987) answered the
most critical question, namely which state's law, Louisiana's or that of the domicile of the nonresident
spouse, should be employed to classify the funds as community or separate? The second sentence of
this Article answers this question in favor of the “law of this state,” that is, Louisiana's substantive law
of matrimonial regimes (see, e.g., La.Civ.Code Arts. 2334-2345 (Rev.1979)).
(b) Rationale. Since the funds used for the acquisition of an immovable are themselves movables, they
should perhaps be classified according to the law governing movables, that is, the law of the domicile
of the acquiring spouse (see Article 3523, supra). However, at least when the acquiring spouse was
domiciled in a separate-property state at the time of acquiring the funds, this solution would make little
sense since, under the law of that state, all funds are separate funds. Moreover, despite the acoustic

similarity, the concept of separate property in a common-law system is not identical to the concept of
separate property under Louisiana law. Under Louisiana law the separate property of a spouse is free
of any claims in favor of the other spouse, whereas in a common-law state the separate property of a
spouse is subject to liens or inchoate rights in favor of the other spouse which ripen into a statutory share
or dower in death cases, and into similar rights, through the doctrine of equitable distribution, in divorce
cases. Symeonides, “In Search of New Choice-of-Law Solutions to Some Marital Property Problems
of Migrant Spouses: A Response to the Critics”, 13(3) Comm.Prop.J. 11, 12-14, 24-25 (1986). Thus,
if the funds, and therefore, under the “source doctrine”, the Louisiana immovable, are to be classified
according to the law of the foreign domicile of the acquiring spouse, the immovable should also be
subject to the same equitable claims that are granted to the other spouse by the law of that state over the
funds used for its acquisition. However, the practical problems that would be created by this otherwise
logically consistent solution are quite formidable, and are complicated by the fact that Louisiana does not
recognize the concept of equitable title. In order to avoid these problems and to preserve certainty of title,
this Article opts for the much simpler rule under which the funds are classified under the internal law of
this state, regardless of the domicile of the acquiring spouse. This Article should withstand constitutional
challenges by the acquiring spouse since it does not affect that spouse's rights to the funds at the moment
they are brought into the state (see Article 3523, supra), but only if and when these funds are used to
buy an immovable in this state, and then only in the absence of a valid matrimonial agreement providing
otherwise.
(c) This Article applies to Louisiana immovables only. Immovables situated in another state are provided
for in Article 3525, infra, which, however, applies only when the acquiring spouse was domiciled in
Louisiana at the time of acquisition.
Like Article 3523, supra, and unlike Arts. 3525, 3526, and 3527, infra, this Article designates the law
that determines the spouses' rights to the immovable during the marriage. Thus, if the immovable is
classified as community property, the provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code (see La.Civ.Code Arts.
2346-2355 (Rev.1979)) pertaining to the management of community property become applicable. This
Article may also be applicable upon termination of the marriage, but only in the cases that are not
covered by Articles 3526 or 3527, infra, which prevail over this Article because they are more specific.


Art. 3525. Termination of community; immovables in another state..., LA C.C. Art. 3525

LSA-C.C. Art. 3525
Art. 3525. Termination of community; immovables in another

state acquired by a spouse while domiciled in this state
Currentness
Upon the termination of the community between spouses, either of whom is domiciled in this state, their rights
and obligations with regard to immovables situated in another state acquired during marriage by either spouse
while domiciled in this state, which would be community property if situated in this state, shall be determined
in accordance with the law of this state. This provision may be enforced by a judgment recognizing the spouse's
right to a portion of the immovable or its value.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope. This Article applies to immovables which: (1) are situated outside Louisiana; (2) would be
classified as community property under Louisiana law (e.g., were acquired with funds classified as
community funds under Louisiana law); and (3) were acquired by a spouse (a) who, at the time of the
acquisition, was domiciled in Louisiana and (b) who, at the time of the termination of the community,
was domiciled in Louisiana or was subject to the jurisdiction of its courts. If any one of the above
conditions is missing, this Article does not apply and, depending on the circumstances, another article
in this Title might be applicable. If no other article is directly applicable, the case may fall under Article
3523, supra, as the residual article of this Title, and, if that Article is not applicable, the court should
resort to Article 3515, supra, the residual Article of this Book.
(b) Application. This Article designates the law applicable only upon termination of the community
and not before. The status of the immovable during the community will depend on the law of the
situs state and particularly on whether or how that state applies the source doctrine. If that state is a
community-property state, the immovable will likely be classified as community property. If that state
is a common-law state, the classification of the immovable will depend on whether that state applies
the source doctrine. Most common-law states consider the acquiring spouse to be the legal owner of the
immovable, subject to an equitable interest of one half for the benefit of the other spouse. See Depas
v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314, 49 Am.Dec. 88 (1848); Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at
Death Act §§ 1(2), 3, 6, and 7. The acquiring spouse may, however, encumber or convey the immovable

to innocent third parties, who acquire it free of any claims of the other spouse. The latter spouse has the
same rights to the proceeds of the sale as that spouse had to the funds used for the acquisition of the
immovable. Cf. Jackson v. Jackson, 425 So.2d 379 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1982).
(c) This Article applies only when the termination of the community occurs while at least one of
the spouses is domiciled in this state and there exists jurisdiction over the other spouse. When the
spouses have moved to another state, the matter will be decided by the courts of that state. This Article,
together with Article 3523, serve as statements of the policy of this state for foreign courts that choose
to inquire. On the other hand, when the spouses are domiciled in this state at the termination of the
community, Louisiana has every legitimate interest, and is constitutionally empowered, to apply its
own law of classification and distribution so as to prevent cheating by one Louisiana spouse who uses
community funds to buy immovable property in his own name in another state. When only one spouse
is domiciled here and there is no jurisdiction over the other, this Article, as well as any article pertaining
to property, is inapplicable because a court cannot affect the property rights of the absent spouse in ex
parte proceedings.
(d) Potential enforcement problems: (1) Divorce in Louisiana. As long as Louisiana remains the
matrimonial domicile, Louisiana has personal jurisdiction over both spouses. This should mitigate, if not
eliminate, most problems of enforcing the Louisiana judgment at the foreign situs. Rather than rendering
a judgment purporting to directly affect the foreign immovable, the Louisiana court should render a
judgment ordering the owning spouse to convey half of the foreign immovable, or an equivalent value, to
the other spouse. (See, e.g., California Civil Code § 4800.5; Texas Family Code § 3.63). Such a judgment
is enforceable in Louisiana by contempt proceedings and would be enforceable at the foreign situs
through recognition proceedings under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution.
The same result would follow in any case where, although no longer the matrimonial domicile, Louisiana
had personal jurisdiction over both spouses on other grounds. (2) Probate proceedings in Louisiana.
Louisiana courts may also be able to implement this Article in all cases in which the court has jurisdiction
over the owning spouse or his successors. They may be ordered to convey to the surviving spouse one
half of the immovable or equivalent value, and such a judgment would be enforceable as explained
above.
(e) The acquiring spouse's own half. By essentially treating the foreign immovable as if it were
community property, this Article adequately protects the non-owner spouse. To give that spouse more
under the substantive successions law of the foreign situs would be giving that spouse much more than
is contemplated by the law of either state. In order to avoid this result, § 3 of the Uniform Disposition
of Community Rights at Death Act provides that “the one half of the property which is the property of
the decedent is not subject to the surviving spouse's right to elect against the will.” On this issue the Act
accurately reflects the judicial practice in most sister states. The same result should follow under this
Title. Being more specific, Article 3525 should prevail over the general situs rule embodied in Article
3534, infra.



Art. 3526. Termination of community; movables and Louisiana..., LA C.C. Art. 3526

LSA-C.C. Art. 3526
Art. 3526. Termination of community; movables and Louisiana

immovables acquired by a spouse while domiciled in another state
Currentness
Upon termination of the community, or dissolution by death or by divorce of the marriage of spouses either of
whom is domiciled in this state, their respective rights and obligations with regard to immovables situated in this
state and movables, wherever situated, that were acquired during the marriage by either spouse while domiciled
in another state shall be determined as follows:
(1) Property that is classified as community property under the law of this state shall be treated as community
property under that law; and
(2) Property that is not classified as community property under the law of this state shall be treated as the separate
property of the acquiring spouse. However, the other spouse shall be entitled, in value only, to the same rights with
regard to this property as would be granted by the law of the state in which the acquiring spouse was domiciled
at the time of acquisition.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope and application. This Article applies only to property, movable or immovable, “acquired
during the marriage by either spouse while domiciled in another state”. If, at the time of acquisition, the
acquiring spouse was domiciled in Louisiana, the case will be governed by Article 3523, supra, with
regard to movables “wherever situated,” by Article 3524, supra, with regard to Louisiana immovables,
and by Article 3525, supra, with regard to certain foreign immovables that meet the conditions specified
therein.
For movables falling within its scope, this Article does not require a Louisiana situs, either at the time
of the acquisition or at the time of the termination of the marriage. When applicable to such movables,

this Article derogates from the general principle of Article 3523, supra, and prevails over it, being more
specific.
With regard to immovables, this Article applies only to “immovables situated in this state”. Immovables
situated in another state may be subject to Article 3525, supra, if they meet the conditions specified
therein. Otherwise, foreign immovables will be governed by the law selected under Article 3515, which
is the residual article. In applying Article 3515, the policies of this Title, particularly those of Article
3526, should be given proper consideration.
The final substantive condition for the application of this Article is that at least one of the spouses be
domiciled in Louisiana at the time of the so-called “significant event”. The significant event could be
the termination of the community (without termination of the marital relationship) or the dissolution
of the marriage (whether or not the spouses lived under the community regime) either by death or by
divorce. Annulment could also be analogized to divorce for the purposes of this Article.
Obviously, as with any other provision of this Book, in order for this Article to become applicable,
Louisiana must possess adjudicatory jurisdiction. Moreover, since the application of this Article
inevitably affects the property rights of the parties, Louisiana must have either in rem jurisdiction or in
personam jurisdiction over the parties affected. Thus, if the marriage has been terminated by death of
either spouse, Louisiana must have probate jurisdiction. See La.Code Civ.Pro. Arts. 2811 and 3401. In
cases of divorce or termination of the community, Louisiana must have jurisdiction over both spouses
in order to render any judgment affecting their property rights. See La.Code Civ.Pro. Art. 10(A); Estin
v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948); Simons v. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank, 381 U.S. 81 (1965).
(b) Classification of property. This Article envisions two separate mental steps. The first step is the
classification of the property that falls within the scope of the Article as either “community property”
or “separate property”. This classification is to be conducted “under the law of this state”, that is, the
substantive rules Louisiana has devised for cases that do not contain any foreign elements. See, e.g.,
La.Civ.Code Arts. 2325-2437 (Rev.1979). In other words, the classification is to be conducted as if the
spouses were domiciled in Louisiana at all critical times. Aside from logistical simplicity, one reason
for applying Louisiana law here is to avoid the anomaly of having to apply the law of a another state
(e.g., a common-law separate-property state) to matters of classification when that state might not have
any comparable scheme for classifying property.
(c) Distribution of property. The second step is the determination of the respective rights of spouses
with regard to the property that has been classified in the first step. For brevity's sake this step is called
“distribution”, although in actuality the property may not always be distributed. Although, as explained
above, the classification of the property is governed exclusively by Louisiana law, the distribution of
the property may be governed either by Louisiana law or by the law of another state. Subparagraph (1)
applies to property that is classified as community property under Louisiana classification law and calls
for the application of the same law for distributing that property at Louisiana's 50:50 ratio between the
spouses or their successors. Subparagraph (2) applies to property classified as separate property under
Louisiana law and calls for the application of the distribution law of the state where the acquiring spouse
was domiciled at the time of acquisition. The reason for this difference is explained below.
(d) Subparagraph (1): “Quasi-Community”. Subparagraph (1) attempts to secure for the non-acquiring,
formerly non-Louisianian, spouse the same protection as is provided by Louisiana substantive law for

similarly situated Louisiana spouses. This scheme is similar to what is known in other states as the
scheme of “quasi-community”. One difference is that this provision is applicable to both divorce and
death situations, whereas, with the exception of Idaho and California, other community property states
confine their scheme to divorce situations only. See also § 17, 18 of the Uniform Marital Property
Act. Another and more important difference stems from the fact that the quasi-community rule of
subparagraph (1) is supplemented by the rule of subparagraph (2), which is explained infra.
(e) Subparagraph (2). Subparagraph (2) of this Article applies only to property that is not classified as
community property under Louisiana substantive law. As long as the marriage lasts, this property is
governed by the law designated by Article 3524 for immovables, and by Article 3523 for movables.
Upon dissolution of the marriage, subparagraph (2) of this Article becomes operative and calls for the
application of the distribution law of the state in which the acquiring spouse was domiciled at the time
of acquisition. For similar results under the jurisprudence, see Schueler v. Schueler, 460 So.2d 1120
(La.App. 2d Cir.1985); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 442 So.2d 1330 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1984). See also Hughes v.
Hughes, 91 N.M. 339, 573 P.2d 1194 (1978).
(f) The objective of subparagraph (2) is the same as that of subparagraph (1), namely to afford some
protection to the non-acquiring spouse. Subparagraph (1) accomplishes this objective through the
application of the community-property law of this state. Subparagraph (2) accomplishes the same
objective through the application of the distribution laws of the domicile of the acquiring spouse at
the time of acquisition. The co-existence of the two subparagraphs might create an impression of
overprotection of the non-acquiring spouse. For a critique on exactly this point, see Reppy, “Louisiana's
Proposed ‘Hybrid’ Quasi-Community Property Statute Could Cause Unfairness”, 13(3) Comm.Prop.J.
1 (1986). For a response, see Symeonides, “In Search of New Choice-of-Law Solutions to Some Marital
Property Problems of Migrant Spouses: A Response to the Critics”, 13(3) Comm.Prop.J. 11 (1986).
(g) Insofar as it encompasses “inheritance” rights of the surviving spouse to Louisiana immovables,
subparagraph (2) of this Article derogates from the general situs rule applicable to succession to
immovables. See Article 3533, infra. Being more specific, this subparagraph prevails over Article
3533, which, of course, remains applicable to the inheritance rights of persons other than the surviving
spouse. Also, insofar as it pertains to the “inheritance” rights of the surviving spouse to movables, this
subparagraph derogates from, and should prevail over, the general rule of Article 3532, infra.
(h) The phrase “in value only” in subparagraph (2) is used in order to avoid the problems that may arise
when the law of the domicile at the time of acquisition grants to the non-acquiring spouse a property
interest (e.g., tenancy by the entirety) that is not recognized by the law of this state.


Art. 3527. Louisiana immovables acquired by a spouse while..., LA C.C. Art. 3527

LSA-C.C. Art. 3527
Art. 3527. Louisiana immovables acquired by a spouse while domiciled in

another state; death of the acquiring spouse while domiciled in another state
Currentness
Upon the death of a spouse domiciled outside this state, that spouse's immovables situated in this state and acquired
by that spouse while domiciled outside this state, which are not community property under the law of this state,
are subject to the same rights, in value only, in favor of the surviving spouse as provided by the law of the domicile
of the deceased at the time of death.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope and rationale. While similar in scope and rationale to subparagraph (2) of Article 3526, this
Article applies to death situations only and applies only when the acquiring spouse dies while domiciled
outside this state. The applicable law is also different. It is the law of the domicile of the deceased at the
time of death rather than at the time of acquisition of the property.
(b) This Article applies only when the acquiring spouse was domiciled outside Louisiana, both at the
time of the acquisition of the property and at the time of death. If he was domiciled in Louisiana at the
time of acquisition and at the time of death, Article 3524, supra, applies, and the other spouse would
have no rights to this (separate) property under Louisiana succession law or matrimonial regimes law
because he would have rights to the community property. If the acquiring spouse was domiciled outside
Louisiana at the time of acquisition, but within Louisiana at the time of death, subparagraph (2) of
Article 3526, supra, will apply, and the surviving spouse's rights will be determined according to the
law of the domicile at the time of acquisition. Finally, if the acquiring spouse (and in all likelihood, the
other spouse as well) was, at the time of acquisition and at the time of death, domiciled in another state,
this Article becomes applicable to give the other spouse the protection given by the law of that state.
When that other state is a community-property state, this protection may amount to virtually nothing.
When the other state is a separate-property state, this protection will likely consist of a statutory share,
usually a one-third share.

Art. 3527. Louisiana immovables acquired by a spouse while..., LA C.C. Art. 3527
(c) Exception from the situs rule. Insofar as it calls for the application of a foreign law to Louisiana
immovables, this Article derogates from the general situs rule of Article 3533, and, being more specific,
it should prevail over that article. However, Article 3527 is entirely consistent with the forced share
exception contained in Article 3533 and is inspired by the same philosophy. The phrase “in value only”
has the same meaning and purpose as it has in Article 3526, supra. See comment (h) under Article
3526, supra.


Bk. IV, T. IV, Refs & Annos, LA C.C. Bk. IV, T. IV, Refs & Annos

Title IV. Successions
LSA-C.C. Bk. IV, T. IV, Refs & Annos

Currentness
LSA-C.C. Bk. IV, T. IV, Refs & Annos, LA C.C. Bk. IV, T. IV, Refs & Annos

Art. 3528. Formal validity of testamentary dispositions, LA C.C. Art. 3528

Title IV. Successions (Refs & Annos)
LSA-C.C. Art. 3528
Art. 3528. Formal validity of testamentary dispositions
Currentness
A testamentary disposition is valid as to form if it is in writing and is made in conformity with: (1) the law of this
state; or (2) the law of the state of making at the time of making; or (3) the law of the state in which the testator
was domiciled at the time of making or at the time of death; or (4) with regard to immovables, the law that would
be applied by the courts of the state in which the immovables are situated.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope. This Article addresses only issues of formal validity, such as the mode of writing, the number
of witnesses, the presence of a notary, and, generally, all other formalities and solemnities required by
law for the confection of a valid testament. Whether a particular issue is an issue of form is determined
according to the law of this state.
(b) Change in the law. Under Civil Code Article 15 (Redesignated 1987), paragraph 1, the formal
validity of testaments was governed exclusively by the law of the place of the making, regardless
of whether that law would validate the testament. This unduly harsh and narrow rule was liberalized
only slightly with the enactment of La.R.S. 9:2401, which allows the upholding of a testament as to
form if the testament conforms to either the law of the place of its making or the law of the place
where the testator was domiciled at the time of the making. See Symeonides, “Exploring the ‘Dismal
Swamp’: Revising Louisiana's Conflicts Law on Successions”, 47 La.L.Rev. 1029, 1044-1047 (1987).
This Article liberalizes prior law by adding three more possible states to the list of states whose law may
be applied to validate a testament as to form. The additions are: this state; the state where the deceased
was domiciled at the time of death; and, with regard to immovables, the situs state. (See comments (d)
through (g), infra). Thus, a testament will be considered valid as to form if it conforms to the pertinent
requirements prescribed by any one of the states enumerated in this Article.
(c) Rationale. This liberalization is long overdue. It has already taken place in most sister states, as well as
in most western legal systems. See Symeonides, “Exploring the ‘Dismal Swamp’: Revising Louisiana's
Conflicts Law on Successions”, 47 La.L.Rev. 1029, 1043-1044 (1987). Besides being firmly grounded

in comparative experience, this liberalization is amply justified by one of the most basic policies of
the substantive law of successions, the policy of favor testamenti. At the domestic level, this policy
favors testate over intestate succession whenever there are reasonable assurances that the testament
contains the genuine will of the deceased. At the multistate level, this policy translates into a so-called
“rule of validation”, that is, a rule that upholds the testament as to form if it conforms to the pertinent
requirements of any state that is sufficiently related with the deceased and his testament. This rule also
finds support in the assumption that nowadays the laws of the various states on questions of testamentary
formalities usually differ only on matters of detail rather than fundamental policy. If this assumption is
true, then failure to comply with the technical requirements of one state should not be fatal to the formal
validity of a testament as long as it conforms with the law of another state also related to the testator.
(d) Under this Article, a testament is formally valid if it satisfies the form requirements prescribed by “the
law of this state”. Pursuant to the general command of Article 3517, supra, this must be understood as
a reference to the “internal law” of this state exclusive of its conflicts law. Theoretically, the application
of the internal law of this state may validate even a testament that has no connection with this state,
such as a testament made outside this state by a testator domiciled at all times outside this state and not
disposing of any property within this state. However, since the law of this state can be applied only when
a Louisiana court has jurisdiction, one or more of the above Louisiana contacts are likely to be present.
(e) Insofar as it authorizes the application of the law of the place of the making of the testament, this
Article restates the rule contained in the first paragraph of Civil Code Article 15 (Redesignated 1987)
and La.R.S. 9:2401. This Article also clarifies a question implicit in the source provisions, namely that
the pertinent law of the place of making is the law in force at the time of making and not later. Thus, a
testament that was valid under that law will not be affected by a subsequent change in that law that would
make such a testament invalid. By the same token, if the testament was invalid under the law at the time
of its making (and was also invalid under all other laws enumerated in this Article), the testament will
not be validated by a subsequent change in that law, unless of course the new law is clearly intended
to validate invalid testaments previously made.
(f) To the extent it refers to the law of the domicile of the testator at the time of making the testament,
this Article restates the supplementary rule of former R.S. 9:2401. However, this Article changes the
law by authorizing the application of the law of the domicile at the time of death in order to validate the
testament. This change brings Louisiana into line with all other sister states and is justified by the policy
of favor testamenti. See comments (b) and (c), supra. Moreover, unlike former La.R.S. 9:2401, which
was confined by its terms to “will[s] made outside this state”, this Article is applicable to testaments
made within or without Louisiana.
(g) This Article also changes the law by authorizing the application of the law of the situs of an
immovable to the extent that law would uphold a testament disposing of that immovable. This change
brings Louisiana into line with all other states of the Union. Obviously, the application of the law of the
situs may validate the testament only to the extent it disposes of immovables situated therein, but not
with regard to immovables situated elsewhere, or movables situated anywhere. The phrase “the law that
would be applied by the courts of the state ...” is meant to refer to the “whole law” of the situs including
its conflicts law. Thus, the quoted phrase authorizes a renvoi. See Article 3517, supra. Compare with
Restatement Second, Conflict of Laws, §§ 236, 239. When the immovable is situated in this state, the
“law that would be applied by the courts of [this] state” is any law designated as applicable by this
Article. When the immovable is situated in another state, the “law that would be applied by the courts

of [that] state” is any law applicable under the relevant conflicts rule of that state. This renvoi would
prove to be particularly useful, and would sustain the disposition, if the foreign situs has a choice-of-
law rule that is more liberal than this Article, such as § 2-506 of the Uniform Probate Code, which
encompasses the law of the testator's residence or nationality. The formal sufficiency, under the law of
the foreign state qua situs, of a disposition of immovables located therein, will not sustain the validity
of dispositions of movables, or of immovables located elsewhere, which are not sustainable under the
other provisions of this Article.
(h) In order to be validated by any of the laws enumerated in this Article, the testament must meet one
minimum requirement, that is, it must be in writing. La.R.S. 9:2401 imposed the additional requirement
that the testament be “subscribed by the testator.” The Uniform Probate Code has dropped this latter
requirement.
(i) The rules established by this Article also govern the formal sufficiency of a subsequent testamentary
disposition that purports to revoke the first. However, the effect of the subsequent disposition on a
previous disposition, that is, whether the former actually revoked the latter in whole or in part, would
be determined by the law designated by other Articles in this Title, such as Articles 3529, 3531, and
3533-3534, infra, as the case may be. Articles 3533-3534 also apply to other forms of revocation, such
as revocation by operation of law or by physical act.


Art. 3529. Capacity and vices of consent, LA C.C. Art. 3529

LSA-C.C. Art. 3529
Art. 3529. Capacity and vices of consent
Currentness
A person is capable of making a testament if, at the time of making the testament, he possessed that capacity under
the law of the state in which he was domiciled either at that time or at the time of death.
If the testator was capable of making the testament under the law of both states, his will contained in the testament
shall be held free of vices if it would be so held under the law of at least one of those states.
If the testator was capable of making the testament under the law of only one of the states specified in the first
paragraph, his will contained in the testament shall be held free of vices only if it would be so held under the
law of that state.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope. The first paragraph of this Article designates the law under which to determine whether,
at the time of making the testament, the testator possessed the juridical capacity to make a testament.
The second and third paragraphs designate the law under which to determine whether a testator, who
possessed the required capacity under the law applicable to that issue, was also able to express his will
freely and without impediments, that is, whether his volition contained in his testament was “free of
vices”. In this Article and throughout this Book, “[t]he masculine gender comprehends [either of] the
two sexes”. La.Civ.Code Art. 3556(1) (1870).
(b) Scope: Capacity. The capacity referred to in the first paragraph of this Article is the capacity to
make a testament in general, as distinguished from the “capacity” to make a particular type of testament
(e.g., an olographic testament), or “capacity” to dispose in favor of particular persons or to dispose of
particular assets. The capacity contemplated in this Article can best be described in a negative manner by
referring to what the Civil Code calls “absolute incapacities”, namely those incapacities which “prevent
the giving ... indefinitely with regard to all persons”. (La.Civ.Code Art. 1471 (1870)). Examples of such
incapacities are unsound mind (La.Civ.Code Art. 1475 (1870)) and lack of minimum age (La.Civ.Code

Art. 1476 (1870)). The article also encompasses similar incapacities recognized by other legal systems.
Whether a particular issue is an issue of capacity is determined under the law of this state.
This Article is not intended to apply to questions relating to the type or form of testaments required
for persons with particular handicaps such as blindness, deafness, illiteracy, etc. These are questions
of form, and as such fall under Article 3528, supra. The testator laboring under such a handicap is in
fact capable of making a testament and of disposing of his property, except that he must do so in the
proper form prescribed by law for persons with such a handicap. Compare with article 5 of the Hague
Convention on the Conflict of Laws Relating to the Form of Testamentary Dispositions.
Similarly, this Article does not encompass what the Civil Code calls “relative incapacities,” namely
incapacities which “prevent the giving to certain persons” (La.Civ.Code Art. 1471 (1870)), such as tutors
(La.Civ.Code Art. 1478-79 (1870)), and doctors and ministers (La.Civ.Code Art. 1489 (1870)). These
incapacities are covered by Article 3530, infra.
Finally, this Article does not affect the rules pertaining to the disposable portion (La.Civ.Code Art.
1493 et seq. (1870)), that is, the rules that prescribe how much property an otherwise capable person is
permitted to dispose of. These questions are governed by Article 3532, infra, with regard to movables,
and Articles 3533 and 3534, infra, with regard to immovables.
(c) Scope: Vices of consent. One of the basic prerequisites for the substantive validity of a testament
is that it must reflect the free and unrestrained will of the testator unaffected by vices of consent. See
La.Civ.Code Arts. 1948-65, 1917 (Rev.1984) and comments thereunder. However, although duress,
fraud, and error are the typical examples of vices of consent in most legal systems, these systems differ
on other vices of consent as well as on the precise legal meaning and ultimate impact of each vice on the
validity of the testament. Thus, in a multistate context, this multiplicity of meanings and consequences
may raise, in addition to a factual question, a genuine choice-of-law question: which law should govern
the issues of the existence vel non of vices of consent and their impact on the validity of the testament?
The second and third paragraphs of this Article address this question.
(d) Comparison with prior law. Civil Code Article 15 (Redesignated 1987) provided that the “form”
of a testament is governed by the law of the place of making, while the “effect” of the testament was
governed by the law of the place where the testament was “to have effect.” Since issues of testamentary
capacity and vices of consent do not fit neatly into either the “form” or the “effect” of the testament,
one could assume that there was simply no statutory choice-of-law rule for these issues. This appears
to have been the assumption of Louisiana jurisprudence, which reached inconsistent decisions on the
issue of testamentary capacity and virtually ignored vices of consent as an issue. The majority view
for capacity seems to have been to apply the law of the situs with regard to immovables and the law
of the testator's domicile with regard to movables. See Symeonides, “Exploring the ‘Dismal Swamp’:
Revising Louisiana's Conflicts Law on Successions”, 47 La.L.Rev. 1029, 1055-1056 (1987). Thus, on
the issue of testamentary capacity, this Article changes the jurisprudence with regard to immovables
and clarifies the jurisprudence with regard to movables. On the issue of vices of consent, this Article
fills a gap in the law.
(e) Operation and rationale. The operation of this Article may be illustrated by the following
hypothetical: In 1985, Mr. T made a testament while he was domiciled in State X. T died in 1990, after
he had already acquired a new domicile in state Y. The first paragraph of this Article provides that, on

the issue of capacity, T's testament will be considered valid if, at the time of the making of the testament
in 1985, T was considered capable of making a testament under the then-existing law of either state X
or state Y. The rationale for this rule of validation is explained in Symeonides, “Exploring the ‘Dismal
If T was considered incapable under the law of both states, the testament will of course be invalid and
the issue of vices of consent will never be reached. If T was considered capable under the law of both
states X and Y, and there happens to be a question about the authenticity of his consent, the second
paragraph of this Article will become applicable. This paragraph provides that T's will contained in his
testament shall be held free of vices if it would be so held under the law of either state X or state Y.
If T was considered capable of making a testament under the law of state X but not under the law of state
Y, then, under the first paragraph of this Article, his testament will be valid as to capacity. However,
according to the third paragraph of this Article, any vices of consent and their impact on the validity
of the testament must be judged exclusively under the law of state X, not Y. Thus, if under the law of
state X, T's will contained in his testament is considered free of vices, the testament will be considered
valid. On the other hand, if under the law of state X, T's will is not free of vices, then the testament
will be considered invalid even if on that same issue the testament would be considered valid under the
law of state Y. Proponents of the testament should not be allowed to “pick and choose” from the laws
of the two states only those provisions that favor validation and thus to salvage a testament that is not
valid in either state. In many states, the rules concerning vices of consent are closely interrelated with
the rules on incapacities. Applying the one set of rules without the other may disturb the equilibrium
accomplished by them and may distort the policies of both states.


Art. 3530. Capacity of heir or legatee, LA C.C. Art. 3530

LSA-C.C. Art. 3530
Art. 3530. Capacity of heir or legatee
Currentness
The capacity or unworthiness of an heir or legatee is determined under the law of the state in which the deceased
was domiciled at the time of his death.
Nevertheless, with regard to immovables situated in this state, the legatee must qualify as a person under the law
of this state.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope. This Article encompasses questions of: (1) capacity to inherit (see, e.g., La.Civ.Code Arts.
950-963 (1870) (existence at the moment the succession is opened)); (2) capacity to receive donations
(see, e.g., La.Civ.Code Arts. 1471-1490 (1870)); and (3) unworthiness of heirs (see, e.g., La.Civ.Code
Arts. 965-975 (1870)). This Article does not apply to questions such as who should inherit, in which
class, or how much, when the testator has left no testament. These questions are governed by Articles
3532-3534, infra.
(b) Rationale. As with Article 3539, supra, the issues that form the scope of this Article pertain more to
the personal and family relations of the deceased rather than to his property as such. For instance, the
rules imposing an incapacity to receive reflect a reprobation of certain relationships (e.g., concubinage,
see former La.Civ.Code art. 1481 (repealed in 1987)), or a determination that certain dispositions are
inherently suspect because of the likelihood of undue influence (see, e.g., La.Civ.Code Arts. 1479,
1489 (1870), declaring invalid legacies to certain tutors, doctors, and ministers). Similarly, the rules on
unworthiness of heirs are legislatively articulated value judgments about family relationships. In all three
instances these legislative determinations have nothing to do with land utilization, and little if anything
to do with security of title. Because of this, they should be reserved to the law-making jurisdiction of the
state where the deceased was last domiciled rather than the state where his property was located. This
is the premise of this Article. For a defense of this premise and of the choice of the law of the domicile
of the deceased rather than the domicile of the heir or legatee, see Symeonides, “Exploring the ‘Dismal

Art. 3530. Capacity of heir or legatee, LA C.C. Art. 3530
(c) The domicile of the heir or legatee. Although not a pertinent factor under this Article, the domicile of
the heir or legatee may assume a dominant role in adjudicating questions pertaining to the status of such
persons under Article 3519, supra. For instance, if the law of the decedent's domicile were to reserve a
certain portion of his estate to legitimate children and another portion to adopted children, then, leaving
aside questions of constitutionality, whether a child would qualify as a “legitimate” or “adopted” child
would be determined in accordance with the law selected for the particular issue under Article 3519. In
that selection, the domicile of the child is likely to be a significant factor. The same is true with regard to
juridical persons and unincorporated associations, except that the pertinent article for determining their
status would be Article 3515, supra.
(d) The proviso in the second paragraph of this Article is confined to immovables situated in “this
state,” i.e., Louisiana, and is intended to preserve the public policy of this state in extreme cases, such
as when the law of the testator's foreign domicile would permit legacies to animals. The proviso also
applies to unincorporated associations that might not be permitted to own property under the law of this
state. In this latter case, however, the incapacity may be cured if the foreign association is subsequently
incorporated under Louisiana law.


Art. 3531. Interpretation of testaments, LA C.C. Art. 3531

LSA-C.C. Art. 3531
Art. 3531. Interpretation of testaments
Currentness
The meaning of words and phrases used in a testament is determined according to the law of the state expressly
designated by the testator for that purpose, or clearly contemplated by him at the time of making the testament,
and, in the absence of such an express or implied selection, according to the law of the state in which the testator
was domiciled at the time of making the testament.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope. Like any juridical act, testaments may be ambiguous for a number of reasons, including the
incorrect use of legal terms, the use of ambiguous language, or the making of contradictory dispositions.
The process of resolving these ambiguities is called “interpretation” by the Civil Code of 1870, which
devotes twelve articles to this subject. (See La.Civ.Code Arts. 1712-1723 (1870)). The general literature
on the subject distinguishes between “interpretation” and “construction”. “Interpretation” is the process
of defining the meaning of words and terms contained in a testament. “Construction” is the process of
completing or presuming the intent of the testator as to matters on which he could have, but has not,
spoken. The introductory phrase of the Article confines its scope to matters of interpretation.
(b) Interpretation distinguished from effect of testament. It must be emphasized that this Article does
not apply to the effect of a disposition once its meaning has been established. For instance, through
interpretation the court may determine whether a disposition contained in a testament was intended
by the testator to be a successive usufruct or some other form of successive disposition. Once this
is determined, the substantive validity and the effectiveness of the disposition is judged by the law
applicable to the merits under Articles 3532, 3533 and 3534, infra. If, under these Articles, the applicable
law is the law of this state and the arrangement is found to be a prohibited substitution, then it will not
be given effect.
(c) The intent of the testator. The cardinal principle of interpretation of testaments is to ascertain and
honor, to the extent possible, the intent of the testator. Article 1712 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870
reflects this principle by providing that “[i]n the interpretation of acts of last will, the intention of the

Art. 3531. Interpretation of testaments, LA C.C. Art. 3531
testator must principally be endeavored to be ascertained ...” Ascertaining the intent of the testator is
essentially a factual inquiry. However, because this inquiry is often inconclusive, different legal systems
provide sets of suppletive rules to aid the court in “supplying” the missing intent of the testator. In a
multistate context, the choice-of-law question is, “which state's suppletive rules should be utilized in
interpreting the testament?” To this problem, this Article provides three solutions in the order in which
they appear in the text. The first is to allow the testator to expressly designate the law that should be
used in interpreting his testament. This solution, which has by now been adopted in most modern codes,
is the most direct way of honoring the testator's intent, consistently with La.Civ.Code Art. 1712 (1870).
If the testator failed to expressly designate the applicable law, it is equally consistent with the cardinal
principle of honoring the intent of the testator to instruct the court to try to ascertain the legal system
upon which the testator was relying at the time of making the testament. This is the second solution
provided by this Article. The third solution is to apply “the law of the state in which the testator was
domiciled at the time of making the testament” as the residual law for those cases in which there was
no express or implied selection by the testator.



LSA-C.C. Art. 3532
Art. 3532. Movables
Currentness
Except as otherwise provided in this Title, testate and intestate succession to movables is governed by the law of
the state in which the deceased was domiciled at the time of death.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope. This Article establishes both the general and the residual rule for determining the law
applicable to testate and intestate succession to movables. The law designated by this Article applies
“except as otherwise provided in [the preceding articles of] this Title”. Thus, when the particular issue
does not qualify as an issue of form, capacity, or interpretation falling within the scope of Articles
3528-3531, supra, the issue will be decided under this Article.
(b) Comparison with prior law: (1) Intestate successions. Civil Code Article 15 (Redesignated 1987)
did not deal expressly with intestate succession. However, paragraph 5 of Civil Code Article 15
(Redesignated 1987), together with Civil Code Article 14 (Redesignated 1987), could have been read as
establishing a unilateral conflicts rule requiring the application of Louisiana law to Louisiana movables.
The jurisprudence, however, ignored both these provisions and applied the law of the last domicile
of the deceased. See Symeonides, “Exploring the ‘Dismal Swamp’: Revising Louisiana's Conflicts
Law on Successions”, 47 La.L.Rev. 1029, 1085-1086 (1987). (2) Testate successions. With regard to
testate successions, Civil Code Article 15 (Redesignated 1987) would, if applied literally, have subjected
the foreign movables of a Louisiana testator to the law of the foreign situs (see La.Civ.Code Art. 15
(Redesignated 1987) par. 2), and the Louisiana movables of a foreign testator to the law of the foreign
state where the testament was made (see La.Civ.Code Art. 15 (Redesignated 1987) par. 3). For discussion
and jurisprudence, see Symeonides, “Exploring the ‘Dismal Swamp’: Revising Louisiana's Conflicts
Law on Successions”, 47 La.L.Rev. 1029, 1076-1085 (1987). This Article removes this uncertainty with
a single, bilateral choice-of-law rule calling for the application of the law of the decedent's last domicile
to both testate and intestate succession to all movables, wherever situated.

(c) Rationale. The domiciliary rule adopted by this Article realigns Louisiana with the rest of the nation
and the civilian world and satisfies two important succession-law policies: the ensurement of a uniform
treatment of the succession as a single unit in cases involving movables located in more than one state;
and the protection of the justified expectations of the testator who, in making or not making a disposition,
is more likely to have relied on the law of his domicile than, say, the law of the situs of the movables.
More importantly, the domiciliary rule recognizes the obvious, which is that, of all the states potentially
involved in a multistate succession, the last domicile of the testator has a more legitimate claim to have
its law applied than either the state where the movable property was located at the time of death or,
even less, the state where the testament was made. Although to some extent this principle applies to
immovables, nonetheless Articles 3533 and 3534, infra, retain the situs rule for them, but allow the
exceptions specified therein.
(d) This Article does not affect the application of Louisiana inheritance tax law. According to R.S.
47:2404, Louisiana imposes inheritance tax on “all tangible movable property physically in the State
of Louisiana, whether ... inherited, bequeathed, given or donated under the laws of this state or of any
other state or country.”



LSA-C.C. Art. 3533
Art. 3533. Immovables situated in this state
Currentness
Except as otherwise provided in this Title, testate and intestate succession to immovables situated in this state is
governed by the law of this state.
The forced heirship law of this state does not apply if the deceased was domiciled outside this state at the time of
death and he left no forced heirs domiciled in this state at the time of his death.
Credits
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope. This Article establishes the general and residual rule for the law applicable to testate and
intestate succession to immovables situated in this state. This Article applies “except as otherwise
provided in this Title,” that is, it applies to questions other than form, capacity, consent, and
interpretation, which are governed by Articles 3528-3531, supra. Immovables situated in another state
are provided for in Article 3534, infra. The terms movable and immovable are used here and throughout
this Title in their usual signification under Louisiana law, and include incorporeals. However, whether
an interest in land or an attachment thereto actually qualifies as an immovable is determined by the law
of the situs of the land.
(b) The situs rule and its exceptions. This Article retains, for the most part, the traditional situs rule
followed by this and most other states of the United States. See Symeonides, “Exploring the ‘Dismal
During the last three decades the situs rule has been severely criticized by most academic commentators
as being too mechanical, arbitrary, and non-responsive to the true policies implicated in most multistate
successions disputes. Indeed, while it has a legitimate interest in matters of land utilization (e.g.,
prohibited substitutions, perpetuities, etc.), the situs state has little interest in deciding matters of
testamentary formalities, capacity, or wealth distribution among members of a family not domiciled
therein. Also, while the situs has an interest in preserving the integrity of its recording system, that
interest is fully satisfied by requiring recordation of the judgment at the situs and does not require
application of situs substantive law on the merits. For these reasons, this Title removes the following

issues from the scope of the situs rule: issues of testamentary formalities (see Article 3528, supra);
capacity, vices of consent, and unworthiness (see Articles 3529-3530, supra); and interpretation (see
Article 3531, supra). This Article introduces a further exception pertaining to forced heirship.
(c) The forced heirship exception. According to this Article, the forced heirship law of this state shall
not apply to cases which present cumulatively the following three fact-patterns: (1) the testator was
domiciled outside this state at the time he acquired the immovable; (2) he was domiciled outside this
state at the time of his death; and (3) he left no forced heirs domiciled in this state at the time of his
death. In such cases, Louisiana has no true interest in applying its forced heirship law against the will
of the foreign testator for the protection of his foreign heirs. The mere fact that the property is situated
here is not sufficient to justify the application of Louisiana's forced heirship law, a law that is geared
toward people, that is, Louisiana people, rather than property.
The exception is narrowly drawn so as to apply only to cases which, aside from the fact that they involve a
Louisiana immovable, are completely alien to Louisiana. For instance, in order for the exception to apply,
the testator must have been domiciled outside Louisiana both at the time he acquired the immovable
and at the time of death. This is designed to prevent long-time Louisiana domiciliaries from effectively
disinheriting their children by establishing a domicile outside Louisiana shortly before their death.


Art. 3534. Immovables situated in another state, LA C.C. Art. 3534

LSA-C.C. Art. 3534
Art. 3534. Immovables situated in another state
Currentness
Except as otherwise provided in this Title, testate and intestate succession to immovables situated in another state
is governed by the law that would be applied by the courts of that state.
If the deceased died domiciled in this state and left at least one forced heir who at the time was domiciled in this
state, the value of those immovables shall be included in calculating the disposable portion and in satisfying the
legitime.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope and comparison with present law. This Article applies to testate and intestate succession to
immovables situated in another state. The first paragraph calls for the application of the law that would
be applied by the courts of the situs and thus restates the traditional rule followed in all states of the
United States. Except perhaps for the renvoi component, the prior Louisiana rule was the same. See
Symeonides, “Exploring the ‘Dismal Swamp’: Revising Louisiana's Conflicts Law on Successions”, 47
La.L.Rev. 1029, 1090-1092 (1987).
(b) Renvoi. By authorizing the application of “the law that would be applied by the courts” of the foreign
situs, the first paragraph of this Article authorizes a renvoi, that is, a consideration of the conflicts
rules of the foreign state. See Article 3517, supra. More often than not, these rules will point to the
internal, substantive successions law of the situs state. If so, the Louisiana court should apply that law.
Occasionally, however, the foreign conflicts rules might point to the law of another state on certain
issues. If so, the Louisiana court should follow that reference to the law of the third state and stop
the reference there. Although renvoi might introduce some complexity into the choice-of-law process,
renvoi has the advantage of ensuring a uniform treatment of questions pertaining to land, regardless of
the forum in which these questions are litigated. Compare with Restatement Second, Conflict of Laws,
§§ 236, 239 (1971).

Art. 3534. Immovables situated in another state, LA C.C. Art. 3534
(c) The forced heirship exception. The second paragraph establishes an exception to the situs rule of the
first paragraph in favor of the forced heirship law of this state for cases in which both the deceased and
at least one of his forced heirs are domiciled in this state at the time of death. The exception authorizes
the inclusion of the value of the foreign immovable into the fictitious mass of the estate of the Louisiana
deceased for purposes of calculating his disposable portion and satisfying the legitime of his forced heirs.
(d) Rationale. The rationale for this exception is the same as in Article 3533, supra. The forced heirship
law is designed for the protection of the descendants of the testator. When any such descendants are
domiciled in Louisiana, this state has a genuine interest in protecting them. When the testator is also
domiciled in Louisiana, the interest of this state in protecting his descendants by imposing on his freedom
of disposition the limits considered appropriate by the collective will outweighs any interest the foreign
situs might have. The fact that the property is not situated in Louisiana does not detract from either the
strength or the legitimacy of this interest. Indeed, the only interest the foreign situs might have in such
cases is the interest of preserving the integrity of its recordation system. This interest, however, will not
be affected by the application of Louisiana law because a Louisiana court may not, under this or any
other Article, render a judgment directly affecting foreign immovables, and because any judgment will
have to be recorded in the situs state to be effective there.
(e) Once the second paragraph of this Article becomes applicable, the paragraph will benefit even those
forced heirs of the deceased who are domiciled in another state. Although these foreign heirs do not
clearly come under the protective scope of the Louisiana law of forced heirship, the application of that
law for their protection may be justified on grounds of evenhandedness and uniform treatment of the
estate, as well as other grounds.
(f) Enforcement. Very often, the rule of the second paragraph of this Article may be implemented without
the need of enforcing the Louisiana judgment at the foreign situs, such as when the testator had enough
movables or Louisiana immovables to satisfy the legitime. The Louisiana court will then include the
value of the foreign immovables in calculating the mass of the estate and the value of the disposable
portion, and will satisfy the legitime out of property within its jurisdiction. When the property within
its jurisdiction is insufficient to satisfy the legitime, a Louisiana court may still be able to implement
this provision with regard to the foreign immovables if the court has in personam jurisdiction over the
parties affected, by ordering them to execute the necessary conveyances. If carefully cast in terms not
purporting to bind directly the foreign immovable, but only the parties before the court, the judgment
would be valid. It would be enforceable in Louisiana by contempt proceedings and in the situs state
through recognition proceedings under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.


Bk. IV, T. V, Refs & Annos, LA C.C. Bk. IV, T. V, Refs & Annos

Title V. Real Rights
LSA-C.C. Bk. IV, T. V, Refs & Annos

Currentness
LSA-C.C. Bk. IV, T. V, Refs & Annos, LA C.C. Bk. IV, T. V, Refs & Annos

Art. 3535. Real rights in immovables, LA C.C. Art. 3535

Title V. Real Rights (Refs & Annos)
LSA-C.C. Art. 3535
Art. 3535. Real rights in immovables
Currentness
Real rights in immovables situated in this state are governed by the law of this state.
Real rights in immovables situated in another state are governed by the law that would be applied by the courts
of that state.
Whether a thing is an immovable is determined according to the substantive law of the state in which the thing
is situated.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Terminology. This Article applies to real rights as defined by Louisiana substantive law (see,
e.g., La.Civ.Code Art. 476 (Rev.1978) and official comments thereunder). Whether a right in a thing
qualifies as a real right is determined according to Louisiana law, even if the thing to which the right
applies is situated in another state. However, whether a thing qualifies as an immovable is determined
according to the substantive law of the state where the thing is situated. For Louisiana immovables,
see, e.g., La.Civ.Code Arts. 462-470 (Rev.1978). An immovable may be corporeal or incorporeal, see
La.Civ.Code Art. 470 (Rev.1978), and includes its component parts, see, e.g., La.Civ.Code Art. 469
(Rev.1978).
(b) Scope. Under this Article, the law of the situs of the immovable governs the real right itself, that
is, its effects, incidents, and extinction. However, except for rights created by operation of law, such
as by prescription or accession, the law of the situs does not necessarily govern the juridical act that
purports to create the real right. For example, when the juridical act purporting to establish the real
right is a contract, its formal and substantive validity and the rights flowing therefrom are determined
according to the law designated by Articles 3537-3541, infra. Although these Articles will often point
to the law of the situs, they may sometimes authorize the application of another law. Similarly, when
the act purporting to establish the real right is a testament, its formal validity and interpretation will
be determined according to the law designated respectively by Articles 3528 and 3531, supra, and the

Art. 3535. Real rights in immovables, LA C.C. Art. 3535
testator's capacity according to the law designated by Article 3529, supra. That law will determine, for
instance, whether the testament is formally valid, whether the testator was of sound mind, and whether
he intended to establish a successive usufruct or some other dismemberment of ownership. Once these
facts are established, the law designated by this Article, that is, the law of the situs, will determine
whether the dismemberment constitutes a prohibited substitution, or, in the case of a usufruct, what its
incidents and the respective rights of the usufructuary are vis-a-vis the naked owner.
This distinction between the real right itself and the juridical act by which the right is established is
inherent in the very nature of real rights. The real significance of classifying a right as real appears
not in the relationship between the grantor and the grantee of the right, but rather in the relationship
between the grantee-holder of the right and third parties. The former relationship is always juridical and
is governed by the law applicable to the juridical act. The latter relationship is often not juridical, but
rather extrajuridical, and forms the subject matter of this Article.
(c) Application. This Article establishes a bilateral conflicts rule applicable to both Louisiana and foreign
immovables. The first paragraph applies to immovables situated in this state and calls for the application
of the internal law of this state. The second paragraph applies to immovables situated in another state
and calls for the application of the “whole law” of that state, that is, including its conflicts law. See
Article 3517, supra. This renvoi is a well-accepted feature of American conflicts law in cases involving
immovables.
(d) Rationale. Although severely criticized by most modern commentators, the situs rule restated in
this Article remains one of the most well-entrenched rules in Louisiana and American conflicts law.
In any event, most of these criticisms are directed against the excessive breadth of the traditional situs
rule rather than against its core. These criticisms were taken into account in formulating the specific
exceptions to the situs rule that are contained in the Titles on marital property, supra, successions, supra,
and conventional obligations, infra. In a mineral-rich state like Louisiana with a substantive law quite
different from that of its neighboring states, it would be unwise to go beyond these exceptions and to
abandon the situs rule altogether. Within the confines prescribed by these exceptions, the situs rule has
a useful role to play in any choice-of-law system, traditional or “modern”.


Art. 3536. Real rights in corporeal movables, LA C.C. Art. 3536

Title V. Real Rights (Refs & Annos)
LSA-C.C. Art. 3536
Art. 3536. Real rights in corporeal movables
Currentness
Real rights in corporeal movables are governed by the law of the state in which the movable was situated at the
time the right was acquired.
Nevertheless, after the removal of a movable to this state, a real right acquired while the movable was situated in
another state is subject to the law of this state if: (1) the right is incompatible with the law of this state; or (2) the
holder of the right knew or should have known of the removal to this state; or (3) justice and equity so dictate in
order to protect third parties who, in good faith, have dealt with the thing after its removal to this state.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Terminology. This Article applies to real rights as defined by Louisiana substantive law (see, e.g.,
La.Civ.Code Article 476 (Rev.1978) and official comments thereunder). Whether a right in a thing
qualifies as a real right is determined according to Louisiana law, even if the thing to which the right
applies is situated in another state.
Real rights are subdivided into principal and accessory. The principal real rights pertain to the substance
of the thing, which is thereby placed at the service of the holder of the right. They consist of ownership
and its permissible dismemberments. The accessory real rights are accessory to the obligation they
secure and include pledges, chattel mortgages, special privileges or liens, and other security interests
recognized by other legal systems. Although most conflicts cases involve accessory real rights such as
chattel mortgages, these rights are subject to special legislation that contains conflicts provisions. As
explained in comment (c) below, these special conflicts provisions are not superseded by this Article,
which is intended to serve as a residual Article for cases not provided for elsewhere by legislation.
This Article applies to corporeal movables only. Incorporeal movables are intentionally excluded from
the scope of this Article. Consequently, the inherently more complex conflicts that involve incorporeals
should be resolved under the flexible formula of Article 3515, the residual article. Whether a thing is

a corporeal movable is determined according to the law of the state where the thing is situated. For
Louisiana movables, see, e.g., La.Civ.Code Arts. 471-475 (Rev.1978).
(b) Scope. This Article applies to real rights in corporeal movables, that is, to the relation between the
holder of the right and third parties other than those involved in the juridical act that gave rise to the
right. Except for rights created by operation of law, as by prescription or accession, the relationship
between the holder and the grantor of the right is not governed by this Article, but by other articles
applicable to the relationship. For example, if the relationship was created by contract, its formal and
substantive validity and the rights flowing therefrom are determined according to the law designated by
the Articles of the Title on conventional obligations, infra. Similarly, when the relationship between the
grantor and the grantee of the right is based on a testament, its formal validity and interpretation as well
as the testator's capacity are determined according to the law designated respectively by Articles 3528,
3531 and 3529, supra. That law determines, for instance, whether the testament was formally valid,
whether the testator was of sound mind, and whether he intended to establish a successive usufruct or
rather some other dismemberment of ownership. Once these facts are established, the law designated
by this Article will determine whether the dismemberment constitutes a prohibited substitution, or, in
the case of a usufruct, what its incidents and the respective rights of the usufructuary are vis-a-vis the
naked owner.
(c) Residual character of this Article. This Article is not intended to supersede more specific statutory
conflicts rules presently found in Louisiana law, such as in the Vehicle Certificate of Title Law (La.R.S.
32:704 et seq.), the Lease of Movables Act (La.R.S. 9:3301 et seq.), and, more importantly, La.R.S.
10:9-103, which was derived from § 9-103 of the U.C.C. and became effective on January 1, 1990.
(d) Content and structure. The first paragraph of this Article establishes a bilateral choice-of-law rule
applicable to movables which, at the time the question arises, may or may not be situated in this state.
The second paragraph establishes a unilateral choice-of-law rule applicable to movables which, at the
time the question arises, are situated in Louisiana, but which were formerly situated in another state.
This Article does not address directly the reverse fact-pattern, that is, cases in which a thing subject to a
real right acquired in this state is subsequently moved to another state. Such cases are rarely encountered
by Louisiana courts. When they do arise, Louisiana courts may devise appropriate solutions drawn from
the principles of Article 3515, supra, as well as from the first and the second paragraphs of this Article.
(e) Rationale of the first paragraph. The first paragraph provides that real rights in a corporeal movable
are governed by the law of the situs of the movable at the time that the asserted right was acquired.
The situs rule is well-entrenched in Louisiana jurisprudence, and seems to be the focal point of the
expectations of parties when dealing with corporeal movables.
(f) Rationale of the second paragraph. Because movables may be moved from one state to another, any
choice-of-law rule based on situs as the exclusive connecting factor leads inevitably to many problems
known collectively as the “conflit mobile”. Rigid adherence to the law of the former situs rule would
ignore the legitimate interest of the second situs in protecting its own citizens who have acquired rights
in justifiable reliance upon the law of that state. By the same token, rigid adherence to the law of the
second situs would mean that rights created while a thing was situated in one state could be extinguished
by subsequent transactions in another state after the thing has been removed to that state. The conflict
between the two situses must be resolved in a way that takes into account the legitimate interests of each
situs. The expectations of the parties provide the key for resolving the conflict. The first state has an

interest in protecting the holder of the right validly acquired while the thing was located in that state,
while the second state has an interest in protecting innocent third parties who have dealt with the thing
after its removal to the second state.
These are the lines along which the second paragraph of this Article attempts to strike a compromise
between the interests of the first situs as well as the constitutionally sanctioned principle of continuity
of rights on the one hand, and the interests of the second situs on the other. The compromise consists
of (a) defining narrowly the circumstances under which the foreign-created right will be subject to the
law of the second situs, Louisiana; and (b) applying the law of the former situs to all other situations
where the exceptions contained in this paragraph are not applicable. This compromise is consistent with
Louisiana jurisprudence.
(g) Application of the second paragraph. When the conditions described in the second paragraph are
met, the foreign-created right will be “subject” to Louisiana law. However, subjecting the foreign-
created right to Louisiana law does not necessarily entail the extinction or subordination of the foreign-
created right, but simply means that the right is subjected to the same requirements, and to the same
protection and rank, as provided by Louisiana law for those rights. For instance, if Louisiana law requires
recordation to make the right assertible vis-a-vis third parties, recordation must be effected within the
time limits specified by Louisiana law. Similarly, if Louisiana law ranks the right lower than other
specific rights in the same thing, whether previously or subsequently acquired, such a ranking will have
to be recognized by Louisiana courts.
(h) Compatibility with the law of this state. The second paragraph of this Article provides that the
continuing vitality in this state of rights acquired in another state after the thing has been removed to this
state depends on the extent to which they are compatible with the law of this state. This is so regardless
of whether the holder of the right knew or should have known of the thing's removal to this state and
regardless of the good or bad faith of third parties who have subsequently dealt with the thing in this state.
A foreign-created right may be totally or partly incompatible with the law of this state. Incompatibility
may also encompass only some aspects of the right, such as the means available to the holder of the
right for its enforcement. Joint tenancies and, until 1985, lease-purchase agreements may be cited as
examples of rights the substance of which is not compatible with Louisiana law. Louisiana should not
be forced to recognize rights that do not fit into its own scheme of real rights, especially in light of
the numerus clausus of real rights under La.Civ.Code Article 476 (Rev.1978). However, this principle
should not prevent Louisiana courts from giving the holder of the right protection that approximates as
much as possible the protection accorded by the law of the other state. In the case of joint tenancy, for
example, Louisiana would not recognize the survivorship feature of joint tenancy under the common
law but might give each joint tenant the Louisiana version of co-ownership. Examples of foreign-created
rights which, though themselves recognized by Louisiana law, are nevertheless partly incompatible with
the law of this state are foreign security interests that allow the creditor to use self-help in repossessing
the thing and to sell it at a private sale without appraisal. In such cases, enforcement of the right must
comply with Louisiana law.
(i) Notice to the holder of the right of the removal of the thing to this state. The second paragraph of this
Article also provides that if the holder of a real right acquired according to the law of another state where
the thing was originally situated knew or should have known of the subsequent removal of the thing to
this state, his rights are subject to the law of this state. As said earlier, this rule, which is derived directly

from pertinent Louisiana jurisprudence, does not mean that these rights will necessarily be subordinated
to rights of third parties subsequently acquired under the law of this state. The rule simply means that
the holder of the foreign-created right will have to comply with Louisiana law in order to secure the
continuing protection and enjoyment of his rights. For instance, if Louisiana law requires recordation
in order to protect him vis-a-vis third parties, he would have to comply with that requirement within
the time limits specified by Louisiana law. Similarly, if Louisiana law ranks his right lower than other
specific rights in the same thing, whether previously or subsequently acquired, such a ranking will have
to be recognized by Louisiana courts. Subjecting the foreign-created right to Louisiana law in such
circumstances is not unfair to the holder of the right, in light of his actual or constructive knowledge of
the removal of the thing to Louisiana and of the opportunity available to him to take protective measures.
(j) Removal of the thing to this state without notice to the holder of the right; protection of third parties in
the interest of justice. On the other hand, when the holder of the foreign-created right did not know and
had no reason to know of the removal of the thing to this state, Louisiana courts have taken the position
that he ought to be protected even as against innocent third parties, and without any limitation as to time.
This position of the Louisiana jurisprudence was contrary to § 9-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
which protects the holder of a foreign-created security interest for only four months after the removal
of the thing to the forum state. Thus, under this jurisprudence, the holder of a foreign-created right was
treated more generously than all other sister states would treat the holder of a Louisiana-created right
in the reverse situation. This difference has been removed by the enactment in Act 135 of 1989, of
R.S. 10:9-103, which is based on U.C.C. § 9-103, and which became effective on January 1, 1990. The
second paragraph of this Article addresses this problem with regard to those areas of the law that are
not covered by R.S. 10:9-103.
The second paragraph of this Article provides that the foreign-created right will be subject to Louisiana
law if “justice and equity so dictate in order to protect third parties who, in good faith, have dealt with
the thing after its removal to this state.” When these conditions are met, the law of this state applies
even if the holder of the foreign-created right had no reason to know of the removal of the thing to this
state. Because of this, his right should be subjected to the law of this state only in exceptional cases
and only when necessary in order to avoid gross inequity. The reference to the dictates of “justice and
equity” is intended to convey this idea, namely that the foreign-created right may be subordinated only
if a compelling case can be made in the interest of justice and equity. The reference to third parties
indicates that only they are the intended beneficiaries of this provision and not the immediate parties
to the transaction that created the right. Moreover, the third parties may invoke the protection of this
provision only if they have dealt with the thing in good faith, even if good faith is not required by the
substantive law for the acquisition of the right asserted by them. Thus, the reference to good faith is
intended to raise the standard for subordinating the foreign-created right to a right created by Louisiana
law.
The following example illustrates the intended application of this provision: A stolen movable that is not
subject to a registration requirement (see La.Civ.Code Article 525, (Rev.1979)) is sold in Louisiana by
“a merchant customarily selling similar things” (see La.Civ.Code Article 524 (Rev.1979)), and bought
by a third party in good faith. Civil Code Article 524 (Rev.1979) protects the purchaser by requiring
the owner, in order to recover the thing, to reimburse to the purchaser the purchase price. Without the
above provision, this protection would probably not be available to the Louisiana purchaser if the owner
of the stolen thing had acquired ownership of it in another state and did not know or have any reason
to know that, after it was stolen from him, it was brought to Louisiana. The few Louisiana cases in

which this problem was addressed have protected the purchaser but did so without any discussion of
the conflicts problem. See, e.g., Southeast Equipment Co. Inc. v. Office of State Police, 437 So.2d 1184
(La.App. 4th Cir.1983). This provision sanctions these cases and supplies a rationale for deciding similar
cases by providing that the purchaser should be protected if he was in good faith, and justice and equity
so dictate. The defendant's good faith in such a case would make the true owner's rights in the thing
subject to the law of this state, if justice and equity so dictate. In this case, because of the fact that
under La.Civ.Code Article 524 (Rev.1979) the purchaser's good faith is a necessary prerequisite to his
having a right to reimbursement, the requirement of good faith imposed by this provision may appear
superfluous. However, the need for this requirement appears more clearly in other cases in which good
faith is not a condition for the acquisition of a right by a third party.


Bk. IV, T. VI, Refs & Annos, LA C.C. Bk. IV, T. VI, Refs & Annos

Title VI. Conventional Obligations
LSA-C.C. Bk. IV, T. VI, Refs & Annos

Currentness
LSA-C.C. Bk. IV, T. VI, Refs & Annos, LA C.C. Bk. IV, T. VI, Refs & Annos

Art. 3537. General rule, LA C.C. Art. 3537

Title VI. Conventional Obligations (Refs & Annos)
LSA-C.C. Art. 3537
Art. 3537. General rule
Currentness
Except as otherwise provided in this Title, an issue of conventional obligations is governed by the law of the state
whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to that issue.
That state is determined by evaluating the strength and pertinence of the relevant policies of the involved states
in the light of: (1) the pertinent contacts of each state to the parties and the transaction, including the place of
negotiation, formation, and performance of the contract, the location of the object of the contract, and the place of
domicile, habitual residence, or business of the parties; (2) the nature, type, and purpose of the contract; and (3)
the policies referred to in Article 3515, as well as the policies of facilitating the orderly planning of transactions,
of promoting multistate commercial intercourse, and of protecting one party from undue imposition by the other.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope. This Article establishes the general approach for selecting the law applicable to conventional
obligations. Being more general, this Article will be superseded by the more specific Articles contained
in this Title. Articles 3538 and 3539, infra, are more specific with regard to issues of form and capacity
respectively. Both Articles contain language that regulates more specifically their relationship to this
Article. (See comment (e) under Article 3538 and comment (b) under Article 3539, infra). The same is
true with regard to Article 3540. See comments (d) and (f) under Article 3540, infra. In essence, this
Article applies in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. The existence, validity, and
effectiveness of a choice-of-law agreement is decided according to the law applicable to the particular
issue under Articles 3537-3539. See comments (c) and (d) under Article 3540, infra.
According to Article 14, supra, this and any other Article of this Title apply “[u]nless otherwise
expressly provided by the law of this state”. The following are among the Revised Statutes that “provide
otherwise”: R.S. 10:1-105 (U.C.C.); R.S. 22:611 et seq. (Insurance Code); R.S. 9:3302 et seq. (Lease
of Movables Act); R.S. 9:3511 (consumer credit transactions); R.S. 51:1418 (consumer transactions).
When applicable, these statutes will prevail, being more specific, over the provisions of this Section.

(b) Comparison with prior law. Paragraph 2 of Civil Code Article 15 (Redesignated 1987) provided
that the “effect” of juridical acts was “regulated by the laws of the country where such acts are to
have effect.” Without any guidance as to how to identify the place of the “effect” of the contract,
Louisiana courts reached conflicting determinations that included the place of performance, the place
intended by the parties, the common domicile of the parties, the place where the object of the contract
was situated, and sometimes the place that, from the totality of the circumstances, had the strongest
connection with the contract and the parties. See Note, “Conflict of Laws--Contracts”, 47 La.L.Rev.
1181 (1987); Comment, “Conflict of Laws: Contracts and Other Obligations”, 35 La.L.Rev. 112 (1974).
In recent years, a significant minority of cases found in Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Co., 276 So.2d 309
(La.1973), which is the leading case that introduced into Louisiana the modern American choice-of-law
doctrine in tort conflicts, the needed excuse for ignoring Civil Code Article 15 (Redesignated 1987) and
applying instead the so-called “governmental interest analysis”, or the approach of the Second Conflicts
Restatement, or both. See Note, “Conflict of Laws--Contracts”, 47 La.L.Rev. 1181 (1987). In retrospect,
the inherent vagueness of Civil Code Article 15 (Redesignated 1987) may well have been a blessing in
disguise, since it protected the Louisiana courts from being locked into the wooden lex loci contractus
rule that was then being followed in other states. This Article maintains this flexibility but also provides
sufficient guidance on how to use it.
(c) Relation to Article 3515. The first paragraph of this Article enunciates the objective of the choice-of-
law process for contract conflicts in language that is purposefully identical to that of the first paragraph
of Article 3515. These two Articles and the comments accompanying them are intended to be read
together. As in Article 3515, supra, the objective is to identify “the state whose policies would be most
seriously impaired”, that is, the state that, in light of its connection to the parties and the transaction
and its interests implicated in the conflict, would bear the most serious legal, social, economic, and
other consequences “if its law were not applied” to the issue at hand. As envisioned by this Article,
the search for the applicable law should not be a mechanical, quantitative process, but should be based
on an objective and impartial evaluation of the consequences of the choice-of-law decision on each of
the involved states with a view towards accommodating their respective interests rather than selfishly
promoting the interests of one state at the expense of the others.
The second paragraph of this Article prescribes the process or method for attaining the objective
enunciated in the first paragraph in language that is parallel to, though more specific than, the language
employed in the second paragraph of Article 3515. Article 3537 adds specificity to the description of
this process by: providing an illustrative list of the factual contacts that are usually pertinent in contract
conflicts; by adding to the list of “policies mentioned in Article 3515” certain sets of policies that are
ex hypothesi pertinent in contract conflicts; and by providing that the evaluation of the strength and
pertinence of the involved policies is to be made “in the light of ... the nature, type, and purpose of
the contract”.
(d) The process. Thus, the first step of the process is to identify “the relevant policies of the involved
states”. A state is considered “involved” when it has any of the factual contacts expressly listed in
the second paragraph of this Article or included by implication in the phrase “pertinent contacts”. The
“relevant policies” of that state are identified through the resources of the interpretative process by
focusing on the specific rules of substantive contract law whose applicability is being urged in the
particular case.

The second step of the process is to evaluate “the strength and pertinence of [these] policies ... in the
light of” the three sets of factors listed in the second paragraph, to wit: (i) the factual contacts of each
involved state to the parties and the transaction; (ii) the “nature, type and purpose of the contract”; and
(iii) the policies listed in clause (3).
(e) Factual contacts. Clause (1) of the second paragraph lists the most important factual contacts or
connecting factors in light of which the strength and the spatial pertinence of the policies of the involved
states are to be evaluated. This list is neither exhaustive nor hierarchical and is intended to discourage
rather than encourage a mechanistic counting of contacts as a means of selecting the applicable law. The
fact that one state has more contacts with the dispute than another state does not necessarily mean that
the law of the first state should be applied to any or all issues of the dispute, unless the contacts are of
the kind that bring into play policies of that state that “would be most seriously impaired if its law were
not applied” to the issue at hand. For example, in a contract pertaining to immovables, the fact that the
“location of the object of the contract” is in one state may well be more important than all other factual
contacts of another state, if the issue in dispute is such as to bring into play a strong policy of the situs
state concerning land utilization or security of land titles. Similarly, the place of the performance of a
contract would normally be more important than most other factual contacts combined, if the issue in
dispute is the availability of specific performance and the contract is considered immoral under the law
of the place of performance.
(f) Multistate considerations. Through its cross-reference to Article 3515, clause (3) of the second
paragraph of this Article incorporates by reference the list of policies contained therein as well as the
analysis prescribed by that Article. See comment (c) under Article 3515, supra. The listing of additional
multistate policies is not intended to alter that analysis, but rather to add specificity to it by mentioning
expressly policies that are likely to be implicated in most multistate contract conflicts. The listing of these
policies is neither exhaustive nor hierarchical. Their relative importance will depend on the particular
contacts of the enacting jurisdiction, the nature, type, and purpose of the contract, and the particular
issue with regard to which there exists an actual conflict.
(g) The nature, type, and purpose of the contract. Deliberately placed between the lists of factual contacts
and multistate considerations, “the nature, type, and purpose of the contract” (clause (2)) should help
orient the dialectical process of evaluating the strength and pertinence of state policies. Indeed, the
nature, type, or purpose of the particular contract may provide useful pointers for assessing the relative
importance of factual contacts and the relative pertinence of multistate considerations. For example, in
a contract with family-law aspects (e.g., a child-support agreement), the domicile of the parties would
normally be more important than any of the other factual contacts listed in clause (1), and the policy
of facilitating and promoting multistate commercial intercourse (clause 3) would be far less relevant
than any of the other multistate considerations listed in clause (3). Similarly, in an employment contract,
the place where the services were to be rendered would usually be among the more important factual
contacts, and the policy of “protecting one party from undue imposition by the other” would acquire
particular significance. Finally, the latter policy would usually be more important in small consumer
contracts than in commercial contracts between parties with equal bargaining power.



Art. 3538. Form, LA C.C. Art. 3538

LSA-C.C. Art. 3538
Art. 3538. Form
Currentness
A contract is valid as to form if made in conformity with: (1) the law of the state of making; (2) the law of the state
of performance to the extent that performance is to be rendered in that state; (3) the law of the state of common
domicile or place of business of the parties; or (4) the law governing the substance of the contract under Articles
3537 or 3540.
Nevertheless, when for reasons of public policy the law governing the substance of the contract under Article
3537 requires a certain form, there must be compliance with that form.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope. This Article applies only to issues of form of the contract. Whether an issue is one of form
is determined by the law of the forum. When the issue is one of form, this Article prevails, as more
specific, over Article 3537, supra, except as specified in this Article. See comment (e), infra.
(b) Comparison with prior law. Paragraph 1 of Civil Code Article 15 (Redesignated 1987) provided that
“[t]he form ... of public and private written instruments ... [is] governed [exclusively] by the laws ... of
the places where they are passed or executed[,]” whether or not those laws would uphold the contract.
For jurisprudence see Note, “Conflict of Laws--Contracts”, 47 La.L.Rev. 1181, 1208-10 (1987). Under
this Article, the law of the place of the making is no longer the exclusive law for determining the formal
validity of the contract. Moreover, that law is applied only to validate, not invalidate, the contract. This
Article establishes what is known in conflicts literature as a “rule of validation”, that is, a rule that favors
validation by authorizing the application of whichever of the laws mentioned therein would validate the
contract. This rule liberalizes Louisiana law and brings it into line with the judicial practice of most
sister states and with the statutory rules of most continental countries.
(c) Rationale. The premise underlying this approach is that, more often than not, the laws of the various
states about contractual formalities differ only in detail rather than in fundamental policy. Because of
this, failure to meet the technical requirements of one state should not, without more, defeat the intent of

the parties to have a binding contract, as long as their contract complies with the form requirements of
another state reasonably related to the parties and the transaction. Each of the states enumerated in the
first paragraph of this Article would be sufficiently related to the transaction and the parties to warrant
application of its law in order to validate the contract. This would be true even if the contract would be
formally invalid under the law of all other states mentioned therein. However, validation should not be
an end in itself. Sometimes, formal requirements are used as means of ensuring observance of strongly-
held substantive policies. Any rule of validation must therefore be subject to appropriate exceptions in
order to preserve those policies. This is the purpose of the exception provided in the second paragraph
of this Article.
(d) Operation of first paragraph. The first paragraph of this Article refers to “the law governing the
substance of the contract under Articles 3537 or 3540.” Article 3537, supra, provides the applicable law
in the absence of a valid choice by the parties, and defines the limits of their choice when one is made.
This law is usually referred to in the literature as the lex causae or the “proper law of the contract”.
Article 3540, infra, authorizes, under certain conditions specified therein, the application of the law
chosen or clearly relied upon by the parties. If the contract satisfies the form requirements of the chosen
law, the contract will be considered valid even if it does not satisfy the requirements of any other state
enumerated in Article 3538. However, as with any of the other laws enumerated in the first paragraph
of this Article, the application of the chosen law is subject to the public policy limitation prescribed in
the second paragraph of this Article. For the risks and advantages of this apparent “bootstrapping”, see
comment (c) under Article 3540, infra.
(e) Operation of second paragraph. The second paragraph of this Article introduces a limited exception
to the rule of validation established in the first paragraph. The exception is in favor of the lex causae
only, that is, the law that, under the factors enumerated in Article 3537, supra, would be applicable to
the particular issue in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. The exception comes into
operation when the party who challenges the formal validity of a contract that is formally valid under
any one of the laws enumerated in the first paragraph of this Article proves that: (1) under the principles
of Article 3537, supra, the law of another state would have been applicable to the issue; and (2) that
state would invalidate the contract “for reasons of public policy”. In the Draft submitted to the Council
of the Louisiana State Law Institute, the words “public policy” were preceded by the qualifier “strong”.
The Council deleted the latter word based on the understanding that, by definition, only strongly held
beliefs of a particular state qualify for the characterization of “public policy”.
The following two examples illustrate the operation of the second paragraph of this Article. An
employment contract that complies with the law of the place of making but not with the law of the
state where the services are to be rendered would be formally valid under the first paragraph of this
Article. However, if under the principles of Article 3537, the law of the latter state would be the law
applicable to the substance of the contract, and if that state would invalidate the contract “for reasons
of public policy”, such as the policy of protecting the weaker party from fraudulent exploitation, then
the contract would have to be declared formally invalid under the second paragraph of this Article. The
same result would be reached in a situation in which a contract pertaining to immovables complies with
the form requirements of the law of the place of making but not with those of the law of the situs of
the immovable. If, under the principles of Article 3537, the law of the situs would be the law applicable
to the substance of the contract, and assuming further that the particular rule of the situs that had not
been complied with reflected a public policy of the situs state, such as a policy designed to preserve
security of titles, then the contract would be declared formally invalid under the second paragraph of

this Article. For purposes of comparison, see Article 9, par. 6 of the EEC Convention on Contractual
Obligations of 1980.


Art. 3539. Capacity, LA C.C. Art. 3539

LSA-C.C. Art. 3539
Art. 3539. Capacity
Currentness
A person is capable of contracting if he possesses that capacity under the law of either the state in which he is
domiciled at the time of making the contract or the state whose law is applicable to the contract under Article 3537.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope. This Article applies to issues of contractual capacity and incapacity as defined by Louisiana
Civil Code Articles 1918-26 (Rev.1984) (that is, minority, interdiction, and being deprived of reason)
as well as to similar incapacities prescribed by other legal systems. Being more specific on the issue of
capacity, this Article prevails over Article 3540, infra. Consequently, the capacity of the parties to choose
the applicable law is to be determined under this Article. (See comment (d) under Article 3540, infra).
(b) Operation. This Article provides in effect that the search for the law applicable to capacity should
begin by looking first to the law of the state that presumptively has the greatest interest in determining the
issue, that is, the domicile of each contracting party. If all parties are considered capable of contracting
under the laws of their respective domiciles, this will normally put an end to the matter. However, if one
party is incapable of contracting under the law of his domicile, then the court should return to Article
3537, supra, with two questions in mind. The first question is whether the law of a state other than that
of the domicile of the incapable party would be applicable to this particular issue of capacity under the
principles of Article 3537, including especially the individualized issue-by-issue analysis that is built
into that Article. If the answer to this question is negative, that is, if the law of the domicile of the
incapable party is also the lex causae, then the contract is to be considered invalid. If the answer is
affirmative, that is, if the lex causae is the law of a state other than that of the domicile of the incapable
party, the court will ask the second question, namely, whether under the lex causae that party would be
considered capable of contracting. If the answer to this question is yes, the contract will be considered
valid, otherwise invalid.
The same two-step process should be followed if both contracting parties lack contractual capacity under
the law of their respective domiciles. It is conceivable, though perhaps not likely, that the law of a third

Art. 3539. Capacity, LA C.C. Art. 3539
state would be the lex causae with regard to that issue under the principles of Article 3537, supra. If so,
and if that law would uphold the contract as to capacity, the contract should be upheld.
(c) Rationale. The objective of this Article is to attain an appropriate equilibrium between two often
competing policies. The first is the policy of protecting security of transactions and commercial
expectations. This policy would be served by a choice-of-law rule that favors validation. The second
is the policy of protecting parties whom the law considers to be in need of protection. This policy
would have been served by an unqualified application of the law of the domicile of the incapable party.
Because it authorizes the application of whichever of the two laws (the lex domicilii or the lex causae)
validates the contract, this Article would seem to favor the former policy too much at the expense of the
latter. However, despite a tilt towards validation, this Article neither compels nor guarantees validation
a priori but instead makes it dependent on the highly flexible and individualized approach of selecting
the applicable law for the particular issue under Article 3537, supra.
The initial resort to the law of the domicile provided for in this Article is consistent with Louisiana
jurisprudence and its civilian origin. See Symeonides, “Exploring the ‘Dismal Swamp’: Revising
Louisiana's Conflicts Law on Successions”, 47 La.L.Rev. 1029, 1055-56 (1987); Note, “Conflict of
Laws--Contracts”, 47 La.L.Rev. 1181, 1203-08 (1987). It is also consistent with the teachings of most
modern American choice-of-law theories which have come to recognize the important role of domicile,
at least as a starting point, in any choice-of-law decision involving capacity. The rules of substantive
law on capacity are essentially a priori societal judgments about the maturity, soundness of mind, and
need of protection of various classes of persons. They are also conscious legislative determinations that
the need of protecting particular classes of persons and their families is strong enough to override the
general policy of promoting the security of transactions. In delineating the scope of operation of these
rules, the conflicts legislator must begin with the premise that they have been enacted with a view toward
protecting people domiciled in the enacting state rather than with the idea of affecting contracts made
therein by people domiciled elsewhere. Consequently, that state has an interest in applying these rules
in every contract which, whether made within or without its territory, involves one of its domiciliaries
whom it considers in need of protection. That interest will not of course always prevail, but it must be
the starting point of the search for the applicable law. It goes without saying that the interest of one state
in protecting the incapable party may often run contrary to the interest that another--and sometimes of
the same--state may have in, for instance, promoting the justified expectations of the other party and the
security of transactions in general. By referring to the principles of Article 3537, this Article attempts to
provide a flexible formula for resolving such conflicts in favor of the lex causae, that is, in favor of the
law of the only other state which has a greater and more legitimate interest in regulating this particular
issue than does the state where the incapable party is domiciled.


Art. 3540. Party autonomy, LA C.C. Art. 3540

LSA-C.C. Art. 3540
Art. 3540. Party autonomy
Currentness
All other issues of conventional obligations are governed by the law expressly chosen or clearly relied upon by
the parties, except to the extent that law contravenes the public policy of the state whose law would otherwise
be applicable under Article 3537.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope. This Article applies to issues other than capacity and form, except as specified in comments
(c) and (d), infra. Like any other article in this Book, this Article may be superseded by more
specific legislative provisions, such as La.R.S. 10:1-105 (U.C.C.); La.R.S. 22:629 (insurance contracts);
La.R.S. 9:3303 (lease of movables); La.R.S. 9:3511 (consumer credit transactions); and La.R.S. 51:1418
(consumer transactions).
(b) Comparison with prior law. This Article restates for multistate contracts the ancient principle of
party autonomy that is referred to obliquely in Civil Code Article 7 (Rev. 1987) for domestic contracts.
That Article provides that “[p]ersons may not by their juridical acts derogate from laws enacted for the
protection of the public interest,” and thus affirms the freedom of the parties to derogate from laws not
falling within the above characterization. When the contract contains foreign elements, this freedom
includes the ability to choose the applicable law. Louisiana courts have recognized this freedom in
dozens of cases decided under the similarly phrased Article 11 of the Civil Code of 1870. See Note,
“Conflict of Laws--Contracts”, 47 La.L.Rev. 1181, 1183-96 (1987). This Article recasts this principle
in affirmative terms for conflicts purposes.
(c) Formal validity. The formal validity of a choice-of-law clause in a contract is judged under the law
applicable to issues of form under Article 3538, supra. Among the states whose law may be applied
to validate the contract as to form under that Article is the state whose “law govern[s] ... the substance
of the contract under Article ... 3540.” This means that if the choice-of-law clause is contained in a
contract that is formally valid only under the chosen law, but not under any of the other laws enumerated
in Article 3538, the contract and the choice-of-law clause will be considered valid as to form. If this

phenomenon is a type of “bootstrapping”, it is one that is both innocuous and practically useful. It is
innocuous because, under both the exception clause of this Article (see comment (f), infra) and the
second paragraph of Article 3538 (see comment (e) under Art. 3538, supra), the chosen law is not
allowed to contravene “the public policy of the state whose law would otherwise be applicable under
Article 3537.” It is practically useful because it allows a contract that is formally valid under the chosen
law to be treated as valid unless and until the opposing party demonstrates that the law of another state
would have been applicable to the issue under Article 3537 and that the chosen law contravenes the
public policy of that state.
(d) Existence and substantive validity. The capacity of the parties to choose the applicable law is
governed by the same law that is applicable to contractual capacity in general under Article 3539, supra.
Thus the “bootstrapping” phenomenon is avoided with regard to capacity. In order to avoid a similar
“bootstrapping” with regard to other “preliminary” issues that pertain to the existence of the choice of
law clause, such as consent and vices of consent, these issues should be judged according to the law
applicable under Article 3537, supra.
(e) Mode, timing, and scope of the parties' choice. To be recognized under this Article, the contractual
choice of law must either be express or implied. It is express when it is literally declared in the contract; it
is implied when, on the basis of the surrounding circumstances, especially the provisions of the contract
or the conduct of the parties, it is evident that the parties have clearly relied upon the law of a particular
state. An implied choice is distinguished from a hypothetical choice. The latter is not recognized by
this Article.
The parties may, of course, choose the applicable law after the conclusion of the contract and may
modify a choice made earlier. The parties may also choose more than one law to govern their contract.
For example, in a contract that is to be performed in more than one state, the parties may provide that
details of performance are to be governed by the law of the state in which performance is to take place.
Recent continental codifications take the same position on this issue. By the same token, the parties may
choose a law to govern only part of their contract. Their choice will be honored if it is otherwise valid
under the provisions of this Title. The rest of the contract will be governed by the law applicable to the
issue under the other Articles of this Title. Naturally, this partial choice of law, as well as the choice of
more than one law, may well result in depecage, namely, the application of different laws to different
parts or aspects of the contract. As long as it remains within the limits of party autonomy as defined in
this Article, this “private” form of depecage should not be any more objectionable than the depecage
brought about by the court. See comment (d), under Article 3515, supra.
As long as they remain within the limits established for party autonomy by the provisions of this Title,
the parties are free to include in their choice the conflicts rules of the chosen law. However, unless they
expressly provide for that inclusion, it is more logical to assume that they intended to avoid rather than
to invite the complexities of renvoi and that, consequently, their choice was intended to be confined to
the substantive law of the designated state.
(f) Limits of party autonomy. The parties are in principle free to choose the law of any state, whether
or not that state has a particular factual, geographical, or legal relationship with the contract. However,
the application of the chosen law is subject to limitations imposed by “the public policy” of the state
whose law would “otherwise”, that is, in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, “be
applicable under Article 3537.” The parties may not, by simply choosing another law, evade the public

policy of the state whose law would have been applicable to the issue “but for” the parties' choice. In
the Draft submitted to the Council of the Louisiana State Law Institute, the words “public policy” were
preceded by the qualifier “strong”. The Council deleted the latter word based on the understanding that,
by definition, only strongly held beliefs of a particular state qualify for the characterization of “public
policy”.


Art. 3541. Other juridical acts and quasi-contractual obligations, LA C.C. Art. 3541

LSA-C.C. Art. 3541
Art. 3541. Other juridical acts and quasi-contractual obligations
Currentness
Unless otherwise provided by the law of this state, the law applicable to juridical acts other than contracts and to
quasi-contractual obligations is determined in accordance with the principles of this Title.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope. This Article applies to juridical acts other than contracts and to quasi-contractual obligations,
such as those arising from negotiorum gestio or from the payment of a thing not due. See, e.g.,
La.Civ.Code Arts. 2293-2313 (1870). This Article applies “[u]nless otherwise provided by the law of
this state”. For examples of situations in which the law provides otherwise, see the Titles on successions
and marital property, supra.
(b) Operation. Obligations falling within the scope of this Article are governed by the law that would
be selected on the basis of the principles enunciated in this Title (i.e., Articles 3537-3540, supra) to the
extent that those principles are applicable to the particular obligation in question.
(c) Rationale. Other more complete conflicts codifications contain separate special rules for juridical acts
other than contracts and for quasi-contractual obligations. In this state, the relative scarcity of conflicts
cases involving such issues militates against the drafting of such special rules. Nevertheless, a general
“catch-all” article is needed to govern these classes of cases. This Article is intended to meet this need.


Bk. IV, T. VII, Refs & Annos, LA C.C. Bk. IV, T. VII, Refs & Annos

Title VII. Delictual and Quasi-Delictual Obligations
LSA-C.C. Bk. IV, T. VII, Refs & Annos

Currentness
LSA-C.C. Bk. IV, T. VII, Refs & Annos, LA C.C. Bk. IV, T. VII, Refs & Annos


Title VII. Delictual and Quasi-Delictual Obligations (Refs & Annos)
LSA-C.C. Art. 3542
Art. 3542. General rule
Currentness
Except as otherwise provided in this Title, an issue of delictual or quasi-delictual obligations is governed by the
law of the state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to that issue.
That state is determined by evaluating the strength and pertinence of the relevant policies of the involved states in
the light of: (1) the pertinent contacts of each state to the parties and the events giving rise to the dispute, including
the place of conduct and injury, the domicile, habitual residence, or place of business of the parties, and the state
in which the relationship, if any, between the parties was centered; and (2) the policies referred to in Article 3515,
as well as the policies of deterring wrongful conduct and of repairing the consequences of injurious acts.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) The approach of this Article. This Article enunciates the general choice-of-law approach of this Title
in the same way Article 3515 enunciates the general approach of this Book. This Article implements for
tort conflicts the general approach prescribed by Article 3515 for other conflicts in general. These two
Articles and the comments accompanying them are intended to be read together. The first paragraph of
this Article enunciates the objective of the choice-of-law process for tort conflicts in language that is
purposefully identical to that of the first paragraph of Article 3515. For the meaning of this language,
see comment (b) under Article 3515. Similarly, the second paragraph of Article 3542, prescribes the
method or process for attaining this objective in language that is only slightly more specific than that of
the second paragraph of Article 3515. For a description of this method, see comments (c) and (d) under
Article 3515, supra; Symeonides, “Problems and Dilemmas in Codifying Choice of Law for Torts: The
Louisiana Experience in Comparative Perspective”, 38 Am.J.Comp.L. 431, 436-41 (1990) [hereinafter
cited as “Symeonides, Choice of Law for Torts”].
Article 3542 adds specificity to the description of this process in two respects. First, this Article adds
to the list of “policies referred to in Article 3515” two sets of policies that are ex hypothesi pertinent in
tort conflicts: “the policies of deterring wrongful conduct and of repairing the consequences of injurious
acts.” Second, this Article provides an illustrative list of the most important factual contacts in light

of which to evaluate the strength and pertinence of the above policies. These contacts will serve the
dual role of helping, first, to identify the potentially concerned states, and, then, to assess the pertinence
and strength of their respective policies and the impact of the decision on such policies. The listing of
contacts is neither exhaustive nor hierarchical, and is intended to discourage a mechanistic counting of
contacts as a means of selecting the applicable law. The fact that one state has more contacts with the
dispute than other states does not necessarily mean that the law of the first state should be applied to any
or all issues of the dispute, unless such contacts are of the kind that bring into play policies of that state
which “would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to the particular issue.” In other
words, the evaluation of factual contacts should be qualitative rather than quantitative, and should be
made in the light of the policies of each contact-state that are pertinent to the particular issue in dispute.
(b) Relation to other articles of this Title. The approach of this Article is further implemented by specific
rules contained in Articles 3543-3546, infra, which are a priori legislative determinations of “the state
whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied”. Being more specific,
these Articles should, when applicable, prevail over this Article. However, as with any a priori rules,
Articles 3543-3546 may in exceptional cases produce a result that is incompatible with the general
objective of Article 3542, in pursuance of which they were drafted. In order to avoid such a result,
Article 3547 contains an “escape clause” which, when applicable, refers these cases back to Article
3542. Moreover, Articles 3543-3546 do not cover the entire spectrum of cases or issues that might fall
under the general headings of these Articles, but only those cases that appeared to be susceptible to
a clear and non-controversial choice-of-law rule. The remaining cases or issues are governed by this
Article as the residual article. Thus, Article 3542 is intended to perform a general as well as a residual
role. In its residual role, this Article applies to all cases and issues that are not included within the scope
of Articles 3543-3546. In its general role, this Article will help determine whether issues that do fall
within the general scope of Articles 3543-3546 should be decided under the rules contained therein or
under the escape clause of Article 3547 which refers them back to Article 3542.


Art. 3543. Issues of conduct and safety, LA C.C. Art. 3543

LSA-C.C. Art. 3543
Art. 3543. Issues of conduct and safety
Currentness
Issues pertaining to standards of conduct and safety are governed by the law of the state in which the conduct
that caused the injury occurred, if the injury occurred in that state or in another state whose law did not provide
for a higher standard of conduct.
In all other cases, those issues are governed by the law of the state in which the injury occurred, provided that the
person whose conduct caused the injury should have foreseen its occurrence in that state.
The preceding paragraph does not apply to cases in which the conduct that caused the injury occurred in this state
and was caused by a person who was domiciled in, or had another significant connection with, this state. These
cases are governed by the law of this state.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope and terminology. This Article applies to “issues pertaining to standards of conduct and safety”
as distinguished from “issues of loss distribution and financial protection” which are governed by Article
3544, infra. This distinction draws from the substantive law of torts and its two fundamental objectives--
deterrence and compensation. By way of illustration, so-called “rules of the road” establish or pertain to
“standards of conduct and safety”, whereas rules that impose a ceiling on the amount of compensatory
damages or provide immunity from suit are “rules of loss-distribution and financial protection”. From
the choice-of-law perspective, the reason for distinguishing between conduct-regulating rules and loss-
distribution rules is the fact that their operation in space abides by different principles. Thus, while
conduct-regulating rules are territorially oriented, compensation or loss-distribution rules are usually
not so oriented. A state's policy of deterrence embodied in its conduct-regulating rules is implicated in
all substandard conduct that occurs within its territory, even if the parties involved are not domiciled
in that state. Conversely, a state's loss-distribution policy may or may not extend to non-domiciliaries
acting within its territory, but does extend to domiciliaries even when they act outside the state. For the
origin and rationale of this distinction in American conflicts law, see Symeonides, “Choice of Law for
Torts”, 441-44.

(b) Relation to Article 3542. Although derived from the general principles of Article 3542, the rules
contained in this Article prevail over Article 3542 because they are more specific. However, according
to Article 3547, infra, the rules of this Article may, in exceptional cases, be subordinated to the principles
of Article 3542. See comment under Article 3547, infra. Moreover, as the residual Article, Article 3542
applies “by default” to cases that involve issues of conduct and safety for which Article 3543 does not
provide a rule (see comment (g), infra).
(c) Operation: The applicable law. Based on the premise that conduct-regulating rules are territorially
oriented, this Article focuses on the law of the state in which the conduct and/or the injury occurred
rather than on the law of the domicile of the involved parties. The law of the domicile is in principle
irrelevant to issues of conduct, except when domicile and conduct coincide in the same state. When
acting outside the state of their domicile, neither the tortfeasor nor the victim should be allowed to
carry with them the conduct-regulating law of that state. Thus, when both the wrongful conduct and
the resulting injury occur in the same state, this Article calls for the application of the law of that state.
When the conduct occurs in one state and the injury in another, this Article calls for the application of
the law of the place of conduct in most cases and for the application of the law of the place of injury
in some cases, as explained below.
(d) Conduct and injury in the same state: Application of the law of that state. The first paragraph of
this Article provides that when both the tortfeasor's conduct and the victim's injury occur in the same
state, the law of that state applies, regardless of the domicile of the parties or any other factors. As long
as the issue is one pertaining to regulation of conduct and safety, the state where both the conduct and
the injury occur has the best, if not the exclusive, claim for applying its law. This is true regardless of
the content of that law, that is, regardless of whether that law provides for a standard of conduct that is
lower or higher than, for instance, the law of the state in which either party is domiciled.
(e) Conduct and injury in different states. The balance of this Article deals with situations where the
tortfeasor's conduct and the victim's injury occur in different states. In these cases the application of the
law of one state or the other depends in part on the content of their respective laws, that is, whether they
establish a lower or a higher standard of conduct. For example, a “negligence per se” rule establishes a
higher standard of conduct than does a rule of ordinary negligence. When the law of the state of conduct
is the one prescribing the higher standard, this Article authorizes the application of that law without
any qualifications, but subject always to the escape clause of Article 3547. When the law of the state
of injury is the one prescribing the higher standard, this Article authorizes the application of that state's
law, but only in cases in which: (a) the tortfeasor should have foreseen the occurrence of the injury in
that state (see comment (g), infra); and (b) the tortfeasor was not a Louisiana domiciliary or another
similarly situated person engaging in conduct within Louisiana (see comment (j), infra).
(f) Conduct and injury in different states: Application of the law of the state of conduct. The first
paragraph of this Article provides that, if the injurious conduct and the resulting injury occur in different
states, the law of the state of conduct applies, if the law of the state of injury “did not provide for a
higher standard of conduct” than the state of conduct. Phrased affirmatively, this means that the law of
the state of conduct applies if it provides for the same or a higher standard of conduct than does the state
of injury. Indeed, when the standards prescribed by the two states are the same, there is no actual conflict
and the application of the law of the state of conduct need not be explained or defended. When the law
of the state of conduct provides for a higher standard of conduct than does the law of the state of injury,

the application of the law of the state of conduct may be justified both in terms of the interest of the two
states and from the perspective of the individuals involved. In terms of the interests of the two states,
applying the law of the state of conduct when that state imposes the higher standard promotes the policy
of that state in policing conduct and preserving safety within its borders, without subordinating whatever
policies may be embodied in the law of the state of injury which allows a lower standard of conduct.
The effectiveness of the conduct-regulating law of the state of conduct would be seriously impaired if
exceptions to it were made for out-of-state injuries. Such exceptions are not warranted by the fact that the
state of injury happens to allow a lower standard of conduct, since such a lower standard is designed to
protect conduct within, not without, that state. Finally, from the perspective of the individuals involved,
there is nothing unfair about subjecting a tortfeasor to the law of the state in which he acted. Having
violated the standards of conduct of that state, he should bear the consequences of such violation and
should not be allowed to invoke the lower standards of another state. See Symeonides, “Choice of Law
for Torts”, 445-46 and authorities cited therein.
(g) Conduct and injury in different states: Application of the law of the state of injury. The second
paragraph of this Article begins with a reference to “all other cases,” that is, cases not covered by the first
paragraph. These are the cases in which the tortfeasor's conduct and the resulting injury occur in different
states, but, unlike the cases covered by the previous paragraph, it is now the state of injury that has the
higher standard. From these cases, the third paragraph of this Article exempts cases that involve conduct
in Louisiana by a Louisiana tortfeasor (see comment (j), infra). The second paragraph itself confines
these “other cases” to those in which the tortfeasor should have foreseen the occurrence of the injury
in the state with the higher standard and subjects those cases to the law of that state. This foreseeability
requirement makes the application of the law of that state not only constitutional but also appropriate
from the choice-of-law perspective. It is a factor of sufficient weight to tip the scales in favor of applying
the law of the state that feels the impact of the tortfeasor's conduct and a good enough response to an
argument of unfair surprise on his behalf. See Symeonides, “Choice of Law for Torts”, 446-47.
As indicated by the use of the verb “should have foreseen”, the foreseeability proviso of the second
paragraph of this Article contemplates an objective rather than a subjective test. Furthermore, since this
is a choice-of-law article, this foreseeability should be understood in a “spatial” sense and should not be
confused with the foreseeability of substantive tort law. The pertinent question here is not whether the
tortfeasor should have foreseen the occurrence of the injury, but whether he should have foreseen that
the injury would have occurred in the particular state in which the injury did occur. If the occurrence of
the injury in that state was not reasonably foreseeable, then the law of that state would not apply under
this Article. Such a case will then be governed by Article 3542, the residual article, which, depending
on the other factors in the case, may or may not produce the same result.
(h) Conduct in more than one state. Cases in which the injurious conduct occurs in more than one
state should be approached under the principles of causation of the law of the forum. Ordinarily,
these principles will make it possible to determine which particular conduct was, legally speaking, the
principal cause of the injury. Following such a determination, the case will be governed by either the law
of the state of that conduct or the law of the state of injury, depending on which paragraph of this Article
is applicable, and subject always to the “escape clause” of Article 3547, infra. In the latter case, as well
as in all cases in which the principles of causation would not yield a clear answer, the applicable law will
be determined in accordance with Article 3542. It is also possible that the fact that the injurious conduct
was not localized in any single state could, in appropriate circumstances, evoke the escape clause of
Article 3547, even without resorting to the principles of causation.

(i) Injury sustained in more than one state. Cases involving multiple victims who sustained their
respective injuries in different states should be handled independently for each victim. Cases where the
same victim sustained injury in more than one state should be resolved by a factual determination of
where the injury was primarily suffered. Following such a determination, the case will be governed by
either the law of the state of injury or the law of the state of conduct, depending on which paragraph of
this Article is applicable, and subject always to the escape clause of Article 3547.
(j) The third paragraph: Conduct in Louisiana. The third paragraph of this Article is intended to ensure
that conduct in Louisiana by persons domiciled in, or having another similarly significant relationship
with, this state will not be subjected to higher standards of another state where the injury might occur. For
a critique of this provision, see Weintraub, “The Contributions of Symeonides and Kozyris to Making
Choice of Law Predictable and Just: An Appreciation and Critique”, 38 Am.J.Comp.L. 511, 515-16
(1990). For a response, see Symeonides, “Choice of Law for Torts”, 447-48.


Art. 3544. Issues of loss distribution and financial protection, LA C.C. Art. 3544

LSA-C.C. Art. 3544
Art. 3544. Issues of loss distribution and financial protection
Currentness
Issues pertaining to loss distribution and financial protection are governed, as between a person injured by an
offense or quasi-offense and the person who caused the injury, by the law designated in the following order:
(1) If, at the time of the injury, the injured person and the person who caused the injury were domiciled in the
same state, by the law of that state. Persons domiciled in states whose law on the particular issue is substantially
identical shall be treated as if domiciled in the same state.
(2) If, at the time of the injury, the injured person and the person who caused the injury were domiciled in different
states: (a) when both the injury and the conduct that caused it occurred in one of those states, by the law of that
state; and (b) when the injury and the conduct that caused it occurred in different states, by the law of the state
in which the injury occurred, provided that (i) the injured person was domiciled in that state, (ii) the person who
caused the injury should have foreseen its occurrence in that state, and (iii) the law of that state provided for a
higher standard of financial protection for the injured person than did the law of the state in which the injurious
conduct occurred.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope: issues. This Article applies to issues of “loss distribution and financial protection” arising
out of offenses and quasi-offenses. These issues are distinguished from “issues pertaining to standards
of conduct and safety” which are governed by Article 3543. For the meaning and rationale of this
distinction, see comment (a) under Article 3543. For its application in American conflicts law, see
Symeonides, “Choice of Law for Torts”, 441-44; Kozyris & Symeonides, “Choice of Law in the
American Courts in 1989: An Overview”, 38 Am.J.Comp.L. 601, 616-17 (1990).
(b) Scope: persons. This Article applies to issues of loss-distribution “as between a person injured by
an offense or quasi-offense and the person who caused the injury”. Thus, the scope of this Article

is confined to obligations between the tortfeasor and the victim and their respective universal or
particular successors. Obligations arising between joint tortfeasors, or between a tortfeasor and a person
vicariously liable for his acts (e.g., employer or parent), are not covered by this Article but by Article
3542, the residual Article. However, in applying Article 3542, the court may be guided by the rules of
this Article.
When one tortfeasor causes injury to more than one person, the applicable law should be determined
separately with regard to each victim. When one person is injured by more than one tort-feasor, the
latter's obligations vis-a-vis the victim and the law governing these obligations should be determined
separately with regard to each tortfeasor.
For the purposes of this Article, the “injured person” in a survival action (see La.Civ.Code Art. 2315.1
(Rev.1986)) is the deceased victim. However, in a wrongful death action (see La.Civ.Code Art. 2315.2
(Rev.1986)) or in an action for loss of consortium (see La.Civ.Code Art. 2315 (1870)), the “injured
persons” are the persons who qualify as plaintiffs under these Articles.
(c) Relation to Article 3542. Like Article 3543, this Article is derived from the general principles of
Article 3542. When applicable, this Article, being more specific, prevails over Article 3542. However,
according to Article 3547, infra, the rules provided in this Article may, in exceptional cases, be
subordinated to the principles of Article 3542. See comment under Article 3547, infra. Moreover, this
Article does not cover the entire spectrum of cases involving issues of loss distribution. As with Article
3543, the objective of this Article is to lighten the court's choice-of-law burden by attempting to identify
those cases for which a safe choice-of-law rule could be established in advance based on accumulated
experience. Because this experience does not yield safe choice-of-law rules for all cases, this Article is
purposefully left open-ended. For instance, this Article does not cover situations in which the wrongful
conduct, the resulting injury, and the domicile of each party are each located in different states. Such
cases are, therefore, governed by Article 3542, the residual Article.
(d) Domicile. Based on the premise that laws of loss distribution are usually not territorially oriented,
this Article pays less attention to territorial factors and focuses instead on the domicile of the parties.
Domicile is defined in Civil Code Articles 38-46 (1870). For the domicile of juridical persons, see
Article 3518, supra, and Article 3548, infra. For the purposes of this Article, the pertinent domicile is
the domicile at the time of the injury. This is stated expressly in the Article or implied by the use of the
past tense. However, a post-injury change of domicile may well be pertinent for the purposes of Article
3542. See Allstate Insurance v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
Domicile has been chosen as the primary connecting factor for the purposes of this Article because
domicile connotes a permanent, factual, consensual, and formal bond between a person and a given
society. Because of this bond, the person participates, however indirectly, in the shaping of that society's
values and may reasonably expect the protection of its laws. Correspondingly, that society has both a
right and a duty to be concerned about that person's welfare. When the domiciliary bond is attenuated
for whatever reason, both the person's expectations and the society's concerns may also be diminished
accordingly. Thus, when a person is only nominally domiciled in one state, but habitually resides in
another or has another substantial factual connection with another state that is pertinent to the particular
issue, the interest of the latter state in protecting him may be stronger than that of the former state.
Depending on the other factors in the case, such a case may be a good candidate for invoking the “escape
clause” of Article 3547, infra.

(e) Common domicile. The first sentence of subparagraph (1) of this Article deals with situations in
which, at the time of the injury, both the tortfeasor and the victim were domiciled in the same state. This
provision calls for the application of the law of the common domicile regardless of whether that law
provides for a higher or a lower standard of financial protection for the victim than does the law of the
state where the conduct and/or the injury occurred. In cases where the law of the state of the common
domicile provides for a higher standard of financial protection than does the state of conduct and/or the
injury, the application of the law of the common domicile has become routine in all states that have
abandoned the traditional lex loci delicti rule. Symeonides, “Choice of Law for Torts”, 448-50; Kozyris
& Symeonides, “Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1989: An Overview”, 38 Am.J.Comp.L. 601,
604-05 (1990); Symeonides, “Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1988”, 37 Am.J.Comp.L. 457,
460-63 (1989). Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Ins. Co., 276 So.2d 309 (La.1973), the leading Louisiana case,
involved this law-fact pattern and was decided the same way. Cases in which the law of the common
domicile provides for a lower standard of financial protection than does the law of the state of conduct
and/or injury are more controversial. See Symeonides, “Choice of Law for Torts”, 452. This Article
adopts the view that, as a general rule, these cases should also be resolved under the law of the common
domicile, unless the special circumstances of the case warrant resort to the escape clause of Article
3547, infra.
(f) Parties domiciled in states with identical law. The second sentence of subparagraph (1) provides
that persons domiciled in states whose law on the particular issue of loss distribution is substantially
identical should be treated as if domiciled in the same state. This legal fiction is justified by both policy
and practical considerations. From a policy viewpoint, this rule is supported by the same factors as the
common-domicile rule. See comment (e), supra. From a practical viewpoint, this rule will alleviate the
court's choice-of-law burden by properly identifying and resolving as “false conflicts” all cases in which
the victim and the tortfeasor were domiciled in states whose law on the issue of financial protection was
substantially identical. This rule will also prove useful in cases involving multiple victims or multiple
tortfeasors because it will enable the court to treat as domiciliaries of the same state those victims or
tortfeasors who are domiciled in states with substantially identical law.
(g) Domicile of either party. Subparagraph (2) deals with cases in which, at the time of the injury,
the tortfeasor and the victim were not domiciled in the same state. Clause (a) of that subparagraph
provides that when both the injurious conduct and the resulting injury occurred in a state where either
the tortfeasor or the victim was domiciled, the law of that state shall apply, regardless of whether it
provides for a higher or a lower standard of financial protection than the law of the domicile of the
other party. For rationale and supporting authority, see Symeonides, “Choice of Law for Torts”, 453-56.
When a person is injured in his home state by conduct in that state, his rights should be determined by
the law of that state, even if the person who caused the injury happened to be from another state. The
law of the latter state should not be interjected to the victim's detriment or benefit. By the same token,
when a person acting within his home state causes injury in that state, he should be held accountable
according to the law of that state, even if the injured person happened to be from another state. The law
of the latter state should not be interjected to the tortfeasor's detriment or benefit. See D. Cavers, The
Choice of Law Process (1965).
(h) Domicile of the injured person. Of the numerous cases that fall outside the scope of subparagraph
(1) and clause (a) of subparagraph (2), clause (b) of the latter subparagraph addresses only the relatively
few cases that meet the three requirements prescribed by that clause. The remaining cases are left to

Article 3542, the residual Article. Clause (b) addresses only the cases in which the injury occurred in
the state of the victim's domicile and authorizes the application of that state's law if both conditions
specified in parts (ii) and (iii) of that clause are satisfied.
The first condition is that the tortfeasor should have foreseen the occurrence of the injury in the state of
the victim's domicile. This condition is necessary in order to protect the tortfeasor from unfair surprise,
see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), and is intended to have the same meaning as the
similar condition in Article 3543 (see comment (g) under Article 3543, supra). If this condition is not
met, clause (b) will be inapplicable and the case will fall under Article 3542, the residual Article. The
second condition for applying the law of the victim's domicile under clause (b) is a showing that that
law provided for a higher standard of financial protection for the victim than the law of the state where
the tortfeasor's conduct occurred. If this condition is not met, clause (b) will be inapplicable and the case
will be decided under Article 3542, the residual Article.
It should be noted that requiring that the victim's domicile provide for a higher standard before its law is
applied under clause (b) does not preclude the application of that state's law in cases in which it provides
for a lower standard. It simply means that, rather than being subjected to a black-letter rule, these cases
will be referred to the more flexible approach of Article 3542. In applying Article 3542, the court will
have the opportunity to look at the totality of the circumstances of the particular case and to evaluate
them in the light of the policies enumerated in that Article. Following such an evaluation, the court may
well conclude that applying the law of the victim's domicile is the best solution under the circumstances.


Art. 3545. Products liability, LA C.C. Art. 3545

LSA-C.C. Art. 3545
Art. 3545. Products liability
Currentness
Delictual and quasi-delictual liability for injury caused by a product, as well as damages, whether compensatory,
special, or punitive, are governed by the law of this state: (1) when the injury was sustained in this state by a
person domiciled or residing in this state; or (2) when the product was manufactured, produced, or acquired in
this state and caused the injury either in this state or in another state to a person domiciled in this state.
The preceding paragraph does not apply if neither the product that caused the injury nor any of the defendant's
products of the same type were made available in this state through ordinary commercial channels.
All cases not disposed of by the preceding paragraphs are governed by the other Articles of this Title.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope and terminology. This Article applies to delictual and quasi-delictual as distinguished from
contractual liability that may arise from an injury caused by a product. Contractual liability is governed
by the Title on Conventional Obligations, supra. For cases falling within its scope, this Article applies
to issues of conduct and safety, to issues of loss distribution, e.g., compensatory damages, as well as
to issues of exemplary, punitive, or special damages. Thus when applicable, this Article prevails over
Articles 3543 and 3544, supra, and Article 3546, infra.
For the purposes of this Article, the word “product” is not confined to industrial products but includes
natural substances, whether raw, processed, or otherwise altered by the industry of man. A product may
be movable or immovable, a single or a composite thing, and includes its component parts. The product
need not be “defective”. It suffices that the product has caused the injury, as for instance when the injury
results from a mis-description. This Article applies to any injury caused by a product, rather than to the
product itself. The latter type of damage is likely to be characterized as contractual in nature and thus
would be governed by the Title on conventional obligations, supra. This Article applies to any injury
directly sustained by a person or his property, whether or not that person is the owner of the product, and
whether or not he was using the product at the time of the injury. This Article covers the liability of any

person who can be made a defendant in a products liability action under Louisiana law. It is understood
that this coverage may include not only the producer or manufacturer of the product and its component
parts, but also retailers, wholesale distributors, and other persons in the commercial chain of preparation
and distribution of the product.
(b) Operation and relation to other articles. This Article delineates the scope of Louisiana's products
liability law by using four factual contacts: place of injury; victim's domicile or residence; acquisition
of the product; and production or manufacturing of the product. With only one exception (cases in
which Louisiana has no contacts other than the manufacturing and acquisition of the product), the first
paragraph of this Article authorizes the application of Louisiana law to all cases in which any two or
more of these contacts are situated in this state. (See comments (d)-(g), infra). The second paragraph
provides a “foreseeability” exception from all of these cases. (See comment (h), infra). Finally, the third
paragraph relegates to the other articles of this Title all cases not disposed of by the first two paragraphs
of this Article. These are the cases in which Louisiana has fewer contacts than the ones required by the
first paragraph or cases that are subject to the foreseeability defense of the second paragraph. Obviously,
this relegation does not preclude the application of Louisiana law to some of these cases. Hence, Article
3545 should be understood as defining the minimum, not the maximum, reach of Louisiana substantive
law. On the other hand, the fact that this Article is also subject to the “escape clause” of Article 3547,
infra, means that some cases or issues that are subjected to Louisiana law by Article 3545 might actually
be decided under a foreign law if the court chooses to utilize Article 3547. See comments under Article
3547, infra. For a critique of this Article, see Kozyris, “Values and Methods in Choice of Law for
Products Liability: A Comparative Comment on Statutory Solutions”, 38 Am.J.Comp.L. 475 (1990).
For a response, see Symeonides, “Choice of Law for Torts”, 464-69.
(c) Injury in Louisiana. The occurrence of a product-induced injury in Louisiana will usually implicate
the pertinent policies of this state in regulating the consequences of the injury and minimizing similar
injuries in the future. Whether or not the policies of this state should prevail over the countervailing
policies of another state will depend on what other connections the two states have with the particular
case. Clauses (1) and (2) of the first paragraph of this Article identify those cases in which it is believed
that the policies of this state would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied. These are
the cases in which, in addition to being the place of injury, Louisiana is also either: (a) the domicile or
residence of the victim; or (b) the place of manufacturing of the product; or (c) the place of acquisition
of the product. In these cases, Louisiana law should apply regardless of the factual contacts of the other
state or states. The application of Louisiana law in such cases has been sanctioned by the United States
Supreme Court in Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
Cases in which Louisiana's only connection consists of being the place of the product-induced injury
present a more difficult problem. Although from a constitutional view-point, Watson contains language
that seems to permit the application of Louisiana law to these cases, it is nevertheless believed that,
from a choice-of-law perspective, these cases should not be subjected a priori to Louisiana law without
considering the contacts and policies of the other state or states. That is why these cases are not covered
by this Article but are referred to “the other Articles of this Title”, that is, Articles 3542-3544 and
3546-3548. Those Articles provide for a more flexible approach based on an evaluation of all pertinent
factors and combinations thereof. Depending on these combinations, those articles may lead to the
application of Louisiana law or to the application of the law of another state.

(d) Injury and victim's domicile or residence in Louisiana. When, in addition to the injury, the
victim's domicile or residence is in Louisiana, then the application of Louisiana law not only passes
the constitutional test of Watson, but is also amply justified, from the choice-of-law perspective, by
Louisiana's legitimate interest in protecting consumers living and injured within its borders. This need
exists whether or not the product was manufactured or acquired in this state. Any potential argument of
unfair surprise that might be made by the defendant is adequately taken care of by the defense provided
in the second paragraph. Besides, the application of Louisiana law may well benefit the defendant if
it turns out to be less protective of the plaintiff than, for instance, the law of the place of manufacture
or acquisition of the product.
(e) Injury and manufacture in Louisiana. Here, the application of Louisiana law is justified by the need
to ensure that products that are manufactured in this state and which actually cause injury here conform
to the standards prescribed by the law of this state. This need exists whether or not the injured person
is a Louisiana domiciliary or a domiciliary of another state whose law would provide him with more
or less protection.
(f) Injury and acquisition in Louisiana. Here, the application of Louisiana law is justified by the need
to ensure that products that are marketed in this state and which actually cause injury here conform to
the standards prescribed by the law of this state. This need exists whether or not the injured person is a
Louisiana domiciliary or a domiciliary of another state. Again, any potential argument of unfair surprise
by the defendant is adequately taken care of by the defense provided in the second paragraph.
(g) Victim's domicile and manufacture or acquisition in Louisiana. Clause (2) of the first paragraph of
this Article also authorizes the application of Louisiana law to cases in which the victim was domiciled
in this state and the product was either manufactured or acquired in this state. Here the application of
Louisiana law is justified by the need to ensure that products which are manufactured or marketed in
this state and which cause injury to a Louisiana domiciliary conform to the standards prescribed by the
law of this state. This need exists even if the injury actually occurred outside this state.
(h) Foreseeability defense. In the interest of fairness, the second paragraph of this Article enables a
defendant to avoid the application of Louisiana law under this Article if he meets the conditions specified
in that paragraph. For similar defenses in other systems, see Symeonides, “Choice of Law for Torts”,
467-69. Obviously, the burden of proof would rest with the defendant, but nothing would preclude the
plaintiff from voluntarily assuming that burden if this would be to his advantage. When this burden is
discharged, “the preceding paragraph does not apply” and the particular case must be handled as a non-
products case under the other articles of this Title.


Art. 3546. Punitive damages, LA C.C. Art. 3546

LSA-C.C. Art. 3546
Art. 3546. Punitive damages
Currentness
Punitive damages may not be awarded by a court of this state unless authorized:
(1) By the law of the state where the injurious conduct occurred and by either the law of the state where the resulting
injury occurred or the law of the place where the person whose conduct caused the injury was domiciled; or
(2) By the law of the state in which the injury occurred and by the law of the state where the person whose conduct
caused the injury was domiciled.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope. This Article applies to claims for punitive or exemplary damages arising out of offenses and
quasi-offenses in all cases except those product liability cases that are governed by Louisiana law under
Article 3545, supra. Article 3546 does not apply to claims for punitive damages arising from other
sources, such as contracts or quasi-contracts. This Article is not intended to prevent either “a court of
this state” or, a fortiori, a federal court, from awarding punitive damages in cases where such damages
are authorized by applicable federal substantive law.
(b) Rationale. Although there is a wide divergence of opinion as to the fairness or effectiveness of
punitive damages, there also seems to be a consensus that their objective is deterrence or punishment
rather than compensation. Punitive damages are not intended for the protection of the individual victim
who, ex hypothesi, has been compensated for his loss through ordinary damages. Instead, punitive
damages are for the most part designed to “punish” the individual tortfeasor, to deter him and other
potential tortfeasors in the future. Punitive damages protect victims only indirectly. This is why the
domicile of the victim is not a pertinent factor under this Article. See Symeonides, “Choice of Law for
Torts”, 460-61.

Since punitive damages have more to do with the tortfeasor than with the victim, this Article focuses
on the three potentially different places that bear relation to the tortfeasor: the place of his domicile, the
place of his conduct, and the place of the injury resulting from that conduct. The state of the tortfeasor's
domicile must have a say in whether the tortfeasor is to be “punished” (or not punished/protected)
and if so, to what degree, or in whether similarly situated potential tortfeasors should be deterred. The
state where the injury-causing conduct occurred has the equally obvious right and interest in regulating
conduct within its borders. Finally, being the state that bears many of the consequences of such conduct,
the state where the injury occurs has a legitimate claim to determine the legal consequences of tortious
conduct.
This Article authorizes the award of punitive damages when such damages are imposed by the laws of
all three or of any two of these states. When all three of the above states impose punitive damages on
particular conduct, the award of such damages need not be defended. When only two of these states
provide for punitive damages, the award may be defended both in terms of the interests of those states
and in terms of the expectations of the tortfeasor. See comments (c)-(e), infra.
When only one of these three states provides for punitive damages, the awarding of such damages might
seem more controversial but is by no means uncommon either in this or, especially, in other states.
See, e.g., Cooper v. American Express, 593 F.2d 612 (5th Cir.1979) (imposing punitive damages under
the law of Alabama, the place of injury, although such damages were not available under the law of
Louisiana where the defendant acted and was domiciled); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co.,
678 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir.1982) (same result with regard to one defendant); Bryant v. Silverman, 146 Ariz.
41, 703 P.2d 1190 (1985) (awarding punitive damages under the law of defendant's domicile although
such damages were not available under the law of the place of injury, which, according to defendant's
contentions, was also the place of conduct). Nevertheless, because of the prevailing hostility towards
punitive damages in Louisiana (see Symeonides, “Choice of Law for Torts”, 459) this Article prohibits,
as a general matter, the awarding of punitive damages in these cases in the absence of exceptional
circumstances that may render applicable the escape clause of Article 3547 (see comment (g), infra).
(c) Places of conduct and injury. Subparagraph (1) authorizes the awarding of punitive damages if such
damages are imposed by the law of the place of the conduct that caused the injury and by the law of
the place where the resulting injury occurred. For rationale and supporting authority, see Symeonides,
“Choice of Law for Torts”, 463; Kozyris & Symeonides, “Choice of Law in the American Courts in
1989: An Overview”, 38 Am.J.Comp.L. 601, 615 (1990). It is not necessary that the conduct and injury
have occurred in the same state. However, when the conduct and injury have occurred in different states,
then both of those states must provide for punitive damages in order for that case to fall under this
subparagraph. For cases in which either the conduct or the injury, or both, occurred in more than one
state, see comments (e) and (h) under Article 3543, supra.
(d) Places of conduct and domicile of the tortfeasor. Subparagraph (1) also authorizes the awarding of
punitive damages if such damages are imposed by the law of the place where the conduct that caused the
injury occurred and by the law of the state where the person who caused that injury was domiciled. For
rationale and supporting authority, see Ardoyno v. Kyzar, 426 F.Supp. 78 (E.D.La.1976); Symeonides,
“Choice of Law for Torts”, 463-64; Kozyris & Symeonides, supra at 615. Again, it is not necessary that
conduct and domicile of the tortfeasor coincide in the same state, but, when they do not, both states must
provide for punitive damages in order for that case to fall under this subparagraph. For cases in which

the conduct occurs in more than one state, see comment (h) under Article 3543, supra. For the domicile
of juridical persons, see Article 3518, supra, and Article 3548, infra.
(e) Places of injury and domicile of the tortfeasor. Subparagraph (2) authorizes the awarding of punitive
damages if such damages are imposed by the law of the place where the injury occurred and by the law
of the state where the person who caused that injury was domiciled. Again, it is not necessary that both
of these factors coincide in the same state, but, when they do not, both states must provide for punitive
damages in order for that case to fall under this subparagraph. For cases in which the injury occurred in
more than one state, see comment (i) under Article 3543, supra. For the domicile of juridical persons,
see Article 3518, supra, and Article 3548, infra.
(f) Measure of punitive damages. This Article allows, but does not compel, the awarding of punitive
damages in the cases which fall within its scope. The Article also does not establish the measure for
punitive damages nor does it designate the state whose substantive law is to provide such measure.
The former is a factual question whose resolution does not belong in a conflicts article. The latter is a
choice-of-law question only in the relatively rare cases in which, by legislation or precedent, the states
enumerated in the article fix in advance, and do so differently, the recoverable measure of punitive
damages. In such cases, the choice from among the differing standards of punitive damages is left to the
court and should be guided by the principles of Article 3542.
(g) Exceptional cases. This Article is subject to the “escape clause” of Article 3547, infra. That clause
“cuts both ways” and thus may lead not only to a contraction, but also to an expansion of the scope
of this Article. Thus, in a case where the award of punitive damages is authorized by the laws of two
or more of the classes of states enumerated by this Article, the court may determine that, under the
principles of Article 3542 and the special circumstances of the particular case, the policies of these states
in imposing punitive damages would be less seriously impaired by an adverse decision than would the
policies of another state that does not impose punitive damages. In such an exceptional case, punitive
damages may be denied.
What might be less obvious is that the escape clause may also lead to the awarding of punitive damages
in cases other than the ones enumerated in this Article. Indeed, despite its prohibitory language, the
first sentence of this Article is not immune from the escape clause of Article 3547. This means that
under appropriate circumstances the court may determine that, although punitive damages may not be
recoverable under this Article, the denial of punitive damages would so impair the policies of another
state favoring such damages as to defeat the principles of Article 3542. In such an exceptional case,
punitive damages may be awarded under the law of the latter state.


Art. 3547. Exceptional cases, LA C.C. Art. 3547

LSA-C.C. Art. 3547
Art. 3547. Exceptional cases
Currentness
The law applicable under Articles 3543-3546 shall not apply if, from the totality of the circumstances of an
exceptional case, it is clearly evident under the principles of Article 3542, that the policies of another state would
be more seriously impaired if its law were not applied to the particular issue. In such event, the law of the other
state shall apply.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
REVISION COMMENT--1991
Function and rationale of this Article. As stated earlier, the choice-of-law rules contained in Articles
3543-3546 were drawn from the general principles enunciated in Article 3542. By designating in
advance the applicable law, these rules will enable the courts to avoid the laborious analysis required
by Article 3542, and thus will alleviate their choice-of-law burden while providing the desired measure
of predictability. However, as with any a priori choice-of-law rules, the rules contained in Articles
3543-3546 may, in exceptional cases, produce a result that is incompatible with the principles of Article
3542 from which these rules have been derived. In order to avoid such a result, this Article provides an
“escape mechanism”. The court will avail itself of this mechanism if it is convinced from the totality
of the circumstances of the particular case that the policies of a state other than the one whose law is
designated as applicable by Articles 3543-3546 would be significantly more impaired if its law were not
applied. In such a case, Articles 3543-3546 must yield to Article 3542 and the law of the former state
must be applied. This mechanism should be reserved for the truly exceptional cases, and the burden of
persuasion for its utilization should be placed on the party who invokes it. For a critique of this provision,
see Weintraub, “The Contributions of Symeonides and Kozyris to Making Choice of Law Predictable
and Just: An Appreciation and Critique”, 38 Am.J.Comp.L. 511, 517-18 (1990).


Art. 3547. Exceptional cases, LA C.C. Art. 3547

Art. 3548. Domicile of juridical persons, LA C.C. Art. 3548

LSA-C.C. Art. 3548
Art. 3548. Domicile of juridical persons
Currentness
For the purposes of this Title, and provided it is appropriate under the principles of Article 3542, a juridical person
that is domiciled outside this state, but which transacts business in this state and incurs a delictual or quasi-delictual
obligation arising from activity within this state, shall be treated as a domiciliary of this state.
Credits
Acts 1991, No. 923, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Editors' Notes
(a) Scope. This Article applies to juridical persons that: are domiciled outside Louisiana; transact
business in Louisiana; and incur a delictual or quasi-delictual obligation arising from their activity in
Louisiana. For the definition of the domicile of a juridical person, see Article 3518, supra. For the
meaning of “transact[ing] business in this state”, see, e.g., La.R.S. 12:301-302 and pertinent Louisiana
jurisprudence. This Article requires the court to treat such foreign juridical persons as Louisiana
domiciliaries for the purposes of this Title, if the court determines that, under the principles of Article
3542, such treatment is appropriate in the particular case.
(b) Operation. One of the effects of this Article is to facilitate the task of the court by enabling it to resolve
cases involving issues of loss distribution or financial protection for which Article 3544, supra, does not
provide a rule. For example, Article 3544 does not provide a rule for cases in which the injurious conduct
as well as the resulting injury occurred in Louisiana but in which neither the victim nor the tortfeasor was
domiciled in this state. In such a case, if the tortfeasor were a juridical person that met the qualifications
prescribed by this Article, the court could decide to treat that person as a Louisiana domiciliary for the
purposes of the particular case. This would mean that the cases would then fall under Article 3544(2),
and would be governed by Louisiana law, whether that law favored the plaintiff or the defendant.
Similarly, Article 3544 does not designate the applicable law for cases in which Louisiana's only contact
with the case consists of being the domicile of the victim. Again, if the tortfeasor in such a case were
a juridical person that met the qualifications prescribed in Article 3548, the court could decide to treat
that person as a Louisiana domiciliary for the purposes of the particular case. This would mean that

Art. 3548. Domicile of juridical persons, LA C.C. Art. 3548
the case would then fall under the common-domicile rule of Article 3544(1) and would be governed by
Louisiana law, whether that law favored the plaintiff or the defendant.
On the other hand, Article 3548 may result in taking some cases out of the scope of the common-
domicile rule of Article 3544(1). For example, under Article 3544(1), loss distribution issues between a
Texas tortfeasor and a Texas victim injured in Louisiana by the tortfeasor's Louisiana conduct would be
governed by Texas law. But, if the tortfeasor were a juridical person that met the qualifications prescribed
in Article 3548, the court could decide to treat that person as a Louisiana domiciliary for the purposes
of the particular case. This would render inoperative the common domicile rule of Article 3544(1) and
would render applicable clause (a) of subparagraph (2) of the same Article. This would mean that the
case would be governed by Louisiana law, irrespective of whether that law favored the plaintiff or
the defendant, because both the conduct and the resulting injury would have occurred in the state of
“domicile” of one of the two parties.


Art. 3549. Law governing liberative prescription, LA C.C. Art. 3549

Title VIII. Liberative Prescription (Refs & Annos)
LSA-C.C. Art. 3549
Art. 3549. Law governing liberative prescription
Currentness
A. When the substantive law of this state would be applicable to the merits of an action brought in this state, the
prescription and peremption law of this state applies.
B. When the substantive law of another state would be applicable to the merits of an action brought in this state,
the prescription and peremption law of this state applies, except as specified below:
(1) If the action is barred under the law of this state, the action shall be dismissed unless it would not be barred
in the state whose law would be applicable to the merits and maintenance of the action in this state is warranted
by compelling considerations of remedial justice.
(2) If the action is not barred under the law of this state, the action shall be maintained unless it would be barred
in the state whose law is applicable to the merits and maintenance of the action in this state is not warranted by
the policies of this state and its relationship to the parties or the dispute nor by any compelling considerations
of remedial justice.
C. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, if the substantive law of another state would be applicable to the
merits of an action brought in this state and the action is brought by or on behalf of any person who, at the time
the cause of action arose, neither resided in nor was domiciled in this state, the action shall be barred if it is barred
by a statute of limitation or repose or by a law of prescription or peremption of the other state, and that statute
or law is, under the laws of the other state, deemed to be substantive, rather than procedural, or deemed to bar or
extinguish the right that is sought to be enforced in the action and not merely the remedy.
Credits
Editors' Notes

(a) Scope. This Article applies to issues of liberative prescription, including all questions of
commencement, suspension, interruption, and accrual of prescription. Cf. La.Civ.Code Arts. 3447,
3449-72 (Rev.1982). For the purposes of this Article, peremption (see La.Civ.Code Arts. 3458-61
(Rev.1982)) is treated as a species of liberative prescription.
This Article does not apply to acquisitive prescription or prescription of non-use. See La.Civ.Code Arts.
3446, 3448 (Rev.1982). According to Articles 3535-3536, supra, these questions are governed by the
law of the situs of the thing.
This Article also does not apply to prescription of judgments. Civil Code Article 3501 (Rev.1983), which
establishes the time periods for the enforcement, revival, and prescription of Louisiana as well as foreign
judgments, is not affected by this Article.
(b) The two poles of this Article: Lex fori and lex causae. This Article is built around two poles: the
lex fori and the lex causae. The lex fori is the law of the state where litigation takes place, including
the choice-of-law rules of that state. The lex causae is the substantive law which, through the choice-
of-law rules of the forum, is found applicable to the merits of a particular action that contains foreign
elements. The law thus chosen may be the law of the forum or the law of another state. In Louisiana,
the lex causae will be chosen through the choice-of-law rules contained in the preceding Articles of this
Book or in other Louisiana statutes.
In the United States, issues of liberative prescription have been traditionally assigned to the lex fori
with occasional exceptions in favor of the lex causae. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Civil Code Article 15
(Redesignated 1987) were fairly representative of the traditional common-law approach. In civil-law
systems, on the other hand, issues of liberative prescription are usually assigned to the lex causae with
occasional exceptions in favor of the lex fori. Recently, this latter approach has also been adopted by the
(American) Uniform Conflict of Laws Limitations Act of 1982. Finally, a fresh, more nuanced approach
has been taken by the 1987 and 1988 revisions of § 142 of the Restatement, Second, of Conflict of
Laws. For a comparison of these approaches, see Symeonides, “Revising Puerto Rico's Conflicts Law:
A Preview”, 28 Colum.J.Transn'l L. 413, 433-37 (1990). This Article draws from all three approaches.
(c) When the lex causae is the lex fori. The first paragraph of this Article states the obvious, namely that,
when Louisiana substantive law would be applicable to the merits of an action brought in this state, that
is, when the lex causae coincides with the lex fori, then the forum's law of prescription and peremption
applies, without any further inquiry and regardless of whether it bars the action.
(d) When the lex causae is a law other than the lex fori. The second paragraph of this Article deals
with actions the merits of which would be governed by the law of another state. Here again the lex
fori remains the basic rule, subject, however, to exceptions in favor of the lex causae which are defined
in subparagraphs (1) and (2). Subparagraph (1) deals with the situation in which the action is barred
under Louisiana prescription law but not under the prescription law of the state of the lex causae,
while subparagraph (2) deals with the converse situation. The two exceptions are deliberately phrased
differently so that the burden of displacing Louisiana law will be heavier in cases where Louisiana law
provides for a longer prescriptive period (see subparagraph 2) than in cases in which it provides for a
shorter prescriptive period (see subparagraph 1) than the foreign lex causae.

(e) Actions barred under Louisiana law: The rule and its exception. Subparagraph (1) of the second
paragraph of this Article begins by reaffirming the lex-fori rule by providing for the dismissal of actions
brought after the accrual of the relevant prescriptive or peremptive period of Louisiana law. The rationale
for the rule in these cases is that the application of the shorter prescriptive period of the forum promotes
the forum's interest in judicial economy and protects the integrity of its judicial system.
Subparagraph (1) also introduces a new exception to the lex-fori rule, an exception that departs from
prior Louisiana conflicts law, which did not allow the displacement of Louisiana prescription law in
cases where Louisiana law provided for a shorter prescription than the lex causae. That limitation was
apparently motivated by a desire to protect the judicial system of this state from the burden of, and
the dangers inherent in, adjudicating claims which were deemed too old under Louisiana's principles
of liberative prescription. However, in some cases this otherwise legitimate desire should yield to
an equally important need to provide a forum. By authorizing a new exception to the lex-fori rule,
subparagraph (1) recognizes this need. The exception is based on two grounds which both must be
shown to exist before it may be utilized.
(f) The two grounds for the subparagraph (1) exception. The first necessary prerequisite to the
application of the exception is that the action “would not be barred in the state whose law would be
applicable to the merits [of the action].” It is immaterial why the action would be maintained in that other
state, that is, whether it is because that state's statute of limitations actually provides for a longer time
limit, or because under that state's rules pertaining to interruption or suspension, including its tolling
statutes, the action would be maintained in the courts of that state.
The second necessary prerequisite to the application of the exception is that “maintenance of the action
in this state is warranted by compelling considerations of remedial justice.” This language is borrowed
from the 1987 Revision of § 142 of the Restatement, Second, of Conflict of Laws. The examples given by
the Restatement are pertinent to the application of this provision and illustrate its exceptional character.
These examples refer to cases where “through no fault of the plaintiff an alternative forum is not available
as, for example, where jurisdiction could not be obtained over the defendant in any state other than
the forum or where for some reason a judgment obtained in the other state having jurisdiction would
be unenforceable in other states ... also situations where suit in the alternative forum, although not
impossible would be extremely inconvenient for the parties.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,
1986 Revisions, § 142 comment f (Supp. March 31, 1987). As might be surmised from the initial phrase
of the quotation, none of these examples should be seen as requiring the forum to entertain an action
solely because it is time-barred in all or most other states. The disapproving reference to Keeton v.
Hustler, 465 U.S. 770 (1984), as an “egregious example of forum shopping” in the comments to this
section of the Restatement leaves little doubt that the plaintiff's own procrastination is not likely to ever
make his case compelling enough to reach the threshold of this exception.
(g) Actions not barred under Louisiana law: The rule and its exception. The opening sentence of
subparagraph (2) of the second paragraph of this Article reaffirms the basic rule of the lex fori for
actions that have been filed timely under Louisiana prescription or peremption law. Here the rationale
for following that rule is that entertaining such actions promotes whatever substantive policies this state
has in not providing for a shorter prescriptive period and preserves to the plaintiff the opportunity to
fully pursue his judicial remedies as long as he does so within the time specified by the law of this
state. These substantive and procedural policies underlying Louisiana prescription law are entitled to
preference in a Louisiana court, unless it is amply demonstrated that neither set of policies is actually

implicated in the particular case and that the opposing substantive policies of another state, that of the
lex causae, are implicated more intimately. Only then may Louisiana law be displaced.
These are essentially the three grounds for the exception to the rule of the lex fori which is enunciated
in the balance of subparagraph (2). Again, all three grounds must be satisfied before this exception is
utilized. Before dismissing an action that has been timely filed under Louisiana law, the court must be
satisfied that the action has prescribed in the state of the lex causae, and that neither the substantive
nor the procedural or remedial policies of the forum state would be served by maintaining the action.
Only then would the policy of providing a forum be outweighed by the policy of discouraging forum
shopping. The very fact that all three hurdles must be overcome before this exception is utilized indicates
that this exception is not expected to be applied often.
(h) Action barred in the state of lex causae. The first necessary prerequisite to application of the exception
is that the action would be barred by the statute of limitations or some other time-bar recognized “in
the state whose law is applicable to the merits [of the action].” Again, it is immaterial why the action
would be barred in that other state, that is, whether it is because that state's domestic law provides for
a shorter prescriptive period, or because, under its own borrowing statute, that state would borrow the
shorter prescriptive period of another state.
(i) Maintenance of action “not warranted by the policies of this state”. The second prerequisite to
displacing Louisiana's prescription law in cases where it provides for a prescriptive period that is longer
than that of the foreign lex causae is a showing that “maintenance of the action in this state is not
warranted by the policies of this state and its relationship to the parties or the dispute”. This test can
be viewed either from a negative or from a positive angle. The court must be satisfied that the policies
of this state in providing a longer prescriptive period for actions of the type before the court would
not be adversely affected by dismissing the particular action, or that these policies would be served by
entertaining the action. Either way, this evaluation will be based on an examination of the relationship,
if any, that this state has with the parties or their dispute. The pertinent question will be whether that
relationship is of the kind that would implicate in a significant way the policies of this state in providing
a longer prescriptive period.
By way of illustration, it would seem that if none of the parties are domiciled in this state and neither
they nor their dispute are related to this state in any other significant way, the policies of this state would
not be served by imposing on its overburdened courts the adjudication of a dispute which, but for the
existence of jurisdiction, is essentially a foreign dispute. Dismissing the action in such a case--which
on its face appears to be a case of forum shopping--would not seriously affect whatever interest this
state has in providing a longer prescriptive period, especially since, ex hypothesi, this state is not the
state of the lex causae.
On the other hand, if the plaintiff is a Louisiana domiciliary, then dismissing his action would deprive
him of the opportunity to litigate in the most convenient forum, and would close to him the doors of the
judicial system which he helps sustain through his taxes. Depending on the other circumstances of the
particular case, dismissal here might not be warranted in light of the policies of this state derived from
its relationship to the plaintiff. Similarly, if the defendant is a Louisiana domiciliary, there would seem
to be less of a concern about forum shopping by the plaintiff and less of an argument of unfair surprise
by the defendant. These two factors would suggest that allowing the action would be warranted by the

policies of this state, but whether or not this would actually be so should be determined by the court by
examining all the circumstances surrounding the particular case.
(j) Maintenance of action not warranted by “compelling considerations of remedial justice.” Finally,
the third prerequisite that must be satisfied in order to displace Louisiana prescription law in cases
where it provides for a prescriptive period that is longer than that of the foreign lex causae is a showing
that maintenance of the action in this state is not warranted by “compelling considerations of remedial
justice.” This phrase is intended to have the same meaning as in subparagraph (1). See comment (f),
supra. Again, under no circumstances should this phrase be seen as a command or even as a license for
entertaining a particular action simply because it is barred in all or most other states. Such egregious
examples of forum shopping as Keeton v. Hustler, 465 U.S. 770 (1984), are neither encouraged nor
condoned by this Article.
(k) Multiple leges causae. Article 421 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure defines a civil action as
“a demand for the enforcement of a legal right.” Obviously more than one such “legal right,” claim, or
cause of action may be cumulated in one and the same proceeding, such as when the plaintiff asserts one
claim based on tort and another on contract. Each of these causes of action would not only be subject to
a different prescriptive period, but might also be governed by a different substantive law on the merits.
If so, each such cause of action should be handled separately under this Article.
This phenomenon of multiple leges causae might be encountered even within the confines of a single
cause of action, since, under the issue-by-issue approach adopted throughout this Book, it is possible
that a cause of action may be governed in part by the law of one state and in part by the law of another
state. For example, the Title on delictual obligations provides different choice-of-law rules for issues of
conduct than for issues of loss distribution, and these rules may on occasion lead to the application of
the substantive law of a different state to each category of issues. In such cases, the decision of which
of these states will be treated as the state(s) of the lex causae for the purposes of this Article is left to
the discretion of the court.
(l) Necessity of pleading prescription. It is a well established principle of Louisiana law that
“[p]rescription must be pleaded. Courts may not supply a plea of prescription.” La.Civ.Code Art.
3452 (Rev.1982). This principle applies to Louisiana prescription and, perhaps a fortiori, to foreign
prescriptions. Nothing contained in this Article is intended to derogate from the above principle. Thus,
when it refers to an action as being “barred ... under the law of this state,” this Article contemplates
situations in which the obligor has properly and timely invoked a valid defense of prescription under
the law of this state. Similarly, when it refers to the action as being “barred in the state whose law is
applicable to the merits of the action”, this Article contemplates situations in which the party who relies
on the foreign law has not only proven that that law would be applicable to the merits, but also has
properly and timely invoked the applicable statute of limitations of that state.
On the other hand, in Louisiana, peremption “may be supplied by a court on its own motion”.
La.Civ.Code Art. 3460 (Rev.1982). This Article should certainly apply with regard to Louisiana
peremptions. However, it is a different question whether a Louisiana court should apply on its own
motion a limitation period provided by the foreign lex causae and treated by that law as applicable ex
officio. Theoretically, a Louisiana court may do so with regard to sister-state, as opposed to foreign-

country, “peremptions”. Article 202 of the Louisiana Code of Evidence provides that the court “shall
take judicial notice” of sister-state law, including presumably the peremptive period provided in that
law. As a practical matter, however, Louisiana courts have all but ignored the above provision which
compels judicial notice of sister-state law and have relied on the litigants to timely invoke and prove
the content of that law.


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Book IV.

Title I. General Provisions

Title II. Status

Art. 3519. Status of Natural Persons; General Principle

Title III. Marital Property

Title IV. Successions

Art. 3528. Formal Validity of Testamentary Dispositions

Title V. Real Rights

Art. 3535. Real Rights in Immovables

Title VI. Conventional Obligations

Title VII. Delictual and Quasi–Delictual Obligations

Title VIII. Liberative Prescription

West's Louisiana Statutes Annotated

LSA-C.C. Bk. IV, Refs & Annos

1991 REVISION AND REDESIGNATION

<Section 4 of Acts 1991, No. 923 provides:>

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

West's Louisiana Statutes Annotated

LSA-C.C. Bk. IV, T. I, Refs & Annos

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

West's Louisiana Statutes Annotated

LSA-C.C. Art. 3515

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2

Notes of Decisions (128)

LSA-C.C. Art. 3515, LA C.C. Art. 3515

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3

Art. 3516. Meaning of “State”, LA C.C. Art. 3516

West's Louisiana Statutes Annotated

LSA-C.C. Art. 3516

Art. 3516. Meaning of “State”

Notes of Decisions (2)

LSA-C.C. Art. 3516, LA C.C. Art. 3516

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

Art. 3517. Renvoi, LA C.C. Art. 3517

West's Louisiana Statutes Annotated

LSA-C.C. Art. 3517

Art. 3517. Renvoi

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

Art. 3517. Renvoi, LA C.C. Art. 3517

Notes of Decisions (3)

LSA-C.C. Art. 3517, LA C.C. Art. 3517

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2

Art. 3518. Domicile, LA C.C. Art. 3518

West's Louisiana Statutes Annotated

LSA-C.C. Art. 3518

Art. 3518. Domicile

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

Art. 3518. Domicile, LA C.C. Art. 3518

Notes of Decisions (3)

LSA-C.C. Art. 3518, LA C.C. Art. 3518

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2

West's Louisiana Statutes Annotated

LSA-C.C. Bk. IV, T. II, Refs & Annos

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

West's Louisiana Statutes Annotated

LSA-C.C. Art. 3519

Art. 3519. Status of natural persons; general principle

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2

Notes of Decisions (8)

LSA-C.C. Art. 3519, LA C.C. Art. 3519

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3

Art. 3520. Marriage, LA C.C. Art. 3520