Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Union Territory of
Chandigarh……………………………………………… (Prosecution)
Versus
Raj…………………...…………………………………..…… (Defence)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
b) Statutes
cause death?
7) Prayer
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATION FULL FORM
& And
MP Madhya Pradesh
Pg. Page
Sec. Section
SC Supreme
Court
u/s Under
Section
UOI Union of
India
v. Versus
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
b) Statutes
1. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860)
1974)
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Hon’ble Court has jurisdiction to try the instant matter under Sec.177 r/w Sec.209 of the
the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Sec.177: Ordinary place of inquiry and trial- Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired
‘
into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.’ r/w Sec.209:
it- When in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought
before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by
(b) subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody during,
(c) send to that Court the record of the case and the documents and articles, if any, which are
to be produced in evidence;
STATEMENT OF FACTS
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The accused cannot be held liable for murder as there was sudden and grave provocation
leading to the alleged act causing the death of the deceased and as such falls within Exception 1
of section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’).
Code’).
b) Whether the accused had an intention to cause death of the deceased or had knowledge
that such bodily injury is likely to cause death?
The accused had no intention of causing the death of the deceased as is clear from
circumstantial evidence and the behavior of the accused and thus does not fall under the ambit
of section 304 part I of the Code.
And, that the defence most vehemently denies all other charges framed against the accused.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
It is submitted that the accused whilst deprived of self-control and due to sudden and grave
provocation committed the said act. The said act falls under the first
f irst exception to section 300
Exception 1.—
1.—When culpable homicide is not murder.—
murder.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the
offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes
the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by
(First) —That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an
(Secondly) —That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by
a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.
(Thirdly) —That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right
Homicide is the killing of a human being by another. Under this exception, culpable homicide is
not murder if the following conditions are complied with : (1) The deceased must have given
provocation to the accused. (2) The provocation must be grave. (3) The provocation must be
sudden. (4) The offender, by reason of the said provocation, shall have been deprived of his
power of self-control. (5) He should have killed the deceased during the continuance of the
deprivation of the power of self-control. (6) The offender must have caused the death of the
person who gave the provocation or that of any other person by mistake or accident.
It is pertinent to note that the simple gesture of nodding on the phone and the suspicious
“…and that
“…and that for the ascertainment of the suddenness of the provocation it is not the mind of the
person who provokes that matters but that of the person provoked that is decisive.”2
(a) consider whether a sufficient interval has elapsed since the provocation to allow a
reasonable man time to cool, and (b) to take into account the instrument with which the
homicide was effected, for to retort, in the heat of passion induced by provocation, by a
simple blow, is a very different thing from making use of a deadly instrument like a
concealed dagger.
Indian courts have not maintained the distinction between words and acts in the application of
the doctrine of provocation in a given case. The Indian law on the subject may be considered
from two aspects, namely, (1) whether words or gestures unaccompanied by acts can amount
to provocation and (2) what is the effect of the time lag between the act of provocation and the
commission of the offence. In Empress v. Khogayi4, a division bench of the Madras High Court
held, in the circumstances of that case, that abusive language used would be a provocation
"What is required is that it should be of a character to deprive the offender of his self-control.
In determining whether it was so, it is admissible to take into account the condition of mind in
which the offender was at the time of the provocation. In the present case the abusive
language used was of the foulest kind and was addressed to man already enraged by the
It will be seen in this case that abusive language of the foulest kind was held to be sufficient in
the case of man who was already enraged by the conduct of deceased's son. The same learned
Judge in a later decision in Boya Munigadu v. The Queen5 upheld plea of grave and sudden
2
K. M. Nanavati vs State Of Maharashtra, 1962
19 62 AIR 605, 1962 SCR Supl. (1) 567
3
LR (1942) AC 1,9
4
(1879) ILR 3 Mad 122,123
provocation in the following circumstances: The accused saw the deceased when she had
cohabitation with his bitter enemy; that night he had no meals; next morning he went to the
ryots to get his wages from them, and at that time he saw his wife eating food along with her
paramour; he killed the paramour with a bill-hook. The learned Judges held that the accused
had sufficient provocation to bring the case within the first exception to s. 300 of the Indian
"............If
"............If having witnessed the act of adultery, he connected this subsequent conduct as he
could not fail to connect it, with that act, it would be conduct of a character highly exasperating
to him, implying as it must, that all concealment of their criminal relations and all regard for his
feelings were abandoned and that they purposed continuing their course of misconduct in his
house. This, we think, amounted to provocation, grave enough and sudden enough to deprive
him of his self- control, and reduced the offence from murder to culpable homicide not
amounting to murder."
The case illustrates that the state of mind of the accused, having regard to the earlier conduct
of the deceased, may be taken into consideration in considering whether the subsequent act
In Jan Muhammad v. Emperor6, it was held that the case was governed by the said exception.
The following observations of the court were relied upon in the present case:
"In the present case my view is that, in judging the conduct of the accused, one must not
confine himself to the actual moment when the blow, which ultimately proved to be fatal was
struck, that is to say, one must not take into consideration only the event which took place
immediately before the fatal blow was struck. We must take into consideration the previous
conduct of the woman, the whole unfortunate affair should be looked at as one prolonged
agony on the part of the husband which must have been preying upon his mind and led to the
All the aforementioned decisions dealt with a case of a husband killing his wife when his peace
of mind had already been disturbed by an earlier discovery of the wife's infidelity and the
subsequent act of her operated as a grave and sudden provocation on his disturbed mind.
Is there any standard of a reasonable man for the application of the doctrine of "grave and
life, traditional values etc.; in short, the cultural, social and emotional background of the society
to which an accused belongs. In our vast country there are social groups ranging from the
lowest to the highest state of civilization. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any
circumstances.7
The Indian law, relevant to the present enquiry, may be stated thus : (1) The test of "grave and
sudden" provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the
accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to
lose his self-control. (2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances,
cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the first
Exception to section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. (3) The mental background created by the
previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the
subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence. (4) The fatal
blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not
after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for
phone call combined with the suspicion of an affair had an incredulous effect on Raj causing
him to lose self-control and effect injury on the deceased by hitting a fl
flower
ower pot laying nearby.
With a total absence of malice, the provocation was grave enough to overpower his
harmonious marriage to Anita. As all the essentials of Exception 1 to section 300 are met, the
b) Whether the accused had an intention to cause death of the deceased or had knowledge
7 K. M. Nanavati vs State Of Maharashtra, 1962 AIR 605, 1962 SCR Supl. (1) 567
It is humbly contended that the requisites to implicate the accused for the offence of murder
under section 300 of The Indian Penal Code, 1860. Where an offence depends upon the proof
of intention the Court must have proof facts sufficient to justify in coming to the conclusion
that the intention existed. No doubt one has usually to infer from the conduct and one matter
that has to be taken into account is the probable effect of conduct. But that is never
imperative to distinguish between culpable homicide done with intention to causing death or
culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with 1[imprisonment for life],
li fe], or
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death,
or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is
done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause
Section 304, Part II of the Code applies where there is no guilty intention but there is guilty
knowledge. It refers to knowledge band does not refer to intention which has been segregated
in the first part. But knowledge is the knowledge of the likelihood of death. Where the accused
persons wielded their lathis on the head of one of the victims, they must have had knowledge
that they were causing such bodily injuries to him as were likely to cause death, the accused
In medical evidence there was only one injury on the head of the deceased which proved fatal,
8
Mayer Hans George, AIR 1956 SC 722
9
section 304, Indian Penal Code, 1860
circumstances the accused had only knowledge that the injuries inflicted by them were likely
l ikely to
cause death. The accused had no intention to cause death nor they had intention to cause such
injury which would be likely to cause death. There conviction altered from section 304, Part I to
Where except one blow of bunt side of axe on head, the accused did not cause any serious
injury on vital part of the body of the deceased, the deceased died six days after the
occurrence. The accused had no intention to cause the death of the deceased. The conviction of
the accused under section 302/34 was changed to one under section 304, Part II/34.12
Where the accused caused injury by throwing stone on the head of the deceased as a result of
which brain came out and deceased died. The conviction of the accused under section 304, Part
The question arises that even though the appellant had a chance and oppurtunities
oppurtunities to inflict
more injuries yet he did not avail of it, can an inference be made that it was injury intended to
be inflicted. The appellant used the axe, a weapon, for inflicting the injury and that too, on the
head of the deceased. It goes to establish that he had at least the knowledge that he is likely, by
his such act, to cause death and it indicated that he must have the knowledge that such an
injury caused by him would result in the following probabilities: a) that the injured might die, as
a result of such injury or b) the injured might survive. When two such alterations are available it
cannot be said that he, appellant caused the injuries with the intention to kill the deceased. In
view of this it is a fit case in which the conviction of the appellant be altered to under section
304, Part II of the Code.14
The first part of section 304 applies where there is guilt intention whereas the second part
applies where there is guilty knowledge. But before the accused was held guilty and punished
11
Madhusudhan Satpathy v. State of Orissa, 1995 SSC (Cri) 155
12
Babu Lal v. State of M.P., 1993 Cr LJ 2667 (SC)
13
Kotwal v. State of M.P., 1994 Cr LJ 255 (SC)
under the first part or the second part of section 304, a death must have been caused by him
under any of the circumstances mentioned in the five exceptions to section 300, which include
death caused while deprived of power of self control under grave and sudden provocation
while exercising in good faith the right of private defence of person or property, and in a
Culpable homicide is dealt with in section 299 of the Code which contains three clauses.
Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the
intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he
is likely by such act to cause death commits the offence of culpable homicide. Section 300 deals
with culpable homicide amounting to murder. Subject to the five exceptions enumerated in
section 300, culpable homicide is murder in four circumstances viz., if the act leading to death is
done with the intention of causing death, or if it is done with causing such bodily injury as the
offender to be likely to cause death of the victim or, if it is done with the intention of causing
bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death or, if the person committing the act knows that that it
is so imminently dangerous that, it must, in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death and, commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing
death or such injury as aforesaid. First clause of section 299 is the same as Firstly of section 300.
accused in the present case had no intention to cause death or such bodily injury as iiss likely to
cause death. For instance, the nature of the instrument allegedly responsible for causing the
death of the deceased was availed to at the crime scene corroborating the fact that there was
no premeditation on part of the accused. The accused did not inflict multiple injuries to the
15
Harendra Nath Mandal v. State of Bihar, 1993 East Cri C 239 (SC)
deceased further purporting that the accused was acting under a sudden and grave provocation
and the single and unintentional act comprises at the most an offence punishable under section
And, that the defence most vehemently denies all other charges framed against the accused.
PRAYER
1. Acquit Mr.Raj from the charge of murder under section 302 of the Code framed against him.
AND/ OR
Pass any other order it may deem fit, in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.
Place: Chandigarh
S/d ________________