ARENDT, Hannah. Karl Marx and The Tradition of Western Political Thought

Karl Marx and the Tradition of Western Political Thought
Author(s): HANNAH ARENDT

Source: Social Research, Vol. 69, No. 2, Hannah Arendt's "The Origins of Totalitarianism":
Fifty Years Later (SUMMER 2002), pp. 273-319
Published by: The New School
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KarlMarxand the
TraditionofWestern
/
Thought / BYHANNAH ARENDT
Political
The followingexcerpts fromHannah Arendt's manuscriptson Karl

Marx are publishedherefor thefirsttime.WhenArendtrefersto thepre-
sent- forinstance,whenshesays "now"- it is importanttobe aware that
shereferstotheearly1950s, theperiodduringwhichtheexcerpts werecom-
posed. Arendtalways wrotein greathaste,but nevermoreso than here.
"
Consequently, thesewritingshave requiredratherextensive"Englishing,
a processto whichArendtalwayssubmitted whatevershe wrotein English
to
prior publication. In this case the "Englishing"has consistedprimarily
in breakingoverlylong sentencesand paragraphs into several shorter
ones, and in correcting what are clearlyerrorsin English grammarand
syntax. But at thesame timeeveryeffort has beenmade to retaintheraw,
racingqualityofArendtfsthought,as wellas theimmediacyofhervoice,
bothofwhichare nowheremoreabundantlymanifestthan in herwritings
on Marx. The readeris referred to thefirstpart oftheprecedingIntroduc-
tionfor moredetailedinformation. J. K.
The BrokenThreadof Tradition
At has neverbeen easyto thinkand writeaboutKarlMarx.His

impacton the alreadyexistingpartiesof theworkers, who had
onlyrecentlywonfulllegalequalityand politicalfranchise
in the
nationstates,wasimmediateand far-reaching.His neglect,more-
over,by the academic,scholarly
worldhardlylastedmorethan
twodecades afterhis death,and since then his influencehas
© 2002.JeromeKohn,Trustee,
Copyright HannahArendtBluecherLiterary
Trust.
SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 69, No. 2 (Summer2002)

274 SOCIAL RESEARCH
risen,spreadingfromstrict Marxism, whichalreadybythe1920s

had becomesomewhat outmoded,totheentirefieldofsocialand
historicalsciences.More recently, his influencehas been fre-
quently denied. That is not,however, becauseMarx'sthought and
the methodshe introducedhave been abandoned,but rather
because theyhave become so axiomaticthattheiroriginis no
longerremembered. The difficulties thatpreviously prevailedin
dealingwithMarx,however, wereof an academicnaturecom-
pared with the difficultiesthat confrontus now.To a certain
extenttheyweresimilarto thosethatarosein the treatment of
Nietzscheand,to a lesserextent,Kierkegaard: strugglespro and
contrawere so fierce,the misunderstandings that developed
within themso tremendous, thatitwasdifficulttosayexactly what
and
or whoone wasthinking talking about. In the case of Marx,
the difficultieswere obviouslyeven greaterbecause theycon-
cernedpolitics:fromtheverybeginning positionsproand contra
fellintotheconventional linesofpartypolitics, so thatto hispar-
tisans,whoeverspokeforMarxwas deemed "progressive," and
whoeverspokeagainsthim"reactionary."
Thissituation changedfortheworsewhen,withtheriseofone
Marxianparty, Marxism became(orappearedtobecome)therul-
ingideologyofa greatpower.It nowseemedthatthediscussion
ofMarxwasboundup notonlywithparty butalsowithpowerpol-
itics,and notonlywithdomesticbutalsowithworldpoliticalcon-
cerns.Andwhilethefigureof Marxhimself, nowevenmoreso
thanbefore,wasdraggedintothearenaofpolitics,hisinfluence
on modernintellectuals rose to newheights:the chieffactfor
them,and notwrongly so, was thatforthefirsttimea thinker,
ratherthana practicalstatesman or politician,had inspiredthe
policiesof a greatnation,thereby making weightofthought
the
feltin theentirerealmof politicalactivity. Since Marx'sidea of
rightgovernment, outlined as
first the dictatorship of theprole-
tariat,whichwastobe followed bya classlessand statelesssociety,
had becometheofficial aimofone country and ofpoliticalmove-
mentsthroughout theworld,then,certainly, Plato'sdreamofsub-

MARXAND WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 275
jectingpoliticalactionto thestrict tenetsofphilosophicthought

had becomea reality. Marxattained,albeitposthumously, what
Platoin vainhad attempted at the courtof Dionysiosin Sicily.1
Marxism and itsinfluence in themodernworldbecamewhatitis
todaybecauseof thistwofold influenceand representation, first
the
by politicalparties of the working classes,and,second,bythe
admiration oftheintellectuals, notofSovietRussiaperse,butfor
thefactthatBolshevism is, pretendsto be, Marxist.
or
To be sure,Marxism in thissensehasdoneas muchtohideand
obliteratethe actual teachingsof Marx as it has to propagate
them.IfwewanttofindoutwhoMarxwas,whathe thought, and
howhe standsin the tradition of politicalthought, Marxismall
-
too easilyappearsmainlyas a nuisance moreso than,but not
essentiallydifferent from,Hegelianismor anyother"ism"based
on thewritings of a singleauthor.ThroughMarxismMarxhim-
selfhas been praisedor blamedformanythingsofwhichhe was
entirelyinnocent;for instance,for decades he was highly
esteemed,or deeplyresented, as the"inventor ofclassstruggle,"
of whichhe was not only not the "inventor"(factsare not
invented)butnoteventhediscoverer. Morerecently, attempting
to distancethemselves fromthename (thoughhardlytheinflu-
ence) of Marx,othershave been busyprovinghow much he
foundin his avowedpredecessors. Thissearchingforinfluences
(forinstance,in the case of classstruggle)evenbecomesa bit
comicalwhenone remembers thatneithertheeconomists ofthe
nineteenth or eighteenth centuries northepoliticalphilosophers
of theseventeenth century were needed fora discovery ofwhat
wasalreadypresentinAristotle. Aristotledefinedthesubstanceof
democratic government as rulebythepoorand ofoligarchic gov-
ernment as rulebytherich,and stressed thistotheextentthathe
discardedthecontentofthosealreadytraditional terms,namely,
rulebythemanyand rulebythefew.He insistedthata govern-
mentofthepoor be calleda democracy, and thata government
of the richbe called an oligarchy, even if the richshouldout-
numberthepoor.2The politicalrelevanceofclassstruggle could

276 SOCIAL RESEARCH
hardlybe moreemphatically statedthanbybasingtwodistinct

formsofgovernment on it.Norcan Marxbe creditedwithhaving
elevatedthispoliticaland economicfactintotherealmofhistory.
For such elevationhad been currenteversinceHegel encoun-
teredNapoleon Bonaparte,seeingin him the "worldspiriton
horseback."
ButthechallengewithwhichMarxconfronts us todayis much
moreseriousthantheseacademicquarrelsoverinfluences and
priorities. The factthat one form oftotalitariandomination uses,
and apparently developeddirectly from, Marxism, is ofcourse the
most formidablecharge ever raised againstMarx. And that
chargecannotbe brushedoffas easilyas can chargesofa similar
nature- againstNietzsche, Hegel,Luther,or Plato,all ofwhom,
and manymore,have at one timeor anotherbeen accusedof
being the ancestorsof Nazism.Althoughtodayit is so conve-
niently overlooked, thefactthattheNazi versionof totalitarian-
ism could developalong linessimilarto thatof the Soviet,yet
nevertheless use an entirely different ideology,showsat leastthat
Marxcannotverywellstandaccused havingbroughtforththe
of
specifically aspectsofBolshevik
totalitarian domination. It is also
truethatthe interpretations to whichhis teachingswere sub-
jected, through Marxism as well as throughLeninism,and the
decisivetransformation byStalinofbothMarxismand Leninism
intoa totalitarian ideology,can easilybe demonstrated. Never-
thelessitalsoremainsa factthatthereisa moredirectconnection
betweenMarx and Bolshevism, as well as Marxisttotalitarian
movements in nontotalitarian countries,thanbetweenNazism
and anyofitsso-calledpredecessors.
It has becomefashionable duringthelastfewyearsto assume
an unbrokenline betweenMarx,Lenin, and Stalin,thereby
accusingMarx of being the fatherof totalitarian domination.
Very few of thosewho yield to thisline of argument seemto be
awarethatto accuseMarxoftotalitarianism amountsto accusing
theWestern traditionitselfofnecessarily endingin themonstros-
ityof thisnovelformof government. WhoevertouchesMarx

touchesthetradition ofWestern thought; thustheconservativism

on whichmanyofournewcritics ofMarxpridethemselves is usu-
ally great self-misunderstanding revolutionary of
as a as the zeal
theordinary Marxist. The fewcritics ofMarxwhoareawareofthe
rootsof Marx'sthoughttherefore haveattempted to construea
special trend in the an
tradition, occidental that
heresy nowadays
is sometimes calledGnosticism, in recollection oftheoldesthere-
siesofCatholicChristianity. Yetthisattempt to limitthedestruc-
tiveness oftotalitarianism the
by consequentinterpretation thatit
has growndirectly fromsucha trendin theWesterntradition is
doomedto failure.Marx'sthoughtcannotbe limitedto "imma-
nentism," as ifeverything couldbe setrightagainifonlywewould
leaveutopiato thenextworldand notassumethateverything on
earthcan be measuredand judged by earthlyyardsticks. For
Marx'srootsgo fardeeperin thetradition thanevenhe himself
knew.I thinkitcan be shownthatthelinefromAristotle to Marx
showsbothfewerand farlessdecisivebreaksthantheline from
Marxto Stalin.
The seriousaspectof thissituation, therefore, does not lie in
theease withwhichMarxcan be slanderedand histeachings, as
wellas hisproblems, misrepresented. The latteris ofcoursebad
enough,since, as we shallsee,Marx was thefirst todiscerncertain
problemsarisingfromtheIndustrial Revolution, thedistortion of
whichmeansat once thelossofan important source,and possi-
bly help, in dealing with real predicamentsthat ever more
urgently continueto confront us. But moreseriousthananyof
thisis thefactthatMarx,as distinguished fromthetrueand not
theimaginedsourcesoftheNazi ideologyofracism,clearlydoes
belongto thetradition ofWestern politicalthought. As an ideol-
ogy Marxism is doubtless the only link thatbinds the totalitarian
formof government directlyto thattradition; apartfromit any
attempt to deduce totalitarianism directlyfroma strandof occi-
dentalthought wouldlackeventhesemblanceofplausibility.
A seriousexamination ofMarxhimself, as opposedto thecur-
sory dismissal of hisname and the often unconscious retention of

278 SOCIAL RESEARCH
theconsequencesofhisteaching,is therefore somehowdanger-

ous in tworespects:it cannotbutquestioncertaintrendsin the
socialsciencesthatare Marxistin all butnameand thedepthof
Marx'sown thought;and it mustnecessarily examinethe real
questionsand perplexities ofour owntradition withwhichMarx
himself dealtand struggled. The examination of Marx,in other
words,cannotbutbe an examination oftraditional thought inso-
faras it is applicable to the modern world, a worldwhose pres-
ence can be tracedbackto theIndustrial Revolution on theone
hand,and to thepoliticalrevolutions of theeighteenth century
on theother.The modernage presentedmodernmanwithtwo
mainproblems, independent ofall politicaleventsin thenarrow
senseof theword:theproblemsof laborand history. The signifi-
canceofMarx'sthought liesneitherin hiseconomictheoriesnor
in itsrevolutionary content,butin thestubbornness withwhich
he clungto thesetwochief new perplexities.
One mightarguethatthethreadofour tradition wasbroken,
in the sensethatour traditional politicalcategorieswerenever
meantforsucha situation, when, thefirst
for timein ourhistory,
politicalequalitywasextendedto thelaboringclasses.ThatMarx
at leastgraspedthisfactand feltthatan emancipationof the
laboringclasswaspossibleonlyin a radically changedworlddis-
tinguishes his thoughtfromthatof Utopiansocialism,the chief
defectof whichwas not (as Marxhimselfbelieved)thatit was
unscientific, but its assumptionthatthe laboringclass was an
underprivileged groupand thatthefightforitsliberation wasa
fightforsocialjustice.That the older convictions of Christian
charityshould developinto fiercepassionsof socialjustice is
understandable enoughat a timewhenthemeansto putan end
to certainformsofmisery wereso evidently present. Yetsuchpas-
sionswereand are "outdated" in the sense that theyhad ceased
tobe applicabletoanysocialgroupbutratheronlytoindividuals.
WhatMarxunderstoodwas thatlabor itselfhad undergonea
decisivechangein themodernworld:thatithad notonlybecome
thesourceofall wealth,and consequently theoriginofall social

values,butthatall men,independent ofclassorigin,weresooner

or laterdestinedto becomelaborers,and thatthosewho could
not be adjustedinto thisprocessof labor would be seen and
judged bysocietyas mereparasites.To putit anotherway:while
otherswereconcernedwiththisor thatrightofthelaboringclass,
Marxalreadyforesawthetimewhen,notthisclass,but thecon-
sciousnessthatcorresponded to it,and to itsimportance forsoci-
ety as a whole,would decree that no one would have anyrights,
noteventherightto stayalive,whowasnota laborer.The result
ofthisprocessofcoursehas notbeen theelimination ofall other
occupations, but the reinterpretation of all human activitiesas
laboringactivities.
Fromtheviewpoint of the history of ideas,one mightargue
withalmostequal rightthatthethreadoftradition wasalso bro-
ken the momentthatHistorynot onlyenteredhumanthought
butbecameitsabsolute. Indeed,thishad happenednotwithMarx
butwithHegel,whoseentirephilosophy is a philosophy of his-
tory,or rather,one thatdissolvedall previousphilosophicas well
as all otherthoughtinto history. AfterHegel had historicized
evenlogic,and afterDarwin,throughtheidea ofevolution, had
historicizedeven nature,thereseemednothingleftthatcould
withstand themighty onslaughtofhistorical The con-
categories.
clusion that Marx quite properlydrew from this spiritual
situationwas his attemptto eliminatehistoryalto-
{geistliche)
gether.For Hegel, thinking historically, the meaningof a story
can emergeonlywhenithas cometoan end.End and truthhave
become identical;truthappearswheneverything is at its end,
whichis to saywhenand onlywhentheend is nearcan we learn
thetruth. In otherwords,we payfortruth withthelivingimpulse
thatimbuesan era,althoughof coursenot necessarily withour
own lives.The manifoldmodernversionsof an antagonism
betweenlifeand spirit, especiallyin theirNietzschean form,have
theirsourcein thishistoricization of all our spiritualcategories,
thatis,in an antagonism betweenlifeand truth.

280 SOCIAL RESEARCH
WhatHegelstatesaboutphilosophy in general,that"theowlof
Minervaspreadsher wingsonlywiththe fallingof the dusk,"3
holdsonlyfora philosophy ofhistory, thatis,itis trueofhistory
and corresponds to theviewof historians. Hegel of coursewas
encouragedto takethisviewbecausehe thoughtthatphilosophy
had reallybegunin GreecewithPlatoand Aristotle, whowrote
whenthepolisand thegloryofGreekhistory wereat theirend.
Todaywe knowthatPlato and Aristotle were the culmination
ratherthanthebeginningof Greekphilosophicthought, which
had begunitsflight whenGreecehad reachedor nearlyreached
itsclimax.Whatremainstrue,however, is thatPlatoas wellas Aris-
totlebecamethebeginningof theoccidentalphilosophictradi-
tion,and thatthisbeginning, as distinguished fromthebeginning
ofGreekphilosophicthought, occurredwhenGreekpoliticallife
wasindeedapproaching itsend.The problemthenaroseofhow
man,ifhe is toliveina polis,canliveoutsideofpolitics;thisprob-
lem,in whatsometimes seemsa strangeresemblance to our own
times,quicklybecame the questionof how it is possibleto live
without belongingto anypolity, thatis,in thestateof apolity, or
whatwe todaywouldcallstatelessness.
One couldsaythattheproblemoflaborindicatesthepolitical
side,and the problemof history the spiritualside, of the per-
plexitiesthatarose at the end of the eighteenthcenturyand
emergedfullyin themiddleofthenineteenth. Insofaras we still
livewithand in theseperplexities, whichmeanwhile havebecome
muchsharperin factwhilemuchlessarticulate in theoreticalfor-
mulation,we are stillMarx's contemporaries. The enormous
influencethatMarxstillexertsin almostall partsof theworld
seemsto confirm this.Yetthisis trueonlyto theextentthatwe
choose not to considercertaineventsof the twentieth century;
thatis,thoseeventsthatultimately led to theentirely novelform
ofgovernment weknowas totalitarian domination. The threadof
ourtradition,in thesenseofa continuous brokeonlywith
history,
the emergenceof totalitarian institutionsand policiesthatno
longer could be comprehended through categoriesof tradi-
the

tionalthought.These unprecedentedinstitutions and policies

issuedin crimesthatcannotbe judged bytraditional
moralstan-
or
dards, punished within the existinglegalframework
ofa civi-
lizationwhosejuridical cornerstonehad been the command
Thoushaltnotkill
The distinction betweenwhatcan and whatcannotbe compre-
hendedin termsof the tradition mayappearundulyacademic.
Among the conspicuous reflections of the crisisof the present
century - and one of the outstanding indicationsthatit indeed
involvednothingless than a breakdownof the tradition - has
been thelearnedattempts bymanyscholarsto datetheoriginof
thecrisis.Withalmostequal plausibility thatoriginhasbeen seen
in historicalmoments rangingbetweenthefourth century before
and thenineteenth century after Christ.Against all suchtheories,
I proposeto accepttheriseof totalitarianism as a demonstrably
newformofgovernment, as an eventthat,at leastpolitically, pal-
pably concerns the livesof all ofus,not only thoughts rel-
the of a
ativelyfewindividuals or thedestiniesofcertainspecificnational
or socialgroups.Onlythisevent,withitsconcomitant changeof
all politicalconditionsand relationships thatpreviously existed
on the earth,renderedirreparableand unhealablethe various
"breaks"thathavebeen seenretrospectively in itswake.Totalitar-
ianismas an eventhasmadethebreakin ourtradition an accom-
plishedfact,and as an eventitcouldneverhavebeenforeseenor
forethought, muchlesspredictedor "caused,"byanysingleman.
So farare we frombeingable to deducewhatactuallyhappened
frompast spiritualor material"causes" thatall such factors
appearto be causesonlyin thelightcastbytheevent,illuminat-
ingbothitselfand itspast.
In thissense,then,we are no longerthe contemporaries of
Marx.Anditis fromthisviewpoint thatMarxacquiresa newsig-
nificance forus. He is theone greatmanofthepastwhonotonly
wasalreadyconcernedwithpredicaments thatarestillwithus,but
whosethoughtcould also be used and misusedby one of the
formsof totalitarianism. Thus Marxseemsto providea reliable

282 SOCIAL RESEARCH
linkforus backintothetradition, becausehe himself wasmore

firmly rootedinit (evenwhenhe thought he wasrebelling against
it or
it,turning upsidedown, escaping from the priority theo-
of
retical-interpretativeanalysisintohistorical-politicalaction)than
we can ever be again. For us totalitarianism necessarilyhas
become the centraleventof our timesand, consequently, the
breakin tradition a faitaccompli.BecauseMarxconcernedhim-
selfwiththefewnewelementary factsforwhichthetradition itself
did not providea categoricalframework, his successor failure
therefore enablesus tojudge thesuccessor failureof thetradi-
tionitselfin regardtothesefacts,evenbeforeitsmoral,legal,the-
oretical,and practicalstandards,togetherwith its political
institutionsand formsoforganization, brokedownspectacularly.
ThatMarxstillloomsso largein ourpresentworldis indeedthe
measureofhisgreatness. Thathe couldproveofuse to totalitari-
anism(thoughcertainly he can neverbe said to have been its
"cause") is a sign of the actualrelevanceof his thought,even
thoughat thesametimeitis also themeasureofhisultimate fail-
ure.Marxlivedin a changing worldand his greatness wasthe pre-
cisionwithwhichhe graspedthecenterofthischange.Welivein
a worldwhosemainfeatureis change,a worldin whichchange
itselfhasbecomea matter ofcourseto suchan extentthatweare
in dangerofforgetting thatwhichhas changedaltogether.
The firstgreatchallengeto tradition camewhenHegel inter-
preted the world as subject change the senseof historical
to in
movement.Marx'sown challengeto tradition - "The philoso-
phershaveonlyinterpreted theworld.. .thepoint,however, is to
change - wasone amongmanypossibleconclusions
it"4 thatmight
be derivedfromHegel'ssystem. To us itsoundsas thoughMarx
weresaying:The worldthe philosophers of thepasthaveinter-
preted,and thatthelastof themunderstoodin termsof a con-
tinuous,self-developing history,is in fact changingbeyond
recognition. Let us tryto takecontrolofthisprocessand change
theworldin accordancewithour tradition. By"tradition" Marx
alwaysunderstoodthetradition ofphilosophy, to whichtheone

surviving class,representing humanity as a whole,would ulti-

matelybecometheheir.Marxhimself meantthattheirresistible
motionofhistory one daywouldstop,thatfurther changewould
be ruledoutwhentheworldhad undergoneitslastand decisive
change.This side of Marx'steachingis usuallydismissedas its
Utopianelement:theend in viewof a classlesssocietywhenhis-
toryitselfwouldcome to a haltonce itsmotor - classstruggle -
wouldhaveceased.In factitindicatesthatin somefundamental
aspectsMarxwasmorecloselyboundto thetradition thanHegel
was.The revolutionary elementin Marx'steachings, therefore, is
onlysuperficiallycontained in his visionof an end brought about
by actual revolution, the outcome of which, accordingto him,
wouldhavecoincidedrathercuriously withtheideal oflifeasso-
ciatedwiththe Greekcity-states. The reallyanti-traditional and
unprecedented side of his thoughtis his glorification of labor,
and hisreinterpretation -
oftheclass theworking -
class thatphi-
losophy since its beginning had alwaysdespised.Labor, the
humanactivity ofthisclass,wasdeemedso irrelevant thatphilos-
ophy had not even bothered to interpret and understandit. In
orderto graspthe politicalimportanceof the emancipationof
labor,and Marx'scorresponding dignification of labor as the
mostfundamental of all humanactivities, it maybe welljust to
mention,at the beginningof thesereflections, the distinction
betweenlaborand workthat,althoughlargelyunarticulated, has
been decisiveforthewholetradition, and that,onlyrecently, and
partlybecauseofMarx'steachings, has becomeblurred.
Marxis theonlythinker ofthenineteenth century whotookits
centralevent,theemancipation oftheworking class,seriouslyin
philosophicterms.Marx'sgreatinfluence todayis stilldue to this
one fact,whichalso,to a largeextent,explainshowhis thought
couldbecomeso usefulforpurposesof totalitarian domination.
The SovietUnion,whichfromthe momentof its foundation
called itselfa republicof workersand peasants,may have
depriveditsworkers ofall therightstheyenjoyin thefreeworld.
Yetitsideologyis primarily an ideologydesignedforlaborers, and

284 SOCIAL RESEARCH
labor, as distinguished fromall other human activities, has

remaineditshighest"value,"theonlydistinction itrecognizes. In
thisrespectit is,moreover, only the most radical version of our
ownsociety, whichmoreand moretendsalso tobecomea society
oflaborers.On theotherhand,theSovietUnion'smeansofdom-
ination,unprecedentedas theyare in politicalhistoryand
unknownto politicalthought,have frequently (and not alto-
getherwrongly)been called the means of a slave society.
Althoughthistermdoes notdojusticeto thenonutili tarianchar-
acterof totaldomination, it does indicatethetotalcharacterof
thesubjectionitself.Thatsuchsubjectionis worsenedwhenthe
utilitarianmotive,whichhad been thechiefguaranteeofa slave's
life,no longerexists,is obvious.Butthenslavery, at leastin West-
ernsociety, neverhas been a formofgovernment and therefore
never,strictly
speaking, hasbelongedin thepoliticalrealm.Only
thosewhowerenotslaveswereable to takepartin politicallife
under normal,nontyrannical government.But even under
tyranny thesphereof privatelifewas leftintact,whichis to say
thattherewaslefta sortoffreedomthatno slavemightenjoy.
But whetherMarx,whoseinfluenceon politicswas tremen-
dous,wasevergenuinely interested in politicsas suchmayjustly
be doubted.The factis thathisinterpretation, or rather, glorifi-
cationoflabor,whileonlyfollowing thecourseofevents,in itself
could notfailto introducea completereversalof all traditional
politicalvalues.Itwasnotthepoliticalemancipation ofthework-
ing class,the equalityforall thatforthe firsttimein history
includedmenialworkers, thatwasdecisive,butrathertheconse-
quence thatfromnow on labor as a humanactivity no longer
belongedto thestrictly privaterealmof life:it becamea public
politicalfactof thefirstorder.BythisI do notreferto theeco-
nomicsphereoflife;thissphereas a wholealways wasa matter of
public concern. But this is
sphere only to a very small extent the
sphere of labor.
Laboris necessarily priorto anyeconomy, whichis to saythat
the organizedattemptof men livingtogether, handlingand

securingboththeneedsand theluxuriesof life,startswithand

requireslaborevenwhenitseconomyhas been developedto the
highestdegree.As theelementary activitynecessary forthemere
conservation oflife,laborhad alwaysbeen thoughtofas a curse,
in thesensethatitmadelifehard,preventing itfromeverbecom-
ing easy and therebydistinguishing it from the lives of the
Olympiangods.5Thathumanlifeis noteasyis onlyanotherway
ofsayingthatin itsmostelementary aspectitis subjectto neces-
that
sity, it is not and never can become freefromcoercion,for
coercionis firstfeltin the peculiarly all-overwhelming urgesof
ourbodies.Peoplewhodo nothingbutcaterto theseelementary
coerciveneedsweretraditionally deemedunfreebydefinition -
thatis,theywereconsideredunreadyto exercisethefunctions of
freecitizens.Thereforethosewho did thisworkforothersin
ordertofreethemfromfulfilling thenecessities oflifethemselves
wereknownas slaves.
In everycivilization laboris theactivity thatenablesthepublic
realmto put at our disposalwhatwe consume.Labor as the
metabolism withnatureis notprimarily productive butconsump-
tive,and itsnecessity wouldremainso evenifno productivity, no
additionto thecommonworld,wereeverassociatedwithit.It is
because of the connectionof all laboringactivity to the strictly
biologicalneedsofourbodiesthatittraditionally wasdeemedto
belongto thelower,almostanimal-like functions of humanlife,
and as such considereda strictly private matter. Public political
lifebegan wherethisrealmof the privateended, or in other
wordswheneverthoseneeds could be transcended intoa com-
monworld,a worldin-between mentranscending themetabolism
withnatureofeachofitsindividuals. Politicsin theoriginalGreek
senseof thewordbeganwiththe liberationfromlabor,and in
spiteof manyvariations remainedthe same in thisrespectfor
nearly3,000years; and this,as we know,wasfirstmade possible
through theinstitution ofslavery. Slaverytherefore wasnota part
ofGreekpoliticallifebuttheconditionofpoliteuein, ofall those
activities
thatforthe Greeksfulfilled the lifeof the citizen.As

286 SOCIAL RESEARCH
suchitwasbasedon ruleoverslaves,butwasitself notdividedinto

rulingand beingruled;fortheearlyGreeksrulingoverslaveswas
a pre-political
conditionofpoliteuein, ofbeingpolitical.
This originalformof politicsunderwent a decisivechangein
theperiodofdecayoftheGreekpolis,a decaythatcoincidedwith
thatculminationof Greekphilosophy, whichwas to become
authoritative
forall timesup to our own.The suspicionand con-
tempt ofthephilosophers concernedtheactivity ofpoliteuein
itself
but not the basison whichit rested.In the steadof politeuein,
whichhad been madepossiblebyliberation fromthenecessities
ofbiologicallife,cametheidealofphilosophein, theactivity
ofphi-
losophizing.From then on the distinctionbetween rulingand
beingruledinvadedthe realmof politicsdirectly; and the rule
overthenecessities oflifebecametheprecondition, notofpoli-
tics,butofphilosophy, thatis,rulingoverwhatever wasmaterially
needed to enable man to lead thehigher,philosophiclifetook
theplace ofpoliteuein.In bothcasestheearlierexperienceofan
activity thelifeofthecitizenwasall butlostto thetradi-
fulfilling
tion.The emancipation oflabor,bothas theglorification of the
laboringactivityand as the politicalequalityof theworking class,
wouldnothavebeenpossibleiftheoriginalmeaningofpolitics -
inwhicha politicalrealmcenteredaroundlaborwouldhavebeen
a contradictionin terms- had notbeen lost.
WhenMarxmade labor the mostimportant activityof man,
he was saying,in termsof the tradition, thatnot freedombut
compulsionis whatmakesman human.When he added that
nobodycouldbe freewhorulesoverothershe wassaying,again
in termsofthetradition, whatHegel,in thefamousmaster-ser-
vantdialectic,had onlyless forcefully said beforehim:thatno
one can be free,neitherthoseenslavedbynecessity nor those
enslavedbythenecessity to rule.In thisMarxnotonlyappeared
to contradicthimself, insofaras he promisedfreedomforall at
the same momenthe denied it to all, but to reversethe very
meaningoffreedom, basedas ithad been on thefreedomfrom

thatcompulsionwe naturallyand originallysufferunder the

humancondition.
Equalityforworkers and thedignificationofthelaboringactiv-
itywere of such tremendousand revolutionary importance
becausetheoccidentalattitudeto laborhad been so closelycon-
nectedwithitsattitudeto lifein thepurelybiologicalsense.And
thissensewasstressed evenmoreforcefully thanbeforein Marx's
own definition of labor as man's metabolism withnature.The
laborerswerenotonlythosewhowereruledbythefreein order
notto be enslavedto thesheernecessities oflife;theywere,psy-
chologically speaking,also thosewho stoodaccusedof philopsy-
chia,of love oflifeforlife'sownsake.Philopsychiain factis what
distinguished theslavefromthefreeman.In ancienttimesthe
freemanfoundhisheroin Achilles,whoexchangeda shortlife
fortheeternalfameofgreatness; afterthefourth century before
Christthefreemanbecamethephilosopher whodevotedhislife
to the "contemplation"
to theõrein, of eternaltruths,or,in the
MiddleAges,to the salvationof his eternalsoul. Insofaras the
politicalrealmwasconstituted byfreemen,laborwaseliminated
fromit;and in all theseinstances, eventhosein whichthevalue
ofpoliticalactionwasmostlimited,laborwasviewedas an activ-
itywithout anydignity in itself
whatsoever.
TheModernChallenge
to Tradition
(excerpts)
Attheotherend ofthispositionand,as itmustappearat first

glance,in themostextremeoppositionto it,standthreeproposi-
tionsthatare thepillarson whichMarx'swholetheoryand phi-
losophyrest:first,Laboris theCreator
ofMan; second, Violence
is the
midwife ofHistory(and, since history forMarx is past political
action,thismeans thatviolencemakesaction efficient);6 and
third,seeminglyin contradiction to theothertwo,Nobody canbe
freewho enslaves
others.
Each of these expressesin
propositions

288 SOCIAL RESEARCH
quintessential formone ofthedecisiveeventswithwhichourown

era began.Thereis first, as a resultoftheIndustrial Revolution,
thefullpoliticalemancipation oftheworking class,regardless of
property and skillqualifications. Neverbeforehad anypolitical
organism soughttoencompassall thosewhoactually livedin it.If
we wereto translatethiseventintothe languageof the seven-
teenthand eighteenth centuries, wewouldhavetosaythatman-
even in the stateof natureand endowedwithnothingbut his
working or laboringcapacity - wasacceptedas a fullcitizen.
It is truethatin Europeannation-states thisall-encompassing
principlewas significantly qualified:only people born in a
nation'sterritory or descendedfromits nationalswere recog-
nizedas citizens. Butthisqualification had nothingtodo withthe
new revolutionary principle itselfand was not, for instance,
applicablein theUnitedStates,theonlycountry wheretheIndus-
trialRevolution wasnothamperedbythetransformation offeu-
dal statesintoclassesand therefore wherethe emancipation of
theworkingclasscould at once achieveitstruecharacter. The
classsystem, so greatly overrated byMarx, who knew the Indus-
trialRevolution only in its Europeanversion,is actuallya feudal
remnantwhose curioustransformations are swiftly liquidated
wherever thatrevolution is permitted to runitsfullcourse.The
politicalconsequencesof theemancipation of laborin America
comeverycloseto a realization ofthesocialcontract betweenall
men thatthe philosophersof the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries stillthought to be eithera prehistoric factat thebegin-
ning of civilizedsociety or a scientificfigment necessary forthe
legitimacy ofpoliticalauthority.
The Industrial Revolution, withitsunlimited demandforsheer
laborforce,resultedin theunheardofreinterpretation oflabor
as themostimportant qualityofman.The emancipation oflabor,
in thedoublesenseofemancipating theworking classand digni-
fyingtheactivity of laboring,indeedimplieda new"socialcon-
tract,"thatis,a newfundamental relationshipbetweenmenbased
on whatthe tradition wouldhavedespisedas theirlowestcom-

mondenominator: ownership oflaborforce.Marxdrewthecon-

sequences of thisemancipationwhen he said thatlabor,the
specifically humanmetabolismwithnature,was the mostele-
mentary humandistinction, thatwhichintrinsically
distinguished
humanfromanimallife.
Second, therewas the tremendousfactof the Frenchand
AmericanRevolutions.In these eventsviolencehad brought
aboutnotsomehaphazardslaughter whosemeaningrevealsitself
only to later generations, or is comprehensible onlyfromthe
viewpointof the interestedparties,but an entirelynew body
politic.In its outlines,and in the case of the UnitedStatesin
manydetails,thisbodypolitichad been drawnup bythe eigh-
teenth-century philosophes and ideologues,thatis, by thosewho
perceived an idea that needed nothingbutthehelpinghand of
violenceto be realized.
Third,the mostchallengingconsequenceof the Frenchand
AmericanRevolutions wastheidea ofequality:theidea ofa soci-
etyinwhichnobodyshouldbe a masterand nobodya servant. All
the modernand not so modernobjections - thatequalityand
freedomare mutuallyexclusive,thattheycannotexistside by
side,thatfreedompresupposesruleoverothers,and thatequal-
ityof all is nothingbut thewell-known conditionof tyranny or
-
leads to it neglectthe greatpathosof the eighteenth-century
revolutions and theirchallengetoall previously heldconceptions
offreedom.WhenMarxsaid thatnobodycan be freewhorules
overothers,he summedup in one greatproposition whatbefore
himHegel,as previously indicated,had beenintenton proving in
thefamousdialecticofmasterand servant: thateach masteris the
slaveofhisservant, and thateach servanteventually becomeshis
master'smaster.
The basicself-contradiction in whichMarx'swholework,from
theearlywritings to the thirdvolumeof Capital,is caught(and
whichcan be expressedin variousways,suchas thathe needed
violenceto abolishviolence,thatthegoal ofhistory is to end his-
tory,that labor is the onlyproductive of
activity man butthatthe

290 SOCIAL RESEARCH
development of man'sproductive forceswilleventually lead to

theabolitionoflabor,etc.)arisesfromthisinsistence on freedom.
ForwhenMarxstatedthatlaboris themostimportant activityof
man, he was saying in termsof the tradition that not freedom but
necessity is what makesmanhuman.Andhe followedthislineof
thought throughout hisphilosophy ofhistory, accordingtowhich
thedevelopment ofmankindis ruledby,and themeaningofhis-
torycontainedin, the law of historical movement, the political
motorofwhichis classstruggle and whosenaturalirresistible dri-
vingforceis thedevelopment of man'slaboringcapacity. When
undertheinfluenceof theFrenchRevolutionhe added to this
thatviolenceis themidwife ofHistory, he deniedin termsofthe
tradition theverysubstantial contentoffreedomcontainedin the
humancapacityofspeech.And he followedthisline of thought
toitsultimate consequencesin histheory ofideologies,according
to whichall activities ofman thatexpressthemselves in thespo-
kenword,fromlegaland politicalinstitutions to poetryand phi-
losophy,were mere and perhapsunconsciouspretextsfor,or
justifications of,violentdeeds. (An ideology, accordingto Marx,
articulateswhatsomebody pretends to be for the sakeofhisactive
role in theworld;all pastlaws,religions, and philosophiesare
suchideologies.)
Fromthisitfollows - and thiswasalreadyclearin Marx'sown
historicalwritings and has become even more manifestin all
Marxist
strictly - thathistory,
historiography whichis therecord
of pastpoliticalaction,showsits true,undistorted face onlyin
warsand revolutions; and thatpoliticalactivity,ifit is notdirect,
violentaction,mustbe understoodas eitherthepreparation of
futureviolenceor theconsequenceof pastviolence.The devel-
opmentof capitalismis essentially the consequenceof the vio-
lence of originalaccumulation, just as the development of the
working is the
class essentially preparation for the day of revolu-
tion.(WhenLeninadded thatthetwentieth century wasall too
likelyto becomea century of warsand revolutions, likewise
he
meantthatitwillbe thecentury inwhichhistory comestoa head

and showsits trueface.) Here again Marxturnedat leastone

strandof our tradition upsidedown.Since Platoit had become
axiomaticthat"itlies in the natureof praxisto partakeless of
truththanspeech."According to Marx,itis notonlypraxisperse
thatshowsmoretruththanspeech,buttheone kindofpraxisthat
has severedall bondswithspeech.Forviolence,in distinction to
all otherkindsofhumanaction,is mutebydefinition. Speechon
theotherhand is notonlydeemedto partakelessof truththan
action,butis nowconceivedto be mere"ideological"talkwhose
chieffunction is to concealthetruth.
Marx'sconviction concerning violenceis not less hereticalin
termsof thetradition thanhisconviction concerning labor,and
botharecloselyinterrelated. The statement laborcreated man,con-
sciously formulated against the traditional
dogma God createdman,
has itscorrelation in theaffirmation thatviolencereveals,which
standsagainstthetraditional notionthatthewordofGod is reve-
lation.ThisJewish-Christian understanding of thewordof God,
thelogostheou, wasneverincompatible withtheGreekconception
of logosand has made it possible,throughout our tradition, for
humanspeechto retainitsrevelatory capacity,so that it couldbe
trusted as an instrument forcommunication betweenmenas well
as an instrument of"rational," thatis,truth-seeking thought. The
basicmistrust ofspeech,as represented in Marx'stheoryof ide-
-
ologies precededby Descartes'terriblesuspicionthatan evil
spiritmayconcealthetruthfromman- has proveditselfto be a
fundamentaland efficientonslaughton religion precisely
becauseitis an onslaughton philosophy as well.
As a matterof courseMarxtakesthispositionto be thefoun-
dationofmodernscience;science,accordingto him,"wouldbe
superfluous iftheappearanceand essenceof thingscoincided."
Thatappearanceas suchwasno longerthought capableofreveal-
ing essence or (and thisis the
essentially same) thatappearance
itselfhad become muteand no longerspoke to men who mis-
trusted theirsensesand all senseperception, is closelyconnected
withtheglorification of muteviolence.Like theglorification of

292 SOCIAL RESEARCH
labor,politically thiswas an onslaughton freedom,because it

impliedtheglorification ofcompulsion and naturalnecessity. But
to concludefromthisthatMarx'slongingforthe"realmoffree-
dom"wassheerhypocrisy, or thathisstatement thatnobodycan
be freewhorulesoverothersis merelyinconsistent, meansnot
only tounderrate therelevance ofMarx's work, but also tounder-
estimate theobjectivedifficultiesand obstaclestoall so-calledtra-
ditionalvaluesin themodernworld.
Marx'sself-contradiction is moststriking in thefewparagraphs
thatoutlinetheideal futuresocietyand thatare frequently dis-
missedas Utopian.Theycannotbe dismissed becausetheyconsti-
tute the centerof Marx'sworkand expressmost clearlyits
originalimpulses.Moreover, ifutopiameansthatthissocietyhas
no topos, no geographical and historical place on earth,it is cer-
tainlynotUtopian:itsgeographical toposisAthensand itsplacein
history is thefifthcentury beforeChrist.In Marx'sfuturesociety
the statehas witheredaway;thereis no longeranydistinction
betweenrulersand ruledand rulership no longerexists.Thiscor-
respondstolifein theancientGreekcity-state, which,althoughit
wasbased on rulershipoverslavesas itspre-political condition,
had excludedrulership fromtheintercourse ofitsfreecitizens. In
Herodotus'greatdefinition (towhich Marx's statement conforms
almosttextually) , thatmanis freewhowants"neitherto rulenor
tobe ruled."Alongwiththestate,violencein all itsformsis gone,
and administration has takentheplace of police and army;the
policeare superfluous, becausethelegislator has becomea "nat-
ural scientistwho does not make or invent laws,butonlyformu-
latesthem"so thatmanhasonlytolivein conformity withhisown
natureto remainwithinthe realmof the law.The expectation
thatitwillbe easyformento followthefewelementary rulesof
behaviordiscoveredand laid downthousandsof yearsago (as
Leninonce strikingly expressedit)7in a society without property
conflicts is "utopian"onlyifone assumesthathumannatureis
corruptor thathumanlawsare notderivedfromnaturallaw.But
hereagainthereis a striking resemblance to a citystatein which

thecitizensthemselves weresupposedtoexecutedeathsentences
pronouncedagainstthemin accordancewiththe laws,so that
theyare not killedby specialforcestrainedin the use of the
meansofviolence,butratherhelpedbyguardiansto commitsui-
cide.The superfluousness ofan army, moreover, followslogically
as soonas we assumewithMarxthatthislifeoftheAtheniancity-
statehas ceasedtobe confinedto thepolisand nowencompasses
thewholeworld.
Moststriking ofall is of courseMarx'sinsistence thathe does
notwantto "liberatelabor,"whichalreadyis freein all civilized
countries,but to "abolishlaboraltogether." And bylaborMarx
here does not mean only that necessary"metabolismwith
nature,"whichis the naturalconditionof man,but the whole
realmofwork,ofcraftsmanship and art,thatrequiresspecialized
training.This realmneverfellunderthe generalcontemptfor
thedrudgery oflaborthatis characteristic ofourwholetradition
and whosedegradation specificallycharacterizesAthenianlifein
the fifthcentury.Only theredo we findan almostcomplete
leisuresocietyin whichthetimeand energyrequiredformaking
a livingwere,so to speak,squeezedin betweenthemuchmore
important activitiesof agorein,walkingand talkingin themarket-
of
place, going to the gymnasium, of attending meetingsor the
theater,or ofjudgingconflicts betweencitizens.Hardlyanything
couldbe morerevealing ofMarx'soriginalimpulsesthanthefact
thathe banishesfromhis futuresocietynot onlythelaborthat
was executedbyslavesin antiquity, but also theactivities
of the
banausoi,the craftsmen and "In
artists: a communist societythere
are no painters,onlymenwho,amongothersthings, paint."The
aristocraticstandardsof Athenianlifehad indeed denied free-
dom to thosewhoseworkstillrequiredthe exertionof effort.
(Thateffort, and notspecialization, wasthechiefcriterion can be
seen fromthe factthatsculptorsand peasants,unlikepainters
and shepherds, weredeemedunfree.)In otherwords,ifwe insist
on examiningMarx'sthoughtin the lightof the traditionthat
began in Greece,and of a politicalphilosophythat,eitherin

294 SOCIAL RESEARCH
agreement or opposition, sprangfromand formulated theprin-

cipal experiencesofAthenianpolislife,we are clearlyfollowing
thecentralindications ofMarx'sworkitself.
This"utopian"sideofMarx'steachings constitutes a basicself-
contradiction, and like all such flagrantinconsistencies in the
workof greatwriters indicatesand illuminates the centerof its
author'sthought.In Marx'scase thebasicinconsistency wasnot
evenhisownbutalreadyexistedin clearoutlinein thethreecen-
traleventsthatovershadowed theentirenineteenth century: the
politicalrevolutions in Franceand America,theIndustrial Revo-
lutionin theWestern world,and thedemandforfreedomforall
thatwas inherentin both.These threeevents,ratherthanthe
workof Marx,wereno longerin accordwithour traditionof
politicalthought, and itis onlyafterthemthat,in itsbrutefactu-
ourworldhas changedbeyondrecognition
ality, whencompared
withanypreviousera.EvenbeforeMarxhad beguntowrite, vio-
lencehad becomethemidwife ofhistory,laborhad becomethe
centralactivity ofsociety,and universal equalitywason itswayto
becomingan accomplished fact.NeitherMarxnor thespiritual
changes that accompanied theserevolutionary events,however,
can be comprehended apart from thetradition theychallenged.
Eventodayourthought stillmoveswithintheframework offamil-
iarconceptsand "ideals,"whichare muchlessUtopianthanmost
believeand usuallyhavea verydefinite placein history, no matter
howviolently theymay clash withtherealityin which we liveand
thattheyare supposedto grasp.
Marxwasnotand,as we shallsee, could nothavebeen aware
thathis glorification ofviolenceand laborchallengedthetradi-
tionalconnectionbetweenfreedomand speech.He was aware,
however, oftheincompatibility offreedom withthenecessity that
is expressedby labor,and also withthe compulsionthat is
expressedbyviolence.Ashe putit,"Therealmoffreedomin fact
beginsonlywherelabor,conditionedbyneed and exterioruse-
fulness,ends."According tothedialectics ofhistory,necessity and
compulsioncouldverywellbringforthfreedom, exceptthatthis

solutiondoes notreallyworkifone, following Marx,definesthe

-
natureof man and notmerelythewayin whichthingshuman
happen- in termsofnecessity. Forthefree,laborlessmanwhois
supposedto emergeafterthe end of history wouldsimplyhave
lost his mostessentially humancapacity, just as the actionsof
men, once they have lost the element of violence,wouldhavelost
theirspecificallyhumanefficiency.
Marxhad a rightnotto be awareof theintimaterelationship
betweenspeechand freedomas we knowit fromthe two-sided
statement ofAristotle: thata freemanis a memberofa polisand
thatthemembers ofa polisaredistinguished fromthebarbarians
throughthefaculty of speech.These twoconnectedstatements
had alreadybeen tornasunderbya tradition thattranslatedthe
one bydeclaringthatmanis a socialbeing,a banality forwhich
one wouldnothaveneededAristotle, and theotherbydefining
man as the animalerationale, the reasoninganimal. In both
the of
instances, politicalpoint Aristotle's insightas wellas his
conceptoffreedom, whichcorresponded withtheexperienceof
theGreekpolitës, waslost.
The wordpolitikon no longermeanta unique,outstanding way
oflife,ofbeing-together, in whichthetrulyhumancapacitiesof
man,as distinguished fromhismereanimalcharacteristics, could
showand provethemselves. It had cometo signify an all-embrac-
ingqualitythatmensharewithmanyanimalspecies,whichper-
hapswasbestexpressedin theStoicconceptofmankindas one
giganticherdunderone superhuman shepherd.The wordlogos,
whichin classicalGreekusageequivocally meantbothwordand
reason,and therebypreserveda unitybetweenthe capacityof
speechand thecapacity ofthought, becameratio.The chiefpolit-
icaldifference betweenratioand logos is thattheformer primarily
residesin,and relatesto,a reasoningindividual in hissingularity,
whothenuseswordsin orderto expresshis thoughts to others,
whilelogosis essentiallyrelatedto othersand therefore byitsvery
naturepolitical.WhatAristotle had seen as one and the same
humanquality, to livetogether withothersin themodus ofspeak-

296 SOCIAL RESEARCH
ing,nowbecametwodistinct characteristics,to havereasonand

tobe social.Andthesetwocharacteristics, almostfromthebegin-
ning,werenotthoughtmerely to be distinct,butantagonistic to
each other:theconflict betweenman'srationality and hissocia-
bilitycan be seen throughout ourtradition ofpoliticalthought.
Thislossoftheoriginally politicalexperiencesin thetradition
ofpoliticalthought had alreadybeenforeshadowed in thebegin-
ningofthistradition whichalmostbutnotquitebeginswith
itself,
Aristotle;where politicalthoughtis concernedit actuallystarts
withPlato.Indeed,in thisrespect, thatis,in affirming in hispolit-
ical philosophythe experienceof the polis,Aristotle seemsin
open conflict withPlato (hispoliticalwritings are fullofpolemi-
cal remarks againsthim),whereasthetradition thatreinterpreted
Aristotle'sdefinition ofman eliminated from it all thoseinsights
intothenatureofpoliticsand man'spoliticalfreedomthatwere
inconsistent withPlatonism.
The chiefdifference betweenPlatoand Aristotle in theirpolit-
icalphilosophies is thatPlato,writing consciously in oppositionto
the politicallife of the decayingGreek city-state, no longer
believedin thevalidity ofthekindofspeechthataccompanied -
-
in thesenseofbeingtheotherside of politicalaction.To him,
suchspeechwasmereopinion,and as suchopposedto theper-
ceptionof truth, unfiteitherto adhereto or expresstruth.Per-
suasion,päthän,the formin whichthe citizensmanagedtheir
publicaffairs amongthemselves, wasto Platoan unfortunate sub-
stituteforthe kindof unshakableconvictionthatcould spring
onlyfromthedirectperceptionof truth, a perceptionto which
themethodof dialegein, talkinga matterthroughbetween"two,"
autosauto,"one"talking withone "other," couldlead. The philo-
sophicalpointis thatforPlatotheperceptionoftruthwasessen-
tiallyspeechlessand could onlybe furthered, not attained,by
dialegein.It is essential in our context that Plato,probablyfrom
theimpression thatthefateofSocratesand thelimitations ofper-
suasionso glaringly exposedat his trial made on him, was no
longerconcernedwithfreedomat all. Persuasionhad becometo

hima form,notoffreedom, butofarbitrary compulsionthrough

words,and in his politicalphilosophy he proposedto substitute
forthisarbitrary compulsionthecoercionoftruth.Insofaras this
truth wasessentiallyspeechlessand couldbe perceivedonlyin the
solitudeofcontemplation, Platonicmanwasalreadynota "speak-
ing" but a rational animal,thatis, a beingwhosechiefconcern
and enlightenment layin himself,in hisownreason,and notin
thefaculty ofspeech,whichbydefinition presupposedhisliving
amongand managinghislifetogether withhisequals.WhenAris-
totleconnectedspeechand freedom, he wason thefirmground
of a thenstillexistingtradition rootedin experience.Yetin the
end Platoremainedvictorious becauseofthefactthattheGreek
city-statewas decayingbeyondremedy - somethingthatPlato
who,as a full-fledgedAtheniancitizen,unlikeAristotle, knewand
whoseinfluencehe suffered -
severelyand whoseultimateruin
he fearedand triedto prevent.
In the entiretraditionof philosophical,and particularly of
politicalthought, therehas perhapsbeen no singlefactorofsuch
overwhelming importance and influenceon everything thatwas
tofollowthanthefactthatPlatoandAristotle wrotein thefourth
century, underthe fullimpactof a politically decayingsociety,
and underconditions wherephilosophy quiteconsciously either
desertedthepoliticalrealmaltogether or claimedto ruleitlikea
tyrant.Thisfacthad firstofall themostseriousconsequencesfor
philosophy which
itself, hardlyneededHegel to come to believe
thatnotonlyphilosophical thought, butnearlyall thought ingen-
eral,was the indicationof the end of a civilization.
Even more
seriouswastheabyssthatimmediately opened betweenthought
and action,and whichneversincehas been closed.All thinking
thatis not simplythe calculationof meansto obtainan
activity
intendedor willedend but is concernedwithmeaningin the
mostgeneralsense came to playthe role of an "afterthought,"
thatis,afteractionhad decidedand determined Action,
reality.
on the otherhand,becamemeaningless, the realmof the acci-
dentaland haphazardupon whichno greatdeeds any longer

298 SOCIAL RESEARCH
shed theirimmortallight.The greatand conflicting Roman expe-

rienceremainedin thisrespectwithoutlastinginfluence,because
itsChristianheir followedGreekphilosophyin itsspiritualdevel-
opmentand Roman practiceonlyin itslegal and institutional his-
tory. Roman experience, moreover, never brought forth a
philosophical conception of its own, but from the beginning
interpreteditselfin the Greek categoriesof the fourthcentury.
When action eventuallybecame meaningfulagain it was because
the rememberedstoryof man's actionswas feltto be "in essence
incoherentand immoral"(JohnAdams), so thathistory'strostloses
Ungefähr (Kant's "melancholyhaphazardness")needed a "ruse of
nature"or some other forceworkingbehind the back of acting
men to achieve anydignityworthyof philosophicalthought.The
worstconsequence, however,was thatfreedombecame a "prob-
lem," perhaps the most perplexingone forphilosophy,and cer-
tainlythe most insolubleforpoliticalphilosophy.Aristotleis the
last forwhom freedomis not yet "problematic"but inherentin
thefacultyofspeech; in otherwords,Aristotlestillknewthatmen,
as long as theytalkwitheach otherand act togetherin the modus
of speech, are free.
%%%
We have alreadyindicatedone of the reasonswhyMarx's con-

cept offreedom,and his insistenceon itas the ultimategoal ofall
politics,resultedin the basic inconsistencyof his teaching.That
reason was the earlyloss of interestin freedomin general as well
as the early oblivion of the fundamentalconnection between
speech and freedom,both of whichare almostas old as our tra-
dition of politicalthought.To this,however,mustbe added one
altogetherdifferent whicharisesless fromthe concept
difficulty,
offreedomas such thanfrom the change thisconcept necessarily
suffersunder conditionsof universalequality.

Neverbeforeour own timeshas equalitymeantin termsof

politicalrealitythatliterallyeveryoneis everyoneelse's equal-
which,of course,does not implythateverybody is the same as
everybody else,althoughthelevelingtendenciesof our modern
societycan hardlybe denied.Priorto themodernage, equality
wasunderstoodpolitically as a matterof equal rightsforpeople
of equal status.In otherwords,it meantthatthosewho were
equal should be treatedequally,but neverthateveryonewas
equal.The Christian notionoftheequalityofall menbeforeGod,
so frequently cited as the originof modernpoliticalequality,
neverintendedto makemenequal on earth,buton thecontrary
insistedthatonlyas citizensofa civitas Dei could theybe consid-
eredequal. The shiftofemphasisfromcivitas terrenato civitas Dei
as theultimatedestinyof man did nothingto changethebasic
inequalitiesofman'spoliticalstatuson earth,in theframework of
whichpoliticalequalityand equityweresupposedtooperate.The
Christian wayof life- to livein theworldwithoutbeingof the
-
world could denytherelevanceofearthly distinctions between
menin orderto affirm theultimateequalityofdestiny. But"ulti-
mate"meantbeyondthisworld,leavingearthly distinctions com-
pletelyintact,and "destiny" referredto a beginningand end,
neitherofwhichwasrootedin theearth.BecauseChristian equal-
itybefore God did not even demand politicalequality of all Chris-
tians,letaloneofall men,thereisas littlejustification forpraising
Christianityfor the modern of
concept equality as there is for
blamingthe Churchforthe equanimity withwhichit tolerated
slavery and serfdom throughout the centuries.Insofaras states-
menwereChristians, and notmerely statesmen whohappenedto
be of the Christian denomination, theyhad nothingto do with
either.
Originally equals wereonlythosewho belongedto the same
group, and to extendthistermto all men wouldhave been to
renderit meaningless. The chiefprivilege inherentin thisorigi-
nal meaningwasthatone's equals,and onlythey,had a rightto
judge one'sownactions.It is in thissensethatCatoin hislasttrial

300 SOCIAL RESEARCH
complainedthatnone of hisjudges wereentitledtojudge him,

becausenoneofthembelongedtohisowngeneration: theywere
not his equals,even thoughtheywereall freeRomancitizens.
Howdeeplythisdistinction betweenequalsand all othermenwas
felt,and howlittleour owncircumstances have preparedus to
understand it,can be seen clearlyif we once againrecallAristo-
tle's definition of man, zbonlogonechon, whichas a matterof
coursehe meantonlyfortheinhabitants ofa polis,forthosewho
wereequals,and whichwe immediately misunderstand as a gen-
eral statement applicableto all humanbeings.The reasonhe
definedthespecificconditionoflifein a polisas thecontentof
humanas distinguished fromanimallifewas not because he
thoughtit applicableeverywhere, but because he had decided
thatitwasthebestpossiblehumanlife.
A moreuniversal definitionand conceptofmanappearedonly
in thefollowing centuries,duringtherisein lateantiquity ofthe
conditionofa-polity thatso curiously resemblestheriseofstate-
lessnessin themodernworld.Onlywhenthephilosophers had
definitely (and notonlytheoretically, as withPlato) brokenwith
thepolis,and whenpoliticalhomelessness had becomethestatus
ofa greatmanypeoplein theworld,did theyconceiveofmanin
an entirely unpolitical way,thatis,independentfromthewayin
whichhe livedtogether withhisequals.The lateStoicconceptof
humanequality, however, wasas negativeas the conditionfrom
which it arose. It has as much or as littleto do withuniversal
equalityin thepositivesensein whichwe livetodayas theStoic
conceptofataraxia, freedomas unmoveability, has to do withany
positivenotionoffreedom.In otherwords,ouruse todayofuni-
versalconceptsand our tendency to universalize rulesuntilthey
cometocomprehend everypossible individual occurrence havea
lottodo withtheconditions ofuniversal equalityunderwhichwe
actuallylive,think, and act.
To whatextentMarxwas awareof and evenobsessedbythis
newuniversal equalitycan be seenfromhisconceptofthefuture
as a classlessand nationlesssociety, thatis, a societywhereuni-

versalequalitywillhave razed all politicalboundariesbetween

men.Whathe didnotsee,andwhatisso verymanifest in Hobbes'
magnificent definition of human equalityas the equal abilityto
these boundariesgive protection
kill,is thatlike all frontiers
together withlimitation,and notonlyseparatebutalso bindmen
together.Marx's greatness,and thereasonforhisenormousinflu-
ence on modernpoliticalthoughtand movements, was thathe
discoveredthepositivecharacter ofthisequalityin thenatureof
manhimself, thatis,in hisconceptionofmanas laborforce.He
knewverywellthatthisnewdefinition of manwaspossibleonly
because "the conceptof humanequalitypossessesalreadythe
solidityofa popularprejudice."Marx'sdefinition ofmanas ani-
mallaborans stoodin consciousoppositionto and challengedthe
traditionaldefinition ofmanas animalrationale.
Animalrationale,
allegedlythe translationof zbonlogonechon,still
sharedwithAristotle's definition thelackofequal applicabilityto
all men,fornotall menare equally"rational," equallycapable of
theoreticalthought. It was the to
capacity give and tolistento the-
oreticalreasons,ratherthanthepractical ofmen,that
intelligence
theadjectiverationale primarily aimedat.The laterinterpretation
oftherationalpartofmanas "commonsense,"despiteorperhaps
becauseof itseminently was neverused to
politicalindications,
definetheessenceof humannature,eventhoughthiscommon
sensewassupposedtobe equallystrong andcametothesamecon-
clusionsin everysingleindividual.BeforeMarxonlyHobbes-
who withMontesquieuwas the greatestthoughnot the most
influential
politicalthinker of thenewera thatwasbeginning -
hadfeltthenecessity offinding a newdefinition ofmanunderthe
assumption ofuniversal equality.According toHobbes,thisequal-
itywasinherent in the originalstateof natureand "theequalityof
theabilityto kill"definedthemostgeneral,commondenomina-
torof man.Fromthisbasicassumption he deducedthefounda-
tionsofhumanpoliticalorganisms withno lessstringent logicality
thanMarxwasto develop,fromtheassumption oftheproductive
forceoflabor,thefoundations ofhumansociety.

302 SOCIAL RESEARCH
Marx'sdemandthatnobodyshouldbe called freewho rules

overothersis in completeagreementwiththefactof universal
equality,a conditionin whichbydefinition no one has a rightto
rule. Yet the eliminationof rule, of the age-old distinction
betweenthosewhoruleand thosewhoare ruled,is so farfrom
beingtheonlyand sufficient conditionoffreedomthatour tra-
ditionevendeemedfreedomimpossible without rulership.Those
whowerenot ruledweredeemedfree,and thisfreedomcould
realizeitselfsolelyamongequals,indeedonlywhere, justas Marx
demanded,the distinction betweenrulersand subjectsdid not
exist.Yetthisfreedombased on rule overslaveswas a freedom
thatapartfromsuchbasicrulership wasinconceivable, notsimply
becauseitimpliedtheruleoverotherhumanbeingsbutbecause
it entailedcontroloverthosebasicnecessities of lifethat,ifleft
uncontrolled throughemancipation fromthelabortheyrequire,
wouldrenderall freedomillusory. Freedomin thisoriginalsense
wasa stateofbeingratherthana faculty; and politics, in anystrict
senseoftheword,wasthought tobeginwhenthatstatehad been
realized.Politicalliferestedon rulership,but to ruleand to be
ruledwasnotitscontent.Wherethiswasthecase,as in theOri-
entaldespotisms, thepeoplesconcernedwereseenbytheGreeks
under
as living conditionsofservitude,thatis,as livingunderpre-
politicalconditions.Freedomtherefore wasnotone ofthepoliti-
cal "goods,"suchas honororjusticeorwealthor anyothergood,
and it neverwas enumeratedas belongingto man'seudaimonia,
hisessentialwell-being or happiness.Freedomwasthepre-politi-
and therefore
cal conditionofpoliticalactivities ofall thegoods
thatmen can enjoythroughtheirlivingtogether. As such,free-
domwastakenforgrantedand didnotneed tobe defined.When
he statedthatthepoliticallifeofa freecitizenwascharacterized
bylogonechon, bybeingconductedin themannerofspeech,Aris-
totledefinedtheessenceoffreemenand theirbehavior, notthe
essenceoffreedomas a humangood.
Universalequalitycannotcoexistwithfreedomas thepre-polit-
ical conditionof politicallifeand withthe absoluterule over

laborers;it is thelatterthatmakesit possibleforfreecitizensto

escape the coercivenecessitiesof biologicallife,at leastto the
extentthatsuch necessitiesdemand of man specificactivities.
Marx'sownformulation thatfreedomis incompatible withrule
overothersonlyenhancesthisdifficulty. If itweretrue,a Greek
might have answered him bysaying that then freedomis impossi-
-
ble:all menwouldbe slavesofnecessitythenecessity to eat and
to live,to preserveand regeneratelife.Not onlyare slavesnot
human,butno manis fullyhumanundertheseconditions. Nor
does the laterdevelopmentof the conceptof freedom,which
made it one of the mostcherishedgoods withinthe political
realm,changeanything in thisbasic traditional incompatibility
betweenfreedomand universal equality.The mostimportant and
far-reaching is
change alreadyclearly visible in Aristotle, whose
definitionsofgovernments are notconsistent withhisdefinition
ofmanas citizen.It is as thoughhe himself had alreadyforgotten
whatthe whole traditionafterhimwas bound to let sinkinto
oblivion,namely, theintimate connectionbetweenfreedomand
speech on the one hand, and between ruleand necessity on the
other.Whathappenedwasthatruleoverothers,whichoriginally
had been experiencedas ruleoverslavesand therefore as a pre-
politicalcondition for the lifeof the polis, entered the political
realmitselfand, bydividingmenwho livedtogetherintothose
whoruledand thosewhowereruled,evenbecameitsdominating
factor.Fromthenon, thatis,almostimmediately afterAristotle,
theproblemof powerbecamethedecisivepoliticalproblem,so
thatthiswholerealmofhumanlifecouldbe defined,notas the
realmof livingtogether, but as the realmof powerstruggles in
whichnothingis so muchat stakeas thequestionof who rules
overwhom.
Rule overothersveryearlyceased to be a merelypre-political
conditionof all politicallife,forno soonerhad it enteredthe
politicalrealmproperthanitbecameat once itsverycenter.This
changecan bestbe observedin the definitions of the formsof
government, which no longer were understood as variouswaysof

304 SOCIAL RESEARCH
livingtogether butas variousformsof rulership amongcitizens.

Kingshipand aristocracy, whichPlatostilldefinedas restingon
distinction (theironly minor difference beingthatthe former
restson thedistinction ofone amongtherulingcitizens, whereas
in the latterseveralare distinguished), now becamemonarchy
and oligarchy. In monarchy one man,and in oligarchy several
men hold poweroverall others.Plato stillthoughtthatthese
formsof government wereplainlyperversions, no truepoliteiai
butbornfromsomeviolentupheavaland dependenton violence
(bia). The use of violencedisqualifies all formsof government
because, accordingto the older conception,violencebegins
wherever thepolis,thepoliticalrealmproper,ends.It endseither
in theruleoverslaves,whichmakesthisrealmpossiblein thefirst
place,or in thedefenseof thewallsof the city,or in the trans-
gression oftheboundary ofthelawstowhichall citizenshavesub-
mittedthemselves voluntarily.
Aristotle, who usestheolderconceptsofkingship,
still aristoc-
racy,and polityto indicatethe "good" formsof governments,
alreadyactually thinksthatthequestionofwhorulesoverwhom,
or of howmanyhold power,is thedecisivecriterion thatdistin-
guishesthemfromeachother.In otherwords,he always describes
monarchy as the rule ofone,oligarchy as the rule ofthe few,and
democracy as theruleofthemajority. However, sincetheelement
ofviolencepresentin rulingas suchwouldalso forhimhavedis-
qualifiedtheseformsofgovernment, he had tointroducethelaw
in an altogether different meaning.The lawwasnowno longer
theboundary(which the citizensoughttodefendlikethewallsof
thecity, becauseit had thesamefunction forthecitizen'spoliti-
cal lifeas thecity'swallhad fortheirphysicalexistenceand dis-
tinctness,as Heraclitus hadsaid), butbecamea yardstick bywhich
rulecouldbe measured.Rule noweitherconformed to or over-
ruled the law, and in the lattercase the rule was called tyranni-
cal- usually, not
although necessarily, exerted by one man - and
therefore a kindofperverted monarchy. Fromthenon, lawand
powerbecamethetwoconceptualpillarsofall definitions ofgov-

ernment, and thesedefinitionshardlychangedduringthemore

than2,000yearsthatseparateAristotle fromMontesquieu.Since
violencein itsarbitrary
formremaineda disqualifying the
factor,
mainquestionnowbecamewhetheror not theruleoverothers
conformedto the existinglaws,whereasthe questionof how
manyactuallywerein possessionof powerbecameless and less
relevant. Kantonlydrewthelastconsequencefromthistradition
ofpoliticalthought whenhe reducedthenumberofformsofgov-
ernmentto two:to ruleoverothersaccordingto law,whichhe
called republican,and its opposite,rule by lawless,arbitrary
power,whichhe calledtyrannical.
In a sensethisdevelopment is a completereversal oftheearlier
in
Greekpoliticalexperience, whichan all important qualifica-
tionforpoliticallifewasthepre-political ruleoverslaves,thatis,
whenonlythosewho held poweroverotherswereconsidered
in politicsat all. Thisearlyexperience,
freeand fitto participate
however, wasneveraltogetherlost.Politicssomehow, thoughin a
verychangedway,was stillconnectedwithfreedom,freedom
remainedconnectedwithexertingrule,and onlyrulerswere
deemedfree.Thisis thecontextinwhichfreedomcouldbecome
a "good,"somethingto be enjoyed,closelyconnectedwiththe
powerofdoingas one pleases,eitherwithinor beyondthelimits
ofthelaw.Freedomremainedwiththe"rulingclass,"and contin-
ued to presupposeothersbeing ruled,even thoughit was no
longertheconditionbuthad becometheverycontentofpoliti-
cal life.Thuswhenuniversal equalityappearedas an unavoidable
demandforjusticeforeveryone, fora socialand politicalbodyin
whichall werefreeand no one wasruled,ithad all theearmarks
of a contradiction in terms:withinthe traditionof political
thoughtthe conceptof universalequalitycould onlymean that
nobodycouldbe free.
Withtheanticipated disappearanceofruleand dominationin
Marx'sstatelesssociety,
freedomindeedbecomesa meaningless
wordunlessitis conceivedin an altogether different
sense.Since
Marxhereas elsewheredid notbotherto redefinehistermsbut

306 SOCIAL RESEARCH
remainedin the conceptualframework of the tradition, Lenin

wasnotso wrongwhenhe concludedthatifnobodycan be free
whorulesoverothers,thenfreedomis onlya prejudiceor an ide-
ology- althoughhe therebyrobbedMarx'sworkof one of its
mostimportant impulses.His adherenceto tradition is also the
reasonfortheevenmorefateful errorof Marxas wellas Lenin
thatmereadministration, in contrast to government, is theade-
quateformofmenlivingtogether undertheconditionofradical
and universalequality.Administration was supposedto be no
rule,butit can actuallybe onlyrulebynobody,thatis,bureau-
cracy,a formofgovernment without responsibility. Bureaucracy is
theformofgovernment in whichthepersonalelementofruler-
shiphas disappeared,and itis ofcoursetruethatsucha govern-
ment may even rule in the interestof no class. But this
no-man-rule, the factthatin an authenticbureaucracy nobody
occupiestheempty chairoftheruler,doesnotmeanthatthecon-
ditionsof rule have disappeared.This nobodyrulesveryeffec-
whenlookedupon fromtheside oftheruled,and,whatis
tively
worse,as a formofgovernment ithas one important traitin com-
monwithtyranny. Tyrannical poweris definedbythetradition as
arbitrarypower,and thisoriginally signified a ruleforwhichno
accountneedbe given,a rulethatowesno one anyresponsibility.
The sameis trueforthebureaucratic rulebynobody,thoughfor
an altogetherdifferent reason. There are manypeople in a
who
bureaucracy may demand an account,butnobodyto giveit
becausenobodycannotbe held responsible. In thesteadof the
tyrant'sarbitrary decisions we find the haphazardsettlements of
universalprocedures,settlements thatare withoutmalice and
arbitrarinessbecausethereis no willbehindthem,butto which
thereis also no appeal.Asfaras theruledare concerned,thenet
ofthepatterns inwhichtheyare caughtis byfarmoredangerous
and moredeadlythanmerearbitrary tyranny.But bureaucracy
shouldnotbe mistaken fortotalitarian domination. If theOcto-
berRevolution had been permitted to followthe linesprescribed
by Marx and Lenin, which was not the case, it would probably

haveresultedin bureaucratic rule.The ruleofnobody,notanar-

chy,or disappearanceof rule,or oppression,is theever-present
dangerofanysocietybasedon universal equality.
Labor,violence,andfreedomindicatethecentralchallengesto
ourtradition thatappearedin thethreegreateventsofthemod-
ern era, and whichMarx attemptedto formulateand think
through.Comparedwiththem,the one reversalof traditional
"values"ofwhichMarxhimself wasaware,theturning awayfrom
"idealism" -
to "materialism"bywhichhe believedhe had turned
Hegel upside down,and forwhichhe has so frequently been
praised or blamed - is of minor importance. Such turning opera-
tions,however, were characteristic of the new age's conscious
rebellionagainst,and unconsciousbondageto,tradition. We are
remindedofKierkegaard's the
turning relationship between phi-
losophy and religionupside down; and of Nietzsche's inverted
Platonismthat,whileassumingwithPlato thateternalessence
and perishablemortallifeare contradictions, arrivedat theanti-
Platonicconclusionthatman,insofaras he is a livingbeing,can
onlybe hinderedin his beingalivethroughtheso-calledessen-
tial.Thislastinstanceis particularly instructive,sincePlatohim-
selfalreadythought he had achievedsucha turning operationin
histeachingthatitisnotthemerely livingand hence mortalbody
but thesoul,precisely becauseit is intangible, thatcould attain
immortality by partaking in true reality, realitynot of the
the
objectsof thesensesbutof theideas thatare seen and grasped
onlywiththeeyesofthesoul.The periagöge, he demanded,wasa
turning around by which everything commonlybelieved in
Greecein accordancewiththeHomericreligionwasstoodon its
head.Atleastthisis quiteobviously whatPlatohimself believed.
One maythinkthatNietzsche, whenhe reversedPlato,wasonly
returning to a pre-Platonic philosophy; butof coursethatis not
thecase,forNietzsche, likeMarx,remainedin theframework of
thetradition despiteall turnings around.To exaltthesensual,as
Nietzschedid,one needsthereality ofthespiritual, just as Plato
needed the brutefactuality of the sensualas the givenback-

308 SOCIAL RESEARCH
groundagainstwhichthe soul could performits periagõgé, its

turning towardtherealmofideas.Plato,whoseworkisfilledwith
directand indirectpolemicalrepliesto Homer,did not turn
Homerdownsideup,buthe did laythegroundwork ofa philoso-
phyin whichsuchturning operations wereindeednotonlya far-
fetchedpossibility,but almosta conclusivenecessity. The whole
development ofphilosophy in lateantiquity, withitsinnumerable
schoolsall fighting each otherwitha fanaticism unparalleledin
thepre-Christian world,largely consists ofturning operations that
weremade possiblebyPlato'speriagõgé, and forwhichthe Pla-
tonicseparationofa worldofmereshadowy appearancesfroma
worldofeternally trueideashad erectedtheframework.
Whenin a lastgiganticeffort Hegel gatheredtogether thevar-
iousstrands oftraditional philosophy they developedfrom
as had
Plato's originalconception,fittingthem into one consistent
whole,a similarsplittingup into two conflicting schools of
thoughtensued,though on a much lower for
level: a shortwhile
philosophicthoughtwas dominatedbyright-wing and left-wing
Hegelians.But the threegreatreversals thateventually wereto
conclude,at leastup to our time,thegreatuninterrupted tradi-
-
tionof philosophyKierkegaard's leap fromdoubtintobelief,
Nietzsche's reversed Platonism, Marx'sleap fromtheory
and into
- (thoughnone ofthemwouldhavebeen possiblewithout
praxis
Hegel and his conceptof history and in thisone all important
respect all threewere and remained followers of Hegel), also
pointto a muchmoreradicalbreakwiththetradition thanany
mere upside-down operationrequires. Of these breaks Marx's
had the mostimmediateconsequences,simplybecause it had
touchedour tradition of politicalthoughtand therefore could
becomedirectly influential on politicaldevelopments.
Marx'sbreakcertainly did notconsistin his"materialism" or in
histurning Hegel upside down. Lenin was altogetherrightwhen
he remarked thatno one couldunderstand Das Kapitalwhohad
not masteredHegel's Logik.In Marx'sownopinion,whatmade
socialismscientificand distinguished itfromthatofhispredeces-

sors,the"utopiansocialists," wasnotan economictheory withits

scientific
insightsas wellas itserrors, butthediscovery ofa lawof
movement thatruledmatterand,at thesametime,showeditself
in thereasoningcapacity ofmanas "consciousness," eitherofthe
selfor ofa class.The tremendous practicaladvantageof Marx's
"scientific"
overUtopiansocialismwas,and stillis,thatitliberated
the socialistmovementfromitsworn-out moralizingattitudes,
and recognizedthattheclassquestionsin modernsocietycould
no longerbe solvedbya "passionforjustice"or on thebasisofa
modified
slightly Christian charity. Iflaboris thecentralactivity of
modernsociety, it is absurdto thinkofmembersof theworking
classas underprivileged, no matterhowoppressedor exploited
theymayhappento be at anyparticular moment.The introduc-
tionofa dialecticalhistorical movement, accordingto whichthe
lastwillbe first,at leastofferedan accountof the tremendous
powerpotentialof thisclass,a potentialthatcame to lightonly
severaldecadesafterMarx'sdeath.
The dialecticalmovement of thesis,antithesis,and synthesis -
whichbecomesinfinite as each synthesis at once establishes itself
as a newthesisfromwhicha newantithesis and a newsynthesis
-
flow holdsmanand matter in itsgripand mixesthemwitheach
other,then separates them from each other,antithetically,so that
theymayappeardistinct as matter and spirit,onlytoreunitethem
The foundation
synthetically. of experienceon whichHegel'sas
well as Marx's dialecticrestsis the all-encompassing eternal
processofnature'smetabolism, ofwhichman'smetabolism with
natureis onlyan infinitesimally smallpart,on theone hand,and
the factof humanhistory on the other.The logic of dialectal
movement enablesMarxto combinenaturewithhistory, or mat-
terwithman;manbecomestheauthorofa meaningful, compre-
hensiblehistory because his metabolism withnature,unlikean
animal's,is not merelyconsumptive but requiresan activity,
namely, labor.ForMarxlaboris theunitinglinkbetweenmatter
and man,betweennatureand history. He isa "materialist" insofar
as thespecifically
humanformofconsuming matteris to himthe

310 SOCIAL RESEARCH
beginning ofeverything;and he is an "idealist"

insofar
as nothing
evercomesfrommatterbyitselfwithouttheconsumingactivity
thatlies in the natureof man,whichis labor.In otherwords
"materialism" and "idealism"havelosttheirmeaning,although
Marxhimself seemsnottohavebeenawareofthis.The greatness
ofHegel'ssystem, and thereasonwhyitwasso extremely difficult
to escapeitsinfluenceifone wantedto remainwithinthescope
oftraditionalphilosophyatall,liesin hisincorporationofthetwo
"worlds"ofPlatointoone movingwhole.The traditional turning
fromtheworldofappearancetotheworldofideasor,conversely,
theturning fromtheworldofideasbackto theworldofappear-
ance,takesplace in thehistorical motionitselfand becomesthe
-
form althoughnot thecontent,whichis therealizationof the
Absolute- ofthedialecticalmovement.
Each of the threestatements byMarx- Laboris theCreator of
Man, Violence
is themidwife and No one can befreewho
ofHistory,
enslavesothers- is revolutionaryin the sense thatit followsand
bringsintoarticulate thoughtthethreerevolutionary eventsthat
usheredin themodernworld.None,however, is revolutionaryin
thesensethatwithitor through ita revolutioncametopass.And
onlythefirst in thesensethatitis inflagrant
is revolutionary con-
flictwiththewholeofourtradition ofpoliticalthought. Thisfirst
statement enough,the one least sus-
is also, characteristically
pectedof"revolutionary tendencies" in thesubversive meaningof
the term,and therefore moredifficult to understandthanthe
others.The one decisivedifference ofourownworldfromall pre-
viousages,the dignification of labor,has alreadyacquiredthe
doubtful statusofa commonplace, and thisin littlemorethana
century. Marx'spropheciesmay have been wrongin almostall
respects,althoughhe certainly did noterrmorethanis thecom-
mon lot of socialscientists.Butin thisone respect - in his con-
victionthatthefuturebelongsto man as a laboringanimal,to
those,thatis,whohavenothingbuttheirlaboringcapacity, whom
he calledtheproletariat - he wasso rightthatwe,eventoday, are
hardlyawareof it.The pointis notwhethertheclassicalecono-

mists,whom Marx in his economic theoriesfollowedclosely

despiteall ofhiscriticisms, wererightin maintaining thatlaboris
the sourceof all wealth,but ratherthatwe livein a societyof
laborers.That is,we livein a societyin whichmen considerall
theiractivities primarilyas laboringactivities, in the sense that
theirend is "thepreservation of individuallife,"and themselves
primarilyas ownersoflaborforce.Itisin thissensethatthosewho
manifestly do not labor,who do not earn theirlivingthrough
labor,are in a societyoflaborers judged to be parasites.
Becauselaborhas lostone ofitschiefcharacteristics, apparent
notonlyinall traditional definitions ofthewordbutalsoin itsety-
mologicaloriginin nearlyeverylanguage,thisbasicconditionof
modernlifeis frequently neglected.Labor has indeed become
justas childbirth
effortless, tendsto becomelessand lesspainful.
The effort oflaborand thepain ofbirth,bothmentionedas the
punishment forman'ssinin thethirdchapterofthefirst bookof
theBible,belongedtogether becausebothexpressedthefactthat
manwassubjectto thecompulsionof necessity forhisverylife.
Laborand itseffort wererequiredformaintaining and preserving
individual life,justas birthand itspainwereunavoidableforthe
reproduction of the species.Effort and pain werenotjust the
symptoms, but the modiin which the basicnecessity inherentin
thehumanconditionmade itselffeltand revealeditself.Labor,
namelythatactivity thatis both requiredfor,and inherentin,
beingalive,does notlose itscharacterof compulsionbecauseit
has becomeeasier,althoughit is truethatit is moredifficult to
perceivecoercive necessityin the guiseof ease than in the harsh
of
brutality pain and effort.
What Marx foresawwas that the IndustrialRevolutionwas
bound to "enlargethe realmof naturalnecessity," thatis, the
realmof labor,despiteall technicaldevelopments thattend to
makelaboreffortless. This enlargement is closelybound to the
giganticmultiplication ofneeds,thefulfillment ofwhichis feltto
belong to the necessities oflife,and the most immediate and tan-
gibleresultofwhichhasbeen thatthe"figure ofthelaborer"has

312 SOCIAL RESEARCH
indeedbecomethecentralfigureofoursociety. In thissociety
the
old verse"Whodoes notlaborshallnoteat"has assumeda direct
relevancethatstandsin oppositionto all otherperiodsofhuman
history.The socialrevolution ofourtimeis containedin thesim-
ple factthatuntilnotmuchmorethan100yearsago,merelabor-
ershad been deniedpoliticalrights, whereastodayweacceptas a
matter ofcoursetheopinionthata nonlaborer maynotevenhave
therightto stayalive.
Marx'sown hope, nourishedby his beliefin the dialectical
structureof everything thathappens,was thatsomehowthis
absoluteruleofnecessity wouldresultin,or resolveitselfinto,an
equallyabsoluteruleoffreedom. Thatis theonlystrictly Utopian
elementin his thought.But it is also theonlyand perhapsdes-
perateconclusionto be drawnfroma traditionthatholds,in
Marx'sown words,thatthe "realmof freedombeginswhere
laboringends."According toMarxitis foolishto thinkitpossible
to liberateand emancipatelaborers,thatis, thosewhosevery
activitysubjectsthemto necessity. Whenall men have become
laborers,the realmof freedomwillindeed havevanished.The
onlythingthatthenremainsis to emancipateman fromlabor,
something thatin all probability as theearly
isjust as impossible
hope ofthephilosophers to freeman's soul fromhisbody.
***
Unavoidably,firstand foremostthe traditionof political

thoughtcontainsthe philosophers'traditional attitudetoward
politics.Politicalthought is
itself older thanour traditionofphi-
losophy, whichbeginswithPlatoand Aristotle, justas philosophy
itselfis olderand containsmorethantheWestern traditioneven-
tuallyaccepted and developed. At thebeginning, therefore,not
of our politicalor philosophicalhistory, but of our traditionof
politicalphilosophy, standsPlato's for
contempt politics, his con-
victionthat"theaffairs and actionsofmen (ta tõnanthrõpõn prag-

mata)are notworthy ofgreatseriousness" and thattheonlyrea-

son whythephilosopherneeds to concernhimself withthemis
theunfortunate factthatphilosophy - or,as Aristotle somewhat
laterwouldsay,a lifedevotedto it,thebiostheôrëtikos - is materi-
allyimpossiblewithouta halfway reasonablearrangement of all
affairsthatconcernmen insofaras theylive together. At the
beginningof the tradition politicsexistsbecause men are alive
and mortal,whilephilosophyconcernsthosemattersthatare
eternal,liketheuniverse. Insofaras thephilosopher is alsoa mor-
talmanhe, too,is concernedwithpolitics.Butthisconcernhas
onlya negativerelationship to his being a philosopher:he is
afraid,as Platoso abundantly madeclear,thatthrough bad man-
agementofpoliticalaffairs he willnotbe able to pursuephiloso-
phy.Scholë, like the Latin otium,is not leisureas such but only
leisurefrompoliticalduty, nonparticipation in politics, and there-
forethefreedomofthemindforitsconcernwiththeeternal(the
aeion), whichis possibleonlyiftheneedsand necessities ofmor-
tallifehavebeen takencareof.Politics,therefore, seenfromthe
specificallyphilosophicalviewpoint, beginsalreadyin Plato to
comprehendmorethanpoliteuesthai, morethanthoseactivities
thatare characteristic of theancientGreekpolis,forwhichthe
merefulfillment of theneeds and necessities of lifewerea pre-
politicalcondition.Politicsbegins,as itwere,to expanditsrealm
downwardto the necessitiesof life themselves, so thatto the
philosophers' scorn for the perishable affairs of mortalswas
added thespecifically Greekcontempt foreverything thatis nec-
essaryfor mere lifeand survival.
As Cicero, in hisfutile attempt to
disavowGreekphilosophy -
on thisone point itsattitudeto poli-
-
tics succinctly pointedout,if only"all thatis essentialto our
wantsand comforts weresuppliedbysomemagicwand,as in the
legends,theneveryman offirst-rate abilitycould dropall other
responsibilityand devote himself exclusively to knowledgeand
science."In brief, whenthephilosophers begantoconcernthem-
selveswithpoliticsin a systematic way,politicsat once becamefor
thema necessary evil.

314 SOCIAL RESEARCH
Thusour tradition ofpoliticalphilosophy, unhappily and fate-

fully,and fromitsverybeginning, has deprivedpoliticalaffairs,
thatis,thoseactivities concerning commonpublicrealmthat
the
comeintobeingwherever menlivetogether, ofall dignity oftheir
own.In Aristotelian terms, politicsis a meanstoan end;ithas no
end in and byitself. Morethanthat,theproperend ofpoliticsis
in a wayitsopposite,namely, nonparticipation in politicalaffairs,
scholê,the condition of philosophy, or rather the conditionof a
lifedevotedto it. In otherwords,no otheractivity appearsas
antiphilosophical, as hostileto philosophy, as politicalactivityin
general and actionin with
particular, the exception, course,of
of
whatwasneverdeemedtobe strictly humanactivity at all,suchas
merelaboring.Spinozapolishing lenseseventually couldbecome
thesymbolic figureof the philosopher, justas innumerable exam-
plestakenfromtheexperiencesofwork,craftsmanship, and the
liberalartssincethetimeofPlatocouldserveto lead byanalogy
to thehigherknowledge ofphilosophictruths. ButsinceSocrates
no manofaction,thatis,no one whoseoriginalexperiencewas
political,as forinstanceCicero'swas,couldeverhope tobe taken
seriously bythephilosophers; and no specifically politicaldeeds,
or humangreatnessas expressedin action,could everhope to
serveas examplesin philosophy, in spiteof theneverforgotten
gloryof Homer's praise of the hero. Philosophyis farther
removedfrompraxiseventhanitis frompoiesis.
Of perhapsevengreaterconsequenceforthe degradationof
politicsis thatin the lightof philosophy - forwhichthe origin
and principle, thearche,are one and thesame- politicsdoes not
evenhavean originofitsown:itcameintobeingonlybecauseof
theelementary factofbiologicalnecessity,
and pre-political which
makesmenneed each otherin thearduoustaskofstaying alive.
Politics,in otherwords,is derivative in a twofold sense:it has its
origin in the data
pre-political of biologicallife, ithas itsend
and
in the postpolitical, highestpossibility of humandestiny. And
sinceitis thecurse,as wehaveseen,ofpre-political necessities to
requirelaboring, we maynowsaythatpoliticsis limitedbylabor

frombelowand by philosophy fromabove. Both are excluded

frompoliticsstrictly speaking,theone as itslowlyoriginand the
otheras itsexaltedaimand end.Verymuchliketheactivity ofthe
classofguardiansin Plato'sRepublic, politicsis supposedtowatch
and managethelivelihoodand thebase necessities of laboron
theone hand,and to takeitsordersfromtheapoliticalthebria of
philosophy on theother.Plato'sdemandfora philosopher-king
does notmean thatphilosophy itselfshould,or everevencould
be realizedin an idealpolity, butratherthatrulerswhovaluephi-
losophymorethananyotheractivity shouldbe permitted to rule
in sucha waythattheremaybe philosophy, thatphilosophers will
havescholë, and be undisturbed bythosematters thatarisefrom
ourlivingtogether and that,in turn,havetheirultimate originin
theimperfections ofhumanlife.
Politicalphilosophyneverrecoveredfromthisblowdealt by
philosophy to politicsat theverybeginningofourtradition. The
contemptforpolitics,the convictionthatpoliticalactivity is a
necessary evil,due partlyto thenecessities oflifethatforcemen
to liveas laborersor ruleoverslaveswhoprovideforthem,and
partlyto theevilsthatcomefromlivingtogether thatis,to
itself,
the factthatthe multitude, whomthe Greekscalled hoipolloi,
threatensthe existenceof everysingleperson,runslike a red
threadthroughout the centuriesthatseparatePlato fromthe
modernage. In thiscontextit is irrelevant whetherthisattitude
expresses itselfin secular terms, as in Plato and Aristotle,or ifit
does so in the termsof Christianity. It was Tertullianwho first
held that,insofaras we are Christians, nullaresnobismagisaliena
quantrespublica("tous nothingis morealienthanpublicaffairs")
and nevertheless stillinsistedon the necessity of the civitaster-
rena,of seculargovernment, because of man's sinfulness and
because, as Lutherwas to put it much later,true Christians
wohnen fernvoneinander, thatis,dwellfarfromeach otherand are
as forlornamong the multitudeas were the ancientphiloso-
phers.Whatis important is thatthesame notionwas takenup,
again in secularterms,bypost-Christian philosophy, as it were

316 SOCIAL RESEARCH
surviving all otherchangesand radicalturnings about,express-

ing itself
now in themelancholyreflectionof Madison, thatgov-
is
ernmentsurely nothing but a reflectionon human nature,
whichwouldnot be necessaryif men wereangels,now in the
angrywordsofNietzsche, thatno government can be good about
whichthesubjectshavetoworry at all.Withrespectto theevalu-
ationofpolitics,thoughin no other,it is irrelevant whetherthe
civitasDei givesmeaningand order to the civitasterrrena, or
whetherthebiostheorëtikos prescribesitsrulesand is theultimate
end of the biospolitikos.
Whatmatters, in additionto theinherentdegradationof this
wholerealmoflifethroughphilosophy, is theradicalseparation
ofthosematters thatmencan reachand attainonlythroughliv-
ing and actingtogether fromthosethatare perceivedand cared
aboutbymanin hissingularity and solitude.And hereagain,it
does notmatterifmanin hissolitudesearchesfortruth, finally
attainingit in thespeechlesscontemplation of theidea ofideas,
or whether he caresforthesalvationofhissoul.Whatmatters is
theunbridgeable abyssthatopened and has never been closed,
not betweenthe so-calledindividualand the so-calledcommu-
nity(whichis the latestand most phonywayof statingthe
authenticand old problem), butbetweenbeingin solitudeand
livingtogether. Comparedto thisperplexity, theequallyold and
vexingproblemof the relationship, or rathernonrelationship,
betweenactionand thought,is secondaryin importance.Nei-
thertheradicalseparationbetweenpoliticsand contemplation,
betweenlivingtogetherand livingin solitudeas twodistinct
modesoflife,northeirhierarchical structure,waseverdoubted
afterPlatohad established both.Here again the onlyexception
is Cicero who, out of his greatRoman politicalexperience,
doubtedthevalidity ofthesuperiority of thebiostheorëtikosover
the biospolitikos,the validityof solitudeover the communitas.
Rightly butfutilely Ciceroobjectedthathe whowas devotedto
"knowledge and science"wouldfleehis "solitudeand ask fora
companionin hisstudy, be itin orderto teachor to learn,to lis-

ten or to speak."Here as elsewherethe Romanspaid a steep

pricefortheircontemptof philosophy, whichtheyheld to be
"impractical." The end resultwas the undisputedvictoryof
Greekphilosophyand the loss of Roman experienceforocci-
dentalpoliticalthought.Cicero,because he was not a philoso-
pher,wasunableto challengephilosophy.
The questionwhetherMarx,who at the end of the tradition
challengeditsformidable unanimity about the properrelation-
shipbetweenphilosophy and politics,was a philosopherin the
traditional sense or even in any authenticsense,need not be
decided.The twodecisivestatements thatsumup abruptly and,as
it were,inarticulately -
his thoughton thematter "The philoso-
phershaveonlyinterpreted theworld.. .thepoint,however, is to
change it,"and "You cannot supersede{aufheben in the Hegelian
triplesense of conserve, raise to a higher level,and abolish) phi-
losophywithoutrealizingit"- are so intimately phrased in
Hegel's terminology and thoughtalong his linesthat,takenby
themselves, theirexplosivecontentnotwithstanding, theycan
almostbe regardedas an informal and naturalcontinuation of
Hegel'sphilosophy. Fornobodycouldhavethought beforeHegel
thatphilosophy is interpretation (of theworldor anything else)
or thatphilosophy couldbe realizedexceptin thebiostheõrêtikos,
thelifeofthephilosopher himself. Whatis to be realized,more-
over,is not anyspecific or new philosophy, notthephilosophy, for
instance,ofMarxhimself, butthehighestdestiny ofmanas tra-
ditionalphilosophy, culminating in Hegel,definedit.
Marxdoes notchallengephilosophy, he challengesthealleged
impracticalityofphilosophy. He challengesthephilosophers' res-
ignation to do no more than find a place for in
themselves the
world,insteadofchangingtheworldand makingit "philosophi-
cal."And thisis notonlymorethanbutalso decisively different
fromPlato's ideal of philosopherswho should rule as kings,
becauseitimpliesnottheruleofphilosophy overmenbutthatall
men, as it were, become philosophers. The consequencethat
Marx drewfromHegel's philosophyof history(and Hegel's

318 SOCIAL RESEARCH
work,includingtheLogik,has onlythisone
entirephilosophical
wasthataction,contrary
topic:history) to thephilosophical tradi-
of
tion,wasso farfrombeingtheopposite thought thatitwasits
true,namelyreal vehicle,and thatpolitics,farfrombeinginfi-
beneaththedignity
nitely ofphilosophy,wastheonlyactivity that
wasinherentlyphilosophical.
Notes
1Arendtrefers in
as reflected
toPlato'slegendaryvoyagestoSyracuse,
theperhapsauthentic Ed.
Seventhand EighthEpistles.
1279bll-1280a3.Ed.
^Politics
3Itisworthquotingin fullthesentencefromHegel's"Preface" to his
PhilosophyofRight in which thisfamous image appears: "Wenn die
Philosophie ihrGrau in Graumalt,dann isteine Gestalt
des Lebens alt
geworden, und mitGrauin Graulässtsie sichnichtverjüngen, sondern
nurerkennen;die Eule der Minervabeginnterstmitder einbrechen-
den Dämmerung ihrenFlug."Ed.
4 Theseson
Feuerbach,XI. Ed.
5InArendt'sDenktagebuch (forthcoming fromPiperVerlag)of 1953
there occurs the followingentry: "Burckhardt (Grieschische Kul-
I, 355-56),machtaufmerksam,
turgeschichte dassdie griechischen Götter
keinerDienerschaft bedurften: nur die MenschenbrauchenSklaven;
die Götterwarenfreivonirdischer Notdurft, wennauch demSchicksal
unterworfen. DieseFreiheit hängtmit ihrer Unsterblichkeit zusammen?
Jedenfalls sind die griechischen Götter gekennzeichnet durch das
'leichte'leben, ihr Dasein ist This
mühelos." trainof thoughtrecursin
one oftheepigraphs thatArendtselected in 1975for herbookonJudg-
ing whichshe did not liveto write.Late in the secondpartof Faust
Goethewrotethatifone couldgiveup magicand standbeforenature
onlyas a man,thenthepain,toil,and laborofbeinghumanwouldbe
worthwhile: "Da war'sderMühewertein Menschzu sein."Ed.
6Elsewhere in thesemanuscripts ArendtmakesthepointthatMarx
wasthefirstto viewpoliticalhistory as "madebymenas laboringani-
mals.. . . Then it mustbe possible makehistory
to in the processof
labor,ofproductivity, tomakehistory as wemakethings. . . . Marx'sthe-
oryof history sees its decisivemovement in the development of the
forcesofproduction, and theforcesofproduction are ultimately based
Ed.
on labor as a force."

7In Stateand Revolution,

Lenin wrotethat"people will gradually
becomeaccustomedto theobservance oftheelementary rulesofsocial
lifethathavebeen repeatedforthousandsofyears"(quotedbyArendt
in the firstedition of TheOriginsofTotalitarianism)
. Ed.


ARENDT, Hannah. Karl Marx and The Tradition of Western Political Thought

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Karl Marx and the Tradition of Western Political Thought

Author(s): HANNAH ARENDT

This content downloaded from 188.72.127.114 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 17:22:46 PM

The followingexcerpts fromHannah Arendt's manuscriptson Karl

The BrokenThreadof Tradition

At has neverbeen easyto thinkand writeaboutKarlMarx.His

SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 69, No. 2 (Summer2002)

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risen,spreadingfromstrict Marxism, whichalreadybythe1920s

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jectingpoliticalactionto thestrict tenetsofphilosophicthought

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hardlybe moreemphatically statedthanbybasingtwodistinct

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touchesthetradition ofWestern thought; thustheconservativism

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theconsequencesofhisteaching,is therefore somehowdanger-

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values,butthatall men,independent ofclassorigin,weresooner

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This content downloaded from 188.72.127.114 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 17:22:46 PM

tionalthought.These unprecedentedinstitutions and policies

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linkforus backintothetradition, becausehe himself wasmore

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surviving class,representing humanity as a whole,would ulti-

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labor, as distinguished fromall other human activities, has

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securingboththeneedsand theluxuriesof life,startswithand

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suchitwasbasedon ruleoverslaves,butwasitself notdividedinto

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thatcompulsionwe naturallyand originallysufferunder the

Attheotherend ofthispositionand,as itmustappearat first

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quintessential formone ofthedecisiveeventswithwhichourown

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mondenominator: ownership oflaborforce.Marxdrewthecon-

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development of man'sproductive forceswilleventually lead to

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and showsits trueface.) Here again Marxturnedat leastone

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labor,politically thiswas an onslaughton freedom,because it

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agreement or opposition, sprangfromand formulated theprin-

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solutiondoes notreallyworkifone, following Marx,definesthe

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ing,nowbecametwodistinct characteristics,to havereasonand

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hima form,notoffreedom, butofarbitrary compulsionthrough

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shed theirimmortallight.The greatand conflicting Roman expe-

We have alreadyindicatedone of the reasonswhyMarx's con-

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Neverbeforeour own timeshas equalitymeantin termsof

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complainedthatnone of hisjudges wereentitledtojudge him,

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versalequalitywillhave razed all politicalboundariesbetween