IRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 244629, July 28, 2020 ]

MARBY FOOD VENTURES CORPORATION, MARIO VALDERRAMA, AND EMELITA VALDERRAMA,

PETITIONERS, VS. ROLAND DELA CRUZ, GABRIEL DELA CRUZ, JOSE PAULO ANZURES, EFREN TADEO,
BONGBONG SANTOS, MARLON DE RAFAEL, CRIS C. SANTIAGO, ELMER MARANO, ARMANDO RIVERA,
AND LOUIE BALMES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

REYES, J. JR., J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the review of
the Decision2 dated October 19, 2018 and Resolution3 dated January 21, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 151531 & 151557 wherein the CA affirmed the Decision4 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) which in turn partially reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter (LA).

Factual Antecedents

Marby Food Ventures Corporation (Marby) is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine
laws engaged in the business of production and distribution of baked goods. Mario Valderrama is the
President/CEO of Marby while Ma. Emelita Valderrama is the Vice-President.5

Roland dela Cruz, Jose Paulo Anzures, Efren Tadeo, Bongbong Santos, Marlon de Rafael, Cris Santiago, Jr.,
Elmer Maraño, Armando Rivera, Louie Balmes, Raymond Pagtalunan and Gabriel dela Cruz, (hereafter referred to
as respondents) were all employed by Marby as drivers. Mark Francis Bernardino (Bernardino) meanwhile was
hired as salesman. They all filed a complaint for underpayment of wage, overtime pay and 13th month pay, non-
payment of holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, sick and vacation leave pay under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), illegal deductions, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against petitioners,
docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-III-10-24653-16.6

In their Position Paper, respondents averred that they were underpaid their daily wage, overtime work pay and
13th month pay. They also did not receive their holiday pay, service incentive leave pay for the year 2013 and
eight days of vacation leave and eight days of sick leave as provided for in their Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA). They also questioned the unauthorized salary deductions made by Marby labeled as "everything" in their
payslips.7

For Bernardino, he alleged that Marby failed to pay him his 13th month pay, service incentive leaves for the year
2013 and eight days of vacation leave and eight days of sick leave as required under their CBA. He was also made
to shoulder the salaries of the drivers and helpers assigned to him. He further averred that Marby also made
unauthorized salary deductions from his commissions.8

Petitioners on the other hand insist that respondents have been receiving the required minimum wage and
13th month pay. The alleged unauthorized deductions are penalties imposed on them for deliveries made outside
the imposed delivery hours, bad orders, shortages in liquidation and cell phone plans. They claimed that
respondents were duly informed of the nature of the deductions and have consented to the same. Nevertheless,
Marby ceased imposing said deductions since September 2016.

As to the claim for overtime pay, holiday pay and service incentive leave pay, petitioners maintained that
respondents are not entitled to the same for being field personnel.9

Ruling of the LA

After the parties submitted their respective pleadings and documents in support of their positions, the Labor Arbiter
dismissed the case with prejudice in a Decision dated December 15, 2016.10

The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondents are not entitled to their claims for overtime pay, holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay, vacation leave and sick leave pay and illegal deductions.

Ruling of the NLRC

Undeterred, respondents together with Bernardino filed an appeal before the NLRC. In a Resolution dated
February 28, 2017, the NLRC partially reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, finding Tadeo, Pagtalunan and
Bernardino to have been receiving the required minimum wage as well as the proper 13th month pay. As for the
rest of the respondents, the NLRC declared them to be field personnel, thus, unqualified for certain monetary
claims. However, it ordered Marby and its co-petitioners to pay respondents their salary differentials and
13th month pay. The fallo of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premised on all the foregoing, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED and the Decision appealed from
is hereby MODIFIED conformably with the above findings.
Accordingly, [Marby and co-respondents are hereby directed to pay the following complainants their wage
differentials and 13th month differentials as follows:

1 RONALD DELA CRUZ P20,308.16

2 JOSE PAULO ANZURES P26,223.16
3 BONGBONG SANTOS P17,773.16
4 MARJON DE RAFAEL P18,590.00
5 CRIS C. SANTIAGO P20,308.16
6 ELMER MARANO P26,223.16
7 ARMANDO RIVERA P21.998.16
8 LOUIE BALMES P21.998.16
9 GABRIEL DELA CRUZ P19.970.16
TOTAL P193,392.28

Respondents are likewise directed to pay attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total monetary
award amounting to P19,339.22.

In all other aspects the Decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration. For the first time, petitioners presented payrolls of
respondents while reiterating their argument that the latter are receiving the basic minimum wage as they are paid
a "premium" called "overtime pay" on top of their basic salary which must be included in the computation of their
daily wage rate.11

In a Resolution dated April 24, 2017, both motions were denied by the NLRC.12

On July 10, 2017, respondents and Bernardino filed a petition for certiorari before the CA docketed as CA-G.R.
SP. No. 151531 alleging that: the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in not awarding double indemnity as provided in Section 12, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 672713 as
amended by R.A. No. 8188;14 in declaring that Tadeo and Pagtalunan are not entitled to wage and 13lh month
pay differentials, and; affirming the conclusion of the LA that they are not entitled to overtime pay, holiday pay,
service incentive leave pay, vacation leave and sick leave pay and illegal deductions.

Petitioners, likewise, filed a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 151557 assailing the award of wage
differentials, 13 1 month pay and attorney's fees in favor of respondents.15

For failure to execute the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, Bernardino and Pagtalunan were
dropped as parties in CA.G.R. SP. No. 151531.

On March 2, 2018, CA-G.R. SP. Nos. 151531 and 151557 were consolidated as it involved the same issues and
parties.16

Ruling of the CA

In a Decision17 dated October 19, 2018, the CA granted respondents' petition for certiorari, thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition in CA-G.R. SP. No. 151531 is hereby GRANTED.

Respondents-employers are hereby ORDERED to pay complainants-employees double their salary differentials,

overtime pay differentials, service incentive leave pay, holiday pay and 13lh month pay.

Respondents-employers are likewise ORDERED to REIMBURSE to complainants-employees the deductions

made from their salaries.

Respondents-employers are also ORDERED to pay ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award as attorney's
fees.

Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all monetary awards from the date of finality
of this Decision until full payment.

CA-G.R. SP. No. 151557 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The present case is hereby REMANDED to the concerned Labor Arbiter for proper computation.
SO ORDERED.

The CA ruled that respondents are regular employees entitled to overtime pay, holiday pay and service incentive
leave pay. This is because based on the position paper of petitioners, respondents are tasked to deliver Marby's
goods at a specified time and place. In short, they were still bound by a specific timetable within which to make
deliveries even if they have the freedom to choose which route to take in order to deliver the goods. To support the
foregoing, the CA highlighted the admission made by petitioners that respondents are required to log their time-in
and time-out in the company and as such, actual work hours were ascertainable with reasonable certainty.

As to the issue on minimum wage, the CA ruled that respondents are entitled to salary differentials. This is
because the amount termed as "overtime pay" in the employees' payslips cannot be considered as premium pay to
support the allegation that the employees are receiving the proper minimum wage.

As to Tadeo, the CA ruled that he is also entitled to salary differentials, except for the year 2016.  This was arrived
1awp++i1

at by comparing the daily wage rate in respondents' position paper and that of the minimum wage for Region III.

As for the 13th month pay, the CA agreed with the NLRC in awarding the same to respondents, with Tadeo, since
they were all receiving salaries below minimum wage. Hence, the basis for their 13n month pay was erroneous.

As to overtime pay, holiday pay, and service incentive leave pay, the CA ruled that since respondents are regular
employees of Marby, it follows that they are entitled to said benefits.

The CA also ruled that the petitioners are liable for illegal deductions because there was no written conformity by
the employees of the deductions imposed by Marby.

Lastly, the CA awarded attorney's fees often (10%) percent of the monetary award to the respondents as they
were constrained to file the instant case to protect their interest. Furthermore, they awarded respondents double
their salary differentials, overtime pay differentials, service incentive leave pay, holiday pay and 13th month pay
pursuant to R.A. No. 6727.18

The petitioners are now before this Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the CA's Consolidated Decision dated
October 19, 2018 and Resolution dated January 21, 2019, raising the following issues:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED THE PETITION

OF THE RESPONDENTS

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION
OF THE PETITIONERS 19

Petitioners reiterate their position that respondents (complainants a quo) are field personnel who are not entitled to
overtime pay, holiday pay and service incentive leave. They also claim to have paid the correct minimum wage and
13th month pay. Aside from that, they assail the award of reimbursements for deductions, the grant of attorney's
fees and double indemnity.20

Ruling of the Court

The petition is DENIED. We affirm the CA ruling with modification.

Respondents are regular

employees and not field
personnel

Article 82 of the Labor Code is instructive on the characterization of the term "field personnel." It provides:

ART. 82. Coverage. — The provisions of this title [Working Conditions and Rest Periods] shall apply to employees
in all establishments and undertakings whether for profit or not, but not to government employees, managerial
employees, field personnel, members of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support,
domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and workers who are paid by results as determined
by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.

xxxx

"Field personnel" shall refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the
principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty.

In Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. v. Bautista,21 this Court clarified that the definition of a "field personnel" is not
merely concerned with the location where the employee regularly performs his duties but also with the fact that the
employee's performance is unsupervised by the employer. We held that field personnel are those who regularly
perform their duties away from the principal place of business of the employer and whose actual hours of work in
the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. Therefore, to determine whether an employee is a field
employee, it is also necessary to confirm if actual hours of work in the field can be determined with reasonable
certainty by the employer. In so doing, an inquiry must be made as to whether or not the employee's time and
performance are constantly supervised by the employer.22

Guided by the foregoing norms, the CA properly resolved that the respondents-employees are not field personnel
but regular employees who perform tasks usually necessary and desirable to petitioners' business. Unmistakably,
the respondents are not field personnel as defined above and the CA's finding in this regard is supported by the
established facts of this case: (1) the respondents were directed to do their deliveries at a specified time and place;
(2) respondents are required to log their time-in and time-out in the company to ensure accomplishment of their
daily deliveries for the day and therefore their actual work hours could be determined with reasonable certainty;
and (3) the respondents supervised their time and performance of duties.

Consequently, respondents are entitled to overtime pay, holiday pay and service incentive leave pay accorded to
regular employees of the petitioners three years prior to the filing of the complaint in accordance with Arriola v.
Filipino Star Ngayon23 that all money claims arising from employer-employee relations shall be filed within three
years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred. Hence, the money claims
will be computed from September 30, 2013 or three years prior to the filing of the complaint on September 30,
2016.

Respondents are entitled to

minimum wage salary differentials,
overtime pay, holiday pay, and
service incentive leave

Petitioners posit that the amount labeled as "overtime pay" should be included in the computation of minimum
wage because in reality it is premium pay given by the company whether they rendered extended hours of
overtime or not.

The nomenclature "overtime pay" in the payslips of respondents provides a presumption that indeed overtime was
rendered by them. There was no tenable explanation offered as to this ongoing practice. Petitioners did not even
present the daily time records of the respondents to prove that they were given premium pay for work not
rendered. Also, if the same was in reality "premium pay," this should have been the term that was used in the
payslips. As the argument proffered by petitioners on this score run counter to what an ordinary man would
consider reasonable, we are inclined to believe that this explanation is merely being advanced to escape liability.

As for holiday pay and service incentive leave pay, it is settled that as a rule, a party who alleges payment as a
defense has the burden of proving it.24

Specifically, with respect to labor cases, the burden of proving payment of monetary claims rests on the employer.
The rationale for this is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar
documents — which will show that overtime, differentials, service incentive leave and other claims of workers have
been paid — are not in the possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute control of the employer.25

In the case at bar, except for the bare allegation of petitioners, no proof was presented to prove payment of the
contested benefits.

Considering that there was in fact no "premium pay" that was given by petitioners to respondents, the latter are
entitled to minimum wage pay differentials.

As for Tadeo, he is entitled to salary differentials, except for 2016. The CA ruled that there was no basis to the
claim that he has been receiving minimum wage because as the NLRC held, the daily rate presented by the
respondents were not disputed by petitioners, hence, they are deemed admitted. To quote:

In complainants-employees' Position Paper, Efren Tadeo was receiving a daily rate of P120.00 for 2013,
Php294.00 for 2014, Php349.00 for 2015 and Php364.00 for 2016.

The Wage Orders for Region III covering these periods are:

"Wage Order No. 111-17, daily rate - P336, effectivity October 1, 2012 - October 30, 2014

Wage Order No. Ill-18, daily rate - P349, effectivity November 1,2014- December 31,2015

Wage Order No. 111-19, daily rate - P364. effectivity January 1,2016"

For failure of respondents-employers to refute the allegation on Tadeo's daily wage rate, the same is deemed
admitted. Comparing the said rate to the minimum wage rate, there is no dispute that Efren Tadeo had received
salary below the minimum wage rate except for the year 2016. As such, he is entitled to salary differentials.

Respondents are entitled to

13th month pay differentials
Because respondents received salaries below the minimum wage, the basis in computing their 13th month pay
was inaccurate. Hence, they should be awarded 13n month pay differentials.

On the part of Tadeo, since he is receiving salary below the minimum wage, his 13th month pay is likewise below
that which he should have been receiving. Hence, and award for 13th month pay differentials for the benefit of
Tadeo is proper.

Respondents are entitled to

reimbursements of deductions

It is clearly stated in Article 11326 of the Labor Code that no employer, in his own behalf or in behalf of any person,
shall make any deduction from the wages of his employees, except in cases where the employer is authorized by
law or regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, among others. The Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, similarly, provides that deductions from the wages of the employees may be made
by the employer when such deductions are authorized by law, or when the deductions are with the written
authorization of the employees for payment to a third person. 27 Therefore, any withholding of an employee's
wages by an employer may only be allowed in the form of wage deductions under the circumstances provided in
Article 113 of the Labor Code, as well as the Omnibus Rules implementing it. Further, Article 11628 of the Labor
Code clearly provides that it is unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to withhold any amount from the
wages of a worker without the worker's consent.

In the instant case, petitioners confirmed the alleged deductions but reasoned that the same were due to the
penalties they imposed for deliveries outside the delivery hours, cell phone plans, bad orders and liquidation
shortage. This act is a clear violation of the labor code since there was no written conformity coming from the
respondents regarding the deduction. Hence, reimbursement of these illegal deductions should be returned to the
respondents.

Respondents are entitled to

attorney's fees

Article 2208 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines is instructive regarding the policy that should guide the courts
when awarding attorney's fees to a litigant. The general rule is that the parties may stipulate the recovery of
attorney's fees. In the absence on such stipulation, Art. 2208 provides that attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to
incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly
valid, just and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered. (Emphasis supplied)

Here, we agree with the ruling of the CA that the respondents are entitled to attorney's fees often percent (10%) of
the monetary awards after being compelled to litigate by the failure of petitioner to pay minimum wage and labor
standards benefits.

Petitioners are not liable for

double the unpaid benefits owing
to the employees

As for double the unpaid benefits, a modification in the CA ruling is in order.

Pursuant to Section 12 of R.A. No. 6727, as amended by R.A. No. 8188, petitioners are required to pay double the
amount owed to respondents.

Section 12. Any person, corporation, trust, firm, partnership, association or entity which refuses or fails to pay any
of the prescribed increases or adjustments in the wage rates made in accordance with this Act shall be punished
by a fine not less than Twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) nor more than One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than two (2) years nor more than four (4) years, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court: Provided, That any person convicted under this Act shall not be entitled
to the benefits provided for under the Probation Law.

The employer concerned shall be ordered to pay an amount equivalent to double the unpaid benefits owing to the
employees: Provided, That payment of indemnity shall not absolve the employer from the criminal liability
imposable under this Act.

If the violation is committed by a corporation, trust or firm, partnership, association or any other entity, the penalty
of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the entity's responsible officers, including, but not limited to, the president,
vice president, chief executive officer, general manager, managing director or partner. (Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, the petitioners argue that the rule on double indemnity applies only if there is refusal or failure
to pay the adjustment in wage rate. They deny that they unjustly refused any payment that respondents are legally
entitled to.

Petitioners' contention is well taken.

In Philippine Hoteliers, Inc., Dusit Hotel Nikko-Manila v. NUWHRAIN-Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter29 the denial of the
grant of double indemnity was anchored on the following:

The Court, however, finds no basis to hold Dusit Hotel liable for double indemnity. Under Section 2 (m) of DOLE
Department Order No. 10, Series of 1998,30 the Notice of Inspection Result "shall specify the violations
discovered, if any, together with the officer's recommendation and computation of the unpaid benefits due each
worker with an advice that the employer shall be liable for double indemnity in case of refusal or failure to correct
the violation within five calendar days from receipt of notice". A careful review of the Notice of Inspection Result
dated 29 May 2002, issued herein by the DOLE-NCR to Dusit Hotel, reveals that the said Notice did not contain
such an advice. Although the Notice directed Dusit Hotel to correct its noted violations within five days from receipt
thereof, it was not sufficiently apprised that failure to do so within the given period would already result in its liability
for double indemnity. The lack of advice deprived Dusit Hotel of the opportunity to decide and act accordingly
within the five-day period, as to avoid the penalty of double indemnity. By 22 October 2002, the DOLE-NCR,
through Dir. Maraan, already issued its Order directing Dusit Hotel to pay 144 of its employees the total amount of
P1,218,240.00, corresponding to their unpaid ECOLA under WO No. 9, plus the penalty of double indemnity,
pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No 6727, as amended by Republic Act No. 8188.31

Here, there was no order from any competent authority advising the petitioners to pay unpaid employee benefits
with sanctions for double indemnity in case of refusal or failure to correct the violation. Hence, it cannot be said
that it refused or failed to pay any of the prescribed increases or adjustments in the wage rates to come within the
purview of Section 12 of R.A. No. 6727, as amended by RA No. 8188. As such, there is no basis to hold the
petitioners for double indemnity.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 19, 2018 and the Resolution dated January 21, 2019 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. Nos. 151531 & 151557 are hereby .AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the penalty
for double indemnity is DELETED.

Interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all monetary awards from the date.of finality of this
Decision until full payment.

The present case is hereby remanded to the concerned Labor Arbiter for proper computation.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C.J., (Chairperson), Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, and Lopez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo,p. 11-27.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Priseilla J. Baltazar-Padilla (now a Member of the Court), with Associate
Justices Victoria Isabel A. Paredes and Henri Jean Paul B. hiring (now a member of this Court),
concurring; rollo, pp. 45-59.
3 Id. at 38-40.

4 Decision was not attached.

5 Rollo, p. 45.

6 Id.

7 Id. at 46.

8 Id.

9 Id.

10 Id.

11 Id. at 46-47.

12 Id. at 47.

13 Also known as the Wage Rationalization Act.

14 AN ACT INCREASING RUN PENALTY AND INCREASING DOUBLE INDEMNITY FOR VIOLATION
OF THE PRESCRIBED INCREASES OR ADJUSTMENT IN THE. WAGE RATES, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE SECTION TWELVE OR REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED SIXTY-SEVEN HUNDRED
TWENTY-SEVEN. OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE WAGE RATIONALIZATION ACT.

15 Id. at 48.

16 Id. at 49.

17 Supra note 2.

18 Id. at 49-58.

19 Id. at 15.

20 Id. at 11-27.

21 Veterans Security Agency. Inc. v. Gonzalvo. Jr., 514 Phil. 488 (2005).

22 Id. at 873-874, citing the Bureau of Working Conditions, Advisory Opinion to Philippine Technical-
Clerical Commercial Employees Association.

23 G.R. No. 175689, August 13,2014.

24 Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Ouerimit. 424 Phil. 721 (2002); Sevillana v. IT (International)
Corp., 3408 Phil. 570 (2001); Villar v. National Labor Relations Commission,387 Phil. 620 (2000); Auction
Electric Co, Inc. v. NLRC, 367 Phil. 620 (1999); Ropali Trading Corporation v. NLRC, 357 Phil. 551
(1998); National Semiconductor (HK) Distribution, Ltd. v. National Labor Relations Commission (4th
Division), 353 Phil. 551 (1998); Pacific Maritime Services, Inc. v. Ranay, 341 Phil. 716 (1997); Jimenez v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 326 Phil. 84 (1996); Philippine National Bank v. Court of
Appeals, 256 SCRA 44, 49 (1996); Good Earth Emporium, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 272 Phil. 373
(1991); Villaflor v. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 680, 690 (1990); Biala v. Court of Appeals, 269 Phil. 53
(1990); Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 255 Phil. 787 (1989).

25 Villar v. National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 706 (2000).

26 Article 113. Wage Deduction. — No employer, in his own behalf or in behalf of any person, shall make
any deduction from wages of his employees, except;

(a) In cases where the worker is insured with his consent by the employer, and the deduction is
to recompense the employer for the amount paid by him as premium on the insurance;

(b) For union dues, in cases where the right of the worker or his union to check-off has been
recognized by the employer or authorized in writing by the individual worker concerned; and

In cases where the employer is authorized by law or regulations issued by Secretary of Labor.
27 Rule VIII, Section 10. Deductions from the wages of the employees may be made by the employer in
any of the following cases:

(a) When the deductions are authorized by law, including deductions for the insurance
premiums advanced by the employer in behalf of the employee as well as union dues adhere
the right to check-off has been recognized by the employer or authorized in writing by the
individual employee himself;

(b) When the deductions are with the written authorization of the employees for payment to a
third person and the employer agrees to do so, provided that the latter does not receive any
pecuniary benefit, directly or indirectly, from the transaction.

28 Article 116. Withholding of wages and kickbacks prohibited. — It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, to withhold any amount from the wages of a worker or induce him to give up any part
of his wages by force, stealth, intimidation, threat or by any other means whatsoever without the worker's
consent.

29 613 Phil 491-507.

30 Guidelines on the Imposition of Double Indemnity for Non-Compliance with the Prescribed Increases
or Adjustments in Wage Rates.||

31 Constitute compliance order defined under Section 2 (n) of DOL.F Department Otuer No. 10 as "the
order issued by fhe regional director after due notice and hearing conducted by himself or a duly
authorized hearing officer finding that a violation has been committed and directing the employer to pay
the amount due each worker within ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof."
 THIRD DIVISION

June 29, 2016

G.R. No. 211141

HILARIO DASCO, REYMIR PARAFINA, RICHARD PARAFINA, EDILBERTO ANIA, MICHAEL ADANO, JAIME
BOLO, RUBEN E. GULA, ANTONIO CUADERNO and JOVITO CATANGUI, Petitioners,
vs.
PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES INC./CENTURION SOLANO,Manager, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This appeal by petition for review on certiorari  seeks to annul and set aside the Decision  dated August 30, 2013
1 2

and Resolution  dated January 28, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 126210, which nullified
3

and set aside the Decision  dated February 22, 2012 and Resolution  dated May 30, 2012 of the National Labor
4 5

Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-NCR Case No. 07-10173-11, and reinstated the Decision  dates October
6

17, 2011 of the Labor Arbiter (LA), dismissing the monetary claims of Hilario Dasco, Reymir Parafina, Richard
Parafina, Edilberto Ania, Michael Adano, Jaime Bolo, Ruben E. Gula, Antonio Cuaderno and Jovito Catangui
(petitioners).

The Facts

This case stemmed from a complaint  for regularization, underpayment of wages, non-payment of service incentive
7

leave (SIL) pay, and attorney’s fees, filed by the petitioners against Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc., (PSEI), a
domestic corporation engaged in providing public utility transportation, and its Manager, Centurion Solano
(respondents).

On various dates from 2006 to 2010, the petitioners were employed by the respondents as bus drivers and/or
conductors with travel routes of Manila (Pasay) to Bicol, Visayas and Mindanao, and vice versa. 8

On July 4, 2011, the petitioners filed a case against the respondents alleging that: (1) they were already qualified
for regular employment status since they have been working with the respondents for several years; (2) they were
paid only P404.00 per round trip, which lasts from two to five days, without overtime pay and below the minimum
wage rate; (3) they cannot be considered as field personnel because their working hours are controlled by the
respondents from dispatching to end point and their travel time is monitored and measured by the distance
because they are in the business of servicing passengers where time is of the essence; and (4) they had not been
given their yearly five-day SIL since the time they were hired by the respondents. 9

In response, the respondents asserted that: (1) the petitioners were paid on a fixed salary rate of P0.49 centavos
per kilometer run, or minimum wage, whichever is higher; (2) the petitioners are seasonal employees since their
contracts are for a fixed period and their employment was dependent on the exigency of the extraordinary public
demand for more buses during peak months of the year; and (3) the petitioners are not entitled to overtime pay
and SIL pay because they are field personnel whose time outside the company premises cannot be determined
with reasonable certainty since they ply provincial routes and are left alone in the field unsupervised. 10

Ruling of the LA

On October 17, 2011, the LA rendered a Decision  in favor of the respondents but declared the petitioners as
11

regular employees of the respondents.  The LA held that the respondents were able to prove that the petitioners
12

were paid on a fixed salary of P0.49 per kilometer run, or minimum wage, whichever is higher. The LA also found
that the petitioners are not entitled to holiday pay and SIL pay because they are considered as field personnel. 13

Dissatisfied with the LA’s decision, the petitioners interposed a Partial Appeal  filed on December 8, 2011 before
14

the NLRC.

Ruling of the NLRC

In a Decision  dated February 22, 2012, the NLRC granted the petitioners’ appeal and modified the LA’s decision,
15

the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the premises considered, the Partial Appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the [LA] dated October
17, 2011 is hereby MODIFIED in that [PSEI] is directed to pay [the petitioners] wage differentials covering a period
of three (3) years counted backwards from the time they filed their complaint against respondents.

SO ORDERED. 16
The NLRC held that the petitioners are not field personnel considering that they ply specific routes with fixed time
schedules determined by the respondents; thus, they are entitled to minimum wage, SIL pay, and overtime
benefits.  With regard to the respondents’ claim that the petitioners have fixed term contract, the NLRC concurred
17

with the findings of the LA that the respondents failed to show any document, such as employment contracts and
employment records, that would show the dates of hiring, as well as the fixed period agreed upon. 18

The respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration  on March 12, 2012 but it was denied in a Resolution  dated
19 20

May 30, 2012; hence, they filed a Petition for Certiorari  before the CA.
21

Meanwhile, during the pendency of this case before the CA, the petitioners filed a motion for issuance of writ of
execution to enforce the NLRC decision. Accordingly, a Writ of Execution dated November 6, 2012 was issued. By
the virtue of such writ, two units of buses owned by PSEI were levied and sold in a public auction, for the amount
of P600,000.00. Thereafter, a corresponding Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was issued. 22

Ruling of the CA

The CA, in its Decision  dated August 30, 2013, reversed and set aside the NLRC rulings and reinstated the LA’s
23

decision. Consequently, the writ of execution, levy, auction sale and certificate of sale of PSEI’s properties were
declared null and void. The petitioners and the NLRC Sheriff were directed to return the subject properties or turn
over the monetary value thereof to the respondents. 24

In overturning the NLRC’s decision, the CA considered the petitioners as field workers and, on that basis, denied
their claim for benefits, such as overtime pay and SIL pay. According to the CA, there was no way for the
respondents to supervise the petitioners on their job. The petitioners are practically on their own in plying the
routes in the field, as in fact, they can deviate from the fixed routes, take short cuts, make detours, and take
breaks, among others. The petitioners work time and performance are not constantly supervised by the
respondents, thus making them field personnel. 25

Aggrieved by the foregoing disquisition, the petitioners moved for reconsideration  but it was denied by the CA in
26

its Resolution  dated January 28, 2014. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
27

The Issue

The main issue in this case is whether the petitioners as bus drivers and/ or conductors are field personnel, and
thus entitled to overtime pay and SIL pay. 28

Ruling of the Court

The petition is impressed with merit.

Again, the Court reiterates that as a rule, it is not a trier of facts and this applies with greater force in labor
cases.  Hence, factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of
1avvphi1

the LA and if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by this Court. But where
the findings of the NLRC and the LA are contradictory, as in the present case, this Court may delve into the
records and examine for itself the questioned findings. 29

Nevertheless, the facts and the issues surrounding this petition are no longer novel for this Court. The
determination of whether bus drivers and/or conductors are considered as field personnel was already threshed
out in the case of Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. v. Bautista,  where the Court explained that:
30

As a general rule, [field personnel] are those whose performance of their job/service is not supervised by the
employer or his representative, the workplace being away from the principal office and whose hours and days of
work cannot be determined with reasonable certainty; hence, they are paid specific amount for rendering specific
service or performing specific work. If required to be at specific places at specific times, employees including
cannot be said to be field personnel despite the fact that they are performing work away from the principal office of
the employee. x x x

xxxx

x x x At this point, it is necessary to stress that the definition of a "field personnel" is not merely concerned with the
location where the employee regularly performs is unsupervised by the employer. As discussed above, field
personnel are those who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business of the employer
and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. Thus, in order to
conclude whether an employee is a field employee, it is also necessary to ascertain if actual hours of work in the
field can be determined with reasonable certainty by the employer. In so doing, an inquiry must be made as to
whether or not the employee’s time and performance are constantly supervised by the employer. 31

Guided by the foregoing norms, the NLRC properly concluded that the petitioners

Are not field personnel but regular employees who perform tasks usually necessary and desirable to the
respondents’ business. Evidently, the petitioners are not field personnel as defined above and the NLRC’s finding
in this regard is supported by the established facts of this case: (1) the petitioners, as bus drivers and/or
conductors, are directed to transport their passengers at a specified time and place; (2) they are not given the
discretion to select and contract with prospective passengers; (3) their actual work hours could be determined with
reasonable certainty, as well as their average trips per month; and (4) the respondents supervised their time and
performance of duties.

In order to monitor their drivers and/or conductors, as well as the passengers and the bus itself, the bus companies
put checkers, who are assigned at tactical places along the travel routes that are plied by their buses. The drivers
and/or conductors are required to be at the specific bus terminals at a specified time. In addition, there are always
dispatchers in each and every bus terminals, who supervise and ensure prompt departure at specified times and
arrival at the estimated proper time. Obviously, these drivers and/or conductors cannot be considered as field
personnel because they are under control and constant supervision of the bus companies while in the performance
of their work.

As correctly observed by the NLRC:

[I]t is undisputed that [the petitioners] as bus drivers/conductors ply specific routes of [PSEI], x x x averaging 2 to 5
days per round trip. They follow fixed time schedules of travel and follow the designated route of [PSEI]. Thus, in
carrying out their functions as bus drivers/conductors, they are not at liberty to deviate from the fixed time
schedules for departure or arrival or change the routes other than those specifically designated for [PSEI], in
accordance with the franchise granted to the [PSEI], as a public utility provider. In other words, [the petitioners] are
clearly under the strict supervision and control of [PSEI] in the performance of their functions otherwise the latter
will not be able to carry out its business as public utility service provider in accordance with its franchise.
32

The Court agrees with the above-quoted findings of the NLRC. Clearly, the petitioners, as bus drivers and/or
conductors, are left alone in the field with the duty to comply with the conditions of the respondents’ franchise, as
well as to take proper care and custody of the bus they are using. Since the respondents are engaged in the public
utility business, the petitioners, as bus drivers and/or conductors, should be considered as regular employees of
the respondents because they perform tasks which are directly and necessarily connected with the respondents’
business. Thus, they are consequently entitled to the benefits accorded to regular employees of the respondents,
including overtime pay and SIL pay.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2013 and Resolution dated January 28,
2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 126210 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
February 22, 2012 and Resolution dated May 30, 2012 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC-NCR
Case No. 07-10173-11 are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 8-24.

 Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with Associate Justices Marlene Gonzales-Sison
2

and Edwin d. Sorongon concurring; id. at 27-35.

3
 Id. at 37-38.

 Rendered by Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles, with Commissioners Perlita B. Velasco and
4

Romeo L. Go concurring; id. at 49-55.

5
 Id. at 56-57.

6
 Issued by Labor Arbiter Enrique L. Flores, Jr.; id. at 58-62.

7
 Id. at 63-66.

Name Date Hired Routes Salary

Reymir Parafina 4/24/2010 Manila-Sorsogon and vice versa P404.00/day
Richard Parafina 4/8/2008 Manila-Sorsogon and vice versa P404.00/day
Edilberto U. Ania 3/22/2009 Manila-Sorsogon and vice versa P404.00/day
Michael Adano 11/20/2008 Manila-Sorsogon and vice versa P404.00/day
Jaime T. Bolo 4/8/2008 Manila-Davao and vice versa P404.00/day
Ruben E. Gula 2/8/2009 Manila-Davao and vice versa P404.00/day
Antonio M. Cuaderno 4/20/2010 Manila-Davao and vice versa P404.00/day
Jovito P. Catangui 2/17/2006 Manila-Davao and vice versa P404.00/day
Hilario Dasco 10/6/2007 Manila-Daet and vice versa P404.00/day

Id. at 68-69.

9
 Id. at 69-71.

10
 Id. at 77-79.

11
 Id. at 58-62.

12
 Id. at 62.

13
 Id. at 60.

14
 Id. at 103-112.

15
 Id. at 49-55.

16
 Id. at 54-55.

17
 Id. at 53-54.

18
 Id. at 53.

19
 Id. at 113-117.

20
 Id. at 56-57.

21
 Id. at 118-126.
22
 Id. at 34.

23
 Id. at 27-35.

24
 Id. at 34-35.

25
 Id. at 33-34.

26
 Id. at 39-46.

27
 Id. at 37-38.

28
 Id. at 17.

29
 Victory Liner, Inc. v. Race, 548 Phil. 282, 293 (2007).

30
 497 Phil. 863 (2005).

 Id. at 873-874, citing the Bureau of Working Conditions, Advisory Opinion to Philippine Technical-
31

Clerical Commercial Employees Association.

32
 Rollo, pp. 53-54.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 162813 : February 12, 2007]

FAR EAST AGRICULTURAL SUPPLY, INC. and/or ALEXANDER UY, Petitioners, v. JIMMY

LEBATIQUE and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated September 30, 2003 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76196 and its Resolution2 dated March 15, 2004 denying the
motion for reconsideration. The appellate court had reversed the Decision3 dated October 15, 2002
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) setting aside the Decision4 dated June 27, 2001
of the Labor Arbiter.

Petitioner Far East Agricultural Supply, Inc. (Far East) hired on March 4, 1996 private respondent
Jimmy Lebatique as truck driver with a daily wage of P223.50. He delivered animal feeds to the
company's clients.

On January 24, 2000, Lebatique complained of nonpayment of overtime work particularly on

January 22, 2000, when he was required to make a second delivery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
That same day, Manuel Uy, brother of Far East's General Manager and petitioner Alexander Uy,
suspended Lebatique apparently for illegal use of company vehicle. Even so, Lebatique reported for
work the next day but he was prohibited from entering the company premises.

On January 26, 2000, Lebatique sought the assistance of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) Public Assistance and Complaints Unit concerning the nonpayment of his overtime pay.
According to Lebatique, two days later, he received a telegram from petitioners requiring him to
report for work. When he did the next day, January 29, 2000, Alexander asked him why he was
claiming overtime pay. Lebatique explained that he had never been paid for overtime work since he
started working for the company. He also told Alexander that Manuel had fired him. After talking to
Manuel, Alexander terminated Lebatique and told him to look for another job.

On March 20, 2000, Lebatique filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of overtime
pay. The Labor Arbiter found that Lebatique was illegally dismissed, and ordered his reinstatement
and the payment of his full back wages, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and overtime
pay. The dispositive portion of the decision is quoted herein in full, as follows:

WHEREFORE, we find the termination of complainant illegal. He should thus be ordered reinstated
with full backwages. He is likewise ordered paid his 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay and
overtime pay as computed by the Computation and Examination Unit as follows:

a) Backwages:

01/25/00 - 10/31/00 = 9.23 mos.

P 223.50 x 26 x 9.23 = P 53,635.53

11/01/00 - 06/26/01 = 7.86 mos.

P 250.00 x 26 x 7.86 = 51,090.00 P 104,725.53

13th Month Pay: 1/12 of P 104,725.53 = 8,727.13

Service Incentive Leave Pay

01/25/00 - 10/31/00 = 9.23 mos.

P 223.50 x 5/12 x 9.23 = P 859.54

11/01/00 - 06/26/01 = 7.86 mos.

P 250.00 x 5/12 x 7.86 = [818.75] 1,678.29 115,130.95

b) Overtime Pay: (3 hours/day)

03/20/97 - 4/30/97 = 1.36 mos.

P 180/8 x 1.25 x 3 x 26 x 1.36 = P 2,983.50

05/01/97 - 02/05/98 = 9.16 mos.

P 185/8 x 1.25 x 3 x 26 x 9.16 = 20,652.94

02/06/98 - 10/30/99 = 20.83 mos.

P 198/8 x 1.25 x 3 x 26 x [20.83] = 50,265.39

10/31/99 - 01/24/00 = 2.80 mos.

P 223.50/8 x 1.25 x 3 x 26 x 2.80 = 7,626.94 81,528.77

TOTAL AWARD P 196,659.72

SO ORDERED.5

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The
NLRC held that there was no dismissal to speak of since Lebatique was merely suspended. Further,
it found that Lebatique was a field personnel, hence, not entitled to overtime pay and service
incentive leave pay. Lebatique sought reconsideration but was denied.

Aggrieved, Lebatique filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. ςηαñrοblεš  νιr†υαl  lαω lιbrαrÿ

The Court of Appeals, in reversing the NLRC decision, reasoned that Lebatique was suspended on
January 24, 2000 but was illegally dismissed on January 29, 2000 when Alexander told him to look
for another job. It also found that Lebatique was not a field personnel and therefore entitled to
payment of overtime pay, service incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay.

It reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the NLRC dated 27 December 2002 is
hereby REVERSED and the Labor Arbiter's decision dated 27 June 2001 REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.

Hence, the instant petition wherein petitioners assign the following errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS - ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION DATED 15 OCTOBER 2002 AND IN RULING THAT THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED.

THE COURT OF APPEALS - ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION DATED 15 OCTOBER 2002 AND IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT
IS NOT A FIELD PERSONNEL AND THER[E]FORE ENTITLED TO OVERTIME PAY AND SERVICE
INCENTIVE LEAVE PAY.

THE COURT OF APPEALS - ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR
FAILURE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO ATTACH CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE QUESTIONED
DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT.7

Simply stated, the principal issues in this case are: (1) whether Lebatique was illegally dismissed;
and (2) whether Lebatique was a field personnel, not entitled to overtime pay.

Petitioners contend that, (1) Lebatique was not dismissed from service but merely suspended for a
day due to violation of company rules; (2) Lebatique was not barred from entering the company
premises since he never reported back to work; and (3) Lebatique is estopped from claiming that he
was illegally dismissed since his complaint before the DOLE was only on the nonpayment of his
overtime pay.
Also, petitioners maintain that Lebatique, as a driver, is not entitled to overtime pay since he is a
field personnel whose time outside the company premises cannot be determined with reasonable
certainty. According to petitioners, the drivers do not observe regular working hours unlike the
other office employees. The drivers may report early in the morning to make their deliveries or in
the afternoon, depending on the production of animal feeds and the traffic conditions. Petitioners
also aver that Lebatique worked for less than eight hours a day.8

Lebatique for his part insists that he was illegally dismissed and was not merely suspended. He
argues that he neither refused to work nor abandoned his job. He further contends that
abandonment of work is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. He also
claims that he is not a field personnel, thus, he is entitled to overtime pay and service incentive
leave pay.

After consideration of the submission of the parties, we find that the petition lacks merit. We are in
agreement with the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining that of the Labor Arbiter.

It is well settled that in cases of illegal dismissal, the burden is on the employer to prove that the
termination was for a valid cause.9 In this case, petitioners failed to discharge such burden.
Petitioners aver that Lebatique was merely suspended for one day but he abandoned his work
thereafter. To constitute abandonment as a just cause for dismissal, there must be: (a) absence
without justifiable reason; and (b) a clear intention, as manifested by some overt act, to sever the
employer-employee relationship.10

The records show that petitioners failed to prove that Lebatique abandoned his job. Nor was there a
showing of a clear intention on the part of Lebatique to sever the employer-employee relationship.
When Lebatique was verbally told by Alexander Uy, the company's General Manager, to look for
another job, Lebatique was in effect dismissed. Even assuming earlier he was merely suspended for
illegal use of company vehicle, the records do not show that he was afforded the opportunity to
explain his side. It is clear also from the sequence of the events leading to Lebatique's dismissal
that it was Lebatique's complaint for nonpayment of his overtime pay that provoked the
management to dismiss him, on the erroneous premise that a truck driver is a field personnel not
entitled to overtime pay.

An employee who takes steps to protest his layoff cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to
have abandoned his work and the filing of the complaint is proof enough of his desire to return to
work, thus negating any suggestion of abandonment.11 A contrary notion would not only be illogical
but also absurd.

It is immaterial that Lebatique had filed a complaint for nonpayment of overtime pay the day he
was suspended by management's unilateral act. What matters is that he filed the complaint for
illegal dismissal on March 20, 2000, after he was told not to report for work, and his filing was well
within the prescriptive period allowed under the law.

On the second issue, Article 82 of the Labor Code is decisive on the question of who are referred to
by the term "field personnel." It provides, as follows:

ART. 82. Coverage. - The provisions of this title [Working Conditions and Rest Periods] shall apply
to employees in all establishments and undertakings whether for profit or not, but not to
government employees, managerial employees, field personnel, members of the family of the
employer who are dependent on him for support, domestic helpers, persons in the personal service
of another, and workers who are paid by results as determined by the Secretary of Labor in
appropriate regulations.

x   x   x

"Field personnel" shall refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away
from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of
work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.

In Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. v. Bautista, 12 this Court emphasized that the definition of a
"field personnel" is not merely concerned with the location where the employee regularly performs
his duties but also with the fact that the employee's performance is unsupervised by the employer.
We held that field personnel are those who regularly perform their duties away from the principal
place of business of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined
with reasonable certainty. Thus, in order to determine whether an employee is a field employee, it
is also necessary to ascertain if actual hours of work in the field can be determined with reasonable
certainty by the employer. In so doing, an inquiry must be made as to whether or not the
employee's time and performance are constantly supervised by the employer.13
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, Lebatique is not a field personnel as defined above for
the following reasons: (1) company drivers, including Lebatique, are directed to deliver the goods at
a specified time and place; (2) they are not given the discretion to solicit, select and contact
prospective clients; and (3) Far East issued a directive that company drivers should stay at the
client's premises during truck-ban hours which is from 5:00 to 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 to 9:00
p.m.14 Even petitioners admit that the drivers can report early in the morning, to make their
deliveries, or in the afternoon, depending on the production of animal feeds.15 Drivers, like
Lebatique, are under the control and supervision of management officers. Lebatique, therefore, is a
regular employee whose tasks are usually necessary and desirable to the usual trade and business
of the company. Thus, he is entitled to the benefits accorded to regular employees of Far East,
including overtime pay and service incentive leave pay.

Note that all money claims arising from an employer-employee relationship shall be filed within
three years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise, they shall be forever
barred.16 Further, if it is established that the benefits being claimed have been withheld from the
employee for a period longer than three years, the amount pertaining to the period beyond the
three-year prescriptive period is therefore barred by prescription. The amount that can only be
demanded by the aggrieved employee shall be limited to the amount of the benefits withheld within
three years before the filing of the complaint.17

Lebatique timely filed his claim for service incentive leave pay, considering that in this situation, the
prescriptive period commences at the time he was terminated.18 On the other hand, his claim
regarding nonpayment of overtime pay since he was hired in March 1996 is a different matter. In
the case of overtime pay, he can only demand for the overtime pay withheld for the period within
three years preceding the filing of the complaint on March 20, 2000. However, we find insufficient
the selected time records presented by petitioners to compute properly his overtime pay. The Labor
Arbiter should have required petitioners to present the daily time records, payroll, or other
documents in management's control to determine the correct overtime pay due Lebatique.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated September 30, 2003 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76196 and itsResolutiondated March 15, 2004
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the effect that the case is hereby REMANDED to the
Labor Arbiter for further proceedings to determine the exact amount of overtime pay and other
monetary benefits due Jimmy Lebatique which herein petitioners should pay without further delay.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

1
 Rollo, pp. 34-44. Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong
concurring.

2
 Id. at 62.

3
 Id. at 194-203.

4
 Id. at 167-174.

5
 Id. at 173-174.

6
 Id. at 44.

7
 Id. at 17.

8
 Id. at 375.

9
 Micro Sales Operation Network v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 155279, October 11, 2005, 472 SCRA 328, 337.

10
 Id. at 336.

11
 Veterans Security Agency, Inc. v. Gonzalvo, Jr.,  G.R. No. 159293, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 298, 305.

12
 G.R. No. 156367, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 578.

13
 Id. at 589.

14
 Rollo, p. 42.
15
 Id. at 375.

16
 Article 291 of the Labor Code.

17
 Supra note 12, at 591.

18
 See Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. v. Bautista, supra at 594.
832 Phil. 554

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 214940. June 06, 2018 ]

MARIA DE LEON TRANSPORTATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY MA.
VICTORIA D. RONQUILLO, PETITIONER, VS. DANIEL M. MACURAY,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the March 17, 2014 Decision[2] and
September 17, 2014 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) granting the Petition
for Certiorar[4] in CA-G.R. SP No. 130387 and denying herein petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration,[5] respectively.

Factual Antecedent

On November 21, 2011, respondent Daniel M. Macuray filed a Complaint[6] for illegal dismissal
against petitioner Maria De Leon Transportation, Inc. before the Regional Arbitration Branch
No. 1 of San Fernando City, La Union, docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-I-11-1119-11 (LC).

In his Position Paper,[7] respondent claimed that, in April, 1991, he was employed as a bus
driver of petitioner, a company engaged in paid public transportation; that he plied the Laoag-
Manila-Laoag route; that he received a monthly pay/commission of P20,000.00; that, in
November 2009, petitioner's dispatcher did not assign a bus to him, for no apparent reason;
that for a period of one month, he continually returned to follow up if a bus had already been
assigned to him; that finally, when he returned to the company premises, the bus dispatcher
informed him that he was already considered AWOL (absent without leave), without giving any
reason therefor; that he went back to follow up his status tor about six months in 2010, but
nobody attended to him; that he was not given any notice or explanation regarding his
employment status; that he felt betrayed by the petitioner, after having served the latter for
18 years; that he considered himself illegally dismissed; that during this time, he was already
62 years old, but he received no benefits for his service; that he was being charged for the
cost of gasoline for the bus he would drive; and that petitioner owed him three months' salary
for the year 2009. Thus, he prayed that he be awarded backwages, separation pay, retirement
pay, 13th month pay, damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.

In its Position Paper and other pleadings,[8] petitioner claimed that respondent was hired on
commission basis, on a "no work, no pay" and "per travel, per trip" basis; that respondent was
paid an average of P10,000.00 commission per month without salary; that, contrary to his
claim of illegal dismissal, respondent permanently abandoned his employment effective March
31, 2009, after he failed to report for work; that it received information later on that
respondent was already engaged in driving his family truck and was seen doing so at public
roads and highways; that respondent's claim of illegal dismissal was not true, as there was no
dismissal or termination of his services, and no instructions to do so were given; that the bus
dispatcher from whom respondent inquired about his status had no power to terminate or
declare him AWOL; that respondent had not actually approached management to inquire
about his employment status, even though he and all the other employees knew that the
Assistant Manager, Corporate Secretary, and Director of the bus company, Elias Dimaya,
resided with his family within the bus company's station and compound in San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte; that respondent's witnesses had an axe to grind against petitioner, which accounts for
their false testimonies; that based on respondent's Complaint, he claimed to have been
illegally dismissed in January, 2009, which was contrary to the documentary evidence which
showed that he continued to work until March, 2009, after which he completely abandoned his
employment; that per Joint Affidavit[9] of petitioner's bus dispatchers, it is not true that
respondent ever made inquiries and follow-ups about his employment until mid-2010; that
there was no illegal dismissal, and thus respondent was not entitled to his monetary claims;
that respondent never refuted the claim that he abandoned his employment with petitioner
because he took on a new job as driver for his family's trucking business and was seen doing
so in public roads and highways; that it was common practice for bus drivers of the petitioner
to simply stop reporting for work for short periods of time, or even years, after which they
would return and ask to be allowed to drive petitioner's buses once more, which management
allowed after the absentee drivers gave satisfactory and reasonable explanations for their
absences; that this practice was impliedly sanctioned in order to give the drivers the
opportunity to take time off from the stress and boredom of driving on long trips; that
respondent's allegations were not true, particularly his claim that he was told by a bus
dispatcher that he was considered AWOL, since he refused to divulge the identity of the bus
dispatcher who gave such information to him; and that there was no truth to respondent's
allegations that the cost of gasoline for every bus trip was charged to him, as it was
shouldered by the petitioner. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the case.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On August 24, 2012, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando rendered a Decision[10] dismissing the
case for lack of merit, declaring that —

x x x [Complainant] cannot state with certainty the date and time of his dismissal if it was
January 2009, middle of 2009 or November 2009 x x x.

[I]n his pro forma complaint sheet, he mentioned that he was already 61 at the time that he
filed his complaint on 23 November 2011. Yet in his position paper he mentioned that he was
already 62 years old after he rendered service for 18 years x x x.

On the issue of constructive dismissal, seemingly Rudy Compañero and Loreto Casil presented
a story that [showed] they were aware that Daniel Macuray was poorly treated by respondent
when he was still employed between  2007 and 2009. But the records [did] not show that the
complainant had shown any sign of whimper or protest. Therefore, x x x the claim is
unfounded.

The [alleged] unpaid fuel expenses that were incurred by unidentified drivers for respondent's
bus with Body No. 1 [was] not supported by substantial evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept to justify a conclusion. He did not present a single accounting of his purchases
for diesel fuel and how much. The complainant did not even claim that the unpaid gasoline
expenses were charged to him.

The complainant failed to present evidence that the treatment he received from respondent
was unreasonable or oppressive and unbearable that would amount to a constructive dismissal
x x x.

xxxx

The complainant never returned back to work after 31 March 2009. An informal voluntary
termination is recognized under the law as an authorized ground for dismissal x x x. In such
case compliance with the two (2) notice requirement of due process is not necessary. When
this happens the employee is not entitled to separation pay and backwages. The dismissal is
not illegal. Hence the claims for separation pay, backwages and damages are denied.

xxxx

IN VIEW THEREOF, this case is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[11] (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission

Respondent filed a Memorandum of Appeal[12] before the National Labor Relations Commission

(NLRC). On December 28, 2012, a Resolution[13] was issued modifying the Labor Arbiter's
judgment by awarding in favor of respondent the amount of P50,000.00 as financial
assistance. The NLRC held:

x x x A close evaluation of the records however [showed] that complainant-appellant was

unsure of the date of his dismissal. In his complaint, he entered the date January, 2009, in his
pleadings the year 2009 and [in] his position paper be stated the month of November, 2009.
Moreover, he failed to identify the dispatcher who did not assign a bus to him. Complainant-
appellant therefore failed to establish the fact of his alleged dismissal with substantial
evidence.

On the other hand, respondents-appellees stress that complainant-appellant did not report for
work anymore from March 31, 2009 and in support thereof submitted folders showing the
particulars of the trips where complainant-appellant served as assistant driver for the period 3
January to 30 March 2009; that neither did complainant-appellant file any leave of absence.
Thus, respondents-appellees concluded that by his failure to report for work beginning 31
March 2009, complainant-appellant permanently abandoned and severed his employment
effective 31 March 2009.

Although absence without valid or justifiable reason is an element of abandonment, settled is

the rule, however, that mere absence or failure to report for work is not tantamount to
abandonment of work. x x x

x x x Respondents-appellees' conclusion that complainant-appellant abandoned his work lacks

factual basis.

In the consolidated cases of Leonardo vs. NLRC x x x the Supreme Court also ordered the
reinstatement sans backwages of the employee x x x who was declared neither to have
abandoned his job nor was he constructively dismissed. As pointed out by the Court, in a case
where the employee's failure to work was occasioned neither by his abandonment nor by a
termination, the burden of economic loss is not rightfully shifted to the employer. Each party
must bear his own loss.

In this case, we note that complainant-appellant is already sixty two years old and he may not
be apt for the job as bus driver considering the long hours of travel from Laoag City to Manila.
Hence, his reinstatement may no longer be possible. Separation pay however[,] cannot also
be awarded to complainant-appellant because he was not dismissed by respondent appellee.
In cases where there was no dismissal at all, separation pay should not be awarded. x x x

Under this circumstance, financial assistance may be allowed as a measure of social justice
and as an equitable concession. x x x

x x x Respondents-appellees are therefore ordered to award financial assistance to

complainant appellant in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DECISION dated 24 August 2012 is hereby MODIFIED
ordering respondents-appellees to award financial assistance by (sic) complainant-appellant in
the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS.

SO ORDERED.[14] (Citations omitted)

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[15] which the NLRC denied in a March 18, 2013
Resolution.[16]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari[17] before the CA, questioning the NLRC dispositions
and praying for the relief he originally sought in his labor complaint.

On March 17, 2014, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, decreeing thus:

We find the petition to be meritorious.

xxxx

In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer company to prove that
its dismissal of an employee was for a valid cause. There is no such proof of a valid cause in
the instant case. On the contrary, the facts bear the marks of constructive dismissal.

xxxx

The Labor Arbiter's findings that there was an informal voluntary termination has no basis.
Based on the age of petitioner as appearing in the records of this case, he was 58 years of age
in November of 2009 when he was no longer assigned any bus. Nearing his retirement, it
[was] irrational that he would suddenly opt for an informal voluntary termination. Thus, the
NLRC's appreciation of facts is more in keeping with logic as it held that there was no
abandonment. Surely, petitioner kept going back to the respondent company to check whether
or not there would already be a bus assigned to him. There being no bad records or previous
transgressions committed by the petitioner against respondent company, or any third party in
relation to his job during his eighteen (18) years of working for respondent company, there
was no rhyme nor reason why he would suddenly not be assigned a bus to drive and no
reason why he would suddenly voluntarily stop working while nearing his retirement.
xxxx

Reinstatement of petitioner, however, may not be in the best interest of respondent company
and or petitioner himself. As correctly declared by the NLRC, petitioner is 'already sixty-two
years old and he may not be apt for the job as a bus driver considering the long hours of
travel from Laoag City to Manila. Hence, his reinstatement may no longer be possible.'

xxxx

Undoubtedly, herein petitioner Daniel Macuray was performing a job that has an intimate
connection to the business of respondent company as he worked as a driver of respondent
Maria de Leon Transportation, a public transportation business company, for eighteen (18)
years. As a regular employee who has been constructively dismissed, petitioner is entitled to
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service.

Under the above-mentioned twin remedies, there is likewise basis for the grant of backwages.
x x x. In this case, petitioner was illegally dismissed in November of 2009 when he was no
longer assigned any bus without cause or reason. Thus, his backwages may be computed from
November of 2009 until December 28, 2012, when the NLRC held that 'reinstatement may no
longer be possible.'

Reinstatement being no longer possible and petitioner being 62 years old, petitioner is entitled
to retirement pay, having worked for respondent company for eighteen (18) years. It is herein
noted that the required length of service, to be entitled to retirement pay under the law, is
only five (5) years. The applicable law is Article 287 of the Labor Code, a amended by R.A. No.
7641 x x x:

xxxx

In view thereof, petitioner is entitled to one-half (1/2) of his monthly commission for every
year of service. x x x. Thus, for having been illegally dismissed, petitioner therein was entitled
not only to separation pay and full backwages, but additionally, to his retirement benefits
pursuant to any collective bargaining agreement in the workplace or, in the absence thereof,
as provided in Section 14, Book VI 8 of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code.

xxxx

As interpreted by the Supreme Court in Auto Bus Transport Systems vs. Bautista, 'employees
engaged on task or contract basis or paid on purely commission basis are not automatically
exempted from the grant of service incentive leave, unless, they fall under the classification of
field personnel.' Herein petitioner does not fall under the classification of field personnel. If
required to be at specific places at specific times, employees including drivers cannot be said
to be field personnel despite the fact that they are performing work away from the principal
office of the [employer]. In this regard, Section 2, Rule V, Book III of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations provides that '[e]very employee who has rendered at least one year of service
shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay.' x x x

Petitioner, who is paid on purely commission basis, is however not entitled to a 13th month
pay, being among those specifically enumerated by law as not covered by PD No. 851 (the law
requiring employers to pay employees 13th month pay) x x x

xxxx

Prescinding from the foregoing, moral damages, exemplary damages, nominal damages and
attorney's fees are due to the petitioner.

x x x Petitioner is thus awarded moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.00

x x x In accordance with existing jurisprudence, petitioner is awarded P30,000.00 in nominal

damages.

A grant of attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00 is likewise proper. x x x

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated December 28, 2012 and March 18, 2013 issued by the National Labor
Relations Commission in NLRC LAC No. 10-003028-12 and Decision dated August 24, 2012,
rendered by the Regional Arbitration Branch No. 1 of the Commission in NLRC Case No. RAB-I-
11-1119-11 (LC) are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, a NEW JUDGMENT is entered finding herein petitioner to have been illegally
dismissed by respondent company from employment and thus is entitled to: 1) separation
pay; 2) backwages; 3) retirement pay; 4) service incentive leave; 5) moral damages; 6)
exemplary damages; 7) nominal damages; and 8) attorney's fees.

Let this case be remanded to the NLRC for computation of the exact amounts due to the
petitioner consistent with the findings made in this Decision.

SO ORDERED.[18] (Citations omitted)

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the same through its
September 17, 2014 Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition.

In an April 18, 2016 Resolution,[19] the Court resolved to give due course to the Petition.

Issue

Petitioner argues in this Petition that —

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR HAVING BEEN FILED X X X
BEYOND THE 60-DAY REGLEMENTARY PERIOD. X X X

XXXX

3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THE DOCKET
FEES WERE NOT PAID BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT AT THE TIME HE FILED THE PETITION OR
WITHIN HIS REQUESTED PERIOD OF EXTENSION X X X

4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT ON
THE GROUND THAT HE FAILED TO INDICATE THEREIN THE OTHER TWO (2) MATERIAL DATES,
NAMELY: THE DATE OF HIS RECEIPT OF THE RESOLUTION DATED 28 DECEMBER 2012 OF
RESPONDENT COMMISSION MODIFYING THE DECISION DATED 24 AUGUST 2012 OF
EXECUTIVE LABOR ARBITER, AND THE DATE WHEN HE FILED HIS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION THERETO. X X X

5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CONCLUDING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS CONSTRUCTIVELY OR ILLEGALLY DISMISSED OR
PETITIONER X X X

6. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CONCLUDING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO SEPARATION PAY, BACKWAGES, RETIREMENT
PAY, SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE PAY, MORAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, NOMINAL
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.[20]

Petitioner's Arguments

Petitioner argues that the CA erred in entertaining respondent's Petition for Certiorari as it was
belatedly filed and defective in form; that the CA erred in failing to appreciate that respondent
was not illegally dismissed, but that he voluntarily resigned and abandoned his employment
when he left to work for his family's trucking business; that respondent knowingly timed the
filing of the instant labor case in such a way as to recover retirement and other benefits; and
that since there was no illegal dismissal, respondent was thus not entitled to his money
claims, including retirement pay and damages, as there was no bad faith on petitioner's part.

Respondent's Argument

Respondent argues that the Petition should be denied for lack of merit; that the CA's
dispositions are correct and must be upheld; that there were no procedural lapses in the filing
of the CA Petition for Certiorari; that petitioner itself was guilty of procedural lapses in the
filing of the instant Petition; that the CA was correct in finding that he was illegally dismissed
from employment; and that the CA did not err in awarding his money claims.

Our Ruling
Respondent claims that he continued to follow up on his employment status for six months.
Petitioner counters that he could not have done the follow ups because members of its top
management never met with him; even the bus dispatchers, who were not part of the bus
company's management, denied meeting with respondent; they declared in a joint affidavit
submitted to the labor tribunals that respondent never approached them at any time during
the said period that respondent claimed he continued following up on his work status.

Indeed, respondent did not specify to whom his follow-ups were directed; if they were upon
management, he would have said so, and the bus company management would have had no
reason to deny this claim. However, the only follow-up he particularly referred to was one
directed to a bus dispatcher, a certain Roger Pasion, who even denied the claim in an affidavit.
[21]

For its part, petitioner claims that respondent simply stopped reporting for work; that he left
his post as bus driver to work for his family's trucking business; and that he was seen driving
the family truck on public roads and highways. This was not denied by the respondent.
Petitioner further contends that what respondent did was typical of its bus drivers; they simply
stop reporting for work for short periods of time, even years, only to re-appear looking to
work for the company once again. Petitioner states that this is allowed in order to give its
drivers the needed break from boredom typically encountered from driving on long trips on
familiar, boring routes, a sort of therapy and sabbatical, a time to refresh oneself from
monotonous work that benefits the driver, passengers, and the bus company itself; that this
practice also affords its drivers the opportunity to find more lucrative employment or greener
pastures elsewhere without foreclosing the possibility of returning to work for the company in
the future.

The Court is inclined to believe petitioner's allegations: respondent left his work as bus driver
to work for his family's trucking business. There is no truth to the allegation that respondent
was dismissed, actually or constructively. He claims that the dispatcher informed him that he
was AWOL; however, a mere bus dispatcher does not possess the power to fire him from work
– this is a prerogative belonging to management. Respondent did not show that he met with
management to inquire on his status. On the other hand, it appears that the Assistant
Manager, Corporate Secretary, and Director of the bus company, Elias Dimaya, resided with
his family within the bus company's station and compound in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. Having
worked for the bus company for 18 years, respondent should have known this fact, and he
could have visited with Elias Dimaya at anytime, if his employment was so important that it
meant his own survival and that of his family. Apparently, however, it would appear that this
was not the case, for the simple reason that respondent had found employment elsewhere.

Thus, respondent's failure to show that his follow-ups were properly directed at management
bolsters petitioner's claim that no follow-ups were made by him. The logical explanation for
this is that he found employment elsewhere and thus opted to stop reporting for work, as was
the practice of other bus drivers working for petitioner.

At any rate, even assuming that respondent was indeed told by respondent's bus dispatcher
Roger Pasion that he was AWOL, this was not tantamount to dismissal, actual or constructive.
An ordinary bus dispatcher has no power to dismiss an employee; in a typical bus company, a
driver might even be of more significance than an ordinary dispatcher. Bus drivers are a more
valuable resource than a dispatcher; without the former, the latter is useless. Without a
driver, there could be no bus to dispatch or trip to schedule. It cannot therefore be said that
an ordinary dispatcher is superior to a bus driver; at most, they are equal in rank.

The fact that respondent made no sincere effort to meet with the management of the bus
company gives credence to petitioner's allegation that he was never fired from work.

However, it cannot be said that respondent abandoned his employment. Petitioner itself
admitted that it sanctioned the practice of allowing its drivers to take breaks from work in
order to afford them the opportunity to recover from the stresses of driving the same long and
monotonous bus routes by accepting jobs elsewhere, as some form of sabbatical or vacation,
without losing productivity and in come and to safeguard the interests of the company and its
patrons, as well as to avoid fatal accidents were the drivers to be suffered to work under
continuous stressful conditions occasioned by driving on the same monotonous routes day in
and day out.

Simply put, respondent availed of petitioner's company practice and unwritten policy – of
allowing its bus drivers to take needed breaks or sabbaticals to enable them to recover from
the monotony of driving the same route for long periods – and obtained work elsewhere. It
appears that what matters to respondent is that when he did this, he was already approaching
retirement age – he was 58 years old in April, 2009, when he took a break from being a bus
driver – and when he filed the labor case in November, 2011, he was already 60. He was born
May 20, 1951.[22] By that time, he had served petitioner for 18 years, or from April 1991 up to
March 31, 2009. Respondent may have thought that for serving the bus company for a
significant period, he should be rewarded for his loyalty.

Thus, since respondent was not dismissed from work, petitioner may not be held liable for his
(respondent's) monetary claims, except those that were actually owing to him by way of
unpaid salary/commission, and retirement benefits, which are due to him for the reason that
he reached the age of retirement while under petitioner's employ. As to unpaid
salaries/commissions, it appears from the record that petitioner failed to pay respondent three
months' worth, that is, for the period January to March, 2009 – which, at P10,000.00 per
month – amounts to P30,000.00. Indeed, this could be one of the reasons why respondent
stopped reporting after March 31, 2009, as he complained of petitioner's failure to pay his
salaries/commissions for the said period.

As for retirement benefits, respondent is entitled to them considering that he was never
dismissed from work, either for cause or by resignation or abandonment. As far as petitioner
is concerned, he merely went on a company-sanctioned sabbatical. It just so happened that
during this sabbatical, he reached the retirement age of 60; by this time, he is already 67
years old. By filing the labor case, he may have pre-empted the payment of his retirement
benefits; but it is a clear demand for retirement benefits nonetheless. Understandably,
respondent may have already expected that he would not be paid retirement benefits since he
stopped reporting for work in 2009 when he took his sabbatical; for him, such move might
have been construed as a resignation or abandonment by his employer, the petitioner, and
rightly so – for this is precisely petitioner's defense in this case.

Under Article 287 of the Labor Code,

Art. 287. Retirement. - Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age
established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.

In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he
may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other
agreements: Provided, however, That an employee's retirement benefits under any collective
bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than those provided herein.

In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of

employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or
more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory
retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire
and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for
every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.

Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half (1/2) month salary shall
mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent
of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.

Retail, service and agricultural establishments or operations employing not more than (10)
employees or workers are exempted from the coverage of this provision.

Violation of this provision is hereby declared unlawful and subject to the penal provisions
provided under Article 288 of this Code.

In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement in Maria De Leon Transportation, Inc., the
Court hereby declares that respondent is entitled to one month's salary for every year of
service, that is:

P10,000.00 x 18 years = P180,000.00

Retirement compensation equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service is more
equitable and just than the CA's pronouncement of one-half month's salary per year of
service, which the Court finds insufficient. This is considering that petitioner has been paying
its drivers commission equivalent to less than the minimum wage for the latter's work, and in
respondent's case, it has delayed payment of the latter's compensation for three months. On
the other hand, petitioner's lax policies regarding the coming and going of its drivers, as well
as the fact that respondent's layovers are considerable – it appears that throughout his
employment, respondent spends a good number of days each month not driving for petitioner,
which thus allows him to accept other work outside – makes up for deficiencies in the parties'
compensation arrangement.

Petitioner's argument that respondent's CA Petition for Certiorari should have been dismissed

outright for being tardy and for being procedurally defective deserves no consideration. As has
been shown above, respondent is entitled to part of his monetary claims; the NLRC judgment
failed to appreciate that respondent remained an employee of petitioner. As against
petitioner's claim of procedural infirmities, the Court must uphold and protect respondent's
substantive rights. Procedure cannot prevail over substantive rights in this case.

Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would
result from the strict application of the [r]ules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the
interest of substantial justice. It bears stressing that the rules of procedure are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to
effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as
they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a
backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of
the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within our power to
suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its operation.[23]

On the other hand, the CA Decision is unwarranted on account of its declaration that
respondent was illegally dismissed from work, which is not the case. As a result, it awarded
other claims that respondent was not entitled to.

As for attorney's fees, the Court finds that respondent is entitled thereto. Under paragraphs 7
and 11, respectively, of Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs, may be recovered "in actions for the recovery of wages of
household helpers, laborers and skilled workers" and "in any other case where the court
deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered." The CA award of P20,000.00 is thus reasonable and just under the circumstances.

Having resolved the case in the foregoing manner, the Court finds no need to address the
other issues raised by the parties. They have become unnecessary and superfluous; their
resolution contributes nothing to the essence of the Court's disposition.

WHEREFORE, the March 17, 2014 Decision and September 17, 2014 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 130387 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and in lieu thereof,
judgment is hereby rendered AWARDING respondent Daniel M. Macuray the following
amounts:

1. P30,000.00 as unpaid salaries/commissions for the period January to March, 2009;

2. P180,000.00 as retirement pay;

3. P20,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and

4. Interest of 12% per annum on the total monetary awards, computed from the filing of the
Complaint up to June 30, 2013, and thereafter 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until their full
satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro,* (Acting Chairperson), Jardeleza, and Gesmundo,*** JJ., concur.

Tijam, J., on official leave.

*
 Per Special Order No. 2559 dated May 11, 2018.

***
 Per Special Order No. 2560 dated May 11, 2018.

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 13-68.

[2]
 Id. at 74-95; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and concurred in by Associate
Justices Michael P. Elbinias and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes.

[3]
 Id. at 70-72.
[4]
 Id. at 190-216.

[5]
 Id. at 373-392.

[6]
 Id. at 119.

[7]
 Id. at 120-136.

[8]
 Id. at 237-247, 315-337.

[9]
 Id. at 322-323.

[10]
 Id. at 110-118.

[11]
 Id. at 116-118.

[12]
 Id. at 137-168.

[13]
 Id. at 100-107: penned by Commissioner Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. and concurred in by
Presiding Commissioner Alex A. Lopez and Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog III.

[14]
 Id. at 104-107.

[15]
 Id. at 169-183.

[16]
 Id. at 96-98.

[17]
 Id. at 190-216.

[18]
 Id. at 83-94.

[19]
 Id. at 513-514.

[20]
 Id. at 29-32.

[21]
 Id. at 322-323.

[22]
 Id. at 80.

[23]
 Coronel v. Hon. Desierto, 448 Phil. 894, 903 (2003).