POPPER ON DEFINITIONS

To Michael Sukale

WILHELM BÜTTEMEYER

SUMMARY. In the present paper I shall first summarize Popper’s criticism of the traditional
method of definition, and then go on to comment critically on his own views on the form
and function of so-called nominalist definitions.

Key words: Aristotle, essentialist definition, nominalist definition, Pascal, Popper

We do not find Popper’s theory of definition where we might expect to find

it first of all, viz. in his main writings on the philosophy of science. Rather
he develops his theory in a work on social philosophy – in his well-known
The Open Society and Its Enemies. After criticizing Plato’s and Aristotle’s
political ideas and before turning to Hegel, he discusses the method of
definition with a view to providing yet another illustration of how, through
the traditional theory of definition, platonism and aristotelianism and
their respective methodologies exercised harmful influence on the social
sciences.
In what follows I shall first summarize Popper’s criticism of the tradi-
tional method of definition and then go on to discuss his own proposals
(excepting the question of the non-creativity of definitions1 ).

1. POPPER’S RECONSTRUCTION AND CRITIQUE OF THE ESSENTIALIST

METHOD OF DEFINITION

1.1.
The main feature of traditional methodology, traced back by Popper to
Plato and Aristotle, is essentialism.2 According to this methodology, the
aim of science is to discover and describe the essences of things. The
idea is that such essences are accessible to intellectual intuition and can
be spelled out in ‘essentialist’ definitions. (In his own ‘reconstruction’
of the traditional distinction between ‘real’, or ‘essential’, and ‘verbal’ or

Journal for General Philosophy of Science (2005) 36: 15–28

DOI: 10.1007/s10838-005-6037-2

C Springer 2005
16 WILHELM BÜTTEMEYER

‘nominal’ definitions, Popper uses the terms ‘essentialist’ and ‘nominalist’,

respectively.3 )
According to Popper’s reconstruction of the traditional methodology
some words denote essences, which means that an essentialist definition
will have two functions: linguistic and ontological – to which we may add
a third, i.e. epistemological function. An essentialist definition (1) spells
out the meaning of a word, and (2) at the same time answers the question
what the essence denoted by the word is. These two functions correspond
to the two component parts of the definition, viz. the term to be defined
(‘definiendum’) and the defining formula (‘definiens’). The definiendum
“designates the essence,” it is “a name of the essence of a thing.”4 (At first
glance these expressions may be surprising, if we are used to refer words to
specific things, their qualities, and so on. However, according to Aristotle,
definitions aim not at singular things themselves but at their underlying
generalities; and the generalities ultimately reduce to essences.) At the same
time, the definiens should give “an exhaustive description of the essence or
the essential properties of the thing in question” (OS II, pp. 10–11). How
can we get hold of essentialist definitions, following Aristotle? According
to Popper’s reconstruction it is necessary to make “many observations”5
and to read out the essences of the observed things by “intuition”. This is
“a mental or intellectual faculty which enables us unerringly to grasp the
essences of things, and to know them”; and, knowing such essences, we
can also describe and define them (OS II, p. 11).
The epistemological function of the essentialist definition consists in
conveying knowledge. Knowledge, if not intuitive, is inferential; it is en-
tailed by certain premises. As it is impossible to demonstrate all premises of
all demonstrations, there must exist some undemonstrable but “indubitably
true” basic premises which precede all demonstrations, and, according to
Popper’s reconstruction, “all ‘basic premises of proofs’ are definitions”. He
adds that “Aristotle’s essentialist definitions are the principles from which
all our knowledge is derived; they thus contain all our knowledge.”6 In the
long run, the aim of all scientific inquiry is the “gradual accumulation”
of an “encyclopaedia containing the intuitive definitions of all essences,
that is to say, their names together with their defining formulae” and
“the syllogistic derivation from it of ‘the whole body of facts’“ (OS II,
p. 12).

1.2.
In his work The Open Society and his other writings Popper raises several
objections against this Aristotelian conception of definition. To begin with,
he criticizes the view of knowledge which implies finality and certainty, and
which embodies the possibility of a gradual extension of our knowledge
 POPPER ON DEFINITIONS 17

about essences. Referring to the history of science, he explains (in accor-

dance with his earlier views expressed in the German edition of his Logic
of Scientific Discovery) that we can never be sure to have reached the truth,
that in the empirical sciences there are no proofs which establish once and
for ever the truth of a theory and that the development of science is more
revolutionary than gradual (OS II, pp. 12–13). He then proceeds to show
(as we shall see in the second part of this article) that definitions actually
used in science are nominalist, not essentialist ones (OS II, pp. 13–15). In
order to show that the essentialist view of definition is untenable in itself,
he finally criticizes the concept of intellectual intuition and the doctrine of
the indispensability of definitions for the clarification of the meanings of
words (OS II, pp. 15–18).
Popper’s critical remarks addressed against the possibility of intellec-
tual intuition are not quite clear. On the one hand, he blames Aristotle who
“simply postulates” that we are in possession of such a faculty and whose
arguments in favor of this theory in the Posterior Analytics in this regard
appear “surprisingly weak” (OS II, p. 11). On the other hand, he himself
concedes that “we possess something which may be described as ‘intellec-
tual intuition’; or more precisely, that certain of our intellectual experiences
may be thus described” (OS II, p. 15). He disputes, with some justification,
that this faculty can produce an unerring insight, or that it may serve as
an argument. At the same time, he does not rule out its possible heuristic
function. On the contrary, he concedes that “it leads him [the scientist] to
his discoveries” and that it “may encourage us to look for arguments.”7
As a result, his criticism of intellectual intuition appears somewhat contra-
dictory, as far as possible existence of this faculty is concerned, whereas
his claim that intuition may have only a heuristic function seems to imply
that it is unsuitable for producing true essentialist definitions. This raises
the issue of the criteria for distinguishing between ‘true’ and ‘false’ es-
sential definitions, both of which may be based on intuition. Inevitably
this presents considerable difficulties for the essentialist approach. Such
difficulties were already remarked on by Antisthenes, and are reiterated by
Popper (OS II, p. 299 f., note 54 (1)).
However, whilst firmly adhering, even in his later works, to his criticism
of essentialist definitions,8 Popper seems unaware of mixing up here three
entirely distinct aspects of the question: (1) the aspect of the argumentative
pros and cons, i.e. the questions concerning the method of definition, the
true or hypothetical character of definitions and the role of definitions in
the use of language; (2) the genetic aspect connected with the problem of
intuition, viz. “how we can get hold of definitions” (OS II, p. 11), which
strictly should be of no relevance, for – as Popper himself observes – “sci-
ence does not ask how he [a scientist] has got his ideas, it is only interested
in arguments” (OS II, p. 16); and (3) the aspect of the consequences of the
18 WILHELM BÜTTEMEYER

essentialist method of definition. If Popper takes the view, as he apparently

does, that “every discipline, as long as it used the Aristotelian method of
definition, has remained arrested in a state of empty verbiage and barren
scholasticism” and that verbalism, scholasticism, mysticism and despair
of reason were the “unavoidable results” of that method (OS II, pp. 9, 20,
21), he reduces the development of science monocausally to a question of
terminology and ignores its various factors, revealed by recent studies in
the history of science.

1.3.
To sum up, Popper polarizes the problem of definition in his Open Society
by focusing on essentialist definitions, on the one hand, and on nominalist
definitions, on the other. He specifies the nature of the essentialist method of
definition (albeit with some inexactitude of historical detail) and contemp-
tuously dismisses its pretension to finality and truthfulness. At the same
time, his criticism of intellectual intuition suffers from a certain ambiguity
as a result of his references to the heuristic and the genetic aspects of such
an intuition.

2. POPPER’S NOMINALIST INTERPRETATION OF DEfiNITION

There is no doubt that the essentialist definition, if taken as a definitive,

indubitably true proposition expressing the essence of a thing, is a rather
problematic instrument of scientific work. Popper, consequently, provides
a different interpretation of definition and introduces a new method, called
by him the method of “nominalist definition.”9 Although he is obviously
inspired by the traditional method of nominal definition, he does not specif-
ically name any predecessor nor does he explicitly specify the differences
between the old nominal and the new nominalist definitions.

2.1.
A nominalist definition involves a rejection of any ‘essentialist’ pretensions.
It merely introduces a new name, the defined term, as an abbreviation of
an already known complex expression, i.e. the defining formula. If we
consider the sentence ‘A puppy is a young dog’ as an example, we can say
with Popper, that a nominalist definition starts with the defining formula
(‘a young dog’) and asks for a short label to it (‘a puppy’); it is an answer to
the question ‘What shall we call a young dog?’ rather than an answer to the
question ‘What is a puppy?’. Popper underlines that his “main emphasis”
in introducing this new approach “is on the question whether the definition
is read from the right to the left or from the left to the right; or, in other
 POPPER ON DEFINITIONS 19

words, whether it replaces a long story by a short one, or a short story

by a long one” (OS II, p. 290, note 38). Defined terms can “always” be
replaced by the corresponding defining formulae, and all definitions may
be eliminated throughout. Furthermore, the relation between a defined term
and the corresponding defining formula is completely “arbitrary” (OS II,
p. 14). If necessary, we can freely introduce new terms, or re-define old
terms, whenever convenient, in a new way (PH, p. 29). The usefulness of
a nominalist definition consists in its contextual convenience and depends
on its consequences (LSD, p. 55). In short, nominalist definitions “do not
contain any knowledge whatever”; their unique function is “brevity” (OS
II, p. 14).
As far as the form and the contextual function of traditional nominal
definitions are concerned, there is nothing new in this. The concept of
such a definition can even be traced back to Aristotle. The Greek philoso-
pher introduced a distinction between a definition which spells out the
essence of a thing, and a definition which merely spells out the mean-
ing of a name, and he rejected the latter on the grounds that it allowed
definitions of non-existing things.10 Popper instead rejects the essentialist
definitions, whilst at the same time trying to associate an epistemic role
with nominalist definitions. Here are some quotations that illustrate his
view:
1. “. . . undoubtedly, the demand that we speak clearly and without am-
biguity is very important, and must be satisfied” (OS II, p. 18).
2. “One sees that the demand that all our terms should be defined is just
as untenable as the demand that all our statements should be proved”
(OS II, p. 17).
3. “. . . all chains of definitions must start with undefined terms, whose
meaning can be exemplified but not defined” (OS II, p. 290, note 39).
4. “In modern science, only nominalist definitions occur, that is to say,
shorthand symbols or labels are introduced in order to cut a long story
short” (OS II, p. 14).
5. “. . . definitions do not play any very important part in science. [. . .]
the scientific or nominalist definitions do not contain any knowledge
whatever, not even any ‘opinion’“ (OS II, p. 14).

2.2.
In order to discuss these statements, let us ask first, how a nominalist
definition could be introduced in a scientific context. We know already that
the starting point are more or less long expressions, such as ‘the product
arising from multiplying an integer by itself’, or ‘the ratio of two integers’.
We may now choose “arbitrarily” a short label or symbol as an abbreviation
of either of these expressions, say ‘prime number’.
20 WILHELM BÜTTEMEYER

But the term ‘prime number’ has already been introduced earlier as an
abbreviation of ‘a natural number which is not divisible without a remain-
der, save by itself and unity’. Any reader of this article will therefore be
justified in objecting that this label surely is inappropriate if only because
it involves ambiguities, which should be avoided in science. For such a
procedure, if always applied, would lead in the final analysis to employing
one and the same symbol for all terms of a scientific theory, causing an
enormous confusion.
Unfortunately, Popper is not quite clear on this point. He discusses ex-
plicitly only the question of already existing ambiguities; and he denies that
it is possible to eliminate them by means of definitions (OS II, pp. 17–18).
But he does not pay much attention to the problem of new ambiguities which
might arise as a direct consequence of nominalist definitions. He admits
(see the above quotations) that “the demand that we speak [. . .] without
ambiguity is very important, and must be satisfied”. But obviously the ar-
bitrariness of nominalist definitions, referred to frequently by Popper,11
and the demand for unambiguousness are not necessarily compatible. In
his book on the Open Society Popper suggests in a note that if there is a
danger of ambiguity we should introduce two different labels (II, p. 291,
note 44 (1)). One might thus feel justified in interpreting this suggestion in
the sense that nominalist definitions – especially their arbitrariness – must
therefore be subject to certain limitations; for example, terms to be defined
should be chosen only provided they don’t create any new ambiguities; this
requirement is certainly satisfied if the relevant terms have not yet been used
in the language concerned. Such a limitation would also have the charac-
teristic of being purely mechanical and making superfluous any analysis
of the meaning of the term in question, thereby conforming to Popper’s
maxim that questions regarding the meanings of terms are of no relevance.

2.3.
A second objection that might be raised concerns the defining formulae;
more precisely their clarity and unambiguousness, as demanded by Pop-
per’s first statement referred to above – see (1). Here, it is necessary to
distinguish two cases.
Case 1: One or more terms of a defining formula may have been intro-
duced themselves by a nominalist definition. In this case, the clarity and
unambiguousness of these terms depend on the clarity and unambiguous-
ness of the words contained in the defining formulae which correspond to
those terms. Therefore, the analysis has to begin again with a reference to
these corresponding defining formulae, and so on.
Case 2: One or more terms of a defining formula are undefined. Are they
clear and unambiguous?
 POPPER ON DEFINITIONS 21

As to clarity, Popper is rather modest, conceding that all our undefined

terms are vague: “We are always conscious, he says, that our terms are a
little vague (since we have learned to use them only in practical applica-
tions) and we reach precision not by reducing their penumbra of vagueness,
but rather by keeping well within it, by carefully phrasing our sentences
in such a way that the possible shades of meaning of our terms do not
matter” (OS II, p. 19). The problem of ambiguity also remains unresolved,
for Popper denies, as we have already seen, the possibility of entirely elim-
inating the ambiguity of the undefined terms that make up the defining
formulae (OS II, pp. 17–18). This seems to conflict with Popper’s first
statement above: for his demand that we should speak clearly and without
ambiguity, is in contradiction with the fact that the undefined terms may be
vague and ambiguous, and that they remain so in the defining formulae of
nominalist definitions and the resulting nominalist languages of individual
sciences. His declaration that the nominalist view can satisfy this demand12
is obviously wrong. In reality, it cannot.

2.4.
The main proponents of the traditional theory of definition were convinced
that it would be possible to avoid vague and ambiguous terms in science and
to eliminate the vagueness and ambiguity of words of the natural languages,
which are needed in science, by defining them with the help of other words
that are less vague and are not ambiguous. Popper is certainly right in saying
– see the second statement quoted above – that it is impossible to define
all our terms and that such an attempt would lead to an infinite regress
of definitions. But I am not aware of any of those thinkers demanding,
as Popper seems to imply (OS II, pp. 15–18), that we should define all
our terms. On the contrary, already Aristotle states that it is impossible
to prove the fundamental principles of science (i.e. axioms, hypotheses
and definitions), nor can all terms be defined by demonstration; otherwise
the chain of proofs would lead to an infinite regress or a vicious circle.
Moreover, he says explicitly that all our scientific knowledge presupposes
a (non-scientific) starting-point, the νoυ̃ς which enables us to formulate
our definitions in the first instance; and he points out that we cannot look
for a definition for everything, especially not for the first parts of things.13
Therefore, I doubt that it is correct to say in a purely negative manner that
“neither he nor, apparently, a great many modern writers” seemed to realize
that the attempt to define all terms must lead to an infinite regress (OS II,
p. 16).
It is instructive in this connection, in addition to referring to Aristotle, to
draw attention to the work of Blaise Pascal, who, incidentally, is never men-
tioned in Popper’s writings. In two of his papers, De l’esprit géométrique
22 WILHELM BÜTTEMEYER

and De l’art de persuader (ca. 1655), Pascal discusses the value of the
axiomatic method and proposes rules for the use of definitions, axioms
and demonstrations. His rules concerning definitions anticipate largely the
method of nominalist definition, proposed by Popper. However, Pascal was
convinced that such definitions could help to instil clarity into our language,
arguing that one should never use expressions whose meaning has not been
explained previously. Like Popper, Pascal maintains that in geometry and
elsewhere we should accept “only definitions, that are called by logicians
nominal definitions, i.e. nothing but assignation of names to things, which
have been clearly characterized in terms which are perfectly familiar”.14
Whilst urging us to use only nominal definitions, Pascal emphasizes that
such definitions do not refer to essences of things, for “definitions are made
only in order to designate the things, about which we are speaking, not in
order to show their nature”.15 In addition, he points out that nominal defini-
tions are useful for their brevity: “Their utility and their application consist
in [. . .] abbreviating our speech by expressing in a single assigned term that
which we could not say except by using several terms”.16 He also affirms
that nominal definitions are arbitrary (with the proviso that one should take
care to avoid ambiguous expressions): “This makes it clear that the defi-
nitions are entirely free and are never subject to contradictions; for there
is nothing more permissible than to call a thing, which one has clearly
indicated, by any name one pleases. But we must be careful not to misuse
our liberty of assigning names by giving one and the same name to two
different things.”17 A third property of nominal definitions, beside their
brevity and arbitrariness, is their eliminability, for we should always keep
in view that we can “always substitute in our mind the defining formulae
for the defined terms, in order to avoid being mislead by the ambiguities
of the terms, which have been determined by the definitions”.18 Finally,
he recognizes explicitly that it is impossible to define all terms and that
the attempt to do so would lead to an infinite regress.19 These reflections
were taken on board by Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole in their famous
‘Logic of Port Royal’.20 In short, Pascal, Arnauld and Nicole are clear ex-
amples, if examples are needed, of “modern writers,” who knew very well,
long time before Popper, that the definition of all words would lead to an
“infinite regression.”

2.5.
Returning now to Popper’s own methodology, we can state that the intro-
duction of a nominalist definition or a term, which has been defined in
this way, depends on previously given undefined terms which form en-
tirely or partially the defining formula. But how are these undefined terms
given?
 POPPER ON DEFINITIONS 23

Popper’s answer to this question is neither clear nor very comprehensive.

On the one hand, he criticizes the operationalists who are convinced they
can define any scientific term by observable and possibly physical opera-
tions or by appropriate experimental procedures. He points out that in their
operational definitions they need certain universal terms, which themselves
need defining, leading eventually to an infinite regress or a vicious circle.21
On the other hand, he speaks himself of “operational definitions” and refers
to “terms whose meaning we have learned ‘operationally’“ (OS II, p. 296,
note 50). Unfortunately, he does not explain the expressions “operational”
and “learned operationally,” nor does he distinguish his “operational defi-
nitions” from the definitions of the operationalists.
Probably, he means that we learn the meaning of such undefined words,
using them intuitively in our daily life and in science. Indeed, he says in
his third statement above that “all chains of definitions must start with
undefined terms, whose meaning can be exemplified but not defined,” and
elsewhere he states that the use of individual terms (but not of universal
terms) may be determined by ostension.22 Maybe that here we have to
take the intentional aspect into account as well. For, according to Popper, a
more precise description of the use of nominalist definitions shows that “the
intentions with which the undefined terms have been used” may sometimes
play a role, if for example we want to replace undefined words by some
other already defined terms which correspond to the same intentions (OS
II, p. 290, note 39).
But none of these factors (operational learning of words, exemplification,
ostension, intentions) can explain how the abstract and universal terms get
their meaning. Popper himself concedes that ostension is of no use for “uni-
versal terms, which cannot be defined by empirical indications, pointing,
etc.”23 The same applies to the unmethodically accomplished operational
learning, against which a fortiori the very same objections may be raised
which Popper addressed against the methodic definitions of the operational-
ists, viz. that “we cannot hope to define dispositional terms, or universal
terms, operationally. For universals, or dispositional terms, transcend ex-
perience” (LSD, p. 441). As for exemplification, he himself criticizes (in a
later work) the extensional approach to language, implicit in any exempli-
fying procedure. In agreement with Rudolf Carnap’s intensional analysis
of meaning, he argues – without, though, spelling this out in more detail
either here or in his other writings – that “every scientific language must
make use of genuine universals, i.e. of words, whether defined or unde-
fined, with an undeterminate extension, though perhaps with a reasonably
definite intensional ‘meaning’.”24 Finally, Popper fails to give a proper ac-
count of the relevance and usefulness of intentions for the definition of
universal terms; he is only referring to their function in the replacement
of undefined words by already defined terms. Yet such universal terms are
24 WILHELM BÜTTEMEYER

indispensable in science. Thus it seems that there is an unbridgeable gulf

between Popper’s undefined terms, which are given “operationally” or by
example and ostension, and the universal terms of science. Nominalist def-
initions based only on exemplified or ostensive terms are not sufficient for
the constitution of a workable scientific language.
There is another type of undefined scientific terms which may occur in
nominalist definitions, viz. terms introduced by implicit definitions. Usu-
ally, defined terms of essentialist or nominalist definitions are introduced
explicitly through one-to-one correlations between the defined terms and
the defining formulae. But the fundamental terms of many axiomatic sys-
tems are introduced without any explicit definition, merely via axioms
which describe the relations between these terms, leaving their nature un-
determined. Hilbert had used such ‘implicit definitions’ in his Grundlagen
der Geometrie (1899), and Frege, for instance, engaged in a debate over
this topic with his German colleague. Popper, on the other hand, seems to
have no problems with this; he states simply that such terms are no more
vague or more ambiguous than any other undefined terms (contradicting
once more his first statement – quoted above):
“. . . either our undefined or primitive terms have a traditional meaning (which is never very
precise) or they are introduced by so-called ‘implicit definitions’ – that is, through the way
they are used in the context of a theory. This last way of introducing them [. . .] makes the
meaning of the concepts depend on that of the theory, and most theories can be interpreted in
more than one way. As a result, implicitly defined concepts, and thus all concepts which are
defined explicitly with their help, become not merely ‘vague’ but systematically ambiguous.
[. . .] This should be sufficient to establish the fact that ‘unambiguous’ concepts, or concepts
with ‘sharp boundary lines’, do not exist” (UQ, pp. 27–28).

2.6.
There is another problem which may arise from Popper’s forth claim quoted
above, according to which only nominalist definitions occur in modern
science. It is possible that Popper had only explicit definitions in mind,
deliberately leaving out e.g. implicit and recursive definitions, and that he
meant his statement to be understood as referring to empirical sciences
only.25 But even allowing for such a restriction, it may still be questioned
whether all explicit definitions occurring in the empirical sciences are in
fact nominalist definitions.
If, for example, we take concepts like ‘rationality’, ‘probability’, ‘infor-
mation’ and so on, whilst they are clearly very important these concepts are
at the same time so complex, vague and ambiguous that they will inevitably
require an elaborate clarification. Nominalist definitions like ‘rationality is
the critical examination of theories’, or ‘probability is the ratio of favourable
to unfavourable cases’, or ‘information is the class of all propositions, which
are logically implied by some proposition’ are evidently not going to be
 POPPER ON DEFINITIONS 25

very helpful. Nominalist definitions can have one of two basic functions:
(1) they can introduce a short label for a complex expression, whose mean-
ing and function in a scientific context is generally already clear (although
from a general semantic point of view they may not be as transparent), or
(2) they may serve to attach a label to one specific aspect of an otherwise
intricate and by no means clear notion. But they do not provide any method
of clarification of concepts. What is required, in addition to the method of
nominalist definition, is something like Carnap’s ‘explication’ or Hempel’s
‘meaning analysis’ and ‘empirical analysis’, in order to clarify and deter-
mine complex vague or ambiguous notions.26 In other words, nominalist
definitions alone are most certainly not sufficient in science.

2.7.
It may seem rather otiose to be addressing such critical comments against
Popper’s now sixty-year-old views. However, he is not only widely
regarded as one of the greatest modern philosophers, but many readers
of his works tend to take his views as a final word in the philosophy
of science. Christoph von Mettenheim, for instance, writes in a recent
book, which reflects the “continuing relevance of Karl Popper,” that he
was “convinced by every word” he read in Popper’s writings, and he
adds: “One of the views which entirely convinced me was the theory of
methodological nominalism, as opposed to essentialism, in particular the
explanation of the role which definitions should play in science, which
Popper explains in Chapters 3 and 11 of The Open Society,” adding later
on: “His theory of definition, supported as it is by Tarski (1965), seems to
me a just evaluation of the role which definitions should play in science.”27
Our discussion of the method of nominalist definition, as proposed by
Popper, has shown the following: (1) the demand for unambiguousness and
the supposed arbitrariness of nominalist definitions are jointly incompati-
ble; (2) his demand for clarity and unambiguousness contradicts the recog-
nized vagueness and ambiguity of undefined terms; (3) his reflections on
how we learn our undefined terms are epistemologically insufficient; (4) his
contention that only nominalist definitions occur in science is untenable,
for this procedure does not offer any method of clarification of concepts;
and (5) his statement that the attempt to define all words would lead to an
infinite regress represents nothing new and is something that has long been
recognized by modern philosophers.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I am very grateful to Dr. Edo Pivčević (University of Bristol) who has read
an earlier version of this article and has suggested several modifications.
26 WILHELM BÜTTEMEYER

NOTES

1. See K. R. Popper: ‘Creative and Non-creative Definitions in the Calculus of Probabil-

ity’, Synthese 15, 1963, 167–186.
2. Popper discussed methodological essentialism mainly in his books The Open Society
and Its Enemies, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1945, Vol. I, Chap. III, Section
vi, and The Poverty of Historicism, London 1957, Chap. I, Section 10. I shall use the
following abbreviations of Karl Popper’s works: C& R - Conjectures and Refutations.
The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, 5th rev. ed. London – New York, Routledge,
1989, repr. 2000; GE – Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie, ed. by T. E.
Hansen, Tübingen, Mohr, 1979; LSD - The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London –
New York, Routledge, (1959) repr. 1992; OK - Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary
Approach, rev. ed., Oxford, Clarendon, 1979, 7th impr. 1992; OS – The Open Society
and Its Enemies, 5th rev. ed., London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966, repr. 1999; PH
- The Poverty of Historicism, 3rd rev. ed., London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961,
repr. 1994; UQ – Unended Quest. An Intellectual Autobiography, new ed., London –
New York, Routledge, 2002.
3. See OS, Vol. II, Chap. XI, Section ii, especially note 38. The traditional theory of
definition is not limited to essential (and nominal) definitions, for Aristotle speaks also
of causal definitions, which purport to explain why a thing exists: see An. post. II 10,
93b 38 ff.
4. C& R, p. 20; OS II, p. 10; see also OS I, p. 32.
5. OS, Vol. II, p. 11. In point of fact, Aristotle admits of the possibility of intuition
of essences via single experiences of relevant particulars; see An. post. II 19, 100a
15–100b 1.
6. OS, Vol. II, pp. 10 and 14. Aristotle allows three kinds of basic premises of demonstra-
tions: axioms (i.e., the general suppositions which are valid for all sciences), hypotheses
(i.e., the special suppositions which are valid only for a single science) and definitions;
and he underlines the methodological difference between propositions which describe
a factual situation by saying that there is something (axioms, hypotheses), and defini-
tions, which say what that something is; see An. post. I 2, 72a 14–24. Therefore, our
knowledge depends on these three kinds of premises.
7. OS II, p. 16. This is stressed by a thesis of his C& R, p. 28: “Intellectual intuition and
imagination are most important, but they are not reliable: they may show us things
very clearly [. . .]. They are indispensable as the main sources of our theories [. . .].
The most important function of observation and reasoning, and even of intuition and
imagination, is to help us in the critical examination of those bold conjectures which
are the means by which we probe into the unknown.”
8. C& R, p. 279 and footnote 62; OK, p. 195, note 6.
9. OS, Vol. II, pp. 14–15 and 18–20.
10. See Aristotle: An. post. II 7, 92 b 26 ff.
11. See OS II, pp. 14 and 291, note 44 (1); PH, p. 29; UQ, p. 28; GE, p. 177.
12. OS II, p. 18: “But undoubtedly, the demand that we speak clearly and without ambiguity
is very important, and must be satisfied. Can the nominalist view satisfy it? [. . .] It can.”
13. Aristotle: An. post. I 3; II 19; Met. IX 6, 1048 a 36–37; VIII 3, 1043b 30.
14. J.-P. Schobinger: Blaise Pascals Reflexionen über die Geometrie im allgemeinen:
“De l’esprit géométrique” und “De l’art de persuader”, Basel – Stuttgart, Schwabe,
1974, p. 43: “On ne reconnaı̂t en géométrie que les seules définitions que les logiciens
appellent définitions de nom, c’est-à-dire que les seules impositions de nom aux
choses qu’on a clairement désignées en termes parfaitement connus”.
 POPPER ON DEFINITIONS 27

15. Ibid., pp. 49–51: “Ce n’est pas que tous les hommes aient la même idée de l’essence
des choses, que je dis qu’il est impossible et inutile de définir. [. . .] Car les définitions
ne sont faites que pour désigner les choses que l’on nomme, et non pas pour en
montrer la nature.”
16. Ibid., p. 43: “Leur utilité et leur usage est d’éclaircir et d’abréger le discours, en expri-
mant, par le seul nom qu’on impose, ce qui ne se pourrait dire qu’en plusieurs termes”.
17. Ibid., pp. 43–45: “D’où il paraı̂t que les définitions sont très libres, et qu’elles ne sont
jamais sujettes à être contredites; car il n’y a rien de plus permis que de donner à une
chose qu’on a clairement désignée un nom tel qu’on voudra. Il faut seulement prendre
garde qu’on n’abuse de la liberté qu’on a d’imposer des noms, en donnant le même
à deux choses differentes”.
18. Ibid., p. 87: “Substituer toujours mentalement les définitions à la place des définis,
pour ne pas se tromper par l’équivoque des termes que les définitions ont restreints”.
19. Ibid., p. 45–47: “. . . je reviens à l’explication du véritable ordre, qui consiste, comme
je disais, à tout définir et à tout prouver. Certainement cette méthode serait belle,
mais elle est absolument impossible: car il est évident que les premiers termes qu’on
voudrait définir, en supposeraient de précédents pour servir à leur explication [. . .];
et ainsi il est clair qu’on n’arriverait jamais aux premières. Aussi, en poussant les
recherches de plus en plus, on arrive nécessairement à des mots primitifs qu’on ne
peut plus définir [. . .]. Mais il ne s’ensuit pas de là qu’on doive abandonner toute sorte
d’ordre. Car il y en a un, et c’est celui de la géométrie [. . .]. Cet ordre, le plus parfait
entre les hommes, consiste non pas à tout définir ou à tout démontrer, ni aussi à ne
rien définir ou à ne rien démontrer, mais à se tenir dans ce milieu de ne point définir
les choses claires et entendues de tous les hommes, et de définir toutes les autres”.
20. La Logique ou l’art de penser. . ., Paris, Guignart-Saureux-Launay, 1662, part I,
Chap. XIII, No. 1.
21. OS II, p. 296, note 50; C& R, p. 62; LSD, Appendix *X, pp. 440–441.
22. OS II, p. 290, note 39; LSD, p. 74. See also OS II, p. 19: “. . . our terms are a little
vague (since we have learned to use them only in practical applications)”; C&R,
p. 279: “I want only to say (again) that outside mathematics and logic problems of
definability are mostly gratuitous. We need many undefined terms whose meaning
is only precariously fixed by usage – by the manner in which they are used in the
context of theories, and by the procedures and pratices of the laboratory.”
23. LSD, p. 74. See also H. Oetjens: Sprache, Logik, Wirklichkeit. Der Zusammenhang
von Theorie und Erfahrung in K. R. Poppers “Logik der Forschung”, Stuttgart-Bad
Cannstatt, Frommann–Holzboog, 1975, pp. 126, 169 ff.
24. C&R, p. 262. It was also remarked that abstract mathematical terms cannot be defined
by examples; see R. Robinson: Definition (1950), Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1972, Chap. V, § 5.
25. OS II, pp. 12 and 290, note 39. Popper’s use of explicit definitions in a logical context
may be studied in his ‘New Foundations for Logic’, Mind 56, 1947, pp. 193–235.
26. See R. Carnap: Logical Foundations of Probability, Chicago 1950; C. G. Hempel:
Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science, Chicago 1952. For a
similar objection see B. Messmer: Die Grundlagen von Poppers Sozialphilosophie,
Bern, Lang, 1981, Chap. 3.1. Popper himself felt perhaps the usefulness of such a
method, when discussing the notions of ‘certainty’ and ‘verisimilitude’. Although
emphasizing repeatedly to be “not interested in definitions,” he commented on the first
notion “for the sake of clarity”. In the second case, he aimed at the “rehabilitation” of
a concept which had been “suspected of being meaningless (or useless),” but which,
being “much needed,” should not be “logically misconceived, or ‘meaningless”’. See
28 WILHELM BÜTTEMEYER

OK, pp. 58, 78, 59; K. Popper: ‘Replies to my critics’, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.): The
Philosophy of Karl Popper, La Salle, Ill., Open Court, 1974, pp. 961–1197, especially
1100. The road taken by him in order to find a definition of the notion of ‘probabilistic
independence’, too, is very different from his method of nominalistic definition, and it
bears more resemblance to the method of trial and error; see his letters to Georg Dorn in
E. Morscher (ed.): Was wir Karl Popper und seiner Philosophie verdanken. Zu seinem
100. Geburtstag, Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, 2002, pp. 48–63 and 481–494.
27. C. v. Mettenheim: ‘The Problem of Objectivity in Law and Ethics’ in I. Jarvie/S.
Pralong (eds.): Popper’s Open Society after Fifty Years. The continuing relevance of
Karl Popper, London – New York, Routledge, 2003, pp. 111–127, especially 112–113.

Institut für Philosophie

der Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg, Fakultät IV
(Human- und Gesellschaftswissenschaften)
D-26111 Oldenburg (Germany)
(minervaeule@uni-oldenburg.de)