1¢h. CHANCERY DIVISION. 668 POCOCK v. CARTER. NEVILLE J. (usor P2808) wa an, Partnership — Business Premises the Property of one Partner — No Special Provision as fo Tenancy—dli Rent to be paid out of Profte—Tenancy ‘plied —Tenancy during Continuance of Partnership. ‘Whore tho premises upon which « partnorehip business is carried on arorand are declared by the pattobrship dood to be, tho property of one partner, and the partnership deed contains "no“provision as to the ‘tonaney of the partnership, bit only e goneral direction that all rent is ‘0 bo paid out of profits the Court will infer that the partnership was intended fo hold the premises on tenancy during the continuance of the partnership and not on a tonancy from year to yoar or at will. Bran indenture of partnership dated November 12, 1905, and made between Susan Pocock, widow, of the first part, Joseph Carter of the second part, and Edwin Pocock of the third part, it was agreed that the three partiés should bé and remain partners in the business of tailors and outfitters at Salisbury for the term of the life of the said Susan Pocock. The partnership deed contained the following provisions “5, The stock in trade and the lease of the promises in which the business is carried on are tho property of the said Susan Pocock, Such stock is to be renewed as ocgasion requires out of the profits of the partnership. “6, All rent rates taxes and all outgoings wages and expenses attending the carrying on of the business or shall be paid out of the yearly profits before di “7. After making such payménts the profits shall be paid to the three partners in oqual shares.” ‘Is was also provided that the said Joseph Carter should have the management of the said business and’ diligently and faithfully employ himself therein and manago and conduct the same for the greatest benefit and advantage of the partnership without payment for such services, he taking a share in such profits as above mentioned, and that the said Joseph Carter should occupy the house and premises in which the said business. ‘was carried on free of any rént or payment of aay kind. Susan Pocock was lessee of the business promises under an664 ‘NEVILLE J. 1912 Posoex. cauren, . UBANCERY DIVISION. 912) indenture of lease dated June 1, 1908, for fifteen and three-quarter ‘years from December 25, 1901, at a yearly rent of 1254. Until ‘the sale hereinafter mentioned the rent was duly paid by the partnership. On December 14, 1907, Susan Pocock brought an action against her co-partners for partnership accounts, and on December 15, 1908, judgment was given directing the usual accounts. Pursuant to am order in this action the book debts, ‘trade fixtures, and artielos used in the said business as on Sep- tember 29, 1910, were sold by private tender, and the defen- dant, Joseph Carter, was the purchaser. By the conditions of sale the purchaser was to have possession and pay his purchase- money into Court on October 20,1910. The sale did not include any interest in the premises upon which the business was carried on. ‘The plaintiff, Susan Pocock, died in 1911, and the action was by order earried on by hor logal personal representatives. By a second certificate in the action filed December 1, 1911, the Master certified that there was due from the partnership to the late plaintiff a sum of 95. 16s, 2. for rent of the partnership premises down to November 12, 1911. This sum was arrived at ty treating the partnership as having held the premises from Susan Pocock on s tenaney from year to year commencing on November 12, and, therefore, not determinable except on that day. ‘This summons was taken out by Joseph Carter to vary the ‘Master's certificate by striking out this sum on the ground that no rent was payable after October 20, 1910. ‘The partnership business was in fact the continuation of a ‘business formerly carried on in partnership between Edwin Pocock, the deceased husband of Susan Pocork, and Joseph Carter. ‘The original articles of partnership contained provisions 1s to the partnership premises, which Edwin Pocock then held ‘under a previous lease, similar to those contained in the present partnership deed. ‘There was some evidence that Edwin Pocock hhad refased to give the original partnership any tenaney in the premises. Baker-Wilbrakam (Sargant with him), for the summons. If ‘a partnership carries on business on premises belonging to one1¢h. CHANCERY DIVISION. 665 partner, and there is no special provision for @ tonaney, the NEVILLE 3, inference may be that the property is the property of the pariner- 1812 ship, or that it continues the property of the partner, but in the Pococe latter caso the partnership has a mere tenaney at will. The outaoy, proposition is clearly stated in Lindley on Partnership, 7th ed: — 1p. 867, note (a): “If there is no lease and the firm is dissolved, ‘he owner ean eject his late partners without notice to quit,” and tho author cites Doe v. Bluek (1) ; Benham v. Gray. (2) ‘There is no reported ease where a tenancy from year to year ‘was inferred in the case of a partnership. Frederie Thompson, for the plaintiffs. ‘The cases cited for thet: proposition do not establish it. In both eases the letting to the partnership was of part of the premises comprised in the lease only, and in Burdon v. Barkus (8) the proposition is stnted as only applying to cases where a part of the promises only isletto the partnership. In Doe v. Miles (4), also cited in the same note, there was a special agreement that the house which was the property of one partner should bo used by the partnership during the partnership. I submit that those cases have nothing to do with this one, where the whole house was used and there is no agreement, Prima facie a person who pays a yearly | rent is a tenant from yonr to yesr, and it would be a great hard- | ship on the partner who owned the premises if any other tenaney were interred, for he would have the house thrown on his hands without any notice and might have difficulty in letting it. Nevitum J. I think the easo is really governed by Burdon v. | Barkus (8) and Benham v. Gray. (2) Tn those eases the tenancy inferred was a tenancy during the, partnership. I thought at | first that it was a choice between inferring a’ tenaney from year to | year, or @ tenancy at will, but Inow think the true inference is that ‘there was intended to be a tenancy during the continuance of the partnership. This inference is equivalent to the express terms | of the tenaney which was dealt with in Doe v. Miles (4), and it appears to be the only inference which will enable the matter to (2) (1888) 8 ©. & P. 464. (8) (se1) 8 Gis. 412; (1862) 4 (2) (1847) 5 ©. B. 138. D.P.€d. 42, (#) (186) 1 Stack. 181.666 NEVILLE J, bo fairly dealt with, Nothing is said in the partnership decd 112 ‘PocooK CHANCERY i 912] bout the terms on which the property was to be held by the partnership though it is plainly intended that the business should bo carried on there. Tt is provided in general terms that all rent, rates, and taxes shall be paid out of profits before division, but there is no specific reference to the rent or tenaney under this particular lease, ‘The rent, however, was paid by the partnership. If T wore to hold that there was implied either a tenancy at will or tenancy from year to year, the partner owning the premises could by giving notice have terminated'the agreement before the end of the partnership and turned the other | partner outof the premises. "That would be a most unsatisfactory position and cannot, I think, have been contemplated by the parties. I must therefore infer that there was a tenaney during ‘the partnership only, which terminated at the dissolution of the partnership on October 20, 1910. ‘The certificate must be varied by striking out the rent except an apportioned rent up to October 20, 1910. ‘The applicant must have his costs in any event. Solicitors: Field, Roscoe & Co. ; Law & Worssam, for Bond & Pearce, Plymouth, ERB