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Intertemporal Choice
Introduction
Objective :
– This 3rd chapter focuses on intertemporal decision.
– Objective : Understand the saving (S henceforth) behavior in
order to explore the causes of current account (CA henceforth)
deficit (CA = S − I)).
– A CA < 0 can be caused by changes in savings or investment or
both.
– If CA < 0 is the result of I behavior, then the open economy
version of the Solow model is well suited to rationalize CA < 0.
– If CA < 0 caused by changes in savings, then the Solow model
is helpless since the saving rate is fixed → s does not react to
changes in future income or interest rates which considerably
limits the predictive power of the model when it comes to
take the model to the data.
– If we want to explain increasing CA < 0 in the EA between
1993 and 2007, we need to understand the saving behavior.
– Savings decision is an intertemporal choice as this is
fundamentally a decision involving a trade-off between
current and future consumption. If we can understand how
consumers arbitrage between future and present consumption,
then we can bring out the determinants of savings.
– It is important to understand well the basic
consumption/saving problem since it is at the core of modern
dynamic macroeconomics.
A Two-Period Model of
an Open Economy
– two-period model = the agent lives two periods ;
– in this economy, there are only households ;
– endowment economy (thus no firms and no capital) ;
– let us denote the first period (indexed by 1) as the
present period and the second period as the future
period (indexed by 2) ;
– open economy : agent can borrow from abroad or
lend to abroad.
Households
Preferences :
– workers receive in each period an exogenous income
stream equal to Y1 at period 1 and Y2 at period 2 ;
– Agents are forward-looking (base their decisions on
present and future income) and value present C1 and
future C2 consumption.
– The agent chooses consumption at period 1, C1 ,
and at period 2, C2 , in order to get the maximum
lifetime utility.
– This lifetime utility is the sum of U (C1 ) = ln C1 , plus
the instantaneous utility in period 2 U (C2 ) = ln C2.
– The lifetime utility Λ is equal to the sum of utility
stream :
Λ = ln C1 + ln C2 . (1)
Budget Constraints :
– Since agents can borrow or lend to the ROW, they
are able to transfer C across time by lending to
abroad (B1 > 0) or by borrowing from abroad
(B1 < 0).
– In the 1st period, the current revenue, Y1 , can be
consumed, C1 , or saved by holding foreign assets,
B1 :
Y1 = C1 + B1 , (2a)
C2 = Y2 + (1 + r) .B1 , (2b)
B2 = 0. (3)
Derivation of Intertemporal
Choices
Intertemporal MRS Analytically :
– Our objective is to determine the optimal trade-off
between C1 and C2.
– Consumption decisions are always based on the
maximum price you are willing to pay ; willingness to
pays is measured by the marginal utility.
– In a two-good economy with C1 and C2, your
willingness to pay for C1 (in terms of C2 ) is
Mu1
measured by the ratio of marginal utilities, Mu2
: it
reflects the amount of C2 your are willing to give up
in exchange for one additional unit of C1 .
– Assuming logarithmic utility, i.e., U (Ci ) = ln Ci ,
∂U (Ci ) 1
marginal utility is Mui = ∂Ci
= Ci
. The ratio of
marginal utilities thus reduces to :
1
M u1 C1
= 1
,
M u2 C2
C2
.
= (5)
C1
– The term on the LHS represents the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution (I-MRS) which
measures the number of future consumption units
the agent is willing to give up to consume one
additional unit in present : it gives the maximum
price the agent is willing to pay for present
consumption.
– This ratio is decreasing because when C1 increases
and C2 declines, Mu1 falls whilst Mu2 increases.
Intertemporal MRS Graphically :
– To determine the optimal trade-off between C1 and
C2, we use a graphical representation of the lifetime
utility : Λ = ln C1 + ln C2 .
– The indifference curve maps lifetime utility into a
graphical representation shown in Figure below.
– The indifference curve is downward sloping because
you want to consume more of C1 , you need to give
up C2 units.
– Graphically, the intertemporal MRS is measured by
the slope of the indifference curve in the
(C1 , C2 )-space.
– The MRS of C1 for C2 is minus the slope of an
indifference curve. For example, MRS at point A in
Figure is minus the slope of a tangent to the
indifference curve at point A.
– Recall that a preference for diversity, or diminishing
marginal rate of substitution (MRS), is captured by
the convexity in an indifference curve, which here
also represents a consumer’s desire to smooth
consumption over time.
– Formally, the slope of the indifference curve in the
(C1 , C2 )-space is obtained by totally differentiating
Λ :
∂Λ ∂Λ
dΛ = .dC1 + .dC2,
∂C1 ∂C2
= Mu1 .dC1 + Mu2 .dC2 .
–
Relative price of present consumption in the
intertemporal market :
– The IBC (4) which writes as
C2
C1 + = Ω,
1+r
Y2
where Ω = Y1 + 1+r
.
– IBC can be rewritten as follows :
C2 = (1 + r) . (Ω − C1 ) . (7)
Mu1 C2
I-MRS = = = 1 + r, (8)
Mu2 C1
that is, the MRS of C1 for C2 (minus the slope of
the indifference curve) is equal to 1 + r, which is
minus the slope of the consumer’s lifetime budget
constraint.
– In Figure below, the consumer chooses the
consumption bundle at point EC ⇒ this choice is
made along IBC independently from the level in Y1
or Y2 : what matters is total wealth and the shape of
preferences.
– The endowment point is at EY . We assume that
Y1 = Y2 = Y . Since B1 = Y1 − C1 , the agent will be a
lender if C1 < Y1 (B1 > 0) and a borrower (B1 < 0) if
C1 > Y1 .
– In the top panel of Figure , the agent is a borrower.
In the bottom panel of Figure , we show the optimal
consumption choice for a consumer who is a lender.
– We can notice that the agent with a flat indifference
curve is a lender and the agent with a steep
indifference curve is a borrower. Because both
agents have the same income, the savings decision is
the result of the taste for present consumption. To
compare the willingness to pay present consumption
across individuals, we need to calculate the rate of
time preference.
–
–
Determinants of Savings
of an Open Economy
– To bring out the determinants of savings, we
proceed in four steps. We first show the role of the
income path.
– Then we highlight the implications of the RTP.
Both the income path and the RTP determines
whether the economy is a borrower or a lender.
– Third, we analyze the implications of a change in
the interest rate on savings by breaking down the
effects into a substitution effect (SE), an income
effect (IE), and a human wealth effect (HE).
Economic Convergence,
Λ = ln C1 + ln C2 .
C1 + B1 = Y1 ,
C2 = (1 + r) .B1 + Y2 ,
where B1 is savings.
Our objective is to derive an analytical expression for
savings. To solve the model, we proceed in four steps :
– First, we derive the IBC by eliminating B1 from
budget constraints which leads to (4) and allows us
to express C2 in term of C1 :
C2
C1 + = Ω,
1+r
C2 = (1 + r) . (Ω − C1 ) .
B1 = Y1 − C1 ,
Ω
= Y1 − ,
µ2 ¶
1 Y2
B1 = . Y1 − . (11)
2 1+r
Savings depends on lifetime income :
– As shown in eq. (15), savings depends on the time
sequence of income. Since in the data, savings is
expressed in percentage of income, we divide both
sides of (15) by Y1 :
· ¸
B1 1 1 Y2
= . 1− . . (12)
Y1 2 1 + r Y1
– According to (12), when households are expected to
be richer in the future, as captured by a rise in the
Y2
ratio of future to current income, Y1
, they increase
B1
C1 and thus lower the savings rate initially, i.e., Y1
Y2
falls as Y1
increases. Henceforth, a country which
experiences an economic convergence will have a
low savings rate and is likely to be a net debtor
B1
initially, i.e., Y1
< 0.
– How it works ? Let us assume that Y1 is low and that
Y2 is expected to be high. In an intertemporal model,
the distribution of income across time is decoupled
from consumption decisions. First, the agent is
forward-looking and bases his/her consumption
choices on the present value of lifetime income, Ω.
Second, the agent dislikes large differences in
consumption and thus will choose to consume in the
present half of total wealth, see eq. (10). As Y2
becomes much larger than Y1 , the agent keeps C1
unchanged and neutralizes the effect of income on
consumption by borrowing abroad. Formally, since Y1
is low and C1 is high, then B1 = Y1 − C1 < 0.
– Figure shows optimal choices for present
consumption (on the horizontal axis) and future
consumption (vertical axis).
– While the agent is patient since ρ = 0, period
1-income is much lower that period 2-income. Since
the agent wishes to have a flat consumption time
profile, he/she borrows in the first period, i.e.,
B1 < 0, and pays back his/her debt in period 2.
–
Savings Behavior
Savings depends on RTP only along a constant
income path :
– So far, we have considered preferences which imply
that ρ = 0.
– While agents are forward-looking, they value more
present than future consumption ⇒ discount future
utility
– To discount future utility, we use the subjective
1
discount factor which is equal to 1+ρ
.
– Thus lifetime utility is equal to the presented
discounted value of utility stream :
1
Λ = ln C1 + . ln C2 , (13)
1+ρ
where parameter ρ ≥ 0 is the RTP which measures
that extent to which the agent discounts the future.
Mu1 1 1
– Calculating Mu2
where Mu1 = C1
and Mu2 = 1+ρ
. C12
and equating the I-MRS to 1 + r gives the optimal
time path for consumption :
Mu1 C2 . (1 + ρ)
= = 1 + r. (14)
Mu2 C1
– Performing the same steps as previously, we have
1+ρ
C1 = 2+ρ
.Ω so that
B1 = Y 1 − C 1 ,
1+ρ
= Y1 − .Ω,
2+ρ
· ¸
1+ρ Y2
B1 = Y 1 − . Y1 + ,
2+ρ 1+r
· ¸
1 1+ρ
B1 = . Y1 − .Y2 . (15)
2+ρ 1+r
– If we assume Y1 = Y2 = Y eq. (15) becomes :
· ¸
B1 1 1+ρ Y
= . 1− . ,
Y 2+ρ 1+r Y
1 r−ρ
= . . (16)
2+ρ 1+r
According to (16), when Y1 = Y2 = Y , savings
behavior is exclusively explained by the differential
between the r and ρ
– Figure shows the situation of a consumer with a
high RTP since the slope of the indifference curve
along a constant consumption path, 1 + ρ, is higher
than 1 + r.
– When ρ > r, the agent will be a borrower in period
1, i.e., B1 < 0 ; graphically, the slope of the
indifference curve along a constant consumption
path is higher than the slope of the budget
constraint, i.e., 1 + ρ > 1 + r.
–
Λ = ln C1 + ln C2 .
– The agent chooses an optimal trade-off between C1
and C2 by equating the intertemporal MRS to the
relative price of present consumption :
Mu1 C2
= = 1 + r, (17)
Mu2 C1
which implies that ρ = 0.
– Budget constraints in period 1 and 2, as described
by eq. (2a) and eq. (2b), respectively :
C1 + B1 = Y1 ,
C2 = (1 + r) .B1 + Y2 .
–
Effect of dr > 0 on Savings when Y2 = 0 :
– An increase in r produces two well-known opposite
effects :
– A substitution effect (SE) which provides
incentives to substitute C2 for C1 as the relative
price of C1 increases : B1 rises. The term on the
RHS of eq. (19) increases. This term reflects the
number of future consumption units you can get by
giving up one unit of C1 .
– SE graphically : the horizontal line moves upwards
which increases savings form B1 to B10 . The move
from E to F is caused by the SE.
– An income effect (IE) which exerts a positive
impact on C1 and thus a negative impact on B1
because 1 + r increases interest receipts in period 2
and thus makes the agent richer. The term on the
LHS of eq. (19) increases : this term reflects the
number of future consumption units you require in
exchange of giving up one unit of present
consumption.
– IE graphically : the I-MRS shifts upwards which
lowers savings from B10 to B1. The move from F to
H is the result of the IE.
– In Figure , the SE and IE cancel out and savings
remains unchanged at B1 .
–
– Remark : It is worth mentioning that the rise in r
makes the agent richer as long as the agent is a
lender (i.e., B1 > 0), otherwise it would make the
agent poorer (i.e., if B1 < 0).
Savings is increasing with r if Y2 > 0 :
– When Y2 > 0, the equality between the Intertemporal
MRS and the relative price of present consumption
is :
(1 + r) .B1 + Y2
= 1 + r.
Y 1 − B1
– Dividing both terms by 1 + r leads to :
Y2
B1 + 1+r
= 1. (20)
Y1 − B 1
Y2
– A rise in 1 + r lowers 1+r
; because the agent feels
poorer, he/she reduces C1 which increases B1 for
the equality to hold.
– when Y2 > 0, a rise in r produces a third effect called
the human wealth effect (HE). As long as Y2 > 0,
B1 becomes increasing in r even if SE = IE.
– Graphically, the HE leads the I − M RS-schedule to
shift to the right and savings decision moves from H
to G.
– Because for logarithmic utility, the IE and SE cancel
out, the HE leads to a rise in savings from B1 to B100 .