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L GAME WARDEN
l: C E N ~ E RFOR
CENTER FOR N
A

AVAL A
NAVAL NALYSES
ANALYSES
•
1401
1401 W ilson B
Wilson oulevard
Bovlevard
A Virginia 2
r l i n g t o n . Virginia
Arlington. 2209
22209
c
C
Evaluation Group
Operations Evaluation
U
[1 January 1976

[j "
,
".
By: VICTORY CAXIELS, C.. E
OA.NIELS. JUDITH C RDHEIM
ERDHE1M c

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Prepared for:
Prepared /
lJ1- 0
°OFFICE O F N~L
O F F I C E OF NA / A L RESEARCH
RESEARCH
Department of the Navy
t h e Navy
[[ .~. i Washington, D.C."D . C : 20350
20350
OFFICE
O F F I C E OF
O F THE CHIEF
CHIEF OF NAVAL
N A V A L OPERATIONS
O P E R A T I O N S . (Op03)
(OPO3)
I:L Department of o f 'the
t h e Navy "
L~
!..
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t.~ Wash'ington, D.C.
Wash"ington, D . C . 20380·
20380. .
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TABLE OF CONTENT$
COm'ENTS
Page
Foreword ..............................................................
'" ................................................................................ " ............ ,. ....... " .. .. .. .. .. .. .... iii
Introduction "............................................................
Introduction ........ ................ ......... " ........................................................................ .. I1
, "

Summary ............................................................... 3
Conclusions ... , .................................................... . 5
.J . . . . . . . . ............ , ......................................... .
........................................................
~

j
11
.............................................................
Background ......................... , ........................................ " ............................................. . 7 U
Mekong
Vekong Delta and the RSSZ
end ...........................................
............................. , .... .......................................... . 7
'" ,.
~atu.re ...................................................
S a t w e of the threat ......................................................................................
• .........................
'.... ,. " 9 []
k:erdiction efforts .............:,
t:. S. Navy L"'.terdiction
V. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. • l 12
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

.............
Setcicg up the operation-
Setting o,eration--Decernber
Acquisitionofassets
Acquisition of assets and
- December 1965
a n d bbases
1963 through September 1968 ••••••••••••• 1
........................................
15
a s e s ••••••.••••.••••••••••••••••••••••.•.••. 15
C o o r d b t i o n within TF 116
CoordL"'.E.tion and with other commands ••••.••••••.•.• 18
116 a!ld
j

18 ............... u
PBR operational tactics and ..:..1.iques ".....................................
a.nd techniques tec~. 20 ~
operacions _............................................
f , ............ " .... " " . . . " " .... " .... " " .. " .. " , . . . " ....

Psychological
Psychologicalo?erations ~
.... " ..... " .... " .... " .... "" ........... " ... " ..... " .. "." .... " ..... . 24
Game Warden
\Vt;uden in t:c.e RSSZ ................................................
iatkeXSSZ • • • • ' ' ' ... , •••••••••• ~.,;.ff 26 •••••• • •••• " •••••• ~., ••

W v d e n In
Game \Varden ttt. hlekong Delta ..........................................
h the ~1ekong"" . " " l " " " 30
It . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " " " .. " .. " , " .. " ......... " .... , •

situa:ion l:l
The slt'Jation
Bt.bliogt"aphy
inOctober .............................................
1968 ...
October 1968 " .... "."" ......... " .......... """" . " ...... ,,.
............................................................ 39
Bibliography .. * ..... " " .. " "
37
.. "" "" .... " " .... " .. " " .. " " ........ " " •• " .. "" " , .... " • " .. ., .. " .. " .... " ...
f .. " ....... "

u
Appendix A -.Distribution of enemy supplies to III and IV Corps
Appendlx ......." A-I
C o r p s .......... A-1 -.A-12
A-I2 "

Append lx B •. VC/'SVA
Appendix VC/WA base areas and 2nd Order
O r d e r of Battle
kttle in in SVN .......... B-1·
SVN •••••••••• B-1 . B-8 -4
Appendix C -- 0r:kr military
Appendlx Ot~r
m i l i t v y and quaslmilltary
quasimilitary forces forces operating
i0 tb.e:
in hDelta and RSSZ .................................
RSSZ................ " " .. ,," , . " ....... " " . " " . " .. . c-1 -.C-3
Col C-3 t " " ..

Appendix D -.Gane
Appendlx G a z e Warden
Wwden task organization •••••••••••••• ........................ .D-1 D-l -.D-IO
D-10 f • ••••••••

Append lx E -.Cr.aracterlstics
Appendix C&Lxacteristicsof Game Warden assets a s s e t s .................E-! E-1 -.E-4 ••• " /IE . . . . '" , /IE /IE /IE " ....

Appendix
Appendix F Force levels.. ........................................
F ... Force !evels.r'.~*
•• "." •• "" •• F-1 ... F-4
Fool 't •• ';." •• _' •••••••••• "
P-4
Appendix
Append G -.Rules of
Ix G of engagement ................................... GG-1.. l ...G-G-99
e q a g e m e n t ••••
,Pdes /IE • " /IE /IE /IE • • • • • • • , • /IE " . " " • ,. /IE , '.' • " ,; . "

Appendk
Append
Append
lx H -. Mej:ong
Meiozg River rnercha.ri.t
Lx: I1...Game
Appendix Gazt: "'arden
Warden chronology ••
smuggling
merchant ship smugglin,g
...............................
................ H-1 .H-2
...... " /IE .. " ••• "

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Ii
'-' " FOREWORD
FOREWORD

[ text,
InInaddition
"additionto
text, this
tothe
this research
thedocuments
documentslisted
researchcontribution
ContributionisIsbased
basedon:
thebibliography
listedininthe bibliographyappearing
on: command
appearingatatthe
commandhistories;
histories;NavForV
end ofofthe
theend
NavForVin-house
themain
main
in-housework-
work-
ing
ingpapers,
papers, memormda,
memoranda, andanddrafts
drafts ofofbrieffngs
briefings and
and studies:
studies; interviews;
interviews; and
and intonnation
information
L provided
providedby bythe
theCentral
CentralIntelligence
Intelligence Agency
Agency(CIA)
(CIA) and
and the
theDefense
Defense Intelligence
Intelligence Agency
Agency(DIA).
(DIA).

Most of
Most ofthis
this information
information (except
(except that
that provided
provided byby the
the intelligence agencies) can
intelligence agencies) can be
be
U found in the Vietnam Command Files and the NavForV Provenance
found in the Vietnam Command Files and the NavForV Provenance Files at the Naval
History
History Division
Division Archives.
ArChives. The
The authors
authors express
express their
their appreciation
Files
appreciation to
at the Naval
Oscar Fitzgerdd
to Oscar Fitzgerald
[, of the Naval History DiviSion for his patience and help in using these files.
of the Naval History Division f o r his patience and help in using these files. The authors, The authors,
Li of
of course, assume f
course, assume ull responsibility
full responsibility ffor
o r their
their Fnterpretations
interpretations of of these
these documents.
docwnents.

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//' di
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION. U
Game was the
Warden was
G a m e W~en US. Navy/Vietnamese
the U.s. Navy (VNN) operation
Navyfliemamese Navy operation establiShed
established in
fn i~
December 1965
December to deny
1965 to deny enemy
enemy movement
movement and
and resupply'
resupply on the major rivers of
on the the Mekong
of the Mekong
Delta and
Delta and the Rung Sat
the Rung Sat Special (RSSZ)in
Special Zone (RSSZ) in South (SVN). The
South Vietnam (SVN). u. s. considered
The U.S. Considered
control to
river control to be

This research
This
be an e s s e n a element
an essential element in

research contribution examines

in the overall plan
the overall

the threat
examines the threat in
p h n to
to pacify

the Mekong
in the
SVN.
pacffy SVN.

Mekong Delta and the RSSZ,

and the RSSZ,
u
Game Warden's
specifically on the rivers. Game limitations on
Warden's response to the threat and limitations on that
are discussed, and enemy resupply needs, logistic
response are logistic routes, and infiltration options
options
are examined. Game
are Game Warde:l'S full effect on
Warda's full remains unknown,
on the enemy remains u - h o w n , but changing
changing
his use of
trends in his of Delta
Delta and RSSZ

The Game Warden concept

RSSZ waterways are are noted.
the beginning of Sea
concept was expanded with the Lords in OctOber
Sea Lords October
u
1968. Sea Lords is beyond ue
Lords is u e scope of this discussion of Game
this report, and the diSCUSSion
enls with September 1968.
in the Delta and the RSSZ encs
Game Warden
u
Figure 1 shows some
Figure loc~tionshighlighted in this report.
soxe of :he key geographical locations report.

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 /'

I CORPS
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[ II CORPS

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'\ III CORPS
RUNG SAT
SPECIAL ZONE
GULF OF
THAILAND SOUTH
CHINA
I X Y l l N "fiVCORPS SEA
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A" IV CORPS
XUYEN

. . .....

I.! 1:. SOUTH

FIG. 1:
FIG. SOUTH 'VIETNAM,
'VIETNAM I
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SUMMARY
bUMNWCY

1960s. the Viet Cong (VC)

During the early 1960s, (VC) in SUCCeSSfiLUYundermined
in southern SVN successfully
SVN government's
the SVN sense of national responsibility among
government's attempts to develop a sense among the
population. Much of the southern half
population. N Corpsl_-was
country--1II and IV
half of the country--III COrpsl--was under VCvc
this control, the V
control. But to maintain and increase this VCc had to infiltrate materm
infiltrate war materials
W a r
SVN.
into SVN.
lilto

1965, the U.
Through the early part of 1965, S. Military Assistance Command, Vie-
U. S. Vietnam
(MACV),
(MAC w ~ ,
V), considered the sea to be the main infiltration resupply route to southern SVN.
Even before the major U. 1965, Cambodia was suspected to be
U. S. commitment in SVN in 1965,
a link in the resupply chain.
chain. There was, however, a question concerning the emphasis,
emphasis
the communists placed on infiltrating supplies from Cambodia in relation to the emphasis
on seaborne infiltration.

1963, the Mekong/Bassac River complex was the major route from Cambodia
Before 1963,
u
to SVN used by the enemy for resupply.
resupply. By 1966, additional enemy crossing points were
located on the Cambodian/SVN
Cambdian/SVN border, and there were implications of high-level
military or govemment
government complicity in supplying the VC.
VC. MACV noted
high-level Cambodian
that Cambodia was
u
the only area borderkg
bordering SVN that could harbor communist forces
forces with no threat of being
countered by U. S. military action.
action. Supplies from Cambodia were brought into SVN by fJ
'-
inland waterways and overland routes.
routes.

1966, the VC
Until 1966, VC openly transited
transited the major rivers of southern SVN and taxed the LJ
insurgents' use of the rivers for logistical movement was thought to
popdation. The insurgents'
local population.
be generally cross-!;tream
cross-meam rather than than along-stream, especially in the lower Delta
m the South China Sea.
provinces fronting on Sea. Lines of communication connecting VC base
areas ran across major
m j o r rivers. Near the Cambodian border, though, there was more
along-stream tra€fic.
along-stream traffic.

SVN military and

SVN md civilian control of land, sea, and inland waterway routes was in-
adequate: the VNN River
adequate; Ricer Force was particularly ineffective. Its main function was to
furnish waterborne
furnish tlqloyments and support for SVN army operations. But river patrol
waterbome deployments lJ
was given a low priority; consequently, the VNN River Force had inadequate resources
d e v e b aa Significant
with which to develop capabjlity for such patrols.
significant capability patrols.
U
U
ITO
'To avoid confusion theVC
with the
confusionaith VC system of dmilitary
t a q regions in SVN (MR-l,
(MR-1, etc.),
etc.), &!tthis

,
report uses the older designation'of
etc.
etc.'
designation of "Corps

. .. . .. .
"Corps areas" for allied operatiOns--that
. .
18, I Corps,
operations--thzt is,

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U The U
The. .S. Navy made its first
U.S. first 'large
h g e commitment in SVN in 1965 with the
in March 1965
establishment of Market Time, aU.a U. Navy/VhW
S. Navy (Vl\'N coastal surveillance operation.
operation. Market
[: Time was to seal off the SVN coast from infiltrators. By mid-1966,
mid-1966, UMA.GV
4 C V discounted
Lnfiltratim as aa major, workable resupply method for the VC.
seaborne infiltration VC.

f-'· U.S. Navy/VNN

Game Warden was established in December 1965 as a joint U. Navy(VNN operation
to deny enemy movement and resupply on the major rivers of the Mekong Delta and the
RSSZ. The rivers inin the upper Delta in SVN are the Mekong and the Bassac. In the lower
sputs into 3 smaller
Delta, the Mekong splits RSSZ, the Long Tau River was
smaUer branches; in the RSSZ,
the major shipping channel to Saigon.

(: Game Warden assets included shallow-draft river patrol boats (PBRs), armed
Included shallow-draft armed UH-lB
UH-lB

' helicopters, and, In

based ashore or on
in the RSSZ, minesweeping
minesweeplng boats (MSBs). PBRs and helicopters were
On bases afloat. Three of the afloat bases were tank landing ships (LSTs)
l--~ stationed on the 3 major rivers of the lower Delta.
of the other afloat bases were nuch
much more
Delta. PBRs operating from an
flexible
flexible in meeting the threat
i ~ LST
than
n
were
o r One
or one
those
operating from shore bases.
l:
Game Warden river patrols enforced SVN curfews, interdicted
Interdicted some VC
VC logistical
and tactical movements, and succeeded inIn iniluencing
ifu"1uenclng some of the Delta popularion
population in
In
formerly VC-contro&d
VC-controlled area8
areas to support the SVN government. In the RSSZ, MSBs swept
SVN government.
dong the main
mines along Shipphg channels
main shipping chznnels and prevented the VC from closing off these vital
[I Links to Saigon.
links Saigon.

Game Warden forces in in the Mekong Delta were originally intended to give about equal
coverage to the major rivers. By mid-1967,
rivers. 8y uits in the upper Delta had reported only
mid-1967, units Ody
L: Light
light contact with the enemy a d
and were repositioned to give maximum concentration of
of
forces on the lower Delta rirers,
forces rivers, where extensive VC activity had been noted.
noted.
U 1968, the enemy was infiltrating
By spring 1968, infiltrating supplies over the Cambodian border with
impunity.
impunity. In response, PBRs sere
were again deployed to the upper. Delta.
Delta. But in July, PBRs
in the upper Delta,were,
Delta ,were, once %ah,
again, experiencing Ody
oilly light contact with the enemy.
enemy.
LJ
u g of Sea Lords later in
Evidence used in the pplanning In 1968 showed that the enemy
generally crossed the border by canals&n& o orr overland routes between the Bassac River and
of Thailand, o
the Gulf of orr to the north of the Mekong River,
River. .Uthough
Although the VC may have
used the major rivers to cross the u'1e border before then, they probably changed their route
patrols. In the hmer
to avoid PBR patrols. e r Delta, however, the VC were forced to cross major
rivers to supply their base L ? in the provinces between the rivers.
a.'"E:as
. .
. .
of a,
The concept of a static bbamer
t n i e r on the major rivers of
of the Delta-&d
Delta-and RSSZ proved
by 1968, and the (3-me
inadequate by Game Warden concept was expanded when Sea Lords began
Lords ;;as a Delta-wide
1968. Sea Lords
in October 1968. Delta-wide operation coordinating the combined assem
assets

....... . __ .. _4__L:--. ... . . -

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of
of the
the River
River Patrol
Patrol Force,
Force, and
and 22 other
other U
U.
. S.S. Navy
Navy in-country
in-country task
taSk forces,
forces, and
and U.
U. SS. and
. and
SVN ground
SVN ground forces.
forces. Sea
Sea Lords
Lords would
would continually
continually harass
harass VC
VC strongholds
strongholds and
and interdict
interdict
supplies infiltrated
supplies infiltrated from
from Cambodia.
Cambodia. TheThe fitst
first Sea
Sea Lords
Lords barriers
barriers were
were established
established onon
canals 35 to
canals to 40
40 &mi.
st.mi. from
from and
and parallel
parallel to
to the
the Cambodian
Cambodian border.
border.

CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS

Until more information becomes

becomes available concerning Game Warden's
Warden's effect on enemy
operations, it is unlikely that its total impact can be assessed. J
pointed to trends in the numbers of
Some analysts have pointed of enemy incidents on the rivers
areas that were critical supply routes for
as indicating afeas fOr the enemy.
enemy. But basing
baSing patrols on
of contact with the enemy could be misleading.
the frequency and intensity of misleading. For example,
deployed to the upper Delta experienced ffar
the few PBRs deploy&
the lower Delta.
Delta. This could have signified
a r fewer incidents than did those in
signified heavier enemy concentrations in the Iower
Delta. However, the more intensive PBR coverage in the lower Delta and comparable
lower U
Delta.
enemy concentrations in both areas could have resulted in the greater number of
Delta.
in the lower Delta.
of incidents
J
conclUSions, however, can be drawn from available intelligence, from assess-
Some conc~usiols,
ments of Game W Warden
v d e i participants, and from an examination of the evolution
evolUtion of the
operation:
* Game Warden
• Game Waden interrupted enemy movement On
on traditional routes across the
major Delta
Delu rivers.
efforts to close the sea lanes
• Enemy effortS Saigon--a major VC objective~-were
lanes to Saigon--a objective--were .
denied by U. S. Navy/VNN
U. S. Navy/V" forces.
Warden secured many sections of the major Delta and
•@ Game Warden and RSSZ rivers for
rivers for
commercial use. .]
Game Warden
CoOrdinifion between Game
• Coordin."'.tion Warden and
and ground fore
force.operations was inadequate.
e.. operations was Wequate.
• The
The mo::,!1e
mofiile afloat base concept provided flexibility
flexibility to
to river boat operations,
operations,
!~J
enabling river
n s e r forces
forces to
to respond
respond to
to aa continually changing
changing threat.
* curfewsproved
• Curfews proved to
to be
be absolutely
absolutely crucial
crucial to
to fulfilling
fulfilling Game
Game Warden's
Warden's mission.
mission.
• Helicopters were essential
Helicopters were essential to
to riverine
riverine operations
operations in
in fire support, observation,
fire support, observation,
and
and medical
m e d i a evacuation.
evacuation.
PBRs were
• PBRs were adequate
adequate for
for patrols
patrols on
on large
large major
major rivers,
rivers, but smaller waterways
but smaller vraterways
required more armor and armament.
required m x e armor and armament.
-

,-.::-====--

, ---------------_. --_.-._--
 /
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Ic , • The
The young u.S.S. Navy
young U. officers and
Navy officers a s t e d men
and eenlisted men assigned
asSigned to
to tiver
riverpatrols
patrols i
performed
performed aggressively and responsibly
aggressively and responsibly on their own
on their own hitiathe.
initiative.

I
r
L • The
The enemy
enemy proved
continually finding new
continually finding
to be
proved to be flexible
new routes
routes for
adapting to
flexible in adapting
his supply
for his supply lines.
lines.
Waxden in
Game Warden
to Game in the
the Delta
Delta by
by
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BACKGROLTND
BACKGROUND
']
.\ I
MEKONG DELTA AND THE RSSZ
J I

To understand the nature of the enemy that Game Warden had to deal with, it is impor-
tant to first understand the environment in which he operated.
lowland plain laced with an intricate and extensive waterway system (see figure 2).
of the Delta is less than 10 feet above sea level.
of level. There aare
impor-
operated. The Mekong Delta is a vast
2). Most
r e 2 major rivers in the upper
o
s s a c . The Mekong in the lower Delta has 3 branches: the Co Chien
Delta: the Mekong and kBassac.
Ham Luong, and My Tho. TIlO. The B l t a iiss also veined with thousands of canals, streams, and
Delta
ditches.

The wet season lasts fromfrom mid-May

mid-May to early October because of of the southwest monsoon,
u
and the dry season lasts from November through mid-March &ring during the northeast monsoon.
monsoon.
During the wet season, the ground in inundated because of of the heavy rains and poor surface
drainage. Typhoons Gin c,1.n also cause flooding from July through B December.
c e m b e r . From June
June
through November, most canals aare r e navigable by ships with a draft of
of more than 6 feet,
feet,
but the canals aare
r e subject to tidal influences from
from the South China Sea and the mlfGulf of
Thailand,
Thailand, making navigation difficult.

The Rung Sat Special Zone is a mangrove swamp laced with

With an intricate network of
canals southeast of Saigon. a r e the Long Tau and the
Saigon. The 2 major rivers of the Rung Sat are
Soirap. The Long Tau River is the critical shipping link to Saigon. During high tides,
be reached by sampan.
any part of the Rung Sat can be []
-- --
Sv"s population -- lived in the area
About 6 million people -- almost 40 percent of SVN's
south of Saigon in 1967. The average population density in the Delta was 460 persons p
Saigon, population density was 1,000 persons pper
square mile; near Saigon, e r square mile.
er
per J
The farm population in the Delta hamlets. Marsh areas .-
Celta was concentrated in small hamlets.
were uninhabited since they are unsuitable for growing rice, the main occupation of most
of the Delta population. The most densely populated provinces were those along the major
rivers. The South Vietnamese farmer relied on the rivers and other waterways not only
to carry his rich rice crop to market, but as
a s his main line of communication. In 1966,
45,000 registered watercraft and uncounted thousands of sampans
there were more than 45,000
that traveled the estimated 3~
3,000 n.mi. of navigable rivers and canals.
000 n.mi.

Blta (except for

Villagers in the Delta for those'
thuse around the port cities) had very little contact
with the outside world. Their knowledge and interest in areas beyond keyond their immediate
J
centuries, tight~knit
environment was extremely limited. For centuries, tight-knit families
families had been
keen the cen-
hown as
social structures known
ter of small village soci.8.l a s hamlets.• They
_0. were socially consemative
conservative
~

mernal
and strongly resisted external influences. This
This situation presented the SVN
SVN government
--

... -.__
sense of national reSP?llsibility.
. with aa difficult problem - - developing aa sense responsibility.

-7-
. -._ ..... --
o
..
~ ~

~. ~. . -. ... ... .. .
J
~

~~ ~

. .. .. ,.
.. . . .. . . .

"'r
~. ~-"- .~-
L __ ___ , ______ _
., --- ---

I
i
. ,I ~\.. '
SOUTH
I, VIETNAM
1 ..~,
.·i

~~
I
i
..
I! .'

I
Ii
00
,I
1
ii
!
GULF
'I
OF
SIAM
i SOUTH
i
i
CHINA
.1,
SEA \
,
i
1

'i
i FIG. 2: MEKONG DELTA AND RUNG SAT
'i
iI .

Ii,.
 /"
/ J
]
The enemy in SVN capitalized on this
this. weabess.
weakness. The VC, ve, directed and Supported by
supported by
NVN, conhcted
NVN, conducted a tampaign
(:ampaign of
of terror, propaganda, political subversion, economic sabo-
aggression. By 1964, according to DIA,
tage, and military aggression.
to be to destroy and prevent
prevent establishment of of pacified
ve objectives i
DIA, VC
pacified hamlets, consolidate
in
sabo-
n SVN seemed
consolidate liberated areas,
J
and destroy government forces.

included gains in territory and population

population control
J
VC military successes during 1964 included
as well aass vvirtual capitals.
i a l isolation of government forces in many provincial and district capitais.
Operations involving one o orr more battalions were carried out with relative impunity.
]
Terrorism and propaganda efforts,efforts, particularly among the rural population, were suc-
cessful in gaining either widespread cooperation with the VC o orr at least noncooperation
govenunent.
with the SVN government.

NATURE OF THE THREAT

1965-1966 shows that the United States originally had an inadequate

Documentation for 1963-1966
of the intricate and detailed organization and in-country network used by
understanding of by the
VC to transport supplies into SVN (see appendix A A).
).

the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi established the Central Committee for
In about 1962, rhe
SVN (COSVN).
(COSVN). It was
w s through this organization that NVN controlled the VC logistic sup-
ply system in SVN. After SVNS V N President Diem's death in 1963,
1963, the enemy's lOgistic
logistic sys-
tem began to evolve
1959)
evolve rapidly. The communications and liaison system (established about
count~ywideand furnished
1959) was virtually countrywide furnished COSVN
COSVN with aa very efficient network of con-
U
trol down to the village level. .
iJ
Through the beginning
Through

arms
Iq@ning of 1965,
route for VC resupply
of arms and
resuply to southern SVN. Between 1963
ammunition
ammunition were delivered by
1963 and March 1965,
communist trawlers to
1965, up to 4,200
SVN. The
4,200 tons
,-'
1965, MACV considered the sea to be the main infiltration -----

destinations
trawlers S W . The &stinations ._
-
tons---..,,-
I
- [J
of the early trawlers were probably An Xuyen and Kien Hoa Provinces in in IV Corps.
Corps. By -- -
mid-1966, because of the buildup
h i l & p of Market Time, MACV discounted seaborne infiltration
as
as a major VC resupply
resllpply method.
_-
Even before the the major
inajor U.S,
U.S. commitment in SVN during
during 1965,
1965, Cambodla
Cambodia was
was suspected
suspected
of playing aa role
role in communist resupply effort
the communist
inthe effort to III and
to III IV Corps. fut
and IV €htthere
there is some
is some
question
question as
as toto the
the emphasis
emphasis that was
was placed on
on infiltration
infiltration from
from Cambodia
Cambodia in
in relation to
to the
the
emphasis on seaborne infiltration.
emphasis on seaborn W t r a t i o n .

.~
..
..
~

.
~.
.. . .
. .

. .. , .
_- o
.

. -9':
J
________________~_____l
ul
u ,/"

U Before 1963,
Before 1963, the,Mekong/Bassac
the,Mekong/BassacRiver complex was the main route from
for resupply in SVN. By 1966, crossing points on the Cambodia/SVN border
from Cambodia
border had been pin-
implications of high-level Cambodian military or
pointed, and there were implications o r goverrurient
government com-
con-
11 plicity in the infiltration of supplies to the VC. MACV noted that Cambodia was
Of supplies was the only
area bordering SVN that could harbor communist forcesforces with no threat of U. S. military

Ii (see appendix A).

action (see

Supplies from
Supplies from Cambodia wi=re
wgre brought into SVN by inland waterways and overland
into SVN
routes. They were transported by sampans,
sampans, junks,
junks, ox carts,
carts, and porters. Supplies
U were moved in stages and handled through as a s many supply depots
depots as
a s were necessary to
ensure
ensure security. No single unit carried supplies over an entire route. Supplies were
Ii
.~,
2rea to another when needed or when aa particular route and
shifted from one rear service area
destination were not impeded l:rf S V N or
by SVN o r U.S. forces. Each rear-service area covered
only one portion of a route. '

LJ Each communist military region had its o"'m own supply system and organization. VC
base
bse areas played an integral role in the resupply network (see
(see appendix B). They SErved
sorved
lj either as way-stations or
O r as
a s fbal
China Sea coast were originally
f i 1 destinations for
f o r supplies. The base areas
a r e a s on the South
originalljy the focus of major resupply efforts by sea. After 1965, 1965,
rear service groups on the ceast
cozst shifted their orientation to receiving supplies from
U Cambodia.

Came Warden had to cope

Game c o p With
Kith an a n enemy who controlled much of the RSSZ and Delta. Blta.
The enemy knew the terrain and interconnecting watenvays, waterways, allowing him considerable
LJ freedom of movement. The VC used the rivers overtly and covertly. They disguised· disguised
themselves as as civilians (with forged
(with forged identification cards) or used someone with legitimate
legitimate·
U papers to smuggle for them. SmuggledSnuggled goods were hidden il)
--- overheads of junks, oorr were hruried
l:ulkheads or
ip false bottoms, hlkheads
r i e d under such hard-to-move cargo aass rice, sugar cane,
- and
and-fish.
fi'ih. One smuggler of raw materials for explosives said that he be concealed contra-
U ·'-nand· iii a false
- . l S ~inb fa1s.e overhead of the
t jUll,k's
k jqqk's
covered that junks appearing eempty
deckhouse and carried
and'carried
x p y stood less chance of
no other cargo. He dis-
of a thorough search,
dis-
search, than junks
carrying an obviously full l&d. load.
(, .-.
.. -
-_
- , In covert
,
of the rivers, the VC moved carefully to avoid contact with government
In covert use of the rivers, the VC moved carefully to avoid contact with government
.
representatives. They preferred to travel at night, usually between 2000 and 2200 hours
represEmtatives. They preferred to travel at night, usually between 2000 and 2200 hours
L: and just before dawn. Game W2rden
during the day.
movements &ring
Warden Delta river patrols later forced
. .the VC to attempt
.

t The enemy also generally moved aatt or near high tide, since the tide opened areas
a t s . When supplies were moved toward crossing points, bar-
closer to the brush for bboats. har-
assing fire was used against SYN SVN army outposts in the area. To make it more difficult
difficult
U for friendly forces to predict 2a crossing attempt, the VC did not maintain groups of Water-
craft at the crossing point; tthey procured
k q procured
. .sampans
water-
needed.
sampans from the immediate area when needed.

L .
--
- .....
... .----
.-....
.
-1o-L-2-
.-10": ..
..
. . .
.. . .
----.
.
.--

[;
.'
. . .. ....
, ..

t:
.,
U""~_
 /./’
u
The VC normally moved in groups of 4 o r 5 per sampan, and the sampans traveled in
4 or in u
u
pairs.

The VC transited the river as

a s cross-stream instead of up- or
o r downstream traffic in
many areas, especially in the lower Delta provinces on the South China Sea. VC control

Pa Xuyenhovinces.
Hoa, Vinh Binh, Bac Lieu, and Ba
large base areas in
in these provinces was extensive, and the enemy had large in Go Cong, Kien
comect-
Xuyen Provinces. The lines of communication connect-
]
ing these base areas ran across major rivers. In the provinces near the Cambodian b bor-
r-
der, there
der, rhere was more enemy along-stream trafac.
traffic.
U
In addition to their extensive use of waterways for
for logistical and tactical movemeas,
movements,
the VC frequently channeled and taxed legitimate civilian maritime traffic, especially in
those areas where they had firm
firm control along the river banks. In the SVN-controlled
SVN-COntrolled
in J
areas, mobile VC tax stations operated with no discernible patterns. Tax levies were
usually extracted in the form of rice, salt, fish, livestock, and produce. Transporta-
Transporn- :]
Because tax collecting was an important source of vc
tion taxes were also significant. &cause VC
revenue, it was almost a daily undertaking.

The largest VC threats

threats to river patrols were amrushes
a m h s h e s and mines. Individual enemy
U I

a r m s and automatic weapons, and there were reports of

craft fought PBRs with small arms mi-
of sui-
cide teams in sampans who had been trained to move alongside the PBRs PERs in the best posi- ]
tion to damage the roats
bats with self-destruct charges.

incicknts occurred when patrols were returning and security and surveil-
Most mining inci.dents !J
".
lance were lax. Mining attempts
attempts were usually coordinated
Coordinated with small arms,
arms, automatic
automatic
weapons, and, occasionally, recoilless rifle fire.
J
Amhshes usually took
Amrushes took place in
in daylight and at low tide. They were mounted from
parts of waterways. The enemy lured boats (r r ...
-r
protected firing positions
posirions
shore or
toward the shore
along narrow
from one
fired from
o r fired one bank to drive a PBR toward the oppostie bank, where
-- [l
the boat was amrus!wd.
amhshed.

In one incident, a PBR Sighted

In sighted a 1/4-inch &om the riv~t's-.
1/4-inch wire leading into the brush from river’s -. J
(Police and Regional Force and Popular
edge just down stream from an RF/PF (police Popuhr Force).91!t::..:---
Force) Gut;
~

---
platoon was
post. A platoon.was dispatched to investigate and discovered a 10-kilo
lO-kilo mine along
fresh water near the area. They traced the wire into the river and found
food and fresh
with'
-a&’
found a large
large
]
explosive ordnance disposal team from Nha Be.
mine, which was recovered by the explosive lk. The
found aa well-laid ambush site with 3 foxholes,
platoon also found
mine facing
facing the river, and 2 spools of wire.
foxholes, aiming stakes,l
stakes, a claymore ]
'.

lWooden
‘Wooden stakes stuck
m c k into
info the bottom of the river with the tops showing, providing exact
line-of-si& information.
range and line-oi-sight
J
U
. .:..:.:..:=.-1l-~=========
....=.:::--:=.=.:=···==c=.=..=..;::..=··:...;·""'··::...·.:::
-===-:.:==-.:.::c.:

U
I
:I 0
.\
 ,/'

L
lJ The enemy often had excellent intelligence on watercraft schedules and capabilities.
preferred to carry out ambushes when craft were returning from
A s with minings, the VC Preferred
As f~om

l' a n operation because the boat's route would k

an e more predictable; 57mm. or
be o r 75mm. recoil-
less rifles supported by automatic weapons were often used instead of mines during an
a m h s h . The rifles were more accurate than mines because the target did not have to be
ambush,
r:
L.,
in one position to be attacked. Moreover, the recoilless rifles were more fleXible
easier to set up than were mines.
flexible and

U If they were forced to move,

The VC were generally patient enough to wait out patrols. If
they would begin sniper fire upstream or
o r downstream from their crossing point to decoy the
patrol away from
from the area. They needed an intricate warning system against patrols, using
U lights, gongs, bells, and
colored lights, 2nd shots.

At the end of 1965, U. S. did not hknow

1965, the U.S. o w the extent of VC use of the R l t a and RSSZ.
Delta
[1 The first Game Warden operatioZlaI
operatiola1 order identified major knoivn
adjacent to the rivers and selected
knovnl VC-controlled areas
selened suspected enemy crossing points (see (see figure
figure 3).
3).

u U. S. NAVY INTERDICTION
NTERDICTION EFFORTS

MACV made a Significant

significant effort to detennine
determine the nature of the threat in the Delta
Lklta and
u the RSSZ and how to efficiently
team of senior U.
eEicient1y utilize SVN forces to meet this threat. In January
U. S. Naval officers
January 1964,
1964, a
officers was directed to study and analyze the nature of the

u threat and offer recommendatiozs

recommendations for improved control and prevention of infiltration of
war supplies and personnel into
umented in the "B.lcklew
S V " The conclusions reached by this study group (doc-
i.m:o SVN.
"Eucklew Report'?
Report") indicated that there was evidence of enemy infiltration,
and that this infiltration was aided S V N military and civilian control of the
2id5d by inadequate SVN
u Land, sea, and inland waterway
land,
direct U.S.
watenray routes. Although the report did not initiate any immediate
involvement, it did point out South Vietnamese defiCiencies
U. S. involvement, deficiencies in dealing with

u the situation.

U.
U. S. advisors to the VSNTh..~ were
Tere aware of the ineffectiveness
ineffectiveness of the River Force in
addition to what was cited in tt~k "B.lcklew
.addition
Ii "FUcklew Report. VM'J
VNN craft were slow and noisy and
thetr~ews unenthusiastic. Since
%&-srews S b the main role of the River Force was to provide capa-
capa-
-
_ bilities
bilities for waterborne deployme;tts
deplyievs and support for SVN anny
army operations, the VI\W paid
VN'N
relatively TIttle
relatlvely ri,er control. The urgency of denying the VC use of Delta
little attention to nTer
and RSSZ waterways was not recognized; therefore,
therefore, river patrol was given a very low
priority. A A s a remlt,
result, the River
Ri,er Force had totally inadequate resources for river patrol.

The first large-scale U.S.

U.S. in-country naval commitment in SVNS V N came in February
1965
1965 after a North Vietnamese trawler was discovered to have delivered arms and ammu-
Ro B
nition to the VC at Vung RO y inil
Pay in II Corps.
Corps. InIn response, the U.S.
U.S. Navy established
Market Time. Ships and aiz-inh
aircraft patrolled the 1,000 n.mi~ of SVN coast to counter sea-
I, 000 n.mi. sea-
borne infiltration. .

Ll ----
======---.:;:::
....... .....
. ._:.:;:.:
.
c.::-=====~-12--
::.=-
. . . .
-
....
. . . . . ... ..................... . . .......

u ..
. .-.- .... ~.

,l
 .

i
!I

,
I
I
• I
I
f

.,;
..."
C;>
. t,
SOUTH
Cu Lao Mag CHINA
Island

I)
SEA

.:i . \Cu Lao Dung

Lao Dung
:..:...
...:... ..:...
::..
.....
i.: ~
Island
,,>$(:::.:.,.:y+
:. "seiected" suspect
··Selected" suspect crossing
crossing
,.,. . .. • points (OpOrder
points 1966)
(OpOrder 1966)
.. .'.'..........
.......
.:.>:..x.5'i. Enemy-controlled areas
~:fff~:
.... Enemy-controlled areas

bases
PBR bases
•0 PBR
'\
,
\t
FIG. '3: KNOWN
FIG.3: KNOWNVC·CONTROLLED
VC-CONTROLLED AREAS
AREAS AND
AND SUSPECTED
SUSPECTED ENEMY
ENEMY
CROSSING
CROSSING POINTS'
POINTS FEBRUARY
FEBRUARY 1966
1966

- - - - - - - - - , - - - - , - -
 //

u The Chief
The Chief of
Market Time,
of the Naval Advisory
the Naval
Time, initiated
Advisory Group
initiated studies
studies to
Group (CHNAG),
to determine
( C M G ) , MACV,
determlne whether
MACV. who
whether Market Time
who was
was responsible
Time could
responsible for
Ix expanded
could be
for
expanded into
into

l! the Mekong
the
Army was
Army
Delta and
Mekong Delta and the
the RSSZ. The
was discussed. It
personnel and
and close
It was
The possibility of
was finally
finally deCided
close coordination
decided that
that the
assigning major
of assigning
the U. S.
S. Navy
major rivers
Navy -- with
coordination with VNN River Assault Groups
with its
to the
rivers to
--
the U.S.
U.S.
experienced
its experienced
Groups (RAGs, see appen-
(RAGS. see appen-
boat personnel
[: C) and
dix C)
dix Task Force
and Task (TF)115
Force (TF) --
was better
115 - - was keener suited
suited for
for the
the job.

from the
Representatives from the Chief
Chief of
of Naval
Naval Operations
Operations (CNO),
(CNO), Commander
Commander in Chief,
in Chief,
Pacific (ChCPac),
Pacific (CinCPac), Commander in Chief,
in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CinCPacFlt),
(CinCPacFlt), MACV, and CHNAG
and CHNAG
met
met in
in Saigon
Saigon in
in September
Septemhr 19651965 to
to draft
draft plans
plans for
for the
the expanded
expanded Market
Market TimeTime force.
force. They
recommended that 120120 suitable
suitable river boats for the
be purchased for
boats be the Delta/RSSZ operation.
Septemker and December 1965,
Between September Yavy realized tl1at
1965, the Navy that the problem of the rivers
[1 was
was separate
separate from
from that of
Of the
the coast and warranted itsits own
own task force
force... - On 18
18 December
1965, Game
1965, Game Warden, the river patrol force,
force, was established a s T
as TF F 116.

[ ;

~: -=:-::: _: - -1:.,:.4-:::;--==-:,::====-====.:..:=.:=-=----=--=-----:;::---:.='--'--

I
j
 J
:I
SEITING UP THE OPERATION--DECEMBER
OPERATION--DECEMBER 1965
1965
u
SETTING
THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1968

ACQUISITION OF ASSETS AND

AND BASES
J
From December 19651965 through h?arch
March 1966, the Naval Advisory Group establish&
framework ffor
basic operational and logistical framework o r Game Warden.
established the
i r s t OpOrder U';FS
Warden. The ffirst was
J
issued in February 1966. Game Warden was divided kit0 into 2 task groups: TG 116.1 for the
116.2 ffor
Mekong Delta and TG 116.2 o r the RSSZ (see appendix D).
D).

o r the Delta was an urgent requirement.

Finding a river patrol boat suitable ffor requirement. The
boat had to be fast, lightweight, maneuverable, equipped with a propulsion system that
would Operate shallow waters infested with a variety of
operate in sllallow of plant and aanimalllie,
n i d Life, and with-
with-
J
hur:tid environment.
stand a hot and hunid
mercial designs. The PBR
environment. The boat also had to be selected from existmg
PER finally chosen had a glass-fiber
existing corn-
com-
glass -fiber hull and was powered by what IJ
propulsion system--a
was then a new propaion system--a jet water pump (see appendix E).

In all, 120 PBRs were scheduled to be operational by the end of the year--40
year--40 in the U
RSSZ and 80 in the Delta. Each "river
river patrol area was to be covered by a group of of 10 PERs.
10 PBRs.

Four inactive LSTs were recommissioned during 1966 1966 to serve aass floating bases,
bases. Each
LST would support 10 B R s and aa fire-support
10 PBRs fh-e-support team of 2 helicopters.
helicopters. The LSTs prOvided
provided
both 24-hour-a-day
24-hour-a-day support for
for the PBRs and 40mm. gunfire support.

Warden. They received new boat-

The LSTs were extensively modified for Game Warden.
handling booms, aa helicopter
Micopter
electronic gear. Until
electrOnic
deck equipped for
for day and night operations, and the newest
specially configured LSTs arrived
fhst of these specially
Urtil the first a a i v e d in %N early
in SVN U
equipped with temporary helicopter decks
in November 1966, 3 dock landing ships (LSDs) equipped
npport.
provided the afloat support.
J
Original plans d k d for
p h s called f o r stationing the LSTs at the mouths of the Delta rivers, but :\
focus of operations forced the LSTs inland. 1966,
heavy seas
an LSD
~ e a and chmges in the focus
s chz.'1ges
LSD had reporte:i
r e p o r t d the loss
loss of asas much as half its
as half
inland. Earlier in 1966,
its operating time because of
Of heavy
heavy winds
U
and seas.

Game
Game Warden shore
siore bases in 19661966 were at Cat Lo, Nha
Nha Be.
Be, My Tho, Vinh Long,Lag,
u
Tho, and
Long Xuyen, Can T!la, and Sa Dec, Naval Support
Sa Dec. Activity at
Support Activity at Saigon
Saigon was r e s p m i b k for
was responsible for
aid-1966, an
base support. In rnid-1966, LSD was stationed between the
an LSD the mouths of the Co CO Chien
and Bassac Rivers; a d beginning in November, an
Rivers: a:cl an LST was stationed
stationed on the Bassac.
Bass=. By
September
September 1968,
1968, Garne
G z r e Warden forces
forces were based at 4 shore
shore bases at Nha
hTha Be, My Tho,
Sa
Sa Dec, and Binh 11l1.'1
TLL! (figure
(figure 4); on-station
4); 3 on -station LSTS;
LSTS; and
and 5 other bases afloat.
afloat.

o
J
U
 r--- -.- -.-. c--

[I
[I
L ____ _ ~ r---'

~,
,-----

i
!
I
.,!
. .

.;
'

:.,..:,.-16-
~.
. . , .

BINH THUY
,

..

CAN TWin'.'
. ..

, .
.... .

,,

:.
. . .
.

, -
.

-..

.; .
.'

... ,!
.

\
,.
.i

FIG.4: PBR SHORE BASES

 /
/' u
iJ
operational. 3 remained On
When the 4 Game Warden LSTs were operational, on Station
station on the Bassac,
Bassac,
out-of-country for maintenance.
Co Chien, and Ham Luong Rivers; the fourth was Out-of-CO~tr'y maintenance. The
bases. There-
LSTs were overcrowded and lacked the maintenance capabilities of the shore bases. There- U
=
fore, after being based on an LST ffor
o r about 5 months, a PBR
PER river section would rotate
with a shore-based unit. PBRs
shore-based unit. PERs found, however, that operating from an LST Or
threat.
5 other afloat bases offered much more flexibility in countering the threat.
or one of the
J
By the end of 1966, it was obvtous
growing
obvious that more boats would be needed to respond to the
Delta. On 28 February 1967, CNO approved a
grovring number of enemy incidents in the Delta. J
of 250 BRs.
force level of PBRs. By April 1968, the river patrol force
force had grown to 200 PBRs and,
late 1968, to 250 (appendix F).
by Iate
J
Recognizing the need ffor ComNavForV recommended a second
o r increased force levels, ComhlavForV
PER, the Mk II,
generation PBR,
\lith U
was signed uith United
n September 1966. In March 1967, a contract to buy 80 Mk IIs
IT, iin ITs
PERs were to be assigned to the Delta,
n i t d Boatbuilders; 60 of these new PBRs ~J
and 20 were to be uused Corps1.
sd in a new river division in I Corps1.

PER gunfire support. Since the Navy

Helicopters were the most suitable aircraft for PBR U
U. S. Army 197th Aviation Company furnished
had no helicopter gunships of its own, the U.
UH -lB ItOquois
the armed UH-1B
March 1966,
used by Game Warden forces (see appendix E
iroqUOis helicopters used ). I
E).
1966, SecDef directed Navy crews to take over all Game Warden helicopter oper-
In
n
U
atiOnS as soon
ations as soon as free the Army
as possible to free h y of that responsibility. By the end of the year,
crews manned 8 Game
Navy crews W-
Game Warden
Game Warden while 2 were in
UH-Bs; 6 of the helos operated in sUPPOrt
Army UH-lBs;
in the maintenance pool at Vung Tau.
suppon of [J
By the end of 1967,
1967, 22 Game Warden helos were organized
orgadzed into 11
11 light helicopter
fire teams. Three fire
fire fire teams operated from
from the Game teams from
Game Warden LSTs, 4 teams from fixed
fixed
bases at l\'ha
h%aBe, Dong Tam,
Tam, Vinh Long, and Binh Thuy, and 8 helicopters remained in the
Vxng Tau. By 1968,
maintenance pool at Vung 1968, Vinh Long was also designated as
as aa maintenance
base.
base.

detachmat had 2 full

Each detachment s o one
full crews so one crew could be kept on 24-hour alert. Helos
avaiLzble to all PBRs
could then be available FBRs within 20 minutes. The helicopter shore
shore bases andand the
LSTs were located so that the maximum patrol distance from from the base or ship
Ship was limited
to 35 n.mi.
to 35 n.mi. or
o r less
less from
from most incidents. Helo
Helo firepower
firepower helped PBRs carry
c a n y out
Out preplanned

-
1
'PBRs
to
.
PBRs had first
.
first operated
0perVed outside
to protect supplies
supplies moving
outside the Delta and
moving north
north from
and RSSZ
from Danang to
RSSZ in
in September
to Thua
September 1966.·
Thua Thien!
1966. They were used
and Quang
Thien'and Q m g Tn
used
Tri Provinces.
Prwlnces.
o
this river division
Ultimately, this division evolved into aa task force __
force called Clearwater.
i]
o
0. u
j .
______________~~__ l
 ,,/
/'

POsitions, especially when these positions were located in

attacks against fixed enemy positions,
tJ aareas risk. As part of their
r e a s that were not accessible to PBRs without unreasonable risk.
secondary mission, the helicopters performed e r i a l reconnaissance arid
performed aaerial and were involved
U in medical evacuation,
evacuation.

SEALs (sea, air, land, reconnaissance teams), highly specialized in counterguerrilla

Ii warfare, were first used in the RSSZ in 1966. By 1968, there were also SEAL teams
attached to each Game Warden task group in the Delta,
Delta.

[: About 90 percent of the SEAL effort was devoted to gathering intelligence. Most
often, SEALs were carried into their area of operation at night either by PBRs oorr fast
craft of their own. SEAL operations usually consisted of ambushes, establishing
patrol craft
(; listening posts, or raiding in VC territory.

"ith other Commands

Coordination within TF 116 and Kith
CTF 116
116 and subordinate commanders were served by Navy Operations Centers (NOC),
(NOC),
of Command Information Centers ashore.
the equivalent of ashore. All NOCs could communicate
[i of other commands in their areas. Helo support was requested
with the operations centers Of
t: operations were coordinated by the NOC.
through the NOC, and PBR operaions

[I CTF 116 headquarters was located at Can Tho oorr Binh Thuy, near Can Tho, ffor
of the operation. Can Tho, centrally located in N
of
o r much
rv Corps and the largest city in the Delta,
was the headquarters of the SVNSVN army's commanding general and the senior U. S. advisor
u for
f o r that corps. It was also the headquarters of the VNN'Fourth Riverine Area.
VNN Fourth Riverhe

Each task group commander--CTG 116.1 and 116. 2--was also an advisor to the VNN.
116.2--was VNN.
[! The locations of Game Warden bases at VNN bases eased the advisory duties of CTF 116.1
and 116.2.
116.2.

U Vietnamese liaison personnel worked with Game Warden crews to help in junk and
sampan searches and to commrnicate
communicate with Vietnamese craft and shore units.
units,. They also
advised U.S.
U. S. crews on local caditions
conditions and customs. VNN officers and enlisted men
[] times, Game Warden authorities requested additional help
generally handled liaison. At tines,
RF IPF boat companies (see appendix C).
from the National RF/PF

lj
l.
By January 1968, TF 116
116 was
ras reorganized, expanding from
new river task groups had commands
cO-s
from 2 to 4 task groups. The
on the Bassac River (TG 116.1),
116. l), Co Chien River
(TG 116.2), My Tho River (TG 116.3), and in the RSSZ (TG 116.4). 116.4). Although the RSSZ
II patrol group commander still functioned
h t i o n e d as an advisor, the 3 new Delta task group com-
responsibility. A new advisory billet for the TV
manders did not have that respnsibility. rv Riverine
com~
R i v e r h e Area

u (the post formerly held by CTG 116.1) was set up outside Game Warden's
Warden's chain of command.

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of the 4 new task group commands was assigned about the same number of
Each of
PBRs, helos, and SEALS.
SEALS. MSBs were assigned in the RSSZ, and an LST was assigned to
each Delta task group. The LSTs could operate as far upstream aass the Bassac-Mekong
Bassac-Mekong
U
crossover. In June 1968,
crossover. 1968, another task group (TG 116.5)
116.5) was established in the upper
Delta.
Delta. J
The river patrol force had no precedents to rely on for guidance. Operational methods
i=ediate experience aass the force
and concepts developed largely from immediate force evolved. The 1966
OpOrder encouraged task group and unit commanders to exercise their initiative and act
J,
fairly autonomously. They kept their superiors informed of of their actions by daily situation
reports and on-the-spot
on-the-spot reports of significant incidents,
Incidents. They were authorized to arrange
With other U.
local joint operations with U. S. and SVN armed forces and with SVN district and
province government representatives.

between U.
There was actually little coordination bemeen forces and the VNN
U. S. Game Warden forces
u
Force. In addition, the mutual distrust benveen
River Force. between the VNN River Force and the SVN
SVN
army limited the former to blocking operations and patrols.
patrols. The U.
U. S. Army Occasionally
occaSionally
RAGs in
used VNN RAGS ill amphibious operations, but coordination was poor.

IJ
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PBR
PER OPERATIONAL
OPERATIONALTACTICS
TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
TECHNIQUES

l: forces were tasked to enforce

Game Warden forces enforce SVN government curfews; interdict VC
infiltration, movement, and resupply; and eliminate the VC insurgency In t h e i i aareas
in their" r e a s of
operations. To accomplish these goals,
goals, Game Warden forces
forces performed harassment
hzrassment and
minesweeping
interdiction operations, river patrols, and mine sweeping operations, especially along the
Saigon shipping
main Saigon shipping channels.
(! Game Warden forces
forces were authorized to visit and search all river craft except foreign
foreign
flag steel-hull merchant ships,
flag ships, warships, o r customs craft unless
warships, and military, police, or
speCifically
specifically authorized by CTF 116
116 (see
(see appendix G). The Mekong River and its its navigable
[I international waterways
branches were, by treaty, international watenvays and open to those nations recognized
S V " Cambodia,
diplomatically by SVN, Cambodia, and Laos.
•
1966, the Vietnamese Customs Agency enforced regulations governing transit by
By 1966,
By
(I

merchznt
merchant ships (see H). If
(see appendix H). If merchant ships on international inland waterways
watenvays
o r if
offloaded cargo to watercraft, or if they dropped items overboard, Game Warden forces
forces
lJ were supposed to make every effort to apprehend the craft upon their departure from
tO,apprehend
alongside the ship and to recover items dropped overboard.

U Game Warden PBRs noted one such incident. In In July 1966,

1966, 2 PBRs on random patrol
established radar contact with a ship that had 3 smaller boats alongside. When the PBRs
$hem, the small craft headed for
approached them, for the river banks and the ship weighed anchor.
[I The ship was identified as aa tanker,
tanker, the Mekong Phnom Penh of Cambodian registry, flying
only a South Vietnamese flag aft. It was impossible to determine whether the tanker had
been offloading contraband for VC forces
forces in the area. fut
&t the ship'
ship'ss activity and the fact
hct
l' that it was anchored in a Prohibited
prohibited area made this a strong possibility.

[' PER operations were based on 2-boat

other and normally in midstream.
patrol~, each b
2-boat patrolg,
midstream. Each patrol lasted aabout
a t within radar range of the
boat
b u t 12
1 2 hours. The PBRs had
neither the armor nor the ffirepower
i r e w e r to attack the river banks. The @Order
OpOrder emphasized

Ii the need for random patrols to avoid mining and ambushes and the need to be alert aagainst
booby traps.
trapS. It also pointed mt
@nm
out that silence was crucial, especially at night, and recom-
mended patrolling on a single engine when possible.
possible.
[ i,
,,'
When a task unit
\.IIlit began pztrolling a new area, the commander gave an area indoctrina-
patrolling 'a
tion and familiarization for hts patrols, in an area were made with local RAGE.
his men. Initial patrols RAGs.

Before starting their patrol,

&fore patrola, PBR crews were briefed on any pertinent intelligence.
Briefings also covered the Sscope
- of the patrol, friendly forces in the area,
and duration of
recognition signals, available asupport, procedures, -Znd
p p o a , communications procebres, 'and special circum-
circum-
stances. Debriefs
stances. after a Wrol
Deoriefs after patrol included intelligence, results, and unusual activities

u by the participants.
noted by participants.

... ...
.

. . . .
.
.-.
.
. . .. . .
. . -
................. ....... ...........
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . : . > - . . . . . .
. .
. . . . . . . .
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]
Precautionary
Precautionary measures
measures were
were taken
taken to
to prevent
prevent the ve from
the VC from determining
determining the
the emct
exact
location
location of
of PBR
PBR patrols.
patrols. There
There were the random
were the random midstream
midstream patrols:
patrols; in
in addition,
addition. radio
radio
communications
communications were
were restricted
restricted to
to aa minimum.
minimum. The
and it was assumed that he could and would monitor
The enemy had
monitor U.S.
had captured U.S. equipment,
equipment.
circuits. If the PBRs were the
U.S. circuits.
U
victims of
of sniping by
by small-caliber,
small-caliber, nonautomatic weapons,
weapons. they would be warned against
using automatic weapon fire in return unless they had pinpointed
to avoid disclosing
disclosing the exact location
location and armament
armament of
pinpointed the source of
of the PBR.
PBR.
of the sniping U
All river trafftc
DJring daytime,
IXlring
trafiic was considered suspect,
suspect. especially during the nighttime curfew.
cUrfew.
watercraft when there were too many for all
daytime. PBRs randomly searched watercraft al1
U
to be searched.
searched. About 60 percent of of all junks and sampans detected were inspected oorr
boarded, according to CinCPac in July 1967. This included a check of identification papers
boarded, ,1
'-l
for all
al1 persons aboard. A South Vietnamese national policeman was usually on board one
provide an SVN "presence.
of the PBRs to provick "presence."" He expedited the checking of papers and the
questioning.
questioning. ~l
When suspects were detained during searches, S. forces maintained custody until
searches. U. S.

cent. WWs
cent.
classified as prisoner of war (POW),
the suspect was chssified
roWs were pkced f
placed camps by
returnee. civil
(?OW). returnee, Civil defendant,
defendant. or inno-
by military police. Returnees were turned over to the
J
nearest Chieu Hoi ceaer.
center. Civil defendants
tary units; and innocez
defendants were delivered to the national police oorr mili-
innocent Vietnamese were released and returned tto o where they were
:]
captured.

weapons to
PBRs were warned to approach contacts at an angle that allowed the most weapons ~J
bear on the target. Approach to aa contact at night was made at high speed with the PBR
darkened. The contact was illuminated at close range. When aa PBR was within optimum
illumLnztion of aa contact, it called for the boat to pull alongside. All occupants
range for illumination J
of the suspicious boat
b3at were ordered to make themselves visible before coming alongside
the PBR. All
A l l searches were to be
sean:hes
to moor thems~!lves
not to themselves to
be done
done in midstream if POSSible,
to the boat being searched.
possible, and PBRs were instructed ]

or
When aa contact came
Erne alongside
alongside the PBR.
crews were warned to
o r mines. PBR Ct(!WS
PBR, the latter was vulnerable
cautious of ve
to be cautious
vulnerable to
VC decoy
to hand grenades
decoy tactics. The
grenades
vc would
The VC J
station
station a boat with legitimate
Ie&imate papers
papers and no
no contraband
contrahand in a position to be searched while
to be
The ve
another boat carrying
another
PBR
FBR medical
carrying contral::e.nd
medical aid
contrabnd would
would evade
by using aa sampan to
aid by
evade search.
to hail
search. The
hail aa PBR to
to evacuate
VC also
also took advantage
advanrage of
evacuate aa wounded person while
of
while aa
U
ve
VC boat escaped
escaped detection.
bstecrion.
] I

lChieu
'Chieu Hoi
and
Hoi was
and allowed
was the
allowed to
t b "Q?en-arms"
" q n - a r m s " program
to reenter
reear South
program in
South Vietnamese
in which
which VC?
Vietnamese society.
society.
VC wh<?_defected
defected were
who." were rehahWtated
rehawed
J
]
...... -2~~.:-c:.;
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lJ While one PBR searched a contact, a second PBR

itself to have aa clear line of
itself Of fire to both sides
PER covered the shore
sides of the river. The b
and positioned
shore and
conductfng the search
a t conducting
I:xlat

u was instructed to maintain a 50-caliber weapon and lookout covering the shore to the U-
engaged side of the boat.
un-

Enforcing the curfews was a continuing problem. Curfews generally lasted from 2000
or
o r 2100 hours to 0600 hours. CiVilians
Civilians in a patrol section were informed of the restric-
tions though
through leaflet drops and loudspeaker announcements. Curfew effectiveness depended
largely on promulgrttion level, and it varied from area to area.
promulgation at the village and district level.

fire team spotted 7 sampans in a restricted zone near

1966, a fire
For example, in April 1966.
Can Gio village in the RSSZ. The fire team requested permission to strike. Permission
was granted after the VNN watch officer
officer at h%a 5? checked with Can Gio district head-
t-.'ha Be
quarters. The he10
helo strike was a2 success. futh t was later discovered through the Can
it

lJ Gio advisors that the sampans held friendly fishermen fully

tions. The village chief had p.;led
fully aware of the curfew regula-
gra;u:ed the people permission to fish.

u Curfew restrictions imposed financial hardship on the people by limiting their fishing
time. Curfews
In 1967,
Curfews were necessarf.
necessary, however, to successfully combat nighttime infiltration.
1967, CinCPac determined tthat
h t the curfew had not stopped VC river crossings.
crossings, but it
was being obserVed
observed by the local
10c-d ?eople. This
This made the task of detecting VC river cross-
ing attempts much simpler.

u After PER
PBR crews developed a2 tamiliarity
enemy, they developed severaillew
hmiliarity with their patrol areas and the nature of the
seven1 3% tactics. One of these was a planned ambush to inter-
cept a possible VC river crossmg. Ambushes were based
crosshg. Amtushes h s e d on intelligence reports or
o r on
C] the judgment of the boat ccommander.
ommxkr.

The tactic was tested in oonex incident when Commander, River Patrol Section 531,
u reacted to intelligence reports of a probable enemy crossing. He took 4 PBRs to the asus-
pected crossing to interdict eene:ny movements. The VNN RAG
x s y movements. RA G commander
commander. at My Tho
s-

addltional river patrol CRY.

sent 3 additional craft. The PBRs
PERs drifted silently into the crossing
cros·sing area and
detected the enemy after aabo'.!t
b s 2an3 hour. Although no large supply of weapons was detected,
the enemy action was evaluated 2s by a tax collector to move under the protec-
as an attempt by
tion of guerrilla troops. .
[1
PBRs at Can Tho used a nee
lL"W technique for sampan surveillance after receiving intel-
ligence concerning a possible VC river crossing southeast of Can Tho. In addition to
U centering normal PBR patrols hin ttbf!
observation post on a sampan -=ed
h suspected area, Game Warden forces established an
a e d byby one U.S. Naval officer and 3 enlisted men.
men. The

II sampan was a former VC crak

craft overhauled by Naval Support Activity Detachment at Can
Tho. Communications to the ??E;\s radio. T
a s on patrol and to Can Tho was by radio. his tactic
This

. . . .
. . . .
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-22-.... A....
... ............... . . . . . . . .
. . . . .. . .. .. . .
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l! . . .. .... . .
. . .

u
 /
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of the entire suspicious area. This kind of

provided continuous surveillance of of surveillance
was considered valuable when used with discretion periodically in areas where the river
was wide enough to provide security for the sampan.
sampan. u
O
Because PBRs had been allowed to fire only warning shots to Stop
stop sampans and junks
for visits oorr searches, many suspicious craft had evaded Game Warden searches.
searches. h
c t o b r 1966, the rules of engagement (appendix G) were changed to Pennit
October
In
permit PBRs to direct
u
fire against evading junks oorr sampans after all other methods to stop them failed.

To counter the movement of contraband in small quantities, a new search procehre,

procedure,
code-named Ferret, was established in 1967 throughout the Blta.
domly stationing PBRs twice a week in known
hours of 0700, 1200, and 1700 hours. A
Delta. Ferret entailed ran-
known VC crossing areas during the peak traffic
A South Vietnamese policeman and policewoman
u
were embarked.

The patrols stopped and searched all river traffic. Inspections included a thorough
u
of cargo, the passing of
probing of
pended beneath keels,
of lines oorr poles under hulls to check for contraband sus-
Imels, and the checking of of passengers against lists Of
of hknown
sus-
VC. Each
0 W n VC.
1I.ith civic action and psychological operations to ease the inconven-
effort was coupled with
u
travelers.
ience to innocent travelers.
LJ
To frustrate PBR patrol methods, the VC confiscated identification
anti discredit PER
frustrate and

the civilians
civilians and local
Loczl authorities.
searching and inconvenience
This resulted in delays in searching
cards of innocent civilians. This inconvenience to
to [J
.
By the end of 1967,
1967, the
the VC were using
rockets, and heavy machine guns.
guns,
using heavier weapons--recoilless
The upsurge in enemy activity culminated in
moms,
weapons--recoilless rifles, mortars,
in the Tet
U
offensive Januvg 1968. After that, CTF 116
offensive of January 116 noted that the enemy was using firing
bunkers, which provided relative security from
from PER fire. Continuous ground
PBR suppressive fire.
sweeps in enemy areas rarely returned significant results.
results. To
ground
TOdeal with increasing enemy
o
TF 1.16
capabilities, TF 116 used
units. These forces
used'quick-reaction
quick-reaction forces
forces combining U.
forces were called on short notice.
notice.
U.S.S. Navy, VNN, and
and RF /PF
RF/PF
u
call
Originally, it was
call for
for help while
were able
able to
WE standard procedure for PERs

to suppress
suppress enemy fire,
PBRs when fired upon to return the fire
while leaving the area of contact. After Tet, it was obvious that
fire, and the procedure was changed
ckanged to allow PERs
fire and
PBRs
the !'BRs
that the
(athe
PBRs (at
and
u
discretion of the boat
bat commanders) to remain and fight.

Improved intelligence
. . .

inteI!igence became available to CTFCTF 116 116 during 1968. A new and and very
o
quiet
quiet surveillance
to
to Game
River. Two
surveillance aircraft,
G a m e Warden units
QT-2FC. proved
&raft, the QT-2PC,
unita by detecting 88 large
PBRs and
Two PERs 2nd aa helicOpter
helicopter fire
proved itsits effectiveness
effectiveness in providing
j m k ' aatt night
large junks nfght near
fire team responded and
pmviding intelligence
near the mouth of
and destroyed or
Of the Bassac
o r heavily
Bassac
h e a d y damaged
u
all
a l l tthe
h e junks.
junks. !
"J '
i

. .
L
-23"- - -.... .. ..

u
.. ... . .~ . ....
~
~ ~

-.
~

. . . ..
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~ ~~ ~ ~

.--'
2

[J
u 1968, TF 116 collected intelligence information on VC cadre in
From April to June 1968,
the Can Tho area for use in a blacklist.
in
ages, heights, weights, and activi-
blacklist. The names, ages, actiVi-
ties of
of various VC cadre were compiled aiphabztically. blacklist was pubIished
alphabetically. The first blacklist published
distrihlted to River Division 51 &ring
. and cUstri.!xted during late June.
June. After one month, the list had helped
in capturing 4 confirmed vcVC in the Can Tho area.
area.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Ass a secondary mission, PBR crews participated in psychological

A psychological operations to involve
u Delta in their own protection and to encourage potential sources of
the people of the Celts
Warden.
ligence for Game 'Warden.
of intel-

Li psychological operations took many forms. PBRs

The psychological PBRs and RAGS
RAGs dropped leaflets
leaflets and
played taped broadcasts designed to meet situations in specific areas. The local popula-
tion received, along with information distriixted by the S
distriruted by V N government, items such aass
SVN
Ll grain, salad oil, cigarettes, soap, cloth, needles, and thread.
boats or, i n VC-dominated regions, was air-dropped
in
thread. Distribution was from
air-dropped oorr packaged to float in with the tick.
tide.

u One type of broadcast was directed against VC explottation of

forces had captured VC aass young as 11
(Game Warden forces
of South Vietnamese youth.
11 years old who had been in combat.)
combat.)
In their broadcasts, Game War&n
Warden crews stated that although the VC had promised South
Vietnamese parents not to place their children into the front lines, the enemy had failed
failed
to honor his pledge. The effectiveness
effectiveness of surface
surface broadcasts was best evidenced by the

u increased VC attacks on the broadcasting vehicles during spring 1968.

Game Warden psychologiiczl

psychological operations involved more than merely distrib.Iting
dtstrihtlng goods
and government propaganda. h mflood and refugee relief
relief operations, Game Warden crews
helped k i l d and repair bridges, schools, houses, and dispensaries. They also made de-
wild
liveries of rice seed.

u Psychological operations iJJ.cluded

hcluded dispensing medical aid and evacuating local Delta
inhabitants and South Vietnamese military personnel.
personnel. The South Vietnamese
Blta
Vietname'se were helped

[i to maintain i n d i v i b l and communal hygiene.

maintaiJ;1 indivicl.!.al

Local projects were undertaken

un&r&aken by Game Warden crews. River Section 542 in the
U RSSZ "adopted" a village. Sailors visited the village with medical assistance, clothes,
RSSZ
shoes, and toys. In the Can Tna
shoes, Thoarea in the Delta,
Delta, following
following the Tet offensive, Game
Warden personnel blilt
h i l t aa school
schcnl and bought classroom equipment and supplies for refugee
u children. .

u
u
'.

LI . .
.-... jr,..-.
rr:.;nl -. ..... .~~,, " ,. , .. . ,
I /
/'

Special psychological campaigns were undertaken on important days of of the Vietnamese

[J
calendar. Dlring Tet 1967, special leaflet and broadcast appeals were made to the alb
calendar. During Delta
. population,
population, stressing the traditional
traditional bmily of Tet.
family nature of Tet. F o r the national election in
For
seCUrity was provided for voters.
September 1967, security voters. A campaign was begun a month before U
1968 to develop a sense of
Tet 1968 of loyalty to the government.
government. PBR crews gave parties and pre- pre-
sented Vietnamese children with toys.

The VC were increasing emphasis on countering friendly psychological

psychological operations
before Tet 1968. The enemy was reported to have ordered Delta inhabitants to destroy
VC-controlled areas. Guerrillas had been ordered to fire
allied leaflets distributed in VC-controlled fire on
]
aircraft engaged i n airdrops.
in airdrops. The VC effort to counter psychological operations indicated
the program was adversely affecting the enemy's
enemy's ability to maintain control of the population.
population.

Each PBR was considered to be a Chieu Hoi station. Many VC turned themselves into
these stations, and some of
of them even taped broadcasts for the PBRs to play when patrol-
ling areas where their former VC comrades would hear the broadcasts.
broadcasts. Game Warden ttask ask
commanders. district chiefs, and U.
unit commanders, S. Navy psychological operations
U.S. operations officers
officers visited
RF IPF outposts to explain PBR operations and win local acceptance of
RF/PF of them.

Game Warden psychological

PSYchological operations convinced the population
popUlation in some areas to help
V N government representatives fight the VC by
SVN
S by providing information on enemy activities.
activities.
An outstanding example of the kind of effect these operations often had on Delta inhabitants
,J
was a letter of appreCiation
appreciation received by the commander of the My Tho-l:e.sed
Tho-based River Division
53 in August 1967. The letter was signed by members of a water taxi association in Kien
53 ~J
Hoa Province.
Province.

The boatmen, who traveled daily on the Ham Luong River, used to have to pay the VC
a t check points established on the river. Payment was in
at in money, rice, medicine
mediCine (espec-
ially antibiotics), and occaSionally
iallyantibiotics), motors. Those who refused to pay the VC were
occasionally sampan motors.
often killed.
killed. The k t m e n felt that the PBR crews were polite when they ,searched
boatmen searched the water- ;1
Warden sailors were respected because they did not take bribes. The boat-
craft, and Game &'arch
men stated that the river was secured by the PBR patrols, and hthey e y promised to give PBR
crews information on VC individuals
indivicfuals and concentrations
concentrations along the river l:e.nks.
hnks.

Local inhabitants who had benefited from

intelligence that served as.a
ceeded in thwartiI!g
a s a l:e.sis
from the humanitarian efforts of the PBRs
basis for some
PBRS provided
some Game Warden operations. The operations
Operations suc-
thwarting VC mining and ambush attempts, destroying VC concentrations, and
u
gaining defectors..
gaining defectors"
u
u
-25-
u
u
;-.',
 /
(i _.I

U GAME WARDEN IN THE RSSZ

L Game Warden's early emphasis was on the RSSZ because of

Warden's ear$ of fears that the
~~~5 enemy would
first PBRs to become operational were assigned
off the shipping lanes to Saigon. The first
cut Off
to the RSSZ in April 1966. By June, PBRs had replaced all the Market Time units there.
Those units took part in operation Jackstay,
Jackstay, which was directed against an estimated 1,000
VC in the RSSZ who frequently attacked military outposts and threatened the sea channel to
Supported by the VhW,
Saigon. The operation, also supported VNN, lasted 12 days and resulted in 63 VC
killed. More importantly, it disrupted a major base area consisting of
killed. of an arms factory,
a training area used to aassemble
ssedle river mines, and a large medical facility. This facility
was so well built, special underwater demolition teams had to be flown in to destroy it.

statiOns awere
Ten river patrol stations ended,
e r e established during Jackstay. When the operation ended,
the stations were maintained by Game Warden PBRs to ensure that the VC would not rre- e-
infiltrate the area. As the Cane
Gaoe Warden force force expanded, mbre
more stations were added to the
RSSZ patrol (figure 5).

u MSBs that had served in

2 March 1966. By June,
June,
in Danang harbor since October 1965
there were 12
12 MSBs operating from
1965 sailed for the RSSZ on
Nha Be tasked with keeping
the vital Saigon shipping cha.n.!!el
c h e l open (see appendix F). The MSBs were from Mine
Squadron 11's detachment Alp&
Alpha, which operated aass a task unit of the Game Warden force.

u Before Game Warden rezched

reached its planned strength, one of the earliest problems was
the need to reshuffle forces to meet emergencies. In April 1966, for example, there were
several mining incidents at 1';"ha
h%a Be.
Be, To help antiswimmer security patrols, 8 PBRs were

u transferred from Vung Tau to the Game Warden base at Nha Be. The PBRs remained at
t\'ha s. Arrrly
U. S.
hTha Be assisting the U. Arny patrol units through June.

Many times during the early

Erly months of the RSSZ patrols, the boats came under
moderate to heavy small-arms
small-arns and
2nd automatic-weapons fire from the banks. The Soirap
soirap
River patrols noted stepped-u;>
stepped-q harassment through June
June and again in December.
Deceinber. Most of Of
the harassing fire
fire was
was recei,ed
receird near the Vam Sat River, a known
lmown infiltration route terminal.
t e d l .
[J
operrtions in the RSSZ taxed both the crews and their boats. Ard
The intense tempo of ope!C.tions And

U most river patrol sections were

used daily, allowing
allowing little
more boats and crews became
~ e z required
time
the
e
for
to do their own maintenance.
preventive
maintenance. Most boats were
maintenance.
maintenance. This condition improved
improvd'as as
becam available and as a s the support bases developed better facilities.
l !
In June, aa NavForV assessment of the RSSZ indicated that patrols on the Long Tau and
SOirap
Soirap Rivers
Rivers had effectively
effectively curtailed
m i l e d night movements. The VC were now now cross!n3:at
crOES-.:at
[J sunrise or
o r sunset, using seemingly sampans stationed i.n
seercingly innocent sampans
bends to notify other VC saIllp2IlS
in micistream
midstream at river
S a m of passing patrol units. To counter thisthis activity, Game
Waden forces
Warden forces established .pecia!
~@.d daytime patrols.
. . .
. . . . ., . .
......... ...... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
-:-_::------:-
. . . . . . . -26 - __-::::-=---;:::---::::;---=---=---:=--
~26~~~=~=
.
....................
..
. . . . . . . . =:==-
c.::--c.::--c.::--:.:..::..::=---:...:;--=-",,--c:..::-
. .
.......
-:.:.::-- ...
..
. . . . :

[I
[ ,

. . . . . . . . . ..

.=.=,..*>. ,^
,-.- -, -
--_
i ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .~ .... . ...
i...
 ./
U
iJ
J i

Saigon: 7 st.mi. J
~J
~J
RUNG SAT SPECIA ZON U
U
U
[J
GANH RAI
BAY
[J
Can Gio

Go Cong Province . U.s.S. Tortuga.

lJ
Legelll
Leg&
0 River patrol stations
U
+ .'
VC infiltration
--.. VC router
infiltration routes
U
FIG. 5:
FIG. 5: RSSZ
RSSZOPERATIONS
OPERATIONS
[J
.- U
, ~ .. ~. . . .
[J
-I
-. .'. -27-
-27- . -
............ ._.... __ ._.....
- ..... -,--- .....
......... ... ____
......... . - - .__..
J:I-
.
.

U
 //'

u Previous studies had reported that the VC took advantage of dark phases of the moon
to move supplies. The NavForV assessment noted, however, that a VC incident had taken
[: place at low tide under full
hindrances imposed by Game Warden patrols.
patrols.
flexible in adapting to
full moon. This suggested the VC were flexible

[i In reaction to increased enemy activity, the USS Tonuga (LSD 26) was transferred
Tortuga (LSD
to the mouth of the Long Tau River in August 1966
1966 to provide an extra patrol section of
10 PBRs and 2 helos. Enemy activity in the RSSZ increased substantially toward the end
10
U of the year.
year. Enemy documents discovered in November elaborated on the communist re-
organization in the RSSZ;
RSSZ: 3 scattered VC pktoons
re-
platoons reformed into one company-size element
to attack RSSZ shipping in "quick-and-clean"
in "quick-and operations. River minings and ambushes
-clean" operations.
[i were emphasized.
emphasized.

1966 ended on an
The year 1966 an ominous note with the 31
31 December discovery of a Soviet-
LJ type contact mine in Saigon's main shipping chan.t1el.
channel. It was the first time a contact mine
had been detected on inland waterways.
waterways.

u At the beginning of 1967, enemy activity was especially heavy in the RSSZ.
end of January, a reinforced U. S, h n y bandion
S. .Army
RSSZ. By the
battalion was assigned to the RSSZ to help deal
"ith
with the increasing VC activity.
II 1967, Game W
In March 1967, arden units were faced
Warden faced with improved accuracy of VC sniper

u fire, An enemy document captured on 21

fire. 2 1 February in the RSSZ indicated that the VC RSSZ
command received 5 sniper rifles the previous week. One participant stated that the VC
were generally very poor shots.
shots, .

1967 that increased river patrols, additional armament

There were indications by April 1967
for M
for a s , and ground operations
MSBs, operatims in the RSSZ were affecting VC ability to mOWlt
mount attacks

u laWlchers,
Saiga channel. MSB armament was bolstered with 40mm.
against shipping in the Saigon
launchers, enabling high
high-trajectory fire agaL'lst
-trajectory fire
4Om~n.grenade
agahst VC positions on the river banks.
banks.

Despite daily channel sweeps

s e e p s by U.S.
U. S. Navy and VhW
VNN craft by the end of 1967,
1967, enemy
mining attempts continued.
continued. Investigation
hlsestigation of one successful mining disclosed a new tech-
nique used by the VC to proiM
protect the electrical wires leading from the firing station to the
mine. To prevent their being cut by minesweepers, the wires were enclosed in 2 sections
mine.
of beetlenut logs, each about
a b o u 6 inches in diameter and 1515 feet long with about 10
10 feet
feet of
of
Wlprotected wire between the 2 sections. The effectiveness of this
unprotected this simple technique was
proven. The area had been swept wept 15 rnining incident.
15 minutes before the mining incident. The dual chain
being used by the VNN minesweepers
mineweepers apparently .passedpassed over the logs without disturbing
dis~lng
the command wire. A subsequ.."'lltexperimental
s u b s w w t experimental sweep using c~ertngs
using the protective log cmerfngs
demonstrated that a conventiO'"....aJ.
conventicd U.S. U.S. chain drag was effective;
effective.
I

. . . . .
LJ _ ........... :-2B~
. . . . . . .
.....
. . . . . .
. .-'.. . .. ".. . .. ...
. . . .. .
.[J
~
.., . . , .'
. .

u
.. ~-.----- .......~~---...........;;..;;...;;.--~---~ '. ';.'
I ' /
/ u
Early in
Early in 1968,
1968, Game
GameW Warden forces noted
a d e n forces noted increased
increased use
use ofof enemy
enemy rockets,
rockets, rfle
rifle
u
grenades, recoilless rifles, and heavy automatic-weapons fire from ambush sites. In
grenades,
April, MSBs
April,
channel, as
recoilless
MSBs again
evidenced
rifles,
again noted
by many
and
noted aa step-up
heavy
step-up in
automatic-weapons
in enemy
enemy mining
recoveries
mining efforts
of
fire
efforts on
electrical wires
from
on the
ambush
the Long
LongTau
during
sites.
Tau shipping
sweep
channel, as evidenced by many recoveries of electrical wires during sweep operations.
ShiPPing
operations.
u
In May
In May and
and August,
August, there
there were
were increased
increased numbers
numbers ofof mining
mining attacks
attacks against
against free-woru
free-World
shipping; 10 attacks
shipping; 10 attacks occurred
occurred in in May'and
May'and 88 in
In August.
August. U
In
In June,
June, the
the VNN
VNN assumed
assumed responsibility
responsibility forfor clearing
clearing command-detonated
command-detonated mines
mines Out
out
of the Long
of the
the enemy
the
Long Tau
enemy on
Tau shipping
on the
shipping channel
the Lang
channel to
Long Tau.
Tau. U.
U. S.
to Saigon;
Saigon; this
S. MSBs
this was
MSBs retain
was the
the type
type of
retain responsibility
of mine
responsibility ffor
mine most
most often
often used
used by
by
mine Countermeasures
o r mine countermeasures
J
against moored
moored mines.
mines.
against
J
U
Ll
U
lJ
U
[J
U
J
lJ
~J
J
."_ .... -.- -

J
.' .
J
.--"--'--~'~---------------------'--"---
 /'
/

u GAME WARDEN IN THE

THE MEKONG DELTA

u The first
first river patrol units began operating in
moved up the Bassac River to Can Tho.
established at locations that Offered
in the Delta on 8 May 1966,
1966, when 10D PERs
Tho. Delta river patrol bases and support ships were
offered the requisite security and facilities while limiting
F'BRs

limiting the
maximum patrol distance to be covered from from a base or
or ship to about 35 n.mi.
n.mi. or
o r less
(figure 6).
6).

lJ Since there was inadequate intelligence during 1966,

the availability of
Of facilities. It turned
1966, boat deployment was based on
turned out, though, that the first
first patrol areas
a r e a s covered--the
covered--the
lower Bassac and Co CO Chien, . Ham Luong, and My Tho Rivers--were
Rivers--were directly withinw i t h VC
supply corridors and probably caused the enemy serious resupply problems.
problems. At the end
of 1966, Game Warden units in in the Delta increased to 80 PBRs;
PBRs; they also patrolled the
upper Bassac and Mekong Rivers.
Rivers,
u River patrol units were re2ositioned
Warden.
Warden. VC activity in
in the
repositioned to meet the elUSive
Mekong Delta rose
elusive enemy throughout Game
sharply during November 1966,
1966, and 1967
1967
[J began with a NavForV assessment that the enemy was seeking a major victory before the
t\ew Year truce (6 to 12 February).
Vietnamese Sew Febmry'). During January
January and February, VC activity
in the Delta west of the My Tho and Ham Luong Rivers.
was especially intense in Rivers.
u Instead of spreading boats uniformly around the Delta, CTF 116 116 concentrated them in
active VC areas during early 1967. Because the lower Bassac, Co Chien, and My Tho
u Rivers were active enemy areas,
repositioned for
a s s , Game Warden
high-density pvrols
f o r high-density
Waden boats assigned to the upper Delta were
patrols on the lower Delta rivers, where intelligence indicated
extensive enemy troop movemeats.
movements.

PBRs had been based at hLong g Xuyen, but contact with the enemy was lighter than h?d
had
been expected. In response to an intelligence report that the enemy would try to concentrate
deployed on 15 January to the
area, 16 boats from Long Xuyen were deploy&
forces in the Dong Tam area,
Iower
lower Bassac and Co Chien Rivers. Meanwhile, Sa Dec-based
Dec-based PBRs concentrated their
patrols in the lower portions of their assigned areas.
[J In April, the PBRs remining
remaining at Long Xuyen were transferred to a floating base at
In April,
[, Cambodian border.
Tan Chau near the Cambodia
light contact with the enemy m
border. Because PBRs at Tan Chau had experienced Ody only
mid-1967, the boats were transferred with the floating base
in mid-1967,
to-Binh Thuy, where there v
tcrBinh was conSiderable enemy activity,
as considerable activity. A few months later, the base
and the PBRs were shifted
shifted closer to the coast at Ben Tre.
Tre.
Ll
[; I .

l: .. _._ .. _-_...__ . .. -_ .. ,,--_ .. _-.-.

-- --_ .. __ ..

U
[1
 ,

...
.oi

. . . . . . . .
:i
:j
.'
:.;
I

..
I')
i,
,

l
I
.-,2-
-... .>.,._. .
, . ..
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .

.
I

..1
.

!I '
~~~~~

II
DONG
TAM
.....
. .

BINH THUY
. -31-

ie!>
:, .
, .... CAN T 1-1'0 '.'\.'"

,,
Vc Binh
..

Dai Secret
-.

!
,, Zone
\
,,
i
, Vc Thanh Phong
............................................

, 'I Secret Zone

: ,I
i
,

, I
,i Vc Long Toan
-.

•i Secret Zone
,1
,I
. . _.

: j
:i
.........

I
...

,,
__. ... - ...~..

'

FIG. 6: PBR BASES AND RIVER SECTIONS, 1966 '

?.!.:~.
,

r- r·------
~ L-- '--- [_' ,
_.

-------- ----------
 ./
./

Upper Delta operations were eliminated

Delta operations eu-ated by the end of 1967, W R contacts With
1967. since PER with
the enemy had been so so light (figure 7).
7). There are
a r e some possible explanations for this
contact. Chau Doc and An Giang Provinces were under the control of the Hoa Hao,
lack of contact.
aa religious sect. The VC erred in 1962 when they assassinated the head of the Hoa Hao.
in 1962
The Hoa Hao kept tight control over their own area, keeping the vi::.
o m area, VC out; Game Warden
u forces found
forces found the area pacified. It may be, however, that the VC had simply found
PBR patrols in the upper Delta.
around the PER In any event, CTF
DeIta. In
found routes
116 saw a need to concentrate
CTF 116
forces in the lower Delta, drav.ing
forces draping on assets patrolling the upper Delta.
u some units to meet the growing threat in Kien Hoa Province, where
116 redeployed some
CTF 116
parts of 3 VC battalions had been reported. By 6 May, about 3,000
3,000 main-force VC troops
LJ were in Kien Hoa. ToTOinterdict enemy lines of communication within that and adjacent
forces were again repositioned.
provinces, Game Warden forces repositioned. PERs
PBRs made incursions into the
K b n Hoa PrOvince.
Ham Luong River in Kien Province.
Ll found increasing amounts of medicine
During the Ham Luong River operations, PBRs found
on boat river traffic bound for
for Thanh
T h h Phu (a coastal district in Kien Hoa Province), where
L intelligence reports indicated a recent VC buildup. Large amounts of penicillin and
streptomycin were discovered concealed on otherwise legitimate river traffic.
traffic. To pave
the way for incursions into the Ba Lai River in Kien Hoa Province, an LST was moved from
LJ the mouth of the Long Tau channel
chmitel in the RSSZ to Dong Tam.

Random PBRpatrols
PBR paaols into canals
c-ls and waterways off the major rivers began at the end
L of 1967
1967.•. Incursions into the lesser waterways were left to the discretion of PER
manders.
manders.
F'BR com-

The boat commander in a patrol area would usually request information on enemy
activity from the district chief. When the district chief felt that enemy troops
troops were

u massing in some area, the WR

Aprill968,
In April
PaR muld
would investigate.
investigate. .

promulgated.: This plan

CornXavForV operational plan was promulgated.
1968, a new ConkvForV
emphasized the need for U.
U. S.
S. Kavy/vhW
Kavy /VNN reaction to infiltration of enemy supplies from
Cambodia. Under the pplan.,
Cambodia. h, a when more. boats became available, they would be assigned
h more
to the upper Mekong. (This official recognition of infiltration from Cambodia tends to
discr~it earlier assessments *&t
discredit that little enemy activity was occurring in the upper Delta
rivers .)
rivers.)

PERs began Game R'arden

In May, PBRs Warden operations on the upper Bassac and Mekong Rivers.
PBRs were assigned 03.
These F'BRs on a rotating basis
basiS from TG 116.1 (Bassac)
(Bas sac) and 116.2 (Co C
116.2 (CO Chien)
Ka)
until June, when the Upper Delta River Patrol Group was established (figure 8). 8). In July,
[ PBRs from the afloat base aat
reminiscent of
reminiscent
Tan
tT u
of their previous
Chau were experiencing only light contact
operations in the upper Delta in early 1967.
previOUS qerations 1967 •.
with the enemy,

. . . .. . .
. . .

[ , . .
... .
..
. .

. . . .
. . : . . . . . .
- -. ..
~
i
,.
.,
J

.~--~--J
'i ----{~AU
,,
I ..1' ""~OC
:;
.,
"
.; \ ,

, ..
.' LONG X U Y E N
i \'
.I ..
..,.
1-:: . ".t"
. ,
,;
i . .

, . .
2 : ; ;.:c-.
> ~..,
.:.,
, ,
.
.:... z.... . ...
'
"",;

,... t:. ,:. .

i ,j
,.
·w
w,
.
;
, ,
\

. .

,. FIG. 7: GAME IN THE DELTA

GAME WARDEN AREA PATROLLED IN
i: OF 1967
END OF
AT THE END 1967

/,
 ~-.

SAIGON
I

i, ,i
f

! "!

'i•
",,
CAN tH,".":
....
c.>
t
, I

,,
. I

: 'I
, I
,i
i
I
,
!
,
:
, \
\

,/
...-

U.
-(j
m
c
8
ca
0
a
s
E
9
n
W

FIG. 8: 1968 GAME WARDEN AREAS PATROLLED IN DELTA

2

a
a
W
..

2
L
a
t-
a
0
-I
-I
W
n
-z
n
W
5
a

--------
 ,/. J
J
Evidence used in
Evidence used in ppIanning
k h g Sea
Sea Lords
Lords later
later in
in 1968
1968 revealed that the
revealed that the enemy
enemy generally
generally
crossed
of
the border
crossed the
Thailand o
border by
r to the
canals oor
by canals
north
r overland
overland routes
routes between the Bassac
between the Bassac River
of Thailand or to the north of the Mekong. Although he may have used the major rivers to
of the Mekong. Although he may have used the
and the
River and
major
the GuLf
Gulf
rivers to
'J
cross
cross the
the border
border in in the
the past,
past, the
the enemy
enemy probably
probably altered route to
his route
altered his avoid PBR
to avoid PBR patrols.
patrols.

The
The 1968
1968 Tet
Tet offensive
offensive saw
saw simultaneous
simultaneous attacks on provincial
attacks on provincial capitals
capitals throughout
throughout the
the
Delta. A
Delta, A study
study of
of enemy
enemy vulnerabilities,
vulnerabilities, submitted
submitted by
by CTF
CTF 116
116 to
to ComNavForV
ComNavForV on on
18 February,
February, included
included this
this assessment
assessment ofof Tet:
Tet:
"The offensive..
"The offenSive •••.cost
cost the
the enemy
enemy aa high
high price
price in
in lives
lives lost,
lost, but
but has
has
not diminished
not diminished his
his capability
capability to
to continue
continue the
the insurgency
insurgency atat pre-
pre-
indeterminate period.
campaign intensity for an indeterminate period. SVN forces have have :.J
severely hampered by the necessity
been Severely necessity to defend the population
population
centers. .
centers. • ..resources
•• resources have been
been spread thin, thus permitting
wide selection of targets.
targets. If
permitting
J
the VC a ride If the enemy objective was to
demonstrate that (SVN and U.
demonstrae U. S.
S. forces) could not effectively defend
the people of
of the Delta,
Delta. he must be judged successful. ..
successful.. •• There
of the Vietnamese people rallying to the J
is no evidence, however, of
cause."
VC cause."

Game Warden forces saved Chau Doc and Ben T Tre

r e from falling to the VC during Tet,
[J
but the Game Warden base at Vinh Long had to be abandoned after the VC overran
ovenan Vinh
c r e m were
Long and PBR crews
Vinh Long.
from their boats. An afloat base was established near
v:ere cut off from
lJ
An incident in Y=h
X m h 1968
1968 illustrates
illustrates the effect Game Warden forces
C h h 1l led aa SEAL
in the lower Delta. A Hoi Chanh
forces had on the enemy
SEAL platoon to aa large weapons cache and arms
iJJ I
factory
factory in Kien Hoa Province.
Province. This
This former
former enemy soldier related how he had been forced
to go without food
food
food for
for 2 to 3 days
supplies on the river. He
food supplies
a
days at a time because PBRs prevented the VC Vc from
from mOving
He added that river patrols had made it impossible
moving
impossible for
for the VC
VC
U1 1
to
to cross

.
cross the river for

In'
In April 1968,
for the preceding 2 weeks.

1968, a CNA
CXA analyst noted that the to be limiting his
the enemy appeared to his move-
u
ments to
ments to lesser Delta waterways inaccessible to
D e h waterways to PBRs. The
The VC
VC also
also continued
continued to take
to take
advantage
advantage ofof the
the islands
islvds inin the
the Bassac
Bassac and
and My
My Tho
Tho Rivers
Rivers to
to conceal
conceal their
their movement
movement while
while LJ
minimizing exposUre to PBR. surveillance.
minimizing exposure to PBR surveillance.

Intelligence reprts in
Intelligence re;>Orts inJune
June indicated
indicated that
that the
the VC
VC planned
planned to
to move segments of
move segments of their
their
Ii 1l
J
'e-.l
existing
existing forces in N
forces in N Corps
Corps to to support
support their
their continuing
continuing pressure
pressure and
and harassment
harassment on
on the
the
Capital Military
Capital

1
District of
Military District of Saigon
Saigon and its environs.
and its environs. Game
Game Warden
Warden operations
~
operations were
were
lJ u
, 1AA VC
VC who
who has
has ren=ed
r e m e d to
to government
government control.
control.
'I
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Ll
o
---.~-----,
 /'
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l
extended to provide
extended to provide one
one river section PBRs to
section of PBRs to patrol
patrol the
the Dong Nai River
Ding Nai Nha Be
River between Nha Be
and aa point about
and about 2.4 st. South of the
mi. south
st.mi. the Long Binh Bridge
Long Binh Bridge northeast of Saigon.
\
L I On 17
On 17July
July 1968, Atmy LeU
1968, AImy X U 1577 inadvertently crossed the SVN/Cambodia border on
1577 Inadvertently on
the
the upper Mekong. On 18 18 July, TF 116
July. TF 116 assumed the
the responsibility
responsLbUty for
f o r ensuring
ensuring that all
all
IJ.S./Allied
U. S. /Allied Shipping
Shipping would be alerted as
as it approached the border. U. U. S. ships
ships were not
allowed to pass aa point 4 n.
allowed n.mi. from the border, and
mi. from and all ships stopping
all ships Tan ehau
stopping at Tan for
Chau for
customs
customs Inspection
inspection were alerted that U.
U. S. personnel were not
not to cross
cross the
the border. Liaison
Liaison
with the
the National Police was also
National Maritime Police also established
established to
to prevent further
further Inadvertent
inadvertent
border crossings. .

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By October 1968, G
SI11JATION IN OCTOBER 1968
THE SITUATION

a m e Warden forces had secured many sections of

Game of the major
major Delta
U I

and RSSZ rivers for commercfal

rivers. WN
along these major rivers.
use. Routine VC tax collections had been interrupted
commercial use.
SVN government curfews were being enforced, and became
effective weapons against the VC.
VC.
u
While it is probable that Game Warden denied the enemy overt control of
rivers, it is ffar
of the major
a r from clear whether Game Warden significantly denied the enemy use of
o
routes. ConVavForV,
the rivers aass supply routes. COITh."1avForV, in October 1968, felt that Game Warden had
movements. An intelligence
effectively denied the VC use of the rivers for logistic movements.
analyst concerned withWith the period noted that, from 1966 to 1968, Game Warden failed to
u
capture a single important shipment of war material.
material. This did not imply the enemy was
Shipments, however, since he had accumulated enough to mount the Tet
not making large shipments,
offensive.
o
1967 indicated there were other VC crossing points in addition to those
Intelligence in 1967
covered by Game Warden patrols.
patrols. These were located to the north and south of the
~
Mekong/Bassac Rivers.
Mekongpassac Rivers. (They later would be interdicted by Sea Lords barriers,)
barriers.)

It was clear by 1968

1968 that the concept of
of a static barrier on the major rivers was in-
U
adequate. Evidence showed that the enemy was infiltrating supplies with impunity over the
Cambodian border. In In March 1968,
1968, NavForV analysts felt that massive infiltration
Fnfiltration over U
the Cambodian border was taking place, especially be\:iVeen
between Ha Tien on the Gulf of
of Thailand
Phu on the
and Chau Phuon me Bassac River.
River.

The
The Market Time
Time task group
group commander in thethe Gulf of Thailand agreed With
with this
assessment. He He noted that enemy
enemy transshipment in the Gulf of Thailand from
from Cambodia
to SVN
SVN had stopped, partly because of Market Time Time and
and partly
parcly because the VC
VC could
could use
the inland waterways
w a t e m z p without fear
fear of disruption.

. was
The
The SVN
S N army,
army, which
ineffective. Kat
which should
only
should have
were
have been able
there
was ineffective, Kot only were there not
able to
enough
control rv Corps
to control
troops
enough troops toto
c o r p s south
interdict
South of
the
the Bassac,
Of the
the enemy, but there
enemy. there
u
were
were reports of SVN

CTF
CTF 116
SiW soldiers

116 had
soldiers collaborating

had earlier
collaborating in

earlier deployed
deployed PBRs
in VC
VC smuggling

F'BRs to
smuggling across

to the
the upper
across the

upper Mekong
Mekong and
the border.

and Bassac
Bassac Rivers and had
Rivers and had
u
withdrawn
support
support in
them
in the
because
the lower
lmer Delta.
of light
Delta. It
contact
is likely
It is
with
that if
likely that
the enemy and
if infiltration
Miltration from
the critical
withdrawn them b a s e of light contact with the enemy and the critical need for more
from Cambodia
need for
had been
Cambodia had
more
been occurring
occurring
U
across
across the
the entire
entire border,
border, the
the enemy
enemy could
could have
have successfully
successfully infiltrated
Miltrated supplies
supplies without
without
using
using the
to
the upper
upper Delta
effectively
Delta rivers.
patrol
rivers. Another
the upper
Another possibility
Mekong
possibility is
and Bassac
to effectively patrol the upper Mekong and Bassac Rivers;
is that
that there
-
Rivers,--
there were
were never
never enough
enough PBRs
PdRs 'J
u
:1
U

_________________________ 1
J
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\
L He
Early in
fn 1968,
1968, ComNavForV discussed the interdiction dffemma in aa new OpOrder.
intesdfction dilemma
mutes and river crossing
He determined that the interdiction of resupply routes crossfng points within
within
SYN presented a more immediate problem to the VC than did interdiction of border cross-
SVN
\ ing points. But the long-term effect would be far far less significant, since the VC were
significant, since
L
known to alter their routes to adapt to hindrances.
h d r a n c e s . Interdiction o(border
of',border crossing points
enemy's caches of modern weapons and would force
would eventually exhaust the enemy's force him to
[, weapons. There were probably many caches of these weapons still available,
use his older weapons. available,
Province.•
especially in the older secret zones in An Xuyen Province
.IIL~, Since
Since it would obviously be more ·advantageous to interdict infiltration at the
more'advantageous
Cambodian border than to capture or destroy enemy material already within SVN, Game
Lords in October 1968. Sea Lords was aa Delta-wide
Warden was expanded into Sea Lords
TF 115
operation coordinating the combined assets of TF 115 (Market Time), TF TF 116,
116, TF 117
117
(Mobile Riverine Force), and U. S. and Vietnamese ground forces. Sea Lords Lords would
supplies infiltrated from Cambodia.
continually harass VC strongholds and interdict supplies

The most logical place to t o set up a barrier against supplies entering SVN from
from
\. Cambodia would have been on the canal that ran
U.S.
situation, U.
political situation,.
r2n along the bo:tder.
boxher. Because of the sensitive
forces were not willing to risk border incidents. The first
S. forces first Sea
Lords barriers were established on canals 35 mi. from and parallel to the
35 to 40 n. mi.
Cambodian border.
border: _.
L,I \
The ultimate objective of in-country naval task forces
forces was to support the extenSion
extension
\ \
of South
South Vietnamese control over
Over the people and territory of the country. To reach this
lJ operations had to complement the pacification programs.
goal, naval operations programs. Sea Lords would
SVN government
extend SVN governmel)t influence into VC-controlled
VC-controlled areas in conjunction with the
accelerated pacification program begun in October 1968.

I .
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I
 /
/'

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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'J
tion 0,
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[J
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1972

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1966
IJ '
I
....
.~ . .~. . ~. ~ ~
.~ ..34 - . .~

u
.~
. ~ .
i
~.
-
~ ... ~ ..... .~~
~. . . . ~.
. .

CJ
u
Inc., draft
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201 0,
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a l y s t , enclosure to "Informal Staff Study on Delta
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. . 1.
I . . ...
...
j ,
L_~

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.. . .... '.;
'
.-
' . .

. "
..[~~ 7:>·;J\.i~..

u -.-~ --.... ••• • C-, -, ••• . , . -

.". ~":'"

U . .l

:.. .
LI "

.::; ..~·;.:.:·;:i;:~~:\r.: ' ,

 /./ u
ChCPac, "Infiltration
CinCPac, "Infiltration Study
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" Secret, 29
29 May
May 1968
1968

Memorandum ER
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ER IM
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the
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Zumwalt, Jr.,
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USN, Itr.
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to VAdm. F. J. Blouin.
ltr. to Blouin, USN.
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u
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Secret. 3 Jan 1969

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u
Headquaaers in Washington,
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28 Feb 1969
28
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D.C. Section, Secret,
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u
for Naval
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Mobile I)
Cevelopment Operations in the
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down,-rded to Confidential.
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u ,

Confidential, May 1969

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u
Nicholson, apt. R.
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~.

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o r the VC/NVA SVN. Bcember
December 1966 - -
April 1969 0,"
Apri11969 Secret, Dec 1970
(U). "Secret,

u
_...... -,-_.-.... - -"---_._._- - . - -------

01
....-.0-------
1. __ -• .--------------------------- \
 /'

~ ~ f i ~Cdr.
Swartztrauber, cdr*
u S.A.,
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(U),"
IT

Secret, Feb
Secret, Feb 1971
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r, Assistant Chief
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NVN-VC War
the NVN-VC
the
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W a r Effort
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stafffor
--
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" TOp
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[' Central
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Vietnamese Sea Infiltration of Milit ary Supplies
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(UJ, ) , ""
preparation-
in preparation.

I i

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APPENDIX A []
DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY SUPPLIES
DISTRIBUTION 111AND
SUPPLIES TO III IV CORPS
AND IV CORPS
U
U
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