November 29, 2017

G.R. No. 203121

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
GOLEM SOTA and AMIDAL GADJADLI, Accused-Appellants
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
This resolves the appeal of Golem Sota (Sota) and Amidal Gadjadli (Gadjadli) from the Decision1 dated
29 February 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00801-MIN which affirmed, but
modified as to the penalty and damages, the Joint Decision 2 dated 19 October 2009 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. L-00355 and L-00356,
finding them guilty of Murder and Arson.
THE FACTS
Sota and Gadjadli were charged before the RTC with murder and arson committed as follows:
Criminal Case No. L-00355

That, in the evening, on or about the 19th day of November, 1999, in the [M]unicipality of
Labason, Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
accused, armed with a handgun and a hunting knife, conspiring, confederating together
and mutually helping one another and with intent to kill, by means of treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, shoot
and stab one ARTEMIO EBA, thereby inflicting upon him multiple gunshot wounds and
multiple stab wounds on the different vital parts of his body, which caused his
instantaneous death; that as a result of the commission of the said crime the heirs of the
herein victim suffered the following damages, viz:

a) Indemnity for victim's death----- ₱50,000.00

b) Loss of earning capacity---------- 30,000.00

 
₱80,000.00
CONTRARY TO LAW (Viol. of Art. 248, Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659),
with the aggravating circumstance of superior strength and the qualifying circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation.3

Criminal Case No. L-00356

That in the evening on or about the 19th day of November 1999, in the [M]unicipality of
Labason, Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another and
with intent to destroy property and moved by hatred or resentment, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously set on fire the residential house of one ARTEMIO EBA,
causing to be totally burned including his belongings, valued at Thirty Thousand
(₱30,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner.

CONTRARY TO LAW (Viol. of Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD
1613).4

Sota and Gadjadli, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charges against them; hence, joint trial
proceeded. To prove its cases, the prosecution called to the witness stand Jocelyn and Abelardo, the
daughter and son, respectively, of the victim, Artemio Eba (Artemio).
The Version of the Prosecution
At around 9:30 p.m. on 19 November 1999, Jocelyn woke up and found that her father, Artemio, was no
longer by her side. She peeped through a hole in the wall of their house, which was located at Sibulan,
Barangay Balas, Municipality of Labason, Zamboanga del Norte, and saw Sota and Gadjadli outside
with three other persons. The moon was bright, thus, she was able to identify Sota and Gadjadli, who
were close friends of Artemio and whose lands adjoined Artemio's land. Sota acted as the leader of the
group while Gadjadli carried a pistol. The group was demanding food from Artemio who was willing to
comply on condition that he would hand the food through an opening in the wall, being afraid to open
the door because he might be harmed. The group lighted a torch made up of coconut leaves and
started to bum the house but Artemio was able to put out the fire. Artemio pleaded for them not to bum
his house and repeated his request that he would wrap the food and hand it to them through the
opening in the wall.5
The group demanded that Artemio open the door; otherwise, they would bum the house. When Artemio
refused to comply insisting that he would hand them the food through the opening in the wall, the group
fired at the house, with Gadjadli firing the first shot at Artemio. At that instance, Jocelyn jumped out of
the window to escape and then ran away. When she looked back, she saw their house burning while
Artemio, who ran down the house, was fired at by the group. Jocelyn proceeded to Eusebio's 6 house,
which was 15 meters away from theirs, and told Eusebio, her brother, what happened to their father; but
Eusebio did nothing about it because he was shivering in fear.7
Abelardo, a son of Artemio, who lived nearby, did not try to rescue Artemio when he saw that his
father's house was burning because he was prevailed upon by his wife not to leave.8
The following day, Jocelyn, together with her brothers and sisters, found Artemio's body with stab and
gunshot wounds. Jocelyn was brought to the police station at the Municipality of Labason where she
executed her affidavit.9 Abelardo reported Artemio's death to the Barangay Captain and the police
detachment, and thereafter executed his affidavit.10 The house and everything inside it, which had a
total value of ₱30,000.00, were totally burned.11
The Version of the Defense
Sota, Gadjadli, Hamid Saaban (Saaban), and Tambi S. Janjali (Janjali) were presented by the accused
to prove their defenses.
When called to the witness stand, Sota admitted that he knew Gadjadli and Artemio. He and his wife
had been staying at the house of his parents at Sibulan, Barangay Balas, which was adjacent to the lot
where Artemio's house stood. On 19 November 1999, he stayed at home with his parents and siblings
because he had fever and chicken pox. He consulted a doctor at Labason hospital about his chicken
pox. He came to know that Artemio, with whom he had no misunderstanding, was killed when the
policemen arrested him. He was brought to the police station where he executed his counter-affidavit.
He claimed that he did not bum the house of Artemio nor was he involved in his killing. He did not see
Gadjadli, who was living at Barangay New Salvacion, on 19 November 1999. He had transferred to
Lemon, which is the boundary of Barangays Balas and New Salvacion, Municipality of Labason.12
Gadjadli stated that he was not responsible for the burning of the house of Artemio and his death.
Before the incident on 19 November 1999 took place, Eusebio, Artemio's son, went to his house to ask
if he knew someone who would kill Artemio for a price of ₱30,000.00. He told him that he did not know
of anyone who would do that. When he asked why he wanted Artemio killed, Eusebio told him that they
were having problems with the partitioning of their property. Eusebio then said that he would just go
home since he could not find someone to kill his father.13
At around 6:00 p.m. on 19 November 1999, Gadjadli proceeded to Artemio's house, which was
adjacent to the farmland he was tilling, to inform Artemio about Eusebio' s plan. When he reached the
place, he saw Eboy, Solaydi, and a masked person shoot Artemio. He shouted at Artemio and his
daughter to run because they might be killed. Artemio's daughter was able to run, leaving Artemio
behind. Eusebio and his companions chased and fired at him but missed.14
Gadjali claimed he had no ill feelings towards Artemio. He averred that Jocelyn could have recognized
his presence at Artemio's house because he shouted at her and Artemio to run. He did not see Sota
that fateful night.15
Saaban, a resident and a Barangay Kagawad of Barangay New Salvacion, Labason, testified that he
knew Sota and Gadjadli. On 5 November 1999, he treated Sota, whose body had been swelling, with
herbal medicine. Because Sota was not healed, he and Sota's parents brought him to Dr. Alpuerto at
the Labason hospital. Dr. Alpuerto was also not able to cure Sota so his wife and mother brought him to
Dipolog.16
Saaban continued to treat Sota when he returned to Labason from Dipolog on 18 November 1999.
Because of the enlargement of Sota's penis, he could not have walked from Balas to New Salvacion.
When he went back to Sota for treatment on 20 November 1999 at about 4:00 a.m., he was informed
that Sota had been arrested. He knew Artemio because their barangays, i.e., New Salvacion and Balas,
respectively, are adjacent.17
Janjali testified that he knew both Sota and Gadjadli. On 19 November 1999, Sota, on his way to see a
doctor for his scabies, passed by Janjali's house at Barangay Salvacion, Labason. Sota proceeded to
Dipolog because the person who was supposed to treat him was not around. He was sure that Sota
arrived from Dipolog three days after Artemio had been killed because Sota passed by his (Janjali's)
house.18
The RTC Ruling
In its Joint Decision19 dated 19 October 2009, the RTC resolved these cases as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. L-00355, the [c]ourt finds the accused GOLEM SOTA
and AMIDAL GADJADLI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Sec. 6 of Republic Act 7659 as charged in the information, and hereby
sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased ARTEMIO EBA the sum of ₱50,000.00 as
civil indemnity for his death without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs of the suit.

2. In Criminal Case No. L-00356, the court finds the accused GOLEM SOT A
and AMIDAL GADJADLI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
ARSON penalized under Section 3, Paragraph 2, of Presidential Decree No.
1613 and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of an indeterminate
prison term of six (6) years for (4) months and twenty (20) days of prision
mayor minimum as minimum to fourteen (14) years and two (2) months and ten
(10) days of the minimum of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua as
maximum may be imposed on the accused and to pay the heirs of the victim
ARTEMIO EBA, the sum of Php30,000.00 representing the value of the house
that was burned.

The accused GO LEM SOT A and AMID AL GADJADLI being detention prisoners are
entitled to be credited 4/5 of their preventive imprisonment in the service of their respective
sentences in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.20

The CA Ruling
The CA, Twenty-First Division found Jocelyn a credible witness who held her ground even during the
cross-examination. The CA held that the requisites in order that circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient for conviction had been satisfied in these cases and which proved beyond reasonable doubt
that Sota and Gadjadli, together with three other unidentified individuals, killed Artemio and burned his
house. The CA however modified the decision of the RTC as to the penalties to be imposed on Sota
and Gadjadli, and the damages to be awarded, viz:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with MODIFICATIONS the assailed
Joint Decision dated October 19, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del
Norte in Criminal Case Nos. L-00355 and L-00356. The accused-appellant Golem Sota and Amidal
Gadjadli are found GUILTY for the crimes of MURDER and ARSON and are hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime of Murder and an indeterminate prison term of six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum and twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal as maximum for the crime of Arson. Accused-Appellants Golem Sota and Amidal
Gadjadli are further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Artemio Eba the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages and Php30,000.00 as
temperate damages, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of six percent (6%) from the
date of commission of the crimes and twelve percent (12%) from the date of finality of this decision.21

ISSUE
The sole issue raised by Sota and Gadjadli in their Brief for AccusedAppellants 22 which they
adopted23 as their Supplemental Brief before the Court was:
THE COURT A QUO FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

THE RULING OF THE COURT

The appeal has no merit.
The findings of the trial
and appellate courts as to
the credibility of Jocelyn
were final and conclusive.
Time and again, the Court has held that when the issues involve matters of credibility of witnesses, the
findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies, and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not
conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor
of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the truth.24 The factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally binding and conclusive on
this Court25 except on the following instances:
1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, and conjectures;

2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

3. Where there is grave abuse of discretion;

4. When the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;

5. When the findings of fact are conflicting;

6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

7. When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

8. When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;

9. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents; and

10. When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.26 (italics omitted)

The CA, performing its sworn duty to re-examine the trial records as thoroughly as it could in order to
uncover any fact or circumstances that could impact the verdict in favor of the appellants, is presumed
to have uncovered none sufficient to undo or reverse the conviction.27 The Court, on the one hand, did
not find any compelling cause or impetus to disturb the findings of the CA especially so that the
accused-appellants failed to convincingly argue their claim that these cases fall within the determined
exclusions.
Most significantly, in every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to establish with the
same quantum of proof the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor, because, even if the
commission of the crime is a given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor
being likewise clearly ascertained.28 In these cases, the prosecution had undoubtedly discharged its
task in accordance with the required degree of proof.
It was the position of the accused-appellants that Jocelyn failed to elucidate who were the actual
perpetrators and how the alleged crimes were carried out. The petitioners claimed that the tales of the
events were all speculations and self-serving perceptions.29
Credible witness and credible testimony are the two essential elements for determining the weight of a
particular testimony.30 Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but must be credible in itself, such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances.31
Although Jocelyn was only twelve years old when the incident happened and when called to the
witness stand, the Court takes note of the truth that she possessed all the qualification and none of the
disqualification to testify in these cases, viz:
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of crime
unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.

Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. -The following

persons cannot be witnesses:

(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for
examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their
perception to others;

(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of

perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them
truthfully.32

Jocelyn's young age had no bearing on her qualification to testify on what happened that night on 19
November 1999. As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident,
and can communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a
witness.33 Significantly, even under the crucible of an intense cross-examination, Jocelyn never
wavered in her narration as to the incidents that led to the killing of Artemio and the burning of their
house, and in the affirmative identification of Sota and Gadjadli as two of the five persons who were
responsible for these crimes.
In Salvador v. People,34 the Court laid down the rule that direct evidence is not the only ground by which
the guilt of an accused may be anchored, viz:
Direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt. The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its
conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from
which the facts in issue may be established by inference. At times, resort to circumstantial evidence is
imperative since to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and
deny proper protection to the community.35

Jocelyn gave the credible testimony that on the night of 19 November 1999, Sota, Gadjadli, and three
other unidentified persons lit the torch to burn their house but Artemio was able to put out the fire.
Because the moon was bright, she vividly saw that it was Sota who acted as the leader of the group
while Gadjadli carried a pistol. She witnessed that the group started to shoot at the house when Artemio
became adamant not to open the door for fear he would be killed. It was with this burst of gunshots that
made her jump out of the window and run towards the house of her brother Eusebio. When she looked
back, their house was already burning while the group was shooting at Artemio who ran down the
house.36 Plainly, these circumstances as testified to by Jocelyn produced a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt that Sota, Gadjadli, and the three unidentified persons were responsible for the killing
of Artemio and the burning of their house.
Accused-appellants denigrate as contrary to human experience the testimony of Jocelyn that Eusebio,
having been informed of what had happened to their father, did not make any move to help him.37
Noteworthy, in People v. Banez,38 the Court ruled that it is not at all uncommon or unnatural for a
witness who, as in this case, having seen the killing of a person, did not even move, help, or run away
from the crime scene, but simply chose to stay and continue plowing. It explained its ruling as follows:
It is settled that there could be no hard and fast gauge for measuring a person's reaction or behavior
when confronted with a startling, not to mention horrifying, occurrence, as in this case. Witnesses of
startling occurrences react differently depending upon their situation and state of mind, and there is no
standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful
experience. The workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and
people react differently to shocking stimulus - some may shout, some may faint, and others may be
plunged into insensibility.39

Jocelyn testified that Eusebio did not help Artemio because he was trembling with fear. Presumably,
Eusebio had been informed by Jocelyn that five malefactors came to Artemio's house that night.
Eusebio's immediate reaction was to cower in fear with concern for his self-preservation rather than
coming to the aid of his father.
Jocelyn had no motive in
naming Sota and Gadjadli as
the perpetrators of the crime.
Sota and Gadjadli failed to attribute any ill motive on the part of Jocelyn in testifying against them.
Notably, nothing from the records can sustain a finding that Jocelyn, who was a child when called to the
witness stand, was moved by ill will against Sota and Gadjadli sufficient to encourage her to fabricate a
tale before the trial court. Both Sota and Gadjadli, according to her, were even the friends of Artemio. At
her tender age, Jocelyn could not have been able to concoct particulars on how the group killed Artemio
and burned their house. Settled is the rule that the absence of evidence as to an improper motive
strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that none existed and that the testimony is worthy of full faith
and credit.40 Moreover, it has been observed that the natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of
the victims, in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating persons other than
the culprits, for otherwise, the culprits would gain immunity.41
The defenses of alibi and
denial proffered by Gota and
Gadjadli were intrinsically
weak.
Sota's alibi was that he had fever due to chicken pox on 19 November 1999; thus, he stayed with his
parents and siblings at their parents' house, located at Sibulan, Barangay Balas. Artemio's house stood
on an adjacent lot. To fortify Sota's defense, Saaban testified that he was treating Sota for the swelling
in his body at New Salvacion.
The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Sota and Saaban were readily apparent. Sota stated that he
was staying in the house of his parents in Sibulan while Saaban claimed that Sota had been staying at
New Salvacion where he had been treating the latter. To bolster his claim that Sota could not have
committed the crime, Saaban stated that Sota's penis had been swollen; thus, Sota could not have
walked to Sibulan. It must be stressed, however, that Sota's defense was that he was at Sibulan at his
parents' house because he had fever and chicken pox.
On the one hand, Janjali stated that he saw Sota on 19 November 1999 as the latter was on his way to
Dipolog to seek medical attention for his scabies. He claimed that it was three days thereafter when
Sota came back from Dipolog, thus, it was impossible for Sota to be at the crime scene on 19
November 1999 because Sota was still at a hospital in Dipolog. He asserted that he was sure about this
because Sota passed by his house going to and coming from Dipolog.
The testimony of Janjali fatally weakens Sota's alibi. To stress, Sota insisted that he was at the house of
his parents on 19 November 1999 while Saaban confirmed that Sota was in Labason on that day. It was
clear, therefore, that contrary to Janjali's testimony, Sota was not in Dipolog; thus, it was not impossible
for Sota to be at the scene of the crime.
Gadjadli offered the absurd alibi that it was Eusebio who had the intention to kill Artemio. He claimed
that three nights before the incident Eusebio came to his house asking if he knew someone who could
kill Artemio for ₱30,000.00.
Noteworthy, the testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety and not merely on its
truncated parts. In deciphering a testimony, the technique is not to consider only its isolated parts nor
anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts.42 The defense of Gadjadli easily amounted to nothing
when assayed as to the other portions of his testimony. He had stated that, on 19 November 1999 at
around 6:00 p.m., he was on his way to inform Artemio about Eusebio' s plan when he came upon
Eusebio, Solaydi, and a masked man shooting at Artemio. Gadjadli failed to consider the fact that the
incident happened at 9:00 p.m. on 19 November 1999; thus, it was impossible for him to have
witnessed the shooting of Artemio at 6:00 p.m.
When compared to the alibi offered by Gadjadli to justify his presence at the scene of the crime, the
Court finds more credible Jocelyn's testimony identifying him as the one carrying the pistol and firing the
first shot at Artemio.
Denial is an intrinsically weak defense that further crumbles when it comes face-to-face with the
positive identification and straightforward narration of the prosecution witnesses.43 For the defense of
alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed
and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the
place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 44 The defense of denial must
be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. 45 Sota's testimony that he was at
his parents' house adjacent to the lot where Artemio's house stood, while Gadjadli claimed that he was
actually at the scene of the crime, clearly proves it was probable that both Sota and Gadjadli had
committed the crimes as charged.
It was the position of Sota and Gadjadli that they had no motive to kill Artemio. 46 Generally, the motive
of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and does not have to be proven. 47 In these cases, the
proof of motive of the appellants becomes even more irrelevant considering that their identity as two of
the persons responsible for the killing of Artemio and the burning of his house was no longer in
question.
Criminal Case No. L-00355
Foremost, there is a need to determine whether the crime committed by the petitioners based on the
facts was arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder using the following guidelines based on
jurisprudence:48
In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were
perpetrated - whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the
main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but
death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting
homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may
be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime
committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the
offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are
two separate and distinct crimes committed - homicide/murder and arson.49

According to Jocelyn, when Artemio refused to open the door, the group began shooting at the house.
The group followed Artemio when he ran under the house, and there shot him - facts that unerringly
leave the conclusion that the group's objective was to kill Artemio.
Jocelyn testified that when Artemio refused to heed the demand of the group to give them food by
opening the door, the group started to bum the house using a lighted torch of coconut leaves, which
flames Artemio was able to put out. When Artemio still refused to open the door, the group threatened
that they would burn the house. They made good their threat before they went after Artemio who ran
below his house. Undoubtedly, the group's intent was also to burn down the house of Artemio, not only
to kill him.
With these established facts, the prosecution was correct in charging Sota, Gadjadli, and the three
unnamed persons with murder and arson.
Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
765950 as follows:
Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall
be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,

derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or
with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an

earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

The RTC held that the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, and the
aggravating circumstance of superior strength that attended the killing of Artemio had been proven by
the prosecution.51
Jurisprudence dictates that, to be liable for murder, the prosecution must prove that: (1) a person was
killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide.52
The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and is done in a swift, deliberate,
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist
or escape.53 In treachery, the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim is without the
slightest provocation on his part.54The mode of attack, therefore, must have been planned by the
offender and must not have sprung from an unexpected turn of events.55 What is decisive is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. Treachery is
likewise committed when the victim, although warned of the danger to his life, is defenseless and
unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace.56
Jurisprudence57 defines evident premeditation as follows:
Evident premeditation exists when the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive
at a calm judgment. Premeditation, to be considered, must be evident and so proved with equal
certainty and clarity as the crime itself. It is essential that the following elements should there concur:
(1) the time when the offender has determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that
the culprit has clung to his determination and, (3) a sufficient interval of time between the determination
and the execution of the crime has lapsed to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.58

It was obvious that the group had deliberately reflected on the means to carry out their plan to kill
Artemio, i.e., by making him open the door of his house when he hands them the food they demanded
and thereafter to shoot him. They had a torch made of coconut leaves while Gadjadli was armed with a
pistol which, as pointed out by the RTC, was an effective ploy and calculation by the group, considering
that if Artemio refused to come out of the house, they would burn it.59
There was treachery when the group made Artemio believe they would bum his house for refusing to
open the door and hand them the food they were demanding. Although Artemio knew the danger to his
life if the group proceeded with its threat to bum the house should he still refuse to open the door, the
unexpected firing at his house made it impossible for him to defend himself or to retaliate.
The circumstance of use of superior strength cannot serve to qualify or aggravate the felony at issue
since it is jurisprudentially settled that when the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with
treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.60
Pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, the penalty to be imposed upon the accused-appellants should be reclusion
perpetua to death.  With the effectivity of R.A. No. 9346,61 murder shall no longer be punishable by
1âwphi1

death but by reclusion perpetua.

Following the ruling of the Court in People v. Jugueta,62 appellants shall be liable for the following: civil
indemnity of ₱100,000.00; moral damages of ₱l00,000.00; exemplary damages of ₱l00,000.00; and
temperate damages of ₱50,000.00. Additionally, the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary
damages, and temperate damages shall be subject to six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality
of decision until fully paid.63
Criminal Case No. L-00356
In Criminal Case No. L-00356, accused-appellants were charged with arson under Art. 320 of the RPC,
as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613.64
Enlightened precedent65 dictates the meaning of corpus delicti m arson, viz:
Proof of the corpus delicti is indispensable in the prosecution of arson, as in all kinds of criminal
offenses. Corpus delicti means the substance of the crime; it is the fact that a crime has actually been
committed. In arson, the corpus delicti is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the
fire, e.g., the charred remains of a house burned down and of its having been intentionally caused.
Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, may be enough to prove
the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.66

As testified to by Jocelyn, she and her siblings found the house and everything inside it burned to the
ground the day after the incident. Noteworthy, the fact that the house of Artemio was burned was never
assailed by the accused-appellants.
Section 367 of P.D. No. 1613 provides that the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed if the property burned is an inhabited house or dwelling, while Section 4 thereof states that
the maximum of the penalty shall be imposed if arson was attended by the following special
aggravating circumstances:
1. If committed with intent to gain;

2. If committed for the benefit of another;

3. If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the
property burned;

4. If committed by a syndicate.

The offense is committed by a syndicate if it is planned or carried out by a group of three

(3) or more persons. (emphasis supplied)

The special aggravating circumstance that arson was committed by a syndicate should have been
appreciated in this case.
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provide:

Section 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation
of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing
it.

Section 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting

the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary
and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
 sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.

The above provisions requiring that the qualifying and aggravating circumstances be specified in the
information are in consonance with the constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against him. The purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for his
defense, precluding surprises during the trial.68 Hence, even if the prosecution has duly proven the
presence of the circumstances, the Court cannot appreciate the same if they were not alleged in the
information.69
The information in Criminal Case No. L-00356 pertinently states that the "above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another and with intent to destroy property
and moved by hatred or resentment, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously set on fire
the residential house of one ARTEMIO EBA, causing to be totally burned including his
belongings."70 The information clearly informs the accused that they, i.e., Sota, Gadjadli, John Doe,
Peter Doe, and Richard Doe, were being charged for having set on fire Artemio's house. The allegation
that there were five accused conspiring to bum Artemio's house undoubtedly qualifies the crime as
having been committed by a syndicate. Put otherwise, the information was couched in ordinary and
concise language enough to enable the accused to know that they were being charged with arson
perpetrated as a syndicate. Hence, to further state in the information that the crime was attended by the
special aggravating circumstance that it was committed by a syndicate would only be a superfluity.
The aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed by a syndicate was confirmed by the fact
that the accused-appellants and three other unidentified persons carried a torch and assembled outside
Artemio' s house making threats to bum it. The well-coordinated movements of the group fortified their
joint purpose and design, and community of interest in burning Artemio's house. The group started to
bum the house of Artemio when he refused to open his door in order to hand them food. It was
fortunate that Artemio was able to put out the fire from the torch; but after the group had fired on the
house of Artemio, they set fire to his house and thereafter ran after him to shoot him. Noteworthy, in
their respective decisions, both the RTC71 and the CA72 ruled that there were five persons who killed
Artemio and burned his house down.
To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to a previous agreement to commit a
crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective.73 In such a case, the act of one becomes the act of all and each of the accused will thereby
be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed.74
Considering the presence of the special aggravating circumstance, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua should have been imposed on the accused-appellants.
On damages, the CA was correct in awarding temperate damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00. In view
of the presence of the special aggravating circumstance, exemplary damages in the amount of
₱20,000.00 is likewise appropriate.75 In addition, the temperate damages and exemplary damages to
be paid by the accused-appellants are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
finality of decision until fully paid.76
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
In Criminal Case No. L-00355, the Court finds GOLEM SOTA and AMID AL GADJADLI GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of ARTEMIO EBA as follows: civil indemnity of
₱100,000.00; moral damages of ₱l00,000.00; exemplary damages of ₱l00,000.00; and temperate
damages of ₱50,000.00, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality
of this decision until fully paid, to be imposed on the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary
damages, and temperate damages.
In Criminal Case No. L-00356, the Court finds GOLEM SOTA and AMIDAL GADJADLI GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Arson defined and penalized under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1613; and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of ARTEMIO EBA the sum of ₱30,000.00 as
temperate damages and ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages, with interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice
(On leave)
ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO*
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* On Leave.
1 Rollo, pp.
3-18; penned by Associate Justice Pamela Ann Abella Maxino, and concurred in by
Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Zenaida T. Galapate-Lagulles.
2 Records, pp. 172-199; penned by Judge Oscar D. Tomarong.
3 Id. at 1.
4 Id. at 2.
5 Records, pp. 33-34 and 44-45; TSN, 4 October 2000.
6 Also known as "Eboy."
7 Records, pp. 34-35, 40, 46-47 and 50-52.
8 Id. at 60-61; TSN, 24 January 2001.
9 Id. at 6.
10 Id. at 5.
11 Id. at 38-39; TSN, 4 October 2000; id. at 62; TSN, 24 January 2001.
12 Id. at (no proper pagination); TSN, 22 May 2008, pp. 2-10 and 15-16.
13 Id. at 129-131; TSN, 31 July 2008.
14 Id. At l31-133;id.
15 Id. at 134; id.
16 Id. at 154-157; TSN, 17 December2008.
17 Id. at 157-158; id.
18 Id. at (no proper pagination); TSN, 27 August 2009, pp. 2-3 and 7-9.
19 Records, pp. 172-199.
20 Id. at 197-198
21 Rollo, p. 17.
22 CA rollo, pp. 11-24.
23 Id. at
30-32; the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
likewise manifested that it was adopting its Brief for the Appellee as its Supplemental Brief.
24 People v. Dayaday, G.R. No. 213224, 16 January 2017.
25 Torres v. People, G.R. No. 206627, 18 January 2017.
26 Macayan, Jr. v. People, 756 Phil. 202, 215-216 (2015).
27 Luy v. People, G.R. No. 200087, 12 October 2016.
28 People v. Yau, 741 Phil. 747, 763-764 (2014).
29 CA rollo, pp. 18 and 20.
30 People v. Mangune, 698 Phil. 759, 769 (2012), citing People v. Sorongon, 445 Phil. 273, 278
(2003).
31 Idanan v. People, G.R. No. 193313, 16 March 2016, 787 SCRA 499, 506.
32 Rules of Court, Rule 130.
33 People v. Esugon, 761 Phil. 300, 310 (2015).
34 581 Phil. 430 (2008).
35 Id. at 439-440.
36 Records, pp. 33-35; TSN, 4 October 2000.
37 CA rollo, p. 20.
38 770 Phil. 40 (2015).
39 Id. at 46.
40 People v. Ygot, G.R. No. 210715, 18 July 2016, 797 Phil. 87, 94.
41 People v. Reynes, 423 Phil. 363, 382 (2001).
42 People v. Com bate, 653 Phil. 487, 500 (2010).
43 Ibanez v. People, G.R. No. I 90798, 27 January 2016, 782 SCRA 291, 312.
44 People v. Pitalla, Jr., G.R. No. 22356 I, I 9 October 20 I 6.
45 People v. Regalado, G.R. No. 210752, 17 August 2016.
46 CA rollo, pp. 21-22.
47 People v. De Guzman, 690 Phil. 701, 716 (2012).
48 People v. Baluntong, 629 Phil. 441 (2010).
49 Id. at 446-447, citing People v. Malngan, 534 Phil. 404, 431 (2006).
50 Entitled
"An Act to impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that
Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, as amended, Other Special Laws, and for Other Purposes"
which was approved on 13 December 1993.
51 CA rollo, pp. 38-40.
52 People v. Carnal, 692 Phil. 55, 73 (2012).
53 People v. Zuliela, 720 Phil. 818, 826 (2013), citing People v. Jalbonian, 713 Phil. 93, 106
(2013) further citing People v. Dela Cruz, 626 Phil. 631, 640 (2010).
54 People v. Juguela, G.R. No. 202124, 5 April 2016, 788 SCRA 331, 350.
55 People v. Caftaveras, 722 Phil. 259, 270 (2013).
56 People v. Carnal, supra note 52 at 85, citing People v. Nugas, 677 Phil. 168, 179-180 (2011).
57 People v. Repollo, 387 Phil. 390 (2000).
58 Id. at 403,
59 CA rollo, p. 40.
60 People v. Dadao, 725 Phil. 298, 314 (2014).
61 Entitled
"An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines" dated 24
January 2006.
62 Supra note 54 at 381-382 and 388.
63 Id. at 388.
64 Entitled "Amending The Law On Arson" dated 7 March 1979.
65 People v. De Leon, 599 Phil. 759 (2009).
66 Id. at 769.
67 Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua
shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;

2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;

3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;

4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo
grove or forest;

5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and

6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.

68 People v. Lab-eo, 424 Phil. 482, 497 (2002).

69 People v. Lapore, 761 Phil. 196, 203 (2015).
70 Records, p. 2.
71 Id. at 186.
72 Rollo, p. 13.
73 People v. CA, 755 Phil. 80, 114 (2015).
74 Buebos v. People, 573 Phil. 347, 360 (2008).
75 People v. De Leon, 599 Phil. 759, 770 (2009).
76 People v. Jugueta, supra note 54 at 388.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 163938               March 28, 2008
DANTE BUEBOS and SARMELITO BUEBOS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE law on arson has always been a constant source of confusion not only among members of the bar,
but also among those of the bench. The bewilderment often centers on what law to apply and what
penalty to impose.
In this case, the Court is again tasked to determine whether petitioners are liable for simple arson or
arson of an inhabited house which merits a penalty of up to reclusion perpetua.
Before the Court is a petition to review on certiorari under Rule 45 the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), affirming with modification that2 of the Regional Trial Court in Tabaco, Albay, finding petitioners
Dante Buebos and Sarmelito Buebos guilty of arson.
The Facts
On January 1, 1994 around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, Adelina B. Borbe was in her house at Hacienda
San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay watching over her sick child. 3 She was lying down when she heard some
noise around the house. She got up and looked through the window and saw the four accused,
Rolando Buela, Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr. congregating in front of her
hut.4 When she went out, she saw the roof of her nipa hut already on fire. She shouted for help. Instead
of coming to her immediate succor, the four fled.5
At some distance away, Olipiano Berjuela heard Adelina scream for help. Olipiano was then drinking
with Pepito Borbe to celebrate New Year’s Eve. Olipiano immediately ran to the place and saw a
number of people jumping over the fence. When he focused his flashlight on them, he was able to
identify Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr.6 He also saw Rolando Buela running
away.7
On complaint of Adelina, petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos, together with Rolando Buela and
Antonio Cornel, Jr., were indicted for arson in an Information bearing the following accusations:
That on or about the 1st day of January, 1994 at 3:00 o’clock in the Barangay Hacienda, Island of San
Miguel, Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with
intent to cause damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire the
nipa roof of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to the latter’s damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.8
The prosecution evidence portraying the foregoing facts was principally supplied by private complainant
Adelina Borbe and Olipiano Berjuela.
Upon the other hand, denial and alibi were the main exculpating line of petitioners and their co-
accused. The trial court summed up the defense evidence in the following tenor:
The defense contended that the accused were at different places at the time of the incident; Rolando
Buela claimed to be at sitio Tugon, Malictay, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay as there was a novena prayer
at his parents’ house on occasion of the death anniversary of his late grandfather; Dante Buebos also
claimed to have been at Romeo Calleja’s having gone there in the evening of December 30, 1993 and
left the place at 12:00 o’clock noontime of January 1, 1994; Sarmelito Buebos asserted that he was at
his residence at sitio Malictay, Hacienda, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay on the day the incident happened
and that he never left his house; Antonio Cornel, Jr. likewise claimed to be at his residence at Añgas
after having visited his in-laws; that he only came to know of the accusation five (5) days after the
incident happened when he visited his parents at Malictay; witnesses were likewise presented by the
accused to corroborate their testimonies.9
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 7, 1998, the RTC found all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson. The
dispositive part of the judgment of conviction reads:
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing, this Court finds accused ROLANDO BUELA, DANTE BUEBOS,
SARMELITO BUEBOS and ANTONIO CORNEL, JR. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
charged; accordingly, each of the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.10
Via a notice of appeal, the four accused elevated the matter to the appellate court. In their appeal, they
contended that (1) the trial court erred in finding them guilty of the crime of arson; (2) that the trial court
erred in finding conspiracy; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to give weight and credence to their
defense of denial and alibi.
On November 13, 2003, through an eight-page decision penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los
Santos, the CA disposed of the appeal in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Each of the accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of
prision mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.11
In downgrading the penalty, the CA opined that the accused could only be convicted of simple arson,
punishable by prision mayor, and not for burning of an inhabited house, which is punishable by
imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. According to the appellate court,
the information failed to allege with specificity the actual crime committed. Hence, the accused should
be found liable only for arson in its simple form.12
Issues
Dissatisfied, Dante and Sarmelito Buebos have resorted to the present recourse. The following
arguments are now raised for the Court’s consideration:
I.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE;
II.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR.13
Our Ruling
Overview of the law on arson
The confusion surrounding arson has been confounded by the dearth of annotation on this part of our
penal law. Certainly, the law on arson is one of the least commented in this jurisdiction. For the
guidance of the bench and bar, a brief legislative history of the body of laws on arson is in order.
Previously, arson was defined and penalized under nine different articles of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 320 (destructive arson), Article 321 (other forms of arson), Article 322 (cases of arson not
included in the preceding articles), Article 323 (arson of property of small value), Article 324 (crimes
involving destruction), Article 325 (burning one’s own property to commit arson), Article 326 (setting fire
to property exclusively owned by the offender, Article 326-a (in cases where death resulted as a
consequence of arson), and Article 326-b (prima facie evidence of arson).
On March 7, 1979, citing certain inadequacies that impede the successful enforcement and prosecution
of arsonists, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D) No. 1613. P.D. 1613
supplanted the penal code provisions on arson. The pertinent parts of the said presidential issuance
read:
SECTION 1. Arson. – Any person who burns or sets fire to the property of another shall be punished by
prision mayor.
The same penalty shall be imposed when a person sets fire to his own property under circumstances
which expose to danger the life or property of another.
SECTION 2. Destructive Arson. – The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
1. Any ammunition factory and other establishments where explosives, inflammable or
combustible materials are stored;
2. Any archive, museum, whether public or private, or any edifice devoted to culture, education
or social services;
3. Any church or place of worship or other building where people usually assemble;
4. Any train, airplane or any aircraft, vessel or watercraft, or conveyance for transportation of
persons or property;
5. Any building where evidence is kept for use in any legislative, judicial, administrative or other
official proceedings;
6. Any hospital, hotel, dormitory, lodging house, housing tenement, shopping center, public or
private market, theater or movie house or any similar place or building;
7. Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated in a populated or congested area.
SECTION 3. Other Cases of Arson. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or forest;
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.
SECTION 4. Special Aggravating Circumstances in Arson. – The penalty in any case of arson shall be
imposed in its maximum period:
1. If committed with the intent to gain;
2. If committed for the benefit of another;
3. If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property
burned;
4. If committed by a syndicate. The offense is committed by a syndicate if it is planned or carried
out by a group of three (3) or more persons.
SECTION 5. Where Death Results from Arson. – If by reason of or on the occasion of arson death
results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed.
SECTION 6. Prima Facie Evidence of Arson. – Any of the following circumstances shall constitute prima
facie evidence of arson:
1. If the fire started simultaneously in more than one part of the building or establishment.
2. If substantial amount of flammable substances or materials are stored within the building not
necessary in the business of the offender nor for household use.
3. If gasoline, kerosene, petroleum or other flammable or combustible substances or materials
soaked therewith or containers thereof, or any mechanical, electrical, chemical, or electronic
 contrivance designed to start a fire, or ashes or traces of any of the foregoing are found in the
ruins or premises of the burned building or property.
4. If the building or property is insured for substantially more than its actual value at the time of
the issuance of the policy.
5. If during the lifetime of the corresponding fire insurance policy more than two fires have
occurred in the same or other premises owned or under the control of the offender and/or
insured.
6. If shortly before the fire, a substantial portion of the effects insured and stored in a building or
property had been withdrawn from the premises except in the ordinary course of business.
7. If a demand for money or other valuable consideration was made before the fire in exchange
for the desistance of the offender or for the safety of other person or property of the victim.
SECTION 7. Conspiracy to Commit Arson. – Conspiracy to commit arson shall be punished by prision
mayor in its minimum period.
SECTION 8. Confiscation of Object of Arson. – The building which is the object of arson including the
land on which it is situated shall be confiscated and escheated to the State, unless the owner thereof
can prove that he has no participation in nor knowledge of such arson despite the exercise of due
diligence on his part.
On November 11, 1980, the law on arson was again revisited via P.D. No. 1744. The new law expanded
the definition of destructive arson by way of reinstating Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code. The
amendatory legislation also paved the way for the reimposition of the capital punishment on destructive
arsonists.
When Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659 (An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes)
was passed on December 13, 1993, Article 320 again underwent a revision. As it now stands, Article
320 of the Revised Penal Code is worded, thus:
Art. 320. Destructive Arson. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any
person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result
of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people
usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official
governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings
and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels,
motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of whether the
offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set on
fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or
conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are
devoted to the service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of
another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or
to collect from insurance.
Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed by
two (2) or more persons or by a group of persons, regardless of whether their purpose is merely to burn
or destroy the building or the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the commission or another
violation of law.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance,
storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death results, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
Of course, with the repeal of the Death Penalty Law on June 24, 2006 through R.A. No. 9346, arson is
no longer a capital offense.14
We proceed to the crux of the petition.
Circumstantial evidence points to petitioners’ culpability
Petitioners score the CA for convicting them of arson based on circumstantial evidence. They argue
that the inference that they were responsible for the burning of private complainant’s hut was not duly
proven by the People.
Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that "indirectly proves a fact in issue through an
inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. Resort thereto is essential when
the lack of direct testimony would result in setting a felon free."15
At the outset, We may well emphasize that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only
basis on which a court draws its finding of guilt. Established facts that form a chain of circumstances
can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of reasoning towards a conviction. 16 Verily,
resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence.17
The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for a conviction: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to
leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.18
After a careful review of the evidence presented by both parties, We find that the circumstantial
evidence extant in the records is sufficient to identify petitioners as the authors of the burning of the hut
of private complainant Adelina Borbe:
1. Private complainant heard some noise emanating from outside her house at around 3:00
a.m.;
2. When she went out to check the disturbance, private complainant saw petitioners, together
with their two other co-accused, standing in front of the house;
3. Moments later, the roof of her house caught fire;
4. Petitioners and their cohorts absconded while private complainant desperately shouted for
help.
The facts from which the cited circumstances arose have been proved through positive
testimony.19 Evidently, these circumstances form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair
conclusion – the culpability of petitioners for the burning of the hut. The Court is convinced that the
circumstances, taken together, leave no doubt that petitioner perpetrated the arson.
Conspiracy evident from coordinated action of petitioners
Petitioners next contend that conspiracy was erroneously appreciated by both the trial and appellate
courts. They posit that the finding of conspiracy was premised on speculation and conjecture.
The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement
need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating
a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. Corollarily, it is
not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement
setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried
out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert, each of them
doing his part to fulfill the common design. In such a case, the act of one becomes the act of all and
each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed.20
In the case at bench, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of petitioners Dante and
Sarmelito Buebos. Both of them stood outside the house of private complainant Adelina. They were part
of the group making boisterous noise in the vicinity. Petitioners also fled together while the roof of
Adelina’s house was ablaze. These acts clearly show their joint purpose and design, and community of
interest.
We quote with approval the CA observation along this line:
Accused-appellant’s assertion that conspiracy has not been established is belied by the accounts of the
prosecution witness. The manner by which the accused-appellants behaved after the private
complainant shouted for help clearly indicated a confederacy of purpose and concerted action on the
part of the accused-appellants. Even if there is no direct evidence showing that all of the accused had
prior agreement on how to set the roof of the house on fire, the doctrine is well settled that conspiracy
need not be proved by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime. Very seldom such prior
agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal undertakings are only rarely
documented by agreements in writing.21
Crime committed and the penalty
The RTC sentenced all four accused to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. On appeal, the CA reduced the sentence to six (6) years of prision correccional,
as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. The CA ratiocinated:
The information charges accused-appellants with "violation of P.D. 1613" without specifying the
particular provision breached. The information having failed to allege whether or not the burnt house is
inhabited, and not having been established that the house is situated in a populated or congested area,
accused-appellants should be deemed to have only been charged with plain arson under Section 1 of
the decree. Under Section 1 of the decree, the offense of simple arson committed is punishable by
prision mayor.
There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances in the case at bar accused-appellants
should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period as provided under
Article 321, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by Presidential Decree No. 1613.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be anywhere within the range
of prision correccional.22
The legal basis of the trial court in convicting petitioners of arson is Section 3, paragraph 2 of P.D. No.
1613. The said provision of law reads:
SECTION 3. Other Cases of Arson. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
xxxx
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally
burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.23 Admittedly, there is a confluence of the foregoing elements
here. However, the information failed to allege that what was intentionally burned was an inhabited
house or dwelling. That is fatal.
Sections 8 and 9 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure state:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. – The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and
the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances for the court to pronounce judgment.
Under the new rules, the information or complaint must state the designation of the offense given by the
statute and specify its qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances. Otherwise stated, the accused
will not be convicted of the offense proved during the trial if it was not properly alleged in the
information.24
Perusing the information, there was no allegation that the house intentionally burned by
petitioners and their cohorts was inhabited. Rather, the information merely recited that
"accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to cause damage, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of the
house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to the latter’s damage and prejudice."25
Although the rule took effect only on December 1, 2000, while the petitioners were convicted by the
RTC on April 7, 1998, it may be applied retroactively. It is elementary that rules of criminal procedure
are given retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused.26
In fine, petitioners can be convicted only of simple arson, under Section 1, paragraph 1 of P.D. No.
1613, punishable by prision mayor.
This is not a case of first impression. This Court has, on a number of occasions, modified the RTC and
CA judgments for having applied the wrong law and penalty on arson. In People v. Soriano, 27 the
accused was found guilty of destructive arson, then a capital offense. On automatic review, the Court
held that he should be held liable only for simple arson. The explanation:
However, we believe that the applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which
imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties
burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as houses, contemplating inhabited houses or
dwellings under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as alleged in the second Amended Information
particularly refer to the structures as houses rather than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law
should therefore be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case of
ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be construed strictly
against the government, and literally in favor of the accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b)
what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the
case at bar.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or
viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code
constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous, odious and
hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity
and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant
social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts
falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the
qualifying circumstances present.
In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither appears to be heinous nor
represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness as distinguished from those acts punishable
under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance was established to convert the
offense to Destructive Arson. The special aggravating circumstance that accused-appellant was
"motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned" cannot be
appreciated in the present case where it appears that he was acting more on impulse, heat of anger or
risen temper rather than real spite or hatred that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego. Nothing
can be worse than a spurned lover or a disconsolate father under the prevailing circumstances that
surrounded the burning of the Cimagala house. Thus, accused-appellant must be held guilty of Simple
Arson penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the act of intentionally burning an inhabited house
or dwelling.28
An oversight of the same nature was addressed by this Court in the more recent case of People v.
Malngan.29 Said the Court in Malngan:
The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is accused-appellant guilty of?
As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the crime of arson: 1) destructive arson, under
Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and 2) simple arson, under
Presidential Decree No. 1613. Said classification is based on the kind, character and location of the
property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused, 48 to wit:
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates the malicious burning
of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and
other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. The
classification of this type of crime is known as Destructive Arson, which is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. The reason for the law is self-evident: to effectively discourage and deter the
commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent the destruction of properties and protect the lives of
innocent people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration leaves only destruction and despair in its wake;
hence, the State mandates greater retribution to authors of this heinous crime. The exceptionally
severe punishment imposed for this crime takes into consideration the extreme danger to human lives
exposed by the malicious burning of these structures; the danger to property resulting from the
conflagration; the fact that it is normally difficult to adopt precautions against its commission, and the
difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators; and, the greater impact on the social, economic, security and
political fabric of the nation. [Emphasis supplied]
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Art. 320, death should result,
the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code remains the
governing law for Simple Arson. This decree contemplates the malicious burning of public and private
structures, regardless of size, not included in Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659, and classified as other
cases of arson. These include houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations,
railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments. Although the purpose of
the law on Simple Arson is to prevent the high incidence of fires and other crimes involving destruction,
protect the national economy and preserve the social, economic and political stability of the nation, PD
1613 tempers the penalty to be meted to offenders. This separate classification of Simple Arson
recognizes the need to lessen the severity of punishment commensurate to the act or acts committed,
depending on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. [Emphasis supplied]
To emphasize:
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or
viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code (as
amended) constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness,
atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency
and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant
social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts
falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the
qualifying circumstances present. [Emphasis supplied.]
Prescinding from the above clarification vis-à-vis the description of the crime as stated in the accusatory
portion of the Information, it is quite evident that accused-appellant was charged with the crime
of Simple Arson – for having "deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO
SEPARA and family x x x knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly
populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building, together
with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire." [Emphasis supplied]
The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar to the facts of the case of People v. Soriano. The
accused in the latter case caused the burning of a particular house. Unfortunately, the blaze spread and
gutted down five (5) neighboring houses. The RTC therein found the accused guilty of destructive arson
under paragraph 1 of Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This
Court, through Mr. Justice Bellosillo, however, declared that:
"x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a penalty of
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties burned by accused-
appellant are specifically described as houses, contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the
aforesaid law. The descriptions as alleged in the second Amended Information particularly refer to the
structures as houses rather than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3,
Par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of
penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and
liberally in favor of the accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b)
what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the
case at bar."
As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant was charged with having intentionally
burned the two-storey residential house of Robert Separa. Said conflagration likewise spread and
destroyed seven (7) adjoining houses. Consequently, if proved, as it was proved, at the trial, she may
be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple arson. Such is the case
"notwithstanding the error in the designation of the offense in the information, the information remains
effective insofar as it states the facts constituting the crime alleged therein." "What is controlling is not
the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof
allegedly violate, x x x but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited."
There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC as Sec. 5 of PD No. 1613
categorically provides that the penalty to be imposed for simple arson is:
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. – If by reason of or on the occasion of arson death results,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied] 1avvphil

Accordingly, there being no aggravating circumstance alleged in the Information, the imposable penalty
on accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.30
Now, to the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate
penalty should range from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Considering that no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the penalty should be
imposed in its medium period [eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years]. The minimum of the
indeterminate sentence is prision correccional, which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years, to be imposed in any of its periods.
The CA sentence is in accord with law and jurisprudence. We sustain it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in full.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ*
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
DANTE O. TINGA** MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
C E RTI F I CAT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* ViceAssociate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, who is on official leave per
Special Order No. 497 dated March 14, 2008.
** Designated as additional member per Special Order No. 497 dated March 14, 2008.
1 Rollo, 65-72. Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos (now deceased), with
Associate Justices B. A. Adefuin-de la Cruz and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring.
2 Id. at 26-28. Criminal Case No. T-2563. Penned by Judge Mamerto M. Buban, Jr, RTC,
Branch 18, Tabaco, Albay.
3 TSN, September 7, 1995, p. 5.

4 Id. at 6.

5 Id. at 12.

6 TSN, December 8, 1994, p. 14.

7 Id. at 16.

8 Id. at 25.

9 Id. at 27.

10 Id. at 28.

11 Id. at 72.

12 Id. at 71.

13 Id. at 16.

14 Those found guilty of destructive arson would now be meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
15 People v. Matito, G.R. No. 144405, February 24, 2004, 423 SCRA 617.

16 People v. Casitas, G.R. No. 137404, February 14, 2003, 397 SCRA 382.

17 Revised Rules on Evidence, Rule 133, Sec. 5 reads:

Sec. 5. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient

for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt.
18 People v. Casitas, supra.

19 TSN, September 7, 1995, pp. 4-29; TSN, December 8, 1994, pp. 3-38.

20 People v. Quinao, G.R. No. 108454, March 13, 1997, 269 SCRA 495; People v. Saul, G.R.
No. 124809, December 19, 2001, 372 SCRA 636; People v. Mozar, 215 Phil. 501 (1984).
21 Rollo, p. 71.

22 Id. at 71-72.

23 People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 142565, July 29, 2003, 407 SCRA 367.

24 People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 125784, November 19, 2003, 416 SCRA 193.

25 Rollo, p. 25.

26 People v. Vallejo, supra.

27 Supra note 23.

28 Id. at 374-376.

29 G.R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 294.

30 People v. Malngan, id. at 327-331.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188708               July 31, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ALAMADA MACABANDO, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is an appeal filed by appellant Alamada Macabando assailing the February 24, 2009 decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00208-MIN. The CA decision affirmed in toto the
August 26, 1002 judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, finding
the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of destructive arson, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
THE CASE
The prosecution's evidence showed that at around 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001, the appellant
broke bottles on the road while holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even ("manabla
ko").3 Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his house.4
At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors shout that there was a fire. When
Cornelio went out of his house to verify, he saw smoke coming from the appellant’s house. He got a pail
of water, and poured its contents into the fire.5 Eric Quilantang, a neighbor whose house was just 10
meters from that of the appellant, ran to the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When Eric
approached the burning house, the appellant, who was carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not
to interfere; the appellant then fired three (3) shots in the air.6 The appellant also told the people around
that whoever would put out the fire would be killed.7
Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went home to save his nephews and nieces.8 Eric also
returned to his house to save his belongings.9
Fire Officer (FO) II Victor Naive and FOI Reynaldo Maliao conducted a spot investigation of the incident,
and concluded, among others, that the fire started in the appellant’s house; and that it had been
intentional.10 Barangay Chairman Modesto Ligtas stated that the fire gutted many houses in his
barangay, and that he assisted the City Social Welfare and Development Department personnel in
assessing the damage.11
The defense, on the other hand, presented a different version of the events.
The appellant declared on the witness stand that he lived in the twostorey house in Barangay 35,
Limketkai Drive, which was owned by his sister, Madji Muslima Edemal. 12 He admitted that he felt
angry at around 2:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001 because one of his radio cassettes for sale had been
stolen.13 The appellant claimed that he went to sleep after looking for his missing radio cassette, and
that the fire had already started when he woke up. He denied making a threat to burn his house, and
maintained that he did not own a gun. He added that the gunshots heard by his neighbors came from
the explosion of firecrackers that he intended to use during the New Year celebration.14
Lomantong Panandigan, the appellant’s cousin, stated, among others, that he did not see the appellant
carry a revolver or fire a shot on December 21, 2001.15 Dimas Kasubidan, the appellant’s brother-in-
law, stated that he and the appellant lived in the same house, and that the latter was asleep in his room
at the ground floor before the fire broke out.16
The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, before the RTC.17 The appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charge on arraignment.18 In its judgment dated August 26, 2002, the RTC found the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. It gave weight to the RTC’s factual findings since
these findings were based on unrebutted testimonial and documentary evidence. The CA held that the
totality of the presented circumstantial evidence led to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of the
crime charged.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the appeal, but modify the crime committed by the appellant and the penalty imposed on him.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
We point out at the outset that no one saw the appellant set fire to his house in Barangay 35, Limketkai
Drive, Cagayan de Oro City. The trial and appellate courts thus resorted to circumstantial evidence
since there was no direct evidence to prove the appellant’s culpability to the crime charged.
It is settled that in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to sustain a
conviction provided that: "(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a
moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime.
Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must
be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused."19
In the present case, the following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain that leads to an
unavoidable conclusion that the appellant, to the exclusion of others, set fire to his house: first, the
appellant, while holding an iron lead pipe, acted violently and broke bottles near his house at around
4:00 p.m. of December 21, 2001; second, while he was still in a fit of rage, the appellant stated that he
would get even, and then threatened to burn his own house; third, Judith Quilantang saw a fire in the
appellant’s room approximately two hours after the appellant returned to his house; fourth, the appellant
prevented Cornelio, Eric, and several other people from putting out the fire in his house; fifth, the
appellant fired shots in the air, and then threatened to kill anyone who would try to put out the fire in his
house; sixth, the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire; and finally, the investigation conducted
by the fire marshals of the Bureau of Fire Protection revealed that the fire started in the appellant’s
house, and that it had been intentional.
The combination of these circumstances, indeed, leads to no other conclusion than that the appellant
set fire to his house. We find it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to prevent his neighbors
from putting out the fire in his house, and threaten to kill them if they did, if he had nothing to do with the
crime. The first impulse of an individual whose house is on fire is to save his loved ones and/or
belongings; it is contrary to human nature, reason and natural order of things for a person to thwart and
prevent any effort to put out the fire in his burning property. By carrying (and firing) a gun during the fire,
the appellant showed his determination to repel any efforts to quell the fire. Important to note, too, is the
fact that the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire which, to our mind, showed deliberate
planning and preparedness on his part to flee the raging fire; it likewise contradicted his statement that
he was asleep inside his house when the fire broke out, and that the fire was already big when he woke
up. Clearly, the appellant’s indifferent attitude to his burning house and his hostility towards the people
who tried to put out the fire, coupled with his preparedness to flee his burning house, belied his claim of
innocence. Notably, the appellant failed to impute any improper motive against the prosecution
witnesses to falsely testify against him; in fact, he admitted that he had no misunderstanding with them
prior to the incident.
The Crime Committed
The CA convicted the appellant of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC, as amended, which
reads:
Article 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any
person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result
of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people
usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official
governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings
and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels,
motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of whether the
offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set on
fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
 3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or
conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure. 1âwphi1

4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are
devoted to the service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of
another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or
to collect from insurance.
xxxx
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance,
storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.
In sum, "Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels,
buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial
establishments by any person or group of persons."20
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613,21 on the other hand, currently governs simple arson. Section 3 of
this law provides:
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be
imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or forest;
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse. [italics and emphasis ours]
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size,
not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.22 This law punishes
simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree of perversity
and viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political, and
national security implications than destructive arson.23
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning;
and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these elements have been
proven in the present case. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his own house, and
that the fire spread to other inhabited houses. These allegations were established during trial through
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the trial and appellate courts found credible and
convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection which stated that damaged houses
were residential, and that the fire had been intentional. Moreover, the certification from the City Social
Welfare and Development Department likewise indicated that the burned houses were used as
dwellings. The appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was used as a residence. That
the appellant’s act affected many families will not convert the crime to destructive arson, since the
appellant’s act does not appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and
viciousness when compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established
evidence only showed that the appellant intended to burn his own house, but the conflagration spread
to the neighboring houses.
In this regard, our ruling in Buebos v. People24 is particularly instructive, thus:
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or
viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code
constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous, odious and
hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity
and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant
social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson.
The Proper Penalty
Under Section 3, paragraph 2, of P.D. No. 1613, the imposable penalty for simple arson is reclusion
temporal, which has a range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, to reclusion perpetua. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable should be an indeterminate penalty whose
minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, or
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, and whose maximum should be the medium period
of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, or sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years,
taking into account the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances that attended the
commission of the crime. Taking these rules into account, we therefore impose on the appellant the
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As regards the award of damages, we sustain the lower courts' findings that the records do not
adequately reflect any concrete basis for the award of actual damages to the offended parties. To seek
recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable
degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable.25
WHEREFORE, the assailed February 24, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00208-MIN is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) appellant Alamada Macabando is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson
under Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613; and
(2) he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty often (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTE S TATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E RTI F I CAT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Com1's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo. pp. 5-16: penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, and concurred in by Associate
Justice Edgardo A. Camello and Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion.
2 Records, pp. 453-460; penned by Judge Noli T. Catli.

3 TSN, January 28, 2002, p. 6.

4 TSN, March 4, 2002, p. 8.

5 TSN, January 28, 2002, pp. 8-9.

6 TSN, February 4, 2002, pp. 8-10.

7 TSN, March 4, 2002, pp. 7-8.

8 TSN, January 28, 2002, p. 9.

9 TSN, February 4, 2002, pp.19-20.

10 Records, pp. 99-101.

11 TSN, April 12, 2002, pp. 5-11.

12 TSN, June 3, 2002, pp. 3-4.

13 Id. at 7-8.

14 Id. at 9-11.

15 TSN, May 2, 2002, p. 8.

16 Id. at 27-28.

17 Records, p. 4.

18 Id. at 12.

19 See Buebos v. People, G.R. No. 163938, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 210, 223, citing People
v. Casitas, G.R. No. 137404, February 14, 2003, 397 SCRA 382.
20 People v. Murcia, G.R. No. 182460, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 741, 752.

21 A Decree Amending the Law on Arson.

22 People v. Malngan, 534 Phil. 404, 443 (2006).

23 People v. Soriano, 455 Phil. 77, 93 (2003).

24 Supra note 19, at 228.

25 We also point out that there is a discrepancy between the affidavit-complaint of Barangay
Chairman Ligtas and the certification issued by the City Social Welfare and Development
Department with regard to the names and number of fire victims. and the estimated cost of the
damage to their respective properties.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 204891, September 14, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. REYNALDO ABAYON Y APONTE, Appellant.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the appeal of accused-appellant Reynaldo Abayon y Aponte (Abayon) assailing
the July 20, 2012 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03195. The CA decision affirmed the July 31, 2007 decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 275, Las Piñas City, and ordered him to pay death indemnity to the
heirs of Lourdes Chokilo, Aiza Delos Angeles, and Zenaida Velos.
THE CASE

In an information dated July 29, 2002,3 Abayon was formally charged as follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

"That on or about the 26th day of July 2002, in the City of Las Piñas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to cause damage to property, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and deliberately burn or set fire to the
house and/or dwelling of ROBERTO IGNACIO Y ANTONIO and TEODORO DELOS
ANGELES Y GOIS causing it to be burned and turned into ashes and as a result
of said fire, victims Lourdes Chokilo, Zenaida Velos and Aiza Delos Angeles who
were then sleeping inside the said house were also burned to death.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

Abayon entered a plea of not guilty when he was arraigned on August 20, 2002.

Trial on the merits followed the pre-trial where Abayon entered into stipulations regarding
specified documentary evidence presented by the prosecution.

The evidence for the prosecution showed that in the evening of July 25, 2002, Abayon and
his wife, Arlene, quarreled outside their residence. Since they rented an apartment
adjacent to others, their neighbors witnessed the entire incident. When Arlene shouted for
help because Abayon was strangling her, Corazon Requitillo (Corazon) and her husband
pacified them. Thereafter, Corazon took Arlene's two (2) children and offered them the
safety of her apartment as Abayon was still drunk.

At around 11:00 P.M. of the same day, Abayon's neighbors heard a hissing sound and
smelled leaking gas. When they came out of their houses to check, they saw Abayon
holding an LPG gas tank outside his apartment. Robert Ignacio Antonio (Robert), one of
his neighbors and his best friend, approached Abayon to ask what he was doing. He heard
Abayon say, "Putang ina, wala pala ako silbi! Inutil pala ako!"4 He also noticed that
Abayon was holding an unlit cigarette inserted between his left index and middle fingers,
that a match was on his left palm, and that his right hand was turning on and off the gas
tank. When he figured out what Abayon was trying to do, Robert scolded him and said,
"Putang ina mo, Boy! Magsusunog ka, idadamay mo pa kami!"5 After that, he turned off
the regulator of the gas tank and brought it to Corazon's house for safekeeping.

At past midnight of July 26, 2002, the house (containing the units where Abayon and his
neighbors live) started to catch fire. The neighbors came out of their respective units
because of the thick smoke and the heat coming from the fire. As a result, the house was
completely burned down along with the personal effects of the residents. Three (3)
persons also died because of the fire,-namely: Lourdes Chokilo, the owner of the house;
Aiza Delos Angeles; and Zenaida Velos.

Expectedly, Abayon denied that he had caused the fire and raised the defense of alibi. He
admitted that he had an altercation with his wife and that he had left after he was pacified
by his neighbors. When he came back, Abayon realized that his wife and children were not
at home, so he decided to look for them at his sister-in-law's place at Trece. Before he
left, he brought inside his apartment the LPG tank and the kitchen stove that had been
placed outside. When Abayon saw Robert, he asked him to look after his house while he
searched for his family.

Abayon allegedly left for Trece at around 9 p.m. only to find out when he got there that
his family was not there. He then proceeded to his sister's house in Makati at around 4
a.m. Again, he did not find his family there. He opted to stay at his sister's place until
8:00 p.m. of July 26, 2002. He was arrested later when he showed up at his residence.

In its July 31, 2007 decision, the RTC found Abayon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of arson resulting in multiple homicide, defined and punished under Sec. 1, in
relation to Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 1613, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The trial court held that
the prosecution successfully established the elements of the crime charged through
circumstantial evidence. It gave no credence to Abayon's denial because his neighbors —
especially his best friend — positively identified him as the person who had earlier
attempted to burn his place down using an LPG gas tank; the fire broke out later and
razed the rooms they were renting.

On appeal, Abayon assailed the RTC decision on the ground that there was no direct
evidence showing that he had started the fire that burned down the house.

In its July 20, 2012 decision, the CA upheld Abayon's conviction based on the RTC's
appreciation of the circumstances proven by the prosecution. The CA held that the proven
circumstantial evidence sufficiently pointed to Abayon as the perpetrator of the crime
charged. The CA included an award of death indemnity worth P50,000.00 each in favor of
the heirs of the three (3) victims.

Abayon filed the present appeal to challenge the CA decision.

OUR RULING

We affirm the conviction of Abayon and order him to pay civil damages on top of the
death indemnity.

There is no complex crime of arson with (multiple) homicide.

In People v. Malngan,6 we held that there is no complex crime of arson with homicide
because the crime of arson absorbs the resultant death or is a separate crime
altogether, to wit:

Accordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

crime/crimes was/were perpetrated - whether arson, murder or arson and

homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if
the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or
on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is
absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who
may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such
goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a
particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a
means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed
— homicide/murder and arson.
From the body of the information filed, Abayon is charged with the crime of arson because
his intent was merely to destroy his family's apartment through the use of fire. The
resulting deaths that occurred, therefore, should be absorbed by the crime of arson and
only increases the imposable penalty to reclusion perpetua to death, pursuant to Section 5
of P.D. No. 1613.

The prosecution established the elements of the crime of simple arson through
circumstantial evidence.

Simple arson, defined and punished under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1613, is essentially the
destruction of property by fire that is not under the circumstances enumerated under
Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. In prosecuting
arson, whether destructive or simple, the corpus delicti rule is generally satisfied by proof
that a fire occurred, and that it was intentionally caused. 7 chanrobleslaw

We point out that no one among the prosecution's witnesses actually saw Abayon start the
fire. The lower courts had to resort to circumstantial evidence since there was no direct
evidence proving his guilt.

It is settled that in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be

sufficient to sustain a conviction provided that: "(a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be
interwoven in a way that would leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused."8chanrobleslaw

In the present case, the RTC enumerated the following circumstances leading to the
unavoidable conclusion that Abayon set the fire that engulfed not only his apartment but
his neighbors' as well: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1. The quarrel of the accused with his wife who must have hurt the accused
when she told him that he was good-for-nothing "walang silbi, inutil;"
and shouting at him to leave the house (lumayas ka);

2. His having muttered audibly, "walang silbi pala ako, inutil pala,"
indicative of his having harbored intense hatred for his wife against
whom he evidently wanted to get back at by burning the house;

3. While holding a match, and having opened the gas tank, such that
leaking gas smelled strongly, indicating that plenty of it leaked out when
he opened the gas tank;

4. His having been berated by his neighbor and best friend about his
intention to burn the house and his fear that his house, too, will be
burned;

5. The failure of the accused's sister to corroborate his defense of alibi;

6. The fact that his best friend, Robert Ignacio, not only did not corroborate
his claim that he entrusted his house to Ignacio, but also and most
importantly the testimonial of his best friend that he opened the gas tank
while muttering the words already mentioned, and while holding a match
and unlighted cigarette.9
The CA, for its part, enumerated the following circumstances pointing to Abayon's guilt, as
follows:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1. On July 25, 2002, at about 9:00 in the evening, neighbors/witnesses

heard accused Reynaldo Abayon y Aponte and his wife Arlene by the
road of Block 5, Lot 4, Champaca Street, Paramount Village, Las Piñas,
having a heated argument with the latter shouting at the accused:
"Putang ina mo! Walang silbi! Inutil ka! Lumayas ka dito."

2. Neighbors Corazon Requyitillo and her husband Eduardo came to the aid
of the distressed Arlene when she yelled "saklolo!", as the accused began
to strangle her.

3. Thereafter, at around 11:00 in the evening, next room-neighbor Roberto

Ignacio y Antonio and his wife Helen heard a hissing sound and  sensed a
robust  stench of leaking  gas  indicating that an abundance of such had
indeed seeped out.

4. Roberto Ignacio then proceeded to the place of the accused and saw the
latter holding an unlit cigarette and a match at his left hand while
twisting on and off the valve of the gas tank with his right and slurring
the words: "Putang ina, wala pala akong silbi! Inutil pala ako!" Seeing
this, Roberto scolded the latter and took the gas tank away.

5. A few moments later, at about twelve o'clock midnight of the same

night, a fire broke out. Said fire began at the room occupied by the
accused Reynaldo Abayon. The fire engulfed the whole house, killing
Lourdes Chokilo, Zenaida Veluz and Aiza delos Angeles.

6. During the trial, accused put up an alibi. However, he failed to produce

any witnesses to corroborate his defense notwithstanding the fact that
said witness were supposed to be with his own sister and sister-in-law.
To make matters worse, his "supposed best friend", Roberto Ignacio,
testified against him.
         
x x x x10

We note that these circumstances all point out to the incidents from around 9:00 p.m.
(when the quarrel between Abayon and his wife started) until 11 p.m. (the time when
Abayon's alleged attempt to burn the houses was thwarted). The courts a quo did not
mention any circumstance that clearly links Abayon to the fire that broke out at past
midnight.

The records, however, also revealed that Abayon bought a match from Edmund Felipe at
around 12:15 a.m. When Edmund asked what the match was for, Abayon uttered, "Wala,
may susunugin lang ako."11 chanrobleslaw

To our mind, Edmund's statement clinches the case against Abayon insofar as establishing
his clear link to the fire that broke out at past 12 a.m.; it also makes all the more
significant the pieces of circumstantial evidence enumerated by both the RTC and the CA
especially in proving the motive for the crime, i.e., what led Abayon to burn his and his
neighbors' houses. The combination of all these circumstances, vis-a-vis the statement of
Edmund, leads to no other conclusion than that Abayon deliberately started the fire that
resulted in the death of three (3) innocent victims. There could be no doubt on this
conclusion: Abayon had the motive (i.e., he was characterized as a 'good-for-nothing
husband' by his wife during a violent quarrel); he had made a previous attempt to start a
fire (by turning on and off the gas tank's regulator, while holding an unlighted cigarette
and match); and he bought a match at past midnight, stating to the vendor that he will
use it to burn something.

Denial cannot prevail over positive and categorical identification of the accused.

On the credibility of witnesses, we note the well-settled rule that the trial court is in the
best position to assess the credibility of witnesses. In the absence of any showing of a fact
or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have been overlooked and,
if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings and assessment on
the credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain binding on an appellate
tribunal.12chanrobleslaw

In People v. Gallarde,13 we distinguished the two types of positive identification of a

perpetrator of a crime and discussed their legal importance, thus: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to

that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There
are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or
accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to
the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence.
There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have
actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to
positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for
instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the
victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is
the second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial
evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence
constituting an unbroken chain, leads to the only fair and reasonable
conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion
of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly
positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody
can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and
elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is
positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is
settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to 
circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused
on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the
community would be denied proper protection. [Emphasis supplied]

Without any showing of ill motive on the part of his neighbors (especially Robert, who is
his best friend) to falsely testify against Abayon, their categorical and positive
identification should prevail over alibi and denial. Corazon testified that he was a neighbor
of Abayon and that she saw him fighting with his wife before seeing him outside her house
holding an LPG tank. Robert, who was able to retrieve the LPG tank from Abayon, actually
tried to talk him out of what he was doing. Two (2) other witnesses for the prosecution,
who were likewise his neighbors, corroborated what Corazon and Robert narrated.

As the RTC and the CA did, we view Abayon's denial to be self-serving and undeserving of
any credence in view of the testimonies of the eyewitnesses' categorical, positive, and
forthright identification of him the night the burning incident happened.

The proper penalty and the awarded indemnities

The penalty for arson resulting to death under Section 5 of P.D. No. 1613 is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since there was no aggravating circumstance alleged in the
information, the CA correctly sentenced Abayon to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua only.

We also point out that the CA awarded P50,000.00 death indemnity in favor of the heirs of
the three (3) victims. We increase this award to P75,000.00 pursuant to People v.
Jugueta;14 we also direct Abayon to further pay the victim's heirs P75,000.00 as moral
damages and P75,0000.00 as exemplary damages.15 chanrobleslaw

The records show rough estimates of the properties the families lost during the fire. 16 In
the absence of a showing that these estimated amounts had been actually expended in a
manner capable of substantiation by any document or receipt, the valuation remains a
mere estimate, and could not be the measure of an award for actual damages. 17 The
failure to present competent proof of actual damages should not deprive Abayon's
neighbors of some degree of indemnity for the substantial economic damage and
prejudice they had suffered.18 chanrobleslaw

According to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages, which are more than
nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds
that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the
case, be proved with certainty. For this purpose, the determination of the temperate
damages rests in the sound discretion of the courts. 19 chanrobleslaw

Thus, we find it proper to award temperate damages to the Chokilo family in the amount
of P100,000.00; to the Ignacio family in the amount of P50,000.00; and to the Balbas
family in the amount of P50,000.00.

In addition, the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages, and temperate
damages payable by the appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid

WHEREFORE, the July 20, 2012 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
03195 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary (a) the awarded civil indemnity is INCREASED from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00;

(b) Reynaldo Abayon is directed to FURTHER PAY each of the victims' heirs the amounts of
P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(c) he is also DIRECTED to PAY temperate damages in the amounts of P100,000.00 to the

Chokilo Family; P50,000.00 to the Ignacio Family; and P50,000.00 to the Balbas Family;
and  cralawlawlibrary

(d) Reynaldo Abayon is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid,

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirt ualLawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1Rollo,
pp. 2-15; penned by Associate Justice Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez, and
concurred in by Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Stephen C. Cruz.

2 CA rollo,
pp. 27-34; by Presiding Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda.
3RTC records, p. 1.

4 TSN, October 27, 2004, pp. 12-13.

5
 Id. at 12.

6
 G.R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 294, 315-318.

7
People v. Luminda, G.R. No. 200954, October 14, 2015, citing People v.
Gutierrez, G.R. No. 100699, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 70, 76.

8
People v. Macabando, G.R. No. 188708, July 31, 2013, 702 SCRA 694, 699-
700, citing Buebos v. People, G.R. No. 163938, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 210,
223, and People v. Casitas, G.R. No. 137404, February 14, 2003, 397 SCRA
382.

9 CA rollo, pp. 33-34.

10
Rollo, pp. 13-14.

11
 Records, p. 167.

12People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 180448, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 419, 425,
citing Bricenio v. People, G.R. No. 157804, 20 June 2006, 491 SCRA 489, 496.

13
 G.R. No. 133025, February 17, 2000, 325 SCRA 835, 849-850.

14 G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016.

15 Id.

16 RTC records, pp. 196-209.

17 See Bacolod
v. People, G.R. No. 206236, July 15, 2013, 701 SCRA 229, 238-
239. See also People v. Murcia, G.R. No. 182460, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA
741, 753-754.

18 Id.

19 Id.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 218425, September 27, 2017 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. WILSON CACHO Y SONGCO,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT

DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision[1] dated July 1, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06123
which affirmed the Decision[2]  dated October 8, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76,
in Criminal Case Nos. 7522 and 7523 finding Wilson Cacho y Songco (accused-appellant) guilty of the crimes of Murder
and Destructive Arson.

Accused-appellant is charged with the crime of Murder under the following Information, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 7522

That on or about the 1st day of January 2004, in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with
a bladed deadly weapon, with intent to kill, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery, evident
premeditation and nighttime which changes the nature of the felony to a Heinous crime of Murder, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and hack with said weapon and behead one
MARIO BALBAO Y ADAMI, which resulted in his death soon thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Likewise, accused-appellant is charged with the crime of Destructive Arson under the following Information:
Criminal Case No. 7523

That on or about the 1st day of January 2004, in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with the
deliberate intent to cause destruction to the house of MARIO BALBAO Y ADAMI, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously set fire to and burn the said house causing its total destruction for the
purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of the commission of the crime of Murder with attendant
special aggravating circumstance that the offender was motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner of
the property in the commission of the felony.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Trial ensued.

The following undisputed facts as summarized by the CA are as follows:

On January 2, 2004, at around 8:10 o'clock in the morning, PO2 Emelito Salen (PO2 Salen) and SPO4
Onofre Tavas (SPO4 Tavas) of the Rodriguez Police Station received a report from a certain Willy Cacho
about a fire in Sitio Catmon, Brgy. San Rafael, Rodriguez, Rizal. PO2 Salen and SPO4 Tavas, who were
accompanied by members of the Bureau of Fire Protection, namely: SFO1 Damasa Viscara and FO2
Casiple, went to Sitio Catmon to verify said report.

Upon arriving in Sitio Catmon, the police officers saw a burned house, which was owned by a certain Boy
who was later identified as Mario Balbao. Upon investigation, they discovered a burned body of a headless
man underneath an iron sheet. Willy Cacho informed the police officers that it was his brother, [accused-
appellant], who killed Boy. [Accused-appellant's] wife likewise told the police officers that her husband was
a patient of [the] National Center for Mental Health and has a recurring mental illness.

Thereafter, the police officers went to the house of [accused-appellant] where they saw a shallow pit
measuring one (1) foot in diameter and five (5) inches deep with a steel peg standing at the center, which
they believed was used to bum a head because there were traces of ash and a human skull on top of the
heap of charcoal. The police officers then saw [accused-appellant] in his backyard. Upon introducing
themselves as police officers, [accused-appellant] acted strangely and exhibited signs of mental illness.
According to SPO4 Tavas, [accused-appellant] admitted killing Boy and burning the latter's house but did
not say why he did it.

When they tried to arrest him, [accused-appellant] became wild. The police officers sought help from other
people to subdue [accused-appellant] and to place him inside the mobile car. [Accused-appellant] was
 then brought to the prosecutors [sic] office for inquest proceedings. After the inquest, [accused-appellant]
was brought to the National Center for Mental Health for confinement.[5]

After trial, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of the crimes of Murder and Destructive Arson, in its Decision[6] dated
October 8, 2012, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 7522, finding [accused-appellant] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. No pronoucement as to
cost.

2. In Criminal Case No. 7523, finding [accused-appellant] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Destructive Arson (Article 320 par[.] 5 RPC as amended by Sec[.] 10 of R[.]A[. No.] 7659) and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. No pronouncement as to cost.

[Accused-appellant] is hereby ordered to be committed to the National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City for
service of sentence.

[Accused-appellant] is to be credited for the time spent for his preventive detention in accordance with
Art[.] 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 6127 and E.O. 214.

SO ORDERED.[7]

The RTC only dealt with the issue of insanity. Since the accused-appellant raised the defense of insanity, the RTC ruled
that he already admitted the commission of the crime. Thus, accused-appellant was tried on the issue of insanity alone.

Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the judgment of conviction of the accused-appellant of the crimes charged in its
Decision[8]  dated July 1, 2014, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision dated October 8,
2012 of the [RTC] of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Issues

The issues to be resolved in this case are: 1) whether the accused-appellant sufficiently proved his defense of insanity;
and 2) whether the crimes of Murder and Destructive Arson were sufficiently proved.
Ruling of the Court

At the outset, appeal in criminal cases throws the whole open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to
correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.[10] After a careful
review and scrutiny of the records, We hold that the accused-appellant can only be convicted of Homicide and
Destructive Arson.

Accused-appellant was not able to

sufficiently prove his defense of
insanity.

Accused-appellant alleges that he was diagnosed with Major Depression with Psychosis in 1996 for which he was
admitted at the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for two (2) months. Thereafter, he was discharged when there
were no longer any symptom that was observed. Then on January 7, 2004, he was again admitted to the NCMH and it
was discovered that his Major Depression with Psychosis had already progressed to Chronic Schizophrenia. Thus, his
defense of insanity was sufficiently proved by his medical record with the NCMH as well as the expert testimony of Dr.
Sagun.[11]

In the case of People v. Isla,[12] it stated that:

Article 12 of the [RPC] provides for one of the circumstances which will exempt one from criminal liability
which is when the perpetrator of the act was an imbecile or insane, unless the latter has acted during a
lucid interval. This circumstance, however, is not easily available to an accused as a successful defense.
Insanity is the exception rather than the rule in the human condition. Under Article 800 of the Civil Code,
the presumption is that every human is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity
bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. It is in the nature of confession and
avoidance. An accused invoking insanity admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is
not guilty because of insanity. x x x.[13] (Citation omitted)
When the accused raised the defense of insanity, he is tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if found to be sane, a
judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt, because the accused had already admitted
committing the crime.[14]

However for the defense of insanity to be successfully invoked as a circumstance to evade criminal liability, it is
necessary that insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the
offense with which the accused is charged. Otherwise, he can be held guilty for the said offense. In short, in order for the
accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea of insanity, he must successfully show that: (1) he was
completely deprived of intelligence; and (2) such complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or
immediately before the commission of the offense.[15]

Accused-appellant having invoked the defense of insanity, he is deemed to have admitted the commission of the crime.
As such, he is bound to establish with certainty that he is completely deprived of intelligence because of his mental
condition or illness.

After the careful review of the records of the case, We found that the accused-appellant failed to prove that he is insane
immediately prior or at the time of the commission of the crime.

Dr. Sagun testified as to accused-appellant's mental condition as follows:

Atty. Censon:

xxxx
 
Q. Madam Witness, do you know one Wilson Cacho or have you happened to know a person
named Wilson Cacho?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. On what occasion did you meet this person named Wilson Cacho?
A. I was able to examine the said patient on July 23 on his third consult at the forensic pavilion
and then I was the one who admitted the patient on November 23, 2007, sir.

xxx
x

Q. What was on your finding on Wilson Cacho when he consulted you on July 23, 2007?
A. As per our records, the patient had been ill since he was 17 years old. His first consult was on
July 15, 1996 and was admitted for two (2) months and was discharged on September 1996. A
follow up after a month, he was in the out-patient and then he was lost for follow-up for eight
(8) years. He consulted again on January 7, 2004 where he was admitted and confined for five
(5) days and after that two (2) years again, he consulted at the out-patient, now at the forensic
pavilion. This was in November 24, 2006 and another consultation at our forensic pavilion on
December 18, 2006. And on July 23, was our first consult in the out-patients and in November
24, that was the time we admitted the patient, sir.

xxx
x

Q. Madam Witness, you said that Mr. Wilson Cacho has been consulting with the National Center
for Mental Health since he was 17 years of age, and do you know what was the finding that
made him to be admitted for two (2) months?
A. Based on our records, he was diagnosed with major depression with psychosis in 1996 and
then after three (3) months, his first consult at the out-patient, he was diagnosed now with
psychosis and in the second admission in January 7, 2004, he was diagnosed with
schizophrenia, sir.

xxx
x

Q. You said that accusd Wilson Cacho was admitted for two (2) months in the year 1996 and you
said he was discharged, for what reason he was [sic] discharged?
A. Basing from the presenting complaint when he was admitted there where remissions, there
were no symptoms seen or observed so he was discharged and was requested to have regular
follow-ups, sir.

Q. In his history was he given or recommended to take medicines?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So, what medicine was recommended for him to take when he was discharged for the first time
in 1996?
A. He was given anti-psychotic and anti-depressant, sir.

xxx
x

Q. Awhile ago I asked you what will happen to a person who have been prescribed these
medicines and he fails to take them?
A. Most of them will have relapse. The symptoms would go back, sir.

Q. Do you know the cost of these medicines if you take it regularly?

A. At that time I cannot recall but at this present time, halluperidol can cost from P20.00 to
P50.00 a day and the anti-depression can cost P20.00 to P100.00 a day, sir.

Q. Can you consider that affordable to persons who even fails to eat three (3) times a day?
A. No, sir.

Q. Can you please tell the date again when this patient consulted again to your hospital?
A. He came back on January 7, 2004 after eight (8) years of follow-up, sir.

Q. For what reason was he made to consult your hospital?

A. Based on our records, the presenting complaint is that "nagwawala, nanghahabol ng itak,"
sir. [16]
In People v. Estrada, [17] We held that to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, evidence as to his
mind condition is necessary, thus:
To ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the
condition of his mind within a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony is not
required. Neither are specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense.
Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffices; for the unfathomable mind can only be known by
overt acts.[18]

Here, while Dr. Sagun testified that accused-appellant was confined at the NCMH in 1996 and that accused-appellant
was diagnosed with Major Depression with Psychosis which progressed to Chronic Schizophrenia, no other evidence
was presented to show that accused-appellant was insane immediately prior to or at the very moment that the crime was
committed. Mere prior confinement into a mental institution does not automatically exonerate the accused-appellant from
criminal liability in the absence of any evidence showing that accused-appellant was completely deprived of reason
immediately prior or at the time of the commission of the crime. If at all, there is no evidence showing that the mental
illness of the accused-appellant, as narrated by Dr. Sagun, constitutes insanity, in that, there is complete deprivation of
his intelligence in committing the act.

We therefore find no cogent reason to reverse the RTC and the CA in its finding that accused-appellant was not able to
prove his defense of insanity. However, We hold that accused-appellant can only be convicted of the crime of Homicide
for failure of the prosecution to prove the existence of any of the qualifying circumstance provided for under the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as charged in the Information.

Accused-appellant is liable for the

crime of Homicide.

Article 248 of the RPC provides that:

Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall
be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of
motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

Under the above provision in order that a person can be convicted of the crime of murder, the prosecution must establish
(1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.[19]

In the Information, it was alleged that the circumstances of treachery, and evident premeditation qualified the crime to
murder.

In People v. Zulieta, [20]  the Court held that:

"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." "The essence of treachery
is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the
hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape." Otherwise stated, an
unexpected and sudden attack which renders the victim unable and unprepared to put up a defense is the
essence of treachery.[21]

While, in Isla,[22] the Court ruled that for evident premeditation to be considered as a qualifying circumstance, it is
necessary that:
(1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) overt act/acts manifestly indicating that the
accused clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and
its actual execution sufficient to allow accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts. x x x The
essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool
 thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent, during the space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. x x x. [23]

In the present case, all the elements of the crime of murder does not exist. It is well-settled that the qualifying
circumstances must be specifically alleged in the Information and duly proven with equal certainty as the crime itself.[24] 
While the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and nighttime were alleged in the Information, the
prosecution failed to prove the same during the trial. In fact, the prosecution failed to present any evidence showing the
existence of the circumstances which would qualify the crime to murder. The mere fact that the accused-appellant
pleaded the defense of insanity and as a consequence admitted the commission of the crime, the same should not be
construed as an abdication of the prosecution's duty to prove with certainty the existence of the qualifying circumstances
alleged in the Information.

Since the prosecution was not able to prove the existence of the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation and nighttime, accused-appellant can only be convicted of the crime of Homicide and not murder.

Accused-appellant is liable for a

separate crime of Destructive Arson.

Accused-appellant further claims that he should have been convicted only of the crime of murder and not both crimes of
murder and arson since the finding that the burning of the house was an attempt to conceal the killing has no factual
basis.

Arson  is the malicious burning of property. Under Article 320 of the RPC, as amended, and Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1613,[25] Arson (Article 320); and (2) other cases of arson (P.D. No. 1613).

Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,[26]  contemplates the malicious burning of
structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military,
government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons.

In order to determine whether the crime committed is arson only, or murder, or arson and homicide or murder, as the
case may be, the main objective of the accused is to be examined. If the main objective is the burning of the building or
edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is
absorbed. If, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when
fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only. Lastly, if the objective is,
likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to
cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed — homicide/murder and arson.[27]

Aside from the fact that accused-appellant already admitted to the commission of the crime of destructive arson due to
his plea of insanity, which as We discussed above was not successfully proven, the prosecution was able to sufficiently
prove that the accused-appellant burned the house of the victim in order to hide or conceal the commission of the crime.
It was established that accused-appellant first beheaded the victim before setting the latter's house on fire.[28] 
Therefore, two separate crimes were committed by the accused-appellant, homicide and arson.
Penalty

Article 249[29] of the RPC, a person convicted of the crime of homicide shall be punished with reclusion temporal. In this
case, due to the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium
period, which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and for (4) months.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[30] if the offense is punished by the RPC, an indeterminate penalty shall be
imposed on the accused, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could
be properly imposed under the rules of the RPC, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense without first considering any modifying circumstances attendant
to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by the law to the sound discretion of the
court and can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in degree without considering the periods into
which it might be subdivided.[31]

The penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor.  Hence, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant
should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor  as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum for the crime of Homicide.

Insofar as the crime of Destructive Arson under Article 320 of the RPC as amended by R.A. No. 7659, accused-appellant
should be sentenced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the R.A. No. 9346,[32] prohibiting the imposition of
the death penalty.
Damages

In view of the prevailing jurisprudence,[33] in Criminal Case No. 7522, accused-appellant is directed to pay the heirs of
the victim with P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
In Criminal Case No. 7523, the accused-appellant is directed to pay the heirs of the victim with P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Further, We impose a six percent (6%) legal interest on the total amounts awarded to the heirs of the victim counted from
the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 1, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
06123 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 7522, accused-appellant Wilson Cacho y Songco is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor  as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accused-appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
Mario Balbao y Adami the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. A
legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum is likewise imposed on the total amount of damages counted
from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

2. In Criminal Case No. 7523, accused-appellant Wilson Cacho y Songco is found GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Destructive Arson and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.  Accused-appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Mario Balbao y  Adami the
amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary
damages. A legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum is likewise imposed on the total amount of
damages counted from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, and Del Castillo, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J.,* on official leave.

• Designated additional Member per Raffle dated August 23, 2017 vice Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, concurred in by Associate Justices Leoncia R. Dimagiba and
Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan; rollo,  pp. 2-9.

[2] Penned by Judge Josephine Zarate-Fernandez; CA rollo, pp. 42-49.

[3] Id. at 42.

[4] Id. at 42-43.

[5] Rollo,  pp. 2-3.

[6] CA  rollo, pp. 42-49.

[7] Id. at 48-49.

[8] Rollo,  pp. 2-9.

[9] Id. at 8.

[10]  People v. Dahil, et al., 750 Phil. 212, 225 (2015).

[11] CA rollo, p. 27.

[12] 699 Phil. 256 (2012).

[13] Id. at 226-267.

[14] People of the Philippines v. Christopher Mejaro Roa, G.R. No. 225599, March 22, 2017.

[15] Verdadero v. People, G.R. No. 216021, March 2, 2016, 785 SCRA 490, 502, citing People v. Isla, supra note 12.

[16] TSN, March 24, 2011, pp. 4-7.

[17] 389 Phil. 216 (2000).

[18] Id. at 233.

[19] People v. Lagman, 685 Phil. 733, 743 (2012).

[20] 720 Phil. 818 (2013).

[21] Id. at 826.

[22] People v. Isla,  supra note 12.

[23] Id. at 270.

[24] People  v.Garcia, 722 Phil. 60, 73 (2013).

[25]  AMENDING THE LAW ON ARSON. Approved on March 7, 1979.

[26]  Section 10. Article 320 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

Art. 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any person who shall
burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous
burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people usually gather or
congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official governmental function or business, private
transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such
as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of
whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and
regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for public use,
entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the service of
public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of another violation of law,
or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.
Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more persons or by a group of
persons, regardless of whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the building or the burning merely constitutes
an overt act in the commission or another violation of law.

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance, storehouse,
archives or general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials. If as a
consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death results, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.

[27] People v. Baluntong, 629 Phil. 441, 446-447 (2010).

[28] Records, p. 10.

[29] Art. 249. Homicide. —  Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the
attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and
be punished by reclusion temporal.

[30] Section 1, Act No. 4103

Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the
minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if
the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same.

[31] Sim, Jr. v. CA, 472 Phil. 503, 516-517 (2004).

[32] AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES. Approved on June 24,
2006.

[33] People v. Jugueta,  G.R. No. 202124, April 15, 2016, 788 SCRA 331.