See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/220520992

Power Asymmetry and Learning in Teams: The Moderating Role of Performance

Feedback

Article  in  Organization Science · April 2010

DOI: 10.1287/orsc.1090.0452 · Source: DBLP

CITATIONS READS
129 1,035

4 authors:

Gerben van der Vegt Simon Barend De Jong

University of Groningen Maastricht University
81 PUBLICATIONS   5,465 CITATIONS    37 PUBLICATIONS   1,415 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

J. Stuart. Bunderson Eric Molleman

Washington University in St. Louis University of Groningen
14 PUBLICATIONS   2,919 CITATIONS    93 PUBLICATIONS   3,349 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Multiple team membership View project

Healthcare professionals motivation and quality of care - a systematic review View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Eric Molleman on 23 July 2014.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Organization Science informs ®

Vol. 21, No. 2, March–April 2010, pp. 347–361 doi 10.1287/orsc.1090.0452

issn 1047-7039
eissn 1526-5455
10
2102
0347 © 2010 INFORMS

Power Asymmetry and Learning in Teams:

The Moderating Role of Performance Feedback

Gerben S. Van der Vegt, Simon B. de Jong

Department of Human Resource Management and Organizational Behavior, University of Groningen, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands
{g.s.van.der.vegt@rug.nl, sdejong@deloitte.nl}

J. Stuart Bunderson
John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri 63130,
bunderson@wustl.edu
Eric Molleman
Department of Human Resource Management and Organizational Behavior, University of Groningen, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands,
h.b.m.molleman@rug.nl

P ast research suggests that power asymmetry within teams can have a stifling effect on team learning and performance.
We argue here that this effect is contingent on whether power advantages within a team are used to advance individual
or collective interests. This study considers the moderating role of one factor that can influence the individual or collective
orientation of team members—the type of performance feedback that a team receives. We propose that whereas individ-
ual feedback reinforces the negative effects of power asymmetry on team learning, group feedback fosters a collective
orientation within a team that transforms power differences into a stimulus for team learning. Analysis of multisource,
multimethod data obtained from 218 individuals in 46 teams provided support for these hypotheses. Results also suggested
that team learning mediated the relationship between power asymmetry and team performance. These findings suggest that
power asymmetry can be a resource for and not just an obstacle to team learning in power-asymmetric teams.
Key words: power asymmetry; learning; teams; performance feedback; task dependence; field study
History: Published online in Articles in Advance July 2, 2009.

A growing body of research evidence in the organi-
zation and management literatures suggests that work
teams can differ considerably in the extent to which
they pursue activities related to learning and continu-
ous improvement and that these differences have impor-
tant implications for team performance (Bunderson and
Sutcliffe 2002, 2003; Edmondson 1999, 2002; Gibson
and Vermeulen 2003; Schippers et al. 2003; Van der
Vegt and Bunderson 2005; see also Argote et al. 2001).
In today’s market environment, where a firm’s success
is contingent on its ability to improve and adapt more
quickly than its competitors, teams with the capacity to
continually improve processes and approaches to operate
more quickly, efficiently, and intelligently have become
a critical competitive advantage. Understanding the fac-
tors that promote or inhibit these interactive learning
processes within teams has therefore become an impor-
tant research agenda for management scholars (Argote
1999, Edmondson 1999).
One key factor that may be important for team
learning is the configuration of power within a team.
A number of researchers have suggested that power dif-
ferences within a team may stifle team learning behav-
iors. For example, Brooks (1994) found that group
347
reflection and process improvement did not occur when
even one team member had significant power over oth-
ers. Similarly, Edmondson (2002) conducted a qual-
itative study of learning behavior in 12 teams and
found that power differences were negatively associ-
ated with team learning. Other research has suggested
that in teams where there is stratification or inequal-
ity in power relations, team members do not learn from
member differences (Bunderson 2003a, 2003b; Pitcher
and Smith 2001). And Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988)
found that power inequality heightens intragroup politics
and undermines team self-improvement. Together, these
studies suggest that power differences can significantly
interfere with team learning and that real learning may
only occur in teams where members have equal levels
of power.
This conclusion is problematic for a number of rea-
sons. First, power differences exist in virtually all teams.
In classic formulations, power is defined as a function of
dependence (Emerson 1962). A has power over B (i.e.,
dyadic asymmetry in power exists) when B is depen-
dent on A for valued or needed resources (physical, emo-
tional, informational) (Blau 1964). In work teams, where
multiple individuals coordinate differentiated efforts to

348
complete some task, resource dependence among group
members is simply a fact of life. Furthermore, although
there may be cases where the power-dependence rela-
tions that exist between task group members will balance
out (i.e., A’s dependence on B is balanced by B’s depen-
dence on A such that neither has a power advantage), it
is unreasonable to assume that perfect balance among all
group members will be the normal or even a common
state of affairs. In most teams, asymmetries in power-
dependence relations will exist because of differences
in the formal or informal resources controlled by team
members as a function of different roles, tenures, or nat-
ural endowments (e.g., intelligence or charisma; Ragins
and Sundstrom 1989).
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that power
differences do not inevitably stifle team learning and
that they may even play a facilitating role. For exam-
ple, Edmondson (2002) found that the effect of power
differences on team learning depended on how these
differences were handled and, specifically, on whether
high-power members adopted a participative approach
(see also Nembhard and Edmondson 2006). Van der
Vegt et al. (2006) also found that teams varied in the
extent to which high-power members helped lower-
power members and that these differences were associ-
ated with performance. Work by Larson and colleagues
(1998) suggests that high-power members can play a key
role in encouraging the discussion of unique member
information.
We therefore suggest that a negative main effects
model of the relationship between power differences and
team learning may be too simplistic and that the time
has come to articulate and investigate moderating factors
(Chen et al. 2001), i.e., factors that mitigate the nega-
tive effects of power differences or that transform power
differences into a resource for learning within teams.
This paper considers one such factor—the type of per-
formance feedback a team receives.
Performance feedback plays a critical role in virtu-
ally all theories of experiential learning (e.g., Ilgen et al.
1979, Nadler 1979) because it provides the mechanism
by which an actor assesses the efficacy of past efforts
and identifies areas of needed improvement (Vroom
1964). Moreover, past research has suggested that the
type of feedback a group receives and, more specif-
ically, whether a group receives feedback about indi-
vidual and/or group performance, can affect a group’s
orientation toward individual or collective improvement
(Hinsz et al. 1997). Building on this literature, we pro-
pose that performance feedback may influence the rela-
tionship between power asymmetry and team learn-
ing by influencing whether team members are oriented
toward individual or collective goals. More specifically,
we will suggest that whereas individual performance
feedback reinforces the negative effects of power dif-
ferences, feedback on group performance transforms
Van der Vegt et al.: Power Asymmetry and Learning in Teams
Organization Science 21(2), pp. 347–361, © 2010 INFORMS
power differences into an asset for both team learning
and performance improvement. We tested hypotheses
based on these general propositions in a sample of 218
employees from 46 work teams. Our results underscore
the importance of a collective orientation for a team’s
ability to leverage member differences for team learn-
ing and improvement (as suggested by Van der Vegt and
Bunderson 2005).
Theory and Hypotheses
Power Asymmetry and Team Learning
We conceptualize team learning in this paper using a
group process lens (Edmondson et al. 2007). That is,
we define team learning as “activities by which team
members seek to acquire, share, refine, or combine
task-relevant knowledge through interaction with one
another” (Van der Vegt and Bunderson 2005, p. 534).
Examples of team learning behaviors include experi-
menting with new approaches or ideas, reflecting on
past actions and action-outcome relationships, seek-
ing different perspectives, and evaluating alternatives
(e.g., Edmondson 1999, 2002; Gibson and Vermeulen
2003; Schippers et al. 2007; West 1996). These team
learning behaviors are a specific class of “interaction
processes” in teams— processes involving interactions
between team members that play a key role in transform-
ing input factors into performance outcomes (Hackman
and Morris 1975). We therefore view team learning
as conceptually distinct from the outcomes that might
result from an engagement in learning-related activi-
ties, outcomes such as more adaptive decisions and
actions, improved performance, or, perhaps in some
cases, decreased efficiency resulting from a misallo-
cation of effort (see Bunderson and Sutcliffe 2003).
Past research has confirmed that team learning behav-
iors are distinct from other team interaction processes
(Drach-Zahavy and Somech 2001) and that variance in
this specific interaction process across teams explains
unique variance in team innovation and improvement
(Drach-Zahavy and Somech 2001, Edmondson 1999,
Van der Vegt and Bunderson 2005).
We conceptualize power asymmetry within a team
as imbalance in the dyadic power-dependence relations
between and among group members as they perform
their separate but interdependent tasks. So a given dyadic
task relation between two members is power-imbalanced
when member A depends more on member B than B
depends on A for resources (e.g., information, exper-
tise, materials) needed to perform his or her work (see
Emerson 1962, Blau 1964). The overall level of power
asymmetry within a team is a simple additive function
of these dyadic power-dependence imbalances. Power
asymmetry is therefore distinct from the construct of
power centralization. Although it is true that a team in
Van der Vegt et al.: Power Asymmetry and Learning in Teams
Organization Science 21(2), pp. 347–361, © 2010 INFORMS
which power is centralized will have at least some asym-
metric power relations, a team with asymmetric power
relations need not be at all centralized (e.g., each mem-
ber may be powerful in some relations but dependent in
others). Moreover, whereas power asymmetry will often
result from member differences in knowledge, skill, and
experience (i.e., “expertise diversity”; Van der Vegt and
Bunderson 2005), expertise diversity does not always
lead to power asymmetry, because members may be
expert in complementary domains, resulting in balanced
power relations.
Past research suggests several compelling reasons why
we might expect power asymmetry to dampen team
learning efforts. Lower-power members may be con-
cerned about negative evaluations from those on whom
they depend for resources and may therefore become
tentative and inhibited in offering opinions and sharing
information (see Ridgeway 2001, Keltner et al. 2003). At
the same time, higher-power members may simply pay
less attention to lower-power members (Kipnis 1972,
Fiske 1993, de Jong et al. 2007) or may be unwill-
ing to acknowledge any dependence on the insights or
knowledge of lower-power members because they fear
that doing so will undermine their privileged power rela-
tion (Lee 1997). These well-documented reactions to
dyadic power differences would all seem to work against
the goal of open dialogue among group members about
how to improve processes and better coordinate member
efforts.
In contrast, we would argue that there are also
good reasons to expect that power asymmetry may not
always dampen team learning and that it can, in fact,
stimulate learning behaviors. Research by Chen et al.
(2001) suggests that although exchange-oriented individ-
uals may respond to power advantages in self-serving
ways and therefore reinforce the negative effects just
described, individuals with a communal orientation actu-
ally respond to power advantages by attending more
carefully to the needs and interests of dependent oth-
ers. They explain this effect by suggesting that the
effect of power on interpersonal behavior is contin-
gent on whether an individual associates power with
self- or other-interested goals. Those who associate
power with other-interested goals respond to power by
assuming greater responsibility for the needs and wel-
fare of dependent others; those who associate power
with self-interested goals respond by treating others in
instrumental ways (which often means ignoring them,
because they have little perceived instrumental value).
This argument is reminiscent of work by McClelland
(1975), who first distinguished between the personalized
(self-interested, uninhibited) versus socialized (other-
interested, restrained) exercise of power.
We would suggest that when power advantages are
leveraged in other-interested ways, power asymmetry
within a group can become a powerful stimulus for
349
learning behavior. Specifically, we suggest that power-
advantaged members who adopt a collective and devel-
opmental orientation in their interactions with dependent
others are able to focus attention, stimulate reflec-
tion, and encourage information exchange in ways that
do not occur as naturally or easily in situations of
balanced power. This argument is supported by past
research examining the effects of power on groups and
dyads. For example, research by Larson and colleagues
(e.g., Larson et al. 1998) suggests that power-advantaged
group members who adopt a participative (i.e., other-
oriented) style encourage more open discussion and
integration of both shared and unshared information
during group discussion than would otherwise occur.
This is consistent with recent research by Nembhard and
Edmondson (2006), who found that higher-power group
members can prompt learning by inviting and showing
appreciation for the input of others. Developmental feed-
back and questions from power-advantaged members are
also more likely to focus attention or stimulate reflec-
tion among dependent members, because individuals are
more attentive and committed to those on whom they are
dependent for valued resources (Rusbult and Van Lange
2003, Wieselquist et al. 1999). Moreover, past research
suggests that member differences within a group can
stimulate learning as different perspectives and prefer-
ences interact and recombine (Bantel and Jackson 1989,
Milliken and Martins 1996, Van der Vegt and Bunderson
2005). Power asymmetry signals substantive differences
between members on dimensions that are truly salient
to group members, because these differences affect both
task performance and social standing within the group.
These very differences could, therefore, be a stimulus
for learning if, once again, team members with a power
advantage help create an environment in which those
differences are not seen in threatening ways.
In other words, power asymmetry within teams can
either stifle or stimulate team learning, depending on
how members respond to intra-team power differences—
particularly when they find themselves in positions of
higher power. If members leverage power advantages
to advance and defend their own interests and status
(an individualistic response pattern), power asymmetry
is likely to stifle team learning. But if members leverage
power advantages to invite reflection and the expression
and integration of insights from all members (a collec-
tivistic response pattern), power asymmetry may actually
stimulate team learning. This conclusion is consistent
with Blau’s (1964) analysis of why a power-advantaged
(i.e., more knowledgeable) member would choose to
share knowledge with a more dependent colleague. Blau
argued that this choice will be based on the slope of
the power-advantaged member’s indifference curve, i.e,
her marginal rate of substitution of the rewards associ-
ated with assisting by the rewards associated with pur-
suing her own interests. And this slope, Blau continues,

350
is determined by “the degree to which [she] is oriented
to colleagues as a reference group [i.e., a collectivistic
orientation] rather than to [her] instrumental tasks and
to the superiors who evaluate [her] performance [i.e., an
individualistic orientation]” (Blau 1964, p. 173).
But what factors might influence whether a team mem-
ber adopts an individualistic or collectivistic response to
power differences? The next section explores one possi-
ble factor that figures prominently in theories of experi-
ential learning—the nature of the feedback that members
receive about their performance.
The Moderating Effects of Performance Feedback
Feedback can be defined as information about the effects
of one’s actions or efforts on some criterion of inter-
est (see Herold and Greller 1977, Taylor et al. 1984).
In its original cybernetic formulation (Wiener 1948),
the concept of feedback was used to describe the pro-
cess by which systems (human or machine) self-regulate.
Feedback about system performance allows a system to
reflect, adapt, and self-correct until desired performance
standards are achieved. Feedback scholars have referred
to this function of feedback as a “cueing” function (see
Nadler 1979, Vroom 1964). In human systems, feedback
also serves a “motivational” function by reinforcing the
promise of a reward and by reinforcing behavior-reward
instrumentalities (Annett 1969; Ilgen et al. 1979, p. 361;
Vroom 1964). Given these key functions, feedback has
long played a central role in theories of learning, con-
tinuous improvement, and performance achievement.
Although different types of feedback can be distin-
guished (Nadler 1979), for the purpose of this study
we focus on the important distinction between feed-
back that provides information about the performance
of individuals within a group (individual feedback) and
feedback that provides information about the perfor-
mance of a group as a whole (group feedback) (see
Barr and Conlon 1994, Nadler 1979, Hinsz et al. 1997,
DeShon et al. 2004). Consider a group of salespeople
in which each team member covers a different district
within a broader region. In managing and motivating
these team members, team leaders might choose to pro-
vide (a) feedback to each salesperson about his or her
sales for the year (individual feedback),1 (b) feedback
to the entire team about its aggregate sales (group feed-
back), or (c) both forms of feedback. Several studies
have examined the independent and combined effects
of individual and group feedback on performance in
groups. Although findings from these studies have been
inconsistent, some important patterns have emerged. For
example, DeShon et al. (2004) found that the effects of
feedback on effort and performance were homologous
across group and individual levels such that group or
individual feedback increased attention and effort toward
group or individual goals, which led to higher group or
individual performance.
Van der Vegt et al.: Power Asymmetry and Learning in Teams
Organization Science 21(2), pp. 347–361, © 2010 INFORMS
A possible explanation for the effects of group feed-
back on group attention and effort observed by DeShon
et al. (2004) and others (e.g., Barr and Conlon 1994) can
be found in the work of Hinsz et al. (1997). They suggest
that group feedback “may change the self-attributional
focus from the individual to the group” (p. 53). That is,
when feedback is received at the individual level of anal-
ysis, it directs attention toward the individual as the rele-
vant actor and therefore motivates the individual to think
about things that he or she could do to improve his or her
individual performance. But when feedback is received
at the group level of analysis, attention is directed toward
the group as the relevant actor and the individual as one
piece of that larger collective. As a result, individual
group members are motivated to think about things that
they can do as a group to improve performance, e.g., bet-
ter coordination, greater information sharing, etc. This
argument is consistent with a study by Zander and Wolfe
(1964), in which it was found that group feedback led
to more cooperation and less interpersonal strain within
a group than individual feedback did. This argument is
also consistent with the broader literature on social cat-
egorization, which has suggested that a shared group
identity increases intragroup cooperation and mitigates
intra-group conflict, even when group members are very
different from one another (Brewer and Miller 1984,
Gaertner et al. 1996, Van der Vegt and Bunderson 2005).
In other words, past research on group and individ-
ual performance feedback would suggest that feedback
about group performance promotes a collective improve-
ment orientation within a group (i.e., how are we doing;
what can we do to improve our performance), whereas
individual performance feedback promotes an individ-
ual improvement orientation (i.e., how am I doing; what
can I do to improve my performance). Given our ear-
lier argument, this would imply that members of groups
in which feedback is received about group performance
will be more likely to use their power advantages in
ways designed to help the group improve. Power advan-
tages then become very useful for learning, because
power-advantaged members can direct attention to areas
of needed improvement, invite and encourage the shar-
ing of diverse perspectives, and initiate or facilitate dis-
cussions about how to manage member differences and
interdependencies (Larson et al. 1998, Nembhard and
Edmondson 2006). In contrast, members of groups in
which feedback is received about individual performance
will be more likely to use their power advantages to
leverage or improve their own performance (cf. De Jong
et al. 2007). Power advantages then become an obsta-
cle to reflective learning, as power-advantaged members
focus on improving their own status or resource position,
regardless of how this involves or affects their depen-
dent colleagues—who are likely to respond by becom-
ing more defensive, guarded, and inhibited (Keltner
et al. 2003).
Van der Vegt et al.: Power Asymmetry and Learning in Teams
Organization Science 21(2), pp. 347–361, © 2010 INFORMS
When power asymmetry is low, however, group mem-
bers do not have power advantages with which to either
advance their own interests or assist others. As a result,
we would not expect power-balanced groups that receive
group feedback to necessarily be more engaged learners
than power-balanced groups that receive individual feed-
back. In fact, when power relationships are balanced,
it may be difficult for group members to learn from
feedback about group performance, because there are
no power-advantaged members to feel responsible for
initiating a learning-oriented response. Power-balanced
groups may therefore benefit more from individual feed-
back, because individual feedback at least implies clear
accountability (Goncalo and Duguid 2008).
Together, these arguments suggest that power asym-
metry will be positively related to team learning in
groups that receive group performance feedback but neg-
atively related to team learning in groups that receive
individual performance feedback. Stated formally:
Hypothesis 1. Group performance feedback moder-
ates the relationship between power asymmetry within
a team and team learning; power asymmetry is posi-
tively related to team learning when group performance
feedback is high.
Hypothesis 2. Individual performance feedback mod-
erates the relationship between power asymmetry within
a team and team learning; power asymmetry is nega-
tively related to team learning when individual perfor-
mance feedback is high.
These hypotheses treat individual and group perfor-
mance feedback separately. But what about cases in
which groups receive both individual and group feed-
back? We suggest that the combination of high indi-
vidual and high group feedback creates an ambiguous
feedback situation in which it is not obvious to members
whether power advantages should be used for individ-
ual or collective interests; both goals are equally possi-
ble (see DeShon et al. 2004, Mitchell and Silver 1990,
Saavedra et al. 1993). In such a situation, we would
expect that whether a given member adopts an individu-
alistic or collectivistic response to power advantage will
be influenced by other factors, including, for example,
the stability of power relations or personality differences
(Keltner et al. 2003). It is not our purpose here to the-
orize about how these other variables might affect the
relationship between power asymmetry and team learn-
ing in ambiguous feedback situations. Rather, we sug-
gest only that in cases of ambiguous performance feed-
back, we would not expect to observe any consistent
effects of power asymmetry on team learning and may,
in fact, observe no relationship. We can therefore offer
no hypothesis on this issue.
351
Power Asymmetry, Learning, and
Team Performance
Finally, we would expect that the above effects of power
asymmetry on team learning behavior will have impor-
tant implications for team performance. The argument
for a relationship between team learning behaviors and
team performance rests on the assumption that adap-
tation and continuous improvement are critical perfor-
mance capabilities in all teams, regardless of what they
do or how much innovation is required in their context.
Teams that engage in learning behaviors are more likely
to learn from their mistakes, integrate new information
about their environment, benefit from member expe-
rience, effectively utilize member diversity, and better
coordinate their efforts. Consistent with this reason-
ing, positive relationships between team learning behav-
iors and supervisor ratings of team effectiveness have
been reported in the pharmaceutical and medical prod-
ucts industry (156 teams; Gibson and Vermeulen 2003),
the oil and gas industry (57 teams; Van der Vegt and
Bunderson 2005), and the furniture manufacturing in-
dustry (51 teams; Edmondson 1999). Furthermore,
Bunderson and Sutcliffe (2003) found that learning
behaviors in 44 management teams were significantly
associated with business unit performance (unit prof-
itability), although the relationship was curvilinear
(teams could engage in too much learning behavior) and
moderated by past performance (team learning was more
beneficial for lower-performing teams). On the whole,
these results provide robust support for learning behav-
iors as an important performance capability in teams.
It follows that by influencing team learning, the com-
bination of power asymmetry and different types of per-
formance feedback can have important implications for
team performance. Specifically, we would expect that
power asymmetry will be positively related to team per-
formance when group performance feedback is high and
that this effect will be mediated by team learning behav-
ior. Similarly, we would expect that power asymmetry
will be negatively related to team performance when
individual performance feedback is high and that this
effect will also be mediated by team learning behaviors.
In other words, we would argue that power asymmetry
can have either positive or negative implications for team
performance, depending on the type of feedback that a
group receives; we would also argue that this effect is
caused by the contingent effect of power asymmetry on
team learning under different types of performance feed-
back. Stated formally:
Hypothesis 3. Team learning behavior mediates the
relationship between power asymmetry combined with
group performance feedback and team performance;
power asymmetry is positively related to team perfor-
mance when group feedback is high, because this com-
bination results in higher team learning behavior.

352
Hypothesis 4. Team learning behavior mediates the
relationship between power asymmetry combined with
individual performance feedback and team perfor-
mance; power asymmetry is negatively related to
team performance when individual feedback is high,
because this combination results in lower team learning
behavior.
Method
Sample and Procedure
The above hypotheses are explicitly concerned with
team-level relationships and were therefore tested at the
team level of analysis using data obtained from 268
employees in 46 teams. These teams worked in a vari-
ety of settings, ranging from the banking sector to the
medical sector and consisted of at least three team mem-
bers (M = 5
83, SD = 3
68). In most of these teams
at least some hierarchical differences and/or differences
in degree of specialization between team members were
present. For example, teams from the banking sector
included a product advisor and an assistant; the med-
ical teams consisted of different types of nurses with
different specializations and/or different levels of author-
ity within the team; and the technical, management, and
consultancy teams consisted of both senior team mem-
bers and more junior professionals. We reasoned that
these intrateam differences, which are characteristic of
the types of member differences that exist in many work
teams, should result in considerable power-dependence
asymmetries within these teams.
We approached teams via personal contacts with and
a presentation to managers about the research project
during a postgraduate MBA course. When a manager
agreed to participate, she or he informed the team and
provided the researchers with information including the
names of team members. Two different types of ques-
tionnaires were subsequently sent to the team: a supervi-
sor questionnaire and a team member questionnaire. The
supervisor questionnaire was primarily used to collect
team performance data, whereas the team member ques-
tionnaire was used to collect power asymmetry, feed-
back, and learning data.2 We approached 50 supervisors
and received 46 usable supervisor questionnaires (92%),
and 218 team members (of a possible 268) returned their
questionnaire (81%). Of these respondents, 146 were
female (67%) and the mean age of the respondents was
36.9 years (SD = 10
4). Twenty percent of these respon-
dents had a high school degree, 44% a vocational degree,
29% a bachelor degree, and 7% a master’s degree or
higher. Educational background also varied within our
sample: 31% of the respondents had a degree related
to economics, 21% had a degree related to the medical
field, 12% had a degree related to engineering, and 10%
had a degree related to business. Degrees in other fields
(e.g., law, linguistics, social, or natural sciences) were
held by less than 10% of the sample.
Van der Vegt et al.: Power Asymmetry and Learning in Teams
Organization Science 21(2), pp. 347–361, © 2010 INFORMS
Measures
Power Asymmetry. This variable was measured using
a peer-rating approach. Consistent with our conceptual-
ization of power asymmetry, we used the following two
items to measure the task dependence of a team mem-
ber (A) on another team member (B) based on Van der
Vegt et al. (1998): “How dependent are you on B for
materials, means, information, etc. in order to carry out
your work adequately?” and “How dependent is B on
you for materials, means, information, etc. in order to
carry out his or her work adequately?” (1 = “not depen-
dent,” 7 = “completely dependent”). In all items, B was
replaced by the name of a specific fellow team member
(from the list provided by team supervisors).
Because we measured A’s dependence on B as well
as B’s dependence on A from both their perspectives,
we were able to examine the relationship between A’s
perception of his or her dependence on B and B’s per-
ception of A’s dependence on him or her. This correla-
tion was 0.31 (p < 0
001). The magnitude of this cor-
relation is in line with prior research involving dyads
(e.g., Kenny and Acitelli 2001; see p. 443, Table 3, the
correlations they reported ranged from 0.20 to 0.47).
Additionally, a univariate analysis of variance indicated
that within-dyad variance was significantly smaller than
between-dyad variance (F 1402 1096 = 1
81, p <
0
001). We therefore used the pooled perspectives of A
and B in each relationship to compute our power asym-
metry measure (cf. Borgatti and Everett 1999). More
specifically, we averaged A’s and B’s ratings of A’s
dependence on B to obtain a pooled measure of A’s
dependence on B, and A’s and B’s ratings of B’s depen-
dence on A to obtain a pooled measure of B’s depen-
dence on A. Next, we computed the absolute difference
between A’s dependence on B and B’s dependence on A
for each pair of team members and averaged all these
scores per team member.3 We then averaged these indi-
vidual scores to obtain a team-level power-asymmetry
score. This operationalization of power asymmetry is
summarized in the following formula:

k 
r 
j=1 i=1 
DBAi − DABi
/r j

k
where DBAi is the mean of A’s and B’s perceptions of
the task dependence of B on A in relationship i, DABi
is the mean of A’s and B’s perceptions of A’s depen-
dence on B in relationship i, r is the number of relation-
ships that team member j has in the team, and k is the
number of team members. The amount of power asym-
metry in these teams ranged from 0 to 1.75 (M = 0
60,
SD = 0
42), with higher scores indicating more power
asymmetry between team members.4
Group Performance Feedback. This variable was
measured with three items based on Van der Vegt et al.
Van der Vegt et al.: Power Asymmetry and Learning in Teams
Organization Science 21(2), pp. 347–361, © 2010 INFORMS
(2003): “We receive feedback as a team about the team
performance”; “When we do not perform well, we are
held responsible as a team”; and “We regularly receive
feedback about how good or bad we performed as a
team.” These items were measured on a seven-point
scale (1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree). The group
performance feedback scores ranged from 2.33 to 6.33,
and Cronbach’s alpha for the individual-level responses
was 0.84.
Individual Performance Feedback. This variable was
also measured with three items. We reformulated the
group performance feedback items to reflect a focus on
individual instead of group performance: “I receive indi-
vidual feedback about my own performance”; “When
I do not perform well, I am held responsible as an
individual”; “I regularly receive feedback about how
good or bad I performed.” These items were mea-
sured with a seven-point scale (1 = totally disagree,
7 = totally agree). The individual performance feedback
scores ranged from 2.63 to 6.58, and Cronbach’s alpha
pi2 , to
was 0.86.
Team Learning. This variable was measured with
six items adapted from Schippers et al. (2003). The
Schippers et al. (2003) measure is very similar to other
process measures of group learning (see Edmondson
et al. 2007) and focuses specifically on team interac-
tion processes associated with reflecting on actions and
outcomes—key elements of experiential learning. Spe-
cific items included: “We talk about different ways in
which we can reach our objectives”; “In this team the
results of actions are evaluated”; “If things don’t work
out as planned, we consider what we can do about
it”; “We ask ourselves how effective our procedures for
reacting to changes are”; “We regularly discuss whether
the team is working effectively”; and “The team often
reviews its methods for getting the job done.” These six
items were measured on a seven-point scale (1 = totally
disagree, 7 = totally agree). Cronbach’s alpha was 0.89.
Team Performance. Because we focused on a rather
diverse sample of teams with different tasks and respon-
sibilities, we used a broad measure of team perfor-
mance (Ancona and Caldwell 1992). Specifically, we
asked each supervisor to compare the performance of a
focal team with that of relevant other teams with sim-
ilar tasks and customers. A pilot study revealed that
the following performance criteria were deemed relevant
by supervisors from the different types of work groups:
efficiency, continuity of the production process, use of
capacities, speed with which the team produces, control
over the production process, quality of work, and overall
team performance. Supervisors rated the team’s perfor-
mance using a seven-point scale (1 = far below average,
4 = average, 7 = far above average). Cronbach’s alpha
was 0.90.
353
Control Variables. Given that groups varied in size
and that team size has been shown to relate to team per-
formance in past research (e.g., Ancona and Caldwell
1992), we controlled for team size in all of our analyses.
Team size information was collected using the super-
visor questionnaire. Additionally, past research suggests
that the overall level of task interdependence might
be associated with team processes and performance
(e.g., Wageman 1995). To explicitly consider the possi-
ble effects of task interdependence, we also controlled
for this variable in all analyses. Task interdependence
was measured by computing the mean of A’s pooled
dyadic task dependence on B and B’s pooled dyadic task
dependence on A and averaging these scores within each
team. Finally, we also controlled for expertise diver-
sity in all our analyses, because research has shown
that this variable might be related to team learning and
performance (e.g., Van der Vegt and Bunderson 2005).
We computed expertise diversity using functional back-
ground information provided by respondents in the ques-
tionnaire. We used Blau’s (1977) formula, 1 −
form an aggregate measure of expertise diversity, where
p represented the proportion of employees of a work
team in the ith category. A higher index score indicates
greater expertise diversity among team members.
Discriminant and Convergent Validity. We used con-
firmatory factor analysis to assess the discriminant and
convergent validity of the group feedback, individ-
ual feedback, and team learning scales. We computed
parameter estimates with the LISREL 8.51 computer
package, using the maximum likelihood method. We first
tested a model in which the group and individual feed-
back and team learning items loaded on three corre-
sponding latent constructs. The overall fit of the model
to the data was adequate ( 2 51 218 = 166
65, p <
0
001, the standardized root mean square of the residu-
als [SRMSR] was 0.05, the goodness-of-fit index [GFI]
was 0.89, and the comparative fit index [CFI] was 0.92).
The factor loading of each item was significant at the
0.001 level or better.
To further evaluate the discriminant validity of our
scales, we computed two alternative models. In the first
model, all feedback items loaded on one latent feedback
construct, and the learning items loaded on a separate
learning construct. The fit of this model was significantly
worse than that of the hypothesized measurement model
( 2 2 = 219
87, p < 0
001, SRMSR = 0
07, GFI =
0
77, CFI = 0
82). The second model contained only one
latent variable. Again, the fit of this model was signifi-
cantly worse than that of the original model ( 2 3 =
496
07, p < 0
001, SRMSR = 0
11, GFI = 0
66, CFI =
0
68). Hence, we concluded that the hypothesized three-
factor measurement model was the most appropriate for
the situation under consideration.
A separate confirmatory factor analysis had to be con-
ducted for team performance because the performance

354
ratings were provided by team supervisors. We tested a
model in which all seven team performance items loaded
on a single factor, and the overall fit of this model was
very good ( 2 14 46 = 13
95, n.s.). The fit indices were
all satisfactory: The SRMSR was 0.043, GFI was 0.92,
and CFI was 0.99, and all factor loadings were signifi-
cant at the 0.001 level or better.
Interrater Agreement and Reliability. All our con-
structs are explicitly conceptualized at the team level.
Nevertheless, because individual and group feedback
and team learning were measured from individual
responses, it is important to evaluate the measure-
ment assumption that responses from members of the
same team will converge (see Kozlowski and Klein
2000). This assumption was investigated by calculating
the interrater agreement coefficient (rwg ; James et al.
1984). Median rwg values were 0.69 for group feedback
(mean = 0
70), 0.74 for individual feedback (mean =
0
73), and 0.78 for team learning (mean = 0
76). These
numbers suggest that team members agreed in their rat-
ings of these variables.
In addition, we would expect variation between teams
in the ratings of feedback and team learning, and we
would expect ratings of members from the same team
to be more similar to one another than to the ratings
of these constructs by members of other teams (see
Bliese 2000). These expectations were investigated by
computing the intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC[1]
and ICC[2]; Bliese 2000). One-way analyses of vari-
ance suggested that team member ratings of group and
individual feedback and team learning all differed signif-
icantly (p < 0
01) between teams. The ICC(1) was 0.21
for group feedback and 0.17 for individual feedback
and learning. These figures indicate that a consider-
able amount of the variance in ratings was due to team
membership (Bliese 2000). The reliability of the group
means was examined by calculating the ICC(2) coeffi-
cients. The ICC(2) values were 0.69 for group feedback,
0.63 for individual feedback, and 0.62 for team learn-
ing. Together, these results support the aggregation of
individual team member responses to create team-level
variables for group feedback, individual feedback, and
team learning.
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Zero-Order Correlations Among the Study Variables
Standard
Variable Means deviation
1. Team size 5
83
2. Expertise diversity 0
44
3. Task interdependence 3
73
4. Power asymmetry 0
60
5. Group performance feedback 4
37
6. Individual performance feedback 4
67
7. Team learning 4
61
8. Team performance 4
77
Notes. N = 46 teams. ∼ p < 0
10; ∗ p < 0
05; ∗∗
p < 0
01;
Van der Vegt et al.: Power Asymmetry and Learning in Teams
Organization Science 21(2), pp. 347–361, © 2010 INFORMS
Analyses
We used hierarchical multiple regression analyses to
test our hypotheses. Following the recommendations of
Aiken and West (1991), we standardized all independent
variables and computed interaction effects by taking the
product of the respective standardized independent vari-
ables. We tested four models to isolate the contribution
of different terms. The first model tested the effects of
our control variables. In the second model, the main
effects of power asymmetry and group and individual
feedback were added to the regression model, followed
by the inclusion of the hypothesized two-way interac-
tions between power asymmetry and feedback in the
third model. In the case of our performance-dependent
variable, we also examined a fourth model to test the
mediating effect of team learning.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
The means, standard deviations, and Pearson zero-order
correlations between variables are presented in Table 1.
As can be seen, the correlation between group and indi-
vidual feedback was positive and significant (r = 0
73,
p < 0
001), indicating that these variables share slightly
more than 50% of their variance. While this correla-
tion is below the 0.75 standard for correlated indepen-
dent variables suggested by Miles and Shevlin (2001),
it was high enough to warrant careful examination of
variance inflation factors in all regression models. Team
learning was positively related to both types of feedback
(r = 0
58, p < 0
001 for group feedback and r = 0
62,
p < 0
001 for individual feedback). Finally, perceptions
of team learning were positively associated with super-
visor ratings of team performance (r = 0
40, p < 0
01).
Hypothesis Tests: Team Learning
Regression results for models with team learning as the
dependent variable are summarized in Table 2. There
was some evidence for a positive relationship between
task interdependence and team learning in Model 1,
although the overall effect of the control variables was
not significant. The addition of power asymmetry and
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3
68
0
25 0
30∼
0
93 −0
24 −0
10
0
42 0
06 −0
19 −0
12
0
92 0
02 −0
18 0
31∗ 0
07
0
90 0
10 0
23 0
06 0
12 0
73∗∗∗
0
76 0
13 0
24 0
26∼ 0
00 0
58∗∗∗ 0
62∗∗∗
0
75 0
06 0
02 0
02 0
13 −0
02 0
14 0
40∗∗
∗∗∗
p < 0
001.
Van der Vegt et al.: Power Asymmetry and Learning in Teams
Organization Science 21(2), pp. 347–361, © 2010 INFORMS 355

Table 2 Results of Regression Analysis for Team Learning

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Model Variable B SE B SE B SE VIF

1. Control Team size 0
12 0
12 0
08 0
09 0
04 0
09 1
19
variables Expertise diversity 0
68 0
55 0
55 0
51 0
80 0
51 1
74
Task interdependence 0
24∗ 0
11 0
15 0
10 0
16∼ 0
09 1
30
2. Main Power asymmetry −0
02 0
12 −0
07 0
11 1
15
effects Group performance feedback 0
20 0
16 0
34∗ 0
15 2
41
Individual performance feedback 0
31∗ 0
15 0
17 0
14 2
11
3. Interactions Power asymmetry∗
Group performance feedback 0
51∗∗ 0
17 2
32
Power asymmetry∗
Individual performance feedback −0
49∗∗ 0
17 2
29
2
R 0
14 0
49 0
61
R2 0
14∼ 0
35∗∗∗ 0
12∗

Notes. n = 46 teams. ∼ p < 0
10; ∗ p < 0
05; ∗∗

p < 0
01; ∗∗∗
p < 0
001. B = unstandardized regression coefficient; SE =
standard error.

group and individual feedback in Model 2 significantly (positive or negative), 12% of the observed variance in
increased the explanatory power of the model (R2 = team learning could be accounted for by the contin-
0
35, p < 0
001) with a positive and significant coef- gent effect of power asymmetry, i.e., the effect of power
ficient for individual Feedback; groups that reported asymmetry at different levels of group or individual per-
receiving more individual feedback also reported more formance feedback. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) for
team learning behavior. The coefficients for the inter- the third model were all well below 4, suggesting that
actions between group feedback and power asymmetry multicollinearity was not a problem in these analyses
and between individual feedback and power asymme- (e.g., Langfred 2004, Miles and Shevlin 2001).
try, added in Model 3, were both significant at p < 0
01 We used the unstandardized regression coefficients
(b = 0
51 for group feedback and −0.49 for individual from the final equation to plot the relation between
feedback), and the addition of these two terms signif- power asymmetry and team learning at high (one stan-
icantly increased the explanatory power of the model dard deviation above the mean) and low (one standard
(R2 = 0
12, p < 0
05). These results are consistent deviation below the mean) levels of group and individ-
with Hypotheses 1 and 2 and suggest that whereas ual feedback (see Figures 1(a) and 1(b)). The pattern of
power asymmetry had no direct effect on team learning results depicted in Figures 1(a) and 1(b) is consistent

Figure 1 Power Asymmetry and Team Learning at Different Levels and Types of Feedback

7.0 (a) Group performance feedback 7.0 (b) Individual performance feedback

6.0 6.0

5.0 5.0
Team learning

Team learning

4.0 4.0

3.0 3.0

2.0 2.0

Group performance feedback high Individual performance feedback high

Group performance feedback low Individual performance feedback low
1.0 1.0
Low High Low High
Power asymmetry Power asymmetry
 Van der Vegt et al.: Power Asymmetry and Learning in Teams
356 Organization Science 21(2), pp. 347–361, © 2010 INFORMS

with our hypotheses. Simple slope tests suggested that
power asymmetry was positively associated with team
learning when group feedback was high (b = 0
44, SE =
0
19, p < 0
05) and negatively associated with team
learning when group feedback was low (b = −0
59,
SE = 0
20, p < 0
01), consistent with Hypothesis 1 (see
Figure 1(a)). To put these slopes into perspective, team
learning at high levels of power asymmetry was a full
Likert-scale point higher (which is more than one stan-
dard deviation) when group feedback was high than
when it was low. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, simple
slope tests also suggested that power asymmetry was
negatively related to team learning when individual feed-
back was high (b = −0
56, SE = 0
21, p < 0
05) and
positively related to team learning when individual feed-
back was low (b = 0
42, SE = 0
18, p < 0
05).
Hypothesis Tests: Team Performance
Regression results for models with team performance
as the dependent variable are summarized in Table 3.
None of the control variables was significantly related to
team performance in Model 1, and the addition of power
asymmetry along with both types of feedback in Model 2
did not increase the explanatory power of the model.
The addition of the two interaction terms in Model 3 did
explain significant variance in performance (R2 = 0
15,
p < 0
05), with a positive and significant coefficient for
the group feedback interaction (b = 0
41, p < 0
05) and
a negative and significant coefficient for the individual
feedback interaction (b = −0
62, p < 0
01). So whereas
power asymmetry had no direct effect on performance
(positive or negative), the contingent effect of power
asymmetry at different levels of performance feedback
accounted for fully 15% of the variance in team perfor-
mance. Once again, multicollinearity did not appear to
be a problem, given that VIF scores for the fourth model
were all well below 4.
Simple slope tests suggested that power asymmetry
was positively related to team performance when group
feedback was high (b = 0
44, SE = 0
22, p < 0
05),
but only weakly negatively related to team performance
when group feedback was low (b = −0
38, SE = 0
20,
p < 0
10). Simple slope tests for the interaction between
power asymmetry and individual feedback revealed that
power asymmetry was negatively related to team perfor-
mance when individual feedback was high (b = −0
61,
SE = 0
29, p < 0
05) and positively related to team
performance when individual feedback was low (b =
0
63, SE = 0
24, p < 0
05). These effects are plotted in
Figures 2(a) and 2(b).
Finally, Model 4 allows us to consider the mediated
effects in Hypotheses 3 and 4 by adding team learning
to the regression model. The addition of team learn-
ing to the model resulted in a significant increase in R2
(R2 = 0
13, p < 0
05) with a positive and significant
coefficient for team learning (b = 0
42, p < 0
05). Fur-
thermore, with team learning in the model, the group and
individual feedback interactions became nonsignificant
(b = 0
10, n.s., for power asymmetry X group feedback
and b = −0
35, n.s. for power asymmetry X individ-
ual feedback). These results suggest that team learning
mediated the moderated effects of power asymmetry on
team performance, as suggested in Hypotheses 3 and 4.
Additional Analysis
We argued that the combination of group and individual
performance feedback creates an ambiguous feedback
situation and that we therefore should not observe any
significant relationship between our dependent variables
and either (a) a group by individual performance feed-
back interaction or (b) a group feedback by individual
feedback by power asymmetry interaction. Follow-up
analyses were consistent with this expectation. Specif-
ically, the addition of a group feedback by individ-

Table 3 Results of Regression Analysis for Team Performance

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Model Variable B SE B SE B SE B SE VIF

1. Control Team size 0
05 0
12 0
07 0
12 0
04 0
12 0
02 0
11 1
20
variables Expertise diversity 0
01 0
58 −0
39 0
66 −0
54 0
69 −0
90 0
66 1
86
Task interdependence 0
03 0
12 0
10 0
13 0
12 0
12 0
03 0
12 1
41
2. Main Power asymmetry 0
10 0
15 0
01 0
15 0
05 0
13 1
17
effects Group performance feedback −0
31 0
21 −0
23 0
21 −0
36 0
20 2
86
Individual performance feedback 0
32 0
20 0
21 0
20 0
11 0
19 2
23
3. Interactions Power asymmetry∗
Group performance feedback 0
41∗ 0
21 0
10 0
23 2
62
Power asymmetry∗
Individual performance feedback −0
62∗∗ 0
23 −0
35 0
23 2
82
∗
4. Mediation Team learning 0
42 0
16 2
43
R2 0
01 0
08 0
23 0
36
R2 0
01 0
07 0
15∗ 0
13∗

Notes. n = 46 teams. ∗ p < 0
05; ∗∗

p < 0
01.
Van der Vegt et al.: Power Asymmetry and Learning in Teams
Organization Science 21(2), pp. 347–361, © 2010 INFORMS 357

Figure 2 Power Asymmetry and Team Performance at Different Levels and Types of Feedback
7.0 (a) Group performance feedback 7.0 (b) Individual performance feedback

6.0 6.0
Team performance

Team performance
5.0 5.0

4.0 4.0

3.0 3.0

2.0 2.0
Group performance feedback high Individual performance feedback high
Group performance feedback low Individual performance feedback low
1.0 1.0
Low High Low High
Power asymmetry Power asymmetry

ual feedback interaction term to Model 3 in regression be positive at high levels of group performance feedback
models predicting team learning and performance did and negative at high levels of individual performance
not increase the explanatory power of either regression feedback. But we also found that power asymmetry
model or yield a significant coefficient for the interac- was positively associated with team learning and perfor-
tion term (b = 0
04, SE = 0
11 for team learning; b = mance when individual performance feedback was low
−0
19, SE = 0
12 for team performance). Moreover, the and negatively associated with team learning and per-
addition of a group feedback by individual feedback by formance when group performance feedback was low.
power asymmetry interaction term as Model 4 also did Our theory did not anticipate this result. We expected
not increase the explanatory value of either regression to find that when group or individual performance feed-
model or produce significant coefficients (b = −0
18, back was low, we would observe no relationship between
SE = 0
14 for team learning; b = −0
14, SE = 0
17 for power asymmetry and either team learning or perfor-
team performance).5 mance, because lack of feedback provides no external
information about how to leverage power advantages.
Discussion On further reflection, we attribute this result to an
Past research suggests that power differences within avoidance dynamic among survey respondents. That is,
teams can stifle team learning. Our goal has been to survey respondents who “strongly disagreed” with state-
explore the thesis that a negative relationship between ments about whether their team receives individual
power differences and learning is not inevitable but is (or group) feedback may be signaling that, in fact,
contingent on whether power advantages within a team
their team deliberately and consciously avoids individual
are used to advance individual or collective interests.
(or group) feedback. In other words, low group feed-
We suggested that when power-advantaged team mem-
back scores may reflect a more individualistic orientation
bers adopt a collective orientation, power differences
can actually be a stimulus for team learning. We fur- within a team, whereas low individual feedback scores
ther proposed that the type of feedback (individual or reflect a more collectivistic orientation. If this is the case,
group) that team members receive will influence whether then the unexpected pattern of results just noted is sim-
they adopt an individualistic or collectivistic orientation ply a function of our measurement approach and, more
and will therefore moderate the relationship between important, is perfectly consistent with our theory. To test
power asymmetry and team learning. Our empirical test this possibility, we looked at the relationships between
of these hypotheses generated results that were clearly power asymmetry and team learning when group or indi-
in line with our expectations, but with some results that vidual performance feedback was at 4.0 on the Likert
bear further consideration. scale (i.e., “neither agree nor disagree”). As expected,
For example, we found support for our central these slopes did not differ significantly from zero.
hypotheses that the relationship between power asym- Second, as we expected, we found no evidence for
metry and both team learning and performance would the combined effects of group and individual feedback

358
on the relationship between power asymmetry and both
team learning and team performance. We attribute this to
the fact that combinations of individual and group feed-
back create an ambiguous feedback situation in which
it is not clear to members whether power advantages
should be used for individual or collective interests (see
DeShon et al. 2004, Mitchell and Silver 1990, Saavedra
et al. 1993). In such a situation, team members’ adop-
tion of an individualistic or collectivistic response to
power advantage may be influenced by individual per-
sonality differences rather than performance feedback
(Keltner et al. 2003), by internal states rather than by
external cues. Future research might therefore examine
the role of variables such as a need for personalized
versus socialized power (McClelland 1975), machiavel-
lianism (Christie and Geis 1970), or a social dominance
orientation (Pratto et al. 1994) in ambiguous feedback
situations. We should note, however, that another pos-
sible explanation for the lack of a significant group-by-
individual feedback effect in this study is that group
and individual feedback was quite highly correlated
in this sample. Although we found no evidence that
this compromised our statistical analyses, covariation
between these two variables could limit our ability to
find a significant interaction between the two, given a
restriction of range in this variable (i.e., too few teams
with high-low and low-high group-individual feedback
configurations).
Theoretical Implications and Future
Research Directions
The results of this study suggest several important impli-
cations for research on teams, learning, and power. First,
this study directly challenges the notion that power dif-
ferences always stifle learning within teams and suggests
instead that the relationship between power asymmetry
and team learning is contingent on member responses
to power advantages, which, in turn, are contingent on
whether members—and particularly power-advantaged
members—adopt an individualistic or collective orienta-
tion in their interactions with other members. We iden-
tified one factor that can influence this orientation—
group and individual performance feedback. But the
theory presented in this paper would imply that any
group design factor that encourages a collective mind-
set within a team should have the same effect. So,
for example, we might hypothesize that group-based
incentives, outcome interdependence, the existence of a
common external threat, or perhaps even strong group
norms could also encourage a collective orientation
within a power-asymmetric team and therefore encour-
age learning-related behaviors. Investigating these vari-
ous design elements offers one promising direction for
future research.
Future research should also seek to confirm the social
psychological processes that we posited as underlying
Van der Vegt et al.: Power Asymmetry and Learning in Teams
Organization Science 21(2), pp. 347–361, © 2010 INFORMS
these learning dynamics in power-asymmetric teams.
Specifically, our theory suggested that power-advantaged
team members with a collective mindset were key to
fostering a learning dynamic within these teams. Future
research should investigate the microdynamics of learn-
ing in power-asymmetric teams to confirm the facilita-
tive role of collectively oriented, power-advantaged team
members and to more clearly explicate the behaviors
through which this facilitation occurs. In-depth analyses
of group and/or dyadic interactions in laboratory or field
groups would be very useful in this regard.
Future research might also compare the interactions
that take place in power-balanced as opposed to power-
asymmetric groups, with and without a collective orien-
tation, to better understand how power differences can
either help or hinder intrateam learning.
Second, this study contributes to the literature on feed-
back by confirming that group and individual perfor-
mance feedback can have very different implications for
group process and performance. We found that although
group and individual feedback do seem to be corre-
lated (suggesting that teams adopting one type of feed-
back are more likely to also adopt the other type of
feedback), these are two separate constructs that exhibit
markedly different moderating effects on a key input-
to-process relationship. Furthermore, these results sup-
port the notion that the type of feedback group members
receive (i.e., individual or group) is important in part
because it influences whether group members adopt an
individual versus a collective orientation (Hinsz et al.
1997). Our results therefore contribute to the litera-
ture on team feedback by empirically investigating the
scarcely researched effects of different types of perfor-
mance feedback (DeShon et al. 2004).
Third, most research on power differences within
groups has conceptualized power at the individual and/or
the group level; i.e., power is something that each mem-
ber possesses to a greater or lesser degree and that can
be evaluated to capture power configurations within a
group (e.g., power centralization). But power, in classic
formulations, is a relational property that emerges from
the dependence of one actor on resources controlled by
another (Emerson 1962, Thibaut and Kelley 1959). It is
therefore possible—and even likely—that a given group
member will have a power advantage in one relation-
ship but not in another. This study explicitly acknowl-
edges this possibility by conceptualizing power asym-
metry within a group as something that emerges from
dyadic dependence, i.e., dependence of one dyad mem-
ber on task-related resources controlled by another. That
is, we suggested that to fully represent power asymmetry
within a group, one must attend to patterns of asymmet-
ric dependence between each of the dyadic relationships
within that group. This study therefore introduces an
approach to conceptualizing and measuring power dif-
ferences in groups that more directly builds on the theo-
retical underpinnings of power and dependence research.
Van der Vegt et al.: Power Asymmetry and Learning in Teams
Organization Science 21(2), pp. 347–361, © 2010 INFORMS
We should note, however, that there may be other
ways of conceptualizing power differences that would
be equally important to consider. For example, one
might look at power advantages/disadvantages to explic-
itly investigate how performance feedback affects the
attitudes or behaviors of power-advantaged compared
with power-disadvantaged dyad members. One might
also conceptualize power asymmetry in terms of nontask
resource dependence—e.g., power differences that arise
from factors such as race, gender, ethnicity, or physical
attractiveness—to determine whether power differences
that arise from factors unrelated to a group’s task could
nonetheless be transformed into an impetus for learning.
Alternatively, one could examine the centralization of
power relations within a team rather than, or in addition
to, asymmetry in power relations to determine whether
power advantages in highly centralized teams might also
be leveraged for group learning. Clearly, the broader
issue of power differences within teams and their direct
or contingent relationship to team learning can be ana-
lyzed in a number of different ways to address theo-
retically significant and practically important research
questions.
Study Limitations
As with any study, certain aspects of this study sug-
gest the need for caution in how these results should be
interpreted and/or generalized. For example, this study
adopted a cross-sectional design that limits our ability to
draw firm conclusions about the direction of causality.
Although alternative arguments based on reverse causal-
ity assumptions are less likely from a theoretical stand-
point (e.g., it is not clear why team learning would inter-
act with feedback to affect power asymmetry), the fact
remains that we cannot conclusively eliminate them.
One might also question whether the use of a sur-
vey to collect measures of power asymmetry, feed-
back, and team learning might have introduced common
method bias into these results (Podsakoff et al. 2003).
Given that group measures of power asymmetry were
constructed from dyadic comparisons, it seems highly
unlikely that correlations between these measures and
the other group process measures would be artificially
inflated. It is, however, quite possible that relationships
between the two types of feedback and team learning
could be inflated because of common method variance.
We explicitly considered the effect of the high correla-
tion between our two types of feedback by examining
variance inflation factors. And any inflated correlations
between team learning and the two types of feedback
should not affect the relationships of core theoretical
interest in this study. So although we acknowledge the
possibility of common method variance among some of
our study variables, we do not see this as a major threat
to the validity of these results.
359
Practical Implications
Based on the premise that any differences in mem-
ber power frustrate intrateam learning, past research has
implied that in cases where team learning is the goal,
teams should be constructed in ways that minimize or
eliminate power differences. So, for example, differences
in tenure or experience should be minimized, author-
ity relations should be eliminated, etc. We question this
approach for several reasons. First, attempts to elimi-
nate or minimize power differences cannot ever succeed
entirely, because power and status differences can and
will emerge around any number of member differences,
however subtle or intangible (e.g., assertiveness, gen-
der, age or informal coalitions). Second, even if these
attempts successfully reduced power differences, they
come at a high cost, because they reduce the very rich-
ness of experience, perspective, contacts, and expertise
that stimulates and facilitates member learning.
This paper offers an alternative solution to the design
and operation of teams where team learning is the goal.
Specifically, we suggest that when power differences
exist between and among group members, it becomes
critical to nurture a collective orientation within the team
so that these power differences can become an asset for
learning rather than a liability. Furthermore, we suggest
that one straightforward means of inducing this collec-
tive orientation is to provide group rather than individ-
ual performance feedback to group members. In other
words, we argue that the solution to dealing with power
differences in teams where learning is a goal is not to
eliminate those differences but, rather, to manage them
so that they become an asset rather than an impediment.
Acknowledgment
This research project was facilitated by a Netherlands Organi-
sation for Scientific Research grant awarded to S. B. de Jong.
Endnotes
1
We expect that team leaders will adopt a consistent approach
to managing the performance of team members such that
if individual feedback is used to manage one team mem-
ber, it will likely be used with all team members. We are
therefore interested in individual performance feedback as a
“shared property” of a team in our theory and analyses (see
Kozlowski and Klein 2000, p. 30)—and we explicitly examine
this assumption of intrateam convergence empirically.
2
Supervisors were not included as part of a team for the pur-
poses of this analysis.
3
When data from only one member of a dyad were available,
dyadic asymmetry was computed using just those data.
4
Our measure of power asymmetry is related to but con-
ceptually and mathematically distinct from measures of
power centralization (e.g., Bunderson 2003b, Freeman 1979).
Whereas power centralization assesses stratification in power-
dependence relations, power asymmetry assesses aggregate
imbalance in those relations. Power-centralized teams are
therefore power asymmetric, but asymmetric teams are not
necessarily centralized. Our measure of power asymmetry also

360
differs from power centralization measures in that it builds
from dyadic power-dependence ratings (because power is, ulti-
mately, relational). We can, however, compute power central-
ization from our dyadic ratings as follows:

k

r
j=1 Pmax − APAj 
i=1 DBAi − DABi 
APAj = PC = 
r k − 1
where APAj stands for average power (dis)advantage of team
member j, PC stands for power centralization, and Pmax is the
largest power advantage score (APA) in the team. All other
symbols were defined above. The correlation between this cen-
tralization measure and our measure of power asymmetry was
0.80 (p < 0
001), and analyses using power centralization gen-
erated similar, albeit weaker, results to those obtained with
power asymmetry. We used a power asymmetry measure in
this study because our core theoretical interest is in imbalance
rather than stratification.
5
Complete results are available on request from the first author.
References
Aiken, L. S., S. G. West. 1991. Multiple Regression: Testing and
Interpreting Interactions. Sage, London.
Ancona, D. G., D. F. Caldwell. 1992. Demography and design—
Predictors of new product team performance. Organ. Sci. 3
321–341.
Annett, J. 1969. Feedback and Human Behavior: The Effects of
Knowledge of Results, Incentives and Reinforcement on Learn-
ing and Performance. Penguin, Baltimore.
Argote, L. 1999. Organizational Learning: Creating, Retaining, and
Transferring Knowledge. Kluwer, Boston.
Argote, L., D. Gruenfeld, C. Naquin. 2001. Group learning in organi-
zations. M. E. Turner, ed. Groups at Work: Theory and Research.
Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ, 369–411.
Bantel, K. A., S. E. Jackson. 1989. Top management and innova-
tions in banking: Does the demography of the top team make a
difference? Strategic Management J. 10 107–124.
Barr, S. H., E. J. Conlon. 1994. Effects of distribution of feedback in
work groups. Acad. Management J. 37 641–655.
Blau, P. 1964. Exchange and Power in Social Life. Wiley, New York.
Blau, P. B. 1977. Inequality and Heterogeneity. Free Press, New York.
Bliese, P. D. 2000. Within-group agreement, non-independence, and
reliability: Implications for data aggregation and analysis. K. J.
Klein, S. W. J. Kozlowski, eds. Multilevel Theory, Research, and
Methods in Organizations. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco.
Borgatti, S. P., M. G. Everett. 1999. Models of core/periphery struc-
tures. Soc. Networks 21 375–395.
Brewer, M. B., R. S. Miller. 1984. Beyond the contact hypothe-
sis: Theoretical perspectives on desegregation. N. Miller, M. B.
Brewer, eds. Groups in Contact: The Psychology of Desegrega-
tion. Academic Press, Orlando, FL, 281–302.
Brooks, A. 1994. Power and the production of knowledge: Collec-
tive team learning in work organizations. Hum. Resources Dev.
Quart. 5 213–235.
Bunderson, J. S. 2003a. Team member functional background and
involvement in management teams: Direct effects and the mod-
erating role of power centralization. Acad. Management J. 46
458–474.
Bunderson, J. S. 2003b. Recognizing and utilizing expertise in work
groups: A status characteristics perspective. Admin. Sci. Quart.
48 557–591.
Van der Vegt et al.: Power Asymmetry and Learning in Teams
Organization Science 21(2), pp. 347–361, © 2010 INFORMS
Bunderson, J. S., K. M. Sutcliffe. 2002. Why some teams empha-
size learning more than others: Evidence from business unit
management teams. H. Sondak (vol. ed.), E. A. Mannix, M. A.
Neale (series eds.). Research on Managing Groups and Teams.
Vol. 4, Toward Phenomenology of Groups and Group Member-
ship. Elsevier Science, Oxford, England, 49–84.
Bunderson, J. S., K. M. Sutcliffe. 2003. Management team learning
orientation and business unit performance. J. Appl. Psych. 88
552–560.
Chen, S., A. Y. Lee-Chai, J. A. Bargh. 2001. Relationship orientation
as a moderator of the effects of social power. J. Pers. Soc. Psych.
80 173–187.
Christie, R., F. Geis. 1970. Studies in Machiavellianism. Academic
Press, New York.
de Jong, S. B., G. S. Van der Vegt, E. Molleman. 2007. The relation-
ships among asymmetry in task dependence, perceived helping
behavior, and trust. J. Appl. Psych. 92 1625–1637.
DeShon, R. P., S. W. J. Kozlowski, A. M. Schmidt, K. R. Milner,
D. Wiechmann. 2004. A multiple-goal, multilevel model of feed-
back effects on the regulation of individual and team perfor-
mance. J. Appl. Psych. 89 1035–1056.
Drach-Zahavy, A., A. Somech. 2001. Understanding team innovation:
The role of team processes and structures. Group Dynamics:
Theory, Research, Practice 5 111–123.
Edmondson, A. C. 1999. Psychological safety and learning behavior
in work teams. Admin. Sci. Quart. 44 350–383.
Edmondson, A. C. 2002. The local and variegated nature of learn-
ing in organizations: A group-level perspective. Organ. Sci. 13
128–146.
Edmondson, A. C., J. R. Dillon, K. Roloff. 2007. Three perspec-
tives on team learning: Outcome improvement, task mastery,
and group process. J. P. Walsh, A. P. Brief, eds. The Academy
of Management Annals. Psychology Press, Lawrence Erlbaum,
Mahwah, NJ, 269–314.
Eisenhardt, K. M., L. J. Bourgeois. 1988. Politics of strate-
gic decision-making in high-velocity environments: Toward a
midrange theory. Acad. Management J. 31 737–770.
Emerson, R. M. 1962. Power-dependence relations. Amer. Soc. Rev.
27 31–41.
Fiske, S. T. 1993. Controlling other people: The impact of power on
stereotyping. Amer. Psych. 48 621–628.
Freeman, L. C. 1979. Centrality in social networks: Conceptual clar-
ification. Soc. Networks 1 215–239.
Gaertner, S. L., J. F. Dovidio, B. A. Bachman. 1996. Revisiting the
contact hypothesis: The induction of a common ingroup identity.
Int. J. Intercultural Rel. 20 271–290.
Gibson, C. B., F. Vermeulen. 2003. A healthy divide: Subgroups as a
stimulus for team learning. Admin. Sci. Quart. 48 202–239.
Goncalo, J. A., M. M. Duguid. 2008. Hidden consequences of the
group-serving bias: Causal attributions and the quality of group
decision making. Organ. Behav. Human Decision Proc. 107(2)
219–233.
Hackman, J. R., C. C. Morris. 1975. Group tasks, group interaction
process, and group performance effectiveness: A review and pro-
posed integration. Adv. Experiment. Soc. Psych. 8 45–99.
Herold, D. M., M. M. Greller. 1977. Feedback: Definition of a con-
struct. Acad. Management J. 20 142–147.
Hinsz, V. B., R. S. Tindale, D. A. Vollrath. 1997. The emerging con-
ceptualization of groups as information processors. Psych. Bull.
121 43–64.
 Van der Vegt et al.: Power Asymmetry and Learning in Teams
Organization Science 21(2), pp. 347–361, © 2010 INFORMS
Ilgen, D. R., C. D. Fisher, M. S. Taylor. 1979. Consequences of indi-
vidual feedback on behavior in organizations. J. Appl. Psych. 64
349–371.
James, L. R., R. G. Demaree, G. Wolf. 1984. Estimating within-group
interrater reliability with and without response bias. J. Appl.
Psych. 69 85–98.
Keltner, D., D. H. Gruenfeld, C. Anderson. 2003. Power, approach,
and inhibition. Psych. Rev. 110 265–284.
Kenny, D. A., L. K. Acitelli. 2001. Accuracy and bias in the percep-
tion of the partner in a close relationship. J. Pers. Soc. Psych.
80 439–448.
Kipnis, D. 1972. Does power corrupt? J. Pers. Soc. Psych. 24 33–41.
Kozlowski, S. W. J., K. J. Klein. 2000. A multi-level approach to
theory and research in organizations: Contextual, temporal, and
emergent processes. K. J. Klein, S. W. J. Kozlowski, eds. Mul-
tilevel Theory, Research, and Methods in Organizations: Foun-
dations, Extensions, and New Directions.. Jossey-Bass/Pfeiffer,
San Francisco, 3–90.
Langfred, C. W. 2004. Too much of a good thing? Negative effects
of high trust and individual autonomy in self-managing teams.
Acad. Management J. 47 385–399.
Larson, J. R., Jr., P. G. Foster-Fishman, T. M. Franz. 1998. Leadership
style and the discussion of shared and unshared information in
decision-making groups. Pers. Soc. Psych. Bull. 24 482–495.
Lee, F. 1997. When the going gets tough, do the tough ask for help?
Help seeking and power motivation in organizations. Organ.
Behav. Human Decision Proc. 72 336–363.
McClelland, D. 1975. Power: The Inner Experience. Irvington,
New York.
Miles, J., M. Shevlin. 2001. Applying Regression and Correlation:
A Guide for Students and Researchers. Sage, London.
Milliken, F., L. Martins. 1996. Searching for common threads:
Understanding the multiple effects of diversity in organizational
groups. Acad. Management Rev. 21 402–433.
Mitchell, T. R., W. S. Silver. 1990. Individual and group goals when
workers are interdependent: Effects on task strategy and perfor-
mance. J. App. Psych. 75 185–193.
Nadler, D. A. 1979. Effects of feedback on task group behavior:
Review of the experimental research. Organ. Behav. Human Per-
formance 23 309–338.
Nembhard, I. M., A. C. Edmondson. 2006. Making it safe: The effects
of leader inclusiveness and professional status on psychological
safety and improvement efforts in health care teams. J. Organ.
Behav. 27 941–966.
Pitcher, P., A. D. Smith. 2001. Top management team heterogeneity:
Personality, power, and proxies. Organ. Sci. 12 1–18.
Podsakoff, P. M., S. B. MacKenzie, J. Lee, N. P. Podsakoff. 2003.
Common method biases in behavioral research: A critical review
of the literature and recommended remedies. J. Appl. Psych. 88
879–903.
View publication stats
361
Pratto, F., J. Sidanius, L. M. Stallworth, B. F. Malle. 1994. Social
dominance orientation: A personality variable predicting social
and political attitudes. J. Pers. Soc. Psych. 67 741–763.
Ragins, B. R., E. Sundstrom. 1989. Gender and power in organiza-
tions: A longitudinal perspective. Psych. Bull. 105 51–88.
Ridgeway, C. L. 2001. Gender, status, and leadership. J. Soc. Issues
57 637–655.
Rusbult, C. E., P. A. M. Van Lange. 2003. Interdependence, interac-
tion, and relationships. Ann. Rev. Psych. 54 351–375.
Saavedra, R., P. C. Earley, L. Van Dyne. 1993. Complex interdepen-
dence in task-performing groups. J. Appl. Psych. 78 61–72.
Schippers, M. C., D. N. Den Hartog, P. L. Koopman. 2007. Learning
in teams: A measure and correlates. Appl. Psych.: An Internat.
Rev. 56 189–211.
Schippers, M. C., D. N. Den Hartog, P. L. Koopman, J. A. Wienk.
2003. Diversity and team outcomes: The moderating effects of
outcome interdependence and group longevity and the mediating
effect of learning. J. Organ. Behav. 24 779–802.
Taylor, M. S., C. D. Fisher, D. R. Ilgen. 1984. Individuals’ reactions
to performance feedback in organizations: A control theory per-
spective. K. M. Rowland, G. R. Ferris, eds. Research in Person-
nel and Human Resources Management. JAI Press, Greenwich,
CT, 81–124.
Thibaut, J. W., H. H. Kelley. 1959. The Social Psychology of Groups.
Wiley, New York.
Van der Vegt, G. S., J. S. Bunderson. 2005. Learning and performance
in multidisciplinary teams: The importance of collective team
identification. Acad. Management J. 48 532–547.
Van der Vegt, G. S., J. S. Bunderson, A. Oosterhof. 2006. Expert-
ness diversity and interpersonal helping in teams: Why those
who need the most help end up getting the least. Acad. Man-
agement J. 49 877–893.
Van der Vegt, G. S., B. J. M. Emans, E. Van de Vliert. 1998. Motivat-
ing effects of task and outcome interdependence in work teams.
Group Organ. Management 23 124–143.
Van der Vegt, G. S., E. Van de Vliert, A. Oosterhof. 2003. Informa-
tional dissimilarity and organizational citizenship behavior: The
role of intrateam interdependence and team identification. Acad.
Management J. 46 715–727.
Vroom, V. H. 1964. Work and Motivation. Wiley, New York.
Wageman, R. 1995. Interdependence and group effectiveness. Admin.
Sci. Quart. 40 145–180.
West, M. A. 1996. Learning and work group effectiveness: A con-
ceptual integration. M. A. West, ed. Handbook of Work Group
Psychology. John Wiley and Sons, Chichester, 555–579.
Wiener, N. 1948. Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the
Animal and the Machine. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Wieselquist, J., C. E. Rusbult, C. A. Foster, C. R. Agnew. 1999. Com-
mitment, pro-relationship behavior, and trust in close relation-
ships. J. Pers. Soc. Psych. 77 942–966.
Zander, A., D. Wolfe. 1964. Administrative rewards and coordination
among committee members. Admin. Sci. Quart. 9 50–69.