Abstract of thesis entitled

“Cognition in Buddhist Psychology:

A Study of the Cognitive Functions in the Teaching of Causality

in Early Buddhism”

Submitted by

HAN, Tao

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

at The University of Hong Kong
in September 2017

The analysis of mind occupies the most crucial position in the Buddha’s teachings.

As the Buddha emphasized, he taught only the explanation and solution of the human

predicament, i.e. dukkha. And, the key always lies in the working of the mind. No

experience will exist and no liberation is possible without the mind. However, for the

ignorant people, it is difficult to realize or figure out how and why the mind goes wrong,

not even to mention about the way to liberate. The Buddha, therefore, patiently and

consistently explained these topics by the analysis of mind. Among all the teachings,

this study focuses on and investigates the analysis of cognition which explains how the

mind functions in daily life according to the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas.

In Early Buddhism, the analysis of cognition mostly began from the impingement

between the sense faculty and the sense object. Thence, starts the whole cognitive

process. In this regard, the Buddha urged disciples to guard the doors of the sense

faculties whenever they cognize the objects. This method is meant to monitor the whole

cognitive process, to contemplate the dangers of unwholesome mental activities and so

as to prevent them from arising. The analysis of cognitive process complies with the
teaching of causality in essentia. Or, in other words, the teaching of causality is

exemplified in the analysis of cognition. Such analysis is much diversified in length

and in content in order to accommodate specific individuals or groups. Hence, the

factors are mentioned due to their necessity and applicability. And, some factors

obviously appear to be more essential and common. These factors, therefore, constitute

the mental composition of ordinary people. This mental composition can be acquired

by synthetic studies of the important discourses in different texts.

Several features have been revealed on the basis of the synthetic studies. First, the

analysis of cognition is empirical and pragmatic in the Buddha’s teachings. We need

not resort to metaphysical or abstract doctrines, just testify these discourses by personal

experience. Secondly, the relationships in the teaching of causality are not simply linear

but multiple which can be sequential or simultaneous. This is because all the factors

constitute a dynamic system. The mind as a whole is always acting and changing.

However, the cognitive processes repeat themselves according to a basic pattern. This

can be explained from the microscopic perspective of factors and from the macro

perspective of processes. These factors are accord with the causal relationship to a great

extent so that all ordinary people have similar reactions and experiences. Furthermore,

some factors interact in a reciprocal cycle. One factor’s effect will become its cause in

turn. Accordingly, the cognitive processes comprised of these factors follow a similar

pattern in each round. More importantly, these factors only get stronger and worse. As

a result, our cognition is the complexity of these factors, functions, and processes

running repeatedly, continuously, and endlessly.

 Cognition in Buddhist Psychology:

A Study of the Cognitive Functions in the Teaching of Causality

in Early Buddhism

by

HAN, Tao
B.A. F.J.U.; M.B.S. H.K.

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for

the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at The University of Hong Kong.

September 2017
 Declaration

I declare that this thesis represents my own work, except where due

acknowledgement is made, and that it has not been previously included in a thesis,

dissertation or report submitted to this University or to any other institution for a degree,

diploma or other qualifications.

Signed ………………………………………………………
HAN, Tao

i
 Acknowledgements

This thesis has been inspired by the Buddha’s teachings. Its accomplishment is

attributed to the Buddha and all brilliant scholars. As the author, I take full responsibility

for any mistake or error in this thesis.

First of all, I would like to thank my Master Ven. Kai Ern and my Dhamma

brothers in Gotama Buddhist Monks Forest Hermitage (Penang, Malaysia) for their

edification and companionship. I also thank all the teachers and professors in Dharma

Drum Mountain (New Taipei, Taiwan) and the University of Hong Kong (Hong Kong).

They have taught me not only Buddhist doctrines but also academic thoughts and

methods. Among all of them, I owe the greatest gratitude to my supervisor Professor

Toshiichi Endo. Nearly a decade ago, both of us began school life at the University of

Hong Kong at the same time. Since then, in the course of my study, he generously

supported me with his knowledge, intelligence, and kindness. He is such a courtly and

gentle teacher and his wife is such an elegant and hospitable lady. May this couple take

care of themselves happily. I am also so grateful to John Shannon, Shin Ling Ng, and

Kar Man Luk for their unconditional efforts in revising and proofreading this thesis.

Thanks for their indispensable contributions.

During my stay in Hong Kong, many organizations and people provided me with

financial assistance and daily necessities. I greatly appreciate all their generosity and

offering: Glorious Sun Group gave me the scholarships for both my Master and Ph.D.

programmes. Ven. Koi Joung of Kwun Yum Buddhist Monastery (Stanley, Hong Kong)

supplied me with the fund and plenty of food. Ven. Dhammapala and Ven. Hoi Chuen

ii
offered accommodations when I needed. Yuk Kwan Luk uninterruptedly prepared

meals and desserts for me. Fai Yung Wong ardently prepared herb medicine and

Cantonese soup (bou tong). Wing Kan Ho tirelessly treated me with physical therapy.

Also, many friends from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and other countries helped me

in many kinds. I would like to thank them all.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my parents, my sister and her families.

They are my strongest supporters. Without them, I would not be able to pursue my goal

and finish my study. I owe them for everything they have done for me. This thesis is

dedicated to them.

May All Living Beings Be Happy and Peaceful.

iii
 Contents

Declaration .................................................................................................................... i
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ ii
Table of Contents …...................................................................................................... iv
List of Charts .............................................................................................................. viii
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................... ix

Chapter 1 Introduction ........................................................................... 1

§1.1 Statement of Thesis …………………………………………………………….... 1

§1.2 Research Sources ………………………………………………………………. 14

§1.3 Basic Features of the Buddha’s Teachings …………………………………..…. 21

§1.4 Methodology and Approaches …………………………………………………. 33

§1.5 Outline …………………………………………………………………………. 41

Chapter 2 The Teaching of Causality as an Analysis of

Cognition ……………………………………...……… 44
§2.1 The Connotation of the Dependent Origination Doctrine …………………….... 48
§2.1.1 The Title ……………………………………………………………….….. 50
§2.1.2 The Abstract Principle …………………………………………………..… 56
§2.1.3 The Twelve Links and Other Variations …………………………………... 59

§2.2 The Evolution of the Teaching of Causality …………………………………..... 64

§2.3 The Buddha’s Enlightenment Experience …………………………………….... 78

§2.4 The Applications of the Teaching of Causality ………………………………... 94

§2.4.1 Macrocosm ……………………………………………………………….. 94
§2.4.2 Saṃsāra, Kamma and Anattā ……………………………………………... 99
§2.4.3 The Mind ……………………………………………………………….... 108

§2.5 Summary ……………………………………………………………………… 114

iv
Chapter 3 The Six Senses as the Beginning of Cognition ………… 117
§3.1 The Functions of the Six Senses ………………………………………………. 120

§3.2 The Foremost Position in the Cognitive Processes …………………………… 128

§3.3 The Metaphor and Empiricism of the Six Senses as Gateways ……………….. 133
§3.3.1 The First Formula ……………………………………………………….. 134
§3.3.2 The Second Formula …………………………………………………….. 142
§3.3.3 The Third Formula ………………………………………………………. 149
§3.3.4 Misconception of Closing the Doors ……………………………………. 152

§3.4 The Mind Faculty …………………………………………………………….. 155

§3.5 Summary ……………………………………………………………………… 165

Chapter 4 The Analysis of Factors in Cognition …………………… 168

§4.1 The Sense Consciousness .……………………………………………………. 170
§4.1.1 Conditions ……………………………………………………………….. 171
§4.1.2 Arising in Different Channels ……………………………………………. 176
§4.1.3 Bare Awareness ………………………………………………………….. 178
§4.1.4 The Same Function ………………………………………………………. 180
§4.1.5 Summary ………………………………………………………………… 181

§4.2 An Integrated Consciousness …………………………………………………. 183

§4.2.1 To Discern Objects ………………………………………………………. 184
§4.2.2 Conciliation: as Awareness ………………………………………………. 187
§4.2.3 Conciliation: as a Life Principle …………………………………………. 190
§4.2.4 Solution: as a General Term ……………………………………………… 194
§4.2.5 Summary ………………………………………………………………… 201

§4.3 Contact (phassa) ……………………………………………………………… 205

§4.3.1 The Origin of Feeling ……………………………………………………. 206
§4.3.2 The Source of Speculative Views ……………………………………….. 209
§4.3.2 Two Types of Contact …………………………………………………… 211

§4.4 Feeling (vedanā) ……………………………………………………………… 214

§4.4.1 The Decisive Role of the Object ………………………………………… 218
§4.4.2 Arising in Different Sensory Channels ………………………..…………. 219
§4.4.3 Objective and Subjective Aspects ……………………………………….. 222
§4.4.4 The Inevitable Feeling …………………………………………………… 225

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 §4.4.5 Summary ………………………………………………………………… 230

§4.5 Perception (saññā) ……………………………………………………………. 233

§4.5.1 As Discriminating ……………………………………………………….. 234
§4.5.2 As Designating …………………………………………………………... 240
§4.5.3 The Three Times …………………………………………………………. 243
§4.5.4 The Perverted (vipallāsa) Perception …………………….……………… 245
§4.5.5 The Dangers of Signs (nimitta) ..…………...……………………………. 249
§4.5.6 The Explanation of Colors ……………………………………………..… 252
§4.5.7 Summary ………………………………………………………………… 255

§4.6 The Activities of Thinking ……………………………………………………. 258

§4.6.1 Attention ………………………………………………………………… 260
§4.6.2 Thinking and Perception ………………………………………………… 262
§4.6.3 Ethical Value …………………………………………………………….. 264
§4.6.4 Regarding as Mime ……………………………………………………… 267
§4.6.5 Summary ……………………………………………………………….... 271

§4.7 Mental Proliferation (papañca) ………………………………………………. 273

§4.8 Craving (taṇhā) ……………………………………………………………….. 286

§4.8.1 Craving for Sensual Pleasure (kāmataṇhā) ……………………………… 289
§4.8.2 Craving for Existence (bhavataṇhā) and Non-existence (vibhavataṇhā)… 296
§4.8.3 Desire (chanda) and Obsession (pariḷāha) ………………………………. 299
§4.8.4 Reaction of Feelings ……………………………………………………... 302
§4.8.5 The Fire Metaphor of Craving …………………………………………… 307
§4.8.6 Summary ………………………………………………………………… 310

§4.9 Clinging (upādāna) ………………………………………………………….... 312

§4.9.1 Clinging and Craving ……………………………………………………. 314
§4.9.2 The Gradual Enhancement ……………………………….……………… 317

§4.10 The Underlying Tendency (anusaya) ………………………………………... 320

§4.10.1 Ethical Value …………………………………………………………… 321
§4.10.2 Unconscious ……………………………………………………………. 323
§4.10.3 Acting in a Reciprocal Process ..……………………………………….. 326
§4.10.4 Summary ……………………………………………………………….. 332

Chapter 5 The Analysis of the Cognitive Processes ………………... 334

§5.1 The Relationships between Factors and Functions ……………………………. 337

vi
§5.2 The Reactions toward the Stimulus of the Object ……….…………………… 351

§5.3 Delineation of the Cognitive Processes ……………………………………….. 358

Chapter 6 Conclusion ……………………………………………….. 374

Appendix 1 Table of the Cognitive Processes ………………………… 379

Appendix 2 Flowchart of the Cognitive Processes from Agreeable
Form …………………………………………..………… 380
Bibliography ………………………………………………………….. 381

vii
 Charts

Chart 1
The difference between the object of the mind faculty and the objects
of the other five faculties …………………………………………………… 163

Chart 2
The parallel processes of the arising of the six types of feeling .……………. 177

Chart 3
The integrated process of different channels ………………………………… 221

Chart 4
The reciprocal process of mental proliferation ……………………………… 280

viii
 Abbreviations

AN Aṅguttara Nikāya
BPS Buddhist Publication Society
CD Chinese Dictionary, Far East Book Co., Ltd.
DĀ Dīrgha Āgama: T1, vol. I 1-149
DA Dīgha Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā
DN Dīgha Nikāya
Dhp Dhammapada
Dhs Dhammasaṅgaṇi
EĀ Ekottara Āgama: T125, vol. II 549-830
EB Encyclopaedia of Buddhism
Jat Jātaka
Kv Kathāvatthu
MĀ Madhyama Āgama: T26, vol. I 421-809
MA Majjhima Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā
MN Majjhima Nikāya
PED Pali-English Dictionary of the Pali Text Society
Pl Pāli
PTS Pali Text Socitey
SĀ Saṃyukta Āgama: T99, vol. II 1-373
SA Saṃyutta Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā
SED Sanskrit-English Dictionary, M. Monier-Williams
Skt Sanskrit
SN Saṃyutta Nikāya
Sn Suttanipāta
Ud Udāna
Vin Vinaya
Vism Visuddhimagga
Vv Vimānavatthu

ix
 Chapter 1 Introduction

§1.1 Statement of Thesis

The analysis of mind has long occupied an important position in the development

of Buddhism. It would not be an exaggeration to say that most doctrines relate to the

working of the mind, for example: four out of the five aggregates which constitute the

Buddhist analysis of human beings are mental activities, i.e. the four formless

aggregates (arūpakkhandha): feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā), volitional

formations (saṅkhārā), and consciousness (viññāṇa). Moreover, there are abundant

discourses about the dangers of negative mental activities, like desire (rāga), craving

(taṇhā), sorrow (soka), hatred (dosa), etc., and also about admonitions and methods to

discard them. From this respect, it is not surprising that psychologists find familiar

terms and ideas in Buddhist teachings related to their disciplines. Johansson points out

the psychological aspect of Early Buddhism:1

Anybody with a good knowledge of psychology and its history who reads the Pali

Nikayas must be struck by the fact that the psychological terminology is richer in this

than in any other ancient literature and that more space is devoted to psychological

analyses and explanations in this than in any other religious literature. (Italics added.)

We should especially notice that the similarities of Pāli suttas and psychology he

mentions consist of terminology, ideas, and method. On the basis of this feature, the

term “Buddhist psychology”, since it was first proposed by C. A. F. Rhys Davids in

1
Johansson 1969: 11.

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1900,2 is widely recognized and used nowadays. Indeed, most teachings in Buddhism

accord with what we call “psychology” in its broadest sense as the study of mind and

behavior. In this sense, Buddhism as a whole is sometimes described as “an interior

science, a mind science.”3

§ Why Cognition

The connection between Buddhism and psychology is becoming more and more

specialized today. In the past few decades, the interdisciplinary subjects of Buddhism

and cognitive psychology developed progressively. This trend did not happen without

reason. In modern psychology, cognitive psychology is the scientific study of the

human memory and mental processes which started to exist as a separate discipline in

the late 1950s.4 Cognitive psychologists, on the one hand, abandoned the traditional

view of a substantial entity which undergoes human experience; and on the other hand,

they investigated how mental activities function in dynamic processes. And they found

that “self and object, the constituents of conscious experience, emerge interdependently

and recurrently in brief states”.5 As a result, cognitive psychology brought about an

enormous impact which was deemed to be a “cognitive revolution” in psychology.6

In Buddhism, the assumption of a permanent, everlasting, and unchanging subject

has long been denied emphatically and ubiquitously. Instead, what underlies human

2
C. A. F. Rhys Davids 1900: lxx. This statement is claimed by Chakkarath (2014: 18).
3
Cabezón 2003: 48.
4
Ashcraft 2006: 9.
5
Kurak 2003: 350.
6
Reisberg 2010: 7.

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experience is explained by ephemeral phenomena, i.e. the five aggregates and the causal

theory. This Buddhist doctrine: the denial of an ontological entity or no-self (Pl:

anatta/anattā; Skt: anātman) has brought about much attention in psychologists’

works.7 Federman points out the similarities and discrepancies between Buddhism and

cognitive psychology:8

Nevertheless, the idea that a stable and continuing self is a semblance looks surprisingly

similar in both sides of the dialogue. I suggest that what triggers the interest on both

sides is a conceptual structure of rejecting a particular kind of self. These rejections,

which are directed towards the Cartesian and the Brahmanical perceptions of self,

create a gap that needs to be filled. Although the act of rejecting, the process of

divorcing from a previous concept of substantial selfhood, is similar in both Buddhism

and cognitive science, the actual content that fills the gap is different.

As he observes, both Buddhism and cognitive psychology share the same

assumptions regarding self or soul, although the contents they propose to justify and

demonstrate the human experience as dynamic processes are different. We should

especially be aware of such differences when we intend to “borrow” terminologies,

ideas, or theories from the other discipline. This awareness, of course, should be applied

to the term “cognition”.

According to cognitive psychology, cognition means “the collection of mental

processes and activities used in perceiving, remembering, thinking, and understanding,

as well as the act of using those processes.” 9 This definition includes all mental

7
Federman (2011: 43) mentions several scholars, like: Hayward, Varela, Watson, and Wallace.
8
Federman 2011: 47.
9
Ashcraft 2006: 11.

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activities about how we perceive the world, how we think about it, and how we react

according to this knowledge. It also indicates a crucial point: the term “cognition”

always means cognitive processes. Hence, we can find two premises in the study of

cognitive psychology: the content of cognition and that content is composed of dynamic

processes. The prominent role of cognition lies in the fact that “our behavior depends

in crucial ways on how we perceive and understand the world around us.”10 In order to

explain how ordinary people cognize, think, and act, it is necessary to reveal the pattern

of the mental activities for psychologists. In a similar vein, Kalupahana points out that

the explanation and solution of the human predicament lie in sense perception in

Buddhism:11

The process of perception, which the Upaniṣadic thinkers also explained on the basis

of a metaphysical self (ātman), received a causal explanation in the hands of the

Buddha. For him, this was a problem of prime importance because he realized that all

the misery and unhappiness in the world were due to the evils associated with sense

perception. The Buddha thus found it necessary to explain clearly how sense perception

takes place. He realized that a proper understanding of the sensory process would give

insight into the origin of suffering as well as into the way one can attain freedom from

suffering. (Italics added.)

In this passage, Kalupahana implicitly connects the causal theory with sense

perception and places them in the center of Buddhist soteriology. On the one hand, both

Buddhist scholars, like cognitive psychologists, rely on mental activities to realize the

10
Reisberg 2010: 4.
11
Kalupahana 1975: 121.

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composition of human beings. On the other hand, the analysis of mind in Buddhism is

endowed with ethical value, while in psychology these two are separated. Buddhism

tries to discern the wholesome mental activities from the unwholesome ones in order to

lead people to a better life. But this consideration never bothers psychologists.

Besides, Federman warns us that the similarities between Buddhism and science

suggested by scholars could be simply “a remarkable coincidence” or it “turns out to

be false under scrutiny” in many cases. 12 Furthermore, “[r]egarding similarities in

method there is a risk of imposing modern categories on pre-modern religious

system.”13 It is true that the Buddha did not adopt any terminology or ideas equal to the

term “cognition”. It is also true that he never intended to systematize a coherent theory

about cognition. But this does not necessarily mean the system is not possible. On the

contrary, we have to admit a common cognitive system to facilitate communicating and

exchanging ideas. To establish a cognitive system does not violate the Buddha's

teaching but helps us to understand mental functions in a more systematic and

comprehensive way. De Silva thus suggests:14

Apart from the contemporary significance of the psychological analysis in

Buddhism, a comprehensive grasp of the entire doctrine of the Buddha cannot be

arrived at without extensive study of the Buddhist concepts of mind, cognition and

motivation, and of the nature of emotion and personality.... For these reasons, it would

be worthwhile to abstract the psychological facets of the doctrine, systematise them

and present the findings within a framework and in an idiom that would interest the

12
Federman 2011: 42.
13
Federman 2011: 42.
14
De Silva 2005: 1-2.

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 psychologist today.

As he says, summarization and systemization of Buddhist doctrines can build a

bridge between Buddhism and psychology. This bridge is based on the similar attempt

of both sides to realize people’s cognition, even though the concrete bricks, viz. the

contents, can be made of different ideas or doctrines. Hence, at first sight, Buddhism

and cognitive psychology share many similarities. Their deep connection still requires

critical and careful studies. One of the fundamental differences that should be noted in

this study is the attitude toward ordinary people’s mental conditions. In cognitive

psychology, the analysis of cognition mainly focuses on normal mental activities:15

(C)ognitive psychology is largely, though not exclusively, interested in what might be

considered everyday, ordinary mental processes. The processes by which we read and

understand are entirely commonplace – not simple, by any means, but certainly

routine.... It is true that cognitive psychology generally does not deal with the

psychologically "abnormal,"... we will merely assume that cognition usually refers to

the customary, commonplace mental activities that most people engage in as they

interact with the world around them.

For psychologists, cognition is defined as the mental activities in “normal” people.

It is common and customary. “Common” means these mental activities can be found in

most people and “customary” means they happen routinely and habitually in daily basis.

In Buddhism, there is a more profound connotation regarding the notion of “normal”.

From the Buddhist viewpoint, the so-called “normal” mental activities are de facto

15
Ashcraft 2006: 11.

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fabricated and illusive. As de Silva asserts: “In one sense everyone is subject to ‘mental

disease’ except the arahants, who have destroyed the āsavas (influxes).” 16 In other

words, all the ordinary people regard their “abnormal” status as “normal”. The reason

people are normal is that everyone shares and accepts similar experiences. Hence,

ordinary people should be described as “unenlightened” instead of “normal” in

Buddhism. Even though such a fundamental difference exists, both Buddhism and

cognitive psychology are devoted to people’s common experiences. Through the

analysis of these similar experiences, we are able to answer some essential questions in

Buddhist theory and practice, such as: How and why people always act into

predicament? What are the critical factors in the cognitive processes which bring about

the unsatisfactory results? And on what basis can we communicate with others or feel

sympathy and compassion?

§ Why Early Buddhism

Facing enormous literature and diverse doctrines in Buddhism, it is necessary to

confine the research sources at the outset. In this study, I intend to investigate Buddhist

teachings and doctrines which belong to Early Buddhism. The term Early Buddhism

indicates the earliest period in the development of Buddhism. Many scholars consider

this period extends from the Buddha’s lifetime to the first schism between the Sthaviras

and the Mahāsāṅghikas. 17 From different traditions, the reasons given to the first

16
De Silva 2014: 78.
17
E.g. Hirakawa 1990: 105; Schmithausen 1990: 1; Kuan 2008: 2. Yin Shun (1994: 1-2) further
distinguishes the Buddha’s lifetime from Early Buddhism and designates the former as “Original
Buddhism”.

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schism are diverse. Three Chinese treatises belonging to Sarvāstivādin attribute the

cause of schism to the “five points” which are related to the qualification of the

arahant.18 All the Vinayas mention the disputation of ten illicit practices at the second

council in Vaiśālī.19 However, none of them specified this disputation as the cause of

schism. Besides, there is a trend among scholars to attribute the reason to the

disagreement among monks about the expansion in the discipline. 20 Basically, the

difference between these reasons is whether the formation of schools depended on

doctrinal diversities or on disciplinary arguments. Gethin reminds us of the significance

of Vinaya in the monastic life:21

Since the Vinaya left monks and nuns largely free to develop the Buddha's teaching

doctrinally as they saw fit, there would be little incentive to provoke a schism on purely

doctrinal grounds. What was of public concern was living by the monastic rules, not

doctrinal conformity. We are dealing here with orthopraxy, not orthodoxy.

Hence, the differences in doctrine were not enough to cause a general division

among monks. It was the disputation of discipline that should be blamed for the first

schism. The distinctive ideas and theories were probably developed at a later period.

According to this theory, Cousins suggests the possible reason of schism:22

The Mahāsāṅghikas were essentially a conservative party resisting a reformist attempt

18
i.e. A Treatise on the Eighteen Schools (十八部論), A Treatise on the Differences of the Views of the
Schools (部執異論), and A Treatise of the Wheel of Different Schools’ Doctrines (異部宗輪論).
19
Including the Sarvāstivāda, the Theravāda, the Mahīśāsaka, and the Dharmaguptaka, all these
schools’ Vinayas listed the ten illicit practices, although minor differences in wording exist and the
numbering schema differs. By contrast, the Mahāsāṅghika Vinaya mentioned only the practice of
accepting gold and money.
20
E.g. Nattier and Prebish 1977: 269; Cousins 1991: 48; Gethin 1998: 51-2; Harvey 2013: 89-90.
21
Gethin 1998: 50-51.
22
Cousins 1991: 48.

-8-
 to tighten discipline. The likelihood is that they were initially the larger body,

representing the mass of the community, the mahāsaṅgha. Subsequently, doctrinal

disputes arose among the reformists as they grew in numbers and gathered support.

If, by the term “Early Buddhism”, we mean the period in which all Buddhist

disciples studied the same teachings, it should be extended to some time after the first

schism. On the other hand, we find that the earliest evidence recorded arguments

between different schools in the Kathāvatthu.23 It indicated that different schools had

already developed their distinctive theories. Hence, the proximal date of the end of

Early Buddhism should be some time between the first schism and the compilation of

the Kathāvatthu. That would be the last half of the second century B.C.E. at the latest,

according to Hirakawa and Harvey.24 Or, as Cousins suggests, it was the third century

B.C.E.25 Though it was a rough definition, this period was also the approximate time

to which our extant literature can be traced back. This will be discussed in the next

section.

After the early period, many later schools, like Sarvāstivāda, Theravāda, Yogācāra,

and Tantric Buddhism theorized and systematized their knowledge of cognition to a

high standard. Even so, from my point of view, we have not sufficiently realized the

teachings and doctrines of Early Buddhism. First of all, I will emphasize once again

that the analysis of mind occupied the foremost position in the Buddha’s teachings.

Gombrich says thus: “[I]t is significant that many sermons are devoted to analyses of

23
Kv 115 ff. Cf. Cousins 1991: 35; Hirakawa 1990: 90-91; Harvey 2013: 95-96.
24
Hirakawa 1990: 91; Harvey 2013: 95.
25
Cousins 1991: 35.

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how we experience the world, what we would call cognitive psychology.”26 Olendzki

also points out the psychological aspect of Early Buddhism:27

The only world we can explore is the inner world, which is really just a virtual world.

So the study of reality becomes the study of the human construction of experience, and

this is why early Buddhism is so thoroughly psychological in nature.

However, the emphasis of psychology in Early Buddhism, it seems, has not earned

itself enough weight in the past even today. Kalupahana especially emphasizes the

underestimation of Early Buddhism thus: “Experiences not described by the Buddha or

his more enlightened disciples are being constantly discussed, while those that are

described and ‘laid bare’ (uttānīkata, as the Buddha himself would characterize them)

are ignored.”28 He even goes so far as to place the Buddha in an undeserved position:29

Indeed, the final victim was the Buddha himself, who is presented not only as a

metaphysician whose ideas had to be improved upon by his later disciples, but also as

one who did not have the capacity to instruct his immediate disciples in the truth he

had discovered.

His assertion is based on the fact that different schools, including Ābhidhammikas

and Mahāyānists, offered different interpretations regarding the Buddha’s teachings.

After the contributions of numerous talented scholars, all of them formed their

systematic theories toward the Sutta Piṭaka. There is no doubt that these theories and

interpretations indicate possible interpretations for us to access the Buddha’s teachings.

26
Gombrich 2009: 167.
27
Olendzki 2003: 17.
28
Kalupahana 1987: xi.
29
Kalupahana 1987: 3.

- 10 -
At the same time, they established a closed and rigid knowledge system and expelled

or rebutted other possible suggestions. In this case, if we fail to grasp Buddhist

teachings in its early forms but engage in highly specialized theories, we may probably

miss the overall perspective of Buddhism. Besides, though Early Buddhism indicates

its preliminary development, it does not mean these teachings are outdated. On the

contrary, Reat considers Early Buddhism would conform more with present-day

studies:30

Though archaic in terminology and less than rigorous in empirical basis and deduction,

the Nikāya treatment of consciousness and its objects is in some ways more

contemporary in outlook than either the Mādhyamika or Vijñāvāda systems which

superseded it in India. Rather than advancing an antiempirical metaphysical theory as

such, it is merely critical of commonsense epistemology.

Hence, in this study, I mainly refer to passages and teachings belonging to Early

Buddhism. In a few cases, I will rely on points or theories from later development to

clarify questions. By doing so, I do not mean to ignore or reject these later theories. Just

that I have found that the materials and explanations in Early Buddhism are abundant

and sufficient to investigate and explain the general functions of cognition.

§ The Scope of This Study

Buddhism was rooted in the Indian cultural background roughly two thousand five

hundred years ago and did not develop according to the modern scholastic studies. This

30
Reat 1987: 27.

- 11 -
simple fact results in that, as Wallace notes, “Buddhism fails to fit neatly into any of

our categories of religion, philosophy, and science.”31 Or as Olendzki points out, the

“Buddhist psychology” we study and realize nowadays “is largely an artificial

construction, mixing as it does a product of ancient India with a Western movement

hardly a century and a half old”.32 From this point of view, we should be aware of

misinterpretation of Buddhist doctrines or terminologies. Buddhism adopted Indian

languages and notions to explain this dynamic process. Mishra asserts that “there is no

equivalent term in Sanskrit that can exactly capture the meaning of cognition in the

sense it is used in the discipline of psychology today.”33 Therefore, it is natural that we

cannot find any definition or explanation of the term “cognition” in early Buddhist

literature although the analysis of cognition did exist there. I, therefore, define the

subject of this study, i.e. cognition, resorting to modern psychology. By doing so, it will

define the topic of this study and the content of references.

The main scope of this study is to investigate important factors and functions

regarding ordinary people’s recognition, thinking, motivation, and reaction according

to early Buddhist literature, and the most significant issue is to explain the cognitive

processes comprised of these factors and functions. Basically and mostly, literature

which belongs to the early period of Buddhism will be included. Besides, only passages

or doctrines regarding cognition will be discussed in detail. Other important aspects of

31
Wallace 2003: 6.
32
Olendzki 2003: 9.
33
Mishra 2006: 266.

- 12 -
Buddhist teachings, like transmigration, meditation, liberation, etc., will be mentioned

only succinctly if they are necessary or helpful to our discussion. The next section is

about research sources, including Pāli and Chinese literature. I will discuss their

conditions, especially some problems or weakness for their use. In other words, some

problems we should be aware of in order to use them validly or interpret them reliably.

To solve these problems, we have to trace back to the Buddha himself, to realize his

intentions and the methods of his teachings which are the topic of the third section.

Then we can accordingly find some principles to help us to use this literature to pursue

our topics. These methods will be discussed in detail in the fourth section. The last

section will outline the whole thesis.

- 13 -
§1.2 Research Sources

Generally speaking, the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas are the extant

sources which can be traced back to the earliest form of the Buddha’s teachings,

although there is always disputation about their authenticity regarding the Buddha’s

own words. The Pāli Nikāyas were preserved by the Theravāda school. There are five

Nikāyas in total: Saṃyutta Nikāya, Majjhima Nikāya, Dīgha Nikāya, Aṅguttara Nikāya,

and Khuddaka Nikāya. The term nikāya means collection or group.34 The term pāli,

which nowadays we use to designate a language, did not originally have this meaning.

As the PED explains, pāli denotes a line, a causeway, or bridge, and then “the canon of

Buddhist writings” or “the original text”.35 Modern scholars suggest that the term pāli

originated from “pāli-bhāsā” as an abbreviation, and this compound means “the

language of the texts”.36 Strictly speaking, pāli alone does not have the meaning of

language. Although there are not enough references for us to determine when and where

this misunderstanding first occurred, both Norman and von Hinüber assume that pāli

was being used as the language of the Theravādin texts between the 15th and 17th

centuries.37 Norman explains how this misunderstanding happened:38

It would seem that the name “Pāli” is based upon a misunderstanding of the compound

pāli-bhāsā “language of the canon,” where the word pāli was taken to stand for the

name of a particular bhāsā, as a result of which the word was applied to the language

34
PED, 352.
35
PED, 455.
36
Norman 1983: 1; von Hinüber 1994: 77-78; Gombrich 2005: xxiii.
37
Norman 1983: 2; von Hinüber 1994: 88.
38
Norman 1983: 1.

- 14 -
 of both canon and commentaries.

Even in the sense of the name of a language, Pāli cannot be considered as the

original language that the Buddha spoke. In fact, the Buddha did not teach in one

language but spoke the dialect of the areas wherever he happened to be.39 This group

of languages is what we called Prakrit. Besides, Norman and Gombrich also indicate

that the extant Pāli Nikāyas were composed or transmitted through several dialects of

Middle Indo-Aryan. 40 They consisted of different features from different dialects.

Therefore, Pāli is rather an artificial written language not for speaking. Even so, the Pāli

Nikāyas still enjoy the foremost importance in the studies of Early Buddhism for two

main reasons. First, they were the only extant complete corpus preserved by one single

school. Secondly, they were preserved in the form of an original language. As Bucknell

points out: “[T]his is the only canon in which all four of the principal nikāyas/āgamas

(sutra collections) are preserved intact and in an Indic language.”41

By contrast, the four Chinese Āgamas were translated from Sanskrit or Prakrit and

belonged to several schools respectively. The term āgama means approach or result,

therefore, resource, reference, text, or canon.42 Although there are some arguments,

most scholars attribute the Saṃyukta Āgama (translated by Guṇabhadra; 求那跋陀羅)

to the Sarvāstivāda or the Mūla-sarvāstivāda; the Madhyama Āgama (translated by

Saṃghadeva; 提 婆 ) to the Sarvāstivāda; 43 the Dīrgha Āgama (translated by

39
Norman 1983: 3-4.
40
Norman 1983: 2; Gombrich 2005: xxiv.
41
Bucknell 2000: IX.
42
PED, 95.
43
Mizuno (1996: 364-65), Lü (1984: 242), and Enomoto (1986: 21-25) consider Saṃyukta Āgama

- 15 -
Buddhayaśas; 佛陀耶舍 and Zhu Fonian; 竺佛念) to the Dharmaguptaka; and the

Ekottara Āgama (translated by Saṃghadeva) to the Mahāsāṅghika. 44 Although the

Chinese Āgamas and the Pāli Nikāyas are diverse in numbers and contents to some

extent, in general, not entirely, these four Āgamas can find their parallel suttas in the

four main Pāli Nikāyas. Many scholars admit that the teaching based on both the

Nikāyas and Āgamas can be traced back to one common authority. 45 Although no

consensus is achieved about how early this authority was, we may deduce that it existed

before the development of the schools’ respective doctrines.

As discussed in the previous section, the first schism did not immediately result in

their differences in doctrines. Therefore, the Sthavira and the Mahāsāṅghika could have

preserved the same canon initially. It was probably at a later stage that these separate

schools amended or interpolated the texts to accommodate their own theories. In this

sense, the identical or similar parts in these corpora should be able to represent a shared

origin. Although we can say that a complete canon of Sthavira was preserved in the

Theravāda school, only the Chinese Ekottara Āgama and several manuscripts and

fragments from the other school, Mahāsāṅghika, can be found. The other three Āgamas

belong to the Sarvāstivāda, the Mūla-sarvāstivāda, or the Dharmaguptaka which all

grew out of the Sthavira, as the Theravāda school did. The common source of these

Āgamas and Nikāyas can be dated to the third century after the Buddha’s death,

belongs to Mūla-sarvāstivāda school, while Kumoi (1984: 248) and Ui (1990a: 136) attribute it to
Sarvāstivāda school.
44
C.f. Lü 1984: 242; Kumoi 1984: 248; Enomoto 1986: 21-25; Hartmann 2004: 11; Kuan 2008: 4.
45
E.g. Lamotte 1988a: 156; Gethin 1998: 44; Harvey 2004: 9.

- 16 -
according to Hirakawa’s research. 46 Although this date was quite late from the

Buddha’s time, these corpora provide a reliable base for us to pursue closer to the date

of the Buddha’s original teachings. Hence, the comparative studies of these two

corpora are very promising. Anālayo suggests many benefits from these comparative

studies:47

In addition to clarifying transmission errors, a comparative study of the discourses

preserved by different reciter traditions considerably broadens one’s perspective on the

early teachings, drawing attention to the common core that is found in versions of a

discourse that may at times vary considerably in details. In short, comparative studies

can confirm essentials and clarify details. At the same time, such comparative studies

offer a precise tool for investigating the early stages of development of Buddhist

thought, as variations detected in this way can reveal the influence of changing

viewpoints and opinions on the transmitted material.

By contrast, Collins clearly points it out that the writing down of the Pāli Nikāyas

and commentaries is a part of a strategy of self-definition and self-legitimation by the

Mahāvihāra lineage in Ceylon.48 The Pāli Nikāyas should be seen as a product of the

Mahāvihārin monks. 49 In other words, he does not endorse the Pāli Nikāyas as

representing Early Buddhism. It is true that some scholars believe that the extent

Nikāyas and Āgamas are an amalgam of the Buddha’s teachings and later followers’

ideas. Hirakawa explains such a possibility:50

46
Hirakawa 1990: 111.
47
Anālayo 2008a: 15.
48
Collins 1990: 101.
49
Collins 1990: 89.
50
Hirakawa 1990: 38.

- 17 -
 As the teachings were committed to memory and passed down from one generation to

the next, explanations reflecting the understanding and interpretations of later

generations were incorporated into the scriptures. The sūtras were expanded and

changes were inevitably introduced into the original teachings. Although the teachings

found in the Āgamas (or sūtras) include much more than the teachings of the historical

Buddha, many of the Āgamas are closely related to the historical Buddha's teachings.

Any attempt to ascertain the original teachings of the historical Buddha must be based

on this literature.

From the new findings of Sanskrit fragments, Hartmann reminds us that none of

these sūtra manuscripts mentioned schools, unlike Vinaya texts. He asserts thus:

“School affiliation of Āgama texts may have been less important than modern scholars

tend to believe.” 51 In other words, even though these Āgamas and Nikāyas were

preserved by several schools, they need not be deemed as the creations of individual

schools but as a source of the knowledge of the Buddha’s teachings. Lamotte gives us

a guideline decades ago:52

The doctrinal basis common to the āgamas and nikāyas is remarkably uniform.

Preserved and transmitted by the schools, the sūtras do not however constitute

scholastic documents, but are the common heritage of all the sects. Thus, the agreement

between the āgamas and nikāyas over a doctrinal point - such as that of Anātman - is

the best, if not the only proof of the authenticity of the latter. Any attempt to reconstruct

a “pre-canonical” Buddhism deviating from the consensus between the āgamas and

nikāyas can only end in subjective hypotheses.

In any case, from the fact that most parts of both the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese

51
Hartmann 2004: 11.
52
Lamotte 1988a: 156.

- 18 -
Āgamas are similar in words and in meanings, we can at least confirm these as the

closest sources to the Buddha’s time. However, it should be noted that some of the

similarities could probably be coincidence, while the dissimilarities could be more

genuine. Ui reminds us on this point:53

We should adopt the discordant parts between the Pāli version and the Chinese

translation as long as the reasons are justified. By so doing, it would not damage the

studies but it can improve validity. In fact, these discordant but valid parts are many.

The point is to establish criteria to judge and assess. If the criteria are correct, we can

deal with the materials properly. Regarding the way to establish such criteria, I believe

we should appeal to the Buddha’s fundamental thoughts.

Hence, the comparative studies of different versions offer a basis for us to assess

the reliability and validity of the texts. However, their similarity is not enough to be the

only criterion. The problem that remains will be how to ascertain which parts can be

considered as the Buddha’s teachings and which parts could have been amended or

interpolated by different schools. Ui emphasizes that the criteria lie in the core of the

Buddha’s teachings. This issue will be discussed in the next two sections.

Taking into account the advantages of the Pāli Nikāyas as mentioned above, I will

mainly refer to or quote passages from Pāli Nikāyas, rather than from the Chinese

Āgamas. These quotations all come from the PTS edition. When specific passages are

referred, their page number will be noted (except Dhp, Sn, and Vism, where the

numbers refer to the verse.) However, when the suttas are mentioned in the text, the

53
Ui 1990b: 310-11.

- 19 -
numerals mean the sequences in their respective Nikāyas. Besides, the English

translations of Pāli passages mostly depend on existing works. The pages of the English

translations will be annexed in parentheses. In order to achieve consistency in the form

of English, the terminologies or phrases will be modified if necessary. The Chinese

Āgamas will be used as counterparts or supplements to the Pāli Nikāyas when there

appear to be differences. The Chinese Āgamas are Taishō Tripiṭaka edition in the

electronic collection of Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association.

In addition to the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas, some later literature will

also be used. Most parts come from the commentaries (aṭṭhakathā) on the Pāli Nikāyas.

Norman concludes three key points about the commentarial tradition: 1. The

commentaries sometimes explained something we could not otherwise understand. It

gave correct explanations of many passages which would otherwise be quite

unintelligible. 2. The commentaries sometimes contained readings which were better

than those in the canonical texts we possess. 3. The commentaries showed us how

Buddhist thought has developed since the time when the canonical text they were

commenting on was composed.54 To sum up, the commentaries being the supportive

resources preserved their own unmatched explanation, though this fragmentary context

was deficient in the overall framework.

54
Norman 2006: 217-8.

- 20 -
§1.3 Basic Features of the Buddha’s Teachings

Owing to the complexity of the sources, how to read the literature will be critical

for us to understand the Buddha’s teachings. In other words, we need some principles

or criteria to testify these texts. As Ui indicates, the key point lies in “the Buddha’s

fundamental thoughts”.55 Because the Buddha attained the final goal, he was able to

reveal the ultimate truth and to teach others the methods to achieve that goal. Although

the Buddha did not invent but discovered or rediscovered the ultimate truth, he (and his

enlightened disciples) were undoubtedly the source of that knowledge that we can rely

on. For many scholars and followers, how to interpret Buddhist Canon correctly became

the most important task to realize the Buddha’s teachings.

In this sense, before the discussion of the methodology, we need to grasp the

feature and essence of the Buddha’s teachings. Regarding this point, we have to,

paradoxically and inevitably, resort to extant literature which contains some problems

as mentioned in the previous section. Therefore, what we can do assertively is to treat

literature as a whole in order to get a general picture. Then we have to trim those

divergent or disposable elements and leave those indispensable ones.

I suggest that the key to interpreting the Buddha’s teachings lies in his intentions.

In other words, the ways or principles of how I treat the contents and sources depends

on the interpretation of the Buddha’s teachings and this interpretation depends on the

Buddha’s intentions. Since we were not the interlocutors of the Buddha’s dialogue, we

55
Ui 1990b: 311.

- 21 -
can only deduce his thoughts and intentions according to extant literature. “What the

Buddha thought, in the sense of his underlying ideas, has largely to be teased out of the

material”, in Gombrich’s words. 56 In order to realize the Buddha’s thoughts and

intentions of his teachings, we may trace back to the causes of his renunciation.

According to the biography, Jātaka, the trigger event of the Buddha’s request for

Nibbāna was the impact and inspiration of the four preceding signs (pubba nimitta): an

old man, a sick man, a corpse and a mendicant, when he was eighteen.57 Before the

Buddha went forth, he had been protected so well by his father from encountering any

dark side in this mundane world.58 It is not difficult to imagine how he was shocked

and impressed when he encountered the decay of the human body. Rather than avoiding

facing the imperfections of life, he decided to renounce his power and fortune to

become a recluse to find a solution. It is in this sense that the four signs: old age,

sickness, death, and renunciation constitute the starting point of the Buddha’s search

for Nibbāna. After that, the Buddha began his noble search for six years until he attained

Nibbāna under the Bodhi tree on a full moon night.59

The whole story, however, seems more symbolic than factual considering its

embellished description and well-arranged plot. Gombrich suggests that much of the

story about the Buddha’s experience of renunciation is allegorical in origin.60 He also

asserts that nowhere in the Sutta Piṭaka described the story of the four signs to the

56
Gombrich 2009: 162-3.
57
Jat I, 58-59.
58
Jat I, 57.
59
Jat I, 67 ff.
60
Gombrich 2006b: 75.

- 22 -
Buddha. 61 It is actually told of the previous Buddha: Vipassi in the Mahāpadāna

Sutta.62 However, if we take the whole Sutta Piṭaka into consideration, the observation

of the imperfections of everyday life constitutes the most part of the reasons for the

Buddha to search for Nibbāna. We find that birth, aging, sickness, and death are the

starting points of investigation of the teachings of causality. In the Sammasa Sutta of

the Nidānasaṃyutta, the Buddha taught his disciples the practice of inward exploration

(antaraṃ sammasanti) by asking the origin of various kinds of dukkha, i.e. aging-and-

death etc.63 In the Ariyapariyesanā Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, the Buddha resorted

to his experience before enlightenment. He realized that he, himself was subject to birth,

aging, sickness, death, sorrow, and defilement, so he decided to look for the way to

escape. 64 Then he concluded his findings into the most well-known doctrine in

Buddhism, the Four Noble Truths (Pl: cattāri ariyasaccāni; Skt: catur āryasatya). And

this doctrine is closely related to the causes of his renunciation. We can see that the First

Noble Truth: dukkha, is defined as birth, aging, sickness, and death; the Second Noble

Truth continues to investigate the reason of dukkha; the third one indicates a possibility

of liberation; the fourth one teaches the method leading to that liberation. 65 Even

though the Four Noble Truths seem organized and systematized and some scholars

doubt its originality, the basic ideas behind it comply with the reason of the Buddha’s

search.

61
Gombrich 2006b: 75.
62
DN II, 21-29.
63
SN II, 107-08.
64
MN I, 163.
65
E.g. SN V, 421-22; MN III, 249-52; DN II, 305-13; AN I, 177-78.

- 23 -
 From his experience and teachings, we can surmise that the Buddha must have

been aware of dukkha in his life and then he determined to find the Nibbāna. The

realization of dukkha was the starting point toward Nibbāna. If our life is perfect enough

in every aspect, liberation would be meaningless and unnecessary. Therefore, the

Buddha emphasized that he taught only dukkha and the cessation of dukkha all the

time. 66 Just like the ocean has only a salty taste, the Dhamma and Vinaya that the

Buddha taught have only one flavor, the flavor of liberation.67 De Silva points out that

it was the Buddha’s intention that makes Buddhism different from psychology:68

The psychology of Buddhism is different from that of any field of psychological

enquiry pursued for its own sake, for the Buddha pursued theoretical questions only

when they had a bearing on the predicament of the suffering man. The psychology of

Buddhism is primarily designed to answer the question What are the causes of suffering

(dukkha) and what is the way out of it?

From this point of view, we may say that the Buddha’s teachings are aim-oriented.

The aim of his teachings was to help others to get liberated and the content of his

teachings was based on his experience or insight. His experience was that everyone can

experience, in person, not some things imaginary. The Buddha never wasted time to

chase pure metaphysical, ontological, or logical questions. He only taught, asked and

answered questions which led to liberation. In this sense, the Buddha or Buddhism has

been described as empirical and pragmatic. Gombrich thus suggests a label “pragmatic

66
i.e. SN III, 119; MN I, 140: pubbe cāhaṃ etarahi ca dukkhañceva paññāpemi dukkhassa ca
nirodhaṃ.
67
AN IV, 203: ayaṃ dhammavinayo ekaraso vimuttiraso.
68
De Silva 2005: 8.

- 24 -
empiricism”:69

[T]he Buddha is not primarily concerned with what exists- in fact, he thinks that is a

red herring - but with what we can experience, what can be present to consciousness.

For his purposes, what exists and the contents of experience are the same. At this level,

if we want a label, his doctrine looks like pragmatic empiricism.

Hence, I will continue to discuss the Buddha’s teachings from two basic aspects:

empirical and pragmatic.

§ Empiricism

The emphasis of experience in Buddhism can be realized from the Buddha himself

and his admonitions for disciples. In the Saṅgārava Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, the

Buddha differentiated three types of recluses and brahmins who claimed they had

reached the final attainment.70 The first type was the traditionalists (anussavikā), who

followed the oral tradition, like the brahmins of the Three Vedas. The second type was

based on personal beliefs, like the Rationalists and Metaphysicians (takkī vīmaṃsī). The

last type was the Empiricists who directly knew the Dhamma even though they had not

heard it before.71 The Buddha proclaimed that he belonged to the last group. Then he

continued to explain the reason how he went through various methods, i.e. meditation,

ascetic practice, the four jhānas and the threefold knowledge (tevijja), and finally got

liberated.72 In this way, the Buddha clarified that his attainment and knowledge came

69
Gombrich 2009: 10.
70
MN II, 211.
71
MN II, 211: pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu sāmaṃ yeva dhammaṃ abhiññāya.
72
MN II, 211 ff.

- 25 -
not from religious tradition nor rational speculation but from his diligent cultivation.

However, this does not mean traditions or theories are totally wrong or useless. They

all are available means for the ordinary people to know the world. The point is that only

supramundane experience can be the final means to judge our worldly knowledge. De

Silva emphasizes this point:73

The criterion for judging the truth of a theory does not rest on mere tradition, the use

of logic or speculative reason. It has to be tested by experience; experience of course

is not mere sense experience but also intuition and insight. The weight of tradition, the

use of logic and reason have their limits and an appeal to experience is necessary.

Therefore, the Buddha taught only what he experienced in person or he realized

by insight. In the Kīṭāgiri Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, the Buddha asked disciples to

quit eating at night because he did so and felt comfortable (phāsuvihāra) and gained

many benefits.74 Then he continued to teach them that different types of feeling would

result in wholesome or unwholesome states. Some should be cultivated, while some

should be abandoned. Because he really knew, saw, found, realized, and contacted these

feelings by wisdom, by experience.75 He also emphasized that it would be inappropriate

if he admonished disciples but he did not know and see the results of these feelings.

Not only for himself, did the Buddha also advise people to accept knowledge based

on personal experience. In the Khandhasaṃyutta, the Buddha told Anurādha that it was

not suitable for him to describe a Tathāgata if he could not actually apprehend the

73
De Silva 2005: 13.
74
MN I, 473.
75
MN I, 475-77.

- 26 -
Tathāgata.76 The Buddha made a simile in the Majjhima Nikāya. Any declaration of

Nibbāna without personal experience just like a man who falls in love with a non-

existent woman.77 It would be meaningless. Only by practicing Dhamma, would people

be able to know and see Nibbāna by the termination of ignorance.78 Therefore, many

suttas described the Dhamma as “directly visible, immediate, inviting one to come and

see, applicable, to be personally experienced by the wise. (sandiṭṭhiko ayaṃ dhammo

akāliko ehipassiko opaneyyiko paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhi.)”79

These instances show that the Buddha taught the Dhamma and Vinaya depending

on his experience and he also wanted disciples to experience it themselves. It indicates

one point: The Buddha requested people to observe, to investigate their mind in person.

As the Buddha said in the Atthinukhopariyāya Sutta of the Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta, after

the six senses contact with the six objects, one examines one’s mental reactions, i.e.

desire, hatred, ignorance, only by seeing with wisdom, not by faith, nor by personal

preference, nor by oral tradition, nor by reasoned reflection, nor by acceptance of a

view after pondering it.80 In this way, when we see, hear, smell etc., we have to be able

to know our mental activities, i.e. the cognitive processes. So that we can abandon bad

acts, like eating at night, and cultivate good acts, like meditation. Therefore, on the one

hand, since the Buddha had the experience of Nibbāna, he could help unenlightened

76
SN III, 118-19.
77
MN II, 33; 40.
78
MN II, 44.
79
SN I, 9. (Bodhi 2000a: 98.) See also: SN I, 117, 220; II, 69; IV, 41-43.
80
SN IV, 139-40: aññatreva saddhāya, aññatra ruciyā, aññatrānussavā, aññatrākāraparivitakkā,
aññatra diṭṭhinijjhānakhantiyā. (Bodhi 2000a: 1215.)

- 27 -
people to distinguish wholesome from unwholesome. On the other hand, as long as

people follow the Buddha’s instructions, they should be able to obtain the same

experience. The key point is to go through by oneself and also to be able to see one’s

experience as it really is. Reat emphasizes that the analysis of experience is what the

Buddha’s teachings rely on:81

The genius of the Buddha consisted primarily in his uncanny intuition for avoiding

what is not arguably true and his ability to state the sublime, without speculation,

mythology or metaphysics, purely on the basis of an incisive and persuasive analysis

of human consciousness as experienced.

§ Pragmatism

Another feature of the Buddha’s teachings is pragmatism. Since the Buddha’s

intention is to help people to get rid of dukkha and to attain Nibbāna such as he achieved,

all his teachings comply with his intention. He thus repulsed any kind of excursive

speculations. For this reason, the Buddha’s teachings can be classified into two main

categories: one is how our mind goes wrong and another is how to rectify this

erroneousness. For the first part, it is the analysis of cognition in ordinary people, while

the second part is the method to transform that cognition. Rahula indicates these two

purposes:82

He was a practical teacher and taught only those things which would bring peace and

happiness to man.... The Buddha was not interested in discussing unnecessary

metaphysical questions which are purely speculative and which create imaginary

81
Reat 1990: 282.
82
Rahula, 1985: 12.

- 28 -
 problems. He considered them as a wilderness of opinions.

Any speculative question or view which did not lead to liberation would be

considered as futile or even harmful. Just like a person is pierced by a poisonous arrow,

one should let the surgeon remove that arrow immediately rather than to inquire

irrelevant questions, such as the details about the archer, bow, and arrow. The Buddha

said that before one got the answers one would die beforehand. 83 Furthermore, the

Buddha taught only helpful doctrines which are few, while the other unspoken ones are

numerous like a handful of leaves compared to all leaves in a forest. 84 Then he

proclaimed that he taught only the Four Noble Truths which “are beneficial, relevant to

the fundamentals of the holy life, and lead to revulsion, to dispassion, to cessation, to

peace, to direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbāna.” 85 Hence, the Buddha

reminded people to remember what he had left undeclared as undeclared, and remember

what he had declared as declared.86 Finally, even the doctrines or methods he taught

are meant to help people to achieve the goal, these doctrines or methods themselves are

not the final goal. The Buddha compared his Dhamma to a raft.87 Once people cross

the river, they should discard that raft. So should Dhamma be discarded if people have

achieved attainment in the path to liberation.

On the basis of these two features of the Buddha’s teachings: empiricism and

83
MN I, 428-30.
84
SN V, 438.
85
SN V, 438. (Bodhi 2000a: 1858.)
86
MN I, 431-32: tasmātiha abyākatañ ca me abyākatato dhāretha, byākatañ ca me byākatato
dhāretha. (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001: 536.)
87
MN I, 134-35.

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pragmatism, we may realize that the core of his teachings is the analysis of mental

activities according to individuals. As the popular simile says, the Buddha like a doctor

diagnosed an individual’s illness and accordingly prescribed medication. The illness is

always mental and is different in terms of different people. The Buddha taught the

solutions according to patients. As Rahula says:88

The Buddha was not a computing machine giving answers to whatever questions

were put to him by anyone at all, without any consideration. He was a practical teacher,

full of compassion and wisdom. He did not answer questions to show his knowledge

and intelligence, but to help the questioner on the way to realization. He always spoke

to people bearing in mind their standard of development, their tendencies, their mental

make-up, their character, their capacity to understand a particular question.

Even though the Buddha’s teachings lead to only one goal, the methods are diverse

and customized. In this respect, the Buddha would refuse to give one absolute answer

(ekaṃsavāda), but he answered on the basis of distinctions (vibhajjavāda). 89 For

example, although the Buddha advocated the middle path to avoid sensualism and

asceticism, he also said that he did not criticize all austerity (tapassī).90 The reason he

gave is that some ascetics do not achieve a wholesome state or transmigration in hell,

while some achieve a wholesome state or transmigrate into a good place.91 Therefore,

the Buddha did not treat austerity equally for all people. In the same manner, the Buddha

did not request all bhikkhus to cultivate the six senses diligently.92 It is impossible for

88
Rahula 1985: 63.
89
AN V, 190.
90
E.g. SN IV, 330-31; DN I, 161; AN V, 191.
91
SN IV, 338-39; DN I, 161-62; AN V, 191-92.
92
SN IV, 124-25; MN I, 477-79.

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the arahants to be negligent, while the others still need to cultivate their minds in terms

of their abilities. Hence, the Buddha clearly distinguished the method and the goal.

While the goal is only one and unique, the method should be judged by the applicability

and ability of individuals. Kalupahana explains thus:93

They were meant not only for those who were philosophically mature and

spiritually advanced, but also for untrained (sekha), ordinary people (puthujjana). The

Buddha was reluctant to confuse the minds of the latter speaking of highly

philosophical theories. His was a gradual path of instruction; hence, during the initial

stages of instruction, the Buddha spoke to an ordinary man in terms intelligible to him.

Hence, everyone has one’s own task to do and no one standard or unified solution

suits all people. Williams thus comments that Buddhism is “a highly individualistic path

of liberation”.94

To sum up, the Buddha’s teachings were totally based on his personal experience

from his wisdom or insight, which was gained after Nibbāna. His knowledge revealed

that mind or experience is composed of dynamic processes. No unchanging and

everlasting entity can be found behind these processes. In order to help others to get

liberated, as he did, he taught only the Dhamma and Vinaya which lead to the final goal:

Nibbāna. Owing to different kinds or backgrounds of people, the Buddha had to explain

his doctrines in different ways to cater to the audiences, sometimes to an individual,

sometimes to a group. Hence, his doctrines were recorded in a specific type or in a

general way. In any case, the Buddha did not get entangled in any pure metaphysical or

93
Kalupahana 1975: 99.
94
Williams 2000: 3.

- 31 -
ontological topic. He always explained how our mind works so that we can learn the

methods to rectify this mind.

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§1.4 Methodology and Approaches

This study is based on literature research to investigate the cognitive functions in

Early Buddhism. The literature I use includes the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas.

As we know, the Buddha’s teachings were memorized, compiled and preserved by his

disciples. In the course of compilation and transmission of Buddhist literature, errors

or interpolations inevitably happened. Hence, the reliability and validity of the sources

have become the foremost concern regarding Buddhist studies. Numerous followers or

scholars have strived to discern the genuineness of the Buddha’s teachings from

fallacies. In order to discern the essence of the Buddha’s teachings, I have discussed

two basic features of his teachings: empiricism and pragmatism. These two features sit

at the core of the Buddha’s teachings. Hence, I suggest that every Buddhist doctrine has

to comply with these features. However, comes to concrete words and phrases, these

features can only offer a general guideline and we need more solid instructions.

Even during the time of the Buddha, some people heard of speeches attributed to

the Buddha and requested his confirmation. From the record in the Rāsiya Sutta of the

Gāmaṇisaṃyutta and the Mahāsīhanāda Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya, rumor had it that

the Buddha criticized all austerity and asceticism.95 Then the Buddha denied this rumor

in person as discussed in the previous section. Probably during the Buddha’s last days,

he taught the “Four Great References (cattāro mahāpadesā)” for disciple’s judgment

in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya.96 Here when disciples heard about

95
SN IV, 330; DN I, 161.
96
DN II, 123-26. See also AN II, 167-70.

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a new teaching which was claimed as preaching by the Buddha, or by a community of

elder bhikkhus, or by several learned elder bhikkhus, or by one learned elder bhikkhu,

they should examine these words and phrases according to the suttas and Vinayas that

they already knew. They could accept this new teaching once it was in accordance with

authorized teachings. First of all, the basic content of the suttas and Vinayas must have

been established and recognized so that this basic content could be used as the criterion

for further judgment. As Wynne asserts: “The passage therefore shows that the accuracy

with which a body of literature called ‘Sutta’ was meant to be transmitted was very high,

down to the letter.”97 Also, it was not unusual for disciples to learn some new teachings

which were not incorporated in the suttas and Vinayas. There was not a fixed corpus at

that time. However, the situation today is different. Both the Sutta Piṭaka and Vinaya

Piṭaka had already been set in stone. The teachings to be examined and the criteria for

judgment are mixed all together. In other words, what we are doing is to differentiate

existing literature by resorting to the same existent literature. In this respect, the Four

Great References do not help too much.

Another hermeneutic method comes from the Sarvāstivāda school and is accepted

by the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra schools, which is deemed as a later development by

Lamotte.98 This method is well-known as the “Four Reliances (catuḥpratisaraṇa)”. It

offers four criteria for people to examine the teachings: one should rely on the dharma

rather than the person, on the meaning (artha) and not the letter (vyañjana), on the

97
Wynne 2004: 103.
98
Lamotte 1988b: 11-12.

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sūtras of definite meaning (nītārtha) and not those needing further interpretation

(neyārtha), on intuitive knowledge (jñāna) and not consciousness (vijñāna).99 The first

reliance summarizes the Four Great References in principle which is meant to ascertain

authenticity. The other three reliances are used to evaluate different interpretations.

Hence, the Four Reliances work on two levels. The first level is to discern between true

teachings and false ones. The second level intends to distinguish ultimate truth from

worldly knowledge. For Buddhist followers, the ultimate truth can be realized only by

intuitive knowledge. In this sense, it is the last reliance which is the most reliable and

authentic means. Lamotte asserts that intuitive knowledge “constitutes the single and

indispensable instrument of true exegesis.”100

The problem is, as ordinary people, we have to resort to our individual knowledge

of the Buddha’s teachings. As Gethin comments: “The final criterion for judging a

teaching lies in an appreciation and understanding of this overall structure and pattern

of the teaching.” 101 And it goes without saying that personal appreciation and

understanding will vary and are diverse. I will suggest three aspects to ensure the

reliability and validity of both the interpretation of and deductions from the teachings

in the following research. All these three aspects are mutually connected and I will

consider them in a reciprocal process. In other words, they should be examined mutually.

These aspects are translation, interpretation, and context.

99
C.f. Thurman: 1978: 23 ff.; Lamotte 1988b: 12; Harrison 2003: 16.
100
Lamotte 1988b: 24.
101
Gethin 1998: 47.

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 Language is a tool to express how we think and feel. The Buddha had to resort to

language to express his ideas or experiences. Therefore, the point always lies in what

he meant and not the text, as the second reliance means. However, the only material we

can start with is texts. We need to collect relevant passages to realize the meaning of a

word or a sentence. It is the preparatory step. The difficulties of this confrontation

manifest firstly in scholars’ efforts of translation and interpretation of Buddhist

terminology. In this respect, translation and interpretation are like the two sides of a

coin. Sometimes these works turn out to be demanding since no correspondent terms

or ideas in our extant system can perfectly fit in with the ancient Indian context. The

PED gives two striking examples: one is dukkha, another is viññāṇa. It says: “It is

difficult to give any one word for viññāṇa, because there is much difference between

the old Buddhist and our modern points of view, and there is a varying use of the term

in the Canon itself.”102 And “There is no word in English covering the same ground as

Dukkha does in Pali. Our modern words are too specialised, too limited, and usually

too strong.” 103 On this point language easily becomes not a tool but an obstacle.

Johansson notes the possibility of misunderstanding: “It is far removed in time and

general outlook from the ancient Buddhist terminology; so already the use of this

terminology may lead to prejudice and misrepresentation.”104

Such prejudice and misrepresentation usually lead to arguments among followers

102
PED, 618.
103
PED, 324.
104
Johansson 1969: 10-11.

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or scholars. In 1976, Wayman brought our attention to the translation and interpretation

of saññā and viññāṇa. He listed and criticized previous translations of the term saññā

and viññāṇa. This list includes “perception” and “consciousness” from Woodward and

Ñāṇamoli, “notion” and “connaissance” in French by Poussin, and “ideas” and

“perceptions” by Hume.105 He strongly endorsed the last one. Nearly forty years later,

Toso keeps pursuing the meaning of saññā. He rejects various translations, including

perception, apperception, idea, ideation, and cognition, and he suggests recognition.106

This time his task involves more scholars than Wayman’s, like Johansson, de Silva,

Gómez, Hamilton, Harvey, Boisvert, and Tan. And such disputation reveals the

incompatibility of interpretations from different scholars and also foresees the ceaseless

struggle in this task in the future.

Regarding the translation, a better solution probably is to leave some specific terms

untranslated or to find out the most appropriate but discordant translations toward the

same term depending on different contexts instead of sticking with one translation in

all passages. De Silva suggests dukkha as an example: “There are also terms such as

dukkha, whose complex meaning cannot be captured a single word.” 107 Gombrich,

therefore, grasps this word according to different contexts: “Again, there has been a lot

of argument over how to translate the word dukkha; and again, the choice of translation

must depend heavily on the context. But what is being expressed is that life as we

105
Wayman 1976: 326 ff.
106
Toso 2015: 690.
107
De Silva 2014: 15.

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normally experience it is unsatisfactory.”108 He also exemplifies the term saṃkhāra as

untranslated in his book.109 In this study, I will leave some terms untranslated or adopt

both original languages and English translation at the same time.

Another point Gombrich emphasizes is the importance of context. Context

includes internal and external. Here the internal context means textual content, while

the external context is logical reasoning. The work of translation largely relies on

interpretation. Subsequently, the interpretation of terms or passages depends on the

understanding of context. Since the topic of this study is cognition, any individual factor

or function should be studied from the perspective of the cognitive processes. Every

factor or function always affects and, at the same time, is affected by other factors or

functions. In other words, every factor has its own causes and results. Hamilton makes

an appropriate statement related to this: “[F]eeling is not to be understood as mere

feeling but that it is part of the cognitive processes as a whole.”110 Once we consider

factor and function in a relationship, we can construe the Buddha’s discourses more

comprehensively. After considering the diversity of feelings, de Silva gives upādāna a

different connotation:111

In the context of painful sensations, upādāna may be more correctly rendered as

‘entanglement’ rather than ‘clinging’, referring to an obsession with what we like as

well as what we dislike.

108
Gombrich 2009: 10.
109
Gombrich 2009: 12.
110
Hamilton 1996: 47.
111
De Silva 2005: 37.

- 38 -
 His work cannot be achieved if he ignores various causes of upādāna. Hence,

treating factors individually and ignoring their causal relationship will sometimes bring

out insufficient understanding. For example, Ñāṇavīra explains the meaning of the

cessation of contact (phassanirodha) by the elimination of the notion of selfness and

thus the relationship of subject and object. And this contact cannot be construed as a

meeting of the sense faculty and the sense object because there is no difference between

enlightened people and worldlings regarding the function of sense organ:112

In this way, phassa comes to be seen as contact between the conscious eye and forms

— but mark that this is because contact is primarily between subject and object, and

not between eye, forms, and eye-consciousness. This approach makes it possible to see

in what sense, with the entire cessation of all illusion of ‘I’ and ‘mine’, there is

phassanirodha in the arahat (where, though there are still, so long as he continues to

live, both the conscious body and the other phenomena, there is no longer any

appropriation).

His argument can be complete only if we ponder on contact from the viewpoint of

the cognition. I found another expression related to phassanirodha which is “the

remainderless cessation of the six bases for contact (channaṃ phassāyatanānaṃ

asesavirāganirodhā)”.113 Here the six senses are called the bases for contact, contact

between the sense object and the sense consciousness based on the sense faculty. Of

course, the six senses are conditioned by other factors. Hence, all the factors and

functions in our cognition are closely connected. Each one can affect others and

112
Ñāṇavīra 2003: 84-86.
113
SN II, 14, 37.

- 39 -
constitute the whole cognition. In this sense, we cannot analyze whichever factor or

function in a vacant environment without considering its connection with others.

- 40 -
§1.5 Outline

Chapter 2 clarifies the meanings and applications of the Buddhist teaching of

causality which are closely connected with the analysis of cognition. The most well-

known explanation of the teaching of causality includes the title “dependent origination

(Pl: paṭiccasamuppāda; Skt: pratītyasamutpāda)”, the abstract principle, and the

twelve links. However, in view of the fact that many variations of the causation were

preserved in early sources, the traditional and authentic explanation seems narrow and

incomplete. After discussing possible explanations from several scholars, I suggest a

hypothesis about how this interpretation gradually formed. Besides, from the inference

of the Buddha’s experience, the most probable content of his enlightenment is the

insight of mental activities, viz. the cognitive processes, which is also the core idea

distinguishing the Buddha from his contemporaries. The analysis of cognition complies

with the teaching of causality in essentia. Or in other words, the teaching of causality

is exemplified in the analysis of cognition. On the basis of this realization, we may

deduce that the Buddha taught the teaching of causality for the purpose of explaining

how our mind works instead of the mechanics of universe or transmigration.

Chapter 3 intends to ascertain the initial position of the six senses in the cognitive

processes. It is clear that the Buddha considered the impingement of sense object as the

beginning of our cognition. Therefore, the six senses are compared to the six doors

which allow the sensory stimuli to flow in. To see the dangers of these processes, the

Buddha exhorted people to guard these doors mindfully. There are three formulas about

- 41 -
the method of guarding the doors of the sense faculties in the Sutta Piṭaka. I find that

only the first formula and the second formula consist of practical content, while the

third one is too vague and not so relevant to this method. Most importantly, what

connects the first and the second formula lies in the functions of signs (nimitta) and

minor features (anuvyañjana). On the one hand, ordinary people recognize the object

with the help of signs and features. On the other hand, the act of recognition is always

affected by defilements and the notion of an eternal entity which is accompanied by

signs and features. Hence, this method does not mean to block the objects outside but

to monitor the whole process.

Chapter 4 is devoted to the analysis of individual critical factors and functions in

the cognitive processes. These factors and functions are arranged into separate sections

according to their general sequence, with some exceptions. There are ten sections and

some of them comprise several similar factors or functions. These sections are the sense

consciousness, an integrated consciousness, contact, feeling, perception, the activities

of thinking, mental proliferation, craving, clinging, and the underlying tendency. In

most sections, I first discuss their etymologies and important passages regarding their

meanings, usages, and functions. Meanwhile, I also refer to other scholars’ research to

investigate alternative explanations for as many as possible. Finally, I will determine

their appropriate meanings according to their functions and causal relations in the

cognitive processes.

Chapter 5 mainly treats cognition as a whole. It emphasizes the relationships and

- 42 -
interactions between the factors and functions in the cognitive processes. Although the

Sutta Piṭaka mostly described the cognitive processes as a simple linear process, these

factors and functions are the applicable parts which are highlighted or drawn from a

mental composition in order to enlighten specific individuals or groups. Hence, the

whole picture of the cognitive processes has to be conceived by combining the

fragments from different discourses. By doing so, this study shows that all factors and

functions constitute a dynamic system comprised of several parallel processes. Their

relationships are multiple which can be sequential or simultaneous. And multiple causes

give birth to multiple results. Besides, the cognitive processes repeat themselves

according to a basic pattern. This can be explained from the microscopic perspective of

factors and from the macro perspective of processes. All of these mental activities

contribute to a gradual degeneration. Our cognition is the complexity of these factors,

functions, and processes running repeatedly, continuously, and endlessly.

- 43 -
 Chapter 2 The Teaching of Causality as an Analysis
of Cognition

In order to discuss the Buddha’s analysis of cognition, the first step is to discern

the contents or passages which depict cognitive functions. Since cognition always

means dynamic processes, the most related doctrine in Buddhism will be the teaching

of causality. Though the Buddha is well-known for his pragmatic and experiential

orientation, the connection between the teaching of causality and the analysis of

cognition is not self-evident. Hence, this study concerns how, and on what basis, the

teaching of causality can be considered as an analysis of cognition. Confronting

difficulties or problems is inevitable.

The first issue is the connotation of the teaching of causality. As one of the most

significant doctrines in Buddhism, the teaching of causality has been widely accepted

as a formulized and systematic doctrine, identified as three elements: the title, the

abstract principle, and the twelve links. However, various similar but discrepant

descriptions of the teaching of causality existing in the Sutta Piṭaka make the common

understanding seem to be over-simplified. This issue will be explained in sections 2.1

and 2.2. The second issue is its applications. This is probably because the teaching of

causality appears in several contexts which clouds its intention. Jayatilleke once

criticized other scholars thus:114

Almost all scholars have said that the purpose of this ‘Chain’ is to explain misery. This

114
Jayatilleke 1963: 450.

- 44 -
 is only partly true. From the evidence of the texts, it appears to have been used primarily

to explain rebirth and karma without recourse to the metaphysical ātman-hypothesis of

the Eternalists and without falling into the other extreme of Materialism.

He discerns two applications which have different intentions. The first application

is a description of how the mind works either in a worldly way or in a liberated way. It

crucially solves the problem of liberation in Buddhist doctrinal edifice and practice.

Since this description explains human psychological activities without resorting to an

everlasting entity, it naturally brings out the second application which is a refutation of

the notion of self (Pl: attā; Skt: ātman). The second application works basically for

those possessed by various self-theories because they are captivated by either

eternalism or nihilism. The situation becomes more sophisticated when the law of

causation is deemed as the basic principle in every doctrine taught by the Buddha. Or

in Bodhi’s words, the principle of the teaching of causality “underlies almost every

aspect of the Buddha’s teaching, from his ideas about social reformation to his outline

of the path to Nibbāna.”115 This is the third application, an interpretation of macrocosm

which Jayatilleke does not mention in his discussion. In section 2.4, all these three

applications will be discussed in detail.

The wide range of applications even further differentiates the explanation of the

factors of the teaching of causality. Bucknell points out that nāma-rūpa and viññāṇa

have diversified meanings in the Sutta Piṭaka because of the different contexts in which

115
Bodhi 2000a: 517.

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they appear.116 He suggests, in the context of the process of transmigration, viññāṇa,

and nāma-rūpa are interpreted as a rebirth-consciousness and mind-body complex

respectively. On the other hand, in the context of perception, they are the six types of

sense consciousness and the six types of sense object. Therefore, the way to treat these

individual factors is sometimes affected by the understanding of the application of the

teaching of causality or vice versa. These different interpretations of the individual

factor will find their instances in Chapter 4.

Furthermore, the different understandings of the applications and factors may

result in a significant debate, i.e. the interpretation of the time span of the twelve links.

Traditionally, the twelve links are divided into three lives both in Sarvāstivāda and

Theravāda. 117 This division is recognized by many modern scholars. 118 However,

alternative interpretations also exist in the Abhidharmma at the same time.119 Some

scholars, therefore, interpret the twelve links to only one moment, one life or unlimited

lives from different aspects.120 The critical point of this debate lies, in the first place, in

the twelve links being treated as the authentic and exclusive explanation of the teaching

of causality. As a result, many scholars have tried to develop a consistent theory to apply

to the twelve links. And there has been no lack of arguments and controversies

116
Bucknell 1999: 339-40.
117
T29, no. 1558, p. 48, a27-28：言三際者：一前際、二後際、三中際，即是過、未及現三生。
Vism, 578–81.
118
E.g. Bodhi 2000a: 518-21; Kalupahana 1975: 145; Collins 1999: 203-04.
119
T27, no. 1545, p. 117, c3-4：復次緣起有四種：一剎那、二連縛、三分位、四遠續。
T29, no. 1558, p. 48, c8-10：又諸緣起差別說四：一者剎那、二者連縛、三者分位、四者遠
續。
120
E.g. Fu 1991: 182; Harvey 2004: 134-37; Gethin 1998: 150-55; Wayman 1980: 286-91; Mizuno
1988: 137-38.

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throughout the development of this doctrine.121 Another reason for this debate is the

confusion of the Buddha’s intention, which I have mentioned above and will further

elaborate in section 2.4. Various views and arguments only complicate our

understanding of the Buddha’s teachings.

To solve these problems, at the outset, I will examine the common understanding

of the teaching of causality. This examination points out the limitations and the internal

contradictions of this common understanding. By doing so, the teaching of causality

exceeds its standard explanation and expands to a wider spectrum of the Buddha’s

teachings. Then I will elaborate how this interpretation of the teaching of causality as

an analysis of cognition can fit in with the Buddha’s enlightenment experience and

pragmatic orientation. It is the cognitive features of the teaching of causality which

distinguish the Buddha’s teachings from that of his contemporaries, both in the content

of enlightenment and in the means of instruction. Thus, these variations of the teaching

of causality offer abundant and essential materials for us to realize the analysis of

cognition in Early Buddhism.

121
Summaries of various views and arguments refer to Cox 1993: 121-22; Jones 2009b: 241 ff.; Fu
1991: 177 ff.; Drummond 2001: 148 ff.

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§2.1 The Connotation of the Dependent Origination Doctrine

The teaching of causality has long been considered as one of the most critical and

profound doctrines in Buddhism. Nowadays when people discuss the teaching of

causality, they mostly refer to the term paṭiccasamuppāda in Pāli or pratītyasamutpāda

in Sanskrit. The most referenced definition for paṭiccasamuppāda comes from the first

sutta of Nidānasaṃyutta: the Paṭiccasamuppāda Sutta. It distinctly defined

paṭiccasamuppāda as an arising process of the whole mass of dukkha which is

encapsulated in the twelve links:122

And what, bhikkhus, is dependent origination? With ignorance as condition, volitional

formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness; with

consciousness as condition, name-and-form; with name-and-form as condition, the six

sense bases; with the six sense bases as condition, contact; with contact as condition,

feeling; with feeling as condition, craving; with craving as condition, clinging; with

clinging as condition, existence; with existence as condition, birth; with birth as

condition, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair come

to be. Such is the origin of the whole mass of dukkha. This, bhikkhus, is called

dependent origination. (Bodhi 2000a: 533.)

The text continued to explain the ceasing process of the same twelve links from

the cessation of ignorance to the cessation of the whole mass of dukkha. However, the

sutta DID NOT define this ceasing process as paṭiccasamuppāda. Other than the twelve

links as the embodiment of paṭiccasamuppāda, sometimes a short verse is used as an

abstract principle, which is: “When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this,

122
SN II, 1.

- 48 -
that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this,

that ceases. (imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati; imasmiṃ asati idaṃ

na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati.)”123 This principle indicates the dependent and

causal relationship between two factors and also explains the reasons and the

possibilities of the changing of these factors.124

These three elements: the title “paṭiccasamuppāda”, the abstract principle, and the

chain of the twelve links are found together in the Sutta Piṭaka. Taking the context of

the teaching of causality into consideration, it usually begins with the reminder for

disciples to pay attention properly (yoniso manasi karoti) 125 to paṭiccasamuppāda,

followed by the abstract principle and the twelve links as a definition. There are six

suttas which follow this pattern, i.e. SN 12: 37, 41, 42, 61; SN 55: 28, and MN 115. In

three suttas, only the title and the twelve links appear: SN 12: 1, 2, and 20. And

sometimes only the abstract principle and the twelve links are accompanied together:

SN 12: 21, 22, 50; MN 38; and AN 10: 92. As a result, many Buddhist textbooks accept

this formulation as the standard explanation. 126

For example, Rahula, in his

distinguished book: What the Buddha Taught, explains the Buddhist teaching of

causality using these three elements in order to prove that everything in this world,

including human beings, is conditioned, relative, and interdependent, therefore, no

123
E.g. SN II, 28. (Bodhi 2000a: 552.) See also: SN II, 65, 70, 78, 95, 96; MN III, 63; AN V, 184.
124
Cf. Jayatilleke 1963: 449 and 1975: 196; Kimura 2004: 112-13.
125
According to Hwang (2006: 51-54), this term initially means ‘thinking according to the origin.’ It
was based on the Buddha’s enlightenment experience and can be applied to all causal relationship.
Kalupahana (1975: 137) also indicates this term means “reflection according to the genesis (yoni) of
things, that is to say, reflection on the causality of things.”
126
E.g. Prebish and Keown 2006: 49-50; Strong 2001: 99-100; Williams 2000: 65-67; Gethin 1998:
141-42; Lamotte 1988a: 36-38.

- 49 -
ātman or self exists.127

In any case, these three elements basically constitute a closed interpretational

system. Though scattered exceptions are found in the Sutta Piṭaka, they are not

significant enough to alter the assertion.128 In view of this, Shulman suggests that “The

12 links are paṭiccasamuppāda” and the abstract principle “deals exclusively with the

process encapsulated in the 12 links”.129 In this way, these three key elements constitute

what we may construe as the doctrine of paṭiccasamuppāda today. At the same time,

the three elements also seem so well organized to be arranged intentionally. More

importantly, it is insufficient to reflect on the whole spectrum of the Buddha’s teaching

of causality. In order to reveal the evolution of this understanding, I will discuss the

meaning of the term paṭiccasamuppāda first. Then I will examine how well the abstract

principle fits in with the context of causality and to what extent the chain of the twelve

links, as the most recognized formulation, represents the Buddha’s teaching of causality.

§2.1.1 The Title

The Pāli term paṭiccasamuppāda is a compound of paṭicca and samuppāda. (Its

127
Rahula 1985: 52-54.
128
Three suttas explained paṭiccasamuppāda by part of the twelve links but still follow the sequence:
SN 12: 60 (five links) and DN 14 (ten links) and 15 (nine links). And SN 12: 62 specifically deals
with the three types of feeling. The principle is applied to ten links in SN 12: 49. Together with the
title, it denotes the three types of feeling in SN 12: 62. All these exceptions can be attributed to
variations of the twelve links. Bucknell (1999: 314) explains these cases thus: “only that portion of
the series was described which was relevant in the context within which the discourse in question
was delivered.” His explanation implies that the twelve links are the source of other variations. I
would suggest that these exceptions probably preserve the vestige of the formation of the teaching
of causality. So that they are far away from competing with the standard explanation.
Besides, the explanation of the term paṭiccasamuppāda is absent in SN 6: 1; SN 22: 57; MN 26, 28,
85, 98; and DN 33. And in MN 79, the principle is devoid of concrete content. These suttas indicate
that the title and the principle could mean causation in a general sense and are irrelevant to the
twelve links. This point will be discussed in text.
129
Shulman 2008: 307.

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Sanskrit form: pratītyasamutpāda shares the same combination which need not be

repeated here.) The term paṭicca is the gerund of pacceti, which means grounded on,

on account of, or concerning. 130 The other term samuppāda means origin, arising,

genesis, coming to be, or production.131 As a result, paṭiccasamuppāda means “arising

on the grounds of (a preceding cause)”.132 This term, therefore, indicates the causal

relationship between different factors in their arising process. Some modern scholars

translate it as interdependent origination, 133 dependent arising, 134 dependent co-

arising,135 conditioned genesis,136 and conditioned arising137. Most scholars translate

this term as “dependent origination”.138 I will follow this translation in this study. In the

Saṃyukta Āgama and the Madhyama Āgama, similar translations: dependent arising

(緣起) and dependent arising dharma (緣起法), are found. However, Dīrgha Āgama

and Ekottara Āgama adopted causality (因緣) or causality dharma (因緣法) which

indicate a causal relationship. It should be noted that although 因 and 緣 in Chinese

translation of Abhidharma means cause (hetu) and condition (pratyaya), such

interpretation is not suitable in this context. First of all, the Sanskrit term

pratītyasamutpāda does not comprise the meanings of hetu and pratyaya. There is no

reason for the translation of 因 and 緣. Besides, in Early Buddhism hetu and pratyaya

130
PED, 395.
131
PED, 689.
132
PED, 395.
133
E.g. Strong 2008: 108.
134
E.g. Gethin 1998: 149; Bodhi 1980; Kalupahana 1987: 5; Jones 2009b.
135
E.g. Robinson and Johnson 1997: 23.
136
E.g. Jayatilleke 1975: 196; Rahula 1985: 52.
137
E.g. Harvey 2013: 65.
138
E.g. Nakamura 1980: 165; Collins 1999: 103; Hamilton 2000: 14; Bodhi 2000a: 516; Williams
2000: 62; Gombrich 2009: 131; Shulman 2014: 86; Wayman 1971: 185; Lamotte 1988a: 36.

- 51 -
were undoubtedly used synonymously.139 It is inappropriate to distinguish causes into

primary ones (hetu) and secondary ones (pratyaya) in the Sutta Piṭaka. In order to tackle

with this contradiction, Kalupahana rightly proves the sameness of the meaning of hetu

and pratyaya.140 He suggests that these two Chinese words, 因 and 緣, have only one

meaning because the first word 因 turns to be an adjective: “In this case hetu is only

an adjective qualifying the word pratyaya, and hetu alone does not seem to have been

used to mean ‘primary cause.’ With this specialization of the meaning of hetu, its former

function of denoting ‘cause’ was taken over by pratyaya.”141 His explanation seems

plausible but he fails to see the background of the translators. I will suggest that the

translation of 因緣 obviously is affected by the causal theory in the Abhidharma. It is

well known that the theory of six causes and four conditions is found systematically in

the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. If we know that Saṃghadeva translated

Abhidharmahṛidaya-śāstra ( 阿 毘 曇 心 論 ) by himself and translated

*Abhidharmāṣṭagrantha-śāstra (阿毘曇八犍度論) with Zhu Fonian, it would not be

difficult to speculate why the Dīrgha Āgama and the Ekottara Āgama adopt the term

因緣. (The other co-translator of the Dīrgha Āgama, Buddhayaśas, who specialized in

the Vinaya was not significant in this discussion.) The theory of six causes and four

conditions has been mentioned in these two Abhidharma texts.142 Saṃghadeva and Zhu

139
Cf. Jayatilleke 1963: 446; Kalupahana 1975: 56; Gombrich 2009: 142; Ronkin 2005: 207.
140
Kalupahana 1975: 59-60.
141
Kalupahana 1975: 60.
142
T26, no. 1543, p. 773, a13-14：有六因：相應因、共有因、自然因、一切遍因、報因、所作
因。
T26, no. 1543, p. 862, c4-5：頗法四緣生、三緣生、二緣生、一緣生？

- 52 -
Fonian must have known this Sarvāstivāda theory and they transplanted this idea into

the Āgama while translating the term pratītyasamutpāda. Therefore, the term 因緣

found in the Dīrgha Āgama and the Ekottara Āgama stands for two different nouns:

hetu and pratyaya in terms of the Abhidharma meaning. They do not denote the same

meaning. This is probably a mistranslation.

As discussed above, these Chinese and modern translations confirm the meaning

of the term paṭiccasamuppāda as AN ARISING PROCESS. Its literal meaning

obviously excludes THE CEASING PROCESS, another important aspect of the

Buddha’s teachings. According to the Udāna, right after the Buddha’s Nibbāna, he sat

under the Bodhi tree and contemplated the twelve links in arising order, i.e. positive or

direct sequence (anuloma) during the first watch of the night and then in ceasing order,

i.e. negative or reverse sequence (paṭiloma) during the second watch of the night for

seven days.143 This description indicates the fundamental difference between these two

processes. One leads to the origin of dukkha which is the Second Noble Truth. The other

is the cessation of dukkha which is the Third Noble Truth.144 However, both processes

are named as “dependent origination” in the Udāna, which implies that the original

meaning of the term paṭiccasamuppāda became blurred during the compilation of the

Udāna.

Shulman touches upon this distinction in his book and uses “dependent-

143
Ud 1-2. See also Vin I, 1.
144
AN I, 177.

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origination” and “dependent-cessation” to describe these two opposite processes. 145

However, he does not discuss further. As mentioned earlier, the Paṭiccasamuppāda

Sutta defined “dependent origination” only by the arising process of the twelve links.

The Paccaya Sutta also gave a similar definition. 146 These two suttas specifically

emphasized thus “this is called dependent origination (ayaṃ vuccati

paṭiccasamuppādo)”, right after the description of the direct sequence of the twelve

links and leaving the reverse sequence out. It is noteworthy that when the Sutta Piṭaka

defined or elaborated some key terms or ideas, there is always an affirmative sentence

at the end of the passage. This affirmative sentence appears as: this is called… (ayaṃ

vuccati…). In such way, the Sutta Piṭaka concluded and emphasized once again the

given definition at the end of the passage. 147

In this case, what is called

paṭiccasamuppāda is the arising process of the twelve links, not their ceasing process.

This definition is clearer in the Paccaya Sutta of the Nidānasaṃyutta. This sutta

was meant to distinguish “dependent origination” and “dependently arisen phenomena

(paṭiccasamuppannā dhammā)”; only the arising process is mentioned. 148 More

importantly, after each arising relationship, it emphasized that the arising process exists

regardless of the Buddha’s appearance: “Whether there is an arising of Tathāgatas or

no arising of Tathāgatas, that element still persists, the stableness of the Dhamma, the

145
Shulman 2014: 90.
146
SN II, 25-26.
147
For example, in the Dhātu Sutta, it used the sentence “this is called diversity of elements (idaṃ
vuccati dhātunānattaṃ).” (SN II, 140.) In the Khandha Sutta, it used the sentences “these are called
the five aggregates (ime vuccanti pañcakkhandhā.)” and these are called the five aggregates of
clinging (ime vuccanti pañcupādānakkhandhā.)” (SN III, 47.)
148
SN II, 25-26.

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fixed course of the Dhamma, specific conditionality. (uppādā vā tathāgatānaṃ

anuppādā vā tathāgatānaṃ, ṭhitā va sā dhātu dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā

idappaccayatā.)” 149 It indicates that this arising process runs continuously and

spontaneously no matter whether it is discovered or realized or not, but the cessation of

dukkha must be strived for and can be attained or realized only by one who sets his/her

foot on the path leading to Nibbāna.

In the same sutta, the term “dependently arisen phenomena” is explained by the

twelve links separately. Each link is said to be “impermanent, conditioned, dependently

arisen, subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away, and cessation. (aniccā saṅkhatā

paṭiccasamuppannā khayadhammā vayadhammā virāgadhammā nirodhadhammā.)”150

Here the arising aspect and ceasing aspect are listed in a row. However, this explanation

cannot be extended to the term “dependent origination”. Kalupahana distinguishes their

difference: “The problem of causation, therefore, involves two aspects, the rule or

pattern according to which things change, and the things themselves that are subject to

change.”151 Every link will arise and then cease because they are impermanent. Once

they cease, that does not mean the causal relationship will consequently come to an end.

The term cessation (nirodha) is not the cessation of dukkha (dukkanirodha). The arising

process is still going and the negative or reverse sequence (paṭiloma) will not happen

even when each link vanishes, fades away, and ceases.

149
SN II, 25. (Bodhi 2000a: 551.)
150
SN II, 26. (Bodhi 2000a: 551.)
151
Kalupahana 1975: 68.

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§2.1.2 The Abstract Principle

It should be noted that both the Paṭiccasamuppāda Sutta and the Paccaya Sutta

did not mention the abstract principle. But once this principle was inserted between the

title and the twelve links in some suttas: SN 12: 37, 41, 42, 61; 55: 28; MN 115; MĀ

86, 181, the definition of paṭiccasamuppāda became blurred. These suttas lack the

affirmative sentence at the end of the definition. The reason is obvious: since the full

abstract principle is applied to both the arising aspect and the ceasing aspect of the

twelve links, it is not suitable to apply it to the term paṭiccasamuppāda. It is interesting

to refer to the Chinese Āgama: SĀ 298 which mentions only half of the abstract

principle:152

What is dependent arising dharma? It is “when this exists, that comes to be; with the

arising of this, that arises.” It is “with ignorance as condition, volitional formations

[come to be]… Such is the origin of the whole mass of duḥkha.” This is called

dependent arising dharma. (云何緣起法法說？謂此有故彼有，此起故彼起，謂緣

無明行…乃至純大苦聚集，是名緣起法法說。)

The redactor(s) of Saṃyukta Āgama must have been aware of the contradiction

between the meaning of dependent origination and the full abstract principle so that

only the arising aspect of the principle was inserted. This nuance even prevails

throughout the whole Saṃyukta Āgama. Mostly, the abstract principle appears in its

half form explaining the arising process of the twelve links.153 Only in three sūtras,

does the principle appear in full and it is divided to explain origination and cessation

152
T02, no. 99, p. 85, a13-16.
153
E.g. SĀ 293, 296-303, 590, 846, 961.

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respectively, i.e. SĀ 262, 335, and 358. Its complete form never coexists with the title

“dependent origination”. Even in the four Āgamas, these two elements coexist only in

the Madhyama Āgama no. 86 and 181. In this respect, these four Āgamas most probably

belong to different schools which can explain this difference. Within Pāli sources, to

my knowledge, the Udāna and the Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya

are the only two examples.154 The abstract principle was divided into an arising part

and a ceasing part and they were prefixed to respective processes. The interesting point

is, according to the Udāna, during the last watch of the night the Buddha contemplated

the twelve links both in the arising order and the ceasing order. Furthermore, the

abstract principle appeared in its complete form there.155 It is possible that these three

elements were combined together step by step. This description probably preserves a

trace of the development of the standard explanation: the abstract principle along with

the twelve links has been separated in the arising part and the ceasing part at the

beginning.

So far, I have discussed that the term “dependent origination” only means the

arising process. Hence, the whole abstract principle cannot perfectly fit with this

definition. Not only is this a problem, but the title “dependent origination” and the

abstract principle sometimes expand in their application. The twelve links confine

themselves in these definite factors. On the contrary, the title and the abstract principle

have no such limitation, therefore, they have been regarded to apply to every

154
Ud 2-3; MN I, 262-64.
155
Ud 2-3.

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phenomenon in this world by quite a few scholars.156 This distinction is well expressed

in Bodhi’s words:157

The Pali texts present dependent arising in a double form. It appears both as an abstract

statement of universal law and as the particular application of that law to the specific

problem which is the doctrine’s focal concern, namely, the problem of suffering.

Another similar statement comes from Gethin:158

The verse and the succinct formula state baldly that the secret of the universe lies in the

nature of causality -- the way one thing leads to another. The chain of twelve links goes

rather further; it attempts to reveal the actual pattern and structure of causal

conditioning.

In this sense, the title and the abstract principle are construed as the law of the

universe and the links are “a particular application”. However, the Sutta Piṭaka did not

support this distinction. When the title and the principle appear, they are seldom

detached from the twelve links, as discussed earlier. Their close connection has been

proposed by Nakamura.159 Saigusa further states that the abstract principle represents

the abstraction and conceptualization of the twelve links, therefore, they are

inseparable.160 This observation implies that the title and the principle may not have

appeared as a guideline for all reasoning or all phenomena at the beginning, but they

are imposed on the twelve links at a later time. From this point of view, even the Buddha

156
E.g. Jayatilleke 1963: 448 ff.; Kalupahana 1975: 110 ff.; Collins: 1999: 106; Harvey 2013: 65;
Strong 2008: 108-09; Williams 2000: 65-66; Hamilton 1996: 68. Further analysis refers to Shulman
2014: 87, n. 68.
157
Bodhi 1980: 6-7.
158
Gethin 1998: 142.
159
Nakamura 1980: 171.
160
Saigusa 2004: 585.

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may have intended to explain the causal relationship between universal phenomena;

but, if he had done so, the title and the abstract principle have never been applied to any

content other than the twelve links. By this saying, I do not mean that the abstract

principle cannot be compatible with phenomena other than the twelve links. On the

contrary, I believe that all the Buddha’s teachings implicitly follow the law of causation.

I would like to emphasize that this interpretation is not this principle’s initial intention,

it is probably vice versa. I would argue that the Buddha, in fact, adopted the existing

idea of causation to analyze psychological activities in particular rather than to explain

other phenomena. This point will be expounded in section 2.4.

§2.1.3 The Twelve Links and Other Variations

On the one hand, the full abstract principle is not in accordance with the title

“dependent origination” but can be applied to and be exclusive to the arising and

ceasing processes of the twelve links. On the other hand, the title “dependent origination”

can be bestowed only on the arising process of the twelve links. But in some suttas, by

the intermediation of the abstract principle, it seems to be expanded to both the arising

and ceasing processes of the twelve links so that these three elements of title, abstract

principle, and twelve links are combined together as the standard explanation for the

teaching of causality.

Furthermore, the term paṭiccasamuppāda (n.) also appears as the adjectival form

paṭiccasamuppanna in the Sutta Piṭaka. These two terms are coexistent only in one

sutta along with the twelve links, i.e. SN 12: 20. Here the adjectival form is used to

- 59 -
describe the twelve links within a list of adjectives: impermanent, conditioned and

dependently arisen (anicca saṅkhata paṭiccasamuppanna).161 This list also appears in

other suttas to emphasize other conditioned phenomena, including the five aggregates162,

body 163
, contact 164
, feelings 165
and even dukkha 166
. This general usage of

paṭiccasamuppanna shows that redactor(s) may have intended to distinguish it from

paṭiccasamuppāda so that the noun paṭiccasamuppāda would be more specific and

circumscribed by the twelve links.

Hence, the chain of the twelve links has long been considered as the standard or,

for some people, the only explanation for the teaching of causality. Even if this is true,

we should not neglect other similar variations in the Sutta Piṭaka. Saigusa has thus

collected all of the different descriptions regarding the teaching of causality in the Pāli

Nikāya and Chinese Āgama.167 This is the most exhaustive study to date. He has also

sorted out all the variations into three categories. According to his analysis, the

variations in the first category are simple but unsystematic. This category appears at the

very beginning. The second is the twelve links and their variations. The last category is

other types, the dates of which cannot be identified as being before or after the twelve

links. His study shows how diverse it is in terms of the amount and content of the links

regarding the teaching of causality. Comparing with the twelve links, these suttas can

161
SN II, 26.
162
SN III, 24-25; MN I, 191.
163
SN IV, 212.
164
SN IV, 214.
165
SN II, 37; IV, 214; MN I, 500; III, 299; DN II, 66.
166
SN II, 34.
167
Saigusa 2004: 472 ff.

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be diversified in the numbers of the links: some are less than twelve: e.g. SN 12: 24

(eight links starting from the six sense bases to aging-and-death), and SN 12: 52-57, 60;

SĀ 283 (five links from craving to aging-and-death); some contain more: e.g. SN 12:

23 (there are twenty-three links in total which combine saṃsāric and liberating

processes); DN 15 (it offers two different versions: nine links and fourteen links).

Sometimes the sequence of these links is different from the standard list: e.g. SN 12:

65, 67; DN 14, 15; SĀ 287, 288; DĀ 13(consciousness and name-and-form are

interdependent). Some suttas depict the causal relationship between factors other than

the standard twelve links: e.g. MN 9 (ignorance and taints are said to be interdependent

on each other) 168 , DN 15 (seeking, acquisition, decision-making, lustful desire,

attachment, appropriation, avarice, guarding of possession are mentioned)169.

Facing these variations, many scholars assert that the chain of the twelve links is

not the earliest form.170 Hirakawa suggests that the Buddha understood the teaching of

causality “in an intuitive way” at the moment of his enlightenment. Thereafter the

Buddha explained this teaching in various ways and the twelve links were compiled as

the final form.171 Both Reat and Collins suggest that the twelve links were developed

gradually, though they do not reject the possibility that this list was formulized during

the Buddha’s lifetime. 172 The evolution of the chain of the twelve links will be

168
MN I, 54-55.
169
DN I, 58-59.
170
E.g. Gethin 1998: 149; Shulman 2014: 89; Williams 2000: 71-72; Bronkhorst 2009: 57; Drummond
2001: 163; Nakamura 1987: 68; Norman 2006: 32. Other scholars refer to the discussion.
171
Hirakawa 1990: 54.
172
Reat 1990: 314; Collins 1999: 106.

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discussed in detail in the next section. At this stage, there is no doubt that there are many

variations coexisting in the Sutta Piṭaka and the chain of the twelve links is counted as

one type among them. Even though it is possible that all these variations had gained the

Buddha’s endorsement, it is also possible that the chain of the twelve links was

formulized at a later stage. In any case, all the variations have to comply with the

fundamental teaching of causality. As Shulman comments:173

More importantly, the twelve links agree fundamentally with other expressions of

dependent-origination in their basic message: they express the way that the mind

functions in saṃsāra, the processes of mental conditioning that constitute human

experience, as well as the way these mental processes condition the objective and

material aspects of human reality. Dependent-origination expresses a fundamental

insight into the conditioned processes that give rise to mental life; the twelve links are

one expression of these processes.

On the basis of this knowledge, the Buddha’s teaching of causality should not be

confined to any single formulation. Saigusa emphasizes the fact that there exist links

other than the twelve links so that to take the twelve links as the orthodox explanation

is too arbitrary.174 Bodhi warns us that the teaching of causality “cannot be reduced to

any single one of its applications. Any application is only a pedagogical device framed

from the standpoint of the teaching’s practical orientation.”175 However, referring to

the Sutta Piṭaka, the fact is that most of these variations do not earn themselves the title

173
Shulman 2014: 89.
174
Saigusa 2004: 582.
175
Bodhi 1980: 9.

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paṭiccasamuppāda.176 They are like the illegitimate siblings of the twelve links. If we

take the Sutta Piṭaka as a whole into consideration, these variations should be treated

equally for us to grasp the Buddha’s teachings. It is in this sense that the term

paṭiccasamuppāda and the chain of the twelve links are too strict in meaning and in

their application. In other words, if we only analyze the suttas mentioning these three

elements: the title, the abstract principle, and the chain of the twelve links, we would

overlook many other variations which equally delivered the Buddha’s analysis

regarding causation.

Hence, I will use “the teaching of causality” to describe Buddhist causal theory.

For “the teaching of causality” as a general term can easily comprise all the related

terms and ideas, including the abstract causal idea, the specific twelve links or other

variations, and both their arising and ceasing processes. It also helps to denote many

more archaic forms of the Buddha’s teachings or ideas without any specific implication.

However, since the term paṭiccasamuppāda has been used as the legitimate description

in scholastic studies, the references quoted below will retain this term. It should be

noted that once the term “dependent origination” is used as a general term outside the

context, dependent origination should be understood as a title denoting the teaching of

causality and not exclusively the twelve links. For scholars who do not notice the

nuance between the term paṭiccasamuppāda and the idea of causation, these two usages

are mostly and eventually mingled in different aspects.

176
As noted earlier, four exceptions are SN 12: 60, 62; DN 14 and 15.

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§2.2 The Evolution of the Teaching of Causality

As discussed above, the meanings of these three elements: the title, the abstract

principle, and the chain of the twelve links are not perfectly coherent. Nevertheless,

they have been put together as a paradigm both in many suttas and scholars’ works. By

contrast, some scholars suspect the authenticity of these three elements and try to

investigate the primary form of the teaching of causality. According to their studies,

these three elements were formulated gradually. This section will examine their

arguments and lastly, I will suggest a possible progression of this evolution.

Nakamura tries to reveal the teaching of causality in its incipient stage resorting to

the Suttanipāta, which he considers to be the oldest stratum of Buddhist scriptures.177

He points out that the term paṭiccasamuppāda appears only once and is devoid of clear

definition. It is in the Vāseṭṭha Sutta (identical with MN 98) that the term

paṭiccasamuppāda is found. Here the Buddha was answering two young brahmin

students the question about what makes a person a true brahmin, by birth or by deed.

Then he gave many examples and conditions to verify a brahmin. He mentioned that a

wise man should know dependent origination and the results of deeds (kamma): “So

that is how the truly wise see kamma as it really is, seers of dependent origination,

skilled in kamma and its results. (evametaṃ yathābhūtaṃ, kammaṃ passanti paṇḍitā;

paṭiccasamuppādadasā, kammavipākakovidā.)” 178 However, the Buddha did not

explain dependent origination any further. Considering his audiences were two brahmin

177
Nakamura 1980: 165.
178
Sn 653.

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students and it was their first meeting, the Buddha should have, perhaps, elaborated

specific terms or ideas which were unfamiliar to them, unless these terms were used in

a general meaning or in a religious sense. These two kinds of usages are found in this

discourse. The term “dependent origination” is parallel with general terms, like passion

(rāga), attachment (saṅga), free from attachment (anādāna), and religious terms, like

austerity (tapa), the holy life (brahmacariya), self-restraint (saṃyama), and self-control

(dama). From this fact, we may suppose that dependent origination here indicates a

causal relationship in a general sense. What the Buddha emphasized to these brahmins

is: “Not by birth does one become a brahmin, not by birth does one become a non-

brahmin; by kamma one becomes a brahmin, by kamma one becomes a non-brahmin.

(na jaccā brāhmaṇo hoti, na jaccā hoti abrāhmaṇo; kammanā brāhmaṇo hoti,

kammanā hoti abrāhmaṇo.)”179 One thing equally important is that the Buddha meant

“kamma” was founded in the mental condition. It seems that the Buddha accepted one

student’s argument but actually shifted the meaning of kamma from action to mind. “It

is intention that I call kamma. (cetanāhaṃ kammaṃ vadāmi.)”, the Buddha said. 180

Gombrich thus comments: “This single move overturns brahminical, caste-bound

ethics.” 181 So the wise man needs to see the relationship of cause and effect in its

psychological aspect and then to cultivate the mind. This instruction makes a person a

real brahmin. All of the Buddha’s discourses surround mental activities. In this context,

179
Sn 650. (Norman 2001: 84.)
180
AN III, 415.
181
Gombrich 2006a: 68.

- 65 -
it would be far-fetched to refer to the twelve links or even the Buddhist theory of

causation.

Moreover, the abstract principle and the chain of the twelve links are totally absent

in the Suttanipāta, but their primary forms can be found. Regarding the reasoning

method, Nakamura indicates that the deductive method was adopted in the Suttanipāta

to investigate the truth. 182 Therefore, we can find the abstract principle in different

wording: “Where do the agreeable (sāta) and the disagreeable (asāta) have their origin?

When what is non-existent do they not come into being? ... The agreeable, the

disagreeable have their origin in contact. When contact does not exist, they do not

exist.” 183 This statement can be compared to the relationship between contact and

feeling in the twelve links but is expressed in different terms and expressions from the

standard formulation. According to Nakamura, the rare term sāta is also used by Jain

scriptures to mean “pleasant feeling”.184 This similarity indicates that this passage must

be very old. On the other hand, one of the familiar phrasings in the twelve links can be

found exactly: “With clinging as condition, existence [comes to be]. (upādānapaccayā

bhavo.)”185 Since this standard phrasing is parallel with the statement quoted above in

the same sutta, it raises our question why these expressions do not accord with each

other, especially not tally with the standard formula in term and wording. Seeing this

situation, it is possible that the Buddha explained the causal relationship in different

182
Nakamura 1980: 171.
183
Sn 869-70: sātaṃ asātañ ca kutonidānā, kismiṃ asante na bhavanti h’ete… phassanidānaṃ sātaṃ
asātaṃ, phasse asante na bhavanti h’ete. (Norman 2001: 114.)
184
Nakamura 1983: 313-4.
185
Sn 742.

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phrases at the beginning and did not intend to formulize his words into a standard form.

From the discussion above, it indicates the adoption of the reasoning method of

the abstract principle in the Suttanipāta, but no unified formation is found. Nakamura

points out that the general form of the principle was implied in the Suttanipāta and

developed gradually into the well-known principle at the end.186 Saigusa also places

the formulization of the abstract principle later than the twelve links. 187 The same

assumption is suggested by Thomas and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, too.188 Their statements

affirm my suggestion in the discussion of the abstract principle. The law of causation

was used as an implicit guideline for all reasoning from the very beginning, but the

abstract principle was derived from the twelve links at a later time.

On the other hand, the content of this deduction, i.e. the concrete factors, the causes

and effects, is pretty diverse and disordered in the Suttanipāta. Poussin and Nakamura

refer to different suttas and they all depict an unfledged status of the twelve links.

Poussin points out that most factors of the twelve links can be found in the

Dvayatānupassanā Sutta of the Suttanipāta.189 Together with other factors, they are

explained individually as the direct cause of dukkha. Even though the sequence of their

appearance follows that of the twelve links, their relationship is not clearly stated.

Poussin, on the one hand, fills in the missing links from other verses; on the other hand,

he argues that these links were later arranged into the standard list according to the

186
Nakamura 1980: 171.
187
Saigusa 2004: 585.
188
C. A. F. Rhys Davids 1931: 152; Thomas 1953: 60, n. 1.
189
Poussin 1913: 2-5.

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cause-and-effect relationship.

Nakamura turns to the Kalahavivāda Sutta of the Suttanipāta which depicts the

causal relationship between various factors.190 He finds that most of these factors are

different from the standard list though some of their meanings can be compared to

factors in the twelve links, like feeling and contact in Sn 870. Not only this, their

explanations and causal relationship are not unified. It is said that delight in feeling

would bring out consciousness. 191 In one place, name-and-form is dependent on

perception;192 in another place, it is dependent on consciousness.193 Such disorganized

form “betrays its preliminary character” in Nakamura’s words.194

Irrespective of whether we accept that the Suttanipāta preserves the oldest

teaching of the Buddha or not, the authenticity of the three elements is much challenged.

If the Suttanipāta represents ancient discourses, we should assume there was a period

in which the standard explanation had not yet been formulized and all variations

enjoyed the same importance to convey the Buddha’s analysis. If the standard

explanation was existent from the outset, there should not have any room or possibility

left for these variations. Not only in the Suttanipāta can this difference be found but

also in the Nikāyas and Āgamas, as mentioned earlier. Four scholars, therefore, suggest

that the chain of the twelve links was gradually compiled from different lists.

190
Nakamura 1980: 167 ff.
191
Sn 1111: ajjhattañ ca bahiddhā ca vedanaṃ nābhinandato, evaṃ satassa carato viññāṇaṃ
uparujjhati.
192
Sn 874: na saññasaññī na visaññasaññī no pi asaññī na vibhūtasaññī, evaṃsametassa vibhoti
rūpaṃ, saññānidānā hi papañcasaṃkhā.
193
Sn 1037: yattha nāmañ ca rūpañ ca asesaṃ uparujjhati: viññāṇassa nirodhena etth’ etaṃ
uparujjhati.
194
Nakamura 1980: 167.

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 The first is Frauwallner. He argues that the explanation of the Second Noble Truth

in the Buddha’s first sermon was the original form which elaborates craving as the

origin of dukkha.195 Later on, ignorance as the fundamental cause was connected with

volitional formations, consciousness and so on. The first list starts from craving and the

second from ignorance. Basically, these two lists depict the same process: the way

human beings are reborn, but somehow, these two lists were combined together.

According to Frauwallner, this combination brings about a problem. The act of rebirth

appears twice in the chain of the twelve links, viz. consciousness and becoming. It also

results in the interpretation of three lives. Schmithausen points out the efforts of the

author of the Mahānidāna Sūtra.196 There he finds three different descriptions about

the teaching of causality and he suggests that they are collected together to form the

chain of the nine links. Gradually the six sense bases, volitional formations, and

ignorance are inserted in order to complete the list. Gombrich, on the one hand, accepts

Frauwallner’s argument that the five links in the first sermon are original, but on the

other hand, follows part of Jurewicz’s assumption that the causal chain from ignorance

to name-and-form is intended to ironize and criticize Vedic cosmogony. 197 Then he

surmises that the Buddha eventually attached the five links together with the six sense

bases, contact, and feeling to name-and-form, so as to complete the twelve links. The

fourth scholar, Bucknell, discusses four different versions referring to both Pāli and

195
Frauwallner 1993: 167.
196
Schmithausen 2000: 45 ff.
197
Gombrich 2009: 138

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Chinese literature. He attributes such differences to the problems of oral transmission.198

He suggests that the standard formulation is derived from two existing lists: the first list

is in the Dvayatānupassanā Sutta of the Suttanipāta which omits name-and-form and

the six sense bases; the other one begins with the individual sense faculty and omits

ignorance and volitional formations.199 He also argues that the evolution of the twelve

links was completed before the Third Council in the Theravāda tradition.200

These scholars try to depict a primary picture of the teaching of causality which is

different from the systematic theory of dependent origination. By contrast, Wayman is

known for his support of the originality of the twelve links. He argues thus: “I am

convinced that the full twelve members have been in Buddhism since earliest times,

just as it is certain that a natural division into the first seven and last five was also

known.”201 He believes that the chain of the twelve links is recognized unanimously

among different schools and, therefore, all other variations are derived from it. The only

problem which has not been resolved from the beginning is “the subgrouping of the

twelve members and their mutual relations, as well as the interpretation of the entire

formula.”202 His position reminds us some questions: How could the chain of the twelve

links be recorded in the most suttas if it was not formulized in the earliest time? And if

the twelve links were the result of standardization, why were other variations not

unified together? From this point of view, it is possible that the twelve links already

198
Bucknell 1999: 333.
199
Bucknell 1999: 333 ff.
200
Bucknell 1999: 341.
201
Wayman 1971: 185-86.
202
Wayman 1971: 186.

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existed at the beginning.

Jurewicz investigates and traces this topic from the Vedic perspective. She points

out the similarities and correspondences between Vedic cosmogony and the chain of

the twelve links. Hence, she argues that the Buddha himself “formulated the

pratītyasamutpāda as a polemic against Vedic thought. Through the identification of

the creative process with the process that leads only to dukkha, he rejected the

Brāhmaṇic way of thinking in a truly spectacular way.” 203 In order to match two

systems, she refers to several Upaniṣad and Brāhmaṇa books, then she suggests that

the Buddha chose these Vedic ideas to achieve his aim. Her assumption is not

impossible, though it also reflects her arbitrariness to some degree. As we know,

Brahminism is one of the oldest religions in Indian culture. It is not surprising to find

related ideas between the Vedas and other Indian philosophies or religions. It would be

surprising if we could not find any. The twelve links, therefore, find their corresponding

factors or ideas in the Vedas. But the only concern is that these factors are scattered in

several Upaniṣad and Brāhmaṇa books, according to her research. Therefore, the

systematic twelve links are not compared to a sequential system but to many individual

disordered factors. From this point of view, even their similarity probably is not

accidental, though is not enough to prove that the chain of the twelve links intends to

ironize and criticize Vedic cosmogony systematically. Jones also doubts the Buddha’s

intention as parody:204

203
Jurewicz 2000: 170.
204
Jones 2009a: 37.

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 I have explored two limits to the possibility of Jurewicz’s proposal. Firstly, because the

twelve-fold chain can be understood as explaining individual rebirth, it cannot only be

concerned with parodying Vedic cosmogony. Secondly, because the twelve-fold chain

was a development within the development of early Buddhism, and the earliest

recorded chain is not concerned with parodying Vedic cosmogony, paṭiccasamuppāda

was not originally a parody of Vedic ideas.

Of course, the possibility of her assumption should not be rejected, but further

investigation is needed. Kalupahana also tends to regard the formation of the abstract

principle and the twelve links as the prototype of the Buddha’s teachings:205

The general formula of causation was something that he discovered with his attainment

of enlightenment. Therefore, when he had to explain the arising and passing away of

the psychophysical personality, he seems to have adopted the more instructive method

of stating the formula first and then applying it to explain the causation of this

personality. This is quite a logical procedure…Considering the large number of

passages in the twelfth fascicle of the Samyukta Āgama (which roughly corresponds to

the Nidāna Samyutta of the Samyutta Nikāya), where the general formula has been

prefixed to the theory of twelve factors, it would be difficult to reject them as late

compositions, as Thomas does. On the contrary, the prefixed version may even be an

earlier version, and the practice of prefixing the general formula may have been

abandoned when it was taken for granted that the special formulation represented an

application of the general formula.

First of all, the correspondence between the Saṃyutta Nikāya and Saṃyukta

Āgama only proves that its origin can be traced back to the sub-division within the

Sthavira school and that must have happened three hundred years after the Buddha’s

205
Kalupahana 1975: 144.

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death. 206 Therefore, we need to consider evidence from other sources on this topic.

Secondly, as I have pointed out earlier, the abstract principle is bound with the twelve

links closely and, therefore, excludes other variations. And, it seems impossible that

those unfledged forms appeared later than the twelve links. Lastly, with respect to the

fact that the Suttanipāta preserves similar but different descriptions of the principle and

the links, it is hard to accept that the standardized formula was fixed from the very

beginning.

In conclusion, all these studies discussed above and their arguments are based on

an obvious fact: there are many variations existing but only these three elements: the

title, the abstract principle, and the chain of the twelve links, are picked out to be the

representative of the teaching of causality. It brings out two opposite opinions: these

three elements were intentionally arranged at a later time or they were the matrix giving

birth to different variations. As I and many scholars have suggested, the progress from

chaos to order seems more reasonable and logical than the reverse one in the course of

the transmission and preservation of Buddhist literature. There is no doubt that the

standard theory of dependent origination was well recognized and broadly accepted at

an early stage. But, it most probably was not the archaic form. Hence, we should assume

an incipient stage when the Buddha elaborated the working of the mind by the teaching

of causality in a pragmatic and unsystematic way. These elaborations differ case by case.

Later on, he or his disciples felt the necessity to give this teaching a name in order to

206
Hirakawa 1990: 110.

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facilitate communication. The term paṭiccasamuppāda is proposed to designate the

arising process of the teaching of causality in general. Just like the adjective

paṭiccasamuppanna, it initially applies to every conditioned phenomenon in the

psychological process. Saigusa suggests that the term paṭiccasamuppāda is used as a

general term in some cases.207 Therefore, dependent origination appears in some suttas

meaning the law of causation of mental activities which was detached from specific

content, i.e. SN 6: 1, 22: 57; MN 26, 28, 85, 98; and DN 33.

It was not until the twelve links became standardized and acknowledged, then the

term “dependent origination” was first bestowed to the arising process of the twelve

links in SN 12:1 and 20. Probably at the same time or at a later period, the abstract

principle was formulized and separately prefixed to the arising and ceasing processes

of the twelve links as a guideline. This rule was observed strictly in the Saṃyukta

Āgama, e.g. SĀ 262, 298, 335, and 358. Up to this stage, there seems to be no problem.

However, the separated abstract principle was merged and inserted between the title

“dependent origination” and the chain of the twelve links. This process is evident in the

Udāna. By doing so, the meaning of paṭiccasamuppāda is expanded accordingly,

comprising both the arising and ceasing processes, e.g. SN 12: 37, 41, 42, 61; 55: 28;

MN 115; MĀ 86, 181. As a result, the title “dependent origination” together with the

abstract principle and the twelve links is juxtaposed to form the orthodox teaching of

causality.

207
Saigusa 2004: 583.

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 As I have elaborated above, this evolution has taken many steps and has taken up

a certain amount of time. What should be noticed is the intention underlying this

evolution. We can imagine that when the Buddha’s teachings spread, it became more

often for him to give public lectures rather than to discuss in a small group or with

individuals. As a result, he needed to explain his teaching in a general way. In the

Pārāyana Vagga which is deemed to be the oldest part of the Suttanipāta by several

scholars, the Buddha answered sixteen brahmins’ respective questions.208 According to

the questioners, he gave diverse answers. Taking a recurrent topic: the way to surmount

birth and old age, for example, the Buddha emphasized different causes to different

brahmins:209

Sn 1048 He calmed, without fumes [of passion] (vidhūma), without affliction

(anigha), without desire (nirāsa), has crossed over birth and old age.

Sn 1056 Dwelling thus, mindful (sata), vigilant (appamatta), wandering as a

bhikkhu (bhikkhu cara), having left behind cherished things (hitvā

mamāyitāni), knowing, you would abandon birth and old age, and grief and

affliction, [and] misery in this very place.

Sn 1082 Whosoever has given up here what is seen, heard or thought (diṭṭha va

suta muta vā) and all rules and vows (sīlabbata sabba), all various [ways]

(anekarūpa sabba), knowing craving (taṇhaṃ pariññāya), are without

208
E.g. Pande 1995: 55; Nakamura 1973: 68-88; Norman 2001: xxxi.
209
Translation is based on Norman’s version (2001: 133 ff.). Italics added.

- 75 -
 defilements (anāsavāsa), them indeed I call “flood-crossing men”.

Sn 1094 This island, without possessions (akiñcana), without grasping (anādāna),

matchless (anāpara), I call it “nibbāna”, the complete destruction of old

age and death.

Sn 1121 Seeing [people] being smitten in the midst of forms, negligent people do

suffer in the midst of forms, therefore, you [being] vigilant, abandon form

(jahassu rūpaṃ) for the sake of non-renewed existence.

Sn 1123 Seeing men afflicted by craving, tormented, overcome by old age,

therefore, you [being] vigilant, abandon craving (jahassu taṇhaṃ) for the

sake of non-renewed existence.

From these instances, we can realize how skillful in means the Buddha was. He

was able to prescribe different “medications” for different “patients”. Therefore, he

admonished them respectively to eradicate desire, craving, grasping or relinquish

belongings, ideas, form, etc. Because of no one standard answer, these brahmins would

repeat asking the same question one after another. From the answers the Buddha gave,

we can accordingly picture their personal weakness. As each one required different

antidotes, no one would doubt why the answers were different for the same question.

However, the chain of the twelve links represents a general doctrine. Since it does not

intend to solve or explain any specific person’s problem, it can be applied to human

beings in general. In other words, it has been abstracted from actual situations and

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became didactic material. Therefore, we may find difficult to grasp initially the

explanation and intention of the chain of the twelve links.

Another related question is who eventually formulized the chain of the twelve

links and these three elements. For scholars who support the originality of these

doctrines, this question does not exist. However, some scholars who suppose that this

theory developed gradually also attribute this outcome to the Buddha himself. In this

way, this theory gains its originality to some degree. However, this suggestion brings

out a critical problem which is the interpretation of the chain of the twelve links, i.e.

the questions proposed by Wayman: “How to define the meanings and components of

each link?” and “how to construe its time span?” Some scholars suggest that it is a later

formation and it could not represent the Buddha’s original thoughts. Hence, there is no

need to argue that the chain of the twelve links spans three lives, or one life, or one

moment. Facing these two standpoints, the critical question is: should we consider these

three elements as the Buddha’s innovation or as an institution framed by later followers

in order to preserve the Buddha’s teachings. To solve these questions, we should not

neglect the Buddha’s enlightenment experience. In this respect, the connection of the

teaching of causality and the analysis of cognition can be found.

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§2.3 The Buddha’s Enlightenment Experience

In the Ariyapariyesanā Sutta, right after the Buddha attained Nibbāna, he thought

to himself that the Dhamma he had discovered was profound, hard to see and

understand, sublime and subtle, and thus he was reluctant to teach the Dhamma.210 In

this passage, the Buddha included the arising and ceasing of defilements into the

Dhamma:211

But this generation delights in adhesion, takes delight in adhesion, and rejoices in

adhesion. For such a generation this state is hard to see, that is, specific conditionality,

dependent origination. And this state too is hard to see, that is, the stilling of all mental

formations, the relinquishment of all attachments, the destruction of craving, dispassion,

cessation, Nibbāna. (Bodhi 2000a: 231.)

Here the Dhamma includes two states: idaṃ ṭhānaṃ…idampi ṭhānaṃ… The first

part is specific conditionality, dependent origination but without further explanation.

The second part indicates the ceasing of volitional formations (saṅkhāra), attachments

(upadhi), craving (taṇhā) and passion (rāga). Hence, we can deduce that dependent

origination means the arising of volitional formations, attachments, craving, and

passion which confirms the real meaning of paṭiccasamuppāda I have mentioned earlier.

In other words, the Buddha realized both the arising and ceasing processes of mental

defilements. These two aspects combine together to constitute the content of the

210
MN I, 167-68. See also: SN I, 136; MN II, 93; Vin. I, 4-5.
211
SN I, 136: Ālayarāmāya kho pana pajāya ālayaratāya ālayasammuditāya duddasaṃ idaṃ ṭhānaṃ
yadidaṃ idappaccayatāpaṭiccasamuppādo. Idampi kho ṭhānaṃ duddasaṃ yadidaṃ
sabbasaṅkhārasamatho sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo taṇhākkhayo virāgo nirodho nibbānaṃ. See also:
MN I, 167; II, 93; Vin. I, 4-5.

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Dhamma.

This evaluation of the Dhamma echoed at a later time when the Buddha exhorted

Ānanda in the Mahānidāna Sutta. In this sutta, the Buddha described dependent

origination as “profound and appears profound”. Being unable to understand and

penetrate this doctrine, people become entangled in the miserable situation of

transmigration.212 This kind of declaration can be found nowhere in the whole Sutta

Piṭaka since the Buddha always made his teaching straightforward and practical. This

instance shows us that the teaching of causality is not just theoretical knowledge, so the

point is not to understand it intellectually. In order to attain Nibbāna, it requires wisdom

to penetrate the teaching of causality as it really is.

This pragmatic teaching toward the final attainment implies another aspect of the

Dhamma. In the Aṅguttara Nikāya, the Buddha declared that his Dhamma and Vinaya

had only the taste of liberation and nothing else.213 This declaration indicates that the

Dhamma is the way to Nibbāna. As Williams says about the word “Dhamma”: “It

consists of the truths, both concerning how things really are, and the way to practise in

order to bring about cognition of how things really are.”214 In this sense, the Buddha

taught the Dhamma as a means in order to realize the Dhamma as content. This feature

makes the meaning of Dhamma in Buddhism, complying with the Indian traditional

usage which involves both a descriptive aspect and a prescriptive aspect, the ultimate

212
DN II, 55. See also: SN II, 92.
213
AN IV, 203.
214
Williams 2000: 7.

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truth itself and the way or method leading to that truth.215

From this point of view, the teaching of causality indicates these two aspects of

the Dhamma. On the one hand, the teaching of causality represents the Buddha’s

prescriptive teaching. The teaching of causality not only explains why we get entangled

in dukkha but also leads us to a way to get rid of the bondage. On the other hand, the

equality of the teaching of causality and the descriptive Dhamma is convincingly

proved in the oft-cited verse: “One who sees dependent origination sees the Dhamma;

one who sees the Dhamma sees dependent origination.”216 As I mentioned earlier, the

term “dependent origination” means the idea of causation in general. This point is also

noted by Saigusa. He rejects the meaning of dependent origination in this verse as being

the twelve links or its variations.217 In this place, Dhamma clearly means the teaching

of causality. Kalupahana suggests this equivalence: “The term dhamma, when applied

to empirical things, is always used in the sense of ‘causally conditioned dhammas’

(paṭiccasamuppanna-dhamma).”218 In this sense, one needs to know the teaching of

causality and to act accordingly so that one can penetrate into this teaching thoroughly

and attain Nibbāna. This primitive connotation of dependent origination is verified by

its usage in the Vāseṭṭha Sutta of the Suttanipāta. In this sutta, two brahmin students

disputed about the causes making a person a brahmin, then the Buddha listed various

conditions to identify a brahmin. The point is not his birth or lineage but his deeds

215
Cf. Gethin 1998: 35; Gombrich 2006b: 35 and 2009: 161; Harvey 2013: 10.
216
MN I, 190-91.
217
Saigusa 2004: 583.
218
Kalupahana 1975: 84.

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(kamma). More importantly, what the deeds mean is the condition of mental activities.

This relationship between deeds and results is the real meaning of dependent origination,

and it always involves the transformation of mental activities. Johansson asserts the

essence of the teaching of causality thus: “I think that the only aim of Early Buddhism

was a certain transformation of the human individual personality and that the

paṭiccasamuppāda is both an explanation and a prescription.”219

However, things are not always as simple as they seem. As many variations of the

teaching of causality exist, records about the Buddha’s enlightenment experience are

diverse and discordant.220 Lamotte notices that the oldest sources which depicted the

Buddha’s enlightenment experience narrated by himself never mentioned the term

“pratītyasamutpāda”. 221 Ui collected fifteen explanations in total for the Buddha’s

enlightenment referring to early sources.222 Among all possible explanations, the chain

of the twelve links is one of three which gain the most attention and emphasis together

with the four jhānas and the three-fold knowledge, and the Four Noble Truths. However,

according to Hirakawa, all these three explanations have their deficiencies in

representing the content of the Buddha’s enlightenment experience. He thus suggests:223

The Four Noble Truths, however, are designed to be used in instructing others and do

not seem to represent the content of the Buddha's enlightenment in its earliest form.

Simpler versions of the theory of Dependent Origination can be found in early sources,

219
Johansson 1985: 8-9.
220
As Norman (1990: 25) points out: “they appear in different forms in different parts of the Pāli
canon, with quite large omissions and changes of emphasis in some versions.”
221
Lamotte 1980: 123.
222
Ui 1990b: 394 ff.
223
Hirakawa 1990: 28.

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 indicating that the twelve-link version of the theory was formulated later. However, the

twelve-link version of Dependent Origination may be a systematized explanation based

on Sakyamuni's meditations when he realized enlightenment. The third theory that the

Buddha attained the Four Trances and Three Superhuman Powers when he attained

enlightenment, was also a relatively late theory, according to Ui.

All these refutations come from two main points: the first one is that different

sources emphasize different content for the Buddha’s enlightenment experience and

there is no way to decide which one is authentic, as we are facing various texts of

Buddhist literature. We can realize the differences between the texts, but there is no

convincing method to distinguish their exact strata, though we can surmise some

sequences roughly. The second one is that all these descriptions look well-organized.

Therefore, it is reasonable to suspect that they were either arranged by the Buddha in

order to instruct others or were standardized by the later redactor(s) to benefit

memorization. In either way, they cannot reflect the real content of the Buddha’s

enlightenment experience. Because of these diversified records, it is literally impossible

to ascertain the real content of the Buddha’s enlightenment experience. Bronkhorst

even suggests: “The vacillating attitude of the texts with regard to the exact content of

this knowledge gives rise to the suspicion that the early Buddhist tradition had little or

nothing to offer in this respect.” 224 But one thing that we can do to investigate the

Buddha’s teachings that have been passed down, is to dig out their intentions and

implications. This hermeneutic methodology is well demonstrated by Fu. According to

224
Bronkhorst 2009: 33.

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this hermeneutic, the original teaching of the thinker or text in Buddhism has no

conclusion. Therefore, we should resort to the content that they are meant to have said

and the content they could have said and implied.225 Then we can figure out why so

many scholars treat the teaching of causality as the quintessence of the Buddha’s

teachings or even the enlightenment experience.226

As mentioned earlier, in the Aṅguttara Nikāya, the Second Noble Truth of the

origin of dukkha is explained by the arising of the twelve links and the Third Noble

Truth of the cessation of dukkha by the ceasing of the twelve links.227 Regardless of

whether we suspect the originality of this explanation which resorts to the twelve links,

the common explanation of the Four Noble Truths leads to the same conclusion. It is

said to be the Buddha’s first sermon: Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta which

emphasized craving (taṇhā) as the key point of the Second and Third Noble Truth.228

This statement respectively implies the arising process and ceasing process of craving,

therefore, the teaching of causality and the Four Noble Truths have a close connection.

Furthermore, the Four Noble Truths can be deemed to be a simple relationship of

causality. The Second Noble Truth is the cause of the first one and the Fourth Noble

Truth is the cause of the third one. This accordance has been suggested by Hirakawa.229

225
Fu 1991: 198.
226
E.g. Hamilton 2000: 83; Gombrich 2009: 132; Robinson and Johnson 1997: 23; Bronkhorst 2009:
37; Harvey 2013: 86; Bodhi 2000a: 525 and 2000b: 1; Jayatilleke 1975: 202.
227
AN I, 177.
228
SN V, 421: Idaṃ kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhasamudayaṃ ariyasaccaṃ– yāyaṃ taṇhā
ponobbhavikā nandirāgasahagatā tatratatrābhinandinī, seyyathidaṃ – kāmataṇhā, bhavataṇhā,
vibhavataṇhā. Idaṃ kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhanirodhaṃ ariyasaccaṃ– yo tassāyeva taṇhāya
asesavirāganirodho cāgo paṭinissaggo mutti anālayo.
229
Hirakawa 1990: 54.

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 Besides, the teaching of causality also refutes the two extreme views and is

deemed to be the middle way in the Sutta Piṭaka. There are three dyads of extreme

views: The notion of existence and non-existence, recorded in SN 12: 15, 47, 48, and

22: 90; “The feeling and the one who feels it are the same” and “The feeling is one, the

one who feels it is another” in SN 12: 17, 18, and 46; “The soul and the body are the

same” and “The soul is one thing, the body is another” in SN 12: 35, and 36. This

refutation of extremes reveals another abstruse doctrine in Buddhism: no-self. Since the

teaching of causality describes psychological activities and posits no everlasting soul

or entity undergoing the whole process, it needs no such thing as self as other religions

do.

All of these instances prove that the teaching of causality connects the most crucial

doctrines, and merits its central position in Buddhism. Bodhi emphasizes the

importance of the teaching of causality:230

As the frame behind the four noble truths, the key to the perspective of the middle way,

and the conduit to the realization of selflessness, it is the unifying theme running

through the teaching’s multifarious expressions, binding them together as diversified

formulations of a single coherent vision.

Seeing the fundamentality of the teaching of causality, it becomes clear that not

only the variations of dependent origination but all the important teachings and

doctrines that the Buddha taught are rooted in the idea of causation. However, most

variations of the teaching of causality in the Sutta Piṭaka look like an expression or

230
Bodhi 1980: 6.

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teaching for others and hardly convey the Buddha’s enlightenment experience. As

Norman says:231

The paṭicca-samuppāda is described in the Pāli Canon with varying lengths and

starting from various points. This probably represents its use in different contexts of

teaching or instruction, i.e. in his sermons the Buddha would sometimes start from a

specific cause or arrive at a specific effect in the chain, for various doctrinal reasons.

On the other hand, to be a general principle, it is possible that the initial utterance

of the teaching of causality is very vague and sketchy. This characteristic can be found

in the Mahāvagga of the Vinaya. When Sāriputta first heard of the verse chanted by

Assaji, he got dhamma-vision immediately and realized: “Whatever is of the nature to

arise all that is of the nature to cease. (yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ

nirodhadhammaṃ.)”232 In the same way, Moggallāna was said to be inspired by the

same verse. This verse is:233

Those Dhammas which proceed from a cause, of these the Tathāgata has told the cause,

and that which is their ceasing – the great recluse has such a doctrine. (ye dhammā

hetu-pabhavā tesaṃ hetuṃ Tathāgato āha tesaṃ ca yo nirodho; evaṃvādī mahā

samaṇo.)

This succinct verse mentions only the causal nexus between the arising and

ceasing of Dhammas. In other words, the Buddha’s primary and essential teaching

indicates the causal relationship of conditioned phenomena deprived of concrete factors

231
Norman 1990: 33, n. 12.
232
Vin I. 40.
233
Vin I. 40.

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and functions. We have to once again distinguish the personal experience from

instructive teaching. As Hirakawa points out, the Buddha probably realized the teaching

of causality “in an intuitive way” at the moment of his enlightenment. This direct

realization could be ineffable and beyond the range of language, therefore, it can only

be expressed in a general way at the outset. In this sense, this verse “Yaṃ kiñci

samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhammaṃ” has been applied to many people

on the occasion that they got the spotless immaculate vision of the Dhamma, i.e. they

attained at least the first fruition, stream-enterer (sotāpanna), including Koṇḍañña234,

Rāhula 235 , Upāli gahapati 236 , Dīghanakha paribbājaka 237 , Brahmāyu Brāhmaṇa 238 ,

Pokkharasāti Brāhmaṇa239, Kūṭadanta Brāhmaṇa240, Sīha senāpati241, Ugga gahapati242,

and even the deva Sakka243. In these circumstances, this sentence is used as a conclusion

or a praise for what they realized at that unprecedented moment.

By contrast, all the analyses of practical factors, i.e. the variations of dependent

origination, dukkha and the way to eradicate it, rely more or less on actual human

situations. Even though the Buddha must have relied on personal experience and

knowledge to attain Nibbāna, all these analyses passed down to us depend on

individuals and are not necessarily applicable to the Buddha himself. Therefore, it is

234
SN V, 423; Vin I. 10.
235
SN IV, 107; MN III, 280.
236
MN I, 380.
237
MN I, 501.
238
MN II, 145.
239
DN I, 110.
240
DN I, 148.
241
AN IV, 186.
242
AN IV: 210.
243
DN II, 288.

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probably safe to say that the Buddha realized and depended on the idea of causation to

attain Nibbāna, and the various analyses of causality were comparatively not essential

at that moment. This kind of analytical knowledge could be gained after his

enlightenment, after his omniscience. Williams comments on this point:244

Thus we might argue that (like Not-Self), although the Buddha does not mention

dependent origination in the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, the very significance of

the four Noble Truths which formed the content of his enlightenment relies implicitly

on the impersonal lawlike behaviour of causation. Perhaps the Buddha’s understanding

of both Not-Self and dependent origination emerged as he thought more and more (as

he meditated) on the implications of what he had discovered.

If this is true, however, can we condense the Buddha’s intuitive experience into a

concise cause-and-effect relationship? Actually, this causal relationship would seem to

be too simplified so it naturally made people underestimate its value, as Ānanda did.245

Gombrich suggests thus: “The story of the conversion of Sāriputta and Moggallāna

shows us that by that time the Buddha's analysis of reality in terms of the causal process

was considered, at least in learned circles, to be his greatest discovery.” 246 This

assertion sheds a light on the question of what made the Buddha distinguish himself

from his contemporaries, or more specifically what was the critical essence of the

teaching of causality which contributed to the Buddha’s enlightenment. As de Jong says:

“No religion arises in an absolute void, but it becomes a new religion when it

244
Williams 2000: 66.
245
DN II, 55; SN II, 92.
246
Gombrich 2009: 130-31.

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distinguishes itself by the nature of its principal doctrines.”247 Only when we consider

the Buddha’s teachings in its Indian background, can we get a clear picture of the

Buddha’s thoughts and his innovation.

During the Buddha’s time, the main religious or spiritual movements can be

distinguished as Brahminism and non-Brahminism, i.e. Samaṇa.248 This classification

is very general and broad. The Samaṇa movement involved different practice methods

and diverse, more often antagonistic views.249 According to Buddhist records, there

were six most renowned masters, and their doctrines varied in many aspects.250 Even

in the brahminical Vedas, it is not rare that the essential doctrines in different books

vary or contradict each other. 251 Reat points out that while Ṛg Veda praised ritual,

priesthood, and a heavenly afterlife, the Upaniṣadic sages denounced these Vedic

doctrines but discussed the concepts of the soul, rebirth, and liberation.252 Comparing

with the Samaṇa movement, Brahminism developed from ancient times, and hence it

is commonly accepted that Brahminism was the dominant religion in the Ganges area.253

Bronkhorst, though, does not deny that brahmins already lived in this region, but he

suggests that they had not yet gained a superior position in the eastern Ganges plain in

the second century BCE. 254 Hirakawa, however, proposes the opposite process. He

247
De Jong 2000: 175.
248
C.f. Harvey 2013: 8-14; Hirakawa 1990: 16-17; Gethin 1998: 9-13.
249
C.f. Gethin 1998: 10-11.
250
Suttas that mention the six masters are SN 3:1, 44:9; MN 30, 36, 77; DN 16. Their respective
doctrines refer to DN 2. Various speculations refer to MN 60.
251
C.f. Gethin 1998: 12; Jayatilleke 1963: 63-64.
252
Reat 1990: 283.
253
E.g. Collins 1999: 32; Harvey 2013: 8-9; Gethin 1998: 12.
254
Bronkhorst 2011: 1-4.

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suggests that the brahmins lost their prestige due to major political and economic

changes during the Buddha’s time. And, this environment enhanced the development

of new religions.255 In sum, the Buddha probably did not confront a dominant religion

in his day but diverse ones. Therefore, we may suppose that various religions and

spiritual leaders developed their distinctive doctrines and competed for prestige,

disciples and social resources.

Generally speaking, most religious thinkers at that time were looking for the

ultimate truth. The issue they were mostly concerned with was to ascertain an

unchanging essence in this changing world. Their quests can be found in different forms

of questions and statements. There are about fifteen questions recorded in SN 12: 20;

MN 2, and 38, and various statements in MN 63, 72; DN 2, and 9. According to

Gombrich, the biggest deficiency of their quest can be concluded as the entanglement

of ontological questions, what exists, with epistemological questions, how we know

everything.256 The Buddha, on the contrary, separated epistemology from ontology and

he was only concerned with the former. He tackled human experience, specifically:

How our mind works and how we cognize.257 He finally realized that the mechanism

of psychological activities lay in the law of causation and then further elaborated his

discovery through the teaching of causality.

However, the concept of causality seemed not unfamiliar to other ascetics.

255
Hirakawa 1990: 15.
256
Gombrich 2009: 61.
257
Gombrich 2009: 145.

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Nakamura directs our attention to the similarities of the Jain causal theory in the

Uttajjhayaṇa and the Buddhist version in the Suttanipāta.258 He asserts that “[i]t is

likely that this Buddhist idea also developed from among the spiritual atmosphere of

recluses including the Jain and Ājivika ascetics.” 259 Kimura also suggests such an

argument.260 Jayatilleke argues that the true concept of causality was first developed in

Ājivika. “It is with Buddhism that we, for the first time, meet with a clear-cut theory of

causation in the history of Indian thought.” 261 De Jong points out that the idea of

causation found in Jain had never gone any further. It was in Buddhism that the teaching

of causality manifested in various and complicated forms. 262 Keith specifically

contributes the origin of the idea of causation to the Sāṃkhya school. 263 But

Kalupahana and Karunadasa object to the connection of Buddhism with the Sāṃkhya

school; they consider that the causation in the Sāṃkhya school is different from the

Buddhist theory.264

From these studies, we may ascertain that the concept of causality was not

unknown to ancient Indian religions and thinkers. Saigusa especially points out that the

analysis of the relationship between two individual factors was the earliest form of the

teaching of causality, which was not unique in Indian culture. It is when the ceasing

process was attached to the arising process that made Buddhist doctrine unique.265 I

258
Nakamura 1980: 172, n. 14.
259
Nakamura 1980: 170.
260
Kimura 2004: 230-7.
261
Jayatilleke 1963: 444-45.
262
De Jong 2000: 176.
263
Keith 1979: 99.
264
Kalupahana 1975: 145; Karunadasa 2013: 21.
265
Saigusa 2004: 581- 82.

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will further point out that the arising and ceasing processes actually focus on

psychological activities, their arising and ceasing. Ronkin concludes that all these

diverse doctrines in India regarding causality rely on substance metaphysics to different

degrees. And this metaphysics “engenders an ontological model on which the

phenomenal world is made up of externally real entities endowed with qualities; ‘things’

that at their basis are immutable substances and that possess certain characteristics.”266

She continues to distinguish the Buddha’s teachings thus:267

A causal relation between two substances would have a different sense from a causal

relation between two processes or events. Drawing on process metaphysics rather than

substance metaphysics, the Buddha was led into recasting the concept of causation as

a whole.

From her point of view, the Buddha did adopt this deduction method which was

also used by his contemporaries. The point is that he turned his attention to mental

activities and he found that various factors connected by causation form a dynamic

process. Masuda also emphasizes that the importance of the teaching of causality in

Buddhism is not this deduction form but the content it reveals. 268 In this sense, we

cannot say that the Buddha discovered the concept of causality or the principle of

dependent origination. The essential meaning of the Buddha’s finding is not even the

principle of causality but the content of causality. The Buddha used the concept of

causality, most importantly, to analyze mental activities. And he found only the process.

266
Ronkin 2005: 198.
267
Ronkin 2005: 198.
268
Masuda 1987: 95.

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Or, maybe, he did the opposite: he traced internally into his mind and found out the

interdependency of all activities. In either way, he eventually realized that so-called

human beings are made up of processes so that all the notions, attachments, and

defilements can be discarded. All of these find no standing point in this ever-changing

process. We can accordingly deduce that this insight into psychological activities

essentially defines the Buddha’s enlightenment experience. Hamilton makes this point

clear:269

[I]t was to the cognitive process that the Buddha was referring on the occasion of his

Enlightenment when he stated that he understood experience, the cause of experience,

the cessation of experience, and the way to achieve the cessation of experience: later

taught as the Four Noble Truths.

I have suggested that the Buddha’s enlightenment experience was rooted in his

analysis of mental activities based on the concept of causality. When this kind of

personal experience was initially required to be expressed, it was recorded as a simple

sentence: “Whatever is of the nature to arise all that is of the nature to cease.” To be

more precise, the point is not the concept of causality or the process of arising and

ceasing but is the content which keeps arising and ceasing. The answer is quite clear

now: it is our cognition which consists of the causal process. That is what all

enlightened people indicate.

Only when the Buddha started to instruct people or rebut opponents would his

realization be expressed in various descriptions and words. These forms must be

269
Hamilton 2000: 83.

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considered in terms of their contexts and intentions. Since the teaching of causality is

deemed as a principle underlying all the Buddha’s teachings, its various applications

unsurprisingly cause confusion and perplexity. At the same time when Buddhist

doctrines became more and more diversified and complicated, especially when

Buddhist followers got to know these teachings in an indirect way apart from personal

experience and cultural background, the original intentions and meanings would

probably have been lost. For this reason, in the next section, I will discuss three main

applications of the teaching of causality in the light of the Buddha’s intentions and the

cultural context.

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§2.4 The Applications of the Teaching of Causality

§2.4.1 Macrocosm

The abstract principle of the teaching of causality has been considered as a

universal law by some scholars. Jayatilleke specifically points out the similarities

between Buddhism and science, both in content and in method.270 Federman indicates

that the close connection of Buddhism with science can be traced back to the time when

Buddhism was first introduced to the Western world: “Buddhism has been perceived as

an ally of science from as early as the 19th century, and continues to be so today.”271

Hence, Buddhism has earned its reputation of being a scientific religion. Even so, the

differences between Buddhism and science should not be trivialized. For the Buddha,

his greatest concern was dukkha and the cessation of dukkha. Because of this pragmatic

concern, the Buddha shunned any metaphysical or dogmatic teachings and discussions.

Any irrelevant issue was of no importance to him.

In the Vacchagottasaṃyutta, the wanderer Vacchagotta consulted the Buddha

about ten statements repeatedly and the Buddha’s explanations were compiled into

fifty-five suttas! These ten statements include: the world is eternal or not; the world is

finite or not; the relation of soul and body; the four possible statuses of Tathāgata after

his death.272 These views are named as “thinking over the world (lokacintā)” in the

Lokacintā Sutta. 273 The Buddha rejected all these as speculative views (diṭṭhigatā)

270
Jayatilleke 1980: 2.
271
Federman 2011: 40.
272
SN III, 257-58.
273
SN V, 448.

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resorting to the analysis of the five aggregates or the six senses. 274
In the

Abyākatasaṃyutta, these ten statements are said to be undeclared (avyākata).275 The

reason is clear. It is because these queries are unwise and these views do not lead to

Nibbāna. Regardless of these views being held, such miserable situations as: birth,

aging, death, and so on would not disappear accordingly.276 From this point of view, we

may include the application of the universe into irrelevant issues. Shulman surmises

and goes so far as to say that the Buddha even denounced such assertion:277

The Buddha seems not to have said that all things arise dependent on their conditioning.

In fact, he may have condemned such a statement an unhealthy speculative view. When

the Buddha did describe something as dependently-arisen, he was referring only to

phenomenal aspects of saṃsāric experience.

However, from many passages in the Sutta Piṭaka which mentioned causation in

the world, it is easy to conclude that Buddhism is a scientific religion. Kalupahana lists

five categories regarding the application of the teaching of causality from the DA: the

inorganic world (utuniyāma), the organic world (bījaniyāma), the sphere of thought or

mental life (cittaniyāma), the social and moral sphere (kammaniyāma), and the higher

spiritual life (dhammaniyāma).278 Then he gives various examples regarding personal

mental activities, social phenomena, physical world, etc. Hence, he argues that these

empirical causal explanations are meant to reject various metaphysical theories and

274
SN IV, 394-97.
275
SN IV, 391 ff. See also MN I, 428 ff.
276
MN I, 430.
277
Shulman 2008: 309.
278
DA II, 432; Kalupahana 1975: 110.

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views.279 This argument is not wrong, but he also suggests that these passages show the

Buddha’s explanation of man and the environment.280 In fact, I will suggest that the

Buddha adopted the impersonal instances only in order to make known the analysis of

mind. The third and the fifth categories are the point, i.e. mental life and spiritual life.

The analysis of the physical world, either organic or inorganic, is not the purpose but a

means. Mizuno rightly commented on this point:281

From the examples mentioned above, we find many different kinds of dependent

origination. The intention is not to describe phenomena in reality world but to point out

the origin of suffering and the consummate attainment… Dependent origination talks

about human being’s life. Although the causation of natural world sometimes is used

as a metaphor, it is not real goal. (Italics added.)

A special example is the discussion of the Aggañña Sutta.282 From the first reading,

it seems that the Buddha was elaborating on the origin of the universe and social

organization. This is also the traditional explanation in Theravāda. Gombrich, after

comparing with brahminical scriptures, convincingly asserts that this is a satirical

work.283 After all, this sutta starts with the Buddha’s care for two brahmin students who

want to become monks. They are exactly the same students in the Vāseṭṭha Sutta.

(Discussed in section 2.2) Here the Buddha once again rejected the idea that brahmins

are distinguished by birth or caste (vaṇṇa). Then he gave a lengthy discourse to mimic

279
Kalupahana 1975: 143.
280
Kalupahana 1975: 110.
281
Mizuno 1988: 140.
282
DN III, 80 ff.
283
Gombrich 1992: 161.

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brahminical genesis by alluding to their story and terminology. Thus, he altered all the

meanings of the brahminical caste system. Finally, regardless of one’s caste, as long as

one is restrained in body, speech, and mind, and has developed the seven requisites of

enlightenment, this person will attain Nibbāna. Hence, it was unfitting to explain the

origin of the macrocosm to two students who have been abused by other brahmins.

However, the connection between the chain of the twelve links and brahminical

cosmogony is suggested by some scholars. Wayman compares the first four links with

the cosmic development of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.284 Jurewicz systematically

indicates the similarities between the whole twelve links and brahminical literature. She

thus concludes that the theory of dependent origination is a refutation device:285

I would rather argue that he formulated the pratītyasamutpāda as a polemic against

Vedic thought. Through the identification of the creative process with the process that

leads only to suffering, he rejected the Brāhmiṇic way of thinking in a truly spectacular

way.

Though I cannot ascertain that the Buddha himself contrived the twelve links, I do

not deny that he employed some brahminical ideas or terms at some point, such as

nāmarūpa, and āyatana. These instances will be discussed in the next chapters.

Gombrich thus connects the application of the universe with the Buddha’s intention of

irony:286

Among the many interpretations offered by commentators both ancient and modern,

284
Wayman 1974: 230.
285
Jurewicz 2000: 170.
286
Gombrich 2009: 142.

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 some have tried to see the Chain of Dependent Origination as dealing with the

macrocosm. I hope it is already clear that in my view that must be wrong. But it is quite

possible that this line of thought preserves some memory of the fact that the Buddha

was ironizing a doctrine that originally dealt principally with the macrocosm.

According to this analysis, we may reckon this kind of description of the

macrocosm as a skill-in-means to convey his ideas. It would be irrelevant for the

Buddha to explain the genesis of the world or social phenomena, though he sometimes

used natural instances. In the Khandhasaṃyutta, the Buddha mentioned the conditions

required for seeds to grow.287 On this occasion, he never intended to explain how the

organic world works. It is not like Jayatilleke suggests. Jayatilleke argues that this is “a

case of natural physical (biological) causation”. 288 However, in this instance, the

Buddha took seeds as similes which must have been known to the disciples, possibly

peasants previously, to elaborate how consciousness sustains. Just as seeds need soil

and water, so consciousness requires form, feeling, perception and volitional formation

as its standing bases (soil) and delight and lust as the nutrient (water). By doing so, the

Buddha brought out two main points: that consciousness is not independent and it gets

liberated when these causes are cut off. He adopted an existing understandable instance

to interpret his idea which was unknown to his audiences. And his intention always

focused on the working of the mind. It is this epistemological feature that makes the

Buddha’s teaching of causality distinguishable from other religions and thinkers.

287
SN III, 54.
288
Jayatilleke 1963: 446-47.

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§2.4.2 Saṃsāra, Kamma and Anattā

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Jayatilleke argues that the primary

purpose of the chain of the twelve links is to explain saṃsāra and kamma, or the

doctrine of no-self, rather than dukkha. This argument mainly relies on the fact that the

chain of the twelve links is frequently used to rebut two extremes, as discussed in the

previous section. Kalupahana further explains thus:289

It is possible to maintain that the ultimate purpose of the special formulation is to

explain the origin and cessation of suffering. But other important issues are also

involved…The Buddha, for whom karma and rebirth were realities, was reluctant to

contribute to anyone of these metaphysical theories. The empiricist approach of the

Buddha prevented him from positing an unverifiable soul to explain the continuity of

the individual after death. On the other hand, he was far removed from the materialist

approach denying the continuity of the individual and his moral responsibility. Thus,

the problem he confronted was to explain the working of karma and the process of

rebirth without falling into the two extreme metaphysical theories of self-causation and

external causation.

He indicates two points: that the notion of no-self comes from the Buddha’s

experience and that he used it to rebut other extreme views. This is the same as I have

previously emphasized that the difference between these two implications is their

intentions. The difference becomes clearer if we refer to the Buddha’s enlightenment

experience. First of all, the Buddha probably would have never heard of the notion of

no-self before his enlightenment. He probably had known the rejection of self as

289
Kalupahana 1975: 142.

- 99 -
nihilists did. However, it would be impossible for him to accept such nihilism because

these nihilists also rejected the necessity of liberation. By contrast, he most probably

had tried to find a way to enable “himself” to escape from saṃsāra, or rebirth and death.

The notion of self (attā) as an entity is widely accepted in Indian culture and must have

been known to him. It would also have been quite impossible for him to have presumed

the notion of no-self so that he could destroy the yoke of saṃsāra. His approach was to

look inside his mind and to analyze how it worked. When he finally penetrated into the

mechanism of mind, he escaped all the fetters and got to know that self or soul was just

a notion. Therefore, the doctrine of no-self would have been the outcome of his

enlightenment experience, not a prerequisite. But all these factors are closely connected

and could have happened at the same time. Rahula rightly points out that the no-self

theory “is the natural result of, or the corollary to, the analysis of the Five Aggregates

and the teaching of Conditioned Genesis.”290 Shulman also describes the progress of

this Buddhist doctrine:291

The Buddha of the Nikāyas teaches a doctrine that is based on an analysis of the

Self/self. He is seen to be an integral part of the spiritual community of his day, a

community in search of the deathless essence of subjectivity. The Buddha was unique

in this religious milieu in that his search for the Self discovered only mental

conditioning.

In this sense, the intention of the application of no-self is to convert the notion of

self, just like the Buddha did to the wanderer Vacchagotta. This wanderer must have

290
Rahula 1985: 52.
291
Shulman 2008: 312.

- 100 -
been so obsessed by the premise of “substance metaphysics”, in Ronkin’s words, that

he kept inquiring of the Buddha the ten statements time after time. On one occasion the

Buddha commented to Vacchagotta that because the latter held another view, accepted

another teaching, approved of another teaching, pursued a different training, and

followed a different teacher, so he was unable to understand the Dhamma. 292 On

another occasion, the Buddha did not even respond to Vacchagotta’s questions about

self.293 Later, the Buddha explained the reasons to Ānanda:294

(The Buddha) If, Ananda, when I was asked by the wanderer Vacchagotta, “Is there a

self?” had I answered, “There is a self,” would this have been consistent on my part

with the arising of the knowledge that “all phenomena are no-self”?

(Ānanda) No, venerable sir.

(The Buddha) And if, when I was asked by him, “Is there no self?” had I answered,

“There is no self,” the wanderer Vacchagotta, already confused, would have fallen into

even greater confusion, thinking, “It seems that the self I formerly had does not exist

now.” (Bodhi 2000a: 1394.)

In this instance, we may see that the notion of no-self could sometimes cause

confusion. The reason is that no-self is a notion. Unless one sees one’s mind “as it really

is”, the notion of no-self can be internalized as personal experience. This can be

illustrated by the discussion between the Venerable Khemaka and sixty elder bhikkhus.

Khemaka clarifies to them thus:295

292
MN I, 487.
293
SN IV, 400-01.
294
SN IV, 401.
295
SN III, 128.

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 I do not regard anything among these five aggregates subject to clinging as self or as

belonging to self, yet I am not an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed. Friends, [the

notion] “I am” has not yet vanished in me in relation to these five aggregates subject to

clinging, but I do not regard [anything among them] as “This I am.” (Bodhi 2000a:

943.)

Then Khemaka compared the notion of “I am (asmī)” to a smell of cleaning

materials, a cloth which, although washed, had a residual smell. This indicates that even

though Khemaka knew the doctrine of no-self, i.e. he had been washed, he was still

affected by the notion of “I am” in the form of the underlying tendency (anusaya).296

Only when he dwelt contemplating the mental activities or the arising and ceasing of

the five aggregates of clinging (pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu udayabbayānupassī

viharati), and put the notion of self and no-self aside, that the underlying tendency to

“I am” could be uprooted, as the end of this sutta shows.297 As Shulman suggests:

“Although a monk may have an initial conceptual understanding of the teaching of

selflessness, it is the direct seeing of the rise and fall of the aggregates that brings one

to a full absorption of its impact.”298 The Buddha also proclaimed that he only saw the

arising and ceasing of the five aggregates and abandoned “speculative views

(diṭṭhigatā)”. 299 To me, this proclamation reveals the reason why the Buddha got

enlightened was that he was able to fully concentrate on his mental activities,

296
SN III, 131: evam eva kho, āvuso, kiñcāpi ariyasāvakassa pañcorambhāgiyāni saññojanāni
pahīnāni bhavanti, atha khvassa hoti yo ca pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu anusahagato ‘asmī’ti,
māno ‘asmī’ti, chando ‘asmī’ti anusayo asamuhato.
297
SN III, 131-32.
298
Shulman 2014: 167.
299
MN I, 486.

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consequently there was no view, of either self or no-self, underlying in him, not even a

trace. So with Khemaka; it was only when he immersed himself into the analysis of his

mind that he got rid of the notion of self and no-self. Robinson and Johnson explain

thus:300

For a person well advanced on the Path, the Buddha says, the question of whether or

not there is a self simply would not occur. Such a person would be more involved in

observing phenomena as they arise and pass away than in engaging in such speculations.

All of this indicates that the not-self doctrine, like the teaching on suffering, is to be

regarded as a strategy of diagnosis and therapy for undercutting craving, attachment,

and the factor of sustenance in the formula of dependent co-arising.

The reasons that the Buddha taught the doctrine of no-self are: he realized there

was no such entity after his enlightenment and exhorted others not to waste time

searching for “self (attā)”. Therefore, applying the teaching of causality to the

explanation of no-self can be nothing but a retrospective proclamation or a refutation.

As a result, interpreting the chain of the twelve links as the saṃsāric process covering

three lives or numerous lives, no matter if it was formulized by the Buddha or not, from

my point of view, although it is not incorrect, is not essential. Such interpretations

should not be realized by knowledge or analysis but by experience. The worst thing is

the attachment to any kind of interpretation. In fact, this attempt brings out many

arguments and controversies. Since these interpretations leave other critical questions

unsolved, such as: How to explain consciousness and becoming which transmigrate

300
Robinson and Johnson 1997: 38.

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between different lives; how can kamma sustain in this process without resorting to a

subject, and how to get rid of ignorance in a previous life. More specific problems are

proposed by Johansson and motivate his book: The Dynamic Psychology of Early

Buddhism.301 Jayatilleke objects to this strict division of three lives thus: “since the

present life, from the point of view of the past, is the future, and from the point of view

of the future life, is the past. So we do not have to take the first two links or the last two

on faith since they can be experienced in this life itself.”302 All those questions require

lengthy discussion and should not bother us here. However, from the fact that there are

so many incompatible opinions about the chain of the twelve links, probably the most

controversial doctrine in Buddhism, it raises our suspicion whether the Buddha himself

developed this ambiguous formula or not.

Besides, the chain of the twelve links can be considered as a description of the

saṃsāric experience rather than the cognitive activity. As Hamilton argues: “[T]he

paṭiccasamuppāda formula is not describing the arising of consciousness and it is

inappropriate to attempt to establish a mini version of the cognitive process in the

middle of it.”303 In her understanding, these two ideas “have different purposes and

describe different processes” and paṭiccasamuppāda “is saṃsāric activity which leads

to further saṃsāric existence, not a description of the ontological status of the cognitive

activity itself.”304 Drummond clearly rejects her argument.305 He points out that in the

301
Johansson 1985: 7-8.
302
Jayatilleke 1975: 204-05.
303
Hamilton 1996: 134.
304
Hamilton 1996: 134.
305
Drummond 2001: 149 ff.

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chain of the twelve links, volitional formations mean bodily, oral, and mental activities

and they bring out the arising of the six types of consciousness. This process must be

cognitive. Furthermore, he resorts to the explanation of rebirth-consciousness

(paṭisandhi-viññāṇa) in the Visuddhimagga. Since rebirth-consciousness depends on

the six types of consciousness, the arising of volitional formations also means the

cognitive processes. Reat also treats both paṭiccasamuppāda and the five aggregates as

“fundamental theoretical complexes of Buddhist psychology” and “an analysis of both

the individual and the world.”306 What he means by “the world” is the experiential

object based on perception. Hence, it would not be far-fetched to argue that the teaching

of causality or the chain of the twelve links explains the operation of cognition.

Even though the Sutta Piṭaka did not explicitly explain the chain of the twelve

links referring to sequential lives, many scholars find evidence to support this

assumption. According to their explanations, two points that break the twelve links into

three lives are consciousness and birth.307 It is evident that birth can mean the beginning

of a new life. And consciousness is construed as the subject which falls into

(okkamati)308 or descends to (avakkanti)309 a body. (This explanation will be discussed

in detail in section 4.2 entitled an integrated consciousness) In Abhidhamma tradition,

this consciousness is called rebirth-consciousness. Therefore, the first two links come

from the past life; the third to tenth links describe the present life; the last two represent

306
Reat 1990: 326.
307
E.g. Bodhi 2000a: 518-19; Kalupahana 1975: 145; Collins 1999: 203-04; Gethin 1998: 150-51.
308
DN II, 63.
309
SN II, 90-91.

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life in the future. The most important is that the division of three lives is considered as

an explanation of transmigration without resorting to an everlasting entity as Jayatilleke

argues. Collins also suggests this:310

The fundamental function of the dependent origination list is to express the Buddhist

idea of the wheel of life turning continuously without any self as a causal agent or

persisting subject of karma.

Ñāṇavīra and Buddhadāsa strongly object to the explanation of three lives

regarding the chain of the twelve links. 311 Both of them resort to the principle of

Dhamma which is “directly visible, immediate, inviting one to come and see, applicable,

to be personally experienced by the wise. (sandiṭṭhiko ayaṃ dhammo akāliko

ehipassiko opaneyyiko paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhi.)”312 If the twelve links span three

lives, the Dhamma would not be possible to be experienced right away. In this sense,

Ñāṇavīra criticizes thus: “Any interpretation of paṭiccasamuppāda that involves time

is an attempt to resolve the present problem by referring to past or future, and is

therefore necessarily mistaken.” 313 Buddhadāsa further argues that the twelve links

arise and cease in one moment: “In just one moment, a complete cycle of

Paticcasamuppada can roll on. Or it could roll on in the space of two or three moments,

depending on the situation.” 314 Another critical point is the explanation of rebirth-

consciousness. Ñāṇavīra and Buddhadāsa consider it is a kind of eternalism

310
Collins 1999: 204.
311
Ñāṇavīra 2003: 80-81; Buddhadāsa 2002: 21 ff.
312
SN I, 9. (Bodhi 2000a: 98.) See also: SN I, 117, 220; II, 69; IV, 41-43.
313
Ñāṇavīra 2003: 81.
314
Buddhadāsa 2002: 22.

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(sassatavāda). 315 Drummond, though, accepts some passages which explain the

transmigration process, he rejects that this is the purpose of the twelve links:316

However, if the twelve links are interpreted as a model of transmigration, which

themselves represent three life-times, this would be due to traditional affective reasons

rather than pure logical inference. Using the twelve links to explain the three life-times

model is redundant; it also ignores the similarity of the five aggregates. In addition, this

interpretation over-looks the fact that the Buddha teaches meditation to guide people

to achieve awakening in this life time, not in some far distant time, place, gender or

lifetime.

By contrast, Drummond tends to interpret the consciousness as the six types of

sense consciousness and the teaching of causality as the cognitive processes. His

conclusion follows one of the approaches suggested by Bucknell. The explanation of

specific links and that of the teaching of causality are closely related. The connection

between the chain of the twelve links and the explanation of transmigration is so

convincing and reasonable that it has been accepted for such a long time. Jones points

out this connection could be an attempt to solve a question which was not clearly

elaborated by the Buddha:317

In short, it would appear that the commentators, by assigning specific, literal meanings

to each of the twelve nidānas, created out of paṭicca samuppāda religious and

metaphysical doctrine describing the rebirth process according to karma. In the suttas,

however, the nidānas are defined in more general and suggestive ways, and the twelve-

315
Ñāṇavīra 2003: 81; Buddhadāsa 2002: 68.
316
Drummond 2001: 162. No English version is published. This is my backtranslation which has been
revised by the writer.
317
Jones 2009b: 244.

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 fold formula does not mention karma. This is not to say that the Buddha did not teach

karma and rebirth, which he clearly did; only that paṭicca samuppāda is not presented

in the canon as explaining it. Indeed, the Buddha does not appear to have explained the

mechanism of the rebirth process or the exact workings of karma. Perhaps this is why

the later Buddhists utilized paṭicca samuppāda to render into definite religious doctrine

what the Buddha had left unexplained.

Regarding this point, it is only if we refer to the Buddha’s foremost concern which

is the dependency of mental activities, that the chain of the twelve links can be deemed

as one example of the explanation of cognition. This suggestion is regardless of by

whom it was formulized and its application, but it basically conforms to the description

of the process of mental activities. More importantly, all the explanations cannot avoid

interpreting some links as cognitive activities. Therefore, it would not be far-fetched to

include the twelve links as one type of cognition. Shulman thus comments: “The insight

of mental conditioning could thus serve as the primary meaning of pratītyāsamutpāda,

and hence the analysis of rebirth would be understood as a particular case of this

fundamental insight.”318

§2.4.3 The Mind

By now I hope I have made my point crystal clear. The insight into the working of

the mind was both the content of the Buddha’s enlightenment experience and the

content he tried to convey to others. With his insight, he found that so-called “mind” is

composed of mental activities which comply with the law of causation. Gethin points

318
Shulman 2008: 303, n. 15.

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out the importance of the mind in the teaching of causality: “First, the Buddhist attempt

to understand the ways of causal conditioning is concerned primarily with the workings

of the mind: the way in which things we think, say, and do have an effect on both our

selves and others.”319 This importance also links with the path to liberation, as Williams

says:320

The primary orientation of Buddhism, therefore, is towards the transformative

experience of the individual, for there are no experiences that are not experiences of

individuals. Buddhism is thus also concerned first and foremost with the mind, or, to

be more precise, with mental transformation, for there are no experiences that are not

in some sense reliant on the mind.

This understanding of mental transformation necessarily connects the Four Noble

Truths: the origin and cessation of dukkha. Jones concludes this connection and rejects

other applications:321

The Kalahavivāda sutta thus shows that a primitive version of the paṭiccasamuppāda

chain belongs to the earliest known Buddhism. However, this version is not concerned

with rebirth according to karma, and nor does it appear to be concerned with parodying

cosmogonic ideas. It simply concerns the arising of dukkha through a cognitive process

in which the hedonic properties of experience lead to reactive greed, emotional

entanglement, and all the ills of the human situation.

Following this psychological approach, there is no need to explain the chain of the

twelve links referring to different lives. The most critical point of the teaching of

319
Gethin 1998: 153-54.
320
Williams 2000: 2-3.
321
Jones 2009a: 36.

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causality should be discussed from the aspect of daily life. As Norman points out: “The

Pāli commentators analyse the twelve-fold version as being spread over three existences,

but it seems more likely that it was in its original formulation a simple empirical

assertion, with no reference to more than one birth.”322 Drummond construes dependent

origination as an analysis of mental cognitive process instead of saṃsāric process.323

However, this approach also brings out different interpretations regarding the teaching

of causality. As mentioned in the previous section, Ñāṇavīra and Buddhadāsa discuss

the whole twelve links regardless of temporal transition. They explain the twelve links

which arise and cease in only one moment from the aspect of cognition. Gethin

considers the analysis into every moment as a means to discover the nature of mind:324

The point that is being made is that reality is at heart something dynamic, something

fluid; however one looks at it, reality is a process; analyse reality down to its smallest

possible components or constituents, and what one finds are, not static building blocks,

but dynamic processes.

On the other hand, some scholars try to accept different interpretations as

alternatives. Harvey suggests that the chain of the twelve links can be seen as “the

perceptual process” which constantly arises and ceases to be an alternative

interpretation of three lives.325 Mizuno distinguishes two different explanations: by the

temporal or factual method and by the momentary or theoretical method, and he accepts

322
Norman 1990: 24.
323
Drummond 2001: 162.
324
Gethin 1998: 155.
325
Harvey 2004: 134-36.

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both as means to convey the teaching of causality in Buddhism.326 Kimura indicates

that psychological phenomena involve both a simultaneous aspect and an asynchronous

aspect. And the Buddha never implied either one clearly.327 In any case, the analysis of

the teaching of causality reveals a dynamic and causal process of mental activities, not

physical phenomena. Gombrich clearly emphasizes the Buddha’s intention:328

True, the Buddha saw our experiences as an ever-changing process, a stream of

consciousness... he did not see an object like a stone or a table as changing from

moment to moment. Nor did he hold the opposite view. Such an analysis of the world

outside our minds was to him irrelevant and a mere distraction from what should be

commanding our attention, namely, escape from saṃsāra… it was our experience of

the world -- of life, if you like, that the Buddha was focusing on and it was our

experience that he considered to be a causally conditioned process.

I will once again take the wanderer Vacchagotta as an example to conclude this

discussion. After Vacchagotta’s longtime inquiry about speculative views (recorded in

the Vacchagottasaṃyutta and the Abyākatasaṃyutta), the Buddha compared the death

of Tathāgata to the extinguishment of fire in the Aggivacchagotta Sutta (MN 72).329 It

seems that Vacchagotta eventually realized his ignorance by this simile. Later on, he

changed his interest, asking the Buddha to teach him wholesome and unwholesome

dhammas (kusalākusala) in the next sutta: the Mahāvacchagotta Sutta (MN 73). 330

Here the Buddha emphasized that a bhikkhu should abandon craving and destroy taints

326
Mizuno 1988: 137-38.
327
Kimura 2004: 410.
328
Gombrich 2009: 67.
329
MN I, 487.
330
MN I, 489-90.

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without recourse of the notion of no-self. After he confirmed that this method could be

successful for anyone, Vacchagotta requested to become a monk. At the last stage, the

Buddha taught him, now a bhikkhu, serenity and insight (samatho ca vipassanā ca) in

order to obtain the six direct knowledges (chaḷabhiññā). After a period of time, he

became an arahant and obtained the threefold knowledge (tevijja) which was exactly

the topic mentioned by the Buddha in their reunion in the Tevijjavaccha Sutta (MN

71).331 The accomplishment of Vacchagotta reveals that the Buddha foresaw his talent

from the beginning.

Through this vivid journey of Vacchagotta, we can figure out what the Buddha’s

attitude toward these three applications was. From the beginning, the Buddha rejected

those speculative views and identified them as undeclared. In the middle, he avoided

confusing this obsessed wanderer with the notion of no-self. Because no-self as a notion

can be mingled with the notion of self. Both notions can be speculative views if they

have not been examined by wisdom. After Vacchagotta realized that life was like the

burning fire without substance, the notion of self and no-self no longer hindered him.

Then, the Buddha directed Vacchagotta to observe his own mind to attain Nibbāna.

According to the Buddha’s attitude, I, therefore, doubt the first application of the

teaching of causality. First of all, the Buddha did not intend to explain how this world

functioned because it was irrelevant to liberation. Even when he mentioned natural

instances or macrocosm, he always took these examples as simile or metaphor to

331
MN I, 482.

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explain the mechanism of mind, or as satire to destroy nonsensical edifices of

knowledge. The second application is acceptable as an attempt to explain the notion of

no-self or rather to correct the wrong view of an existing self or soul. Its purpose was

to make people abandon the belief in self so that it would not perplex or deter people

from contemplating their changing and transient mental activities. And, I consider the

last application as the gist of the Buddha’s teachings. The teaching of causality

describes human psychological activities in direct but diverse ways. Therefore, it not

only reflects the Buddha’s enlightenment experience but also demonstrates both the

mundane conundrum and the supermundane solution for individuals. It not only is the

essence of the Dhamma but also the way to reach that goal.

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§2.5 Summary

The motive of the Buddha’s renunciation is vividly depicted in the story of his

encounter of the four sights: an old man, a sick man, a dead corpse, and a mendicant.332

Even though this story is more symbolic than factual, it does indicate that the

imperfection in this world was the causes of the Buddha’s Noble Quest. In the

Ariyapariyesanā Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, the Buddha recalled his past:333

Suppose that, being myself subject to birth, having understood the danger in what is

subject to birth, I seek the unborn supreme security from bondage, Nibbāna. Suppose

that, being myself subject to aging, sickness, death, sorrow, and defilement, having

understood the danger in what is subject to aging, sickness, death, sorrow, and

defilement, I seek the unaging, unailing, deathless, sorrowless, and undefiled supreme

security from bondage, Nibbāna. (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001: 256.)

This awareness is what I consider as the inception of Buddhism. The need to get

rid of such dukkha was the primary goal before the Buddha’s enlightenment and his

ultimate intention to instruct others in the rest of his life. This point should be the

foremost concern whenever we discuss Buddhist doctrines. However, the idea of

looking for liberation from saṃsāra was not unusual in ancient India, even up to today.

Many thinkers or masters have claimed that they have achieved the final goal.334 The

Buddha was not unique among this stream. What made him outstanding, as we have

reviewed from extant sources in this chapter, was his insight into the mechanism of

332
Jat I, 58-59.
333
MN I, 163.
334
MN I, 510; II, 196.

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mind: How it works, especially how it gets entangled in dukkha or saṃsāra so that he

can figure out the way to escape from that predicament. According to his analysis, the

mechanism of mind is mental processes in compliance with the relationship of cause

and effect. This impersonal principle of causality, on the one hand, dominates our

experience, on the other hand, it allows the personal will to be involved to shape the

future. That is what the verse “Whatever is of the nature to arise all that is of the nature

to cease.” means. Hence, everyone equally has a chance to get liberated and should take

full responsibility for this.

On the other hand, just as the simile of the lotus indicates, each individual’s

conditions vary and each one’s mental activities are also different.335 The Buddha, out

of his insight and compassion, taught the Dhamma to describe his enlightenment

experience and to prescribe the way of getting rid of dukkha as well. The prescriptions

he gave depend on the situation or the background of individuals or collective groups.

For this reason, we get an impression that the discourses in different suttas look

sometimes specific but sometimes abstract and general. As Wynne indicates:336

We should suppose that the Buddha taught numerous individuals, including those who

were his disciples and those who were not; that his teaching comprised individual

instruction as well as public sermons and debates; that he taught in a variety of regional

dialects; and even that his method of teaching and its content changed from person to

person as well as over time.

In any case, all the descriptions of the teaching of causality to a great extent

335
SN I, 138; MN I, 169; II, 93.
336
Wynne 2010: 191.

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describe our psychological activities. We should consider all these variations together

to grasp the Buddha’s teaching of causality and all the variations are legitimate in

accordance with his intention. All these variations prove that the teaching of causality

is “a process perpetually underpinning our own everyday sensory experience, activated

by our responses to the feelings arisen at the six sense bases.”337 It is this presumption

that the next chapter will discuss the initial position of the six senses in the cognitive

processes.

337
Bodhi 2000a: 523.

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 Chapter 3 The Six Senses as the Beginning of
Cognition

What we experience through the six senses is the base of what we recognize.

Therefore, the six senses and their respective objects are what the Buddha called “the

all (sabba)” or “the domain (visaya)”.338 In the Loka Sutta, the Buddha equated the

arising and ceasing of the world to the arising and ceasing process from the six senses

to aging-and-death.339 Thus, the Buddha said that it was until reaching the end of the

world that one could bring an end to dukkha.340 Here the so-called “world” does not

mean its geographic sense, it cannot be known, seen, or reached by traveling.341 What

the Buddha called the “world” is actually our fathom-long body (vyāmamatte kaḷevare)

endowed with perception and mind (saññimhi samanake).342 The Buddha’s assertion

was built on the fact that a human being is a perceiver, a conceiver of the world

(lokasaññī, lokamānī) through the six senses. 343 Karunadasa emphasizes that it is

“through the activity of our physical and mental sense-faculties that a world can be

experienced and known at all.”344 This world is thus not a physical one but only exists

in our experience obtained through our senses. Or we can say if this external world

exists, it is because we can experience it and recognize it. As Gombrich says: “[F]or the

338
SN IV, 15.
339
SN II, 73-4; IV, 87-8.
340
SN I, 62.
341
SN IV, 93; AN 9: 38.
342
SN I, 62.
343
SN IV, 95.
344
Karunadasa 2013: 23.

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Buddha ‘the world’ is the same as ‘that which we can normally experience’.” 345

From this point of view, the importance of the six senses lies in their initial position

of our experiences, of our cognitive processes. As Bodhi says, they are the “starting

points for the genesis of cognition”.346 Gombrich also asserts thus: “Cognition, for the

Buddha, begins with the exercise of the six faculties.”347 And the crucial point is that

whatever comes in through the six senses causes a series of mental reactions. The

analysis of mental activities is the essence of the teaching of causality as I emphasized

in the previous chapter. This teaching intends to reveal the nature of mind which is a

dependent and ever-changing process. Ronkin makes this point quite clear:348

Hence, the boundaries of one's cognitive process are the boundaries of one's world: the

latter is the world of one's own experience, dependent on the workings of one's

cognitive apparatus. All encountered phenomena are best portrayed and understood in

terms of processes rather than of substances.

In this process, all factors and functions depend on other factors and functions.

Therefore, there is no genuine beginning of this stream of psychological activities. The

Buddha said: “This saṃsāra is without discoverable beginning. A first point is not

discerned of beings roaming and wandering on hindered by ignorance and fettered by

craving.”349 However, for discussion, we need a point to start with and that is the six

senses in Buddhism. We should also keep this in mind from the outset that even the six

345
Gombrich 2009: 9.
346
Bodhi 2000a: 1124.
347
Gombrich 2009: 144.
348
Ronkin 2005: 244.
349
SN II, 178: anamataggāyaṃ saṃsāro pubbākoṭi na paññāyati avijjānīvaraṇānaṃ sattānaṃ
taṇhāsaṃyojanānaṃ sandhāvataṃ saṃsarataṃ. (Bodhi 2000a: 651.)

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senses are conditioned in the cognitive processes. The reason why those causes

preceding the six senses are ignored in this study is that they are not significantly

involved in our daily experience. By that, I do not deny their effects in cognition. Take

ignorance, the fundamental factor in saṃsāra, for example. From the Buddhist view,

there is no moment that our psychological activities are not under the influence of

ignorance or lack of wisdom. In this sense, on the one hand, its cognitive function is

not so obvious. On the other hand, we cannot avoid mentioning it throughout the

discussion of other factors in the cognitive processes. Since only significant factors will

be discussed in this study, the functions of the six senses earn themselves the first stage

in the cognitive processes.

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§3.1 The Functions of the Six Senses

It was quite common that the Buddha analyzed our senses as six types which were

cakkhu, sota, ghāna, jivhā, kāya and mano in Pāli terms. It is also common that people

translate the five bodily terms with physiological implications: eye, ear, nose, tongue

and body; and the last one mano as psychological: mind. As a result, the five bodily

senses are naturally conceived as the five physical organs which are opposite to the

mind. It appears that Buddhist analysis confirms Descarte's mind-body dualism. But is

it? In the Ādittapariyāya Sutta of the Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta, it is said that the five bodily

sense faculties can be lacerated by various sharp tools, while the mind can only be

harmed by sleep.350 In this sense, the five bodily sense faculties do denote physical

organs. This is the view that many scholars hold.351 On the other hand, since the mind

always lists with the other five bodily senses, some scholars also consider it as a

physical organ. For example, Rahula definitely counts it as an organ. 352 Johansson

suggests that mind has “interior organisation” but he admits that there is no direct

evidence.353 Ñāṇavīra locates mano in the brain.354 According to Hamilton’s research,

there is no place both in the Sutta Piṭaka and the Abhidhamma Piṭaka designating mano

a physical location.355 It is Buddhaghosa who first declared heart-basis (hadayavatthu)

as the location of mano in the Visuddhimagga. 356 His argument hence became the

350
SN IV, 168 ff.
351
E.g. Gethin 1998: 140; Harvey 2013: 70; Jayatilleke 1963: 433; Rahula 1985: 20-21; Hirakawa
1990: 143; Boisvert 1997: 40; Bronkhorst 2009: 28; Giustarini 2005: 153.
352
Rahula 1985: 22.
353
Johansson 1965: 188.
354
Ñāṇavīra 2003: 89.
355
Hamilton 1996: 22-23.
356
Vism, 447.

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traditional view in the Theravāda school.

However, it is not satisfactory to treat not only the mind but all of the six senses

as physical organs. I will suggest that they basically denote figurative functions in the

Sutta Piṭaka. It is in this way that the six senses play a critical role in the cognitive

processes. Through the discussion of the functions of the six senses, this section reveals

their real connotation. Another point that should be noted is: even though we are used

to separating mind and body, the Sutta Piṭaka did not clearly imply this. Indeed, it may

be the opposite. The six senses are mostly described in the same manner. In order to

emphasize this point, all my quotations will include only the first sentence regarding

the eye but the full description of the related mind aspect. The repetitive parts in terms

of the five bodily faculties will be omitted. By doing so, we can keep alert to the unified

description in terms of all six senses. On the other hand, the unique connotation of the

mind faculty will be discussed in the last section.

Except as mentioned along, the six senses sometimes are referred to as āyatana,

indriya, and dhātu in the Sutta Piṭaka. All three of these terms are suggested by

Hamilton to denote some sort of figurative meanings rather than physical organs.357 The

term āyatana is most well known in the twelve links as the six sense bases (saḷāyatana).

There is a section named after it in the Saṃyutta Nikāya. According to Jurewicz, the

term āyatana had already been used in the cosmogonic descriptions of the Aitareya

Upaniṣad. It means both the abode of the highest subjective powers which “governing

357
Hamilton 1996: 16-18.

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the cognitive powers and instruments” and the abode of “the object of cognition of these

cognitive powers and instruments.”358 Being the abode of the subject and the object,

āyatana offers a platform allowing the two opposite powers to meet together. Jurewicz

further points out the similarity between Buddhism and the Upaniṣad. The appearance

of āyatana in the twelve links is the same as it is in the Upaniṣad which indicates “the

manifestation of the subjective powers and their objects.”359 Therefore, āyatana has an

implication that it combines subject aspect and object aspect and then brings out

subsequent activities. The first explanation of āyatana given by the PED is “sphere,

locus, place….”360 Hence, this term is better rendered as a sphere or locus of the six

senses “which establishes the foundation of the psychological life of the individual”.361

In Buddhist analysis, the actual psychological event of the meeting of subject and object

is contact (phassa). It is in this sense that the six senses are also named after “the six

bases for contact (cha phassāyatanā)”.362 Without these bases, there is no possibility

for the interaction between subject and object and, therefore, for all experiences.

Sometimes āyatana includes not only the six internal senses (cha ajjhattikā

āyatanā) but also the six external objects (cha bāhirā āyatanā). 363 The six internal

senses are mentioned above. The six external objects are forms, sounds, odors, tastes,

tangibles, and mental phenomena (rūpa, sadda, gandha, rasa, phoṭṭhabba, dhamma).

358
Jurewicz 2000: 92.
359
Jurewicz 2000: 93.
360
PED, 105.
361
Hamilton 1996: 17.
362
E.g. SN IV, 43, 70, 83, 124.
363
SN IV. 7-8.

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Each sense can cognize its corresponding object. The Paṭhamadvaya Sutta, therefore,

pairs the six senses with their respective objects and designates them as a “dyad”.364 It

is noteworthy that even the dyad of the mind faculty and mental phenomena can be

divided into internal and external. However, mental phenomena do not exist like the

other five external objects as external stimuli. They happen all the way in the mind.

Hence, these six external objects should be better construed as the stimuli or raw data

which are opposite to the six sense bases as receptors. The distinction of internal and

external is not because of inside or outside the body but the relativity of subject and

object.

Regarding the term indriya, it was originally derived from the Vedic god Indra

which means “belonging to Indra”. 365 But in the specific Pāli sense, it means

“‘belonging to the ruler’, i.e. governing, ruling or controlling principle.” 366 In

Buddhism, it is used in many categories of Buddhist psychological philosophy and

ethics. Referring to senses, indriya means the six sense faculties.367 As the PED notes,

it should mean “faculty or function” but is “often wrongly interpreted as organ”. 368

Another term dhātu means element which, like indriya, appears in many categories. It

means element, factor, principle, and so on. 369 This term dhātu more commonly

describes the four primary elements (mahābhūtā): earth, water, fire, and wind (paṭhavī,

364
SN IV, 67-68.
365
PED, 121.
366
PED, 121.
367
SN V, 245.
368
PED, 121.
369
PED, 340.

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āpo, tejo, vāyo). When it refers to sensory activities, it comprises the six senses, the six

sense objects, and the six sense consciousnesses.370 Hence, like āyatana and indriya, it

has abstract meanings rather than physical ones.

From the analysis above, the six senses in Buddhism denote their sensory functions

rather than physical organs. Meanwhile, without physical organs, these abilities could

not happen for the living beings in this world. Hence, the physical organs are

indispensable, but it is their sensory functions which play a role in cognition. As

Hamilton emphasizes, the point lies not in “the body qua material body” but “the body

as a living organism”.371 It is in this sense that the passages in the Ādittapariyāya Sutta

have another interpretation. What this sutta emphasized is not physical organs. But the

danger caused by indulging in sensual pleasure is worse than that of losing sensory

abilities. And to damage these physical organs is a way to destroy the functions of the

five bodily senses, just as the mind will stop working while people sleep. To see this,

some scholars interpret the six senses thus to emphasize their sensory functions: sight,

hearing, smell, taste, touch or sensibility, and ideation.372 This understanding is of the

most importance in the discussion of cognition. It is that their functions matter, rather

than their physical status. The following discussion shows the three functions of the six

senses and the difficulties of construing them as physical organs.

As mentioned above, the six senses can cognize their separate objects. And the

370
SN II, 140.
371
Hamilton 2000: 29.
372
E.g. Hamilton 1996: 20, 43; Robinson and Johnson 1997: 24; PED, 121.

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sense faculty and its object are called a “dyad”. The Dutiyadvaya Sutta described that

consciousness depends on a dyad, thence starts cognition:373

In dependence on the eye and forms there arises visual consciousness… In dependence

on the mind and mental phenomena there arises mental consciousness. The mind is

impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise; mental phenomena are impermanent,

changing, becoming otherwise. Thus this dyad is moving and tottering, impermanent,

changing, becoming otherwise…

The meeting, the encounter, the concurrence of these three things is called mental

contact. Mental contact too is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. The cause

and condition for the arising of mental contact are also impermanent, changing,

becoming otherwise. When, bhikkhus, mental contact has arisen in dependence on a

condition that is impermanent, how could it be permanent?

Contacted, bhikkhus, one feels, contacted one thinks, contacted one perceives. Thus

these things too are moving and tottering, impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise.

It is in such a way, bhikkhus, that consciousness comes to be in dependence on a dyad.

(Bodhi 2000a: 1172-73.)

This sutta described the way we feel and think resorting to the perception of the

six senses. Therefore, it not only indicates the arising of consciousness but also the

cognitive processes. These functions will be discussed in detail in the next two chapters.

At this stage, only the functions of the six senses deserve our attention which are

receiving, transmitting, and offering a platform. First of all, each sense faculty can

receive stimuli only from its corresponding sense object. In the Chappāṇakopama Sutta,

373
SN IV, 67-69.

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the six senses are compared to the six animals which have different domains (visayā)

and resorts (gocarā). 374 In its counterpart of the Saṃyukta Āgama, it distinctly

emphasized that each sense faculty can only cognize its corresponding sense object, not

others.375 Or to put it another way, the stimulus can impinge on its corresponding sense

faculty only. Colors cannot be received by the skin and tastes cannot be smelled by the

nose. In the Āsīvisopama Sutta of the Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta, the six senses are said to be

struck (haññati) by their respective agreeable and disagreeable objects.376 The same

description repeats again in the Yavakalāpi Sutta. 377 Hence, the six senses are like

receptors which accept stimuli or raw data from their objects. And these stimuli are

diverse in their attributes. Here the term “agreeable and disagreeable (manāpāmanāpa)”

should be construed as the attribute of an object.

Secondly, after receiving these stimuli, the six senses will right away transmit

these stimuli to each sense consciousness in the form of sensory information. In the

passage quoted above, the arising of the sense consciousness is said to depend on the

combination of the sense and the object. This statement indicates that the stimulus

should impinge the sense faculty before the arising of the sense consciousness. There

is a time gap between the impingement and the sense consciousness. In other words,

the six senses are more like passages which receive stimuli from objects on the one side

and then transmit the sensory information to arouse the sense consciousness for further

374
SN IV, 198-99.
375
T02, no. 99, p. 313, b2-3: 此六種根種種行處，種種境界，各各不求異根境界。
376
SN IV, 175: cakkhu haññati manāpāmanāpesu rūpesu… pe… mano haññati manāpāmanāpesu
dhammesu.
377
SN IV, 201.

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process on the other side.

Lastly, once the sense consciousness arises, this indicates contact at the same time.

Contact means the meeting of the sense faculty, the sense object, and the sense

consciousness. For this sensory event, the following reactions occur: feeling (vedeti),

thinking (ceteti), and perceiving (sañjānāti).378 At this point, contact is picked out not

only because of its sensory function but also because of the establishment of a

relationship between subject and object. And the sense faculty works as the platform

for that contact. Hence, the six senses are also called “the base for contact.”379

According to the discussion above, it is the cognitive functions of the six senses

which are emphasized in the Sutta Piṭaka. If we construe the six senses as physical

organs, consciousness would contact the object in each organ rather than in the mind.

From the viewpoint of neurology, the six senses are more like sensory nerve systems

which perform the functions of receiving and transmitting sensory information. In

Buddhism, the six senses connect the objects’ stimuli and subject’s reactions. All our

experience must begin from this connection.

378
SN IV, 69: phuṭṭho vedeti, phuṭṭho ceteti, phuṭṭho sañjānāti.
379
E.g. SN IV, 43 ff.

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§3.2 The Foremost Position in the Cognitive Processes

The six senses mentioned in the Sutta Piṭaka appear in several contexts which

indicate their foremost position in the cognitive processes. It is not only because the six

senses are listed in the first place but also that their effects dominate the whole cognitive

process as we will see.

Even though the six sense bases are conditioned by name-and-form in the chain of

the twelve links, they sometimes appear as the first link in the teaching of causality. The

Ñātika Sutta starts this process with the six senses:380

In dependence on the eye and forms, visual consciousness arises… In dependence on

the mind and mental phenomena, mental consciousness arises. The meeting of the three

is contact. With contact as condition, feeling [comes to be]; with feeling as condition,

craving; with craving as condition, clinging… Such is the origin of this whole mass of

dukkha. (Bodhi 2000a: 582.)

In this passage, the six senses replace ignorance as the first cause of dukkha. In the

Sammasa Sutta of the Nidānasaṃyutta, the Buddha instructed his disciples how to

engage in inward exploration (antaraṃ sammasanti).381 This method is much like the

way the Buddha investigated the origin and cessation of dukkha. Here he also started

by asking the cause of aging-and-death. However, the factors mentioned in this sutta

are not the same as the twelve links, they are aging-and-death, attachment (upadhi),

craving (taṇha), the six senses endowed with a pleasing and agreeable nature (piyarūpa

380
SN II, 74.
381
SN II, 107-09.

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sātarūpa). Then the Buddha concluded that the arising process of dukkha was thus:382

Whatever ascetics and brahmins at present regard that [i.e. the six senses] in the world

with a dear and agreeable nature as permanent, as happiness, as self, as healthy, as

secure: they are nurturing craving. In nurturing craving, they are nurturing attachment.

In nurturing attachment, they are nurturing dukkha. In nurturing dukkha, they are not

freed from birth, aging, and death; they are not freed from sorrow, lamentation, pain,

displeasure, and despair. They are not freed from dukkha, I say. (Bodhi 2000a: 606.)

Here the Buddha was saying that people tend to treat the six senses as permanent

(nicca), happiness (sukha), self (attā), healthy (ārogya) and secure (khema). Such

misconception of the six senses would initiate a series of mental activities leading to

misery. The point is the nature of the six senses and misconception. In the analysis of

the six senses, their gratification (assāda) is said to be pleasure (sukha) and joy

(somanassa) arising in dependence on the six senses. 383

When people dwell

contemplating (anupassin) this gratification, craving will increase. 384 This kind of

systematic analysis of gratification, danger (ādīnava), and escape (nissaraṇa) can be

applied not only to the six senses but also to the six objects385, the five aggregates386,

and feelings387. On the one hand, these factors would bring out pleasure and joy which

is the gratification. For this reason, people easily crave for or grasp these factors. On

the other hand, the Buddha instructed his disciples to contemplate the dangers of these

382
SN II, 109.
383
SN IV, 7.
384
SN II, 84.
385
SN IV, 8.
386
SN III, 28.
387
SN V, 207.

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factors which are the characteristics of impermanence, dukkha, and subjection to

change. In this way, craving will cease.388

This kind of examination was systematically instructed to the Buddha’s son

Rāhula in the Rāhulasaṃyutta and the Cūḷarāhulovāda Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya.

These factors were examined one by one, comprising the six senses, the six sense

objects, the six sense consciousnesses, the six sense contacts, the six types of feeling

born of contact, the six types of perception (saññā) of object, and the six types of

volition (cetanā), the six types of craving (taṇhā), and the six types of thought (vitakka)

and examination (vicāra) about object.389 All these factors are said to be impermanent,

dukkha, and subject to change. Therefore, they should not be regarded (samanupassati)

as “This is mine, this I am, and this is my self. (etaṃ mama, esohamasmi, eso me

attā.)”390

In this checklist and other similar ones, the six senses always occupy the foremost

position. It indicates that our experience begins from the impingement between the

sense faculty and the sense object. Another point is that other factors in this list are

categorized according to the sense faculties or their objects. This categorization implies

that all the cognitive processes are under the influence of the senses and the objects.

More importantly, as Gombrich says, this kind of categorization “according to the

senses by which it is perceived is not merely anthropocentric: it also emphasises how

388
SN II, 84 ff.
389
SN II, 244 ff.; MN III, 278-79.
390
SN II, 244 ff.; MN III, 278-79.

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rather than what – how we know, and how we experience, rather than what there is.”391

Since the six senses mark the inception of the cognitive processes, they are the

first ones to be imposed on the notion of selfness. The Nidānasaṃyutta said: “with the

remainderless cessation of the six bases for contact (channaṃ phassāyatanānaṃ

asesavirāganirodhā), it would eventually lead to the cessation of dukkha or

saṃsāra.”392 As mentioned earlier, the six senses have another designation: bases for

contact. They are the bases for the contact of consciousness and stimulus. Without the

six senses, no cognition or experience is possible. For this reason, the six senses are not

only the beginning of the arising of dukkha but also the breakpoints in the chain of

causation, other than ignorance and craving mentioned in some suttas.393

What should be noted here is that the cessation of the six senses does not denote

their sensory functions. Because even enlightened people still retain these functions. As

discussed in the previous chapter, an enlightened person penetrates into mental

activities and sees things as they really are. Therefore, the notion of selfness will be

erased. In other words, there is no opposition of subject and object. In the Aṅguttara

Nikāya, a liberated bhikkhu could contemplate the vanishing of the powerful objects

(vayañcassānupassati) which were cognized by the six senses without being affected.394

It shows that enlightened people see the stimulus as process and ordinary, unenlightened

people see it as an ontological entity. This ability to observe the arising and ceasing

391
Gombrich 2006b: 36.
392
SN II, 14, 37.
393
Some suttas declare that the remainderless cessation of ignorance brings out the end of dukkha, e.g.
SN 12: 1-3, 46-48; 55: 28, while some indicate the cause is craving, e.g. SN 12: 43-45; 35: 103-107.
394
AN III, 377-78.

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processes is the last step of Khemaka’s attainment which helped him to get rid of the

notion of selfness. Sāriputta once said that although the Buddha sensed objects with the

six senses, he was liberated from desire and lust.395 Ānanda also explained that the five

bodily sense faculties and their objects were present in the Buddha, but he did not

experience these bases (āyatana).396 More importantly, the Buddha did not experience

the base while he was actually percipient, not while he was non-percipient.397

These passages suggest that the sensory functions of the six senses still exist in

enlightened people. The difference lies in that enlightened people perceive an object as

it really is, therefore, the six senses as the bases of subject and object cease completely.

In this sense, the cessation of six senses as the bases for contact, on the one hand, is

detached from the notion of selfness; and on the other hand, does not support contact,

which represents the interaction of subject and object. For the ordinary people, we get

the opposite conclusion from the discussion of enlightened people, i.e. the six senses

are bases for the interaction of subject and object and can be bestowed with the notion

of selfness. It is no wonder that the six senses become the crucial factors in the

cultivation of the mind. The next section will be devoted to the methods about how to

cultivate the six senses and what the consequences are.

395
SN IV, 164-65.
396
AN IV, 427.
397
AN IV, 427: saññīmeva kho tad āyatanaṃ no paṭisaṃvedeti, no asaññī.

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§ 3.3 The Metaphor and Empiricism of the Six Senses as

Gateways
The implication of the six senses as the starting point of cognitive processes can

be realized from metaphors in the Sutta Piṭaka. In the Kiṃsukopama Sutta of the

Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta, the body is compared to a city and the six senses are the six gates.

The gatekeeper means mindfulness. Inside the city, the consciousness is compared to

the lord of the city. 398 In this sense, the six senses are much like the entrances or

openings of the body and the corresponding consciousness is able to deal with sensory

information coming in through these senses.

To see the leading position of the six senses, Buddhist disciples are sometimes

exhorted to guard the doors of the sense faculties (indriyesu guttadvāra).399 Here, again,

the six senses are analogized as the doors of a house or building. More importantly, the

specific position and function of the six senses are not only metaphorical but also

empirical. Since the six senses have been treated as the beginning of our cognitive

processes, it can be realized that the Buddha admonished his disciples to guard the sense

faculties in order to cultivate the mind. In the Sutta Piṭaka, the teaching of guarding the

doors of the sense faculties is often juxtaposed with being moderate in eating and being

devoted to wakefulness which constitutes the three essential trainings in a bhikkhu's

daily life. 400 Not only to a newly ordained bhikkhu 401 , these teachings can also be

398
SN IV, 194-95.
399
E.g. SN IV, 103, 112, 120, 176, 178.
400
E.g. SN II, 218; IV, 103, 175; MN I, 273-74; AN I, 113-14.
401
E.g. SN II, 218; AN III, 138.

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applied to a trainee (sekha) who is temporarily liberated (samayavimutta)402 as well.

Hence, this teaching can be deemed to be a basic requirement for the cultivation of the

path to liberation. Moreover, it is said also to be the case for a lay person who is looking

for a holy life.403 As long as one is unguarded at the doors of the sense faculties, no

matter who one is, this would lead to the decline of a wholesome status. Only

enlightened people have no need to do so for they have already eradicated all

defilements.404

§3.3.1 The First Formula

In the Sutta Piṭaka, there are three formulas regarding how to guard the doors of

the sense faculties. In the Rathopama Sutta of the Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta, the Buddha

explained the teaching of guarding the doors of the sense faculties thus:405

Here, having seen a form with the eye… Having cognized a mental phenomenon with

the mind, a bhikkhu does not grasp its signs and its features. Since, if he left the mind

faculty unrestrained, evil unwholesome states of avarice and grief might invade him,

he practices the way of its restraint, he guards the mind faculty, he undertakes the

restraint of the mind faculty. (Bodhi 2000a: 1239.)

According to this instruction, guarding the doors of the sense faculties means that

one should not grasp the signs (nimitta) and minor features (anuvyañjana) of the objects,

402
E.g. SN IV, 125; AN III, 174, 330; IV, 24, 331.
403
SN IV, 112-13.
404
SN IV, 125.
405
SN IV, 176: idha bhikkhu cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā…pe… manasā dhammaṃ viññāya na nimittaggāhī
hoti nānuvyañjanaggāhī, yatvādhikaraṇam enam manindriyam asaṃvutaṃ viharantaṃ abhijjhā
domanassā pāpakā akusalā dhammā anvāssaveyyuṃ, tassa saṃvarāya paṭipajjati, rakkhati
manindriyaṃ manindriye saṃvaraṃ āpajjati.

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in order to avoid avarice and grief (abhijjhā domanassā). According to the PED, nimitta

means the attribute or characteristic of an object and anuvyañjana denotes minor or

secondary ones.406 However, in the Sutta Piṭaka, the distinction between nimitta and

anuvyañjana is not clear. Only in the Ādittapariyāya Sutta of the Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta,

it used the phrase: “to grasp the sign through the features (anuvyañjanaso nimittaggāho)”

in the five external objects.407 And consciousness is said to stand tied to gratification in

the sign or in the features. 408 In this sense, the perception of sign requires further

information or acknowledgment from separate features. The SA explained anuvyañjana

as being like the segments or particulars and nimitta as the composite.409 For example,

nimitta can be man or woman; anuvyañjana indicates hand, foot, smile, talk, etc.

Buddhaghosa repeated this explanation in the Visuddhimagga. 410 In the Saṃyukta

Āgama, these two terms were translated as 相 and 隨好 or 好.411 As in the Pāli Nikāyas,

no details were given. The distinction between these two terms was not even mentioned

in the Chinese counterpart of the Ādittapariyāya Sutta. 412 Furthermore, only the

translation of nimitta was found in the other three Āgamas. Both Madhyama Āgama

and Dīrgha Āgama used 相 and Ekottara Āgama used 想.413 None of them mentioned

minor features. Therefore, the Ādittapariyāya Sutta and later commentaries were the

406
PED, 367; 43.
407
SN IV, 168-69.
408
SN IV, 168-69: nimittassādagadhitaṃ vā viññāṇaṃ tiṭṭhamānaṃ tiṭṭheyya,
anuvyañjanassādagadhitaṃ vā.
409
SA III, 4: nimittaggāhoti hi saṃsandetvā gahaṇaṃ, anubyañjanaggāhoti vibhattigahaṇaṃ.
410
Vism, 20.
411
T02, no. 99, p. 58, a10-23.
412
SĀ 241.
413
E.g. MĀ 80, 144; DĀ 20; EĀ 579, 741.

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only available materials on this topic. Tan follows the definition given by the SA and

explains these two terms in the cognitive processes thus:414

The signs (nimitta) are the most distinctive qualities of the object which, when

unmindfully grasped, can give rise to defiled thoughts: simply put, this is one

perception of the object as a whole. The features (anuvyañjana) are the details that

subsequently gain attention when the initial perception is not followed by restraint.

As Tan suggests, nimitta denotes significant and general characteristics which

emerge first, whereas anuvyañjana is the details or minor features which come

afterward. This sequence, however, does not comply with the passage of the

Ādittapariyāya Sutta. As we can see from above, people perceive the details first and

then the generalities, according to this sutta. From my point of view, these two

sequences are both possible. Sometimes we acknowledge parts of the object first, then

the entirety; sometimes the process is the opposite. Kalupahana offers another

explanation. He distinguishes these two terms as substance and quality behind the

cognitive experience:415

And this is clearly explained by the occurence of the term animitta along with suñña,

the latter being the denial of a substance. Thus, nimitta is strongly suggestive of a

mysterious cause or substance, either in the eye or in the object that the eye perceives.

If nimitta is the substance, then the anuvyañjana refers to its associate, namely, quality.

Here is the famous metaphysical issue of substance and quality.

He first discusses the meaning of animitta and deduces that nimitta means a hidden

414
Tan 2007: 163.
415
Kalupahana 1987: 48.

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substance. Therefore, an ordinary person tends to search for some kind of mysterious

substance by its quality. He also emphasizes that it is this substance should be and can

be expelled in the cognitive processes, not the sense object, which means animitta.416

According to his explanation, nimitta becomes something non-existent but fabricated,

like attā. The point is that nimitta and anuvyañjana either indicate signs or features

based on sense objects or they denote a metaphysical entity. This will be discussed later.

In any case, the term nimitta appears in many passages in the context of perception,

while anuvyañjana can be found less often and mostly in company with nimitta, both

in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas. This probably implies that nimitta alone

was enough to convey necessary meanings and anuvyañjana hence was dropped. Next,

I will discuss the meaning of nimitta in further detail and the third explanation of nimitta

as the mental image affected by defilements.

In the Raṭṭhapāla Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, a maid recognized the venerable

Raṭṭhapāla by grasping the nimittas of his hands, feet, and voice.417 Besides, the term

mukhanimitta means the appearance of one’s face in the mirror.418 This kind of usage

indicates that nimitta is the sensory information which reflects the characteristics of an

object. Then it will be used to identify another object. Like the dawn is the foresign

(pubbanimitta) and presage (pubbaṅgama) of the sunrise.419 Nimitta not only comes

from external objects but also ideas. Before the Buddha’s parinibbāna, he talked to

416
Kalupahana 1987: 163.
417
MN II, 62: hatthānañ ca pādānañ ca sarassa ca nimittaṃ aggahesi.
418
SN V, 121-23.
419
SN V, 29-32.

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Ᾱnanda about the possibility of the Buddha’s longevity of one aeon and these words,

not the sounds, was considered as nimitta and hint (obhāsa).420 According to this story,

Ᾱnanda failed to deduce that possibility from the meaning of the Buddha’s words, i.e.

nimitta. In Sūda Sutta, an inept cook was described as being unable to observe the

nimitta of the master’s favorite flavors by his acts or words.421 Hence, the term nimitta

in these two instances means some kind of connotation which needs to be deduced from

speeches or actions. In other words, nimitta here does not represent sound or form but

the idea or meaning behind these things. When nimitta represents an idea or meaning,

i.e. dhamma, it may come from and after the other five sense objects or the five bodily

cognitive processes. From these passages, nimitta includes all kinds of outward

appearances of the six sense objects, both external and internal, which are meant for

recognition or realization. People need to ponder over it to get the conclusion and react

accordingly. It itself, therefore, should be objective and neutral.

However, in the Saṃgayha Sutta II, Mālukyaputta (Māluṅkyaputta) learned from

the Buddha that unmindfully paying attention to pleasing (piya) nimittas of the six sense

objects will bring out passion (sāratta).422 In the same way, various feelings, avarice

(abhijjhā) and vexation (vihesā) would arise from the objects or nimittas. A similar

description can be found in the Kāya Sutta and the Āhāra Sutta of the

Bojjhaṅgasaṃyutta. Desire of sensual pleasure (kāmachanda) and malevolence

420
SN V, 259; DN II, 103; AN IV.309
421
SN V, 150: Sa kho so bālo avyatto akusalo sūdo sakassa bhattassa nimittaṃ na uggaṇhati.
422
SN IV, 73: rūpaṃ disvā sati muṭṭhā, piyanimittaṃ manasi karoto; sārattacitto vedeti, tañca ajjhosa
tiṭṭhati. tassa vaḍḍhanti vedanā, anekā rūpasambhavā; abhijjhā ca vihesā ca, cittam assu
pahaññati.

- 138 -
(byāpāda) are caused respectively by improper attention to beautiful signs

(subhanimitta) or repulsive signs (paṭighanimitta).423 Hence, nimitta in these contexts

seems to be endowed with different mental characteristics, i.e. they are mingled with or

produced by personal inclinations. Anālayo thus points out that the different signs are

endowed with “a first evaluation of sense data”. 424 He suggests that nimitta is the

product of three root defilements: desire, hatred, and ignorance, which were designated

as “the makers of signs (nimittakaraṇa)”.425 However, he also realizes that nimitta can

be used to develop concentration when “the dynamics of attracting attention underlying

the nimitta” are skillful.426 In this sense, it is motivation or the underlying tendency

which determines nimitta to be wholesome or unwholesome.

On the other hand, it is also possible that different nimittas only reflect the qualities

of the objects. The Ghosita Sutta mentions three kinds of objects: agreeable (manāpa),

disagreeable (amanāpa), and to be felt neutral (upekkhāvedaniya) which cause the three

types of contact and the three types of feeling respectively.427 Johansson explains this

is because of conventional expression: “just as we in English speak about pleasant

objects although we very well know that the objects are neutral: the feelings are only in

us. There are no pleasing objects; only we may be pleased.”428 In the same manner,

whether the sign is beautiful or repulsive is determined by the object. The beautiful sign

423
SN V, 65, 103.
424
Anālayo 2003: 178.
425
MN I, 298: rāgo kho nimittakaraṇo, doso nimittakaraṇo, moho nimittakaraṇo.
426
Anālayo 2003: 179.
427
SN IV, 114.
428
Johansson 1985: 89-90.

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is the sensory information of an agreeable object, while the repulsive sign represents a

disagreeable object. They do not necessarily indicate the effects of desire, hatred, and

ignorance. Hence, the MA interpreted the phrase “the maker of signs” in another way.

The MA obviously took nimitta as the pure signal or indication. In this sense, desire,

hatred, and ignorance mark a person as ordinary or noble, like the brand of signatures

or letters is meant to identify the owner of a calf.429 Here the brand means nimitta and

the signature or letters means the defilements. Harvey points out the nuance on this

point:430

Attachment-, hatred- and delusion nimittas would be nimittas in the sense of being

“characteristics,” though we have also seen that they themselves produce nimittas, i.e.,

give indications of the nature of a person. Sense-object nimittas would be nimittas due

to being the target of perceptions, and are taken to indicate particular features of the

world.

A similar explanation is also used in the term “the makers of measurement

(pamāṇakaraṇa)” by the MA. It said that these defilements are measures (pamāṇa) to

judge a person.431 From this point of view, nimitta means neutral sensory information

prepared for further recognizing referring to past experience in the cognitive processes.

Or the cognitive processes themselves, craving or hating some things, can be nimitta

for identifying this person. In other words, nimitta as mental image represents either a

concrete object or an abstract idea which implies or indicates something else. Harvey

429
MA II, 355.
430
Harvey 1986: 36.
431
MA II, 355.

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thus defines the term nimitta as “a delimited object of attention, that may, or should be

taken as indicating something beyond itself or the general features of that to which it

belongs.”432 From his point of view, nimitta itself is neither the product of defilements

as Anālayo suggests nor a fabricated substance or an entity as Kalupahana suggests.

Though it does usually and easily trigger defilements and the notion of selfness in

ordinary people. Just like the metaphor of the black ox and the white ox, neither of them

is the fetter of the other but the yoke between them is the fetter.433 When the six sense

faculties contact with the six objects, it is lust and desire (chandarāga) toward them

which is the fetter. Since nimitta represents the object, it is also the target of desire or

hatred. As mentioned earlier, the Buddha sensed the six objects but he was liberated in

mind.434 Therefore, we may suppose that the Buddha also resorted to nimitta as sensory

information in order to recognize people or things like the maid did. However, he would

not grasp the nimitta as well as the object. The nimitta would cease in the Buddha when

he attained the signless concentration of mind (animitta cetosamādhi). 435 Boisvert

explains how noble people guard the doors of the sense faculties thus:436

The texts state that those established in the noble discipline, when seeing a form with

the eye, hearing a sound with the ears, etc., do not hold on to their signs and minor

characteristics (anubyañjana) because doing so would lead to the arising of desire,

discontent and unwholesome states of mind.

432
Harvey 1986: 33.
433
SN IV, 163, 166, 282.
434
SN IV, 163.
435
SN V, 154.
436
Boisvert 1997: 139.

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 As the Buddha instructed Mālukyaputta that in the seen, heard, sensed, and

cognized, there will be merely the seen, heard, sensed, and cognized.437 We should be

mindful and avoid associating nimitta with pleasant or unpleasant experience so that

we would not desire it, hate it, be stirred by it. This is what the method of guarding the

doors of the sense faculties emphasizes. The role that nimitta plays and the dangers it

causes in the cognitive processes will be discussed in the next section and also in the

section of perception (saññā).

§3.3.2 The Second Formula

In the explanation of guarding the doors of the sense faculties, the Rathopama

Sutta also mentions the restraint of the sense faculties. In this sense, “indriyasaṃvara

(the restraint of the sense faculties)” has been used as an alternative title in some

suttas.438 Sometimes, a different explanation has also been given either under the title

“indriyesu guttadvāra” or “indriyasaṃvara”, which is:439

Here, having seen a form with the eye… Having cognized a mental phenomenon with

the mind, he is not intent upon a pleasing mental phenomenon and not repelled by a

displeasing mental phenomenon. He dwells having established mindfulness of the body,

with a measureless mind, and he understands as it really is that liberation of mind,

liberation by wisdom, wherein those evil unwholesome states cease without remainder.

(Bodhi 2000a: 1203.)

437
SN IV, 73: ettha ca te diṭṭhasutamutaviññātabbesu dhammesu diṭṭhe diṭṭhamattaṃ bhavissati, sute
sutamattaṃ bhavissati, mute mutamattaṃ bhavissati, viññāte viññātamattaṃ bhavissati.
438
SN I, 54; V, 74; MN I, 9, 180-81, 346; II, 161, 226; III, 34-35; DN I, 70, 207; II, 281.
439
SN IV, 189-90: idha bhikkhu cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā…pe… manasā dhammaṃ viññāya piyarūpe
dhamme nādhimuccati appiyarūpe dhamme na vyāpajjati upaṭṭhitakāyasatī ca viharati
appamāṇacetaso tañca cetovimuttim paññāvimuttiṃ yathābhūtam pajānāti yatthassa te uppannā
pāpakā akusalā dhammā aparisesā nirujjhanti. See also SN IV, 120; MN I, 270:

- 142 -
 This explanation suggests two methods to restrain the sense faculties: the first one

is to establish mindfulness of the body (kāyasati) with a measureless mind

(appamāṇacetaso), and the second one is to understand the state of liberation of mind

(cetovimutti) and liberation by wisdom (paññāvimutti). For the first method, it actually

mentions two techniques: the development of mindfulness of the body (details refer to

MN 10, 119, DN 22) and the cultivation of the four measureless minds (details refer to

SN 41: 7, MN 127). As mentioned earlier, mindfulness is compared to a gatekeeper in

the Kiṃsukopama Sutta. 440 In the second formula, mindfulness of the body is

emphasized to guard the doors of the sense faculties. The connection of the practice of

mindfulness of the body and guarding the sense doors is clear. Kuan indicates that

kāyasati and kāyagatāsati are synonyms.441 Therefore, in the Kāyagatāsati Sutta, the

objects of mindfulness include breathing, postures, movements, and foulness of the

body, the four primary elements, corpses, and the four jhānas.442 These objects cover

the six senses: looking ahead and away (sight), talking (hearing), breathing (smelling),

eating and drinking (taste), postures and movements (touch), and foulness and corpses

(ideation). In other words, the method of mindfulness of the body intends to be aware

of every part and action of the body or the sense faculties. Hence, mindfulness of the

body is compared to a strong post or pillar in the Chappāṇakopama Sutta which can

restrain the six animals, i.e. the six senses, from wandering away.443 After scrutinizing

440
SN IV, 194.
441
Kuan 2008: 81.
442
MN III, 89 ff.
443
SN IV, 200.

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Pāli and Chinese passages about kāyagatāsati, Kuan rebuts that kāya means the

physical body in this context but “the individual (kāya) being conscious of sense

objects”.444 He, therefore, asserts thus: “Kāyagatā sati or kāyasati is a general guideline

or fundamental principle applied to the path to liberation, and is not restricted to those

specific exercises, including those related to the physical body.”445

While a measureless mind indicates the possession of the arahant path, the second

method requires the state of liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom which is only

used to indicate the state of arahantship. In fact, according to the text, it asks

practitioners to understand it (pajānāti) rather than to enter and dwell in it (upasampajja

viharati) as an arahant does. Therefore, compared to the first formula, the second one

seems more advanced but still satisfies the requirement for a non-arahant. Bodhi

distinguishes the first formula and the second formula as:446

Though no explicit doctrinal allocations are made for these two formulas, it seems the

first is prescribed in general for a bhikkhu in the initial stages of training, while the

second describes the sense restraint of the trainee (sekha), one at a minimal level of

stream-enterer, perhaps too the natural sense restraint of the arahant.

According to his explanation, the first formula is easier for an ordinary monk or

lay person, while the second formula is more difficult. However, this differentiation

cannot be supported by Sutta Piṭaka. It is in the Aṅguttara Nikāya that the second

444
Kuan 2008: 102.
445
Kuan 2008: 103.
446
Bodhi 2000a: 1127.

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formula can be applied not only to a trainee447 but also to a newcomer448. Therefore, the

difficulty of these two formulas may not be applied as distinctly as they appear. In other

words, these two formulas have similar requirements for people to accomplish.

What connects these two formulas is the emphasis of the dangers of signs (nimitta).

In the Vaṅgīsasaṃyutta, Ānanda instructed Vaṅgīsa in the ways to extinguish sensual

lust. He first blamed the perversion of perception (saññāya vipariyesā) and then

suggested thus to avoid beautiful signs (subhaṃ nimittaṃ):449

Develop the mind on foulness, One-pointed, well concentrated; Apply mindfulness to

the body, be engrossed in revulsion. Develop meditation on the signless, and discard

the tendency to conceit. Then, by breaking through conceit, you will be one who fares

at peace. (Bodhi 2000a: 284.)

According to Ānanda’s instruction, the establishment of mindfulness of the body

(kāyagatā sati) and the meditation on signless (animitta) were both beneficial for the

suppression of sensual lust. Here the mindfulness of the body obviously specifies the

contemplation of foulness (asubha) which is meant to avoid the desirable image of

bodily characteristics into impure and decayed ones. (details refer to DN 28)

Interestingly, the term nimitta also has the meaning of sexual organ. 450 Hence, this

instruction actually implies that by contemplating the foulness of the body, one can

eventually get rid of the sign of sexual characteristics, i.e. nimitta.451 However, this

447
E.g. AN III, 173, 330; IV, 25, 331.
448
AN III, 138.
449
SN I, 188: asubhāya cittaṃ bhāvehi, ekaggaṃ susamāhitaṃ; sati kāyagatā tyatthu, nibbidābahulo
bhava. animittaṃ ca bhāvehi, mānānusayam ujjaha; tato mānābhisamayā, upasanto carissasi.
450
PED, 367.
451
This connection is suggested by Harvey (1986: 34).

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method may not be workable for unskilled people. This point is vividly exemplified in

the Bhāradvāja Sutta. The king Udena was curious about how the young monks

suppressed their sensual lust. After giving two answers: imagining women as relatives

and the contemplation of foulness, Bhāradvāja recommended the first formula to avoid

the thought of beauty (subha).452 The king Udena was satisfied with the first formula

and admitted that once he had restrained his senses and, with mindfulness established,

the desire for women would not assail him.453 This sutta showed that the contemplation

of foulness as one part of the establishment of mindfulness of the body may not be

enough. Only when the doors of the sense faculties are guarded with mindfulness, i.e.

keeping cognition under surveillance, would the desire be suppressed effectively.

On the other hand, meditation on the signless (animitta) can give rise to the

liberation of mind. In the Gilāna Sutta, when the Buddha was about to attain

parinibbāna, he told Ᾱnanda that he felt comfortable only when he entered the signless

concentration of mind (animitta cetosamādhi).454 The explanation about the signless

concentration of mind in this and many other suttas is “by non-attention to all signs, a

bhikkhu enters and dwells in the signless concentration of mind. (idha bhikkhu

sabbanimittānam amanasikārā animittaṃ cetosamādhim upasampajja viharati.)” 455

We may know that here nimitta comes not from external objects but stands for the

mental object of meditation. In order to enter the signless concentration of mind a

452
SN IV, 111-12.
453
SN IV, 112-13.
454
SN V, 154.
455
SN IV, 268-69.

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bhikkhu cannot depend on any sign. In this state, the emergence of sign would be

considered as degeneration. Once Moggallāna cultivated the signless concentration of

mind, his consciousness (viññāṇa) followed with the signs.456 So the Buddha warned

him to concentrate his mind, i.e. he should prevent signs from arising.

In the Mahāvedalla Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, Sāriputta indicated that non-

attention to all signs (sabbanimittānañca amanasikāro) and attention to the signless

element (animittāya dhātuyā manasikāro) are two conditions for the attainment of the

signless liberation of mind.457 Harvey analyzes different types of animitta-ceto-vimutti

which include the four formless attainments, vipassanā, and the four paths and the four

fruitions in his study.458 The reasons why these states were called signless are varied:

the four formless attainments experience no external sense objects but only mental

objects; the development of vipassanā, the four paths, and the four fruitions which

discard the signs of permanence, happiness, and self can be deemed as signless in a full

sense. According to him, all these states surpass the effects of the signs of the five sense

objects, though the mental signs as the objects of meditation (samādhi-nimitta) are

allowed in some cases. This is so because nimitta is defined as external in the term

animitta-ceto-vimutti.

To sum up, the method of guarding the doors of the sense faculties points out the

critical position of nimitta. Even though nimitta per se as a mental sign reflects the

456
SN IV, 269.
457
MN I, 296.
458
Harvey 1986: 25 ff.

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object and, therefore, is ethically neutral as well as the object, the way people treat it

will lead to different directions. When the beautiful sign (subhanimitta) or repulsive

sign (paṭighanimitta) emerges, ordinary people always associate it with some things or

feelings they want or hate. Hence, the Buddha warned people not to grasp signs and

features. On the other hand, one should depend on some specific signs to cultivate the

mind. The mindfulness of the body with a measureless mind is a method resorting to

sign. When this kind of cultivation achieves high-level attainment, all types of sign will

be discarded and, therefore, this is called signless. Harvey elaborates the different

functions of nimitta in the path to liberation thus:459

The way beyond this trapped state of consciousness involves the practice of “guarding

the senses”: of mindfully monitoring the input of the senses so that there is no seizing

on such misleading troublesome sensory indications, but a viewing of sense objects as

simply sense-objects. On the other hand, there may be the development of awareness

of more salutory “signs,” such as that of the unpleasant, and usually ignored aspects of

bodily existence. The development of inward states of calm concentration are also

important. These turn the mind away from the distraction of "external" signs and focus

on some chosen salutary “sign,” which might concern some aspect of the foulness of

the body, as referred to above, or one of the many other objects of samatha meditation,

such as the breath.… As insight reaches a high pitch, “change of lineage” occurs, which

turns the mind away from conditioned phenomena towards the unconditioned, the

signless nibbāna.

Moreover, Harvey notes that the four paths and the first three fruitions have

signless nibbāna as an object, only the fruition of arahantship has no object, only

459
Harvey 1986: 46-7.

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nibbāna.460 This statement reminds us that the teaching of guarding the doors of the

sense faculties can be applied even to a trainee who is temporarily liberated as

mentioned earlier. Hence, even though the four paths and the first three fruitions have

attained the signless liberation of mind, they are still required to keep monitoring the

raw data coming in through the six senses. This is probably because nimitta as

meditation objects still exist in them though nimitta does not mean the five external

signs anymore. Only the not-learner: an arahant, has no defilement and no object so that

an arahant does not need to guard the doors of the sense faculties. This fact shows how

crucial and necessary it is to keep cognition under surveillance.

§3.3.3 The Third Formula

The first formula emphasizes the effects of signs and features which indicate the

dangers of indulgence in the senses. And the second formula teaches two methods to

avoid such dangers. The first one describes disadvantageous aspects, the second one

shows advantageous aspects. Other than these two formulas, in the Saṃvara Sutta of

the Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta, there is a third formula on the restraint of the sense faculties.

In this sutta, the text distinguishes what restraint and nonrestraint mean:461

And how, bhikkhus, is there restraint? There are, bhikkhus, forms cognizable by the

eye… mental phenomena cognizable by the mind that are desirable, lovely, agreeable,

pleasing, sensually enticing, tantalizing. If a bhikkhu does not seek delight in them,

does not welcome them, and does not remain holding to them, he should understand

460
Harvey 1986: 47-8.
461
SN IV, 79-80.

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 this thus: I am not declining away from wholesome states. (Bodhi 2000a: 1180.)

Comparing with the first two formulas, this one does not offer any critical

information about the teaching of guarding the doors of the sense faculties. In the whole

Suttapiṭaka, this formula appears many times but it connects with the title saṃvara only

in the Saṃvara Sutta. On the other hand, it is mostly used to explain the arising and

ceasing of dukkha, e.g. SN 22:5; 35: 64, 88; MN 38, 145, 148, or the reason why some

beings can attain Nibbāna, e.g. SN 35: 118, 124, 131. Furthermore, other than the six

sense objects462, the targets that people seek delight in, welcome, and remain holding

on to, include the five aggregates463, the three types of feeling464, and equanimity in

neither-perception-nor-non-perception465. In this sense, the third formula offers only a

general idea about mental discipline. This description does not specifically prescribe

the method of guarding the doors of the sense faculties. Hence, it may be questionable

to group the third formula with the first two since the Saṃvara Sutta is the only instance

of it in the Pāli Nikāya. Another piece of evidence comes from Dukkhadhamma Sutta

and Chappāṇakopama Sutta of the Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta. In these two suttas, the text

also defined what restraint and nonrestraint are, but by the second formula, not the third

one.466 Besides, there are two sūtras explaining restraint and nonrestraint in the Chinese

Āgama. They are SĀ 277 and 1170.467 Both sūtras warn people to not be affected by

462
E.g. SN IV, 36, 37, 60, 72-73, 79; MN III, 267.
463
i.e. SN III, 14.
464
i.e. MN I, 266; III, 286.
465
i.e. MN II, 265.
466
SN IV, 189-90, 198-200.
467
T02, no. 99, p. 75, c25-p. 76, a1: 眼根律儀所攝護。眼識識色，心不染著；心不染著已，常樂
更住；心樂住已，常一其心；一其心已，如實知見；如實知見已，離諸疑惑；離諸疑惑已，
不由他誤，常安樂住。耳、鼻、舌、身、意亦復如是。是名律儀。

- 150 -
the six objects and offer more details and techniques in this respect. Hence, the Chinese

sūtras confirm this assumption.

To sum up, the teaching of guarding the doors of the sense faculties or the restraint

of the sense faculties should only refer to the first and second formula. Both these two

formulas mention the reactions to the stimulus received by the six senses. Everyone in

this world, except enlightened people, tends to connect the stimulus of the objects with

signs and features from past experience and, therefore, grasp these outward appearances.

Since the outward appearances are fabricated by desire, hatred, and ignorance, to grasp

them inevitably brings out more desire, hatred, and ignorance. The agreeable object

causes avarice and the disagreeable object causes aversion. And more importantly, the

notion of selfness thus sneaks into this process. This vicious cycle has no beginning and

no ending.

On the other hand, one should establish mindfulness of the body with measureless

mind and also understand the state of liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom. By

doing so, avarice or aversion will not arise. In other words, to restrain the sense faculties

means to prevent the arising of signs and features which connect present objects with

past experience. And this teaching should be observed throughout the path to liberation

until one attains Nibbāna.

T02, no. 99, p. 313, a8-12: 多聞聖弟子若眼見色，於可念色不起欲想，不可念色不起恚想，

次第不起眾多覺想相續住，見色過患；見過患已，能捨離。耳、鼻、舌、身、意亦復如是。
是名律儀。

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§3.3.4 Misconception of Closing the Doors

In addition to descriptions of the method, we sometimes get the impression from

the metaphors that there is something unwholesome outside and we should keep them

out of sensory domains. As mentioned earlier, a metaphor compared the six senses to

the gates, and mindfulness to the gatekeepers. The able gatekeeper guarding the

entrance would expel strangers and let acquaintances pass.468 At the other sutta, just as

a tortoise draws its limbs and neck inside its shell to avoid the jackal's attack, bhikkhus

should thus undertake the restraint of the sense faculties to safeguard themselves from

Māra.469 In the four Chinese Āgamas, this teaching was translated into 守護(攝)根門

(guarding the doors of the sense faculties) 470 or 律儀 (restraint)471. However, there are

five sūtras in the Saṃyukta Āgama using 關閉根門 (closing the doors of the sense

faculties) which confirms the impression mentioned above, i.e. SĀ 255, 275, 279, 282,

and 1261. Though we cannot trace back to the original Sanskrit text, their corresponding

Pāli suttas can be used as references. Two sūtras out of five have no counterparts with

the Pāli Nikāya, i.e. SĀ 282, and 1261. The other three sūtras all show that the term 關

閉 used in the Pāli Nikāya is guttadvāra, i.e. SĀ 255, 275, and 279. Since 守護 is the

most common translation which can be found in the four Āgamas and 關閉 seems like

a rare exception, the Chinese translation of closing the doors of the sense faculties is

468
SN IV, 194.
469
SN IV, 177-78.
470
T02, no. 99, p. 71, a16-19: 若當比丘守護根門，飲食知量，初夜、後夜，覺悟精進，觀察善
法，樂分別法，樂修梵行，離於睡眠，心不疑法，斯有是處。
T02, no. 100, p. 375, b12-14: 令諸比丘當作是學，守攝諸根，飲食知量，初中後夜，精勤修
習，修最上念覺，當如難陀。
471
T02, no. 99, p. 75, c19-20: 有不律儀、律儀。諦聽，善思，當為汝說。

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doubtful. However, in the SĀ 255, 279, and 282, these two terms 關閉 (to close) and

守護 (to guard) appear side by side. From this fact, the possibility that the translation

of 關閉 is accurate cannot be dismissed.

In any case, the presumption of closing the doors of the sense faculties leads to

some problems. First, according to Buddhist psychology, the value of an object is not

intrinsic but is fabricated by the perceiver. Therefore, there is nothing genuinely

unwholesome; only the perceiver’s reactions are important. Secondly, it is far-fetched

to decide to accept or reject objects before we recognize them. If we do not even

recognize what they are, how can we like or dislike them? Another question is that if

someone can really avoid unwholesome stimuli outside, if there are any, does this

person get rid of defilements as a result? In other words, which one should we erase

from our experience, the objects or our evil mental reactions?

In order to answer these questions, we should turn to another metaphor. In the

Indriyabhāvanā Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, after the brahmin student Uttara

described the way to develop the sense faculties that his teacher, the brahmin Pārāsariya,

had taught him which was to refrain from seeing forms and hearing sounds, the Buddha

immediately pointed out the error; that if this was true, a blind man or a deaf man would

have developed the sense faculties in this way.472 Hence, to restrain the sense faculties

should not mean to close the doors of the sense faculties or cut relations with the

external world. This teaching is intended to remind us to be alert to our mental reactions

472
MN III, 298.

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triggered by stimuli coming in through the doors of the sense faculties. Hamilton

accordingly points out that it is not the sense faculties which should be blamed for the

entry of the enemy but “what has to be guarded is, in fact, one's reaction to what one

experiences by means of the senses”.473 The special position of the senses explains why

they are deemed to be the doors to be guarded and as the factors to be eradicated. For

this reason, the six senses become the first stage requiring vigilance and surveillance.

473
Hamilton 1996: 19.

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§3.4 The Mind faculty

From the discussion up until now and numerous suttas in the Sutta Piṭaka, the six

senses are mostly mentioned and described in parallel. And their sequence from the eye

to the mind is always the same. It is rare to find distinctions between these six senses.

Especially, the mind faculty, as the sixth sense, is usually treated impartially.

Nevertheless, two suttas of the Dīgha Nikāya did mention categories which only

include the five bodily senses: the five sense faculties (pañcindriyā)474, and the five

bodily senses and their sense objects: the ten bases (dasāyatanā)475. However, the reason

for this was not explained there. But it was mentioned in the Uṇṇābhabrāhmaṇa Sutta

of the Indriya Saṃyutta and the Mahāvedalla Sutta. The five bodily faculties have

different domains (visayā) and resorts (gocarā).476 They do not experience each other’s

resorts and domains. But all of them take recourse (paṭisaraṇa) in the mind faculty

which experiences their resorts and domains. This elaboration is different from that in

the Chappāṇakopama Sutta. There the mind faculty is treated equally with the other

five bodily senses.477

The unique statement in this context seems to bestow the mind faculty with a

coordinating function. C. A. F. Rhys Davids hence refers to mano as the sensus

communis. 478 Boisvert explains thus: “The text does not imply that mano perceives

smells, visual forms, etc., but only that it can perceive the concept (dhamma) that was

474
DN III, 239.
475
DN III, 290.
476
SN V, 217; MN I, 295.
477
SN IV, 198-99.
478
C. A. F. Rhys Davids 1914: 50.

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derived from the percept apprehended by one of the first five sense-doors.”479 Rahula

also argues that the object of the mind must depend on physical experiences of the other

five bodily senses.480 In the discussion of the cessation of senses above, I referred to a

passage in the Aṅguttara Nikāya. The Buddha said that when the five bodily faculties

and their objects arose in him, he did not experience these bases though he was

percipient (saññi).481 First of all the mind faculty and its objects are not mentioned here.

This omission implies that the mind faculty might function in some ways other than

with the five bodily senses. Since this sutta continued to explain that perception (saññā)

still keeps working, we may surmise that mano is probably treated as a coordinator

which receives sensory information from the previous perception and, therefore,

enables further mental activities.

Another instance comes from the Samanupassanā Sutta of the Khandhasaṃyutta.

When an ordinary person is contacted by a feeling born of ignorance-contact

(avijjāsamphassa), there occur various notions regarding selfness. And because of these

notions, the five bodily sense faculties will descend (avakkanti). 482 Here the mind,

dhammas, and the element of ignorance are emphasized apart from the other five bodily

sense faculties (atthi mano, atthi dhammā, atthi avijjādhātu). The term avijjādhātu is

unusual in the Sutta Piṭaka and no explanation can be found. I construe it as the

underlying tendency which affects the whole cognitive process continuously. Therefore,

479
Boisvert 1997: 121.
480
Rahula 1985: 21-22.
481
AN IV, 427.
482
SN III, 46-47.

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this sutta actually explained that under the influence of ignorance there arises the notion

of selfness which is the result of the contact of the mind faculty and dhammas and

consequent feeling. This process will continue to cause the working of the five bodily

faculties in the future. The expression of appearance or descent probably means rebirth

or arising in this life. This point will be discussed in the section of an integrated

consciousness.

Then the sutta said that a noble disciple abandons ignorance and arouses true

knowledge (vijjā) even though the five bodily sense faculties still remain (tiṭṭhanti).

This description confirms the statement mentioned above that the five bodily faculties

still kept working in the Buddha. However, since he did not have the notion of selfness,

there is no base for the contact of subject and object. The five bodily sense faculties can

receive and transmit sensory stimulus but they do not offer the bases for contact

anymore. Regardless, these two different processes: ignorance and liberation, both

relate to the mind faculty. And it indicates the key role of the mind in which its natures

of vijjā or avijjā will bring out different results. Hamilton points out this distinguishing

feature:483

Since the context is concerned with ignorance or knowledge, this difference might be

because according to Buddhist teachings liberation comes about by means of the

cognitive faculties of which manodhātu is in some way the sense. As such it is directly

involved in the process of liberation in a way the other senses are not.

Therefore, we may distinguish the role of the mind faculty according to the

483
Hamilton 1996: 27-28.

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cognitive processes. The first one is as a coordinator which works right after the other

five bodily faculties receive respective stimuli. The other is a generator which causes

the appearance of the five bodily sense faculties. These two processes can be connected

in sequence. After one receives a stimulus through one of the five bodily sense faculties,

the mind faculty will arise to handle the sensory information. For an ordinary person,

the notion of selfness has not been eradicated, so this person treats the faculty as subject

and the stimulus as object. The mind faculty is ignorant. In this case, this condition will

continue to trigger the working of the five bodily sense faculties in the future, even in

the next life. By contrast, there is no notion of selfness in an enlightened person.

Therefore, for enlightened people, the five bodily sense faculties do not function as the

base for that notion, and so their mind faculty is not polluted and gets liberated. As a

result, this process would not cause further working of the five bodily sense faculties

or rebirth. Only the functions of receiving and transmitting remain until death.

Other than the distinctive role of the mind faculty, the prevailing description of the

mind faculty as one of the six senses should not be ignored. Hence, we get two functions

of the mind faculty, as Johansson points out:484

Here, two functions of mano are clearly indicated: the function of knowing or cognizing

mental states, ideas and so on… and the function of receiving and experiencing the

impressions directly from the other senses.

To make it clear, these two functions signify two different types of cognitive

484
Johansson 1965: 185.

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process. They are not incompatible. One type begins from perception in the five bodily

faculties and the mind faculty follows. The other one starts and proceeds only involving

the mind faculty. This difference can be found in the famous theory “citta-vīthi” in a

later development.485 They are discerned as the five-door process (pañcadvāravīthi)

and the mind-door process (manodvāravīthi) in Abhidhamma theory. Such difference

accords with the description in the Sutta Piṭaka.

Or to put it in another way, the difference of the functions of the mind faculty lies

in its object, i.e. dhammas. When the dhammas emerge from memory or thinking, the

mind faculty receives this raw data which is irrelevant to any bodily sensory

information. While the dhammas come from the outcome of the cognitive processes of

the five bodily senses, in this case, the mind faculty works as a coordinator processing

all the sensory information. Take reading, for example. When we read a book, we see

words through the eye faculty. But the perception in the eye faculty only deals with

primitive information like shapes or colors of words, not meanings. It does not involve

any advanced cognitive process. In order to utilize these words for thinking, the results

of the eye perception must go through the mind faculty. Then the mind can recognize

the meanings of words and sentences. On another occasion, if we try to remember what

we have read previously, we do not rely on any of the five bodily senses in that situation.

We need to recollect memories. And the whole process happens in the mind faculty.

The passages mentioned above bestow upon the mind faculty two types of function.

485
Bodhi 2010: 153 ff.

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Hamilton concludes thus: “[I]t has both a unique function as a collator of incoming data

and also can be described in terms of the sixth in a series of senses in that it is the sense

corresponding to ‘mental’ objects.”486 However, Bodhi identifies the functioning agent

to mental consciousness rather than the mind faculty:487

I interpret the sentence simply to mean that mind-consciousness has access to the data

provided by the five types of sense consciousness, which it collates, categorizes, and

interprets with its own stock-in-trade, namely, concepts.

The confusion about this function indicates a nuance between the mind faculty and

mental consciousness which both take dhammas as the object. Gombrich points out this

problem:488

This is a somewhat crude system: the differentiation between the mind and mental

consciousness seems to us clumsy, whereas ranging the mind alongside the five senses

rather than making it superordinate to them (as was done by Sāṃkhya and other later

philosophical systems) seems simplistic.

It will be easier to understand if we consider this problem in the cognitive

processes. When the mind faculty receives its object, dhammas, the mental

consciousness will arise accordingly. Here the object of mental consciousness is also

called dhammas. Moreover, dhammas are said to be cognized not only by the mind

faculty and mental consciousness but also by the other five sense consciousnesses. The

Dutiya-aparijānana Sutta mentions all these factors:489

486
Hamilton 1996: 34.
487
Bodhi 2000a: 1936.
488
Gombrich 2009: 144.
489
SN IV, 18-19: yaṃ ca cakkhu ye ca rūpā yañca cakkhuviññāṇaṃ ye ca cakkhuviññāṇaviññātabbā

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 The eye and forms and visual consciousness and dhammas to be cognized by visual

consciousness… The mind and dhammas and mental consciousness and dhammas to

be cognized by mental consciousness. (Bodhi 2000a: 1142.)

In this passage, these six senses are treated equally. Besides, the term dhamma is

the object in three different aspects which involve the mind faculty, the mental

consciousness, and the five bodily sense consciousnesses. I will deal with mind faculty

and mental consciousness first and then discuss the other five bodily sense

consciousnesses. As discussed earlier, the mind faculty arises in two positions in the

cognitive processes. The difference lies in the origin of dhammas. However,

irrespective of whether the mind faculty works alone or depending on other senses, its

functions are the same as the other five bodily senses which are receiving, transmitting,

and offering a platform. The role of the mind faculty is a passage between external

stimuli and internal mental activities. The difference between the mind faculty and the

other five bodily senses is its object: dhamma, which does not come from outside the

body. Dhamma, as well as the other five external objects, is raw data without any

processing which can be received only by respective sense faculties. Hence, the sources

of dhamma are all-inclusive except for the five external stimuli.

In the same way, mental consciousness should be considered together with the

other five bodily sense consciousnesses. These raw data, after being processed and

being transmitted by the six senses, become the object of each sense consciousness: i.e.

dhammā…pe… yo ca mano ye ca dhammā yañca manoviññāṇaṃ ye ca manoviññāṇaviññātabbā

dhammā.

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dhamma. That indicates they are not sensory stimuli anymore but perceptual

information which can be cognized by the sense consciousness. These sense

consciousnesses do not cognize stimulus directly. The raw data, such as form, sound,

and dhamma, has to be processed by the sense faculties and transformed into sensory

information, i.e. dhamma. Then the sense consciousness can cognize this information.

It is at this point that dhamma as the object of the mind faculty and as the object of

mental consciousness can be distinguished. The object of mental consciousness must

be preliminarily processed by the mind faculty.

According to this analysis, the five bodily sense faculties receive their respective

objects; the mind faculty receives dhamma which is raw data and has two origins; the

mental consciousness and the other five bodily sense consciousnesses cognize

dhammas which are sensory information. Their relationship and the process can be

illustrated as below:

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 form, sound, odor, etc.
the five sense consciousnesses
(the raw data)

dhammas (the sensory information) the five sense

the five bodily senses: eye, ear, nose, etc. contacts

dhamma from the

previous sensory the mental consciousness

dhammas (information)
the mental contact
the mind faculty

dhamma from
database

Chart 1 The difference between the object of the mind faculty and the objects of the

other five faculties

Lastly, in the cases of the five external objects, they not only cause a series of

cognitive activities in the individual sensory process but eventually produce some kind

of sensory information to be further processed by the mind faculty. Therefore, they are

said to take recourse in the mind faculty.490 The mind faculty follows the other five

bodily sense faculties. This means that the process of the mind faculty is required in

each sense cognitive process. In the process of the mind faculty, the outcome of the

490
SN V, 217; MN I, 295.

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process of the mind faculty would become the object of the mind faculty once again,

just like the process of the five bodily faculties.

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§3.5 Summary

Even though the teaching of causality explains our cognition as dependent and

without beginning, the emphasis on the six senses as the initiation is of the most

importance. This point can be realized from their leading position in the analysis of

cognition. As discussed, some suttas depict the cognitive processes starting from the

six senses. Moreover, many following factors and functions are categorized according

to the six senses and their objects. These two features indicate that the six senses can

influence our cognition from the very beginning. The reason lies in their functions

which are receiving, transmitting, and offering a platform.

Since the six senses are the gateways for human beings to interact with the world,

their first function is to receive the stimuli from the objects. And this function must rely

on physical organs. For this reason, it is plausible to describe the six senses as physical

organs, especially for the first five bodily senses. However, in the suttas, they are also

endowed with cognitive functions. The six senses transmit sensory information to

respective sense consciousnesses. The six sense consciousnesses cannot contact the

stimuli directly because consciousness only takes dhamma as the object. In this way,

the six senses are said to be the bases for contact which represents the interaction of

subject and object. They are like the platform for the arising of cognition. Such

interaction is not merely a physical event but involves mental activities.

Besides, if we emphasize their cognitive functions, it will be easier to understand

why the mind faculty is mostly listed parallel with the other five bodily senses. In

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Buddhist psychology, the mind faculty has the same functions like the others. The mind

faculty also receives the raw data from its object, transmits information to mental

consciousness, and becomes the base for mental contact. The only distinction is that the

mind faculty can cognize its object: dhamma which includes the outcomes of the

previous five bodily cognitive processes and from pure mental activities, while the five

bodily senses can never cognize anything processed by the mind faculty. On the one

hand, the six senses should be treated equally and there is no dualism between mind

and body. On the other hand, the mind faculty is always listed as the last. Its position

implies that the mind faculty has the ability to process all information produced by the

five bodily senses. Hence, the six senses in Buddhism indicate not only physical organs

but most crucially their cognitive functions which enable our cognition and experience

to happen. Without these cognitive functions, there is no way for us to experience the

world.

Owing to their foremost position in the cognition, the six senses are emphasized

in the Buddhist cultivation of the mind. They are compared to gateways in both

metaphorical aspect and empirical aspect. In this respect, three formulas under the name:

“guarding the doors of the sense faculties” or “the restraint of the sense faculties” can

be found in the Sutta Piṭaka. However, only the first two formulas accord with the

implication of the cultivation of the six senses. The third formula does not specifically

apply to the cultivation of the senses. The first formula indicates the disadvantages

about being unable to guard the six senses, while the second one shows the advantages

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of this cultivation. What connects these two formulas lies in the natures and functions

of signs (nimitta) and minor features (anuvyañjana). Signs and features reflect the

characteristics of the objects. People recognize the object at present depending on its

signs and features. Owing to past experience and the underlying tendency, these signs

and features are dyed by various defilements. And such recognition must depend on the

assumption of the permanent and unchanging entities. As a result, people cannot avoid

reacting unwholesomely.

In order to cultivate the senses, these two formulas do not intend to stop perceiving

the objects. In fact, we can only passively receive all the stimuli in our daily life. As

long as we open our eyes or ears, or keep breathing, the sights, sounds, and odors will

continuously flow into our senses. It is common that we tend to pay attention to the

objects most interesting or related. Hence, the Adanta-agutta Sutta of the

Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta instructs people not to desire pleasant objects and not to evade

unpleasant objects after the five bodily senses cognize the objects.491 It is in this sense

that we should be alert to every stimulus coming from the six senses. Meanwhile, what

is stimulated by these stimuli should be under surveillance as well so that we can realize

how our mind works and, most importantly, how it goes wrong.

491
SN IV, 70-71.

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 Chapter 4 The Analysis of Factors in Cognition

The Buddha attained Nibbāna on the basis of his insight of mental activities. Such

insight was substantiated in the teaching of causality. The teaching of causality was

initially manifested in various descriptions without a certain title and systematic

formulas. These descriptions were recorded loosely and dispersedly in early sources.

They were like diagnoses for individual cases in different situations. Since all human

beings basically share the similar experience, these descriptions could be expected to

be explained by more or less the same factors or functions.

Among all the factors, the Sutta Piṭaka did emphasize the six senses as the

beginning of the analysis of the cognitive processes. The six senses are especially

compared to the gateways of a place which need to be guarded. However, it does not

mean we should keep the stimuli of the objects outside. On the contrary, what needs to

be guarded is the whole cognitive process stimulated by the stimulus and what has to

be kept outside is the defilements and unwholesome reactions toward the objects.

Therefore, the Buddha repeatedly explained how this unsatisfactory situation happens

by the teaching of causality. The contents or factors in the analysis that the Buddha

elaborated were diverse in order to accommodate his audiences. Nevertheless, one thing

common for all the analyses of an ordinary person is that they always end in an

unfortunate predicament. From this point of view, all these variations of the teaching of

causality follow the same analysis that can be counted as the analysis of cognition.

This section, therefore, will scrutinize cognitive factors or functions in these

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variations in the teaching of causality. According to the definition of cognition, the

scope of this analysis will be confined to UNENLIGHTENED or AVERAGE people’s

experience, more specifically, the experience of dukkha. Hence, many irrelevant ideas,

such as transmigration, meditation, and liberation, will be omitted in order to facilitate

discussion. Please be reminded that the factors selected here reflect personal

arbitrariness to some degree. I do not intend to include all factors mentioned in the Sutta

Piṭaka, as Ābhidhammikas did. I do hope to examine the essential and indispensable

factors which represent the analysis of the cognitive processes in Early Buddhism.

Besides, some of the factors occupy a fundamental position in the whole Buddhist

edifice. It is impossible and unnecessary to investigate all aspects and all meanings of

them. Only their cognitive functions and relationships with other factors will be

discussed. Meanwhile, all these works are prepared for the next chapter to survey the

cognitive processes as a whole.

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§4.1 The Sense Consciousness

In the discussion of the functions of the six senses, consciousness is said to arise

depending on a dyad: the sense faculty and the sense object. 492 This sophisticated

description indicates that consciousness does not arise simultaneously when sensory

stimulus enters the scope of the sense faculty. In other words, the sensory stimulus may

impinge on the sense faculty first, then the sensory information is transmitted to arouse

the sense consciousness. Another point is that consciousness is named after different

senses. There are six types in terms of the six senses: visual consciousness, auditory

consciousness, gustatory consciousness, olfactory consciousness, tactile consciousness,

and mental consciousness. 493 Not only the consciousness, as we have seen, the

subsequent contact and feeling are also categorized according to senses. This kind of

categorization implies that the sense consciousness together with contact and feeling is

distinguished according to different senses. This section will thus discuss the functions

of consciousness as sensory reactions.

The specific description of the sense consciousness can be found in the

Mahātaṇhāsankhaya Sutta. The Buddha compared the sense consciousness to different

types of fire:494

Just as fire is reckoned by the particular condition dependent on which it burns—when

fire burns dependent on logs, it is reckoned as a log fire; … as a faggot fire; … as a

grass fire; … as a cowdung fire; …as a chaff fire; … as a rubbish fire — so too,

492
SN IV, 67-68.
493
SN II, 72.
494
MN I, 260.

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 consciousness is reckoned by the particular condition dependent on which it arises.

When consciousness arises dependent on the eye and forms, it is reckoned as visual

consciousness…when consciousness arises dependent on the mind and mental

phenomena, it is reckoned as mental consciousness. (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001: 260.)

In this sutta, the Buddha was responding to the false view of bhikkhu Sāti. He

misinterpreted the Buddha’s teachings as that the same consciousness goes throughout

saṃsāra. The Buddha, therefore, took the fire as a metaphor to refute the notion of an

everlasting consciousness. This metaphor indicates four crucial points: 1. Like fire, the

sense consciousness requires conditions to arise; 2. The six sense consciousnesses can

be distinguished by their conditions, i.e. different channels; 3. Since the six sense

consciousnesses arise in different channels, they are unable to perform integrated

functions, like distinguishing the sensory information. They are a spontaneous

awareness toward stimulus; 4. Even though the six sense consciousnesses are different

in channels, they perform the same function of awareness.

§4.1.1 Conditions

The metaphor of fire points out that the sense consciousness, like fire, needs fuel

(condition) to arise. It cannot exist independently. Karunadasa states thus:

“Consciousness is not an entity that exists but an event that occurs, an occurrence due

to the appropriate conditions.”495 As the Dutiyadvaya Sutta emphasized, the arising of

the sense consciousness depends on the sense faculty and the sense object.496 Hence,

495
Karunadasa 2013: 50.
496
SN IV, 67-69.

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the sense consciousness is a process which deals with the outcome from the

combination of the sense and the object. However, the Mahāhatthipadopama Sutta of

the Majjhima Nikāya mentioned that the sense consciousness requires the third

condition:497

If internally the eye is intact… If internally the mind is intact and external mental

phenomena come into its range, but there is no appropriate (tajja) combination

(samannāhāra), then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of

consciousness. (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001: 283-84.)

This sutta was the only passage in the Sutta Piṭaka which mentioned the term

samannāhāra in the arising process of the sense consciousness. We cannot find any

explanation about this term in any sutta. The MA explained samannāhāra as paying

attention (manasikāra) which is arising, turning or changing life continuum (bhavaṅga)

in dependence on the eye and forms.498 It is the “five-door adverting consciousness”

(pañcadvārāvajjanacitta) initiating a cognitive process. Some scholars, therefore,

count attention as an individual requisite for the sense consciousness.499 In this sense,

when the sense object impinges on the sense faculty, the sense consciousness still

requires the act of attention to get aroused. And this attention, it seems, can be

categorized into the aggregate of volitional formations (saṅkhārā). The point is what

kind of attention this term means. Boisvert, though, accepts the explanation of

497
MN I, 190-91: ajjhattikañ ce cakkhuṃ aparibhinnaṃ hoti…pe… ajjhattiko ce mano aparibhinno
hoti bāhirā ca dhammā āpāthaṃ āgacchanti no ca tajjo samannāhāro hoti, n’eva tāva tajjassa
viññāṇabhāgassa pātubhāvo hoti.
498
MA II, 229: tajjo samannāhāroti taṃ cakkhuñca rūpe ca paṭicca bhavaṅgaṃ āvaṭṭetvā
uppajjanamanasikāro, bhavaṅgāvaṭṭanasamatthaṃ cakkhudvāre kiriyamanodhātucittanti attho.
taṃ rūpānaṃ anāpāthagatattāpi aññāvihitassapi na hoti, tajjassāti tadanurūpassa.
499
E.g. Harvey 2004: 129-30; De Silva 2005: 26; Karunadasa 2013: 56; Jayatilleke 1963: 433-34.

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samannāhāra as “the act of attention”, he equates this attention directly to the function

of viññāṇa.500 But this explanation makes consciousness appearing twice in sequence

in this process. Since samannāhāra arises before the sense consciousness and right after

the sense faculty and the sense object, there is no place for any recognition or volition

regarding this immediate stimulus. Reat, on the other hand, connects samannāhāra with

contact. He thus suggests: “Sensory contact, accompanied by appropriate attention, is

as necessary for consciousness as consciousness is for sensory contact and appropriate

attention. Consciousness is neither an epiphenomenon nor is it independently

existing.”501 Hence, contact/attention and consciousness are interdependent and arise

simultaneously. In either way, at this stage, we have not recognized what we are seeing,

hearing, or smelling. If there is any conscious activity, it can only come from a previous

experience. That is the reason Harvey considers that the act of attention is infected by

the previous volitional formations which exist before the current cognitive activity,

either in this life or belonging to a previous life.502 He further explains that attention in

initiating a perceptual process provides consciousness with a specific object. 503

In

other words, volitional formations accumulated in the past can direct the sense

consciousness through attention.

However, his explanation seems not to get support from the context. The

Mahāhatthipadopama Sutta is meant to discuss the Four Noble Truths and the five

500
Boisvert 1997: 119.
501
Reat 1987: 19.
502
Harvey 2004: 129.
503
Harvey 2004: 129.

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aggregates of clinging. The effect of volitional formations is out of its concern.

Moreover, to my knowledge, there is no place in the whole Sutta Piṭaka discussing how

previous volitional formations affect present cognition. Even though it is factual that

we must have been affected by experience and personal preference in daily life. This

kind of effect can only be performed in a series of psychological activities and reactions.

This attention either intentional or unintentional must happen after we recognize the

object.

According to the PED, samannāhāra means “concentration” and also “bringing

together”.504 Sarathchandra offers two possibilities: either an “automatic act of sensory

attention” or “a deliberate act directed by interest”.505 He then refers to its original

meaning in Sanskrit and intends to accept the first interpretation because voluntary

attention cannot exist before bare consciousness. The term samannāhāra should mean

“a sort of correspondence between the sense-organ and the stimulus.” 506 Ñāṇamoli and

Bodhi also translate this term as “corresponding (conscious) engagement”. 507

Johansson construes it as “contact probably refers to the physical impingement of the

object on the sense-organ by which the primitive sensations are produced.”508 Hamilton

thus suggests: “The ‘attention’ referred to here does not appear to refer to deliberately

paying attention, but, rather, to the fact that a conscious event provides one with

504
PED, 683.
505
Sarathchandra 1958: 21.
506
Sarathchandra 1958: 22.
507
Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001: 283.
508
Johansson 1965: 185.

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awareness of its object; without awareness of its object it is not a conscious event.”509

In the Mahāhatthipadopama Sutta, the sense faculty, the sense object, and

combination (samannāhāra), are treated as three prerequisite conditions. The sense

consciousness would not arise without any of these three. In its Chinese counterpart,

MᾹ 30, the position of samannāhāra was taken by 念 in this context.510 This word 念

in ancient Chinese usage means idea, thought, or memory.511 In the Madhyama Āgama,

念 can be translated back to Sanskrit: smṛti which means remembrance, reminiscence,

or thinking of.512 None of these meanings make sense in this context. We may assume

that Saṃghadeva probably confronted with the problem of translation and chose the

closest Chinese term he thought.

The most important thing is that this word in this passage is not parallel with the

sense faculty and the sense object as the conditions of the sense consciousness. Instead,

it is more likely a result of the combination of the sense and the object. According to

this passage, even if the sensory stimulus contacts the sense faculty, they still have to

connect together appropriately to bring about the subsequent perception. Therefore,

samannāhāra or 念 is probably better construed as a physical event which connects

the sense faculty and the sense object.513 Then it brings out the corresponding sense

consciousness, especially in the situation that the object is presented to the sense faculty

509
Hamilton 1996: 89.
510
T01, no. 26, p. 467, a12-15: 若內耳、鼻、舌、身、意處壞者，外法便不為光明所照，則無有
念，意識不得生。諸賢！若內意處不壞者，外法便為光明所照而便有念，意識得生。
511
CD, 2274.
512
SED, 1272.
513
The term “physical” is not used in its material sense since the object of the mind: dhamma is not
material. Therefore, “physical” in this context emphasizes the position between internal sensory
faculty and external sensory stimulus.

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for the first time. If this person does not even know what the object is, does not have

any idea about its color, smell, or taste, how could this person pay attention to the object

of interest; even if this attention is unconscious.

§4.1.2 Arising in Different Channels

The second point is that the sense consciousness has six types in terms of the sense

faculties. Their respective names betray their differentiation. Just like each sense faculty

can receive stimulus from a corresponding object, the sense consciousness cognizes

corresponding sensory information. That is what this passage emphasized: When the

sense consciousness arises on the basis of eye faculty, it is called visual consciousness.

The same statement applies to the other five consciousnesses. But their bases are

different. Each sense faculty offers a platform for respective stimuli and the sense

consciousnesses. In other words, different types of the sense consciousness arise in

different sensory channels. They are like the tributaries of a river. These channels can

be seen as parallel and coexistent in the cognitive processes. There is no integrated

sense consciousness at this stage. Not only the sense consciousness but also the

subsequent factors: contact and feeling can be categorized by the sense faculty. This

feature shows they are different events at this stage. And the difference is their channels.

This interpretation also matches a discovery from cognitive neuroscience: The cerebral

cortex can be divided into different areas which are in charge of different sense

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abilities.514 Kurak confirms this connection to neuroscience:515

In fact, each of the six cognitive groups, which are not to be literally identified with the

sense organs, is often said to have its own corresponding vijñāna through which it is

rendered potent. Such a position is consistent with a cooperative functional neural

group approach to explaining consciousness.

These six types of process can be compared to six tributaries. Different waters

(sensory data) flow in different tributaries (sensory channels) continuously and

simultaneously, except when the water stops. Take the process in eye faculty as a

representative, the other five processes happen at the same time. These different

channels can be illustrated as below:

visual consciousness

eye
visual contact feeling born of visual contact
form

the other five types

of consciousness

the other five

sense faculties
the other five feeling born of different
types of types of contact
the other five contact
external objects

Chart 2 The parallel processes of the arising of the six types of feeling

514
Sternberg and Sternberg 2012: 51 ff.
515
Kurak 2003: 344.

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§4.1.3 Bare Awareness

According to these two points discussed above, the sense consciousness is a mere

mental activity depending on the sense faculty and the sense object. Therefore, it arises

in its corresponding channel. For this reason, it has not involved any knowledge or

impulsive motivation yet. We can deduce that the sense consciousness functions as a

preliminary awareness of the object. At this stage, our mental activities have not yet

progressed into an integrated process which can coordinate with other advanced mental

activities. Rahula emphasizes this point:516

Consciousness is a reaction or response which has one of the six faculties as its basis,

and one of the six corresponding external phenomena as its object... Consciousness

does not recognize an object. It is only a sort of awareness -- awareness of the presence

of an object... There is no recognition at this stage... It is perception that recognizes...

The term visual consciousness is a philosophical expression denoting the same idea as

is conveyed by the ordinary word seeing. Seeing does not mean recognizing.

The sense consciousness should mean the function of bare awareness. It is more

like a passive reaction. Sarathchandra denies that viññāṇa in perception means full

cognition, “but bare sensation, a sort of anoetic sentience that occurs before the objects

is completely apprehended.”517 Nyanatiloka also defines viññāṇa (as one aggregate) as

“furnishes the bare cognition of the object, while the other 3 contribute more specific

functions.”518 He further points out that the ethical and karmic aspects of viññāṇa “are

516
Rahula 1985: 23.
517
Sarathchandra 1958: 4.
518
Nyanatiloka 1980: 357.

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chiefly determined by the mental formations associated with it.” 519 This point clearly

shows the preliminary function of the sense consciousness. Hence, the sense

consciousness itself cannot be regarded as wholesome or unwholesome. It cannot be

developed or cultivated at this stage, as Karunadasa suggests.520 Gombrich points out

the ethical aspect of consciousness: “Consciousness, viññāṇa, is on this view ethically

neutral, and merely a necessary component, along with the sense organs and their

objects, of the functioning of the senses, and analogously of the mind.”521 However, he

also construes consciousness as appetitive from the metaphor of fire:522

To sum up so far, in Vedic tradition consciousness and its objects are thought of in terms

of fire. In the Mahā Taṇhā-Saṅkhaya Sutta the Buddha draws on this idea but is more

analytical. He sees consciousness as being like fire in that it is an appetitive process,

which cannot exist without having something to feed on. Moreover, the analogy with

fire can provide a model of how a process can be dynamic and seek out its objects

without being guided by a seeker.

Hence, Gombrich considers consciousness as an appetitive process which looks

for its objects actively. Meanwhile, he also explains what he means appetite should be

a part of craving.523 Johansson also speculates that consciousness could be active owing

to the effect of craving. But from the fact that intention (manosañcetanā) and volitional

formations (saṅkhārā) is always separated from consciousness in Buddhist analysis, he

519
Nyanatiloka 1980: 357.
520
Karunadasa 2013: 51.
521
Gombrich 2009: 123.
522
Gombrich 2009: 122.
523
Gombrich 2009: 123.

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suggests that consciousness is not endowed with active intention:524

The meaning is perhaps that taṇhā operates through viññāṇa, although not really

belonging to viññāṇa. Taṇhā may become conscious through viññāṇa: in that case we

would find active processes in viññāṇa. On the other hand, manosañcetanā, which

means “conscious striving”, is distinguished from viññāṇa, and therefore we must

presuppose active processes outside viññāṇa.

No matter whether consciousness is active or inactive in nature, both Gombrich

and Johansson suggest that consciousness craves for objects or that craving (taṇhā)

seeks objects relying on consciousness. I think that the problem here lies in the premise

that there is a subject which can exert or perform various actions. In other words, they

think that the sense consciousness can be affected by desire or volition. However, the

sense consciousness was mostly described as a spontaneous activity. Hence, the sense

consciousness at this stage is not endowed with the ability to desire deliberately.

§4.1.4 The Same Function

Lastly, though different types of sense consciousness are aroused by different

sensory stimuli, they function in the same way: all of them are the process of being

conscious of the object. As discussed earlier, the sense faculty receives stimulus from

the object directly and transmits the sensory information to the mind. Then the

corresponding sense consciousness arises to deal with that information. It is in this

sense that all six sense consciousnesses cognize the same object, which is dhamma.525

524
Johansson 1965: 194.
525
E.g. SN IV, 18-19, 58-59; MN III, 264-265.

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In other words, they do not contact sensory stimulus directly but sensory data, as

discussed in section 3.4. Hamilton takes the metaphor of fire to explain the sense

consciousness:526

The analogy implies that just as fire is fire whatever is burning and whatever name is

given to it, so viññāṇa is viññāṇa whatever sense originated the cognition and whatever

name is given to it as a result: it is not fire or viññāṇa itself that is of different types…

As fire can be described as the process of burning which only occurs given appropriate

conditions, so consciousness can be described as a process of being aware which occurs

given appropriate conditions.

Fire is fire no matter where it happens. It burns until the fuel runs out. So is the

sense consciousness, it arises to be aware of an object. The difference between different

consciousnesses lies in their channels. Different names of the sense consciousnesses

are meant to indicate the arising origins. But all of them function in the same way.

§4.1.5 Summary

The six sense consciousnesses are always said to depend on different sense

faculties and the sense objects in numerous suttas. They can be distinguished by the

sense faculties where they originate. Not only this, their cognitive processes should be

considered as different channels. These channels are parallel with each other. An

integrated function has not yet developed; however, it is not an event of stimulus impact

anymore. Neither the sense faculty nor the sense object has the ability to deal with

sensory information. Only the sense consciousness can process the information. In this

526
Hamilton 1996: 89-90.

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sense, the six sense consciousnesses belong to the primitive stage of the cognition.

Bearing this in mind, we can realize that the six sense consciousnesses are

spontaneous activity toward external stimuli. Although there are six types of sense

consciousness, they have the same function which is the awareness of the object. It is

this awareness ability which represents the subjective aspect in opposition to the

objective aspect. From the discussion of the cessation of senses, enlightened people still

obtain the ability to cognize the objects but they are deprived of the notion of selfness.

By contrast, ordinary people always cognize the objects from the perspective of subject.

This assertion implies that the arising of the sense consciousness represents the notion

of selfness in the cognition. Once the subjective aspect is not involved, no duality of

subject and object exists. Thence, the six senses as the bases for contact will cease

accordingly.

However, the arising of the sense consciousness does not involve any intentional

mental activity or personal experiences from the past. They cannot be directed by

attention or affected by desire. The first reason is that the six sense consciousnesses are

spontaneous activity. They totally depend on the combination of the sense and the object.

More crucially, to construe consciousness being directed by another factor means to

contrive a subject throughout cognitive processes. In this way, the six sense

consciousnesses would become the subject to feel, crave, or think. This idea can be

established owing to an integrated consciousness, not the sense consciousness. But an

integrated consciousness does not necessarily entail such an idea.

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§4.2 An Integrated Consciousness

The six sense consciousnesses are endowed with the primitive function of

awareness. They can only notice the appearance of the object. However, in the Sutta

Piṭaka, viññāṇa is well known for its diversified meanings and usages. The PED notes

this: “In this (fundamental) application it may be characterized as the sensory and

perceptive activity commonly expressed by “mind”. It is difficult to give any one word

for viññāṇa because there is much difference between the old Buddhist and our modern

points of view, and there is a varying use of the term in the Canon itself.” 527 De Silva

states that it has varying contextual usages and “cannot be reduced to any single

meaning”.528 Johansson says the unity of viññāṇa is sometimes denied.529 Therefore,

at this stage, we should carefully distinguish different functions bestowed on

consciousness in the cognitive processes. Kalupahana indicates three basic aspects of

consciousness:530

At least three important uses of viññāṇa can be clearly distinguished. First, it is used to

denote psychic phenomena in general, synonymous with the terms citta (hsin), ‘mind,’

and mano (i), ‘thought.’ Second, it is used to describe a complete act of perception or

cognition; and third, it stands for the connecting link between two lives, a form of

consciousness that later came to be designated ‘rebirth consciousness’ (paṭisandhi-

viññāṇa). The first of these refers to psychic life in general, and the last two represent

two important aspects of consciousness. It is of interest to find out whether there is any

connection between the last two uses of viññāṇa, namely, the psychological and the

527
PED, 618.
528
De Silva 2005: 20.
529
Johansson 1965: 189.
530
Kalupahana 1975: 119.

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 eschatological.

These three aspects are closely connected: a general mental activity, cognitive

activity, and a life principle. No doubt consciousness performs some cognitive activities

as we already have seen in the previous section. However, the vague and broad usages

of consciousness make it become an essential factor which underlies the cognitive

processes in every moment, even after death. This section will examine the functions

of an integrated consciousness and explain how these different interpretations connect

with each other.

§4.2.1 To Discern Objects

In the Khajjanīya Sutta of the Khandhasaṃyutta, consciousness is so called

because it cognizes different tastes:531

“It cognizes (vijānāti),” bhikkhus, therefore, it is called consciousness (viññāṇa). And

what does it cognize? It cognizes sour, it cognizes bitter, it cognizes pungent, it

cognizes sweet, it cognizes sharp, it cognizes mild, it cognizes salty, it cognizes bland.

“It cognizes,” bhikkhus, therefore, it is called consciousness. (Bodhi 2000a: 915.)

These different types of taste should be regarded as sensory stimuli collected by

the tongue faculty. In the same vein, we can deduce that consciousness can cognize

other types of sensory stimulus as well. However, consciousness does not receive these

stimuli directly. The sense faculties do. The object of consciousness should be dhamma.

As discussed in the previous section, the six sense consciousnesses take dhamma as

531
SN III, 87.

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objects. Therefore, it is probable that it is gustatory consciousness that cognizes tastes.

However, the function of the sense consciousness is to be barely aware of something.

The sense consciousness happens in the individual channel, and thence it is too

primitive to be endowed with the function of discernment. The sense consciousness can

be aware of the presence of sense objects but not be able to discern or identify these

objects.

The Khajjanīya Sutta indicates an important function of consciousness which is to

discern different types of taste. The function of perceiving or discerning tastes requires

knowledge or experience from the past to some degree. Otherwise, there is no basis for

this discerning ability. From this point of view, the function of discernment should

denote an integrated consciousness. We should conceive consciousness as one unit

which has the ability to discern sensory information more than to be merely aware of

stimulus. Moreover, both the Mahāvedalla Sutta and the Dhātuvibhaṅga Sutta of the

Majjhima Nikāya said that consciousness can cognize the three types of feeling:532

“Consciousness, consciousness” is said, friend. With reference to what is

“consciousness” said? “It cognizes, it cognizes,” friend; that is why “consciousness” is

said. What does it cognize? It cognizes: “[This is] pleasant”; it cognizes: “[This is]

painful”; it cognizes: “[This is] neither-painful-nor-pleasant.” (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi

2001: 388.)

According to this passage, consciousness takes feeling as the object, therefore, it

obviously arises after feeling. The function of discernment cannot be put to use by the

532
MN I, 292.

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sense consciousness since it arises before feeling. It is consciousness as an integrated

unit which not only can be aware of the present object but also can distinguish attributes

of objects and differences of mental activities. Resorting to etymology, both the noun

viññāṇa and the verb vijñānāti are derived from the prefix vi and the root jñā. The root

jñā means to know, recognize, or experience in both Sanskrit and Pāli.533 And the prefix

vi originally means “apart, asunder”.534 Therefore, vijñānāti has distinctive meaning in

the act of distinguishing or discerning, understanding, and recognizing.535 Following

its explanations, we can conclude that consciousness means the ability to cognize and

to discern. Harvey separates two functions of consciousness and the function of

perception (saññā) in the cognitive processes:536

That is, viññāṇa is the awareness that a particular sense organ has a ‘something’ as

object, plus a discernment of the parts of this ‘something’; cognition is more outward-

directed, and gives an interpretation of what is known by the sense-organ. In a full

perceptual process directed to a visual object, for example, an eye-centred viññāṇa is

followed by conception-centred ones, with a sequence of cognitions interpreting the

same object as it is discerned at a progressively higher level.

He continues to name these two types of consciousness as “sense-discernment”

and “conceptional-discernment”.537 In other words, according to Harvey, this cognitive

process has three stages: the first one is to be aware of the objects by individual sense

consciousness; the second is to discern the parts or aspects of the object by conceptional

533
SED, 425; PED, 282.
534
SED, 949; PED, 611.
535
SED, 961; PED, 617.
536
Harvey 2004: 150.
537
Harvey 2004: 151.

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consciousness; lastly is to label these features by perception, i.e. saññā. His argument

supports the distinction between the six sense consciousnesses and an integrated

consciousness in the cognition. The former notices the presence of the object and the

latter further discerns the attributes of that object.

§4.2.2 Conciliation: as Awareness

Even though these two functions of consciousness seem well stated, when it comes

to the sentient phenomena as a whole, the definition of consciousness becomes blurred.

Sāriputta once explained in the Mahāvedalla Sutta that consciousness cannot be

separated from feeling and perception. These states are conjoined (saṃsaṭṭhā), not

disjoined. 538 Gethin suggests that consciousness, feeling, and perception operate

together “as different aspects of the process of being aware of a particular object of

consciousness.”539 And “[v]iññāṇa can perhaps best be characterised as awareness or

consciousness of things in relation to each other; this seems to relate both the notion of

self awareness and that of discriminating various objects.”540 The Khandhasaṃyutta

said that consciousness cannot be dependent from the other four aggregates:541

Though someone might say: “Apart from form, apart from feeling, apart from

perception, apart from volitional formations, I will make known the coming and going

of consciousness, its passing away and rebirth, its growth, increase, and expansion” -

538
MN I, 293: yā ca vedanā yā ca saññā yañ ca viññāṇaṃ, ime dhammā saṃsaṭṭhā no visaṃsaṭṭhā. na
ca labbhā imesaṃ dhammānaṃ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṃ paññāpetuṃ. yaṃ hi
vedeti taṃ sañjānāti, yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vijānāti.
539
Gethin 1986: 37.
540
Gethin 1986: 37.
541
SN III, 58: so evaṃ vadeyya: aham aññatra rūpā aññatra vedanāya aññatra saññāya aññatra
saṅkhārehi viññāṇassa āgatiṃ vā gatiṃ vā cutiṃ vā upapattiṃ vā vuddhiṃ vā virūḷhiṃ vā vepullaṃ
vā paññāpessāmīti, netaṃ ṭhānaṃ vijjati.

- 187 -
 that is impossible. (Bodhi 2000a: 894.)

This description confirms that consciousness is always conscious of something.

Rahula thus argues: “Consciousness depends on matter, sensation, perception and

mental formation, and that it cannot exist independently of them.” 542 Boisvert

concludes thus:543

The “mystical” sense of viññāṇa may be elucidated if looked at as a function which is

applied throughout the mind and matter phenomenon. Viññāṇa is probably the faculty

needed for the cognition of pure percept, of sensation and of conceptualization as well;

it is not independent of any of these three aggregates. Since none of the aggregates has

the capacity of being self-conscious, only viññāṇa can be considered as performing the

function of consciousness or attention.

De Silva refers to the Western psychological division of the mind in this respect:544

Scholars who find the tripartite functions useful in understanding the Buddhist concept

of mind consider feeling (vedanā) as the affective dimension of experience, disposition

and volition (saṅkhāra) as the contative dimension, and perception (saññā) and

consciousness (viññāṇa) as the cognitive aspect. While this may be a useful way of

charting out the dimensions of psychological experience and behaviour, it may not be

very safe to put absolute reliance on it. In a deeper sense all four mental khandhas are

present in all states of consciousness and experience… In this manner, the three

dimensions of experience are the product of abstract analysis, whereas all three aspects

are found in all states of consciousness and behavior.

According to their studies, consciousness is more like fundamental awareness

542
Rahula 1985: 25.
543
Boisvert 1997: 118.
544
De Silva 2005: 17-18.

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throughout the whole cognitive process. It is not only aware of the presence of a sense

object but also feeling, perception, and volitional formations, i.e. all mental activities.

It is in this sense that many scholars consider that viññāṇa has the ability to be conscious

of all phenomena without further discrimination or cognition. Hamilton, therefore,

points out that the initial position of the sense consciousness in the cognitive processes:

“It appears at the beginning of the sentence because it is a prerequisite to every stage in

the cognitive process… It is the function of viññāṇa to enable us to be aware of each of

these aspects of the cognitive process.” 545 In order to make a coherent definition,

Hamilton thus excludes the ability of discrimination from consciousness: “Viññāṇa

does not specifically do the discriminating, but, rather, is the awareness by which we

experience every stage of the cognitive process, including the process of

discriminating.”546 This kind of “discriminatory or identificatory role” is bestowed to

perception, according to her. 547 Gombrich also takes this position to separate

consciousness from perception thus: “Saññā carries a connotation of naming, so it refers

to perceptions to which one can put a name, as distinct from mere consciousness of

something being there (which is viññaṇa, the fifth khandha).” 548 Therefore, the

Khajjanīya Sutta did not mean that consciousness can discern tastes but only be aware

of the presence of tastes. In this sense, there is no difference between the six sense

consciousnesses and an integrated consciousness. Because the only function of viññāṇa

545
Hamilton 1996: 91.
546
Hamilton 1996: 92.
547
Hamilton 1996: 53.
548
Gombrich 2006b: 92.

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is “consciousness of” all mental activities.549 And this function is persistent throughout

the whole cognitive process.

§4.2.3 Conciliation: as a Life Principle

When consciousness is endowed with the characteristic of persistence, it is also

endowed with the ability to connect different time periods, both moments and lives. In

this way, consciousness exceeds cognitive experience in this life and becomes the

subject which endures transmigration. In the Sampasādanīya Sutta, consciousness is

compared to an unbroken stream (viññāṇasota) between different lives. 550 Boisvert

even separates consciousness from its objects so that it becomes independent of objects:

“Viññāṇa as pure consciousness or mere attention does not necessarily need to be

conscious of or attentive to something in order to exist.”551 It seems that no other

aggregate has this ability. De Silva thus distinguishes consciousness into “cognitive

consciousness” and “total consciousness”.552 For him, cognitive consciousness relates

to sense perception, while total consciousness is “an unbroken stream directed by

rebirth, which includes conscious and residual mental events of the individual.” 553

Bucknell attributes this distinction to different contexts of the teaching of causality:554

The viññāṇa of the branched version is the summation of the six types of consciousness

associated with the sense organs, which makes that version read like an account of the

549
Hamilton 1996: 88.
550
DN III, 105.
551
Boisvert 1997: 118.
552
De Silva 2005: 19.
553
De Silva 2005: 19.
554
Bucknell 1999: 327.

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 psychological process of sensory perception. In contrast, the looped version, for which

viññāṇa defined as rebirth consciousness reads like an account of events associated

with the process of physical rebirth.

The interpretation of a life principle can find its support in the Mahāvedalla Sutta.

During people’s life, viññāṇa is one of three requisites together with vitality (āyu) and

heat (usmā). Without them, the body would be discarded and forsaken.555 Even after

people’s death, it seems viññāṇa would last as some kinds of entity. The Mahāvedalla

Sutta continued to list six indications to ascertain a dead person, i.e. bodily formations,

verbal formations, mental formations, vitality, heat, and faculties. When these six

indications stop working, that means this person is dead. Since only two requisites:

vitality and heat are listed within the six indications, it may imply that viññāṇa can stay

continuously after death. In the Saṃyutta Nikāya, it is also said that Mara tried to search

Godhika’s and Vakkali’s viññāṇa after their death.556 Since both of them had attained

parinibbāna, Mara’s search was futile. By contrast, ordinary people’s viññāṇa would

be reborn according to previous volitional formations they generated:557

If a person immersed in ignorance generates a meritorious volitional formation,

consciousness goes to the meritorious [realm]; if he generates a demeritorious

volitional formation, consciousness goes to the demeritorious; if he generates an

imperturbable volitional formation, consciousness goes to the imperturbable. (Bodhi

2000a: 587.)

555
MN I, 296: yadā kho imaṃ kāyaṃ tayo dhammā jahanti: āyu usmā ca viññāṇaṃ, athāyaṃ kāyo
ujjhito avakkhitto seti yathā kaṭṭhaṃ acetanaṃ.
556
SN I, 122; SN III, 124.
557
SN II, 82: avijjāgato yaṃ purisapuggalo puññaṃ ce saṅkhāraṃ abhisaṃkharoti, puññūpagaṃ hoti
viññāṇaṃ. apuññaṃ ce saṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti, apuññūpagaṃ hoti viññāṇaṃ. āneñjaṃ ce
saṅkhāram abhisaṅkharoti āneñjūpagaṃ hoti viññāṇaṃ.

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 Moreover, the Mahānidāna Sutta entailed three conditions for consciousness in

order to give birth and grow up: 1. Consciousness has to come into the mother's womb

(mātukucchismiṃ okkamissatha); 2. Consciousness is not deflected (vokkamissatha); 3.

Consciousness is not cut off (vocchijjissatha).558 These passages altogether interpret

viññāṇa as a role or function to sustain human psychological activities. In this life,

viññāṇa is an indispensable factor. It can last after death. It is also the entity causing

rebirth in the next life. In this way, viññāṇa becomes a life principle as a subject

undergoing every life or transmigration.

Since the Buddha clearly rebutted Sāti’s declaration in the Mahātaṇhāsankhaya

Sutta, consciousness must not be understood as an unchanging and everlasting entity.

However, according to the passages mentioned above which indicated consciousness

can last after death, to construe consciousness as fundamental awareness is a good way

to solve this problem. Hence, the PED interprets viññāṇa as participle “minding”

instead of noun “mind” and “it is only the immutable persistence that is condemned.”559

Therefore, consciousness can be an ever-changing psychological process which

underlies all mental activities throughout this life as well as between different lives.

Wijesekera unifies the different meanings of viññāṇa:560

[T]he so-called ‘separate meanings’ of Viññāṇa do not refer to so many different entities

but to aspects of the same phenomenon. A study of all the relevant passages shows that

behind all these aspects is a much deeper Viññāṇa… Viññāṇa was the basis for all

558
DN II, 63.
559
PED, 618.
560
Wijesekera 1964: 259.

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 conscious and unconscious psychological manifestations pertaining to individuality as

it continued in Saṃsāra or empirical existence.

Kalupahana notices these two types of consciousness and further suggests that the

teaching of causality as a principle connects these two types of consciousness:561

On the one hand, consciousness arises because of conditions (paccayaṃ paṭicca, sui so

yüan sheng), for example, the contact of sense organs and sense objects (see below).

On the other hand, as discussed above, it serves as a cause in that it conditions the

psychic personality of the newly born individual. Thus, the problem of perception, as

well as the problem of rebirth, which the Upaniṣadic thinkers solved by positing an

immutable and perduring soul, were given causal explanations in the early Buddhist

texts.

Hence, the teaching of causality is the theory or explanation to connect different

aspects of viññāṇa. Johansson thus erases the distinction of viññāṇa:562

As viññāṇa is in its rebirth-aspect felt to be empirical and to consist of processes only,

without much inner unity, there is no reason to distinguish between the perceptual

viññāṇa and rebirth-viññāṇa.

In this sense, although viññāṇa is said to be a subject enduring moments and lives,

it also complies with the law of causation. It itself is the result of the previous

consciousness and meanwhile the cause of the next consciousness. From this point of

view viññāṇa turns out to be a self-dependent subject although it is always changing.

561
Kalupahana 1975: 121.
562
Johansson 1965: 198.

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§4.2.4 Solution: as a General Term

However, according to the teaching of causality, it never emphasizes any of these

factors as a persistent entity. All these factors are equally dependent. If viññāṇa can be

the lasting subject, its causes and effects should exist altogether accordingly. In other

words, not only consciousness but also the other four aggregates arise and cease

continuously. As we have seen earlier, all the five aggregates work hand in hand. Then

why only consciousness is picked out to be the subject? Kalupahana indicates that only

consciousness can preserve past experience:563

While not denying the influence of the physical on the psychophysical personality, the

Buddha emphasized the importance of consciousness or the psychic personality

because only it has a past history. It is the personality that survives physical death and,

in conjunction with the new biophysical contributions of the parents, gives rise to a

relatively new psychophysical personality.

This explanation bestows viññāṇa a role of memory or database. The problem is

that memory is a complex notion, so we hardly find specific analysis of it in the whole

Sutta Piṭaka. Besides, not only viññāṇa but also other factors, like saññā, saṅkhārā are

closely related to the function of memory. There is no implicit indication to specify

consciousness as the subject which can preserve experience in the Sutta Piṭaka. This

idea is much to do with the later schools, especially the Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda.

From the understanding that consciousness is an underlying stream throughout life

to life, it reveals an interesting point: viññāṇa does not perform any specific function.

563
Kalupahana 1975: 117-18.

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Wynne proposes a question that viññāṇa seems useless since vedanā, saññā, and

saṅkhārā constitute all forms of consciousness. 564 In other words, we can remove

viññāṇa from the analysis of cognition without any effect if it functions as bare

awareness. To solve this problem, we need to find other possible explanations of

viññāṇa. In the Assutavā Sutta of the Nidānasaṃyutta, the Buddha compared our mind

to a monkey in contrast to the body thus:565

Just as a monkey roaming through a forest grabs hold of one branch, lets that go and

grabs another, then lets that go and grabs still another, so too that which is called “heart”

and “mind” and “consciousness” arises as one thing and ceases as another by day and

by night. (Bodhi 2000a: 595.)

This passage indicates that “heart (citta)”, “mind (mano)”, and “consciousness

(viññāṇa)” can be used as synonyms. These three terms do not have any specific

definition but only have a general meaning here. This usage is identified as very old by

the PED.566 Most importantly, the simile of the monkey does not imply a subject like a

monkey who grasps objects longingly and constantly. Just like the Buddha refuted

Moḷiyaphagguna’s question: “who craves?” as invalid:567

If I should say, “One craves,” in that case, this would be a valid question: “Venerable

sir, who craves?” But I do not speak thus. Since I do not speak thus, if one should ask

me, “Venerable sir, with what as condition does craving [come to be]?” this would be

a valid question. To this, the valid answer is: “With feeling as condition, craving [comes

564
Wynne 2010: 198.
565
SN II, 95: seyyathāpi makkaṭo arāññe pavane caramāno sākhaṃ gaṇhati. taṃ muñcitvā aññaṃ
gaṇhati. evam eva kho yad idaṃ vuccati cittaṃ iti pi mano iti pi viññāṇaṃ iti pi, taṃ rattiyā ca
divasassa ca aññad eva uppajjati aññam nirujjhati.
566
PED, 618.
567
SN II, 14.

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 to be]; with craving as condition, clinging; with clinging as condition, existence... Such

is the origin of this whole mass of dukkha.” (Bodhi 2000a: 542.)

Therefore, what the Buddha meant by heart, mind, and consciousness is a general

designation for the mental activities as a whole. There is no subject, consciousness in

this case, grasping or craving the object. Whenever the stimulus contacts the sense

faculty, the whole cognitive process begins. But only the causes and effects happen.

And craving is just one of the factors in this process. No subject is needed in this process,

as it is ever-changing and ephemeral. Hence, there is no need to contrive consciousness

as a subject which underlies the whole cognitive process and transmigration. As

Johansson emphasizes:568

As belonging to the popular pulpit style, this should certainly not be taken too literally:

usually it is emphatically stressed that khandha, of which viññāṇa is one, are dissolved

at death; here viññāṇa has been used as citta is used in many similar contexts.

From this point of view, the term viññāṇa is used to denote the general mental

activity in this kind of context. Hence, it is devoid of the meaning of consciousness or

the meaning of one aggregate. Jayatilleke supposes viññāṇa to be “the general term for

‘cognition’”. 569 Wayman also points out that the common consciousness covers all

mental processes. 570 This kind of interpretation actually preserves its earliest usage.

Especially in the Dhātuvibhanga Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya which is considered as

very old, the Buddha taught Pukkusāti to contemplate the six elements (dhātu) which

568
Johansson 1965: 193.
569
Jayatilleke 1963: 435.
570
Wayman 1976: 331.

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consist of a person. They are the earth element, the water element, the fire element, the

air element, the space element, and the consciousness element. 571 Among these six

elements, viññāṇa is used to represent all mental activities in contrast to the other five

physical elements. To see this, Kalupahana indicates that the four formless aggregates

are derived from consciousness:572

The four immaterial aggregates merely represent the different aspects of the psychic

personality, which in the earlier classification was denoted by the element of

consciousness (viññāṇa, shih).

Wynne resorts to the Alagaddūpama Sutta to solve this question. He suggests that

the list of the six standpoints for views (diṭṭhiṭṭhānāni) in this sutta represents the

original formation before the standard five aggregates formula. 573 In this list,

consciousness is absent but the other four aggregates and the sentence “what is seen,

heard, sensed, cognized, encountered, sought, and mentally pondered. (taṃ diṭṭhaṃ

sutaṃ mutaṃ viññātaṃ pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicaritaṃ manasā)” are found. The first

part of this sentence: diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ mutaṃ viññātaṃ has been identified by many

scholars as an allusion to Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.574 Here the term muta means the

functions of taste, smell, and touch. 575 Therefore, these four terms include all six

sensory functions. And they cover all means a person can get to know the existence of

ātman in Upaniṣadic doctrine. The remaining part: pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicaritaṃ

571
MN III, 239.
572
Kalupahana 1975: 116.
573
Wynne 2010: 200 ff.
574
E.g. Jayatilleke 1963: 60-61; Gombrich 1990: 60. Also refer to Wynne 2010: 201 n. 44; Kuan 2008:
19-20.
575
PED, 536.

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manasā, according to Wynne, describes the meditative methods to access ātman. Hence,

this passage shows that “no aspect of one’s experience, not even the experience of the

Upaniṣadic ātman, should be regarded as one’s real identity (attan).” 576 Wynne,

therefore, suggests that the last aggregate: consciousness, is annexed to an archaic four

aggregates list:577

Thus the initial list of misconceived views is altered in order to formulate an empirical

denial of the Upaniṣadic ātman: the replacement of the pericope ‘what is seen etc.’ by

‘consciousness’ is an intentional change that facilitates a more explicit critique of

Upaniṣadic thought. The structure of this teaching looks like a good example of the

Buddha’s skill in means: in order to criticise a contemporaneous idea, an initial list of

incorrect views is adapted to the important five aggregate doctrine.

If his suggestion is accepted, we may assume that the functions of viññāṇa are so

vague and general, therefore, viññāṇa is not significant enough to be picked out in the

analysis of cognition at the very beginning. It was not until a later date, that viññāṇa

was gradually recognized as important as the other four aggregates. Hence, the concept

of consciousness was developed into various forms which connect various mental

activities loosely. This development brought about confusion and also enabled itself to

be construed as the underlying base in all the sentient phenomena. Ñāṇamoli thus

separates these two usages of viññāṇa:578

Viññāṇa (rendered by “consciousness”) is, loosely, more or less a synonym of mano

and citta; technically, it is bare cognition considered apart from feeling [vedanā],

576
Wynne 2010: 201.
577
Wynne 2010: 204.
578
Ñāṇamoli 2010: 456, n. 35.

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 perception [saññā] or formations [saṅkhāra].

Keeping this interpretation in mind, we can further discuss passages which seem

to be dealing with a saṃsāric entity. In such passages, consciousness is said to fall into

(okkamati)579 or to descend to (avakkanti)580 somewhere. This kind of verbs can be

considered as a conventional expression. It does not mean something goes somewhere.

As the PED notes: “We say ‘he went to sleep’, without meaning that he went

anywhere.”581 Hence, Hamilton indicates these terms as a linguistic convention: “The

use of verbs which mean ‘descend’ or ‘enter’ are a linguistic convention which indicate

that viññāṇa is a vital factor in the arising of an individual and in the saṃsāric

experience.”582 C. A. F. Rhys Davids asserts that this expression is “a case of folklore

speech adopted by the Suttanta teaching that the usual verb for happening or coming to

be – viz. uppajjati, uppatti, arising or attaining – is here replaced by avakkanti, descent,

a figure of speech more rare”.583 Kalupahana also agrees with her interpretation.584 And

this kind of usage was maybe a kind of conventional expression. Bodhi construes this

expression as metaphorical, “it should not be taken literally as implying that

consciousness is a self-identical entity which transmigrates from one life to another…

It is not an ongoing subject but a series of transitory acts of cognition arising and passing

away through conditions.”585

579
DN II, 63: viññāṇaṃ va hi mātu kucchiṃ na okkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ mātu
kucchismiṃ samucchissatha.
580
SN II, 91: saññojaniyesu dhammesu assādānupassino viharato viññāṇassa avakkanti hoti.
581
PED, 163.
582
Hamilton 1996: 85.
583
C. A. F. Rhys Davids 1914: 22.
584
Kalupahana 1975: 118.
585
Bodhi 2000b: 18.

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 In this sense, when the Buddha explained how consciousness goes to a body or a

realm, he actually meant that the composite of mental activities comes into being under

certain circumstances. Here viññāṇa in this context is not necessary to be an entity or

an aggregate. Reat compares the meanings of viññāṇa in Buddhism and in Upaniṣads.

The greatest difference he found is “In the Upaniṣads, vijñāna is the very stuff of

consciousness, while in Buddhism viññāṇa is merely a designation for consciousness

in general.”586 He makes an assertion about consciousness in a general sense thus:587

The “layering” of consciousness in Buddhism must be approached with caution,

however, because differentiation between various aspects of consciousness in the

Buddhist scheme is for the purpose of analysis, not for the purpose of ranking aspects

of consciousness into a hierarchy of levels that approach an essential soul… There is

no abstract book, apart from the pages, which could have pages. Similarly,

consciousness in general as designated by viññāṇa does not have aspects such as

feeling, perception, etc.; it is all of these aspects together.

According to these analyses, it seems that the term viññāṇa or consciousness in

the earliest days of Buddhism did not have an identifiable or specific definition and

function. It gradually became important in the analysis in terms of cognition and

transmigration. It is probably because of its general usage from the very beginning that

made it vague and unclear. Also in this respect, consciousness connects all aspects of

Buddhist psychology. When consciousness was incorporated into the analysis of

cognition, it satisfied some functions and gaps. As the sense consciousness, it shows

586
Reat 1990: 296.
587
Reat 1990: 295.

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that the subjective aspect became involved from the beginning. While as an integrated

consciousness, it discerns mental phenomena. This function especially caused

confusion with the function of perception which will be discussed later. On the other

hand, its general meaning as mental activity in toto was preserved so that all these

different connotations were mixed up.

§4.2.5 Summary

As discussed in the previous section, the six sense consciousnesses function as

bare awareness. They happen in separate sensory channels. This section discusses

another kind of viññāṇa which functions as an integrated unit. According to the Sutta

Piṭaka, viññāṇa is called thus because it can cognize different tastes or feelings. This

function necessarily requires discerning ability and experience. Therefore, we need to

contrive viññāṇa which is able to utilize experience, memory, and knowledge. In this

way, a distinction is made between the six sense consciousnesses and an integrated

consciousness. These two types and functions seem incompatible. Hence, some people

try to conciliate these two interpretations. In this way, consciousness is minimized to

the persistent function of awareness or conscious activity. By doing so, viññāṇa is

considered as a fundamental psychological factor which underlies the whole cognitive

process.

This attempt solves two problems. First, it unifies different meanings and functions

of viññāṇa. Since consciousness is regarded as the basic conscious activity, every

description of viññāṇa in the Sutta Piṭaka can undoubtedly be compatible with this

- 201 -
interpretation. However, this interpretation meanwhile makes viññāṇa useless in the

working of the mind. It does not perform any specific function. Wynne thus suggests

that viññāṇa probably is not mentioned in the Buddha’s analysis of mind from the

beginning. 588 So that we cannot really point out a specific function of viññāṇa.

Secondly, viññāṇa becomes a life principle connecting not only every moment but also

different lives. This continuous and uninterrupted consciousness offers an explanation

how ordinary people transmigrate without resorting to the notion of self (attā) or soul.

However, it is not only an everlasting entity that the Sutta Piṭaka tried to avoid but also

a subject. The Buddha always emphasized that factors or phenomena have to depend

on one another. Once we accept a continuous subject, even if it keeps changing, all the

other factors would become the concomitants of that subject. This is what we find in

the analysis of citta and cetasika in Abhidhamma theory.

We already know that the Buddha clearly rebutted Sāti’s declaration about an

unchanging consciousness. Sāti understood viññāṇa as the same subject which

transmigrates and experiences the results of kamma. 589 It is worth noting that the

Buddha suggested the six sense consciousnesses to rectify Sāti’s view, not the

consciousness as a life principle. If the Buddha really had an idea that viññāṇa is the

basic awareness which underlies our mental activities and connects every moment and

life, he should have candidly pointed out the fault of Sāti’s view and clarified that

consciousness is not always the same but ever-changing. But he did not. Moreover, if

588
Wynne 2010: 201.
589
MN I, 258.

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the Buddha really meant that the aggregate of consciousness would fall into (okkamati)

or descend to (avakkanti) a body, it would not have been far-fetched to expect that many

people misinterpreted this doctrine as Sāti did. Unfortunately, I find no other records

regarding this topic. The critical point probably is not the everlasting consciousness but

a continuous subject. Amending consciousness to a changing subject does not help

Sāti’s declaration. Let us substitute Sāti’s words as: “It is this transient consciousness

that runs and wanders through the round of rebirths, not other aggregates.” and “It is

that transient consciousness which speaks and feels and experiences here and there the

result of good and bad actions, not other aggregates.” I doubt that this kind of

amendment would be accepted, but such amended statements are compatible with the

idea that the only function of consciousness is bare awareness undergoing time and

lives. From the rebuke of the Buddha, we can realize that the point is not a changing or

unchanging consciousness but a continuous subject.

Since consciousness as a subject is rejected, it is better considered as a general

term for this psychological activity or as the mind in these contexts. Therefore,

consciousness cannot be construed as the only one factor which connects different lives

but as a representative of the whole psychological activity. On the other hand, the actual

functions: being aware of objects and discerning their differences can be undoubtedly

attributed to consciousness. As Karunadasa emphasizes: “[C]onsciousness is neither

that which cognizes (agent), nor that through which cognition takes place (instrument),

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but is only the process of cognizing an object.” 590 It is this cognitive function that

enables our experience and knowledge. From this point of view, the sense

consciousness as well as the integrated consciousness and other factors arises in an

appropriate condition and cease when this condition disappears.

590
Karunadasa 2013: 50.

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§4.3 Contact (phassa)

Contact (phassa), according to the Nidānasaṃyutta, is of six types: visual contact,

auditory contact, olfactory contact, gustatory contact, tactile contact and mental

contact.591 It is always defined as the meeting of the sense faculty, the sense object, and

the sense consciousness. 592 The involvement of the sense consciousness is crucial.

Since phassa does not mean the contact between the sense faculty and its object, it is

not a mere physical event. That event would be combination (samannāhāra). Contact

requires consciousness. Therefore, contact is categorized as name (nāma) together with

feeling, perception, etc. 593 The very moment that the sense consciousness emerges

indicates the establishment of contact at the same time. In this respect, contact is an

abstract expression for such a spontaneous sensory event.

Boisvert considers contact as “bare sensory experience, devoid of any subjective

inclinations”.594 Even so, contact does combine the two aspects of subject and object.

Ñāṇavīra warns us not to interpret phassa as mere contact between the sense faculty,

the sense object, and the sense consciousness but as contact between subject and

object.595 Hamilton hence considers consciousness which involves contact represents

“the subjective world of the individual” and “it is what happens subjectively that

matters”.596 It is because of ignorance, that ordinary people have the notion of selfness

591
SN II, 3.
592
SN IV, 67-69.
593
SN II, 3: vedanā saññā cetanā phasso manasikāro, idam vuccati nāmaṃ.
594
Boisvert 1997: 49.
595
Ñāṇavīra 2003: 84-85.
596
Hamilton 1996: 50.

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and hence construe things to be “mine”. This notion becomes the foundation of our

daily experience. The subject, the notion of selfness, contacts the object, the world. This,

according to Ñāṇavīra, is the primary meaning of phassa.597 This explanation seems to

confirm the term “ignorance-contact (avijjāsamphassa)” mentioned in section 3.4.

Because of this ignorance-contact, there will be various notions about selfness and

saṃsāra. In the Pārileyya Sutta, it said that which regards the five aggregates as self

(attā) is a volitional formation (saṅkhāra).598 Then it explained the reason: “When the

uninstructed person is contacted by a feeling born of ignorance-contact, craving arises:

thence that volitional formation is born. (avijjāsamphassajena vedayitena phuṭṭhassa

assutavato puthujjanassa uppannā taṇhā, tatojo so saṅkhāro.)”599 In this place, contact

is closely connected with ignorance against the truth of no-self. In other words, contact

stands for the meeting of self and the object. And it consequently brings out feeling and

craving. Thereafter the various notions about I or self arise. Not only feeling but also

speculative views are rooted in contact. It is especially the last reason that Sutta Piṭaka

emphasized the importance of contact. I will continue to discuss these two aspects of

contact: the origin of feeling and the source of speculative views.

§4.3.1 The Origin of Feeling

During the Buddha’s time, there were different opinions about the origins of pain

and pleasure recorded in the Nidānasaṃyutta, including done by oneself, by another,

597
Ñāṇavīra 2003: 84.
598
SN III, 96-99.
599
SN III, 96-99. (Bodhi 2000a: 922-23.)

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by both oneself and another, and arisen fortuitously.600 The Buddha asserted that pain

and pleasure are dependent on contact. Therefore, the SA said that there is no experience

of dukkha without contact.601 In the chain of the twelve links, contact is the direct cause

of feeling. In the Dutiya-assutavā Sutta and the Phassamūlaka Sutta, the arising and

ceasing of the three types of feeling: pleasant feeling, painful feeling, neither-painful-

nor-pleasant feeling depend on contact.602 These two suttas described contact as to be

experienced as pleasant, painful, or neither-painful-nor-pleasant. This process is further

compared to the conjunction and friction of two fire-sticks so heat and fire can be made.

Hamilton thus argues that the qualities of feelings are decided by contact:603

A further point about the analogy of the sticks is that it raises the possibility that phassa

itself is agreeable, disagreeable or indifferent. That appropriate feelings arise from

appropriate contact suggests that, say, the agreeableness of the feeling is determined at

the phassa stage of the process of the arising of the feeling.

Though this argument is not wrong, it is not complete because contact is also

conditioned. In the Ghosita Sutta of the Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta, it explained how the

object affects the arising of different kinds of contact and feelings.604 Here the six sense

objects are distinguished into agreeable (manāpā), disagreeable (amanāpā), and to be

felt neutral (upekkhāvedaniyā). Hence, contact and feeling are different accordingly.

The sense faculty and the sense consciousness are not related to the qualities of feeling.

600
SN II, 33 ff.
601
SA II, 56: yasmā hi na vinā phassena dukkhapaṭisaṃvedanā atthi.
602
SN II, 96-97; IV, 215.
603
Hamilton 1996: 47.
604
SN IV, 114.

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Only sense objects are. These different types of process can be traced back to the

attributes of the objects. This will be discussed more in the next section. Nevertheless,

this causal relationship seems to be neglected by Hamilton.

Similar negligence is found in Ñāṇavīra. He argues that the six senses cannot be

construed as physical organs because there is no difference in the point of physical

organs between ordinary people and arahants. Therefore, when the Sutta Piṭaka said

that contact ceases in an arahant, it means “the entire cessation of all illusion of ‘I’ and

‘mine’”. 605 In other words, contact represents the interaction of subject and object

instead of a physical event in the physical organ. However, his argument is not complete

once we consider the statement: “the remainderless cessation of the six bases for contact

(channaṃ phassāyatanānaṃ asesavirāganirodhā)” which has been discussed in the

previous chapter. This statement points out that contact needs to depend on the sense

faculty. It is the sense faculty as the base that makes contact arise. Though Ñāṇavīra

rightly refutes the six senses to be physical organs, he fails to see the six senses in their

cognitive functions. Between the subject and object, the sense faculty offers a platform

for the cognitive activity. This is why the sense faculty is called the base for contact.

And the Buddha does not experience such bases though he can sense the world.606 Once

the notion of selfness is eliminated, there would be no connection between subject and

object. Hence, the function of the six senses as the base will perish, as does contact.

605
Ñāṇavīra 2003: 85.
606
AN IV, 427.

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§4.3.2 The Source of Speculative Views

Furthermore, the importance of contact could be discussed as part of the cognitive

processes. It is in the cognitive processes that contact is considered as the cause of

various views. Though the statement that contact conditions feeling is well known,

other than feelings, sensual pleasure (kāma) and kamma also arise from contact. 607

Besides, contact is said to be the cause of perception and volitional formations. 608

Moreover, it may cause the four formless aggregates: feeling, perception, volitional

formations, and consciousness.609 Even though these passages do not mean that contact

is the direct cause of these factors, they indicate that all experience must be established

on the interaction of subject and object. That is why the SA noted that contact is the

starting point to realize the five aggregates.610

From this point of view, Bodhi suggests that these passages in the Nidānasaṃyutta

mentioned above do not intend to explain the relationship between feeling and

contact.611 His suggestion is more based on the Brahmajāla Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya.

He suggests that in the Brahmajāla Sutta, the proclamation of each of the sixty-two

speculative views “is conditioned by contact and the views cannot be experienced

607
AN III, 411; 415.
608
SN III, 60, 63, 101-02; MN III, 17.
609
MN III, 279.
610
SA II, 111-12: Phasse, bhikkhave, āhāre pariññāteti tīhi pariññāhi pariññāte. Idhāpi tisso pariññā.
Tattha “phasso saṅkhārakkhandho taṃsampayuttā vedanā vedanākkhandho, saññā
saññākkhandho, cittaṃ viññāṇakkhandho, tesaṃ vatthārammaṇāni rūpakkhandho”ti evaṃ
sappaccayassa nāmarūpassa yāthāvato dassanaṃ ñātapariññā. Tattheva tilakkhaṇaṃ āropetvā
sattannaṃ anupassanānaṃ vasena aniccādito tulanaṃ tīraṇapariññā. Tasmiṃyeva pana nāmarūpe
chandarāganikkaḍḍhano arahattamaggo pahānapariññā. Tisso vedanāti evaṃ phassāhāre tīhi
pariññāhi pariññāte tisso vedanā pariññātāva honti tammūlakattā taṃsampayuttattā ca. Iti
phassāhāravasena desanā yāva arahattā kathitā.
611
Bodhi 2000a: 748.

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without contact.” 612 Hamilton agrees that contact leads to various views: “Without

phassa, the Sutta states, none of those views would be held. All of the views arise

because of continual contact in the six spheres of contact.” 613 Kuan explains this

process:614

All the views and speculations that cause disputes in the world result from such

subjective experiences based on sensory contacts, including the contact between mind

and mental objects. These experiences bring about various ways of conceptualization

among different beings, which leads to naming associated with conceptual proliferation

(papañca-saṅkhā, or papañcasaññāsaṅkhā), and hence diverse views and arguments

among people.

Bodhi further explains how these views are rooted in the cognitive processes:615

Since views proclaim things to possess a nature that they do not really have, entirely

under the dictates of craving, the adherence to them is always accompanied by an inner

turmoil or element of anxiety, which vitiates the feeling of pleasure they give with a

nagging sense of mental uneasiness. It is this which makes the holding to views a form

of suffering.

For these reasons, contact is not just a perceptive event. It also entails all the ideas

and reactions. These two interpretations in terms of feelings and views are probably

owing to two types of contact.

612
DN I, 43: te vata aññatra phassa paṭisaṃvedissantīti n’etaṃ ṭhānaṃ vijjati.
613
Hamilton 1996: 47.
614
Kuan 2008: 22.
615
Bodhi 2007: 34.

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§4.3.3 Two Types of Contact

In the Mahānidāna Sutta, the distinction of impact-contact (paṭighasamphassa)

and designation-contact (adhivacanasamphassa) is found.616 This passage intends to

clarify why contact depends on name-and-form. However, its explanation is quite

recondite both in Pāli and Chinese sources. In the Mahānidāna Sutta, contact is divided

into designation-contact and impact-contact in order to pair with name and form:617

(The Buddha) If those qualities (ākāra), traits (liṅga), signs (nimitta), and indicators

(uddesa) through which there is a description of the name-factor were all absent, would

designation-contact be discerned in the form-factor? (Ānanda) Certainly not, venerable.

(The Buddha) If those qualities, traits, signs, and indicators through which there is a

description of the form-factor were all absent, would impact-contact be discerned in

the name-factor? (Ānanda) Certainly not, venerable.

(The Buddha) If those qualities, traits, signs, and indicators through which there is a

description of the name-factor and the form-factor were all absent, would either

designation-contact or impact-contact be discerned? (Ānanda) Certainly not, venerable.

(The Buddha) If those qualities, traits, signs, and indicators through which there is a

description of name-and-form were all absent, would contact be discerned? (Ānanda)

Certainly not, venerable. (Bodhi 2000b: 50-51.)

This passage mentions that designation-contact regarding form must depend on

616
DN II, 62.
617
DN II, 62: “yehi, ānanda, ākārehi yehi liṅgehi yehi nimittehi yehi uddesehi nāmakāyassa paññatti
hoti, tesu ākāresu tesu liṅgesu tesu nimittesu tesu uddesesu asati api nu kho rūpakāye
adhivacanasamphasso paññāyethā”ti? “no hetaṃ, Bhante.” “yehi, ānanda, ākārehi yehi liṅgehi
yehi nimittehi yehi uddesehi rūpakāyassa paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu …pe… tesu uddesesu asati api
nu kho nāmakāye paṭighasamphasso paññāyethā”ti? “no hetaṃ, Bhante.” “yehi, ānanda,
ākārehi …pe… yehi uddesehi nāmakāyassa ca rūpakāyassa ca paññatti hoti tesu ākāresu …pe…
tesu uddesesu asati api nu kho adhivacanasamphasso vā paṭighasamphasso vā paññāyethā”ti? “no
hetaṃ, Bhante.” “yehi, ānanda, ākārehi …pe… yehi uddesehi nāmarūpassa paññatti hoti, tesu
ākāresu …pe… tesu uddesesu asati api nu kho phasso paññāyethā”ti? “no hetaṃ, Bhante.”

- 211 -
name-factor, while impact-contact regarding name depends on form-factor. Johansson

explains this passage thus:618

This means, I think, that processes in the body produce stimulus-contact (paṭigha-

samphasso) in the nāma-part, i.e. bodily processes become conscious by appropriate

stimulation; in this way the body becomes conscious. Without bodily functions, the

mind would not be stimulated. And the nāma-part gives verbal contact (adhivacana-

samphasso) in the rūpa-part, i.e. conscious processes (feelings, images, intensions)

produce verbal associations which can be expressed by voice and gesture in rūpa,

namely by means of bodily organs. Without psychological functions there would be no

bodily expression.

Hamilton compares these two types of contact to the distinction between the five

bodily senses and the mind faculty.619 Tan resorts to Abhidhamma doctrine, in which

designation-contact refers to the mental cognitive process (mano-dvāravīthi), while

impact-contact indicates the five-door cognitive process (pañca-dvāravīthi). 620

Sarathchandra argues that phassa in these two terms means ideas in general. He

explains impact-contact as “the phassa experienced by the five external sense-organs

or ideas of sensation”, while designation-contact means “phassa experienced through

the mind or ideas of reflection.” 621 Harvey explains that this process is a constant

interplay:622

Stimulation is like the spark which ignites the petrol, setting off a process which turns

618
Johansson 1985: 32-33.
619
Hamilton 1996: 49.
620
Tan 2007: 163.
621
Sarathchandra 1958: 14.
622
Harvey 2004: 133.

- 212 -
 the crank (the development of the processes of sentiency/nāma), which crank also

communicates its motion so as to generate another spark (stimulation depends on

sentiency - and its accompanying sensitive body/rūpa)… [I]mpact-stimulation

(paṭigha-samphassa), which depends on the sensitive body (rūpa), and designative-

stimulation (adhivacana-samphassa), which depends on sentiency (nāma, literally

‘name’). Discernment, then, makes possible the designation, or some form of naming,

of sense-objects. It conditions both internal nāma-rūpa - the sentient body, or perhaps

‘naming form’ – and external nāma-rūpa- ‘named’ or ‘meaningful’ ‘forms’.

However, in the Chinese counterpart: MĀ 97, it mentions that impact-contact (有

對更樂) depends on name-factor (名身) and designation-contact (增語更樂) depends

on form-factor (色身).623 It should be noted that both Pāli and Chinese sources omit the

six senses in the relationship of contact and name-and-form. The DA equated

designation-contact with mental contact (mana-samphassa) and impact-contact with

five bodily contacts.624 Therefore, on the one hand, impact-contact as a sensory event

brings out feeling and perception. On the other hand, designation-contact of the mind

faculty causes views, ideas, and reactions. Each of them has to depend on the other.

This distinction certainly follows the analysis of the five bodily sense faculties and the

mind faculty in the previous chapter.

623
T01, no. 26, p. 579, c7-10: 「阿難！所行、所緣有名身，離此行、離此緣有有對更樂耶？」
答曰：「無也。」 「阿難！所行、所緣有色身，離此行、離此緣有增語更樂耶？」答曰： 「無
也。 」
624
DA II, 501: yvāyam cattāro khandhe vatthuṃ katvā mano-dvāre adhivacana-samphassa-vevacano
mano-samphasso uppajjati… paṭigha-samphasso ti sappaṭighaṃ rūpakkhandhaṃ vatthuṃ katvā
uppajjanaka-phasso.

- 213 -
§4.4 Feeling (vedanā)

There is no exception in the Sutta Piṭaka that feeling (vedanā) arises depending

on contact. I also illustrated in Chart 2 that feeling can be distinguished by the six types

of contact. Following the analysis of contact above, this section will discuss the

meanings and functions of feeling in detail. Both the Khajjanīya Sutta of the

Khandhasaṃyutta and the Mahāvedalla Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya explained feeling

in the same way. The only difference between these two suttas is that the Mahāvedalla

Sutta used the verb vedeti, while the Khajjanīya Sutta used another verb vediyati. The

quote below is from the Mahāvedalla Sutta:625

“It feels, it feels (vedeti),” friend, that is why “feeling” is said. What does it feel? It

feels pleasure, it feels pain, it feels neither-pain-nor-pleasure. “It feels, it feels,” friend,

that is why “feeling” is said. (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001: 388.)

Both the noun vedanā and the verb vedeti are derived from the root vid. The root

vid in Sanskrit has several meanings of which two are the most significant: to know, to

understand; and to experience, to feel.626 Hamilton, therefore, suggests that these two

meanings both are relevant to vedanā because of its cognitive dimension.627 She further

gives an example that “feeling sad” also means “knowing this experience.” 628

Accordingly, the term vedeti also has twofold meanings: “to know” is its intellectual

side and “to feel” is experiential.629 However, the other verb vediyati is used only in the

625
MN I, 293: vedeti vedetīti kho tasmā vedanāti vuccati. kiñca vedeti? sukhampi vedeti, dukkhampi
vedeti, adukkhamasukhampi vedeti.
626
SED, 963.
627
Hamilton 1996: 45.
628
Hamilton 1996: 46.
629
PED, 648.

- 214 -
meaning of “to feel” without the meaning of “to know”.630 Hence, there is no doubt that

vedanā can be translated as feeling or sensation. 631 But the question that vedanā is

endowed with this ability of knowing or not needs to be verified. I will emphasize the

experiential aspect of feeling first and come back to this question later.

Since these terms vedanā, vedeti, and vediyati are etymologically related, their

meanings would not be easy to be clarified if we resort to each other. According to the

text, vedanā means to feel pleasure, pain, and neither-pain-nor-pleasure. It seems this

passage implies that a subject can feel these three qualities. The SA thus emphasized

that there is no one that feels except feeling itself. In other words, there is no soul or

self to feel.632 In the Moḷiyaphagguna Sutta, the Buddha repeatedly clarified that in this

psychological process no subject exists, only causes and effects. The Buddha rebutted

such questions as invalid, like: Who contacts? (ko nu kho phusati.) Who feels? (ko nu

kho vediyati.) And who craves? (ko nu kho tasati.)633 There is a seeming contradiction

about the term vediyati. On the one hand, it is used in the definition of vedanā; on the

other hand, it was denied by the Buddha thus, “I do not say ‘One feels’ (‘vediyatī’ti

āhaṃ na vadāmi).”634 These two aspects are closely related. When the verb vediyati is

used to define the noun vedanā, the sutta emphasized that feeling is a process. It is this

psychological activity “to feel” that the Buddha called “vedanā”. As Williams says:

630
PED, 648.
631
PED, 648.
632
SA II, 292: vedayatīti, ettha ca vedanā va vedayati, na añño satto vā puggalo vā.
633
SN II, 13-14.
634
SN II, 13.

- 215 -
“For Buddhism, there are no nouns, only verbs.”635 Vedanā should better be realized as

an activity in progress rather than a stable status or some “things”. As Johansson asserts:

“There are no ‘things’ in Buddhism, only processes.” 636 Since the whole cognitive

process is connected by these actions rather than an everlasting entity, it is not

applicable to inquire the subject of these activities. Therefore, on the occasion of denial,

it is the ontological subject that was rejected. Therefore, the expression of vediyati

becomes inapplicable in this context. In other words, the Buddha used the verb “to feel”

to define the noun “feeling”. While some people asked “who did it?”, the Buddha turned

to emphasize “no such subject” to feel. On the contrary, the Buddha accepted only the

questions regarding the causes and conditions, such as: “With what as condition does

feeling come to be? (kim paccayā nu kho vedana.)”637 And his answer was contact.

Whenever the sense consciousness arises depending on the sense faculty and the

sense object, this sensory event is called contact in Buddhism. Contact immediately

brings out feeling. As mentioned earlier, there are six types of feeling which are born

of the six types of contact: feeling born of visual contact, feeling born of auditory

contact, feeling born of olfactory contact, feeling born of gustatory contact, feeling born

of tactile contact, feeling born of mental contact. 638 In this sense, feeling can be

distinguished in terms of contact or the sense faculty. I have also mentioned that the

three types of feeling: pleasant feeling (sukhā vedanā), painful feeling (dukkha vedanā),

635
His statement is recorded in Gombrich’s book (2009: 131).
636
Johansson 1985: 217.
637
SN II, 13.
638
SN II, 3.

- 216 -
and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling (adukkhamasukhā vedanā) are affected by the

attributes of the objects in the previous section. All three types of feeling can arise from

the six senses. As a result, we get eighteen types of feeling in terms of different

processes. In the Ghosita Sutta of the Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta, it explained how these

feelings are distinguished:639

There exists the eye element, and forms that are agreeable, and visual consciousness…

There exists the mind element, and mental phenomena that are agreeable, and mental

consciousness: in dependence on a contact to be experienced as pleasant, a pleasant

feeling arises. There exists the mind element, and mental phenomena that are

disagreeable, and mental consciousness: in dependence on a contact to be experienced

as painful, a painful feeling arises. There exists the mind element, and mental

phenomena to be felt neutral, and mental consciousness: in dependence on a contact to

be experienced as neither-painful-nor-pleasant, a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling

arises. (Bodhi 2000a: 1200.)

This passage indicates two points: First, the objects can be agreeable (manāpā),

disagreeable (amanāpā), and to be felt neutral (upekkhāvedaniyā) which in turn define

their respective processes. The attributes of the objects are closely related to the

subsequent reactions. Secondly, these processes can be categorized according to

different sense faculties. There are eighteen distinctive types in total. The question is

whether they arise simultaneously or not. I will discuss these two points below and then

639
SN IV, 114: saṃvijjati kho cakkhudhātu, rūpā ca manāpā, cakkhuviññāṇaṃ ca…pe… saṃvijjati
kho manodhātu, dhammā ca manāpā, manoviññāṇañca sukhavedaniyaṃ. phassaṃ paṭicca
uppajjati sukhā vedanā. saṃvijjati kho manodhātu, dhammā ca amanāpā, manoviññāṇañca
dukkhavedaniyaṃ. phassaṃ paṭicca uppajjati dukkhā vedanā. saṃvijjati kho manodhātu, dhammā
ca upekkhāvedaniyā, manoviññāṇañca adukkhamasukhavedaniyaṃ. phassaṃ paṭicca uppajjati
adukkhamasukhā vedanā.

- 217 -
analyze the role of feeling in the view of cognitive processes.

§4.4.1 The Decisive Role of the Object

In the Aṭṭhasata Sutta of the Vedanāsaṃyutta, it systematically lists all

categorizations of feelings, including two, three, five, six, eighteen, thirty-six, and one

hundred and eight types. 640 Among all, the three types of feeling are the most

recognized one in numerous suttas. They are pleasant feeling, painful feeling, and

neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling.641 In the definition of vedanā, pleasure, pain, and

neither-pain-nor-pleasure are said to be the objects of feeling in the Khajjanīya Sutta

and the Mahāvedalla Sutta. The SA explained thus, “‘To feel pleasure’ means to feel

and to experience a pleasant object; the following two are the same. (sukham pi

vedayatīti sukhaṃ ārammaṇaṃ vedeti, anubhavati. parato padadvaye pi es’ eva

nayo.)”642 Hence, we can realize that feeling is the process experiencing the attributes

of the object. However, it does not mean that feeling is caused by the object directly.

Feeling arises after the sense consciousness cognizes the sensory information.

As mentioned above, the three types of feeling are caused by different types of

contact and these contacts are affected by the attributes of the objects.643 Therefore,

pleasure, pain and neutral are the sensory information transmitted throughout the

processes. In other words, from the six senses to feelings, these stages are determined

by the attributes of the objects. If the object is agreeable, it brings out contact whose

640
SN IV, 231-32.
641
SN IV, 232.
642
SA II, 292.
643
SN IV, 114.

- 218 -
quality is agreeable. Then pleasant feeling arises as a consequent result. If the object is

disagreeable, so should be the feature of contact and feeling. The function of feeling is

“to feel” the object and nothing more. What we call pleasure, pain, and neutral are

intrinsic qualities of feeling which are the spontaneous results of the objects. From this

point of view, feeling cannot be seen as a deliberate action. It is not a subjective

intentional response to the object. As Johansson suggests: “There is a marked tendency

to attribute the qualities of feeling to qualities in the objects.”644 Kuan accepts this

argument but explains more clearly. He suggests that as the qualities of feelings are

intrinsic in the sensory data, therefore, they are inevitable. 645 Hence, feeling arises

spontaneously whose function is to feel the attributes of the objects and whose quality

is decided by the objects. On the other hand, the differences of the three qualities of

feelings are said to be cognized by consciousness as discussed earlier. From this point

of view, the function of feeling does not and needs not “to know” either the attributes

of the objects or the qualities of feelings. Feeling itself is only an affective reaction

toward the stimulus. It does not involve any self-conscious ability. This point can also

be known from the sensory channel it arises.

§4.4.2 Arising in Different Sensory Channels

The Ghosita Sutta distinctively elaborates the way that feeling arises in terms of

different contacts or sense faculties. Like the sense consciousness and contact, feeling

644
Johansson 1985: 91.
645
Kuan 2008: 27.

- 219 -
happens in different channels of the cognitive processes. This fact can be further proved

by another categorization: the five faculties (pañca indriyā).646 The Dutiyavibhaṅga

Sutta explained these five are the pleasure faculty (sukhindriya), the pain faculty

(dukkhindriya), the joy faculty (somanassindriya), the grief faculty (domanassindriya),

and the equanimity faculty (upekkhindriya). The pleasure faculty and the pain faculty

belong to bodily feeling (kāyikā vedanā), while the joy faculty and the grief faculty

belong to mental feeling (cetasikā vedanā). And the equanimity faculty comprises both

bodily and mental origins. This sutta continued to explain the relationship between the

five faculties and the three types of feeling. The pleasure faculty and the joy faculty are

counted as pleasant feeling. The pain faculty and the grief faculty are painful feeling.

The equanimity faculty is neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling.

As discussed earlier, the three types of feeling are differentiated by their qualities,

while the six types of feeling can be distinguished by their origins. The five faculties of

feeling elaborate that different qualities of feelings arise in different origins. Therefore,

we may see how both pleasant feeling and painful feeling can be further divided into

bodily type and mental type. Even though the quality of the pleasure faculty and the

quality of the joy faculty are the same, they arise in different channels and these

channels are their differences. Otherwise, there is no way and it is unnecessary to

distinguish them.

Another supporting point is that there is only one of the three types of feeling that

646
SN V, 209-10.

- 220 -
can be felt at the same time. In both the Dīghanakha Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya and

the Mahānidāna Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya, they state that one can feel only one type

of feeling at one time, either pleasant feeling or painful feeling or neither-painful-nor-

pleasant feeling, rather than two or three types.647 In other words, only one type of

feeling arises in each sensory channel each time. As long as our senses function

normally, we see forms, hear sounds, and other senses work continuously moment by

moment. These sensory stimuli are received by respective sense faculties continuously

in different channels at the same time. However, each sense faculty can only feel one

type of feeling at any one time. And between these six channels, we can process only

one of them. These different channels can be illustrated as below:

an agreeable form

feeling born of visual

a disagreeable form contact: either pleasant, or
painful, or neutral
a neutral form an integrated
consciousness

feeling born of the other

the other five objects five types of contact:
with different either pleasant, or
attributes painful, or neutral

The six channels are simultaneous Only one goes through

Chart 3 The integrated process of different channels

647
MN I, 500= DN II, 66: yasmiṃ samaye sukhaṃ vedanaṃ vedeti, n’eva tasmiṃ samaye dukkhaṃ
vedanaṃ vedeti, na adukkhamasukhaṃ vedanaṃ vedeti, sukhaṃyeva tasmiṃ samaye vedanaṃ
vedeti.

- 221 -
 Therefore, there is only one type of feeling in each sensory channel and only one

channel can get our attention at one time. Suppose a man goes to a movie theater, the

environment is excellent, the chair is cozy. When the movie starts to play, even though

the image is vivid and soft, he sits so close to the loudspeaker that the sound makes him

feel deafened. In this case, his visual and tactile sensations are pleasant, while the

auditory feeling is painful. All these feelings arise simultaneously and continuously.

However, this man is mostly affected by the sound since the pain suppresses the other

feelings. Just like the simile of the six animals in the Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta, the six

animals with no restraint will be dominated by the strongest one and will be dragged

by that one.648 In this way, these types of feeling proceed in different channels in terms

of the sense faculties. Each of them reflects a corresponding attribute of the object at a

primitive level. And our mind will be attracted by only one of them at any one time.

§4.4.3 Objective and Subjective Aspects

The Suttapiṭaka defined “feeling (vedanā)” as “to feel (vedeti).” These two words

appear side by side in the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta: “With contact as condition, there is

feeling. What one feels, that one perceives. (phassapaccayā vedanā, yaṃ vedeti taṃ

sañjānāti.)”649 This statement shows the critical position of feeling. On the one hand,

it means that vedanā and vedeti intrinsically have the same meaning. I have emphasized

this point at the beginning. On the other hand, it reveals the dual aspects of feeling.

648
SN IV, 198-99.
649
MN I, 111-12.

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Feeling itself is endowed with both objective aspect and subjective aspect from the

perspective of the cognition. The noun vedanā in this passage represents an objective

description, while the verb vedeti implies the intervention of a third person. Ñāṇananda

thus points out that feeling is the turning point from the impersonal note to a deliberate

mental activity.650 According to my analysis above, feeling is not endowed with any

conscious intention yet. The qualities of feeling only reflect the attributes of the objects

spontaneously. However, feelings do mark personal affective reactions. It is in this

respect that feeling can be deemed as the subjective aspect of the stimulus in contrast

to the attributes of the objects which must be objective. We can also say that feeling

transforms the external stimulus into the internal acquirement. From this point of view,

feeling goes further than contact in the dual relationship of subject and object. Contact

is the sensory event combines subjective consciousness and objective sensory

information. Feeling is totally subjective. Boisvert differentiates contact and feeling

thus:651

The principal difference between contact and vedanā should be noted carefully: The

former is the mere perception of external stimuli perception devoid of any subjective

interpretation; the latter, however, has a definite subjective content. It is this

subjectivity that differentiates vedanā from contact.

Kalupahana indicates that this process becomes subjective owing to ego-

consciousness:652

650
Ñāṇananda 2012: 5-6.
651
Boisvert 1997: 51.
652
Kalupahana 1975: 122.

- 223 -
 Thus, immediately after feeling (vedanā), the process of perception becomes one

between subject and object. The feeling comes to be looked upon as belonging to a

subject. This marks the intrusion of the ego consciousness, which thereafter shapes the

entire process of perception, culminating in the generation of obsessions.

Karunadasa also notes that the change of the expression from vedanā to vedeti

suggests that ego-consciousness appears as “a superimposition on a purely impersonal

process.”653 I agree with them that the term vedeti is used to signify a psychological

reaction. But feeling itself cannot be affected by the notion of selfness. Since it is

endowed with passiveness, feeling is not an intentional or deliberate mental activity. To

be specific, feeling is the object of the notion of selfness. And it is at this critical point

that feeling can be described as “This is mine, this I am, and this is my self. (etaṃ mama,

esohamasmi, eso me attā.)” in the Sutta Piṭaka.654 Take our daily experience as an

example. It happens commonly that we consider things as belongings (This is mine.)

Sometimes we consider feeling in the same way. (I have a pleasant feeling toward an

object.) Since feeling is not something coming from outside but arising inside, it is

easily identified with “I” (This I am.) or a certain part of an eternal self (This is my

attā.). In any case, feeling is the object of the notion of selfness instead of the notion

itself.

In sum, there are three perspectives to discuss feeling. First, it is a spontaneous

reflection toward sensory stimulus. Feeling, therefore, can be considered as objective

or impersonal. Secondly, since feeling arises as an internal mental reaction, it represents

653
Karunadasa 2013: 58.
654
E.g. SN IV, 24-26; 106-107.

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the subjective and personal side in the process of perception. Lastly, owing to its dual

aspects, it connects with the notion of selfness in the sense that it is the object of the

expressions: mine, I am, and my self.

§4.4.4 The Inevitable Feeling

The dual aspects of feeling earn itself a crucial position in the cognitive processes

in Buddhism. Williams notices that feeling is the turning point toward unwholesome

reactions:655

This is an important stage in the process, since this link along with all the previous links

of the present life (i.e. from the third link, consciousness, on) are the results of former

karman. They are thus not in themselves morally wholesome or unwholesome. They

are therefore morally neutral. But at this stage (no doubt due to previous habits which

the wise person should watch carefully and counteract), conditioned by those feelings

the eighth link, craving, can so easily arise.

Since feeling can be spontaneous and objective, it has no ethical value. Since it

represents a personal affective dimension toward the external stimulus, feeling becomes

the target of avarice or aversion in an ordinary person. As a result, the blameless feeling

causes unwholesome reactions. In the Vedanāsaṃyutta, it is said that as one experiences

pleasure without knowing the nature of feeling, the underlying tendency to lust

(rāgānusaya) would be present. In the same vein, painful feeling brings out the

underlying tendency to aversion (paṭighānusaya) and neither-painful-nor-pleasant

655
Williams 2000: 71.

- 225 -
feeling brings out the underlying tendency to ignorance (avijjānusaya). 656 The

Chachakka Sutta further elaborates these three different reactions.657 In this sutta, an

ordinary person enjoys and desires a pleasant feeling but dislikes a painful feeling and

is indifferent toward neutral feeling. This is because this person does not understand the

nature of feeling. Whenever feeling arises, it would be the hotbed for the underlying

tendency (anusaya) to develop. But this would not happen in an enlightened person. In

the Salla Sutta of the Vedanāsaṃyutta, the Buddha opened with a statement that both

an uninstructed person and an instructed disciple feel the three types of feeling, i.e.

pleasant feeling, painful feeling, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. 658 The

distinction between these two is that ordinary people feel the three types of feeling with

attachment (saññutto).659 There is the notion of selfness connected with that feeling. So

that the three types of the underlying tendency would accordingly appear. While the

noble disciples stand on the opposite. They would not be affected by these feelings.

The interesting point is that according to this sutta an ordinary person feels mental

feeling after a bodily one, while a noble disciple feels only the bodily feeling. This

difference of their reactions is compared to the ache caused by a dart striking. An

ordinary person would sorrow, grieve, lament, weep, and become distraught toward that

ache. So this person gets struck by a second dart which is mental distress. By contrast,

a noble disciple would get hurt by only the first dart, not the second one. This statement

656
SN IV, 205.
657
MN III, 285.
658
SN IV, 207-08.
659
SN IV, 208-09: so sukhaṃ ce vedanaṃ vediyati saññutto naṃ vediyati. dukkhaṃ ce vedanaṃ
vediyati saññutto naṃ vediyati. adukkhamasukhaṃ ce vedanaṃ vediyati saññutto naṃ vediyati.

- 226 -
shows that both of them experience a bodily painful feeling but the ordinary person

would continue to hurt mentally, while the noble disciple gets rid of the subsequent

mental feeling. It brings out the presumption that some types of feeling are inevitable,

some are not. Johansson discerns the subjective reaction from bare feeling thus:660

In English usage, all sensations are neutral, but they immediately become, in most cases,

either pleasant or unpleasant through an addition of a subjective reaction and evaluation;

this is called feeling. From this point of view, "sensation" is to be preferred as

translation of vedanā, and we shall find that a distinction between the mere reception

and registration of information (i.e. sensation) and the subjective reaction to it was

actually made also in Buddhism.

Johansson translates vedanā as “sensation” for it is just mere reception and

registration of sensory information. He further explains thus: “[T]he pleasant and

unpleasant qualities are inherent in the objects and that these qualities are merely

perceived.”661 His arguments confirm the fact that vedanā is a spontaneous reflection

of a perceived quality in the object. For him, the term “feeling”, on the other hand, is

used to denote a subjective reaction and evaluation to that preceding sensation. He also

indicates an arahant feels sensations like ordinary people but no subjective feelings.662

Kuan follows this distinction, he suggests that the bodily feeling is original and intrinsic

in the sensory data, which is inevitable, and the mental feeling is the “secondary feeling”

which can be avoided.663 He explains thus:664

660
Johansson 1985: 87-88.
661
Johansson 1985: 89.
662
Johansson 1985: 90.
663
Kuan 2008: 27.
664
Kuan 2008: 26.

- 227 -
 In this sutta the bodily feeling refers to the original painful feeling he experiences,

which is the mere reception of sensory data, while the mental feeling refers to the

subsequent subjective reaction to the original feeling, which may be expressed in this

sutta by the words “he sorrows, distresses himself.”

Like Johansson, Kuan distinguishes feelings into two types: “the original feeling”

is inevitable while “the secondary feeling” can be avoided.665 He further argues that the

secondary feelings are equal to emotions in psychological studies. However, emotions

do not simply belong to vedanā, they are the result of perception (saññā) and “can be

the transition from the original feeling to saṅkhāra.” 666 After the functioning of

perception, the original feelings turn to be the secondary feelings, i.e. emotions. And it

is this emotion which further brings out the underlying tendency, which belongs to

saṅkhārakkhandha.667 I agree with them that the Salla Sutta did discern feelings into

two types: inevitable ones and avoidable ones. I also consider the reactions, like sorrow

(socati), grieve (kilamati), and lament (paridevati), as emotions which arise gradually

between feeling and volitional formations. Even though these emotions can also be

avoided, I would argue that they are not feeling in essentia. On the other hand, what the

avoidable mental feelings mentioned in the Salla Sutta can be regarded as the

subsequent feelings, they are not emotions.

This difference can be explained by the thirty-six types of feeling or the thirty-six

positions of beings (chattiṃsa sattapadā) in the Saḷāyatanavibhaṅga Sutta. They are

665
Kuan 2008: 26-27.
666
Kuan 2008: 27.
667
Kuan 2008: 28.

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six types of joy (somanasa), six types of grief (domanasa), and six types of equanimity

(upekkhā), totaling 18 types, which are respectively named after household life

(gehasita) and renunciation (nekkhammasita), totaling 36 types.668 Here we only need

to discuss the feelings based on the household life. According to this sutta, after the

contact of the six types of agreeable object, one will regard (samanupassati) the gain

of the objects as a gain (paṭilābha) or regard the non-gain of the objects as a non-gain

(appaṭilābha). 669 Then joy or grief related to household life will arise accordingly.

Since joy and grief belong to mental feelings, they cannot be directly caused by the five

external objects. In other words, they are the results of the thought of ownership of

desirable things. Because ownership is achieved or not, an ordinary person feels joy or

grief. It is in this sense, that these mental feelings are the subsequent feelings and can

be avoided. This point will be explained in steps in the next chapter.

Furthermore, the inevitable feeling offers an occasion for people to react either in

a wholesome way or an unwholesome way. The initial feelings as spontaneous

reflection are inevitable in all human beings. The reason that the subsequent feelings

are distinguished into household life and renunciation is people’s reactions toward the

initial feelings and the objects. Boisvert emphasizes thus: “This distinction between

these two types of vedanā is not intrinsic to the vedanā themselves, but rather results

from the way one approaches the vedanā.” 670 Hence, the initial feelings are the

668
MN III, 217-19.
669
MN III, 217 - 18.
670
Boisvert 1997: 74.

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reflections of the objects which will cause different reactions and these reactions will

continue to lead to the subsequent feelings. Gethin points out this potentiality of the

initial feelings:671

The significance of the three kinds of vedanā seems to lie in their being seen as three

basic reactions to experience which possess a certain potential to influence and govern

an individual's subsequent responses in either skilful or unskilful ways.

As he says, it is the responses toward the initial feelings which are endowed with

ethical values. Even the subsequent feelings themselves are neutral in ethics and in

soteriological value. We may not say that feelings based on household life or

renunciation are unwholesome or wholesome. The categorization of household life and

renunciation is the result of unskillful or skillful reactions.

§4.4.5 Summary

To conclude, feeling arises because of the stimulation of the object. Agreeable

objects bring out pleasant feeling; disagreeable objects bring out painful feeling; neutral

objects bring out neutral feeling. The quality of feeling fully reflects the attribute of the

object. However, due to different origins of the stimulation, i.e. different sense faculties,

feeling arises in different channels in the cognitive processes. In other words, feeling is

not an integrated unit to perform the function of feeling. There is even no such subject

to do that. Feeling itself means “to feel” and is endowed with no intellectual nature. It

is not a deliberate or volitional act but rather a spontaneous activity. Hence, feeling does

671
Gethin 1986: 36.

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not mean the function: to know or to cognize the attributes of the objects. Such function

belongs to the integrated consciousness and perception.

The importance of feeling is that it transforms the objective stimulation into a

subjective reaction, even though feeling itself lacks clear subjective identity. This

identity will manifest in later stages. Jurewicz indicates that the root vid in the

Chāndogya Upaniṣad denotes “the ātman’s consciousness of the will to perform

subject-object cognition” and that consciousness is represented by vedanā in the chain

of the twelve links.672 Therefore, we may think in this way: the object gives rise to “my”

specific type of feeling so that the object would not be irrelevant to me anymore. Instead,

it connects with me in the aspect of feeling. It is in this sense that feeling along with the

object becomes the target of avarice or aversion.

However, feeling does not necessarily lead to unwholesome states. It is a bifurcate

point which leads to either mundane reactions or liberated path. The initial feelings are

inevitable and common to all human beings. However, the ordinary people react

unskillfully, hence feelings based on household life arise. For trained disciples, they

cultivate their mind in the path to liberation. Those subsequent feelings are known as

feelings based on renunciation. In this way, how people treat feelings defines the

direction of the cognitive processes. As Boisvert points out:673

Hence, vedanā itself is not a sufficient condition for the emergence of craving; rather,

the perspective from which sensations are approached plays a crucial role in the

672
Jurewicz 2000: 93-94.
673
Boisvert 1997: 73.

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 emergence of craving.

In the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta, following feeling, it is perception and then thinking:

“What one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, that one thinks about. (yaṃ

vedeti taṃ sañjānāti yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vitakketi.)”674 Also in the Dasuttara Sutta of

the Dīgha Nikāya, feeling, perception, and thought arise in sequence.675 This process

eventually leads to a miserable situation. We may also get to know how these three

factors work closely from the fact that they originate from contact: “Contacted one feels,

contacted one intends, contacted one perceives. (phuṭṭho vedeti, phuṭṭho ceteti, phuṭṭho

sañjānāti.)”676 Since feeling is not endowed with any volitional intention or ethical

value, it seems that it is the working of perception and thinking which attributes

unwholesome reactions in an ordinary person. The next two sections will discuss the

functions of perception and thinking activities.

674
MN I, 111-12.
675
DN III, 289: vedanānānattaṃ paṭicca uppajjati saññānānattaṃ, saññānānattaṃ paṭicca uppajjati
saṅkappanānattaṃ.
676
SN IV, 69.

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§4.5 Perception (saññā)

Unlike the twelve links, feeling is not followed by craving but by perception

(saññā) in the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta and the Dasuttara Sutta.677 After that several mental

activities follow, like thinking (vitakketi), mental proliferation (papañceti), intention

(chanda), or obsession (pariḷāha). These two suttas, therefore, indicate that perception

plays a role between feeling and subsequent reactions. The Dhātusaṃyutta explained

that perception depends on the diversity of elements (dhātu). Since elements here mean

the six sense objects; there are six types of perception accordingly: perception of form,

perception of sound, perception of odor, perception of taste, perception of tangible,

perception of mental phenomena.678 These six types of perception can be found in the

Khandhasaṃyutta as well.679 This categorization implies that perception is the function

to perceive or to identify the six types of object.

In the discussion of the categorization of senses, contact and feeling are

categorized internally which refer to different sense faculties, while perception, and

subsequent volition, craving, thought, and examination switch their criteria to the six

sense objects.680 Even though all these factors are categorized into six types, the switch

of criteria from internal to external indicates an integrated function. Since the six senses

receive their respective stimuli simultaneously, these cognitive activities proceed in

different channels. The following factors in the cognitive processes from the sense

677
MN I, 112; DN III, 289.
678
SN II, 144.
679
SN III, 60; 63.
680
DN II, 308-10.

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consciousness to feeling are spontaneous activities in terms of the six senses. They are

distinguished by different sensory channels. Once the psychological activities become

advanced and complicated, an integrated unit is needed to coordinate individual

activities. For this reason, we consider consciousness as an integrated unit which is able

to discern objects. Similarly, perception does not arise in separate channels but

functions as a unit to perceive one object at one time. Hence, Harvey describes

perception as being “more outward-directed”.681 It is because of this integrated function

that notions, languages, and memories can be applied and be coordinated as we will see.

§4.5.1 As Discriminating

Both the Khajjanīya Sutta and the Mahāvedalla Sutta defined saññā referring to

colors: 682

“It perceives, it perceives (sañjānāti),” friend; that is why “perception” is said. What

does it perceive? It perceives blue, it perceives yellow, it perceives red, and it perceives

white. (Bodhi 2000a: 915.)

Color is the attribute of the object which can only be received through the eye

faculty. In the same vein, we can deduce that saññā not only perceives color but also

other stimuli because saññā is said to be able to perceive all the six objects. At this

stage, saññā must denote an ability more developed and conscious. Since raw data has

been dealt with by the sense consciousness and feeling, it needs to be identified in order

681
Harvey 2004: 150.
682
SN III, 86-87, MN I, 293: sañjānāti sañjānātīti kho tasmā saññāti vuccati. kiñca sañjānāti?
nīlakampi sañjānāti, pītakampi sañjānāti, lohitakampi sañjānāti, odātampi sañjānāti.

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to be processed further. In section 4.2, the function of viññāṇa is said to cognize

different tastes683 and feelings684. Taste, like color, is one type of the various attributes

of the object which can be sensed only by the tongue faculty. From this perspective,

there is no difference between the functions of saññā and of viññāṇa. There is no

difference between “to cognize (vijānāti) tastes” and “to perceive (sañjānāti) colors”.

It also works to say “to cognize colors” or “to perceive tastes”. Both are said to identify

or discriminate the characteristics of the object. The problem is that we cannot find any

further explanation to differentiate viññāṇa and saññā in the Sutta Piṭaka. Besides, I

have pointed out the vagueness of viññāṇa that it relates to every aspect of our mental

activities. This is especially the case between viññāṇa and saññā. Therefore,

Sarathchandra notes that “viññāṇa in the earliest texts was almost synonymous with

saññā.”685 Hamilton thus suggests the difficulties of defining these two terms:686

But we also noted that the author(s) both of this passage and the similar passage in the

Mahāvedallasutta seem to have difficulty describing the difference between saññā and

viññāṇa, using standard formulas about colours and tastes. The verbs used in both these

passages to define viññāṇa and saññā are vijānāti and sañjānāti respectively. These

verbs are associated with cognition, but neither of them has a precise meaning and their

use further indicates that the author(s) had difficulty in attempting to define viññāṇa

and saññā.

This difficulty that Hamilton points out is verified in the Ekottara Āgama. Here

683
SN III, 87.
684
MN I, 292; III, 242.
685
Sarathchandra 1958: 16.
686
Hamilton 1996: 92.

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consciousness was defined by tastes and perception by colors.687 However, pleasant

feeling and painful feeling were said to be perceived by perception instead of by

consciousness. Moreover, consciousness was said to be able to distinguish right/truth

or wrong/falseness. Since both saññā and viññāṇa involve the function of

discrimination, it seems no harm to their meanings if we exchange their objects.

Resorting to the commentary, the SA explained the reason why the Sutta Piṭaka used

different objects to define viññāṇa and saññā: “Perception is analyzed by way of the

eye door because it is evident in grasping the appearance and shape (ākārasaṇṭhāna) of

the object; consciousness is analyzed by way of the tongue door because it can grasp

particular distinctions (paccattabheda) in an object even when there is no appearance

and shape.”688 Here we are informed of two aspects of the objects: ākārasaṇṭhāna and

paccattabheda. Perception is in charge of the former and consciousness the latter. But

we cannot define that perception arises only depending on forms and consciousness

only on tastes. Both of them function toward all stimuli. In this sense, ākārasaṇṭhāna

and paccattabheda should be applied to all kinds of objects. If ākārasaṇṭhāna is

presented, perception will firstly arise and perceive it. If there is no ākārasaṇṭhāna,

only paccattabheda, it is consciousness not perception which can cognize it. According

to this passage, it implies that ākārasaṇṭhāna is not necessarily offered in every kind of

sensory information. These two terms ākāra and saṇṭhāna used in the context of

687
T02, no. 125, p. 707, b17-21: 所謂想者，想亦是知。知青、黃、白、黑，知苦樂，故名為
知。… 所謂識，識別是非，亦識諸味，此名為識也。
688
SA II, 293: yasmā pana ārammaṇassa ākārasaṇṭhānagahaṇavasena saññā pākaṭā hoti, tasmā sā
cakkhudvāre vibhattā. yasmā vināpi ākārasaṇṭhānā ārammaṇassa paccattabhedagahaṇavasena
viññāṇaṃ pākaṭaṃ hoti, tasmā taṃ jivhādvāre vibhattaṃ.

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perception usually denote outer forms, appearances or shapes.689 They can naturally be

cognized through the eye faculty. But outer forms cannot be applied to other sense

faculties. Therefore, this interpretation is not appropriate. The alternative way to discern

these two aspects is to construe ākārasaṇṭhāna as the general or total feature in contrast

to paccattabheda as the separate part. Harvey suggests his solution:690

While colours can usually be immediately identified, tastes and feelings often need

careful consideration to properly identify them: discernment and analysis are needed…

That is, cognition grasps the general configuration of an object while viññāṇa analyses

and discriminates its parts or aspects.

According to his suggestion, saññā perceives the general characteristic of the

object, while viññāṇa cognizes the object in detail. On the contrary, Hamilton gives a

tentative explanation that viññāṇa and saññā differ in the degree of discrimination for

which they are responsible.691 For example, consciousness identifies that something has

color and perception identifies that it is yellow; or the former identifies that something

is sour and the latter identifies it as a lemon.692 In this way, she tries to interpret viññāṇa

as the ability to cognize the general feature, while saññā to perceive specific

characteristics. Her explanation is totally opposite to Harvey’s, though she later

abandons this idea and considers that the function of discrimination has nothing to do

with viññāṇa. The solution she suggests is that viññāṇa functions as basic awareness

689
PED, 93 and 671.
690
Harvey 2004: 144.
691
Hamilton 1996: 54.
692
Hamilton 1996: 54.

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and only saññā has the ability to discriminate or identify.693 Her argument accords with

Bodhi’s and Rahula’s. 694 Gombrich also distinguishes these two terms by the same

way:695

Though there is some confusion in the Pali Canon between saññā and viññāṇa, the

settled Buddhist position becomes that viññāṇa just makes the perceiver aware that

there is something there, while saññā then intervenes to identify what it is. Therefore

saññā is the application of language to one's experience. This is, however, where the

Buddha saw a big problem.

He points out saññā has two functions: identification and designation, while

viññāṇa is just mere consciousness. The function of designating of perception will be

discussed later. Here I will refer to another well-known explanation given by the SA,

later adopted by Buddhaghosa.696 The commentary compared the abilities of sañña,

viññāṇa, and paññā to a child, an adult, and an expert. Sañña perceives the

characteristics of an object; viññāṇa not only knows the object but also sees its essence

as impermanent, dukkha, and no-self; it is paññā knowing every aspect of the object,

as well as bringing about the manifestation of the supramundane path. According to this

explanation, the function of viññāṇa is more than bare awareness or discriminative

ability. Bodhi hence comments on this simile that which “is difficult to reconcile with

the account of these factors found in the Nikāyas.”697 This explanation involves some

693
Hamilton 1996: 55.
694
Bodhi 2000a: 1072-73; Rahula 1985: 23.
695
Gombrich 2009: 145.
696
SA II, 293; Vism, 437.
697
Bodhi 2000a: 1072.

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kinds of knowledge or insight in order to gradually penetrate into the nature of the

phenomenon. It indicates three steps or levels toward liberation. Therefore, its angle is

mainly based on the soteriological function, not cognitive ones. From this point of view,

it is not surprising to find that viññāṇa is able to realize that the object is impermanent,

dukkha, and no-self. Even though the usages of viññāṇa and vijānāti in the Sutta Piṭaka

are mostly related to cognition, the explanation given by the Pāli commentary seems in

accord with Chinese Ekottara Āgama’s. In the Ekottara Āgama, consciousness is said

to be able to discern right/truth and wrong/falseness and the criteria should be the three

characteristics (ti-lakkhaṇa), i.e. impermanence, dukkha, and no-self. Hence, the

connotation of viññāṇa cannot be only mere consciousness but also knowledge to a

greater extent. This explanation seems well-stratified about the steps of liberation.

However, the designations for three steps may be due to scholastic efforts. The point is

no matter what names these steps are called, you can call this function or that function

as saññā or viññāṇa, but the analysis should comply with our experience.

From the discussion above, one thing can be sure is that sañña in the Sutta Piṭaka

and commentary means discriminatory ability regarding the various characteristics of

the objects. According to the analysis of an integrated consciousness in section 4.2, the

ability to cognize and to discern the general characteristic of the object is necessary in

the cognitive processes. The processes of discrimination comply with our experience.

We cognize the object or develop our knowledge of the object from a vague image to a

clear picture. Some scholars mentioned above bestow the function of discrimination

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and designation only to sañña. By contrast, as mentioned earlier, Harvey suggests two

types of consciousness as “sense-discernment” and “conceptional-discernment”, and

perception as a labeling function.698 I assume an integrated consciousness which can

grasp general characteristic of an object apart from perception and the sense

consciousness. We may construe that viññāṇa is the function to cognize and discern

objects in general, and saññā not only can discriminate the characteristics of the object

but at the same time develops notions and languages for those objects. The latter is the

distinctive feature of perception.

§4.5.2 As Designating

From the aspect of etymology, the difference of viññāṇa and saññā does shed light

on their functions. Both viññāṇa and saññā come from the root jñā but with different

prefix vi and saṃ. The root jñā means to know, recognize, or experience in both Sanskrit

and Pāli.699 Hence, the meanings and usages of these two terms are different in their

prefixes. In Sanskrit, the prefix vi originally means “apart, asunder” which is opposite

to the prefix saṃ meaning “together with, altogether.”700 It is in this sense that I consider

viññāṇa has the function of discrimination, while saññā performs more complicated,

comprehensive, and coordinated cognitive functions. The next step in human cognition

involves a language system. We depend on language to arrange and develop knowledge.

It is worth noting that the Sanskrit term saṃjñā (the equivalent word of Pāli saññā) also

698
Harvey 2004: 150-51.
699
SED, 425; PED, 282.
700
SED, 949; 1152.

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means a name, appellation, or title. 701 This meaning is preserved in the Pāli verb

sañjānāti which means “to call” or “to name”.702 This usage can be found in two suttas

in the Majjhima Nikāya.703 Hence, saññā must have something to do with notions and

languages. And these functions can never be applied to viññāṇa. Gethin emphasizes

these two functions of perception:704

A saññā of, say, “blue” then becomes, not so much a passive awareness of the visual

sensation we subsequently agree to call “blue”, but rather the active noting of that

sensation, and the recognising of it as “blue” - that is, more or less, the idea of

“blueness”.

In this sense, the functions of saññā include not only to discriminate the

characteristics of the object but, more importantly, to apperceive these features by

giving them names. So that the object can be known, recognized, and memorized. As

Gombrich points out: “Sañña carries a connotation of naming, so it refers to perceptions

to which one can put a name.”705 The function of perception hence keeps a distance

from the sensory stimulus and involves an established notion system. Boisvert thus

emphasizes that the names of different colors are just concepts which have no concrete

content, therefore, perception involves the ability to recall past knowledge of

categorization:706

[W]e may say that the words “to perceive” and “to be conscious of” would suggest that

701
SED, 1133.
702
PED, 670.
703
MN I, 271= I, 281: “samaṇā samaṇāti vo jano sañjānāti.”
704
Gethin 1986: 36.
705
Gombrich 2006b: 92.
706
Boisvert 1997: 78.

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 the blueness, yellowness or redness of the object is inherent in the object itself, whereas

saying “to recognize” implies that the colour (which may not be exactly blue, yellow

or red, if such pristine colours indeed exist) is “categorized” by being linked to previous

labellings. In fact, the word blue names nothing but a concept, and different people

form different concepts to describe the same sensation.

This kind of analysis reveals the way we perceive the object referring to a cultural

linguistic system and personal notion structure. This designating ability is mainly

established on personal experience and this experience is different from person to

person, therefore, it is fabricated by the mind. Olendzki explains this process in detail:707

The aggregate of perception, present in any moment of experience, supplies

information about “what” it is we are sensing or thinking. We have learned through a

lifetime of training how to make sense of the data entering our senses, and various

systems and subsystems of the brain assemble these data into discernable categories of

perception: blue, green, long, short, table, chair. These categories are to some extent

built into the hard-wiring of our sensory apparatus, are greatly influenced by shared

social conventions such as language, symbolic structures and culture, and are also

shaped by a host of personal and idiosyncratic experiences throughout our learning

process.

In this way, the function of saññā in the cognitive processes is related to

discrimination which can recognize the differences of objects referring to notions and

languages. This function is what viññāṇa lacks during discriminating.

707
Olendzki 2003: 21.

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§4.5.3 The Three Times

Other than the explanation by different colors, the Ekottara Āgama also defined

the aggregate of perception as the conjunction of the three times, i.e. past, present, and

future.708 I find nowhere in the Nikāyas or Āgamas explanations of how perception

functions in the three times. Johansson distinguishes perception functions in terms of

two conditions. The first one is to perceive the object at present, i.e. the sensory

information comes from one of the five bodily senses. The other one is to imagine an

object totally depending on the mind faculty. He suggests:709

To be conscious of a colour may mean at least two things: you may see, for instance, a

blue object or you may, with closed eyes, imagine a blue colour (or, thirdly, you may

think about “blueness” without actually being concretely aware of the colour itself).

Saññā covers both the two first experiences.

According to his explanation, perception perceives the object either at present or

from memory. He also mentions the thought which is deprived of concrete experience

and is not counted as perception by him. Hamilton continues Johansson’s argument but

goes further:710

When such sensory data is co-temporal, saññā apperceives (identifies) them; when they

are not co-temporal, saññā functions conceptually. The latter might either be in the

sense specifically suggested by Johansson, of imagining a (previous) apperception (one

might describe this as the bringing to mind of an image of an earlier identification). Or

it might be in the less specific and more abstract sense of imagining or conceiving of

708
T02, no. 125, p. 707, b10: 所謂三世共會，是謂名為想陰。
709
Johansson 1985: 93.
710
Hamilton 1996: 59.

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 something that has not actually been apperceived as it is (presently) being imagined or

conceived of.

She considers perception functions as apperception when the object is co-temporal,

but when the object is not co-temporal it is conception. It seems that she includes the

abstract imagination as perception which is not accepted by Johansson. Then she

attributes the difference to different types of contact, i.e. impact-contact

(paṭighasamphassa) and designation-contact (adhivacanasamphassa). 711 In other

words the distinction between bodily origin and mental origin. As discussed earlier,

perception means the ability to designate all types of sensory information. This ability

involves language and, therefore, memory. Language exists as a form of memory. In

other words, even when the object is co-temporal, as the ability of designation,

perception still has to resort to knowledge from the past, i.e. recollection. Karunadasa

emphasizes on this point: “[P]erception means our ability to relate present sense stimuli

to past experience and thereby recognize the sense data… And, therefore, perception

(saññā) has to be considered as cognition as well as recognition.”712

Therefore, toward the present object, perception immediately discriminates and

designates the stimulus. Take the story in the Raṭṭhapāla Sutta that a maid recognized

the venerable Raṭṭhapāla as an example. 713 When she first met him, she could

discriminate the shape and the color of his hands and feet and also designate these

characteristics as thin or fat, brown or yellow. The shape and color would appear as

711
Hamilton 1996: 59.
712
Karunadasa 2013: 53.
713
MN II, 62.

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signs and features for this maid to compare with her knowledge and language. This

function is perception toward the present stimuli from the five bodily senses.

After she perceived these characteristics, she might feel familiar. But she had not

been able to recognize who he was right away. She had to recollect similar

characteristics from what she remembered about Raṭṭhapāla by the signs of his hands,

feet, and voice at present so that she could recognize him. At this stage, since she

already perceived the shape and color, she subsequently used this information as an

object for further identification. In other words, this information is not form (rūpa) but

dhamma. Besides, this stage depends on her memory as a whole, not just notions and

languages. However, this identification is similar to the functions of discrimination and

designation. It can be considered as the type of perception of mental phenomena.

In the same manner, when the object is not at present, people can perceive mental

phenomena from recollection or imagination. The difference between these processes

is not so much. Although recollection depends on something which really happened,

while imagination can be totally fictional, both depend on our mental images which do

not base on stimuli from the five bodily senses. Such difference does not ensure the

accuracy of memory. People can remember something falsely but still believe that their

memories are true. Hence, ordinary people always perceive objects in a deceptive way

based on fabricated notions and languages.

§4.5.4 The Perverted (vipallāsa) Perception

I will continue to explain how perception goes perverted in the cognitive processes

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and how perception obstructs our understanding of truth. The functions of

consciousness are multiple as discussed earlier. By contrast, perception mostly appears

in the context of perception. It has never been used to represent mental activities or a

life principle. But the Sutta Piṭaka also said that “perception is multiple, varied, and of

different aspects. (saññā pi hi bahū anekavidhā nānappakārikā.)”714 The first sutta of

Majjhima Nikāya, the Mūlapariyāya Sutta gave an extensive list of objects that an

untaught ordinary person can perceive. This list includes twenty-four objects. 715 As

Bodhi sums up: these objects “cover the entire scale of experiential data, classified in a

number of mutually complementary ways.”716 According to his analysis, these twenty-

four objects can be arranged into four groups: the four primary elements, the planes of

existence, the cognitive objects, and the four abstract categories. 717 Kalupahana

categorizes them into seven and he says all are concepts or ideas.718 To sum up, an

ordinary person perceives all objects he can get, even Nibbāna:719

He perceives (sañjānāti) Nibbāna as Nibbāna. Having perceived Nibbāna as Nibbāna,

he conceives (maññati) [himself as] Nibbāna, he conceives [himself] in Nibbāna, he

conceives [himself apart] from Nibbāna, he conceives Nibbāna to be “mine,” he

delights in Nibbāna. Why is that? Because he has not fully understood it, I say.

714
MN II, 27.
715
MN I, 1-4.
716
Bodhi 2006: 3.
717
Bodhi 2006: 3.
718
Kalupahana (1987: 57): “The first set includes gross material elements; the second, all beings,
human and divine; the third refers to the four stages of higher contemplation; the fourth embraces
the major forms of sense experience; the fifth and sixth are abstract concepts, and the seventh refers
to ultimate freedom.”
719
MN I, 4: nibbānaṃ nibbānato sañjānāti; nibbānaṃ nibbānato saññatvā nibbānaṃ maññati,
nibbānasmiṃ maññati nibbānato maññati, nibbānaṃ meti maññati, nibbānaṃ abhinandati. taṃ
kissa hetu? ‘apariññātaṃ tassā’ti vadāmi.

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 (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001: 87.)

In this way, everything can be the object of perception. Since an ordinary person

has not yet attained Nibbāna, we can assert that Nibbāna in this passage must not be the

final attainment. The MA explained why Nibbāna can be used in ordinary people thus:

“Because one’s self (attā) endowed with the five cords of sensual pleasure is gratifying,

to that extent, this self is considered to have attained “the highest earthly Nibbāna here

and now (paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbāna).” 720 First of all, the so-called “the highest

earthly Nibbāna here and now” is not Nibbāna de facto. Ordinary people wrongly

perceive this state as Nibbāna. Therefore, the meaning of Nibbāna is misinterpreted by

ordinary people in the first place. Not only this but everything people can experience is

included: external and internal objects, daily experience, meditational attainments, and

abstract notions. People do not fully understand these objects and misinterpret them.

In order to perceive these objects, the functions of perception: discrimination and

designation require knowledge or experience from the past. So that one can apperceive

“something” as “something”. However, this perception is not the ability to penetrate the

essence of these objects. It distorts “one thing” into “another thing”. Hence, the MA

pointed out that this perception is a perverted one (saññāvipallāsa).721 According to the

Aṅguttara Nikāya, there are four kinds of perverted perception: perceiving what is

impermanent, dukkha, no-self, and foul as permanent, satisfactory, self, and beautiful.722

720
MA I, 38: yato kho ayaṃ attā pañcahi kāmaguṇehi samappito samaṅgibhūto paricāreti. ettāvatā
kho ayaṃ attā paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṃ patto hotīti ādinā nayena pañcadhā āgataṃ
paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṃ veditabbaṃ.
721
MA I, 25.
722
AN II, 52.

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In other words, how ordinary people perceive is to discriminate and then to designate

the object depending on fabricated notions and languages. Bodhi elaborates this process

in detail:723

We can assume that before this perceiving “earth as earth” supervenes, there occurs a

simple, primitive act of perception merely registering the object in a faint and indistinct

manner. If the first impression the object makes is lacking in interest, the mind will

quickly let it go and pass on to the next. But if the impression is found to merit sustained

attention, the object will become the focus of a succession of perceptions bringing its

features into sharper relief. These subsequent perceptual acts, however, will not

necessarily define the object’s nature with exclusively greater clarity and precision.

They may grasp more fully the object’s prominent qualities; but at the same time, due

to the power of ignorance -- always present at least dormantly in the worldling’s mental

make-up -- they will also tend to refract the object through subjective distortional media

issuing in a false or “perverted” perception.

According to his explanation, saññā functions in two steps: the first is to register

sensory information roughly; (This function, in my interpretation, belongs to an

integrated consciousness.) once this object is worthy of interest, there will be a series

of perceptions perceiving it from a subjective angle. The first step is to identify or to

recognize the object. The second step is a series of intentional and subjective reactions.

Hence, these subsequent perceptions treat the object toward a wrong direction. It seems

that the first step is neutral in ethics and the second one has unwholesome value. It is

in this sense that I suggest to ascribe these two steps to viññāṇa and saññā respectively

723
Bodhi 2006: 4.

- 248 -
rather than to combine two different functions with different ethical values. Especially,

if we recollect that consciousness is ethically neutral, it would be reasonable to attribute

this primitive discernment to consciousness.

By contrast, perception discriminates the object in further detail. However, this

process does not ensure the accuracy and genuineness. On the contrary, the process of

discrimination and designation in ordinary people is doomed to be incorrect owing to

ignorance and fabricated notions and languages. Premasiri explains this: “Saññā stands

for the purely subjective, and subjective experiences can easily be erroneously

described, when they are verbally formulated, as views and elevated to the position of

objective truths.”724 In this way, the sensory information, not only colors but also all

kinds of objects, is forced to conform to the existent mental structure. For the ordinary

people, this process mostly does not help them to penetrate the essence of objects.

§4.5.5 The Dangers of Signs (nimitta)

In the discussion of guarding the doors of the sense faculties, we learned that signs

(nimitta) and minor features (anuvyañjana) mean the outward appearances which come

from the object, both external and internal. It can be used to identify the object

according to past experience. It is also used as the object of meditation, such as the four

primary elements and the four colors. According to SED, the term saṃjānāti means

“communicate or make anything known by signs.”725 After his study, Skilling indicates

724
Premasiri 2008: 7.
725
SED, 1133.

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that the Sanskrit term saṃjñā is mostly related to nimitta.726 Boisvert makes known that

the function of saññā is “to recognize and interpret perceptions through their signs

(nimitta) and minor features (anubyañjana).”727 Coseru also defines:728

[The aggregate of saññā] comprises apperception and refers to the capacity to

comprehend the specific marks (nimitta) of experienced phenomena… This

apperceptive cognitive event encompasses the sense of knowing something in its

totality of aspects. Thus, perceiving a tree is apprehending it as such by virtue of the

fact that one has had previous experience of the same or similar objects, and thus has

the notion of ‘tree’ as a botanical species with a certain configuration.

Hence, we may realize that saññā means the function to identify and discriminate

the object by associating nimitta with notions and languages so that we can make sure

what the object is and what to call it. On the basis of this understanding, signs and

features can be compared to materials which represent the sense objects and need to be

processed. Anālayo thus emphasizes the importance of nimitta:729

Thus the nimitta is a central factor in the operational mechanics of memory and

recognition, since it is with the help of such a nimitta that the aggregate of perception

or cognition, saññā, is able to match information received in the present moment with

concepts, ideas, and memories.

However, this apperception process can bring out two dangers in an ordinary

person. Even though signs and features have different qualities as well as the objects,

they are ethically neutral and cannot be blamed. Owing to ignorance, we customarily

726
Skilling 1997: 480.
727
Boisvert 1997: 139.
728
Coseru 2012: 81.
729
Anālayo 2003: 177.

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connect the object and its signs and features with past experience which was dyed by

various defilements. As long as one pays attention to a sign or feature, these defilements

will have a chance to dominate the cognitive processes. Therefore, the point is not the

signs or features but the reaction toward them. Kuan also depicts the whole process as

“a vicious cycle”:730

While saññā associated with unskillful/unwholesome (akusala) consciousness

produces “memories” as misconceptions, the misconceptions will in turn bring about

“recognition” or “apperception” of incoming sensory data in a misleading way. This is

a vicious cycle.

As a result, what an ordinary person calls “normal” perception is actually

proceeding along the wrong track because of misunderstanding of signs and features.

Secondly, owing to the association of nimitta at the present with memory in the past,

we tend to suppose some essences permanent and unchanging undergoing this process.

As Anālayo explains:731

Every successful act of recognition, unless counteracted by systematic attention to the

truth of impermanence, can in this way add to the unconscious presumption that there

is something in phenomena that does not change.

The functions of signs and features indicate how the ordinary people cognize

objects in a deceptive way. The purpose of restraint of the sense faculties is to eliminate

the delusions of signs and features and to prevent the arising of defilements toward the

objects. Meanwhile, the arising of signs can be erased in the practice of insight into

730
Kuan 2008: 14.
731
Anālayo 2003: 178.

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impermanence, dukkha, and no-self and the attainment of signless concentration

(animitta samādhi). Harvey concludes thus:732

Any level of insight into impermanence is known as “signless,” as it undermines or

removes the misperception that seizes on delusive “signs” of permanence; the

corresponding insights into suffering and non-self also remove the “signs” of happiness

and self.

It should be noted that signs and features reflect the characteristics of the objects,

they are ethically neutral. The ordinary people perceive the object with the help of signs

and features. However, such perception is always subject to ignorance, personal

inclinations, the underlying tendency, etc., and it always goes to the wrong way. Signs

and features are much like knives. They can be used to cut off defilements in meditation

or they can hurt unenlightened people.

§4.5.6 The Explanation of Colors

As we have seen, to explain perception by colors was authentic in the past and is

also accepted by many modern scholars. This definition causes problems at the same

time since it cannot define saññā properly. I found that it is not fortuitous to define

saññā by perceiving colors in the Sutta Piṭaka. The reason seems related to meditational

cultivation. According to the method of the eight bases for transcendence (aṭṭha

abhibhāyatanāni), a meditator sees external blue, yellow, red, and white, without

perceiving form (arūpasaññī) internally, one transcends them and has such perception

732
Harvey 1986: 47.

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(saññī): “I know, I see.”733 First of all, this person has already abandoned the perception

of internal forms but still has perception toward external forms. In other words, even if

these external colors were received by the eye faculty, no corresponding idea would

arise. Hence, there would be no discrimination or designation. This passage also

mentions that this person would have a specific perception of realization when one

transcends these external colors.

Even though the Sutta Piṭaka did not speak out, the method of the eight bases for

transcendence is closely related to another method: the contemplation of ten kasiṇa

bases (dasa kasiṇāyatanāni). The contemplation of ten kasiṇa bases is found in several

suttas. 734 It is also listed right behind the eight bases for transcendence in the

Mahāsakuludāyi Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya. 735 Here one needs to perceive

(sañjānāti) the four primary elements, the four colors: blue, yellow, red, and white, the

space, and the consciousness as above, below, and across, undivided and

immeasurable. 736 Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi resort to Visuddhimagga to explain the term

kasiṇa. They define it as “a meditation object derived from a physical device that

provides a support for acquiring the inwardly visualized sign”.737 Since Buddhaghosa

replaced the last two kasiṇas to limited space and light in the Visuddhimagga, their

definition of “physical device” was not applicable to the original passage in the Sutta

733
MN II, 13-14: ajjhattaṃ arūpasaññī eko bahiddhā rūpāni passati nīlāni nīlavaṇṇāni
nīlanidassanāni nīlanibhāsāni…tāni abhibhuyya jānāmi, passāmī’ti evaṃ saññī hoti. (See also: DN
16, 33, 34; AN 8: 65, 118; 10: 29.)
734
MN II, 14-15; DN III, 268, 290; AN V, 46, 60.
735
MN II, 14-15.
736
MN II, 14-15: nīlakasiṇameko sañjānāti… pītakasiṇameko sañjānāti… lohitakasiṇameko
sañjānāti… odātakasiṇameko sañjānāti…uddhamadho tiriyaṃ advayaṃ appamāṇaṃ.
737
Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001: 1285, n. 768. (Vism, 110.)

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Piṭaka. According to this method, to perceive the four colors does not mean to discern

or recognize these colors. Because the perception of colors has already been abandoned

in the cultivation of the eight bases for transcendence. So that although one can extend

the sign, i.e. the counterpart sign (paṭibhāga-nimitta), to unlimited space, it requires

highly meditational concentration and mind training.

However, the method of the ten kasiṇa alone is not enough to get liberated. In the

Aṅguttara Nikāya, it said that some ascetics and brahmins determine any one of the ten

kasiṇa as their goal.738 Therefore, this technique was not restricted to Buddhists but is

practiced by other meditators in India as well. It is even more possible that Buddhist

monks brought the method of the ten kasiṇa from other traditions at first. The point is

that this perception practiced by either Buddhists or other meditators is itself a high

attainment and cannot be compared to sensory perception. The only difference between

the Buddha and the other meditators is that the Buddha directly knew to what extent

the attainment of the kasiṇa is supreme and discards it, while the others enjoy their

attainment.739 This difference does not lie in this method but the reaction toward it. All

these techniques are means to help people to cultivate their mind and they themselves

are not the goal. T. W. Rhys Davids suggests that Buddhists adopted some meditation

techniques from previous beliefs and that these techniques “are not the end, and the end

738
AN V, 47: paṭhavīkasiṇasamāpattiparamā kho eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā atthābhinibbattesuṃ…pe…
viññāṇakasiṇasamāpattiparamā kho eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā atthābhinibbattesuṃ. yāvatā kho
viññāṇakasiṇasamāpattiparamatā tad abhiññāsi Bhagavā, tad abhiññāya Bhagavā ādim addasa
ādīnavam addasa nissaraṇam addasa maggāmaggañāṇadassanam addasa.
739
AN V, 47.

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can be reached without them.” 740 Hence, the Buddha did not stop and was never

satisfied with these techniques.

In any case, we may know that both these two methods: aṭṭha abhibhāyatanāni

and dasa kasiṇāyatanāni, make the four colors as objects in order to attain samāpatti

and eventually to attain Nibbāna. A meditator needs to perceive one of the four external

colors as a sign. To perceive colors does not mean to identify or to designate these colors

in this context. It means the opposite. No discrimination or designation exists at this

stage. These two methods are highly meditational attainments in contrast to

misrecognition in an ordinary person. Therefore, the four colors in this context should

not be the objects of perception in common but the objects of meditation in the specific.

In other words, to perceive colors is not enough to convey the meanings of saññā.

Taking these four colors as objects of perception was probably affected by the

meditational techniques: abhibhāyatanāni and kasiṇāyatanāni. On the contrary,

perception should mean the ability to perceive all the six kinds of objects as we have

known the six types of perception. Perception is categorized by the objects, not by the

senses. In this regard, perception should be grasped by the way it processes all the

sensory information.

§4.5.7 Summary

The traditional explanation of perception referred to different colors. This was

probably affected by ancient meditational techniques. The four colors were treated as

740
T. W. Rhys Davids 1908: 87.

- 255 -
the object of meditation instead of perception. In the whole Sutta Piṭaka, the target of

perception comprises everything. Everything which can be experienced, thought of, or

imagined, would be perceived in the cognitive processes, not only colors. Hence,

perception is described as “multiple, varied, and of different aspects”.741

For a long time, the difference between perception and consciousness confuses

many scholars and students. Some people try to define these two terms at the outset and

then interpret texts in line with the given definitions. By comparison, I emphasize the

practical functions in the descriptions of cognition in the Sutta Piṭaka. After analyzing,

two basic functions: discrimination and designation can be attributed to perception.

Perception means the ability to discriminate the characteristics of the object in further

clarity and certainty, then comes the ability to designate these characteristics. These two

functions closely depend on notions and languages from past experience. Notions and

languages are the mental structure supplied as regulations or rules for people to follow.

Within the functioning of perception, there are signs and features connecting every

single stimulus, notion, and name. Signs and features are sensory information which

can be derived from all the six sense objects. People use them to match the object with

knowledge. Hence, the whole system needs to achieve highly coherence, consistency,

and stability. So that people can recognize objects, form ideas, express thoughts, and

communicate with others. However, this system does not reflect the true essence of the

world in ordinary people. On the contrary, it is fabricated in the first place. Gombrich

741
MN II, 27.

- 256 -
points out this inaccuracy: “If what we normally take to be objects in the world around

us are not really stable, but are processes, all changing (albeit not at random), whether

slowly or fast, our interpretation of what our senses perceive is never perfectly

accurate.” 742 On the basis of this fabricated system, people wrongly recognize the

object as something other than what it really is. This is the reason why perception was

called as “perverted (vipallāsa)” by the commentary.743

742
Gombrich 2009: 196.
743
MA I, 25.

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§4.6 The Activities of Thinking

Among all suttas we have discussed, some of them describe that after perception

comes several similar mental activities which can be generally categorized as thinking.

Furthermore, they can be distinguished into two types: the first type is general

description without concrete explanation. In the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta, perception is

followed by thinking in the sentence: “What one perceives, that one thinks about. (yaṃ

sañjānāti taṃ vitakketi.)”744 And it is thought (saṅkappa) that depends on perception

and arises in the Dasuttara Sutta. 745 The second type gives more details about the

function of thinking. In the Mūlapariyāya Sutta, after an ordinary person perceived

(sañjānāti) an object as something, that person follows to conceive (maññati) various

relationships between the notion of selfness and the object. 746 The three types of

unwholesome thought: sensual pleasure thought (kāmasaṅkappa), thought of ill will

(byāpādasaṅkappa), and thought of harming (vihiṃsāsaṅkappa), and the three types of

wholesome thought: thought of renunciation (nekkhammasaṅkappa), thought of non-ill

will (abyāpādasaṅkappa), and thought of harmlessness (avihiṃsāsaṅkappa), are said

to take their respective types of perception as the origin in the Samaṇamaṇḍikā Sutta.747

These terms mentioned above and others will be discussed later; though they have

different etymologies, all denote to think, to reflect, to conceive, or to consider. Some

of them can be used as synonyms according to the contexts. The PED explains the term

744
MN I, 112.
745
DN III, 289: saññānānattaṃ paṭicca uppajjati saṅkappanānattaṃ.
746
MN I, 1 ff.: pathaviṃ pathavito sañjānāti; pathaviṃ pathavito saññatvā pathaviṃ maññati,
pathaviyā maññati, pathavito maññati, pathaviṃ meti maññati pathaviṃ abhinandati.
747
MN II, 27-28: kāmasaññā, byāpādasaññā, vihiṃsāsaññā– itosamuṭṭhānā akusalā saṅkappā.

- 258 -
saṅkappa is equivalent of the term vitakka. 748 In fact, vitakka and saṅkappa are

interchanged to designate the three types of unwholesome thought and the three types

of wholesome thought in the Sanidāna Sutta of the Dhātusaṃyutta.749 Johansson also

indicates their close connection.750 Besides, the PED equates vitakka and vicāra and

explains that they have the same meaning: “just thought, thinking, only in an emphatic

way (as they are also semantically synonymous), and that one has to take them as one

expression, like jānāti passati, without being able to state their difference.”751 The PED

further explains that their differences made by commentators “are mostly of an edifying

nature and based more on popular etymology than on natural psychological grounds”.752

Moreover, as we will see, some of them are literally interchangeable according to the

meaning and usage in the contexts.

However, rather than the meaning of thinking, we cannot deny that these terms

have other meanings and usages. Since this section will focus on the functions of

thinking in the cognitive processes, I will not discuss their philological differences and

irrelevant meanings and usages. The point is how these activities of thinking connect

with perception. And how the activities of thinking function and deal with sensory

information.

748
PED, 662.
749
SN II, 151-53.
750
Johansson 1985: 187.
751
PED, 620.
752
PED, 620.

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§4.6.1 Attention

Before discussing the topic of thinking, a mental activity deserves our attention:

manasikāra. The PED gives it two kinds of meaning: attention and thinking.753 These

two functions, on the one hand, can be distinguished to some extent, on the other hand,

they are closely connected in meaning so that they are expressed by the same word.

Before teaching a doctrine, the Buddha usually reminded interlocutor(s) to be

concentrated by the sentence: “Listen and pay attention closely! I will speak. (suṇāhi

sādhukaṃ manasi karohi! bhāsissāmi.)” Here manasikāra means to fix one’s mind on

the talk cautiously. It does not yet have the function of thinking. Similarly, in the

Saṃgayha Sutta II, as long as one cognizes the six sense objects without mindfulness,

one would pay attention to pleasing signs.754 And this attention would cause various

feelings and unwholesome reactions. This passage describes that when a person keeps

attending to the sign of the object, it does not mean thinking about the sign. In the Kāya

Sutta and the Āhāra Sutta of the Bojjhaṅgasaṃyutta, paying attention improperly

(ayonisomanasikāra) to the five nutrients: the sign of beauty, the sign of repulsion,

lethargy or drowsiness, unsettledness of mind, and the basis for doubt, would cause

unwholesome mental status.755 These suttas mention the function of manasikāra as a

kind of preliminary attention to the object.

The Vitakkasaṇṭhāna Sutta explained that the reason for the arising of

753
PED, 521.
754
SN IV, 73: rūpaṃ disvā sati muṭṭhā, piyanimittaṃ manasi karoto.
755
SN V, 64-65; 102-03.

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unwholesome thinking (vitakka) connected with desire, hatred, and ignorance is

because one pays attention to some signs.756 In the Akusalavitakka Sutta, the result of

paying attention improperly is to be consumed by thinking.757 These two suttas showed

that attention starts an unwholesome thinking process and the outcome, vitakka, would

hurt or dominate this person. In other words, if attention cannot be controlled, the

subsequent thoughts will be uncontrollable accordingly. Therefore, manasikāra in the

meaning of paying attention is always conscious and intentional.

Attention does not mean thinking. But the term manasikāra can be used to denote

thinking or pondering. The Buddha admonished interlocutor to think seriously thus:

“Please answer after you paid attention. (manasi karitvā kho byākarohi.)” 758 In the

sentence “the noble disciple pays attention closely and properly to dependent

origination (ariyasāvako paṭiccasamuppādaññeva sādhukaṃ yoniso manasi karoti)”, it

means to ponder over the teaching of causality according to the origin, e.g. SN 12: 37,

61, 62. Or disciples should pay attention closely and properly to the five aggregates of

clinging as impermanent, dukkha, and disease etc., e.g. SN 22: 122, 123. In these

contexts, manasi karoti means deliberate thinking rather than paying attention.

Furthermore, this kind of thinking will bring out penetration or insight in dependent

origination by wisdom (paññāya abhisamaya).759 In this sense, the term manasikāra is

parallel with other terms which denote to understand the Buddha’s teachings properly:

756
MN I, 119.
757
SN I, 203: ayoniso manasikārā, bho vitakkehi majjasi; ayoniṃ paṭinissajja, yoniso anuvicintaya.
758
MN I, 232.
759
SN II, 104.

- 261 -
“I hope that you venerable ones have learned the teachings well, grasped them well,

attended to them well, reflected on them well, and penetrated them well with wisdom.

(kacci vo āyasmantānaṃ dhammā sussutā sugahitā sumanasikatā supadhāritā

suppaṭividdhā paññāya.)”760

In sum, manasikāra has two functions in terms of contexts: the first one is simply

attention and the second one is deliberate thinking. It is in its twofold meanings that we

should consider it as an activity directing our mind to the object and then initiating more

organized thoughts.

§4.6.2 Thinking and Perception

The connection of thinking and perception lies in two aspects: language and sign

(nimitta), both are two distinctive features of perception. As we have seen, the functions

of perception are to identify the object by sign and to designate object by language. In

the discussion of manasikāra, one of the objects of attention is sign. After one pays

attention to some signs, unwholesome thinkings (vitakka) would arise accordingly. The

Vitakkasaṇṭhāna Sutta explained how sign (nimitta) causes various thoughts thus:761

Here, by means of a sign, a bhikkhu pays attention to that sign, there arise in him evil

unwholesome thinkings connected with desire, hatred, and ignorance, then he should

pay attention to other sign connected with what is wholesome… If, while he pays

attention to other sign connected with what is wholesome, there still arise in him evil

760
SN III, 6.
761
MN I, 119: idha bhikkhuno yaṃ nimittaṃ āgamma yaṃ nimittaṃ manasikaroto uppajjanti pāpakā
akusalā vitakkā chandūpasaṃhitā pi dosūpasaṃhitā pi mohūpasaṃhitā pi, tena bhikkhunā tamhā
nimittā aññaṃ nimittaṃ manasikātabbaṃ kusalūpasaṃhitaṃ…pe… tassa ce bhikkhuno tamhā
nimittā aññaṃ nimittaṃ manasikaroto kusalūpasaṃhitaṃ uppajjant’eva pāpakā akusalā vitakkā ch.
pi d. pi m. pi, tena bhikkhunā tesaṃ vitakkānaṃ ādīnavo upaparikkhitabbo.

- 262 -
 unwholesome thinkings connected with desire, hate, and delusion, then he should

examine the danger in those thinkings. (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001: 211.)

This passage shows that the unwholesome thoughts would arise owing to an

unspecific sign or even a sign connected with wholesomeness. Since the sign is

ethically neutral, it is the object which attributes the sign with different qualities.

Therefore, even if a person attends to a wholesome sign, the unwholesome thought

would possibly arise. Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi explain how the object causes the

unwholesome thoughts through perception:762

The Pali verb “conceives” (maññati), from the root man, “to think,” is often used in the

Pali suttas to mean distortional thinking -- thought that ascribes to its object

characteristics and a significance derived not from the object itself, but from one’s own

subjective imaginings. The cognitive distortion introduced by conceiving consists, in

brief, in the intrusion of the egocentric perspective into the experience already slightly

distorted by spontaneous perception.

According to their explanation, if this process is distorted in the stage of perception

at first, therefore, the subsequent thinking will be accordingly distorted as well. Besides,

they also point out the root of this deviate process is the notion of selfness which will

be discussed later.

In the Cūḷavedalla Sutta, thought (vitakka) and examination (vicāra) precede

speech so that they are called verbal formations (vacīsaṅkhāra).763 Karunadasa defines

them as “sub-vocal operations of the mind preceding vocal utterance”. 764 Thinking

762
Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001: 1162.
763
MN I, 301.
764
Karunadasa 2013: 59.

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hence means the ability to use the language so that words can be uttered. However, not

only speech but also bodily actions and mental activities are caused by thinking. The

Vammika Sutta said that if a person thinks (anuvitakketi) and ponders (anuvicāreti) at

night, this will bring out bodily, verbal, and mental activities in the daytime.765 In the

same manner, what one does by day will become the sources for thinking and pondering

at night. Therefore, this person like an ant-hill “fumes by night” and “flames by day”.

It is like an endless causal cycle. The activities of thinking and their manifestations

support or ignite each other by turns.

§4.6.3 Ethical Value

The activities of thinking which come after perception can be accordingly

classified as wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral in ethics. When they are used in a

general way, they simply mean to think or to ponder over some issues or ideas. A

frequent question is “what do you think of this? (taṃ kiṃ maññasi.)” And it usually

follows questions like: “Is the object permanent or impermanent, unsatisfactory

(dukkha) or satisfactory (sukha)?”766 “Whether the soil inside fingernail or the great

earth is more?”767 “Whether the two or three drops of water or the water in the ocean is

more?”768 In these passages, the term maññati means reasoning activity resorting to

logic or common sense. Therefore, it does not have any specific ethical value.

On the other hand, the term maññati also denotes false thinking which is affected

765
MN I, 144.
766
SN II, 244.
767
SN II, 133.
768
SN II, 136.

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by perverted perception and is usually connected with the notion of selfness as

mentioned earlier. In the Sanidāna Sutta, it elaborates the three types of unwholesome

thought: sensual pleasure thinking (kāmavitakka), thinking of ill will (byāpādavitakka),

and thinking of harming (vihiṃsāvitakka), and the three types of wholesome thinking:

thinking of renunciation (nekkhammavitakko), thinking of non-ill will

(abyāpādavitakka), and thinking of harmlessness (avihiṃsāvitakka).769 These thinkings

have their respective origins. For example: sensual thinking depends on sensual

pleasure perception (kāmasaññā) and sensual pleasure perception depends on a sensual

pleasure element (kāmadhātu).770 The next sutta, the Giñjakāvasatha Sutta, describes

the three types of element (dhātu): inferior (hīna), moderate (majjhima), and superior

(paṇīta), which bring out their respective perceptions, views (diṭṭhi), thinkings (vitakka),

intentions (cetanā) and other factors.771 These two suttas classify different cognitive

processes in terms of their ethical value. The unwholesome thought is inferior, while

the wholesome thought is superior. According to the SA, the element (dhātu) means the

thinkings (vitakka) of defilements or wholesome states and these defilements

themselves or wholesome states themselves.772 It is worth noting that vitakka can be

the cause of saññā, i.e. a part of dhātu, and also the result of saññā. Hence, the

commentary implied that previous mental activities will affect subsequent cognition. It

also implied that vitakka has inherent ethical value and can affect the function of

769
SN II, 151-53.
770
SN II, 151.
771
SN II, 153-54.
772
SA II, 135-36: ettha kāmavitakkopi kāmadhātu kāmāvacaradhammāpi, visesato sabbākusalampi.

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perception. Here we have to notice different usages of vitakka and vitakketi.

The verb vitakketi means a reasoning process, while the noun vitakka can describe

a mental status. In other words, the noun vitakka can be the result and the object of the

verb vitakketi. As we will see, the Sutta Piṭaka did include such difference. Two

consecutive suttas in the Saccasaṃyutta, named the Vitakka Sutta and the Cinta Sutta,

use the term vitakketi and the term cinteti in a similar way. First, these two suttas warn

bhikkhus not to think (vitakketi) evil unwholesome thinking (vitakka) or not to reflect

on (cinteti) evil unwholesome thought (citta).773 The unwholesome vitakka is the three

types of unwholesome thinking mentioned above. The unwholesome citta/ cintā means

the ten speculative views which are the same topics mentioned by the wanderer

Vacchagotta in the Vacchagottasaṃyutta.774 Then these two suttas advise bhikkhus to

think about or to reflect on the Four Noble Truths. And these thoughts: vitakka and cintā,

are beneficial.775

Similarly, the Sabbāsava Sutta said: “By attending to dhammas unfit for attention

and by not attending to dhammas fit for attention, both unarisen taints arise in him and

arisen taints increase.” 776 The dhammas unfit for attention are sixteen types of

speculative question about selfness and the dhammas fit for attention are the Four Noble

Truths. Here these terms manasikāroti, vitakketi and cinteti are used synonymously and

all can be applied to both wholesome and unwholesome dhammas. Therefore, these

773
SN V, 417-18.
774
SN III, 257 ff.
775
SN V, 417-18: ete, bhikkhave, vitakkā atthasaṃhitā… esā, bhikkhave, cintā atthasaṃhitā.
776
MN I, 7-8: tassa amanasikaraṇīyānaṃ dhammānaṃ manasikārā manasikaraṇīyānaṃ dhammānaṃ
amanasikārā anuppannā c’eva āsavā uppajjanti uppannā ca āsavā pavaḍḍhanti.

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verbs denote a reasoning process and the two nouns: vitakka and citta/cintā indicate

thoughts or ideas. Anālayo points out that “it is mostly the context that decides whether

a particular instance of vitakka should be seen in a negative or in a positive light.”777

Hamilton suggests citta has a passive meaning of the state of mind:778

[T]he nominal term citta has a passive meaning, corresponding to its grammatical

form as a passive past participle: ‘a thought’, not ‘thinking’; the activities associated

with citta as ‘mind’ in general are expressed by the active terms cinteti or cetasā. The

central meaning of citta I would like to suggest is also passive in meaning. This is that

it represents one’s ‘state of mind’.

It is clear that thinking as mental processes is the way to manipulate knowledge.

The activities of thinking are neutral reasoning processes. The results of these thinking

processes will be named by nouns and can be the object of further activities of thinking.

We can ponder over either the thoughts of desire, hatred, and ignorance or the thought

of renunciation. It is these thoughts that are endowed with ethical value. However, as

discussed above, perception leads the cognitive processes to different directions

beforehand. In this sense, the activities of thinking only follow the directions.

§4.6.4 Regarding as Mime

A recurrent topic of thinking in the Sutta Piṭaka is the notion of selfness. The

Mūlapariyāya Sutta discusses how an ordinary person cognizes and delights in every

object aberrantly.779 In this sutta, it describes a person who first perceives (sañjānāti)

777
Anālayo 2009: 712.
778
Hamilton 1996: 110.
779
MN I, 1 ff.

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the objects, like the things he saw (diṭṭha), heard (suta), sensed (muta), or cognized

(viññāta). As discussed in section 4.2.4, seeing, hearing, sensing, and cognizing are

ways to know the existence of ātman in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. In a similar vein,

the Mūlapariyāya Sutta continued to list how this person conceives (maññati) the object

to connect with oneself in four aspects: to conceive self as the object, to conceive self

inside it, to conceive self outside it, and to conceive “the object is mine”.780 Ñāṇamoli

and Bodhi suggest that this fourfold linguistic pattern: accusative, locative, ablative,

and appropriative, represents “the diverse ways in which the ordinary person attempts

to give positive being to his imagined sense of egohood”.781 This fourfold pattern can

be expanded to a ninefold conceiving (maññita): asmi, ayam aham asmi, bhavissaṃ,

na bhavissaṃ, rūpī bhavissaṃ, arūpī bhavissaṃ, saññī bhavissaṃ, asaññī bhavissaṃ,

nevasaññī--nâsaññī--bhavissaṃ in suttas, e.g. SN 22: 47; 35: 248; MN 140. Ñāṇamoli

and Bodhi conclude thus:782

The activity of conceiving thus seems to comprise the entire range of subjectively

tinged cognition, from the impulses and thoughts in which the sense of personal identity

is still inchoate to elaborate intellectual structures in which it has been fully explicated.

And this kind of thinking is totally denied in the Sappurisa Sutta by a succinct

statement: “This bhikkhu does not conceive anything, he does not conceive in regard

to anything, he does not conceive in any way. (ayaṃ pi bhikkhu na kiñci maññati, na

780
MN I, 3: diṭṭhaṃ maññati, diṭṭhasmiṃ maññati, diṭṭhato maññati, diṭṭhaṃ me ti maññati.
781
Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001: 1163.
782
Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001: 1163.

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kuhiñci maññati, na kenaci maññati)” 783 When maññati is used in this context, it

obviously has negative connotations. Hence, an enlightened person would never

conceive the object in this way. In the Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta, bhikkhus were admonished

to uproot all conceivings (maññita).784 That means one does not conceive (maññati) the

object in terms of the fourfold linguistic pattern. The Aṅguttara Nikāya also said that

although the Buddha had seen, heard, sensed, and cognized the objects, he did not have

various misconceptions.785 On the other hand, an enlightened person who transcends

the conceived (maññata) still would say “I” or “they”. This person uses language as

mere expressions (vohāramattena so vohareyyā).786

Similarly, numerous suttas warn people not to regard (samanupassati) any

impermanent, dukkha, and changing object as “This is mine, this I am, and this is my

self. (etaṃ mama, esohamasmi, eso me attā)”, e.g. SN 22: 49, 59, 79; 35: 32, 121; MN

22, 35. Kuan argues that one regards (samanupassati) the object as a gain (paṭilābha)

in the Saḷāyatanavibhaṅga Sutta meaning labeling or identifying and that this function

belongs to saññā.787 However, to regard something as a gain can be compared to regard

it as “mine”. This function is different from labeling or identifying an object but

connects the object with the notion of selfness, the subject.

As discussed, the function of perception is to identify the object with notion or

783
MN III, 45.
784
SN IV, 21-24: idha bhikkhu cakkhuṃ na maññati, cakkhusmiṃ na maññati, cakkhuto na maññati,
cakkhu meti na maññati. rūpe…pe… cakkhuviññāṇaṃ…pe… cakkhusamphassaṃ…pe…
785
AN II, 25.
786
SN I, 14-15.
787
Kuan 2008: 26.

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language. This identification basically categorizes sensory information according to the

characteristics of the objects. This function has not yet consciously connected to the

notion of selfness. Hence, the Mūlapariyāya Sutta used different verbs: sañjānāti and

maññati, to differentiate these two functions. As we have seen earlier, the verb sañjānāti

means to apperceive the object as something. The term samanupassati is usually used

to denote considering various relationships between the object and the subject, its

function and meaning should be more close to that of maññati which involves the

activities of thinking instead of perceiving. Let us compare the usages and connotations

of maññati and samanupassati with two standard sentences in many suttas: “What do

you think, is form permanent or impermanent? (taṃ kiṃ maññasi, rūpaṃ niccaṃ vā

aniccaṃ vā.)” and “Is what is impermanent, dukkha, and subject to change fit to be

regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, and this is my self’? (yaṃ panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ

vipariṇāmadhammaṃ kallaṃ nu taṃ samanupassituṃ ‘etaṃ mama, esohamasmi, eso

me attā’.)” While the first expression is a simple question, the second expression

intends to ask the connection of the notion of selfness and the object. Although the PED

gives the term maññati and samanupassati similar meanings, like to think, to deem,

regard, their usages can be differentiated. The term maññati can be used in the first

expression and also in the second expression like in the Mūlapariyāya Sutta. However,

the term samanupassati is always used in the sentences regarding the notion of selfness

in the whole Sutta Piṭaka. Hence, what the Saḷāyatanavibhaṅga Sutta means regarding

the object as a gain confirms the usage in the second expression. This activity does not

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belong to perception but is a type of thinking.

§4.6.5 Summary

In this section, I have discussed different terms and passages all related to the

activities of thinking. It indicates a fact that thinking is a wide-ranging mental activity

in the cognitive processes. Cognitive psychologists define thinking thus:788

Most would agree that ‘thinking’ covers a range of different mental activities, such as

reflecting on ideas, having new ideas, theorising, arguing, making decisions and

solving problems. An important feature common to all of these particular activities is

that they are under our own control and we can run through actions symbolically in our

minds.

This definition shows that thinking differs from previous factors we have

discussed in two aspects. Firstly, thinking means several connected reasoning processes.

These processes come about from the outcomes of the previous perception. Secondly,

it is a fully self-conscious activity. Even though the way we think might be affected by

some unconscious factors, we must KNOW what we think or how we think. From

another aspect, thinking is also connected with intention. And this connection is

expressed in the term manasikāra. Hamilton points out this connection:789

Though to ‘pay attention’ is the appropriate English idiom, manasikāra in fact simply

means ‘applying the mind’, and this term suggests how the distinction between willing

and thinking becomes blurred in practice: deliberate thinking is in effect

indistinguishable from willing.

788
Groome et al. 2014: 241.
789
Hamilton 1996: 108.

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 However, the term manasikāra has twofold and also ambiguous meanings:

attention and thinking. Although attention arises before thinking, it is still an intentional

activity. Therefore, from the perspective of Buddhist soteriology, we should always be

alert and control it along the right track, evading objects which cause the unwholesome

thoughts and attending to those objects which bring about the wholesome thoughts.

In the Sutta Piṭaka, it adopted several terms to describe the activities of thinking,

as discussed above: manasi karoti, maññati, vitakketi, cinteti, and samanupassati.

When the terms are used to indicate the process or method of reasoning, they are

ethically neutral. When they are used as nouns, the descriptive adjectives define the

thought whether wholesome or unwholesome. However, even if the wholesome

thoughts are the right path, they cannot access the final truth. According to the

Atthinukhopariyāya Sutta, one can only really understand whether one’s mind is

endowed with desire, hatred, and ignorance or not, only by seeing with wisdom, not by

faith, or by personal preference, or by oral tradition, or by reasoned reflection, or by

acceptance of a view after pondering it.790 Hence, when we talk about the cultivation

of the mind, it is all about penetration of experience by wisdom without any deceptive

concept or thought. As the Sappurisa Sutta said: “for in whatever way they conceive,

the fact is ever other than that. (yena yena hi maññanti tato taṃ hoti aññatha.)”791

790
SN IV, 139-40.
791
MN III, 44. (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001: 911.)

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§4.7 Mental Proliferation (papañca)

The term papañca and its derivatives do not appear all that often in the whole Sutta

Piṭaka. 792 Most of these suttas together with their commentaries lack a concrete

explanation of the term. 793 Johansson says that papañca “is not one of the most

important concepts in early Buddhism”.794 However, in the opening of his book on

papañca, Ñāṇananda suggests that papañca is fundamental for us to understand the

philosophy of Early Buddhism, but the interpretation of this term is divergent among

scholars. 795 Hence, my approach in this section will be much different from other

sections. I will discuss papañca beginning from various views and interpretations of

scholars. Then I will pursue its functions in the cognitive processes in the suttas. At the

end, I will suggest my assumption about papañca.

The PED gives the term papañca three different meanings: 1. obstacle,

impediment; 2. illusion, obsession, hindrance to spiritual progress; 3. diffuseness,

copiousness. 796 Kalupahana and Boisvert adopt the PED’s translation: obsession. 797

Collins translates it more specifically as “imagining or false conceptualization”. 798

Even though the PED cannot identify the relationship of papañca and the Sanskrit term

prapañca, many scholars assert they are identical.799 Prapañca comes from pra and

792
They are found in four suttas of SN, four of MN, three of DN, and eight of AN.
793
C.f. Gombrich 2009: 221, n. 24.
794
Johansson 1985: 190.
795
Ñāṇananda 2012: 1. See also: Gombrich 2009: 150.
796
PED, 412.
797
Kalupahana 1976: 78; Boisvert 1997: 80.
798
Collins 1999: 141.
799
E.g. Collins 1999: 141; Hamilton 1996: 56; Johansson 1985: 190-91; Harvey 2013: 496; Gethin
1998: 235.

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√pac or pañc. The root pac or pañc means “to spread out” or “make clear or evident”.800

Hence, the Sanskrit term prapañca means diffuseness, manifoldness, diversity, and then

manifestation.801 In this sense, several scholars, including Ñāṇananda, Gethin, Harvey,

and Kuan, use “conceptual proliferation” to denote the multiplication in conception.802

On the other hand, both Hamilton and Ronkin suggest, and Gombrich follows, “verbal

differentiation” or “verbal proliferation”.803 Hamilton explains that papañca means the

process of making manifold which is the function of language and is indispensable to

our experience:804

One might say that the process of making manifold in order to identify is the process

of making nameable the aspects of one’s experience. For this reason the Pali term for

making manifold, papañceti, is sometimes alternatively translated ‘verbal

differentiation’… In the broadest sense, all this verbal differentiation is what we call

language, without which we could not think or communicate or understand the world

of our experience in its entirety: the process of ‘making sense’ is one which involves

the introduction of identifiable categories and references which can be indicated by

means of language.

Ronkin explains that language, on the one hand, “is intrinsic to our experience”,

on the other hand, is fabricated:805

The Buddha shows that language is, in principle, faulty: having the power to make

manifold and endlessly to proliferate, it makes things appear and disappear; it can

800
SED, 575.
801
SED, 681.
802
Gethin 1998: 235; Harvey 2013: 124; Ñāṇananda 2012: 5; Kuan 2008: 22.
803
Hamilton 2000: 124; Ronkin 2005: 245; Gombrich 2009: 150.
804
Hamilton 2000: 124-25.
805
Ronkin 2005: 245-46.

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 construct anything and hence cannot be representational of reality. There can be no

innocence of relations between word and world.

According to their arguments, as long as we think, we have to resort to language.

However, the nature of language, unfortunately, cannot access the reality. The term

papañca hence is used to describe this inaccurate “act of conceptualizing”. 806 By

contrast, Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi translate it as “mental proliferation”.807 Johansson also

points out: “Papanca is never defined in terms of verbal thought but is much closer to

concrete sense experience and concrete imagining.”808 He concludes the term thus:809

Papañca is then a word for a vaguely defined prolific tendency, in the fields of

imagination, thought and action. It is the tendency to produce associations, wishful

dreams and analytic thought. It is an ego-related activity, which gives satisfaction to

human vanity and pride.

In this way, Johansson describes papañca as something more fundamental and also

vaguer which underlies and impulses our mental activities. To summarize the studies of

these scholars, papañca denotes the diffusive process in our cognition. Since this

diffusive process is considered as an illusion in Buddhism, it is a hindrance in the path

to liberation.

In the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta, papañca arises after thinking in the passage: “What

one thinks about (vitakketi), that one mentally proliferates (papañceti). With what one

has mentally proliferated as the source, perceptions and notions [born of] mental

806
Gombrich 2009: 150.
807
Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001: 202.
808
Johansson 1985: 192.
809
Johansson 1985: 195.

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proliferation (papañcasaññāsaṅkhā) beset (samudācaranti) a man.” 810 Ñāṇananda

suggests that vitakka is “the onset or initial application of thought” and papañca refers

to “the consequent prolificity in ideation”.811

In the Yavakalāpi Sutta of the Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta, the ninefold conceiving

(maññita) about the notion of selfness is also called papañcita together with stirring

(iñjita), trembling (phandita), and conceit (mānagata).812 And in the Abyākata Sutta of

the Aṅguttara Nikāya, four types of postmortem speculation of the Tathāgata are called

maññita or papañcita and are also named as fallen into craving (taṇhāgata), fallen into

perception (saññāgata), fallen into clinging (upādānagata), and remorse

(vippaṭisāra). 813 Johansson thus construes papañca as an associative and analytical

thought of the splitting type.814 It seems he considers papañca as a type of thought

(vitakka). By denoting papañca as a prolific process, he confirms the definition of

papañca as the activities of thinking. Bodhi also explains that papañca equals to

maññanā in the cognitive processes:815

Craving and other defilements arise and flourish because the mind seizes upon the

“signs” (nimitta) and “features” (anubyañjana) of sensory objects and uses them as raw

material for creating imaginative constructs, to which it clings as a basis for security.

This process, called mental proliferation (papañca), is effectively synonymous with

conceiving (maññanā). These constructs, created under the influence of the defilements,

810
MN I, 112: yaṃ vitakketi taṃ papañceti, yaṃ papañceti tatonidānaṃ purisaṃ papañcasaññāsaṅkhā
samudācaranti.
811
Ñāṇananda 2012: 4.
812
SN IV, 202-03.
813
AN IV, 68-69.
814
Johansson 1985: 191-92.
815
Bodhi 2000a: 1127.

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 serve in turn as springboards for still stronger and more tenacious defilements, thus

sustaining a vicious cycle.

According to this explanation, papañca is the term meant to describe all kinds of

discursive reasoning process in ordinary people rather than the result of thinking.

Besides, in the commentarial tradition, papañca was usually defined by the three

defilements (kilesa): craving (taṇhā), conceit (māna), and views (diṭṭhi). 816

Accordingly, Boisvert broadens the definition of papañca thus: “[M]ore or less, as a

synonym for desire, wrong views and conceit.”817 Therefore, not only our conceptional

aspect but also emotional aspects are implied by papañca.

However, Sarathchandra indicates that craving is the result of papañca rather than

papañca itself. 818 Boisvert also clarifies that these notions are connected but not

identical: “Although obsession cannot be directly correlated with craving, it can be

associated with the emergence of craving.” 819

This explanation confirms our

understanding that papañca is the fundamental element behind various unwholesome

activities. In this sense, Ñāṇananda concludes thus: “Nevertheless, papañca can be

regarded as something fundamental to taṇhā, māna and diṭṭhi -- something that both

underlies and comprehends each of them.”820

Furthermore, the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta points out that after the arising of papañca

comes papañcasaññāsaṅkhā which would attack this person. This compound

816
MA IV, 167= DA II, 425: chinnapapañceti ettha papañcā nāma taṇhā māno diṭṭhīti, ime tayo
kilesā.
817
Boisvert 1997: 81.
818
Sarathchandra 1958: 5.
819
Boisvert 1997: 82.
820
Ñāṇananda 2012: 12.

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papañcasaññāsaṅkhā consists of three terms. Sarathchandra translates the term saṅkhā

as “obsession”. 821 Johansson tries to follow its literal meaning: “number” or

“enumeration”, and translates it as “sequence” or “chain”. 822 In a similar vein,

Ñāṇamoli uses “calculation”.823 These translations seem not so precise. As discussed

earlier, saññā means the ability to designate an object. Hence, saṅkhā in this compound

has the connotation of “word” or “name”.824 According to the explanation in the PED,

papañcasaññāsaṅkhā can be translated as “idea and sign of obsession”.825 Ñāṇananda

defines this term thus: “concepts, reckonings, designations or linguistic conventions

characterised by the prolific conceptualising tendency of the mind.” 826 However,

according to his explanation, it seems he either omits the meaning of saññā or combines

saññā and saṅkhā together as having the same meaning. 827 Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi

consider this compound as dvanda and translate it as “perceptions and notions [born of]

mental proliferation”.828 Similarly, Kuan uses “apperception and naming [associated

with] conceptual proliferation”. 829 According to their discussion, at this stage,

perception together with notion or denomination comes to be the result of papañca.

However, in the same passage of the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta, it is said earlier that

perception is the cause of thought and then papañca.830 The Suttanipāta also said that

821
Sarathchandra 1958: 5.
822
Johansson 1985: 193.
823
Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001: 1204.
824
PED, 664.
825
PED, 412.
826
Ñāṇananda 2012: 5.
827
Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi (2001: 1204) point out that Ñāṇananda does not translate the term saññā.
828
Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001: 1204-05.
829
Kuan 2008: 19.
830
MN I, 112: yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vitakketi, yaṃ vitakketi taṃ papañceti.

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papañcasaṅkhā has perception as the origin (saññānidānā hi papañcasaṅkhā).831 In

this sense, both Kuan and Boisvert assert that unwholesome saññā can bring out

papañca.832 Harvey says thus:833

That is, saññā can easily lead on to a host of conceited imaginings and speculations.

Thus saññā is specified as the source of ‘reckonings (that come) from elaboration

(papañca-saṅkhā)’.

Hence, the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta points out that perception, on the one hand, is the

cause of papañca; but on the other hand, is the result of papañca. Accordingly, we may

deduce that as the result of perception, papañca will, in turn, cause subsequent

unwholesome saññā. Therefore, what the term papañcasaññāsaṅkhā really indicates is

the outcome of papañca, i.e. unwholesome perceptions and notions for the next round

of cognition. And this outcome will irresistibly affect and harm this person. From this

respective, all activities of perception in an ordinary person are brought by the previous

papañca. There is no pure or innocent saññā in a worldling’s cognition.

In the same manner, the Sakkapañha Sutta declares that thought (vitakka) takes

papañcasaññāsaṅkhā as its origin and cause. Without papañcasaññāsaṅkhā, there will

be no thought. 834 In this case, papañcasaññāsaṅkhā indicates the unwholesome

perceptions and notions which arises before thought. It is exactly the saññā mentioned

in this sentence: “What one perceives, that one thinks about. (yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ

831
Sn 874.
832
Kuan 2008: 24; Boisvert 1997: 136.
833
Harvey 2004: 143.
834
DN II, 277: vitakko kho papañcasaññāsaṅkhā-nidāno papañcasaññāsaṅkhā-samudayo
papañcasaññāsaṅkhā-jātiko papañcasaññāsaṅkhā-pabhavo, papañcasaññāsaṅkhāya sati vitakko
hoti, papañcasaññāsaṅkhāya asati vitakko na hoti.

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vitakketi.)” 835 This is also what the perverted perception (saññāvipallāsa) in the

commentary means.836 Ñāṇananda describes this reciprocal cycle clearly:837

The assertion of the Sakkapañha sutta that ‘vitakka’ originates from ‘papañca saññā-

saṅkhā’ only means that in the case of the worldling the word or concept grasped as an

object for ratiocination, is itself a product of ‘papañca’. This, in its turn breeds more

of its kind when one proceeds to indulge in conceptual proliferation (papañca).

Concepts characterised by the proliferating tendency (papañca saññā-saṅkhā)

constitute the raw material for the process and the end product is much the same in kind

though with this difference that it has greater potency to obsess, bewilder and

overwhelm the worldling. Thus there is a curious reciprocity between ‘vitakka’ and

‘papañca saññā-saṅkhā’- a kind of vicious circle, as it were. Given ‘papañca saññā-

saṅkhā’, there comes to be ‘vitakka’ and given ‘vitakka’ there arise more ‘papañca

saññā-saṅkhā,’ resulting in the subjection to the same.

According to the study by now, the sequence of these connected factors can be

briefly illustrated as below:

(previous cognition) … → vedeti→ sañjānāti→ vitakketi→ papañceti→ …

(↑ papañcasaññāsaṅkhā samudācaranti)

……→ vedeti→ sañjānāti→ vitakketi→ papañceti→ … (continue…)

(↑ papañcasaññāsaṅkhā samudācaranti)

Chart 4 The reciprocal process of mental proliferation

835
MN I, 112.
836
MA I, 25.
837
Ñāṇananda 2012: 24.

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 Since papañca in the Sutta Piṭaka is closely connected with thought, the feature

of thinking as discussed earlier: the emergence of the notion of selfness, can also be

applied to it. It is in this sense that the ninefold speculation about the notion of selfness

is called maññita or papañca.838 Sarathchandra hence defines papañca by this duality

of subject and object:839

Sense-perception, therefore, implies a dual relationship, the relationship of the

perceiving individual and the world as perceived. In its subjective aspect it is

consciousness, and in its objective aspect it is the world of perception, and papañca is

the general term for both aspects.

Hamilton traces the origin of papañca back to the notion of selfness and argues

that the profound implication of papañca is “making manifold” and, therefore,

attributing ontological existence to both subject and object:840

The root of dukkha is thoughts of ‘I’ and ‘mine’, from which root grows papañca, the

process of making manifold, or attributing independent existence to, what is not

manifold or independently existing. Attributing independent existence to oneself and

attributing independent existence to what is external to oneself are equally relevant.

Karunadasa indicates that the underlying tendency for the ego-consciousness

awakens at the stage of feeling but is now fully fledged:841

At this stage, the latent ego-consciousness that awakened earlier becomes fully

solidified and crystallized. This stage also involves a more marked verbalization, a

process of labeling the object, all resulting in a profuse proliferation of conceptual

838
SN IV, 202-03.
839
Sarathchandra 1958: 8.
840
Hamilton 1996: 131.
841
Karunadasa 2013: 59.

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 constructs.

It is based on this ontological premise that an ordinary person takes this duality as

real and is counteracted by this delusion. In his analysis of the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta,

Ñāṇananda indicates the drastic turning point in the cognitive processes:842

The deliberate activity implied by the third person verb is seen to stop at ‘papañceti’.

Now comes the most interesting stage of the process of cognition. Apparently it is no

longer a mere contingent process, nor is it an activity deliberately directed, but an

inexorable subjection to an objective order of things. At this final stage of sense-

perception, he who has hitherto been the subject, now becomes the hapless object.

The difficulty to understand the term papañca is due to its appearances in various

contexts without concrete definition or content. Regarding this point, even the

commentaries do not offer necessary help. The only one thing that we can be sure is

that papañca is always considered as unwholesome. It is listed in the

Asaṅkhatasaṃyutta as a negative quality to be eliminated together with others, such as

defilement (āsava), craving (taṇhā), and attachment (ālaya), to describe the final

attainment, Nibbāna. 843 Another thing about it is that papañca has a psychological

connotation. Most scholars agree that this connotation is its feature of diffusing or

proliferating notions or conceptions. Other than this we know little about the

background of its original usages and meanings in this psychological aspect.

Gombrich suggests his assumption about the meaning of papañca by tracing back

to its etymology and the brahminical background. Since pañca means “five” in Pāli and

842
Ñāṇananda 2012: 6.
843
SN IV, 359 ff.

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Sanskrit, papañca looks like to mean “quintuplication”.844 According to the Upaniṣad,

there are five kinds of breath (āna) in the human body, but all of them originally came

from the same thing: life-breath (prāṇa).845 It is a prolific process from one ātman to

five entities. Hence, he surmises that the Buddha was “appropriating brahminical

terminology”. 846 However, the negation of papañca in Buddhism does not mean

acceptance of a united entity as Brahminism did. Gombrich asserts that: “His argument

was not that by using language we had too many concepts, but rather that none of them

did justice to the truth.”847

A passage in the Aṅguttara Nikāya probably preserved a more concrete usage of

papañca. It compares an unskilled bhikkhu to a deer or an animal (maga) who devoted

itself to and is delighted in papañca.848 Sarathchandra interprets this passage as a deer

that is attracted by a mirage of water just like a bhikkhu is thirsty for the illusion of

happiness. 849 Johansson pictures this sensitive deer enjoying various objects in the

forest which expresses papañca as activities of split attentiveness.850 If we consider

reproduction as the basic and primary instinct for animals, we can understand that

animals would be eager to reproduce their as many offspring as possible. Through

reproduction, animals also preserve their genes. In this sense, the term papañca may be

used to describe how the mind proliferates in various forms in order to prosper and to

844
Gombrich 2009: 206.
845
Gombrich 2009: 205.
846
Gombrich 2009: 206.
847
Gombrich 2009: 206.
848
AN III, 294: yo papañcaṃ anuyutto papañcābhirato mago, virādhayi so nibbānaṃ yogakkhemaṃ
anuttaraṃ.
849
Sarathchandra 1958: 10.
850
Johansson 1985: 194.

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preserve itself or the notion of self (attā).

This supposition reminds us that our cognitive processes become divergent after

the contact of the sense faculty, the sense object, and the sense consciousness. The

Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta said that “contacted one feels, contacted one intends, contacted

one perceives.”851 This passage implies that feeling, thinking, and perception can arise

in different aspects from the same sensory event. Besides, contact is the cause of the

four formless aggregates in the Cūḷarāhulovāda Sutta.852 As de Silva indicates, feeling

can be considered as the affective aspect of experience, thinking is conative, and

consciousness and perception are cognitive. 853 In the Koṭṭhika Sutta of Aṅguttara

Nikāya, the six bases for contact become the origin of papañca:854

As far as the range of the six bases for contact extends, just so far extends the range of

mental proliferation. As far as the range of mental proliferation extends, just so far

extends the range of the six bases for contact. With the remainderless fading away and

cessation of the six bases for contact there is the cessation of mental proliferation, the

subsiding of mental proliferation. (Bodhi 2012: 540.)

As discussed earlier, the cessation of the six senses does not mean the denial of the

function of seeing, hearing, or cognizing etc. But the six senses are not the base for the

duality of subject and object. The embodiment of duality is exactly the core meaning

of papañca. The term papañca is always circumscribed by diffusive processes. It

851
SN IV, 69: phuṭṭho vedeti, phuṭṭho ceteti, phuṭṭho sañjānāti.
852
MN III, 279.
853
De Silva 2005: 17-18.
854
AN II, 161-2: yāvatā channaṃ phassāyatanānaṃ gati tāvatā papañcassa gati. yāvatā papañcassa
gati tāvatā channaṃ phassāyatanānaṃ gati. channaṃ phassāyatanānaṃ asesavirāganirodhā
papañcanirodho papañcavūpasamo.

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denotes not only the prolific processes regarding thinking, conception, or notions but

the whole cognitive process as well. The cognitive processes diffuse in affection,

cognition, and conation after the meeting of the sense faculty, the sense object, and the

sense consciousness. This situation contradicts the Buddha’s teaching of mindfulness

and unification of mind (cetasa ekodibhāva).

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§4.8 Craving (taṇhā)

In the chain of the twelve links, craving (taṇhā) comes after feeling. However, as

discussed in the previous section, craving is also the result of papañca. The Pāli term

taṇhā or the Sanskrit term tṛṣṇā literally means drought or thirst.855 Therefore, it is a

kind of eagerness for water to soothe discomfort. The PED lists ten words including

taṇhā which are used as synonyms in the compound with kāma, the other nine are:

desire (chanda), lust (raga), delight (nandī), affection (sineha), longing (pipāsā),

obsession (pariḷāha), greed (gedha), infatuation (mucchā), and attachment

(ajjhosāna).856 It further reminds us that the primary meaning of these terms as verbs

is “adhering to” or “grasping”, hence, attachment; on the other hand, “the reaction of

the passions on the subject is expressed by khajjati ‘to be eaten up’, pariḍayhati ‘to be

burnt’, etc.”857 According to this explanation, all these words are used to denote the

function of strong desire toward sensual pleasure. Even though each of them has

different etymological roots, they can be seen as having similar meanings in different

levels or degrees. Owing to their feature of sticking to the object, they go out of control

and reversely control the person. We will confront some of these words in the following

sections and discuss their meanings according to the contexts.

In the Sutta Piṭaka, the desperate appetite of craving was explained thus:

“Whatever in the world has a pleasing and agreeable nature: it is here that this craving

855
PED, 294.
856
PED, 203.
857
PED, 203.

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arises when it arises; it is here that it settles when it settles. (yaṃ kho kiñci loke

piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ etthesā taṇhā uppajjamānā uppajjati, ettha nivisamānā

nivisati.)”858 In other words, everything and everywhere can be the target of craving. In

this sense, craving in the teaching of causality is explained as six types resorting to the

six external objects (bāhirāni āyatanāni): i.e. craving for forms, sounds, odors, tastes,

tangibles and mental phenomena. 859 Even though craving has six types, it is not

distinguished with regard to the sense faculty, like contact and feeling, but by the sense

objects, like perception. In other words, contact and feeling are categorized internally

which relate to their nature or different sense faculties; the categorization of perception

and craving switches outside to external objects. At this stage, craving acts as an

integrated unit and focuses the stimulus of object flowing in through different sense

faculties. Hamilton suggests that feeling functions at a general level regarding the sense

faculties, while volitional formation (perception can be added) is developed and

discursive so that it can focus on a specific external object. 860 It is based on this

developed and discursive ability that the mind is aware of the existence of an object and

then craves for it. Kurak explains that craving is “a process which also has the effect of

imputing the impression of existence to the emerging object(s).”861 Therefore, it is at

the stage of craving that our mind is fully aware of the object and intentionally focuses

on that specific object. From another aspect, craving indicates that the notion of selfness

858
SN II, 108; DN II, 309-10. (Bodhi 2000a: 605.)
859
SN II, 3; DN II, 57.
860
Hamilton 1996: 16.
861
Kurak 2003: 344.

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functions at the conscious level. It is always the “I” that desires something.

It is noteworthy that the explanation of craving in the Four Noble Truths is

different from that in the chain of the twelve links. Both these two kinds of explanation

appear in their respective contexts in the Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta.862 I will suggest that these

two explanations have different intentions and can be distinguished by their contexts.

The Sutta Piṭaka explained craving in the chain of the twelve links in terms of the six

sense objects as mentioned above. This explanation follows the analysis of cognition.

As explained earlier, the six sense bases, the six sense contacts, the six types of feeling

born of contact, the six types of perception and craving are divided according to their

cognitive functions.

Craving in the Four Noble Truths is explained as the origin of dukkha, and hence

the origin of the five aggregates of clinging, e.g. SN 22: 104; 56: 11, 13; MN 9, 10, 141;

DN 22. In this context, craving is analyzed into three types: craving for sensual pleasure

(kāmataṇhā), for existence (bhavataṇhā), and for non-existence (vibhavataṇhā), e.g.

SN 22: 104; 56: 11, 13, 14; MN 9, 10, 141; DN 22. According to the SA, kāmataṇhā

means lust (rāga) for the five cords of sensual pleasure (pañca kāmaguṇā); bhavataṇhā

is lust for form-sphere or formless-sphere existence, attachment to jhāna, and lust

accompanied by the eternalist view; vibhavataṇhā is lust accompanied by the

annihilationist view.863 From my point of view, this explanation is not satisfactory. I

862
MN I, 48-51.
863
SA II, 264: kāmataṇhādīsu pañcakāmaguṇiko rāgo kāmataṇhā nāma, rūpārūpabhavarāgo
jhānanikantisassatadiṭṭhisahagato rāgo ti ayaṃ bhavataṇhā nāma, ucchedadiṭṭhisahagato rāgo
vibhavataṇhā nāma.

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will clarify that these three categories are related to the three spheres, especially the

destinations or results after death.

Other than this categorization, the Saṅgīti Sutta mentions another two categories:

craving for sensual pleasure, for form (rūpataṇhā), and for formless (arūpataṇhā); and

craving for form, for formless, and for cessation (nirodhataṇhā). 864 These two

categories appear only once in the whole Sutta Piṭaka. Since these two categories can

be considered either overlapping with the first category or being irrelevant to this study,

only the first category will be discussed next, i.e. craving for sensual pleasure, for

existence, and for non-existence.

§4.8.1 Craving for Sensual Pleasure (kāmataṇhā)

According to the PED, kāma has two aspects: an objective one: pleasantness or

the object of sensual enjoyment; and a subjective one: enjoyment or sense-desire.865

Dhammapāla systematically defined kāma into six types: pleasing objects (manāpiyā

rūpādi--visayā), desire and lust (chandarāga), greed for anything (sabbasmiṃ lobha),

sexual lust (gāmadhamma), effort to do good (hitacchanda), and self-determination

(serībhāva).866 The first type is kāma as object and the next three types are kāma as

subjective reaction. All these four types are unwholesome in contrast to the last two

wholesome types.

In the Kāma Sutta of the Suttanipāta, kāma was defined as various objects: field,

864
DN III, 216.
865
PED, 203.
866
Vv, 11.

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property, gold, cows and horses, servants and men, women, relatives. 867 In the

Māgaṇḍiya Sutta, the Buddha implied that craving for sensual pleasure (kāmataṇhā)

means craving for the five cords of sensual pleasure (pañca kāmaguṇā). 868 The

commentary also defined kāma as mentioned above. Uttiya once asked about the

definition of pañca kāmaguṇā and the Buddha replied him thus:869

Forms cognizable by the eye that are desirable, lovely, agreeable, pleasing, sensually

enticing, tantalizing. Sounds cognizable by the ear… Odours cognizable by the nose…

Tastes cognizable by the tongue… Tangibles cognizable by the body... These are the

five cords of sensual pleasure spoken of by me. (Bodhi 2000a: 1538.)

According to this passage, the five cords of sensual pleasure are the five agreeable

objects except mental phenomena. These five external objects can be cognized

respectively by the five bodily sense faculties. Hence, the term kāma in kāmataṇhā

means the five external objects of craving. In the Kāmaguṇa Sutta, the Buddha precisely

described his experience about how his mind was attracted by the five cords of sensual

pleasure:870

Bhikkhus, before my enlightenment, while I was still a Bodhisatta, not yet fully

enlightened, the thought occurred to me: “My mind may often go towards those five

cords of sensual pleasure that have already touched the heart but which have passed,

ceased, and changed, or towards those that are present, or slightly towards those in the

867
Sn 769: khettaṃ vatthuṃ hiraññaṃ vā gavāssaṃ dāsaporisaṃ, thiyo bandhū puthu kāme yo naro
anugijjhati.
868
MN I, 504.
869
SN V, 22: cakkhuviññeyyā rūpā iṭṭhā kantā manāpā piyarūpā kāmūpasaṃhitā rajanīyā,
sotaviññeyyā saddā. ghānaviññeyyā gandhā. jivhāviññeyyā rasā. kāyaviññeyyā phoṭṭhabbā iṭṭhā
kantā manāpā piyarūpā kāmūpasaṃhitā rajanīyā. ime kho pañcakāmaguṇā vuttā mayā.
870
SN IV, 97: pubbeva me sambodhā anabhisambuddhassa bodhisattasseva sato etad ahosi: ye me
pañcakāmaguṇā cetaso samphuṭṭhapubbā atītā niruddhā vipariṇatā, tatra me cittaṃ bahulaṃ
gaccheyya paccuppannesu vā appaṃ vā anāgatesu.

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 future.” (Bodhi 2000a: 1190-91.)

This passage shows that how the mind is accustomed to seek pleasant objects in

the three times: past, present, and future. The SA explained that the five cords of sensual

pleasure that the Bodhisatta had been attracted to in the past meant the prosperous life

in the three palaces; those at present are natural scenery when the Bodhisatta was

practicing austerity; those in the future are imagination about the future Buddha

Metteyya.871 There is no problem with the first two explanations. The last explanation

about the future is not qualified. The imagination about the future Buddha comes not

from the five bodily sense faculties but from the mind. Even if we suppose that the

Buddha, before his enlightenment, already had the ability to foresee the future, this

ability does not depend on any bodily sense faculty. Hence, such imagination about

Metteyya cannot be accounted for the five cords of sensual pleasure. It is more likely

that the Buddha as a Bodhisatta was eager for some bodily comfort when he suffered

from extreme austerities.

From the experience of the Buddha, the reason why the mind goes astray lies in

the five cords of sensual pleasure which always bring out bodily pleasant feelings. This

kind of initial feeling is inevitable as emphasized earlier. And through recollecting

experience in the past, cognizing stimulus at present, and expecting the recurrence of

pleasure in the future, the mind keeps wandering and is far away from realizing the

object as impermanent, conditioned and dependently arisen. The Buddha then

871
SA II, 390.

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continued to instruct his disciples that they should guard their mind from going astray.

By doing so, the six senses together with the six types of perception toward objects

would cease.872

Even though these five external objects are called kāmaguṇā, they themselves are

not kāma at all. The Nibbedhika Sutta of the Aṅguttara Nikāya clearly denied the five

external objects as sensual pleasure (kāma) but lustful intention (saṅkapparāga) is

sensual pleasure.873 Hence, lustful intention can be regarded as the subjective aspect of

sensual pleasure. In the Nasanti Sutta of the Devatāsaṃyutta, one deity told the Buddha

that when a man is bound to desirable objects (kamanīyā), he would not get rid of

death.874 Then the Buddha clarified that the beautiful things (citrāni) in this world are

not sensual pleasure, a person’s lustful intention (saṅkapparāga) is.875 Here the Buddha

once again directed our attention from external objects into our mind. As Nanayakkara

indicates:876

In relation to the senses which thrive on them, these objects in themselves, have an

alluring, enticing and captivating power. Nevertheless, as they exist objectively in the

external world, the Buddhists take great care not to mistake them for kāma, the defiling

subjective attitude of man to the external world. While the former is designated vatthu-

872
SN IV, 98: yattha cakkhuṃ ca nirujjhati, rūpasaññāca virajjaati, ye āyatane veditabbe…pe…
yattha jivhā ca nirujjhati, rasasaññā ca virajjaati, ye āyatane veditabbe. yattha mano ca nirujjhati,
dhammasaññā ca nirujjhati, ye āyatane veditabbe.
873
AN III, 411: api ca kho n’ete kāmā kāmaguṇā nām’ete ariyassa vinaye vuccanti: saṅkapparāgo
purisassa kāmo, n’ete kāmā yāni citrāni loke.
874
SN I, 22: na santi kāmā manujesu niccā, santīdha kamanīyāni yesu baddho. yesu pamatto
apunāgamanaṃ, anāgantvā puriso maccudheyyā.
In the same sutta, another deity said misery (agha) and dukkha are born of desire (chanda).
However, he did not relate desire to the objects. It was the Buddha who realized the whole causal
relationship.
875
SN I, 22: na te kāmā yāni citrāni loke, saṅkapparāgo purisassa kāmo.
876
Nanayakkara 1996: 102.

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 kāma, it is the latter, precisely termed kilesa-kāma, that the Buddhists are primarily

interested in their psycho-ethical religious system.

In the Nirāmisa Sutta of the Vedanāsaṃyutta, it distinguishes different types of

rapture (pīti), happiness (sukha), equanimity (upekkhā), and deliverance (vimokkha).877

The rapture, happiness, and equanimity which arise in dependence on the five cords of

sensual pleasure are said to be carnal (sāmisa). The term āmisa originally means raw

meat and also has the meaning of fleshy, material or physical, in opposition to mind,

spirit, or dhamma. 878 In the Nivāpa Sutta, the five cords of sensual pleasure are

compared to the bait (nivāpa) which represents the material things of the world

(lokāmisa).879 This simile emphasizes the physical aspect of the five cords of sensual

pleasure. By contrast, what is called non-carnal or spiritual (nirāmisa) is related to the

four jhānas.880 In this sense, the Pañcakaṅga Sutta of the Vedanāsaṃyutta indicates

that the pleasure of the first jhāna is loftier and more sublime than the sensual

pleasure.881 In order to abandon the effects of these five external objects, the Buddha

sometimes instructed disciples to develop the Noble Eightfold Path, e.g. SN 45: 30, 177,

or the four establishments of mindfulness, e.g. SN 47: 6, 7; AN 9: 65. Most frequently,

many more suttas instruct the four jhānas right after the rejection of the five cords of

sensual pleasure, e.g. SN 36: 19, 31; MN 26, 59, 66, 99, 139; DN 29; AN 9: 34. It is

clear that the Buddha considered the pleasure (sukha) and joy (somanassa) arising from

877
SN IV, 235-37.
878
PED 104.
879
MN I, 155.
880
SN IV, 235-37.
881
SN IV, 225.

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the five external objects as filthy, coarse, and ignoble. 882 On the contrary, the four

jhānas are called: pleasure of renunciation, of seclusion, of peace, and of

enlightenment.883

Besides, carnal deliverance is to be freed from the sphere of sensual pleasure

(kāmadhātu or kāmaloka).884 Here kāma means its subjective aspect which indicates

the world under the influences of desire. Hence, the five cords of sensual pleasure

correspond with the sensual-sphere which is basically comprised of the five desirable

objects. Gethin construes that all beings in the sensual-sphere (kāmadhātu) are endowed

with consciousness and the five physical senses.885 In other words, the term kāmaguṇā

emphasizes the five external objects which are the fundamental sources of desire in this

sensual-sphere.

In the term kāmaguṇā, kāma denotes the object of desire which obviously excludes

mental phenomena. But that does not mean mental phenomena cannot be the object of

desire. Although craving for existence and for non-existence can be included in craving

for mental phenomena, these two are only parts of mental phenomena. I find the same

description which is applied to mental phenomena in many suttas in the

Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta, e.g. SN 35: 63, 64, 88, 98, 114, 118, 122, 123. Here mental

phenomena are also said to be desirable, lovely, agreeable, pleasing, sensually enticing,

and tantalizing as well as the five external objects. And all these six objects are called

882
MN I, 454.
883
MN I, 454.
884
SN IV, 235-37.
885
Gethin 1998: 118.

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“the things that fetters (saṃyojaniyā dhammā)”886 or “the things that can be cling to

(upādāniyā dhammā)” 887 . The reason they are so called is the desire and lust

(chandarāga) toward them.888 As informed by Dhammapāla, chandarāga represents

the subjective reaction of sensual pleasure. Just like two oxen are yoked together by a

single harness.889 It is desire and lust that bring out the fetter or clinging, not the senses

nor the objects. Hence, not only the five cords of sensual pleasure but all these six

objects could be the object of craving.

Nakamura analyzes the term kāmaguṇā. He finds guṇā is used as the meaning of

the five external objects of the five bodily senses both in Jain scripture and the

Mahābhārata other than in Buddhist suttas. 890 Besides, the five cords of sensual

pleasure were broadly applied to laities, e.g. SN 3: 11, 12; 35: 246; MN 82; DN 23, and

deities, e.g. SN 35: 248; 55:1. Therefore, this notion must have existed in India from a

very early time. Since guṇā consisting of the five external objects excludes dhamma,

Nakamura supposes that this definition “may reflect the stage of the development of

thought before the technical term ṣaḍ-viṣaya was adopted.”891 From this point of view,

it is possible that the analysis of the mind faculty and dhamma is a later development.

In other words, the Buddha adopted a common expression to exhort people not to seek

satisfaction in the five external objects. He also emphasized that these objects should

886
SN IV, 107.
887
SN IV, 108.
888
SN IV, 107, 108: yo tattha chandarāgo taṃ tattha upādānan.
889
SN IV, 163.
890
Nakamura 1983: 312.
891
Nakamura 1983: 313.

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not be blamed but lustful intention (saṅkapparāga) or desire and lust (chandarāga), i.e.

our mental reactions, should. Later on, once the analysis of mind was attached to that

of the other five bodily senses, the harms of the mental objects were listed after the five

cords of sensual pleasure. Hence, craving for sensual pleasure probably emphasized the

five external objects as the origin of pleasure at the beginning, but we cannot exclude

mental phenomena from the object of sensual pleasure. Anālayo also identifies craving

for sensual pleasure as including all the six sense objects. 892 This is of the most

importance. If we define kāma only to the five external objects, then the sixth object:

dhamma will be excluded.

In the explanation of the origin of dukkha, craving was said to bring a renewal of

being, to be accompanied by delight and lust, and to delight in this and that.893 This

explanation is very similar to the other one given at the beginning. Both emphasize that

craving looks for agreeable objects everywhere. Another point mentioned here is that

craving causes rebirth. This may be explained by craving for existence and for non-

existence.

§ 4.8.2 Craving for Existence (bhavataṇhā) and Non-existence

(vibhavataṇhā)
As the target of craving, the term bhava in Buddhism means three spheres for

beings. In the Paṭhamabhava Sutta of the Aṅguttara Nikāya, sensual-sphere existence

892
Anālayo 2008b: 244.
893
MN I, 48: yā yaṃ taṇhā ponobbhavikā nandirāgasahagatā tatratatrābhinandinī. (Ñāṇamoli and
Bodhi 2001: 135.)

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(kāmabhava), form-sphere existence (rūpabhava), and formless-sphere existence

(arūpabhava) are given to explain what bhava is.894 It specifically indicates that these

three spheres are the realms for future rebirth: 895

If there were no kamma ripening in the sensory realm, would sensual-sphere existence

be discerned?… Thus for beings hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving, kamma

is the field, consciousness the seed, and craving the moisture for their consciousness to

be established in an inferior realm. In this way, there is the production of renewed

existence in the future. (Similar descriptions are applied to form-sphere existence and

formless-sphere existence.) (Bodhi 2012: 310.)

Although these three spheres include everywhere in this mundane world, the PED

notes that people especially crave for rebirth in heaven. 896 According to Buddhist

tradition, heaven also exists in the sensual sphere. However, the SA defined the term

bhavataṇhā only to form-sphere, formless-sphere, and jhāna. 897 Hence, Bodhi

considers this explanation is too narrow:898

More likely, craving for existence should be understood as the primal desire to continue

in existence (whether supported by a view or not), craving for extermination as the

desire for a complete end to existence, based on the underlying assumption (not

necessarily formulated as a view) that such extermination brings an end to a real “I.”

Both kinds of craving are rooted in false views of an eternal self so that existence

894
AN I, 223-24.
895
AN I, 223-24: kāmadhātuvepakkañ ca kammaṃ nābhavissa, api nu kho kāmabhavo paññāyethā…
iti kho kammaṃ khettaṃ, viññāṇaṃ bījaṃ, taṇhā sneho. avijjānīvaraṇānaṃ sattānaṃ
taṇhāsaṃyojanānaṃ hīnāya dhātuyā viññāṇaṃ patiṭṭhitaṃ. evaṃ āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbatti
hoti… rūpadhātuvepakkañ…arūpadhātuvepakkañ…
896
PED, 499.
897
SA II, 264.
898
Bodhi 2000a: 1052.

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and non-existence can become the target of craving. Craving for existence must

presume an immortal entity (sassata diṭṭhi) as its premise, while craving for non-

existence indicates a state of annihilation in the future (uccheda diṭṭhi). This point has

been indicated by the commentary as mentioned earlier.899 It is at this point that these

two opposite reactions unite, as de Silva points out:900

Though on a superficial analysis these two attitudes appear to be diametrically opposed,

against the larger setting of the law of dependent origination, they are considered as

merely the contrasting attitude of a man bound to craving.

Both existence and non-existence become the target of craving in the sense that

people react or struggle in different ways toward dukkha in life. Somaratne discerns

two types of craving: craving for existence “tends towards stability” and craving for

non-existence “tends towards change”. 901 He thus concludes: “In reality both are

founded on the same notion of self.”902 Therefore, even though people may crave for

non-existence, they still cannot get away from the cycle of saṃsāra. As the

Paṭhamabhava Sutta explained that different spheres of rebirth depend on their

corresponding kamma.903 Craving is not the determinant of the future rebirth. It is like

the moisture which can facilitate the rebirth. Hence, what a person craves for does not

ensure the result. A person may crave for rebirth in the formless-sphere or even non-

899
SA II, 264: kāmataṇhādīsu pañcakāmaguṇiko rāgo kāmataṇhā nāma, rūpārūpabhavarāgo
jhānanikantisassatadiṭṭhisahagato rāgo ti ayaṃ bhavataṇhā nāma, ucchedadiṭṭhisahagato rāgo
vibhavataṇhā nāma.
900
De Silva 2014: 42.
901
Somaratne 2016: 134.
902
Somaratne 2016: 123.
903
AN I, 223-24.

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existence in the future. But this person may be reborn as human again. It is because of

the capability of kamma what a person did before, not because of what a person wants.

In sum, sensual pleasure that people crave for means the six objects in the sensual-

sphere. The five cords of sensual pleasure or the five agreeable bodily sense objects are

the most vicious and blamed. Hence, craving for sensual pleasure implies that the

targets of craving are inclusive and have pleasure as essence. Craving for existence and

non-existence indicate people’s reactions or expectations toward the results of death.

All three types of craving are the cause of rebirth and the origin of dukkha.

§4.8.3 Desire (chanda) and Obsession (pariḷāha)

The Dasuttara Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya lists two types of the teaching of

causality. The first list is nine things to be abandoned and the second list is nine things

hard to penetrate.904 The former starts by craving (taṇhā) then come quest (pariyesanā)

and acquisition (lābha). The latter, after thought (saṅkappa), follows desire (chanda),

obsession (pariḷāha), quest (pariyesanā), and acquisition (lābha). Comparing these two

passages, quest and acquisition are duplicated, while craving is placed before them as

well as desire and obsession. Besides, desire, obsession, and craving are paralleled

together with lust (rāga), affection (pema), and longing (pipāsā), in a list to describe

the eagerness for something in many suttas. The objects of eagerness include the five

aggregates905, sensual pleasure (kāma)906, and mud house (paṃsvāgāraka)907. We may

904
DN III, 288-89.
905
SN III, 7, 107-08; IV, 387.
906
SN III, 11; MN I, 101.
907
SN III, 190.

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surmise that craving, desire, and obsession are connected to each other.

The term chanda means “impulse, excitement; intention, resolution, will; desire

for, wish for, delight in.”908 It can be used in the contexts of both virtue and vice. In the

first context, it usually accompanies wholesome qualities. For example, the Aṅguttara

Nikāya said: “desire toward the wholesome dhamma is hard to obtain in this world.

(kusale dhamme chando dullabho lokasmiṃ.)” 909 It seems that desire should be

encouraged. However, in the Sajjhāya Sutta of the Vanasaṃyutta, a bhikkhu recollected

that he had desire toward Dhamma-verses (dhammapadesu chanda) in the past because

he had not yet achieved dispassion (virāga).910 And such desire disappeared together

with dispassion. From this point of view, desire for wholesome objects is the means to

cultivation and eventually needs to be discarded.

In its second context, according to the PED, its meaning is close to lust (raga) and

sensual pleasure (kāma). 911 Therefore, we can find these three terms combined in

different forms: chandarāga (desire and lust), kāmachanda (desire of sensual pleasure),

and kāmarāga (sensual lust). All these compounds denote similar meanings to describe

the impulsive desire. Or as the PED noted, kāmachanda is just “an enlarged term of

kāma”.912 Besides, in its bad sense, desire is listed with other defilements, like hatred

(dosa), ignorance (moha), dread (bhaya), and anger (paṭigha). 913 According to its

908
PED, 274.
909
AN III, 441. (Bodhi 2012: 981.)
910
SN I, 202.
911
PED, 274.
912
PED, 274.
913
DN I, 25; III, 182.

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usages in the Sutta Piṭaka, when it connected with a mental quality, the term chanda

can be ethical neutral to express the wholesome or unwholesome things. However,

when it is mentioned independently, it always has the bad connotation of desiring

something. Therefore, desire is said to be the root of dukkha (chando hi mūlaṃ

dukkhassa) or the root of the five aggregates of clinging (ime kho

pañcupādānakkhandhā chandamūlaka).914 In this place, desire takes over the place of

craving which is responsible for the origin of dukkha or the five aggregates of clinging

in the explanation of the Four Noble Truths.

The other term pariḷāha comes from the root dāha which means “burning, heat”.915

Therefore, pariḷāha was used to describe the uncomfortable state causing by heat. Its

figurative meaning is “fever of passion, consumption, distress, pain”.916 This usage is

similar to the term taṇhā which means thirsty and then craving. The Māgaṇḍiya Sutta

said that the touch of fire will cause pain, extreme heat (mahābhitāpa), and serious

fever (mahāpariḷāha). 917 In the same way, hot weather will cause such fever

(ghammapariḷāha), too.918 Moreover, even lustful thoughts may cause bodily fever. In

the Aggañña Sutta, men and women were said to think about each other excessively,

lust arose in them and then brought out bodily fever. As a result, they indulged in

intercourse. 919 Apart from bodily feeling, pariḷāha can describe mental status. The

914
SN III, 100; IV, 329; MN III, 16.
915
SED, 477.
916
PED, 435.
917
MN I, 507.
918
MN I, 284.
919
DN III, 88.

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Hatthaka Sutta of the Aṅguttara Nikāya described a householder who did not sleep well

due to both bodily fever and mental fever (pariḷāhā kāyikā vā cetasikā vā) born of desire,

hatred, and ignorance.920 In the Mahāsaḷāyatanika Sutta, it also said that if a person

finds pleasure (sārajjati) in the sense faculty, the sense object, the sense consciousness,

contact, and feeling, then craving, bodily fever, and mental fever will increase.921 Here

the meaning of pariḷāha consists of its literal and figurative aspects.

§4.8.4 Reaction of Feelings

In the chain of the twelve links, feeling is said to be the cause of craving and both

feeling and craving are of six types. The difference is that feeling is divided by senses,

while craving is divided by objects. It is because feeling arises from different sensory

contact and then craving for that specific object arises. We also know that feeling has

three different types: pleasant feeling, painful feeling, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant

feeling. And these types merely reflect the attributes of the objects. In this sense, how

can these three types of feeling all lead to craving? It can be expected that people hunger

for pleasant feeling, how about painful feeling and neutral feeling? As mentioned earlier,

the underlying tendency to lust underlies pleasant feeling; the underlying tendency to

aversion underlies painful feeling; the underlying tendency to ignorance underlies

neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling.922 From this perspective, different types of feeling

should bring out different mental reactions.

920
AN I, 137.
921
MN III, 287-88.
922
MN I, 303.

- 302 -
 In the Mahātaṇhāsankhaya Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, it describes that delight

(nandī) would arise regardless of what type of feeling it is:923

Whatever feeling he feels—whether pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-

pleasant—he delights in that feeling, greets it, and remains attachment toward it. As he

does so, delight arises in him. Now delight in feelings is clinging; with clinging as

condition, existence… (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001: 359.)

In this passage, one would delight in (abhinandati), greet it (abhivadati), and

remain attachment (ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati) toward not only pleasant feeling but also the

other two types of feeling. Hence, even a painful feeling can be the object of enjoyment.

When this person reacts like this, delight would arise and this delight is called clinging

(upādāna). The PED also confirms nandī in this context equals upādāna.924 The MA

explained that why a person delights in the painful feeling is because of the notions of

“I” and “mine”. 925 The Suttanipāta offers a similar explanation. It said that desire

(chanda) toward pleasant and unpleasant objects is owing to this person seeing non-

existence (vibhava) and existence (bhava) in forms.926 The view of existence and non-

existence always presumes a persistent entity behind the worldly phenomena. Therefore,

people would enjoy all kinds of objects, no matter they are pleasant or unpleasant.

Some scholars also try to solve this puzzle. Bodhi explains how craving is caused

by these feelings: “[A]s the yearning for pleasant feeling, the wish to flee from painful

923
MN I, 266: yaṃ kiñci vedanaṃ vedeti, sukhaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vā adukkhamasukhaṃ vā, so taṃ
vedanaṃ abhinandati abhivadati ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati. tassa taṃ vedanaṃ abhinandato abhivadato
ajjhosāya tiṭṭhato uppajjati nandī, yā vedanāsu nandī tadupādānaṃ, tass’ upādānapaccayā bhavo…
924
PED, 346.
925
MA II, 311: ahaṃ dukkhito, mama dukkhanti gaṇhanto abhinandati nāma.
926
Sn 867: ‘sātaṃ, asātan’ti yam āhu loke, tam ūpanissāya pahoti chando, rūpesu disvā vibhavaṃ
bhavañ ca vinicchayaṃ kurute jantu loke.

- 303 -
feeling, or the relishing of the dull peace of neutral feeling. But its strong support is

pleasant feeling.”927 From this point of view, lust, aversion, and ignorance are different

facets of craving toward different feelings. Even aversion means craving for something.

In the same vein, Boisvert explains that craving and aversion are two sides of the same

coin:928

Moreover, our common understanding of craving may be misleading, since taṇhā refers

to both craving and aversion. According to Buddhism, craving reflects our

discontentment with the present moment, with reality as it is. We desire or crave

something because of a deep inner dissatisfaction and because of our inability to accept

reality as it presents itself. Craving is nothing but aversion towards our immediate

situation. Similarly, aversion manifests itself as the craving for a better condition. The

word taṇhā refers to both craving and aversion and henceforth, whenever the word

craving is employed, aversion is also intended since both are the two faces of the same

coin. (Italics added.)

According to his viewpoint, craving something means dissatisfaction or aversion

for the present, while hating something alludes to the need to get rid of the present

situation. Both Bodhi and Boisvert resort to the attributes of the objects. When a

favorable situation appears, people dislike to lose such pleasant experience and look for

the continuance. While facing an unfavorable situation, people hate persistence and

want to escape from the unpleasant experience. Buddhadāsa offers another explanation.

He explains that delight exists in all types of feeling thus:929

927
Bodhi 2000b: 13.
928
Boisvert 1997: 134.
929
Buddhadāsa 2002: 38.

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 This means that when there is sense contact and feeling arises, be it pleasurable,

unpleasurable or neither pleasurable nor unpleasurable feeling, then there is amusement

or delight in that feeling. We delight in the pleasurable feeling in the form of lust; we

delight in unpleasurable feeling in the form of anger or hate; we delight in the neither

pleasurable nor unpleasurable feeling in the form of delusion. This indeed is attachment.

Delight is attachment because this very delight is the base of clinging: if there is delight

then there must be clinging.

He explicitly points out that the three reactions: lust, anger, and delusion, are the

manifestation of delight, attachment, or clinging. However, he does not mention craving

in this process. Since all three types of feeling bring about delight or clinging, we can

deduce that craving is also the result of the three types of feeling. For Buddhadāsa, all

different reactions prove that human beings grasp different feelings in various forms.

And these forms can be collectively included in attachment. Similarly, de Silva explains

clinging toward painful feeling thus:930

In the context of painful sensations, upādānā may be more correctly rendered as

‘entanglement’ rather than ‘clinging’, referring to an obsession with what we like as

well as what we dislike.

Hence, the three types of feeling all together constitute experience in this world

and people immerse deeply in such experience. Even when people try to avoid painful

feeling they do not get rid of subjective reaction toward it. In the Kaḷāra Sutta of the

Nidānasaṃyutta, Sāriputta explained that feeling is the source and origin of craving.931

Then the Buddha asked him how to examine the existence of delight in feelings (in

930
De Silva 2005: 37.
931
SN II, 53: taṇhā kho vedanānidānā vedanāsamudayā vedanājātikā vedanāpabhavāti..

- 305 -
plural form). Sāriputta answered thus:932

There are these three feelings. What three? Pleasant feeling, painful feeling, neither-

painful-nor-pleasant feeling. These three feelings are impermanent; whatever is

impermanent is dukkha. When this was understood, delight in feelings no longer

remained present in me. (Bodhi 2000a: 569.)

Then the Buddha concluded “Whatever is felt is included in dukkha. (yaṃ kiñci

vedayitaṃ taṃ dukkhasmim.)”933 Here dukkha does not mean painful feeling but the

Noble Truth of dukkha. Bodhi suggests that dukkha in this context denotes a

philosophical category, where its meaning is contrasted with what is not conditionally

produced, not impermanent, not subject to arising and passing away, i.e. with Nibbāna,

the unconditioned element.934 In this sense, all types of feeling are conditioned and

impermanent. As long as people do not understand the nature of feeling, people would

keep delighting in and craving for all three types of feeling. From this point of view,

craving means not only to look for a delightful object but also represents deep desire

toward worldly life.

In this section, I discussed several theories about how to interpret the causal

relationship between craving or clinging and different types of feeling. First one comes

from the Suttanipāta and the commentary. Owing to the notion of an everlasting entity,

people take delight in all kinds of objects. Bodhi and Boisvert treat craving and aversion

932
SN II, 53: tisso kho imā vedanā. katamā tisso? sukhā vedanā, dukkhā vedanā, adukkhamasukhā
vedanā. imā kho tisso vedanā aniccā. yad aniccaṃ taṃ dukkhanti vidite yā vedanā sunandī sā na
upaṭṭhāsi.
933
SN II, 53.
934
Bodhi 1976: 102.

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as different but coexistent reactions toward the same object. Buddhadāsa considers lust,

anger, and delusion as different forms of delight. Such delight in feelings means

attachment. De Silva distinctly interprets such connection as entanglement.

To sum up, craving and clinging in Buddhist psychology have broader

connotations. They are not just emotional or intentional desire toward pleasant objects

but deep-rooted impulsive reactions toward various feelings and objects. People are

eager to find something satisfactory and permanent from daily experience.

§4.8.5 The Fire Metaphor of Craving

It is from this impulsive and instinctive aspect, that I suggest that taṇhā should be

grasped in its metaphorical meaning which relates to fire. According to Jurewicz, the

root of tṛṣṇā: tṛṣ in the Ṛigveda is represented in the form of the fire’s activity.935 The

burning of human subjects: poets reveal the conditions of cognition in the genesis

process. Hence, tṛṣ got the meaning of sweating, lack of water, or thirst as the side

effects of heat. Furthermore, Jurewicz points out that the Buddha employed the negative

image of fire to describe cognition:936

It may be assumed that in formulating the tṛṣṇā link, the Buddha was also referring to

the fiery activity of the poets burning the world in the cosmogonic act of cognition. In

his chain, their activity is deprived of its positive dimension and is identified only with

the negative aspect of fire, which in its insatiability digests, and thus destroys, itself

and the world around it.

935
Jurewicz 2000: 96.
936
Jurewicz 2000: 96.

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 From this point of view, we may understand that feeling causes taṇhā or tṛṣṇā not

only in the abstract aspect: craving but more generally in the metaphorical aspect:

burning. Three suttas in the Saṃyutta Nikāya describe the process of making a fire

thus:937

Just as heat (usmā) is generated and fire (teja) is produced from the conjunction and

friction of two fire-sticks, but when the sticks are separated and laid aside the resultant

heat ceases and subsides. (Bodhi 2000a: 597.)

According to this passage, the friction of sticks is compared to contact. Feeling is

the resultant heat. All these three suttas left fire unexplained. If we know tṛṣṇā

originally means burning, we can perfectly insert craving in this metaphor. As long as

the sense faculty contacts object, feeling will arise like heat, and craving subsequently

burns up everything. In the Āditta Sutta of the Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta, it is said that all

factors in our experience are all on fire:938

And what is the all that is burning? The eye is burning, forms are burning, visual

consciousness is burning, visual contact is burning, and whatever feeling arises with

visual contact as condition-whether pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant-

that too is burning. Burning with what? Burning with the fire of lust, with the fire of

hatred, with the fire of ignorance; burning with birth, aging, and death; with sorrow,

lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair, I say. (Bodhi 2000a: 1143.)

Here all the sense faculty, the sense object, the sense consciousness, contact, and

feelings are burning with the fire of lust, fire of aversion and fire of ignorance. This

937
SN II, 96-97; IV, 215.
938
SN IV, 19-20.

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metaphor of three fires, according to Gombrich, is also a reinterpretation of brahminical

tradition.939 It is noteworthy that from the sense faculty to feeling are the object of

burning and feeling is the last factor. Then the sutta implicitly connects the three types

of feeling with the three types of fire. These three fires are the reactions to their

respective types of feeling. Pleasant feeling causes the fire of lust, painful feeling causes

the fire of aversion, and neutral feeling causes the fire of ignorance. In general, all these

burning activities can be summed as taṇhā. In the Upādāna Sutta of the

Nidānasaṃyutta, the Buddha distinctly compared taṇhā with fire:940

Thus, sustained by that material, fueled by it, that great bonfire would burn for a very

long time. So too, when one lives contemplating gratification in things that can be clung

to, craving increases. With craving as condition, clinging… (Bodhi 2000a: 589.)

Like the fire is supplied by material, taṇhā increases because of continuously

observing the sweetness (assādānupassin) of the object. Taṇhā here is the abstract form

of the blazing fire and continuous attention to the object is the fuel feeding taṇhā. Not

only taṇhā, two out of ten synonyms mentioned at the beginning of this section: longing

(pipāsā) and obsession (pariḷāha) also have similar literal meaning. Their respective

roots: pā and dāha mean “to drink, quaff”941 and “burning, heat”942. Hence, all these

three terms originally describe physical needs or reactions caused by high temperature.

Although taṇhā in its abstract form means craving, when it was used in the chain

939
Gombrich 2006b: 65-66.
940
SN II, 84-85.
941
SED, 612.
942
SED, 477.

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of the twelve links, its metaphorical aspect comes more significant. Taṇhā is the

voracious fire regardless of what the material is. It destroys everything and the world,

i.e. the means of our experience, as Jurewicz points out. In this sense, we can realize

that all three types of feeling can cause the fire and the fire is taṇhā. The metaphor of

fire even gets reinforced for the next stage: clinging (upādāna) which literally means

the fuel.

§4.8.6 Summary

In the chain of the twelve links, craving is said to arise depending on feeling. Since

feeling is explained by six types in terms of the six types of sensory contact, craving is

accordingly divided by the six objects of the six senses. The critical point is that feeling

is the spontaneous activity, while craving is active toward the target. Hence, from

feeling to craving implies the manifestation of subjective intentional activity in the

cognitive processes. Johansson comments at this point: “Taṇhā, ‘craving’, means a

subjective reaction to and subjective involvement in perceptual things, which leads to

a construction of a distorted world, to false values and to suffering.”943 However, this

causal relationship is not a predetermined process as discussed in the previous several

sections. The arising of craving can be prevented by wholesome perceptions and

thoughts. Hence, Reat points out that the stages from feeling to craving are “the

fundamentals of Buddhist moral theory and psychopathology”.944

943
Johansson 1985: 97.
944
Reat 1990: 323.

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 On the other hand, for the ordinary people, the habitual reactions toward different

feelings are so tenacious that the cognitive processes inevitably end in dukkha.

Therefore, pleasant feeling brings out lust; painful feeling leads to aversion; neutral

feeling causes ignorance. All these reactions can be considered as a form of craving in

order to deal with the unsatisfactory situation. Hence, in the context of the origin of

dukkha, craving is explained by three types: craving for sensual pleasure, for existence,

and for non-existence. Here the term sensual pleasure (kāma) mostly denotes the five

external objects of craving, but dhamma is also listed parallel with the other five

external objects in the Sutta Piṭaka. In this sense, the target of craving for sensual

pleasure should be construed as all the six objects endowed with pleasant and agreeable

qualities in the sensual-sphere, while craving for existence and non-existence represent

the fundamental desire for life. People are eager to live continuously and better in this

life and in the next life as well. By contrast, sometimes people may give up their lives

facing unfavorable situations regardless of whether or not they believe in future rebirth.

This nihilistic idea is also one of the solutions toward life hence it is also a form of

craving.

At the metaphorical level, the whole cognitive process can be compared to the

process of burning. Contact is like the friction between the sense object and the sense

faculty. After that, it will produce heat which denotes all types of feeling, and fire, which

implies craving. Just like fire requires fuel to sustain, the whole process of cognition

depends on clinging to continue round and round.

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§4.9 Clinging (upādāna)

In the twelve links, clinging comes after craving. The term upādāna means

drawing upon, grasping, holding on, gripping, and attachment.945 The SA explained this

term as “grasping tightly (Upādānanti daḷhaggahaṇaṃ vuccati.)”.946 When it comes to

the adjectival form, it means “finding one's support by or in, clinging to, taking up,

nourished by.”947 In this sense, both clinging and craving have the distinctive feature of

desire or want. Harvey defines clinging thus “a more active involvement with and

clinging to the object of craving.” 948 Karunadasa also indicates that clinging is an

intensified form of craving.949 As discussed, the object of craving includes all the six

sense objects in the explanation of the twelve links. And they can be categorized into

sensual pleasure, existence, and non-existence in the definition of dukkha. However,

none of these two types of categorization were adopted by clinging. In the whole Sutta

Piṭaka, the target of clinging is four-fold: sensual pleasure (kāma), view (diṭṭhi), rule

and vow (sīlabbata), and the doctrine of self (attavāda).950 This categorization usually

came after the six types of craving. It was never listed with the three-fold craving. In

other words, the four-fold clinging is not necessarily related to the three-fold craving.

However, sensual pleasure was placed at the first position by both categorizations.

I have clarified that sensual pleasure as the object of craving includes all the six sense

945
PED, 149.
946
SA II, 14.
947
PED, 149.
948
Harvey 2013: 71.
949
Karunadasa 2013: 30.
950
SN II, 3.

- 312 -
objects in the sensual-sphere. Similarly, clinging for sensual pleasure may indicate the

same objects which are agreeable and attractive. Craving and clinging are distinguished

by intensity or level of this strong desire. Craving requires sensual pleasure to satisfy

needs, while clinging attaches sensual pleasure consistently to continue and to enhance

the reaction.

According to the commentarial tradition, the second item: diṭṭhi, includes all

wrong views except sīlabbata and attavāda.951 Here sīla and vata are rules and vows

regarding liberation which were held by ascetics and brahmins. 952 Lastly, attavāda

means various notions about selfness. The commentary referred to the

Upādāparitassanā Sutta. A person would regard (samanupassati) the five aggregates

as connected with the notion of selfness in various relationships. Owing to the change

and alteration of the five aggregates, this one would become trembled (paritassanā)

through clinging and also become frightened (uttāsa), distressed (vighāta), and anxious

(apekkhā).953 Then the subject will crave for and cling to that object. As Kurak points

out: “the notion of self emerges in the stage of craving but ‘becomes fully present’ in

clinging.”954 Owing to the vicissitudinous nature of the object, the result of craving and

clinging is doomed to be futile. And this dissatisfaction brings out many unwholesome

reactions.

The connection of clinging and the notion of selfness can be found in the Ānanda

951
SA II, 14.
952
Dhs, 1222.
953
SN III, 16-17.
954
Kurak 2003: 344.

- 313 -
Sutta. This sutta used a pun of the term upādāya. It said that “after clinging, the notion

of ‘I am’ occurs, not without clinging. (upādāya asmīti hoti, no anupādāya.)”955 Then

it suggests an instance about a person who looks his/her face in a mirror or in a bowl

with water. This person looks at it with clinging (upādāya). This term upādāya as well

as upādāna comes from upa + ā + dā and its literal meaning is taking up.956 Hence, this

sutta implies that just like people take up or depend on a mirror in order to check faces,

the notion of selfness sustains because people cling to some objects.

§4.9.1 Clinging and Craving

In the metaphor of fire, craving is compared to fire and clinging is the fuel which

sustains the burning activity. Such simile comes from the literal meaning of upādāna:

“that (material) substratum by means of which an active process is kept alive or going,

fuel, supply, provision.”957 By revealing the metaphor of fire, Gombrich connects the

concrete and abstract meaning of upādāna. He suggests that “the five processes that

constitute our experiences are being compared to burning bundles of firewood to feed

either the fire of our suffering or the fires of passion, hatred and confusion”.958 Here

upādāna means not only to grasp something but also fuel for burning. Jurewicz also

points out the two aspects of upādāna:959

The meaning of this word is both “fuel” and “grasping”. The first evokes the fire

955
SN III, 105.
956
PED, 149.
957
PED, 149.
958
Gombrich 2009: 115.
959
Jurewicz 2000: 98.

- 314 -
 metaphor with its concrete meaning of burning fuel and eating food; the second is more

abstract and refers to cognitive activity.

In this sense, upādāna, on the one hand, means to cling to the objects; on the other

hand, it sustains the continuity of craving process as a supportive factor. More

importantly, unless this process stops, it will cause this person to follow a path wrongly

in three aspects: body, speech, and mind. 960 Reat thus asserts: “Clinging is the

actualization of desire.”961 De Silva explains this process thus:962

When a person’s passions are roused, there emerges a kind of tenacity to hold on to

these pleasures. This is the emergence of clinging (upādāna). Unless there is the

persistence of clinging, excitation of the sense organs is not sufficient to rouse the

individual to activity. Though clinging emerges always with craving as a condition,

clinging as such works on a far deeper level and once a person clings to pleasure-giving

objects, some latent tendencies (anusaya) will already have been excited.

He confirms that craving is not enough to impel people to act. The crucial factor

is clinging. Yamada even discerns that clinging manifests in physical actions, while

craving in mental actions:963

‘Clinging’ (upādāna) is the manifested physical action, taking what one likes and

abandoning what one dislikes; while ‘thirst’ (taṇhā) is the manifested mental action,

desiring what one loves and hating what one detests.

If we realize the original meaning and usage of upādāna in the fire metaphor, we

should allow multiple explanations of this term. It can be material substance for burning.

960
SN II, 151.
961
Reat 1990: 325.
962
De Silva 2005: 63.
963
Yamada 1980: 271.

- 315 -
It can be the abstract element to sustain an activity. Or it can mean a strong attachment

to something so that this greedy reaction will continue. Hence, both craving and

clinging are the essential factors in the cognitive processes just like fire and fuel cannot

be separated.

Only when the fuel runs out, the fire of desire, hatred, and ignorance would be

“going out” which is the original meaning of Nibbāna.964 Gombrich, therefore, suggests

that to translate upādānakkhandhā as “clinging aggregates” is not wrong but loses its

original metaphorical meaning. 965 He also suggests that the five aggregates are

equivalent to burning bundles of firewood. 966 This kind of interpretation especially

makes sense of the terms for the two kinds of Nibbāna: sa-upādi-sesa and an-upādi-

sesa. The term upādi is the compound form of upādāna.967 Hence, the term sa-upādi-

sesa does not mean that an enlightened person still has a residue of clinging but a

residue of fuel.968

In the Kutūhalasālā Sutta of the Abyākatasaṃyutta, the Buddha explained to a

wanderer Vaccha why the enlightened disciples would not be reborn. This is because

that only people with clinging (sa-upādāna) would be reborn like a fire keeps burning

with fuel (sa-upādāna).969 In this passage, the Buddha used the term upādāna as a pun

to mean the fuel for burning and clinging for saṃsāra. At the end of the sutta, the

964
Gombrich 2006b: 65; 2009: 112.
965
Gombrich 2006b: 67.
966
Gombrich 2006b: 68.
967
PED 149.
968
Gombrich 2006b: 68-69.
969
SN IV, 399: seyyathāpi aggi sa-upādāno jalati, no anupādāno, evam eva khvāhaṃ sa-upādānassa
upapattiṃ paññāpemi, no anupādānassa.

- 316 -
Buddha answered Vaccha’s question about the fuel between death and rebirth, saying

thus:970

When, Vaccha, a being has laid down this body but has not yet been reborn in another

body, I declare that it is fueled by craving. For on that occasion craving is its fuel.

This answer indicates that craving is the upādāna which sustains saṃsāra.

According to this explanation, the distinction between craving and clinging might not

be so clear and sharp.

§4.9.2 The Gradual Enhancement

I have mentioned in the previous section that ordinary people would delight in

(abhinandati), greet (abhivadati), and remains attachment (ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati) toward

the three types of feeling.971 As a result, delight (nandī), i.e. clinging (upādāna), would

arise. We already know that clinging comes after craving in the chain of the twelve links.

However, craving is never clearly defined as the activities that a man delights in, greets,

and remains attachment toward objects.

These three terms: abhinandati, abhivadati, and ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati, usually appear

together in the context to describe the activities of enjoyment, especially when the six

objects are said to be desirable, lovely, agreeable, pleasing, sensually enticing, and

tantalizing, e.g. SN 35: 63, 64, 88, 98, 114, 115, 118, 119, 124, 131, 230. The subsequent

970
SN IV, 400: yasmiṃ kho samaye imañ ca kāyam nikkhipati, satto ca aññataram kāyam anuppanno
hoti, tam ahaṃ taṇhūpādānaṃ vadāni. taṇhā hissa tasmiṃ samaye upādānaṃ hoti. (Bodhi 2000a:
1393.)
971
MN I, 266: yaṃ kiñci vedanaṃ vedeti, sukhaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vā adukkhamasukhaṃ vā, so taṃ
vedanaṃ abhinandati abhivadati ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati. tassa taṃ vedanaṃ abhinandato abhivadato
ajjhosāya tiṭṭhato uppajjati nandī, yā vedanāsu nandī tadupādānaṃ, tass’ upādānapaccayā bhavo…

- 317 -
reaction that comes after these three activities is delight or clinging. As mentioned

above, the Sutta Piṭaka defined delight toward feelings as clinging. 972 In the

Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta, once a person delights in, greets, and remains attachment toward

the six pleasant objects, consciousness would become dependent on them and also cling

to them.973 From these passages, we may conclude that abhinandati, abhivadati, and

ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati mean the activities before clinging. Bodhi, therefore, compares the

sequence with the chain of the twelve links and suggests that these activities are the

works of craving.974 If we suppose that the teaching of causality resorts to a clear-cut

categorization, it is possible to sort out all factors under the division of the twelve links.

However, as shown earlier and will be mentioned later, some factors were not even

included in the twelve links, like perception, and some functions comprise more than

one factor, like the activities of thinking. Hence, adopting a loose categorization would

be more necessary and practical. From my point of view, these four terms describe the

gradual development from craving to clinging.

The term abhinandati is derived from the root nandati and the term abhivadati is

from the root vadati. The PED explains that the original meaning of nandati is to utter

sounds of joy.975 Both vadati and abhivadati have the meaning of to speak.976 Hence,

these two terms abhinandati and abhivadati have an implication about joyful verbal

expression. Abhinandati can be compared to an outburst of excitement, while

972
MN I, 266: yā vedanāsu nandī tadupādānaṃ.
973
SN IV, 102 ff.: tannissitaṃ viññāṇaṃ hoti tadupādānaṃ.
974
Bodhi 2000a: 1049.
975
PED, 346.
976
PED, 599; 69.

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abhivadati is this excitement emerging in inner or speaking language. From this point

of view, they can be regarded as the manifestation of mental proliferation (papañca) in

verbal or conceptual forms. The term ajjhosāya is the gerund of ajjhosati and has the

meaning of “hanging on, attached to”.977 The following verb tiṭṭhati originally means

“to stand” and, therefore, “to remain in, abide by”.978 When these two terms combine

together, it gets the meaning of staying in a state of attachment. This definition seems

very similar to clinging.

As discussed above, these three terms describe a gradual process of enhancement

from emotional and language expressions to adherent attachment. From this point of

view, all of them constitute a transition between craving and clinging.

977
PED, 12.
978
PED, 301.

- 319 -
§4.10 The Underlying Tendency (anusaya)

The last factor in this chapter is the underlying tendency (Pāli: anusaya; Sanskrit:

anuśaya). This term anusaya is derived from the root anu and seti. 979 The literal

meaning of seti is “to lie down, to sleep”.980 The prefix anu is an emphatic particle

meaning strongly, persistently and completely, according to Sasaki’s study.981 Hence,

anusaya means deep-rooted and inactive bias, proclivity, disposition, or tendency. In

the Sutta Piṭaka, there are many different types of the underlying tendency. As

mentioned earlier, the three types of the underlying tendency correspond to the three

types of feeling respectively: i.e. the underlying tendency to lust (rāgānusaya) underlies

pleasant feeling; the underlying tendency to aversion (paṭighānusaya) underlies painful

feeling; the underlying tendency to ignorance (avijjānusaya) underlies neutral

feeling.982 The Anusaya Sutta of the Maggasaṃyuttaṃ lists seven types in total: the

underlying tendencies to sensual lust (kāmarāga), to aversion (paṭigha), to view (diṭṭhi),

to doubt (vicikiccha), to conceit (māna), to lust for existence (bhavarāga), and to

ignorance (avijjā).983 The same list is also mentioned in the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta, the

Dīgha Nikāya, and the Aṅguttara Nikāya. 984 This list, therefore, is regarded as the

standard categorization by some scholars.985

De Silva further connects these underlying tendencies with craving: “kāma-

979
PED, 44.
980
PED, 722.
981
Sasaki 1986: 17.
982
MN I, 303.
983
SN V, 60.
984
MN I, 109-110; DN III, 254, 282; AN IV, 9.
985
E.g. Karunaratna 1965: 775; Jayatilleke 1975: 86-87; De Silva 2014: 36; Collins 1999: 101-02;
Karunadasa 2013: 78.

- 320 -
rāgānusaya with the craving for sensual pleasures; paṭighānusaya with the destructive

and annihilationist urges; māna, diṭṭhi and bhava-rāgānusaya with the ego instinct.”986

Johansson mentions other types of the underlying tendency which are not on the list

and are categorized in another way: “kāmarāga, bhavarāga and byāpāda seem to

belong to the area of motivation proper, paṭigha and māna are emotional terms, diṭṭhi,

sakkāya-diṭṭhi and avijjā are cognitive terms, sīlabbataparāmāsa may refer to a type of

behaviour or attitude, and the rest to combinations of the areas.”987 Among all these

types, only arahants can eradicate the underlying tendencies to conceit, to lust for

existence, and to ignorance.988 Hence, these three are regarded as the most tenacious

and fundamental. In other words, the eradication of these three types of the underlying

tendency means the attainment of Nibbāna.

§4.10.1 Ethical Value

The PED explains the underlying tendency is “Always in bad sense.”989 However,

in the Cūḷavedalla Sutta, the bhikkhuni Dhammadinna rejected that the three types of

the underlying tendency toward different feelings should be abandoned, i.e. the

underlying tendency to lust, to aversion, and to ignorance. 990 According to her

explanation, these three underlying tendencies are helpful for the attainment of jhāna.

In this sense, the underlying tendency seems not so “bad”.

986
De Silva 2014: 36.
987
Johansson 1985: 107.
988
Karunaratna 1965: 777; De Silva 2014: 36.
989
PED, 44.
990
MN I, 303: na kho sabbāya sukhāya vedanāya rāgānusayo pahātabbo, na kho sabbāya dukhāya
vedanāya paṭighānusayo pahātabbo, na kho sabbāya adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya avijjānusayo
pahātabbo.

- 321 -
 The PED also notes that anusaya occurs absolutely in the oldest texts “without

mention of the cause or direction of the bias”.991 In this way, some suttas described

anusaya together with chanda, rāga, nandī, and taṇhā, toward the five aggregates, the

six senses, the six objects, and the six sense consciousnesses.992 According to this usage,

the meaning of anusaya may be incorporated into desire in a broad sense and it can be

applied to all internal and external factors. Especially in three Cetanā Suttas of the

Nidānasaṃyutta, as long as the underlying tendency exists, there will be the

maintenance of consciousness and subsequent rebirth.993 These suttas did not indicate

what this underlying tendency was. Bodhi construes it as the underlying tendency to

ignorance and the underlying tendency to lust since these suttas were meant to explain

future rebirth.994 Tan argues that in its oldest usage, anusaya means “the latent tendency

of adherence to mental standpoints.”995 He points out that mental standpoint (cetaso

adhiṭṭhana) means craving and views in the commentary, the term anusaya originally

denotes these two basic defilements. However, the PED warns us not to put such

connotation back to the earlier passages.996 It seems like that the PED holds the view

that the term anusaya denotes the latent tendency of all defilements in general. As the

Dutiya-aññatarabhikkhu Sutta said:997

if one has an underlying tendency towards something, then one is measured in

991
PED, 44.
992
E.g. SN III, 10, 13, 191.
993
SN II, 65-67: no ce ceteti no ce pakappeti atha ce anuseti, ārammaṇam etaṃ hoti viññāṇassa
ṭhitiyā.
994
Bodhi 2000a: 758, n. 112.
995
Tan 2010: 13.
996
PED, 44.
997
SN III, 36: yaṃ kho anuseti tam anumīyati, yam anumīyati tena saṅkhaṃ gacchati.

- 322 -
 accordance with it; if one is measured in accordance with something, then one gets

such name in terms of it. (Bodhi 2000a: 879.)

Hence, as long as someone has an inclination toward any object, this person can

be recognized by that object. However, the commentary still referred to defilements to

explain this term.998 Bodhi comments thus:999

Additionally, we might suppose, one is reckoned not only by way of the defilements,

but even more prominently by way of the aggregate with which one principally

identifies. One who inclines to form is reckoned a “physical” person, one who inclines

to feeling a “hedonist,” one who inclines to perception an “aesthete” (or fact-gatherer?),

one who inclines to volition a “man of action,” one who inclines to consciousness a

thinker, etc.

Hence, when it is used without specific connotation, the underlying tendency

greatly denotes desire complying with the context of craving and clinging. From this

point of view, it is craving, clinging, and attachment which are blamed as the origin or

root of dukkha in the Sutta Piṭaka.

§4.10.2 Unconscious

In the Mahāmāluṅkya Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, the Buddha clarified the five

lower fetters (pañcorambhāgiyāni saṃyojanānī) as the five defilements which persist

in an ordinary person until being eradicated, i.e. the belief in individuality

(sakkāyadiṭṭhi), doubt, rules and vows (sīlabbata), sensual lust, and ill will

998
SA II, 33.
999
Bodhi 2000a: 1053, n. 47.

- 323 -
(byāpāda).1000 Even though a newborn infant does not have any ideas or notions, the

five lower fetters exist as the underlying tendencies.1001 In other words, the underlying

tendency is innate from birth. From this point of view, we may deduce that not only

these five types of the underlying tendency but also the underlying tendency as a

general term, which includes all defilements, exists from birth. This passage implies

two points: the underlying tendency should be unconscious and inactive and it is the

accumulation of past kamma from previous lives.

Some scholars consider the underlying tendency as an unconscious mental

activity.1002 In his earlier work, De Silva refers to the Western psychological definition

about the unconscious, then he includes anusaya as unconscious motivation similar to

the Freudian concept of the unconscious. 1003 Regarding this relationship, Johansson

expresses his concern about comparing the similarity and difference between Buddhism

and Freudian theory. 1004 Collins, though, defines the underlying tendency as not

conscious, he reminds us to be aware of this usage: “Using the modern concept of the

unconscious to elucidate Buddhist thought is, like all such attempts at cross-cultural

parallels in psychology, fraught with potential misapprehensions.” 1005 Hence, we

should be aware of the discrepant background of psychology and Buddhism, as I

mentioned in the introduction. It would be difficult to define Buddhist ideas or theories

1000
MN I, 433-34.
1001
MN I, 432-33.
1002
E.g. Jayatilleke 1975: 86; Harvey 2004: 125; Karunadasa 2013: 78.
1003
De Silva 2005: 73-75.
1004
Johansson 1985: 110.
1005
Collins 1999: 101.

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absolutely depending on Western science. Even de Silva himself has recently adjusted

his definition of anusaya. He suggests the underlying tendency works at a subliminal

level to substitute it as unconscious:1006

In general, the term anusaya indicates a dormant or latent predisposition working at a

subliminal level, closer to threshold consciousness rather than at the level of buried

traumatic experience…because I see these traits as closer to the conscious level rather

than buried at a deeper level. I see them as more like ‘sleeping’ or dormant passions…

The dormant level of emotions is described as the anusaya level; the emotions may

emerge as thought processes (pariyuṭṭhāna), at which level mindfulness may help the

individual to restrain, or, if not, they may emerge as impulsive action (vītikkama).

This shift may correspond to the experience of Khemaka in the Khemaka Sutta.

As Khemaka admitted that he had abandoned the five lower fetters, he still knew that

he had an underlying tendency “I am” so that he had not attained arahant yet.1007 From

this point of view, we may realize that the underlying tendency can be examined by a

highly cultivated person. Tan considers it on a pre-conscious level: “They are just below

the conscious, and as they are habitual, not much thought, if any, is given to them.”1008

In other words, the reason why the underlying tendency is said to be unconscious is

because ordinary people are unable to notice it. The term anusaya indicates the dormant

and pertinacious inclination beneath our cognitive processes. In Buddhism, the problem

always lies in the functions of our mind instead of the categorization of factors.

1006
De Silva 2014: 34-35.
1007
SN III, 131.
1008
Tan 2010: 12.

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Johansson concludes thus:1009

Summing up the evidence, it seems preferable to use the translations "tendency" and

"disposition", by which we mean a personality trait that is not always showing but is

present and may become operative, when the child has matured or other conditions

become favourable. When active, the tendencies usually operate by becoming

conscious. In order to perform a bad action, a conscious intention is needed, because

only the intention is wrong and kammically active.

In this sense, the importance of the underlying tendency lies in its inactive

characteristic. Because of its inactivity and latency, we consider it unconscious.

Because of its unawareness, it can persist unnoticeably. Because of its persistence, it is

the root of defilement hence it is the last factor to eradicate to attain Nibbāna.

§4.10.3 Acting in a Reciprocal Process

As discussed above, the underlying tendency is innate in an infant. This point

emphasizes that underlying tendency is the accumulation of kamma from previous lives.

The underlying tendency is preserved and persists in an inactive condition. However,

in this life, in our daily life, it becomes the source of unwholesome activities and these

activities, in turn, reinforce the underlying tendency. This reciprocal process is well

depicted in the Chachakka Sutta. This sutta was meant to explain the arising and

ceasing of the belief in individuality (sakkāyadiṭṭhi) in terms of the cognitive processes.

Because of the contact of the senses and the objects, it causes the three types of feeling.

1009
Johansson 1985: 110.

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Thereafter the interaction of the underlying tendencies and reactions begins:1010

When one is touched by a pleasant feeling, if one delights in it, greets it, and remains

attachment toward it, then the underlying tendency to lust lies within one.

When one is touched by a painful feeling, if one sorrows, grieves and laments, weeps

beating one’s breast and becomes distraught, then the underlying tendency to aversion

lies within one.

When one is touched by a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, if one does not

understand as it actually is the origination, the disappearance, the gratification, the

danger, and the escape in regard to that feeling, then the underlying tendency to

ignorance lies within one. (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001: 1134.)

This sutta can be analyzed into two stages which constitute a reciprocal process:

the first stage is from feelings to reactions; the second stage is from reactions to the

underlying tendencies. The first half implies the activation of the underlying tendencies,

while the second half explains the formation of the underlying tendencies.

The way the underlying tendencies become active was not clearly stated in the

above passage but it was explained in the Mahāmāluṅkya Sutta. This sutta said that an

infant has the five underlying tendencies to the five lower fetters, while an ordinary

person would be obsessed (pariyuṭṭhita) and be overcome (pareta) by the five lower

fetters. 1011 In this way, these defilements become steadfastness (thāma). The term

1010
MN III, 285: so sukhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno abhinandati abhivadati ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati,
tassa rāgānusayo anuseti. dukkhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno socati kilamati paridevati urattāḷiṃ
kandati sammohaṃ āpajjati, tassa paṭighānusayo anuseti. adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho
samāno tassā vedanāya samudayañ ca atthaṅgamañ ca assādañ ca ādīnavañ ca nissaraṇañca
yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāti, tassa avijjānusayo anuseti.
1011
MN I, 433-34.

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thāma is derived from the root sthā which means stand firmly.1012 The root of the term

pariyuṭṭhita is pari and uṭṭhita. And uṭṭhita is also derived from the root sthā. It is

meaningful to recall the root of anusaya: seti which means lying down or sleeping.

Hence, the Buddha used puns about the defilements which emerge from the previous

dormant state just like a baby keeps sleeping, while an adult stands up. And these two

periods indicate the defilements either in latency or in functioning. This differentiation,

however, was denied by the Theravāda school and the Vaibhāṣika school. They consider

that these two stages are identical.1013 After their studies, two scholars Karunaratna and

Waldron seem to support the position in the Sutta Piṭaka and reject these two schools’

views.1014

On the other hand, Buddhaghosa suggested three aspects: discipline (sīla),

concentration (samādhi), and wisdom (paññā) to uproot defilements in three levels

respectively: the transgression (vītikkama), the obsession (pariyuṭṭhāna), and the

underlying tendency. 1015

Several scholars also accept such differentiation. 1016

According to Karunadasa, the underlying tendencies manifest in the obsession level “as

the mind’s turbulence, excited feelings, or negative emotions” and then they are

externalized “in the form of vocal and physical actions”.1017

Now we may go back to the passages in the Chachakka Sutta. This sutta depicts

1012
SED, 1262.
1013
Karunaratna 1965: 776-77.
1014
Karunaratna 1965: 777; Waldron 2003: 40.
1015
Vism, 5.
1016
E.g. Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001: 1267-68, n. 651; De Silva 2014: 34-35; Karunadasa 2013: 95.
1017
Karunadasa 2013: 95.

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an ordinary person’s reactions toward the stimuli of the objects. These reactions are

delights in (abhinandati), greets (abhivadati), remains attachment (ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati),

sorrows (socati), grieves (kilamati) and laments (paridevati), weeps (kandati) beating

one’s breast (urattāḷiṃ) and becomes distraught (sammohaṃ āpajjati). According to the

discussion earlier, both abhinandati and abhivadati denote desire and are related to

utterance or language. We cannot ascertain if they really express the activity of uttering

sound, but at least they can be deemed as the pre-utterance activity. These three terms:

socati, kilamati, and paridevati all describe sadness. Kuan suggests they are emotions

which refer to “subsequent subjective reaction to the original feeling”.1018 All these five

terms belong to the obsession level. On the other hand, kandati and urattāḷiṃ depict a

person expressing sadness in bodily movements. Hence, they enter the transgression

level. The last two expressions “remains attachment” and “becomes distraught”

describe a long-term and lasting mental state. This long-term mental state can be

compared to bent or inclination (nati) mentioned in the Channa Sutta of the

Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta. 1019 It said that if a person is attached (nissita), there will be

wavering (calita) and then inclination. The SA explained nati as the inclination of

craving (taṇhā-natiyā).1020 These three stages: attachment, waver, and inclination can

be compared to the obsession level, the transgression level, and the long-term mental

state respectively.

1018
Kuan 2008: 26.
1019
SN IV, 59. See also MN III, 266.
1020
SA II, 372.

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 This process from anusaya to reactions can be summarized thus: once the sense

faculty contacts with the object, there arise pleasant feeling, painful feeling, or neutral

feeling. Whenever these feelings arise and whatever types they are, there will always

be a related underlying tendency waiting. In this sense, the underlying tendency to lust

underlies pleasant feeling; the underlying tendency to aversion underlies painful feeling;

the underlying tendency to ignorance underlies neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling.1021

Under such conditions, these underlying tendencies will emerge as mental activities in

the obsession level or as verbal and bodily activities in the transgression level. Another

point is that the underlying tendency to ignorance does not mean that ignorance will

arise but means that wisdom cannot arise. As the passage describes, the ordinary people

fail to penetrate neutral feeling as it really is. Johansson elaborates these three different

reactions well in his summary:1022

As a result, the perceiver may either be pleased, or unhappy, or unable to understand

the nature of the sensation. This means that a motivational factor is released - or a

failure to react because of incomprehension. The introduction of a disposition here

should probably not be understood as a new factor conditioned by the emotional

reaction (or the lack of it) but rather as an explanation. Desire is produced because a

disposition to it is activated. Repugnance is released by an unpleasant sensation

because a disposition to it was latent within and is now released. The meaning and

consequences of a neutral sensation will not be understood because the latent tendency

to ignorance has been activated.

1021
MN I, 303: sukhāya kho vedanāya rāgānusayo anuseti, dukkhāya vedanāya paṭighānusayo
anuseti, adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya avijjānusayo anuseti.
1022
Johansson 1985: 116.

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 So far, I have discussed the way the underlying tendency gradually becomes

activated. The second stage is comparatively easier to understand as it looks. In the

Chachakka Sutta, all these different reactions bring out their respective underlying

tendencies. It is because of these reactions that make the underlying tendency persistent

and tenacious. Besides, as discussed above, when one reacts with attachment, there

would be inclination (nati). This inclination indicates a long-term mental state which

would enrich the underlying tendency. Karunadasa explains how this inclination (or

bent in his translation) works:1023

Each mental bent lays down an imprint. When this imprint is repeated we develop

habits and patterns of behaviour. Habitual patterns help shape our character and our

character in turn determines our destiny. This determination is true in either way,

whether for our own betterment or for our downfall.

The formation or reinforcement of the underlying tendency is a slow and endless

process. Every ignorant act facilitates this process. From the example that a newborn

infant has the underlying tendency, we can deduce that the underlying tendency should

be accumulated throughout numerous lives, hence this life is also included. What an

ordinary people did in daily life helps the underlying tendency to continue, to strengthen.

Then, the underlying tendency will lead this person to react along the wrong course. In

this way, the reciprocal cycle goes on and on.

1023
Karunadasa 2013: 78.

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§4.10.4 Summary

Waldron sums up three aspects or roles about the underlying tendencies:1024

(1) psychologically, they are involved in the karma-generating activities elicited by

cognitive processes; and thus (2) “psycho-ontologically” are instrumental in

perpetuating samsaric existence; whereas (3) soteriologically, their gradual eradication

is closely linked to progress along the path to liberation.

This section mainly focuses on the psychological aspect and mentions about the

other two aspects. For the ordinary people, the underlying tendencies persist in

dormancy all the time from one life to next. They are the accumulations of defilements.

They will be awake under appropriate conditions which are stimuli and feelings.

Different underlying tendencies react toward different stimuli and feelings. As the SA

said: “As long as the underlying tendencies exist, they become a condition for the

kammic consciousness, for there is no way to prevent its arising.”1025 They manifest

themselves in thoughts, or in verbal and bodily actions. And these reactions are always

wrong or unwholesome.

On the other hand, all these wrong or unwholesome reactions become the nutrients

for the underlying tendencies. Every time people react, as long as they are not yet

liberated, the underlying tendencies will get strengthened by these reactions. Bodhi

points out this reciprocal process: 1026

Thus in the working of the worldly consciousness a reciprocal operation comes into

1024
Waldron 2003: 34.
1025
SA II, 71: anusaye sati kamma-viññāṇassa uppattiyā avāritattā etaṃ anusaya-jātaṃ paccayo hoti.
(Bodhi 2000a: 759, n. 113.)
1026
Bodhi 2006: 6.

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 view: on the one hand the latent defilements issue in distorted perceptions; on the other,

these distorted perceptions awaken the defilements and reinforce their underlying roots.

But this whole process takes place with such swiftness and subtlety that the worldling

is not aware of it.

Hence, the underlying tendencies trigger the reactions and the reactions reinforce

the underlying tendency. In this way, ordinary people are mired deeper and deeper in

this predicament.

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 Chapter 5 The Analysis of the Cognitive Processes

In my analysis of how cognition was taught in Early Buddhism, I found many

factors and their sequences or descriptions reappearing in different suttas. These

repetitions were probably the features or vestiges of oral transmission in order to

facilitate memorization. However, it is also possible that they indicate common mental

factors or functions among ordinary people. In either way, the principle of causality and

daily experience should be the basic rules for these descriptions to comply with. These

factors and functions must follow the causal relationship and can be experienced by

human beings. In this sense, with regard to discussions of individual factors and

functions in the previous chapters, this chapter will analyze how Early Buddhism

realized or explained cognition from the perspective of a dynamic system. All these

factors and functions will be treated as part of the cognitive processes to investigate

their relationship, interaction, and cooperation.

From a first look, most suttas depict the factors or functions in a simple linear

relationship. The number of the factors or functions involved can be few or many. For

example, the Puṇṇama Sutta mentions only one cause (hetu) or condition (paccaya) for

each of the five aggregates. The four primary elements are the cause of the form

aggregate; contact is the cause of feeling, perception, and volitional formations; name-

and-form is the cause of consciousness.1027 By contrast, the Upanisa Sutta lists twenty-

three factors in sequence and each one is the proximate cause (upanisa) of the next

1027
SN III, 101-02.

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factor.1028 All these descriptions indicate a clear cause-and-effect relationship. However,

the variations of these factors and functions imply that these causes and effects are not

fixed or unchangeable. The Upanisa Sutta explained that the proximate cause of

volitional formations is ignorance; the proximate cause of consciousness is volitional

formations; consciousness is the cause of name-and-form.1029 Hence, we are informed

of two different causal relationships in the Upanisa Sutta and the Puṇṇama Sutta. Such

inconsistency exists throughout the Sutta Piṭaka. In the first section, I will discuss how

to interpret these different relationships between factors and functions.

Although the Sutta Piṭaka depicted factors and functions in various ways, the

cause-and-effect relationship must be the bottom line. Therefore, certain causes will

lead to certain effects. From this point of view, such causal relationship seems to be

impersonal and spontaneous. Ñāṇananda analyzes the cognitive processes in the

Madhupiṇḍika Sutta. He asserts that these processes begin on an impersonal note but

end in a hapless situation.1030 All ordinary people become like the puppets controlled

by the causal relationships. It seems like that everyone has the same reaction and

cognitive processes toward the same object. People will look for agreeable objects and

evade disagreeable objects. But a further question comes to mind: Do all human beings

have the same criterion to assess an object as agreeable or disagreeable? Or does every

individual have their own preferences? The second section will discuss the validity of

1028
SN II, 31-32.
1029
SN II, 31.
1030
Ñāṇananda 2012: 5-6.

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common criterion toward the object, i.e. to what extent people are subject to the effects

of the objects in daily experience and the effects are universal or personal.

In Chapter 2, I pointed out that the essence of the Buddha’s teachings is the

analysis of mind. This analysis is taught in the form of the teaching of causality.

Different suttas or passages mention different factors and functions. The key point why

these factors and functions are mentioned lies in their applicability and importance.

However, for the ordinary people, the cognitive processes in daily life involve more

factors and functions than those mentioned in individual suttas. Besides, the way our

mind operates is more complicated than it seems outwardly in the Sutta Piṭaka. It is not

satisfactory to analyze cognition depending on individual suttas or passages. We should

scrutinize the general sources and then systematize these descriptions to delineate a

general and overall picture of the human mind. The last section, as a comprehensive

analysis, will conclude how the factors or functions work in coordination to constitute

the cognitive processes.

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§5.1 The Relationships between Factors and Functions

In the discussion of the teaching of causality, I mentioned different interpretations

of the time span of the twelve links. Even though the Sutta Piṭaka did not elaborate

distinctly, these different interpretations are preserved in Abhidhamma tradition.

According to the Sarvāstivāda school, dependent origination can be analyzed in terms

of four types of time span: in one moment, in separate time periods, in different lives,

and in immeasurable lives.1031 We may summarize that all factors in the first type arise

simultaneously, therefore, this type is based on reasoning, while the other three types

are sequential relationships which refer to experience or theories. These four

interpretations indicate that differences and uncertainties about the understanding of the

twelve links existed from an early period.

I also suggested that the premise of these different interpretations is to accept the

chain of the twelve links as the authentic and exclusive explanation for the teaching of

causality. The fact is that although many people engaged in contriving a coherent theory,

they never achieved a consensus. Putting this argument aside, in Chapters 3 and 4, I

elaborate that the analysis of mental activities of an ordinary person found in the Sutta

Piṭaka can be practical and experiential. Such analysis basically relies on the variations

of the teaching of causality, not only the twelve links. These passages depict our

cognitive processes beginning from the stimuli of the objects and ending at various

1031
T27, no. 1545, p. 117, c3-4：復次緣起有四種：一剎那、二連縛、三分位、四遠續。
T29, no. 1558, p. 48, c8-10：又諸緣起差別說四：一者剎那、二者連縛、三者分位、四者遠
續。

- 337 -
perplexities or predicaments, i.e. dukkha. Within these processes, all the factors comply

with the principle of causality. From this point of view, we have good reasons to

interpret the teaching of causality in Early Buddhism from the cognitive aspect.

The standard explanation of the twelve links uses the adverb paccaya to denote

the relationship of two adjacent links. The term paccaya literally means “resting on,

falling back on, foundation; cause, motive etc.”1032 Hence, it defines one factor which

is caused by another factor. Sometimes this relationship is expressed in other terms. For

example, the Sanidāna Sutta explained that different thoughts (vitakka) have their

respective sources (nidāna) and the subsequent factor arises (uppajjati) by depending

on (paṭicca) the previous factor.1033 These terms can be found in the Suttanipāta, too,

as mentioned in Chapter 2. Nakamura points out that these terms: nidāna, paṭicca,

upanissāya, denote the same causal relationship.1034 Buddhaghosa has given a list of

terms which express the same meaning: paccaya, hetu, kāraṇa, nidāna, sambhava, and

pabhava. 1035 All these terms tend to define a relationship between different mental

activities. In this way, the Sutta Piṭaka elaborated how mental activities arise and cease

depending on previous causes. It is all about conditions. Hence, Nibbāna can be

achieved by the eradication of these unwholesome conditions. In this sense, the causal

relationship must be stabilized and irreversible. The Dhātusaṃyutta especially

1032
PED, 384.
1033
SN II, 151-53.
1034
Nakamura 1980: 170.
1035
Vism 532-33: paccayo hetu kāraṇaṃ nidānaṃ sambhavo pabhavo ti ādi atthato ekaṃ byañjanato
nānaṃ.

- 338 -
emphasized that it is the cause bringing out the result not the other way around:1036

It is in dependence on the diversity of elements that there arises the diversity of

perceptions; in dependence on the diversity of perceptions that there arises the diversity

of intentions; … contacts; … feelings; … desires; … passions; … quests; … gains.

The diversity of quests does not arise in dependence on the diversity of gains; the

diversity of passions does not arise in dependence on the diversity of quests; … the

diversity of elements does not arise in dependence on the diversity of perceptions.

(Bodhi 2000a: 633-34.)

The sequence of factors cannot be mistaken. If the cause and effect can be

exchanged, then the causal relationship will collapse. And the eradication of

defilements cannot necessarily ensure the attainment of Nibbāna. However, the

sequence does not mean that some of these factors cannot exist concurrently. As

discussed earlier, some people tend to treat the whole round of the twelve links as

existing within one moment. Although this interpretation cannot be testified in our

experience, it is not impossible that some factors may arise at the same time. This

connection is exemplified definitely in the relationship between consciousness and

name-and-form in some suttas, e.g. SN 12: 65, 67; DN 14, 15; SĀ 287, 288; DĀ 13.

This interdependent relationship was compared to two sheaves of reeds leaning together

to stand by Sāriputta.1037 Without the other one, each factor would not exist. Therefore,

some factors may coexist along with other sequential factors in the analysis of cognition

in Early Buddhism. Yamada combines these two interpretations to complete the

1036
SN II, 147-48.
1037
SN II, 114.

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Buddhist causal theory:1038

The causal relationship involving time includes the logical relationship which does not

involve time. The relationship which involves time, i.e., causal relationship, is physical

and factual; whereas the relationship which does not involve time, i.e. akālike

relationship, is logical and conceptual.

He further considers name-and-form as the six sense objects, and the six sense

consciousnesses and the six senses should all arise together in the cognitive processes.

In his study, not only two but three links: consciousness, name-and-form, and the six

senses, in the twelve links are simultaneous.1039 In a similar vein, Reat also interprets

these factors, i.e. the coming together of consciousness, name-and-form, and the sense

faculty, and contact, as the same event:1040

[I]t would be incorrect to think that first viññāṇa arises, then nāma-rūpa, then the six

sense spheres, then contact. In fact, all of these necessarily arise simultaneously… The

passages examined above… deal with the mutual interdependence of consciousness,

faculty, object and sensual contact. The paṭiccasamuppāda formula paints a similar

picture, with nāma-rūpa as a general designation for the object of consciousness.

As a sensory event, contact has the inherent connotation of the meeting of the

sense faculty, the sense object, and the sense consciousness. Therefore, these factors

must be coexistent at the same time. The point is that both Yamada and Reat regard

name-and-form as the six sense objects so that the analysis of cognition can be applied

to the twelve links. According to Bucknell’s study, the Buddha adopted the term nāma-

1038
Yamada 1980: 274.
1039
Yamada 1980: 271.
1040
Reat 1987: 22.

- 340 -
rūpa initially to mimic Upaniṣadic genesis and endowed it a perceptive meaning. It was

later development when nāma-rūpa was reinterpreted as the combination of mental and

physical elements and viññāṇa as rebirth-consciousness.1041 In this way, the explanation

of transmigration was able to apply to the twelve links. However, the analysis of mind

was always of the most concern for the Buddha. From this point of view, the

interpretation of cognitive functions seems more accordant to the Buddha’s intention.

Even consciousness and name-and-form as the objects are said to be

interdependent, there is a logical flaw here. As discussed earlier, the combination of the

sense and the object happens before the arising of consciousness. In other words, the

object is the cause of the sense consciousness, while the sense consciousness cannot

bring out the object. It was explained in the Mahāhatthipadopama Sutta that the object

comes into the range of the intact sense faculty but the consciousness does not

necessarily arise.1042 Hence, even though nāma-rūpa means the collection of the six

sense objects, it is not interdependent with the sense consciousness.

To solve this problem, we have to read these passages from the aspect of cognition.

For the Buddha, it was meaningless to discuss an object which had not been perceived

yet or cannot be sensed. The reason that an object is considered as existent is that it can

be perceived by people. Kalupahana especially emphasizes the perceivable objects in

our experience:1043

1041
Bucknell 1999: 339-40.
1042
MN I, 190.
1043
Kalupahana 1975: 70-71.

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 Hence, any theory about the nature of the external world has to be based on sense data

(phassa), and speculation that goes beyond sense data would be metaphysical and futile.

Such theories are based on hypothetical ideas about what reality ought to be rather than

on verifiable data. In other words, they are beyond the sphere of experience (avisaya,

fei ching chieh).

From this point of view, even though the combination of the sense and the object

happens right before the sense consciousness, our cognition turns out to be meaningful

only on the occasion that the sense consciousness arises depending on the stimulus of

the object. And the object is considered meaningful only after the arising of the sense

consciousness. In other words, although the object impinges the sense faculty first, its

meanings and effects will be acknowledged only after the sense consciousness arises.

This is the reason that the sense consciousness and the sense object are said to be

interdependent. Both of them require each other. There will be no cognitive experience

possible without any of them.

Likewise, this argument is also expressed by the statement that experience must

rely on contact which is the sensory event for the meeting of the sense faculty, the sense

object, and the sense consciousness. As mentioned at the beginning, the Puṇṇama Sutta

attributes the cause of feeling, perception, and volitional formations to contact.1044 In

the Dutiyadvaya Sutta, it said that feeling, intention, and perception arise owing to

contact: “Contacted one feels, contacted one intends, contacted one perceives.” 1045

Kuan accordingly illustrates these three factors as being simultaneous in three

1044
SN III, 101-02.
1045
SN IV, 68-69. (Bodhi 2000a: 1172.)

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directions.1046 Hence, this description implies that these factors work without apparent

sequence. Similarly, the Mahāvedalla Sutta also clarifies that feeling, perception, and

consciousness are inseparable:1047

Feeling, perception, and consciousness, these states are conjoined, not disjoined, and it

is impossible to separate each of these states from the others in order to describe the

difference between them. For what one feels, that one perceives; and what one

perceives, that one cognizes. That is why these states are conjoined, not disjoined, and

it is impossible to separate each of these states from the others in order to describe the

difference between them. (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001: 389.)

Many scholars, therefore, emphasize that the analysis of cognition involves three

aspects. Gethin considers that these three aggregates operate together in different

aspects of the cognitive processes. 1048 Hamilton also analyzes: “We have the three

mental khandhas of vedanā, saññā and viññāṇa working together, each contributing to

the process: vedanā as affective cognition, saññā as discriminatory or identificatory

cognition, and viññāṇa as consciousness of each and every part of the process as a

whole.”1049 However, as an alternative interpretation, Johansson suggests these three

are “all different stages of a conscious process.”1050

Furthermore, de Silva includes all four formless aggregates into consideration:

feeling is the affective/emotional aspect, volitional formations are conative/volitional,

1046
Kuan 2012: 45.
1047
MN I, 293: yā ca vedanā yā ca saññā yañca viññāṇaṃ: ime dhammā saṃsaṭṭhā, no visaṃsaṭṭhā.
na ca labbhā imesaṃ dhammānaṃ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṃ paññāpetuṃ. yaṃ hi
vedeti taṃ sañjānāti, yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vijānāti. tasmā ime dhammā saṃsaṭṭhā no visaṃsaṭṭhā. na
ca labbhā imesaṃ dhammānaṃ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṃ paññāpetuṃ.
1048
Gethin 1986: 37.
1049
Hamilton 1996: 95.
1050
Johansson 1985: 60.

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and perception and consciousness are cognitive. 1051 He suggests that all these

aggregates function persistently: “In this manner, the three dimensions of experience

are the product of abstract analysis, whereas all three aspects are found in all states of

consciousness and behavior.” 1052 Hence, for some scholars, the theory of the five

aggregates intends not to analyze the constitution of human beings but to reveal

different aspects of the function of the mind.1053 From this point of view, the analysis

of mind into three aspects is rather analytical and does not involve temporal sequence.

As Reat points out:1054

The three terms, viññāṇa as consciousness in general, vedanā as feeling, and saññā as

perception of specific features, may be differentiated for the purpose of analyzing

conscious experience. They do not, however, denote separate entities which arise, each

dependent on the former, in a temporal or even a logical causal sequence, as might be

imagined by noticing their respective positions in the enumeration of

paṭiccasamuppāda or of the five aggregates. Instead, they all occur together and are

actually aspects of the same thing.

According to their studies, we may find the possibility that our experience can be

analyzed from different aspects. These aspects can be distinguished by the information

that the mind is dealing with. In the perceptive aspect, we discern and recognize the

attributes or characteristics of the objects. In order to do that, we need to depend on

memories and knowledge. This perceptive action is comparatively stable but mostly

1051
De Silva 2014: 18.
1052
De Silva 2005: 17-18.
1053
E.g. Reat 1990: 310; Hamilton 1996: xxix.
1054
Reat 1990: 313.

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fabricated. Therefore, we usually perceive the object wrongly and unconsciously.

Meanwhile, there are different types of feeling arising continuously toward the stimuli

of objects. As long as the stimuli keep contacting with the six senses and the six

consciousnesses, these feelings will spontaneously and accordingly arise. They only

exist at that very moment. The qualities of feelings just reflect the attributes of the

objects. In other words, feeling is totally led and determined by the object. However,

different people would have different feelings toward the same object in terms of

personal characteristics or inclinations. This point will be the topic of next section. The

last aspect is the volitional or conative activities which choose and utilize sensory

information and feeling as sources to think, make decisions, and react. These activities

are diverse and of different kinds. They can be desiring something, despising somebody,

laughing, weeping, fighting, etc.

These three aspects cooperate together but develop in different directions. Since

they happen in several parallel processes, their relationships can be simultaneous or

sequential depending on the way we look at them. While feeling is arising in every

moment, consciousness and perception cognize, discriminate and designate information

step by step, our mental, oral, and bodily reactions are incited by feelings and cognition

from the present or from the past. Federman resorts to cognitive psychology and

suggests a more complex relationship to substitute the single linear model:1055

The Buddhist description of the cognitive process [i.e. Abhidhamma theory] identifies

1055
Federman 2011: 46.

- 345 -
 several consecutive and distinct stages, and even suggests that what seems parallel (like

hearing and seeing at the same time) is in fact a result of serial processing. It is generally

accepted in cognitive science that it is the other way around: cognition depends on

many parallel functions rather than a line of sequential events. Even what seems like a

linear process (logical reasoning would be an example) is a result of many parallel

processes.

As cognitive psychology reveals, our cognition is composed of many parallel

processes at the same time. These parallel processes are acting and cooperating to

constitute a complicated system: our mind. That means the relationships between

different factors or functions are dynamic and diverse. From the viewpoint of different

processes, some factors can be simultaneous, while in the same process some factors

do have sequential order. For example, the same stimulus may cause perception and

feeling in two processes at the same time. On the basis of the results of perception and

feeling, we are able to think and to react to that information. On the one hand, making

a decision usually happens after we recognize or have affection toward the object. On

the other hand, we may continue to perceive and to feel the object at present during the

process of decision-making.

Another point is that some factors or functions last longer than others. For example,

the sense consciousness and feeling may arise and cease on the instant of the contact of

the object, while craving may continue for a long period and the underlying tendency

would never disappear unless liberated. Therefore, when we see or eat something

agreeable, it is possible that we stay in the state of craving or desiring that object for a

- 346 -
period. Such a situation lasts until our desire is terminated, or worse: craving gets

enhanced and eventually becomes clinging. As a result, clinging will incite people to

act, to quest, or to own the object. Most importantly, our desire will persist in the form

of craving or clinging throughout the whole process. Meanwhile, the underlying

tendency to lust gets nourished.

Since the factors or functions in cognition arise in different aspects, all the factors

or functions cannot be treated as a single linear causation. Even though the Sutta Piṭaka

mostly depicted the sequential relationship between different factors, I find many

variations in the relationship as discussed in the previous chapters. For example, in the

answers to different brahmins, the cause of birth and old age is said to be one of these:

desire, craving, grasping, possession of belongings, and holding rules and vows in the

Pārāyana Vagga.1056 Both Poussin and Kalupahana notice that the Dvayatānupassanā

Sutta explained all factors as the direct cause of dukkha and their interrelationship is

not clearly stated.1057 Saigusa categorizes this kind of causation as the earliest form.1058

Therefore, it seems likely that the teaching of causality did not declare a series of causal

relationship at the beginning but suggested or emphasized several causes equally to

explain human experiences. Hence, Ronkin considers the causal relationship in Early

Buddhism was meant for the pragmatic purpose:1059

To judge by the Nikayas, the Buddha and his immediate disciples were not too

1056
Sn 1048-1123.
1057
Poussin 1913: 2-5; Kalupahana 1975: 97-98.
1058
Saigusa 2004: 581.
1059
Ronkin 2005: 209.

- 347 -
 interested in analysing the possible relations among the sine qua non conditions that

make up a sufficient condition for an arisen process, nor in the variety of possible

relations between these conditions and the arisen process. Rather, they were

preoccupied with singling out the general mechanism by which processes are related.

In this sense, we need not only to reconsider many variations about the factors or

functions in the teaching of causality but also their multiple relations. It would be

simplistic to treat Buddhist causal theory by a single formula or one linear relation.

Harvey gives an example about multiple causes: “A key example of conditionality not

involving a single determining cause is that craving is said to arise conditioned by

feeling: spiritual ignorance must also be a condition for this, as an awakened person has

feeling, but no craving.” 1060 Such an implicit connotation was later developed and

systematized in Abhidhamma theory. The Theravāda school listed twenty-four

conditions (paccaya), while the Sarvāstivāda developed their theory of the six causes

(hetu) and the four conditions (pratyaya). The Sarvāstivādins even admitted that the

analysis of the six causes cannot be found in the Sūtra Piṭaka. 1061 Later on,

Buddhaghosa emphasized that the relation between factors is multiple in the

Visuddhimagga. There are multiple causes bringing out multiple results. 1062 His

argument gained recognition from many scholars.1063 Gethin explains these multiple

causal relationships thus:1064

1060
Harvey 2013: 65-66.
1061
T27, no. 1545, p. 79, a26-27: 然此六因非契經說，契經但說有四緣。
1062
Vism, 542.
1063
E.g. Ronkin 2005: 209; Harvey 2013: 65-66.
1064
Gethin 1998: 153.

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 Another important point made in the exegetical literature is that, although the formula

states just one condition for each subsequent link, this should not be taken as suggesting

that a single cause is a sufficient condition for the arising of each further link. Each

condition is stated as a representative and significant cause; the Theravada tradition

records here as a fundamental axiom the principle that a single cause does not give rise

to either a single result or several results; nor do several causes give rise to just one

result; but rather several causes give rise to several results. (Italics added.)

The explanations of these theories need not go into details in this study. The point

is that Ābhidhammikas felt the necessity to discern these different causal relationships.

By doing so, we may not confine the Buddhist teaching of causality into the one-to-one

relationship. The reason that most of the teaching of causality was expressed in a one-

to-one relationship is meant to emphasize or to analyze “this” critical cause which

brings out “that” result. Jayatilleke thus points out: “In Buddhist causal theory any

causal situation is complex. What we pick out as a cause is only a predominant factor

which operates along with other factors in bringing about an effect.”1065 Kalupahana

emphasizes the interdependent relationship of multiple causes which consist of a

system in Early Buddhism:1066

First, early Buddhist theory transcends the commonsense notion of causation. While

recognizing several factors that are necessary to produce an effect, it does not select

one from a set of jointly sufficient conditions and present it as the cause of the effect.

In speaking of causation, it recognizes a system whose parts are mutually dependent…

Thus, although there are several factors, all of them constitute one system or event and

therefore are referred to in the singular. Only if a cause includes all the necessary

1065
Jayatilleke 1975: 212.
1066
Kalupahana 1975: 59.

- 349 -
 factors will it give rise to the effect. (Italics added.)

From Kalupahana’s viewpoint, even the Buddha might emphasize one or several

factors as the cause of dukkha referring to an individual’s personality; people need to

transform their habitual cognitive processes which involve all unwholesome

defilements in order to attain Nibbāna. In other words, Buddhist soteriology involves

not only one or several factors or functions or one single cognitive process but all

factors, functions, and cognitive processes. All these elements are connected and

constitute an entirety.

- 350 -
§5.2 The Reactions toward the Stimulus of the Object

We have learned that the relationships of factors or functions are dynamic and

multiple. Meanwhile, these relationships should be common and stable so that they can

be used to describe ordinary people’s mental activities. Sufficient causes are expected

to bring out specific results. From this point of view, all unenlightened people follow

the same causal relationships. In the discussion of the arising of different feelings, the

differences of feelings are said to be decided by the attributes of the objects. All the six

sense objects are distinguished into agreeable (manāpā), disagreeable (amanāpā), and

to be felt neutral (upekkhāvedaniyā) in the Ghosita Sutta. And agreeable objects cause

pleasant feeling; disagreeable objects cause painful feeling; neutral objects cause

neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. 1067 Furthermore, in the Chachakka Sutta, an

ordinary person would react in accordance with the three types of feeling. If pleasant

feeling arises, this person will delight in it, greet it, and remain attachment toward it. If

the feeling is painful, this person will sorrow, grieve and lament, weep beating his/her

breast and become distraught. And an ordinary person would not be able to understand

the essence of neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling as it really is. Finally, the underlying

tendencies to lust, to aversion, and to ignorance would get reinforced.1068

According to these passages, it seems that human reactions and behavior are

destined from a stage as early as the impingement of the objects. Each kind of object

corresponds to a specific defilement and brings out its subsequent reactions. It is clear

1067
SN IV, 114.
1068
MN III, 285.

- 351 -
that specific object brings out specific feeling in all human beings, including ordinary

people and enlightened ones. It is said that the Buddha once got hurt in the foot by a

rock and felt severe pain. He had to endure the pain with mindfulness.1069 Even the

Buddha felt pain when he was injured. All human activities which were supposed to be

subjective and personal are actually irresistible and predeterminate. Only if a person is

restrained in the sense faculties, can he/she avoid to be intent upon (adhimuccati)

pleasing objects and to be repelled (byāpajjati) by displeasing objects.1070 Or as the

Buddha did, enlightened people would not react unwholesomely, but counteract with

wholesome acts.

On the basis of the presumption that all human beings share a common experience,

the Sutta Piṭaka offered a way to treat others sympathetically. This was named “a

Dhamma exposition applicable to oneself (attupanāyika dhammapariyāya)” by the

Buddha.1071 One should think like this: “What is displeasing and disagreeable to me is

displeasing and disagreeable to the other too. How can I inflict upon another what is

displeasing and disagreeable to me?” 1072 These displeasing and disagreeable things

include bodily and oral actions, like killing, stealing, lying, etc.1073 The same method

was also taught by Mahā Moggallāna as “the way ought to infer about oneself (attanāva

attānaṃ evaṃ anuminitabbaṃ)”.1074 The basic rule is one should not treat others in the

1069
SN I, 57, 245-46.
1070
E.g. SN IV, 119-20, 189-90, 199; MN I, 270.
1071
SN V, 353.
1072
SN V, 353-54: yo kho myāyaṃ dhammo appiyo amanāpo, parassa peso dhammo appiyo amanāpo.
yo kho myāyaṃ dhammo appiyo amanāpo, kathāhaṃ paraṃ tena saṃyojeyyaṃ. (Bodhi 2000a:
1797-99.)
1073
SN V, 353-55.
1074
MN I, 97-100.

- 352 -
way that they do not like. So one should abstain from doing unwholesome things. The

same rule can be applied to the agreeable things. In the Manāpadāyī Sutta of the

Aṅguttara Nikāya, the householder Ugga once heard the Buddha’s teaching thus: “The

giver of what is agreeable gains what is agreeable. (manāpadāyī labhate manāpaṃ.)”1075

Then he offered the Buddha his favorite food, valuable clothing and bedding. After his

death, Ugga was reborn as a deity as he had wished. In this sense, all people must have

to share the same or similar experience. Everyone has the same favorite or undesirable

things.

However, this deduction seems to be inconsistent with our experience. We know

that different people have different preferences or reactions toward the same object. In

the definition of the First Noble Truth: dukkha, it mentions two occasions: association

with displeasing things (appiyehi sampayoga) and separation from pleasing things

(piyehi vippayoga):1076

Here, whoever has unwanted, disliked, disagreeable forms, sounds, odors, tastes,

tangibles or mental phenomena, or whoever encounters ill-wishers, wishers of harm,

of discomfort, of insecurity, with whom they have concourse, intercourse, connection,

union, that, monks, is called association with the displeasing [things].

Here, whoever has what is wanted, liked, agreeable forms, sounds, odors, tastes,

tangibles or mental phenomena, or whoever encounters well-wishers, wishers of good,

of comfort, of security, mother or father or brother or sister or younger kinsmen or

friends or colleagues or blood-relations, and then is deprived of such concourse,

intercourse, connection, or union, that, monks, is called separation from the pleasing

1075
AN III, 49-50. (Bodhi 2012: 669.)
1076
DN II, 306.

- 353 -
 [things]. (Walshe 1995: 345.)

According to this sutta, to encounter with disagreeable objects or to separate from

agreeable objects are two unwanted situations which lead to dukkha. On the one hand,

these agreeable and disagreeable objects can be interpreted as universal. All people

consider the object as pleasing or displeasing alike. On the other hand, they can be

diversified according to individuals. This passage mentions the separation of one’s

families and relatives which should be meaningful to the same families. In this sense,

people react mournfully because of the separation from those they love, rather than

from strangers. Therefore, in the Assu Sutta of the Anamataggasaṃyutta, owing to the

separation from one’s families, wealth, and health, the tears that a person has shed

throughout saṃsāra are more than the water in the four oceans.1077 Hence, even though

people may have common reactions or similar feelings, the reactions toward the same

object may not be the same in all individuals. Kalupahana comments on this point:1078

While there is a general tendence in human beings to be attracted to pleasurable objects

of experience and repulsed by the unpleasurable (sukha-kāmā hi sattā dukkha-

paṭikkūlā), such tendencies may vary from person to person not only with regard to the

quality of the pleasure or revulsion, but also to the degree to which one is attracted and

repulsed.

From this point of view, we may realize that people’s feelings cannot be simplified

as two or three types. These feelings and subsequent reactions are diverse in quality and

intensity. The assertion of the diversity of personal preferences goes so far that the Sutta

1077
SN II, 180.
1078
Kalupahana 1987: 96-97.

- 354 -
Piṭaka even denied such universal experience. In the Pañcarāja Sutta, there are five

kings arguing about which one is the foremost among the five cords of sensual pleasure

(kin nu kho kāmānam aggaṃ.).1079 Then the Buddha explained that the foremost object

is determined by whatever is most agreeable (manāpapariyanta).1080 One thing which

is agreeable to one person may be disagreeable to another. Therefore, we cannot say

only forms, or sounds, or odors, or tastes, or tangibles are the best.

Since there is no unified criterion to evaluate these sensory stimuli, there are three

problems with their arguments. First of all, different kinds of sense objects cannot be

compared. Every person has his/her own criteria to pick out his/her favorite or most

disliked objects in this world. It is impossible for all human beings to single out one

kind of object. Secondly, even the same person may change the preference to different

sensory stimuli from time to time. The Chappāṇakopama Sutta said that our six senses

like the six animals would be dominated by the strongest one.1081 So the point mostly

lies in the intensity of the stimulus. The bad smell can ruin a delicious meal. Lastly,

even the same object can cause different or even opposite reactions in different people.

Not everyone can accept spicy food. Hence, the Buddha said the object that makes one

person feel pleasant may be repulsive to another person. In this sense, there is no

universal rule which can be applied to all people.

As discussed above, there are two seeming contrary descriptions about the criteria

1079
SN I, 79.
1080
SN I, 80: manāpapariyantam khvāhaṃ pañcasu kāmaguṇesu agganti vadāmi. te ca rūpā
ekaccassa manāpā honti, te ca rūpā ekaccassa amanāpā honti.
1081
SN IV, 199.

- 355 -
of the sense objects in the Sutta Piṭaka. The first description is that all people share the

same or similar experience so that we have to treat others with sympathy and

compassion. We should not deprive other’s precious things, speak ill of others, or do

anything undesirable to other people. The second description is everyone has his/her

own interests or preferences hence there is no generally recognized criterion to compare

these objects. Some people might like spicy food or classical music but some people

might feel uncomfortable or find it boring.

According to the examples given by the Buddha and Mahā Moggallāna, they show

a strong ethical obligation to a society. These instructions require people to behave

complying with social rules and norms which were based on common experience. In

other words, these examples did not intend to explain how we perceive the world

internally. They presume a similar interpersonal mental structure to obey. And this

mental structure is mainly focused on emotional reactions toward other people, not the

specific objects. It is true that different people would define different kinds of words or

sentences as lie, profanity, or curse, but most people would not like to be subjected to

such speech. Even though everyone has his/her respective feelings toward the same

object, all ordinary people have some objects most favorite or most hateful. These

situations may be diverse among individuals. But desiring agreeable objects and

evading disagreeable objects are the same among ordinary people. In the Kakacūpama

Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, the Buddha admonished disciples that whether a bhikkhu

is kind, gentle, and peaceful or not, this can be known only when disagreeable speech

- 356 -
touches him. 1082 This admonishment showed that a person may keep calm toward

speech irrelevant to him/her until people say something that this person cares about.

This can be realized further from the cognitive processes as a whole. In the first

stage, different types of object can bring out their respective feelings in different people.

This is a spontaneous process which involves the six sense objects. Different people

feel the same object as pleasant or unpleasant in terms of the conditions of their six

senses. That is to say, even though the object brings out corresponding feeling

spontaneously, it does not cause the same type of feeling in all human beings. Different

people have different criteria about what is an agreeable object and what is a

disagreeable object. Some people may feel cold, while others may feel warm about the

same temperature. In this case, people should recognize their differences in the first

stage. There is nothing which can be considered as agreeable or disagreeable by all

people.

Secondly, we can expect that most people share a similar or the same experiences.

Such rule relies on both the attributes of the objects and personal feelings toward the

objects. We should realize that all human beings have similar mental structure. We all

want to stay in a place with a suitable temperature even though people may define

“suitable” differently. As a result, people should treat others with sympathy and

compassion. That is what the Buddha and Mahā Moggallāna taught us.

1082
MN I, 126: yato ca kho bhikkhuṃ amanāpā vacanapathā phusanti, atha bhikkhu sorato ti
veditabbo, nivāto ti veditabbo, upasanto ti veditabbo.

- 357 -
§5.3 Delineation of the Cognitive Processes

According to the analysis of cognition in Early Buddhism, the cognitive processes

begin from the impingement of stimuli of objects and end in various situations which

were considered as dukkha. Since many suttas depicted these processes in more or less

similar sequences, it is appealing and possible to arrange these depictions into models

or patterns. Therefore, this section is an attempt to delineate the cognitive processes in

the Sutta Piṭaka. Besides, it is also a synthetical study derived from foregoing analyses

and conclusions in this study. The factors and functions mentioned in the suttas are

categorized in a chart at Appendix 1. Besides, Appendix 2 delineates the cognitive

processes as a flowchart. It will be useful to refer to the appendixes while reading this

section.

The Mahāhatthipadopama Sutta listed three conditions for the initiation of

cognitive processes.1083 First, the internal sense faculty (sight, hearing, etc.) should be

intact, i.e. its function is workable; secondly, the external stimulus (raw data: forms,

sounds, etc.) comes within range of the sense faculty; lastly, the stimulus and the sense

faculty should combine with each other appropriately. Here the well-receiving of the

object by the sense faculty is called combination (samannāhāra).1084 Then the raw data

will be transformed into sensory information: dhamma and transmitted to the mind by

each sense faculty to arouse the sense consciousness, i.e. visual consciousness, auditory

consciousness, etc. Therefore, the sense consciousness is said to depend on a dyad: the

1083
MN I, 190.
1084
MN I, 190.

- 358 -
sense faculty and its object, in the Dutiyadvaya Sutta.1085

The moment that the sense consciousness arises also means the state of contact

(phassa) which is the meeting of the sense faculty, the sense object, and the sense

consciousness. If the conditions are not sufficient, the sense consciousness will not arise,

nor does contact as well as all subsequent mental activities arise. Hence, the term

contact is used to describe the situation that the sense consciousness arises appropriately.

From this point of view, the sense consciousness and contact are interdependent. They

are different sides of a coin.

In this way, the sense consciousness must depend on something to function. The

Buddha used a metaphor of fire and fuel to explain this dependency in the

Mahātaṇhāsankhaya Sutta.1086 Fire cannot exist without fuel and was named after the

fuel. The sense consciousness arises depending on the object and is named after it.

However, the object of the sense consciousness is not the raw data of the sense object.

The sense consciousness does not like the sense faculty which can directly access raw

data, such as forms, sounds, and odors. Its function is to be aware of the presence of the

sensory information, i.e. dhamma which has been dealt with by the sense faculty

previously. (The unique situation in the mind faculty was explained in section 3.4.) The

sense consciousness marks the intervention of the subjective aspect as a preparation for

the further procedure. Here the sense faculty serves as a base for the contact of subject

and object. This function hence gets the six senses the name: “the six bases for contact

1085
SN IV, 67-68.
1086
MN I, 260.

- 359 -
(cha phassāyatanā)”.1087

Since contact does not merely mean a physical event, it indicates the initial

interaction of subject and object. It marks the divergent point of the cognitive processes

in terms of perception, sensation, ideation, and volition. After contact, feeling (vedanā)

arises. Bodhi suggests that these two activities are simultaneous because of

connascence condition.1088 However, I found no passage in the Sutta Piṭaka which can

support his suggestion. Bodhi might have been referring to Abhidhamma theory. On the

other hand, although the Sutta Piṭaka did not explain directly in this way, there is no

other factor which can intervene between contact and feeling. In other words, even

though contact and feeling might not arise simultaneously, there cannot be any interval

between them. Furthermore, from the impingement until feeling, these stages show a

strong propulsive or spontaneous tendency. In this sense, Ñāṇananda considers that

these stages are impersonal.1089 Karunadasa supplements this point that even though

these stages are the results of dependent arising, “the latent tendency for the ego-

consciousness awakens” in the stage of feeling.1090 Meanwhile, he emphasizes that the

ego-consciousness is “a superimposition on a purely impersonal process.”1091 Similarly,

Kalupahana argues that consciousness is always accompanied by the volitional

formations from the past, therefore, this process can never be impersonal:1092

1087
E.g. SN IV, 43, 70, 83, 124.
1088
Bodhi 2000b: 15.
1089
Ñāṇananda 2012: 5.
1090
Karunadasa 2013: 58.
1091
Karunadasa 2013: 58.
1092
Kalupahana 1987: 33.

- 360 -
 If it were to be a completely impersonal experience, the consciousness that preceded it

should be a tabula rasa, with no dispositional tendencies (saṅkhāra) associated with it.

This is not acceptable to early Buddhism. In the absence of such an unpolluted

consciousness on occasions of sense experience, even if the sense organ were to be

completely changed and the object of perception were to be something completely new,

the perceiving consciousness will still bring back its old dispositions when

experiencing that feeling.

It seems that he interprets the sense consciousness and the integrated

consciousness as the same thing. As he suggests consciousness connects perceptive

aspect and rebirth aspect in another place: It is this consciousness which arises

depending on the sense faculty and the sense object, experiences the feeling, and goes

through lives. 1093 In this sense, this consciousness is always under the effects of

volitional formations. Therefore, Kalupahana cannot agree with the term “impersonal”

but uses “natural process” instead.1094

As discussed in section 4.2, I have doubts about the notion of an everlasting and

ever-changing consciousness. Therefore, no such consciousness needs to be contrived

as the subject accompanied by the volitional formations. From another aspect, we may

see that the factor which dominates these stages is the attributes of the objects, not

personal intentions. As the Ghosita Sutta indicates, the agreeable object brings about a

contact to be experienced as pleasant and a pleasant feeling; the disagreeable object

brings about a contact to be experienced as painful and a painful feeling; the neutral

1093
Kalupahana 1975: 121.
1094
Kalupahana 1987: 33.

- 361 -
object brings about a contact to be experienced as neither-painful-nor-pleasant and a

neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling.1095 Both contact and feeling can be deemed as the

spontaneous reflection of the object. And their natures also reflect the attributes of the

objects. From this point of view, I suggest that these stages are not under the effects of

some personal intentions or volitional formations. However, this does not mean all

human beings have the same feeling toward the same object. On the contrary, the same

object may cause different types of feeling in different people. The point is that whether

the attribute of the object is suitable for this person or not. If it is suitable then the

corresponding feeling is pleasant otherwise the feeling is painful. These processes are

impersonal but differ from person to person. The reason which is responsible for these

stages is ignorance or lack of wisdom; because an ordinary person fails to penetrate the

essence of the sense objects and feelings. These stages are not impelled by intentions

or volitional formations.

From the six senses until the stage of feeling, the cognitive processes can be

divided into six different sensory channels in parallel. As long as the sensory stimulus

keeps contacting the sense faculty, the cognitive process in that channel will continue

uninterruptedly. Therefore, all the six channels can function at the same time. We do

not stop seeing while hearing or smelling. So does feelings. After that, our mind will be

attracted by the strongest stimulus among the six sense objects. Just like the strongest

animal can drag the other five animals in the metaphor in the Chappāṇakopama

1095
SN IV, 114.

- 362 -
Sutta.1096 At this stage, it is the integrated consciousness discerning one of the six types

of sensory information as well as the feeling in a primary level.1097 In order to discern

the specific sensory information, the integrated consciousness requires the

discriminatory ability and also the ability to access the database from past experience

so that we can distinguish this object from other objects. For example, the red color is

different from green or the sweet taste is different from sour. Or pleasant feeling is

different from painful feeling. Thus the sensory information and feeling proceed in two

aspects but they are closely connected or concomitant.

However, at this stage, our mind has not yet recognized the characteristics of the

object in detail, never mention about naming it. The further function to process these

materials is perception (saññā). According to the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta (MN 18) and the

Dasuttara Sutta (DN 34), feeling is followed by perception. 1098 These two suttas,

therefore, imply that the functions of discriminating and designating are required at this

stage. Following consciousness, perception means the ability to discriminate all

characteristics and, more importantly, to designate them. Both of these two functions:

discriminating and designating depend on the use of signs (nimitta) and minor features

(anuvyañjana) of the objects. Even though signs and features themselves are ethically

neutral, they are always connected with defilements in ordinary people. It is in this

sense that perception involves not only knowledge systems but also personal

1096
SN IV, 199.
1097
SN III, 87; 43, 140 MN I, 292.
1098
MN I, 112: DN III, 289.

- 363 -
evaluations or inclinations.

Such knowledge systems and personal preferences are mostly affected by the

underlying tendency (anusaya) in various forms. The underlying tendency persists from

life to life, therefore, it already exists not only from the beginning of cognition but also

from birth. It is the inactive form of various defilements. In particular, the Cūḷavedalla

Sutta said that the underlying tendency to lust underlies pleasant feeling; the underlying

tendency to aversion underlies painful feeling; the underlying tendency to ignorance

underlies neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling.1099 From this point of view, perception

can be considered as the emergence of the underlying tendency as obsession

(pariyuṭṭhāna) toward different feelings and therefore the objects. Besides, perception

is also the accumulation or the result of mental proliferation (papañca) from past

experience. This is well-known as the term “perceptions and notions [born of] mental

proliferation (papañcasaññāsaṅkhā)”.1100 In this way, perception in an ordinary person

can never be pure and innocent. In the process of discriminating and designating an

object or feeling, an ordinary person always relates the present experience to the past

under the effects of lust, aversion, ignorance, etc. And such perception was regarded as

unwholesome or perverted in Buddhism. As Boisvert explains:1101

Saññā is primarily responsible for the way in which the individual approaches

sensations. Saññā imposes categories on our sensations and classifies them. The texts

usually give the example that a certain sensation is interpreted as “blue” or “yellow.”

1099
MN I, 303.
1100
MN I, 112.
1101
Boisvert 1997: 88.

- 364 -
 But this categorization goes much further by classifying sensations as “worth craving,”

and “worth hating.”

After this sensory information and feeling are recognized and designated, our mind

will pay attention to the object or feeling which is the most attractive. The

Vitakkasaṇṭhāna Sutta and the Akusalavitakka Sutta explained that once a person pays

attention to some signs improperly, the unwholesome thinking (vitakka) will arise

beyond control. I have found that these terms: thought (saṅkappa) 1102 , thinking

(vitakka)1103, conceiving (maññati)1104, come after perception in several suttas. I also

found other terms, like paying attention (manasikāra)1105, to reflect (cinteti)1106, and to

regard (samanupassati) 1107 are used in similar meanings of thinking. These are the

activities of thinking. Karunadasa analyzes that perception goes under the influence of

latent defilements: desire, hatred, and ignorance; meanwhile, distortional thinking

(maññanā) functions owing to the ingression of egocentric perspective. 1108 As

Kalupahana notices the term maññati usually means the activity leading to

substantialist beliefs. 1109 Hence, following an already perverted perception, the

activities of thinking go further to connect the notion of selfness with the objects,

external and internal, in various relationships.

The Madhupiṇḍika Sutta (MN 18) states that after thinking (vitakketi), one

1102
SN 14.12;
1103
MN I, 112.
1104
MN I, 1 ff.
1105
MN I, 232.
1106
SN V, 417-18.
1107
E.g. SN 22: 49, 59, 79; 35: 32, 121; MN 22, 35.
1108
Karunadasa 2013: 139-40.
1109
Kalupahana 1987: 31.

- 365 -
proliferates mentally (papañceti). 1110 Hamilton indicates thus: “[B]oth vitakka and

papañca, which are described as taking place subsequent to the activity of saññā, are

more obviously discursive processes.”1111 Ñāṇananda differentiates vitakka as the early

stage of thinking, while papañca is the consequence.1112 According to its usage in the

Sutta Piṭaka, mental proliferation always denotes conceptive activities which become

diffusive and manifold. It is in this sense that improper thinking leads to mental

proliferation. Besides, I also suggest that this term can be used to describe the cognitive

processes as well. This suggestion can be explained by the fact that the activities of

thinking involve three aspects: cognitive, affective, and conative.

In its cognitive aspect, thinking is the function to utilize sensory information.

Meanwhile, it is also affected by conative activities. Hamilton comments on this point:

“deliberate thinking is in effect indistinguishable from willing.”1113 Both the Dasuttara

Sutta (DN 34) and the Sanidāna Sutta (SN 14.12) state that desire (chanda) and

obsession (pariḷāha) come after thought (saṅkappa). 1114 These two terms can be

regarded as different expressions for craving (taṇhā). The meaning of craving originates

from its literal image of thirst. It is based on such motivation that people look for the

objects to satisfy their desire. The targets of craving are diverse and all-inclusive. The

Sutta Piṭaka emphasized that these objects should have a pleasing and agreeable

1110
MN I, 112.
1111
Hamilton 1996: 58.
1112
Ñāṇananda 2012: 4.
1113
Hamilton 1996: 108.
1114
DN III, 288-89; SN II, 151.

- 366 -
nature.1115 Accordingly, then comes the pleasant feeling. By contrast, the Chachakka

Sutta (MN 148) explained that the disagreeable object and painful feeling will cause

sorrow, grief, hatred or aversion; neutral object and neutral feeling lead to ignorance.1116

However, the Mahātaṇhāsankhaya Sutta (MN 38) elaborates the three types of feeling

leading to craving.1117 It reveals that, at the deep level, craving is the reaction toward

all kinds of objects and feelings. I suggest that craving means the activity of burning in

ancient India. Hence, it represents the voracious appetite for everything, including

agreeable and disagreeable objects.

Furthermore, the literal meaning of clinging (upādāna) also comes from the

activity of fire which means fuel. In this sense, craving (fire) consumes all objects no

matter what they are and clinging (fuel) sustains such activity constant and

uninterrupted. The six sense objects are the objective side, while their concomitant

feelings represent the subjective side. Without feelings, these objects are irrelevant and

valueless for craving and clinging. Therefore, craving and clinging as the conative

activity depend on the affective factor, feeling, to a great extent. Therefore, the activities

of thinking are the ability to utilize all information from sense objects, feelings, ideas

and notions, past memories; meanwhile, they are under the influence of desire.

Thinking is a complex and manipulative process. It is in this sense that the

Madhupiṇḍika Sutta (MN 18) said: “What one thinks about, that one mentally

1115
SN II, 108; DN II, 309-10.
1116
MN III, 285.
1117
MN I, 266.

- 367 -
proliferates.”1118 The cognitive processes as a whole become diffusive and manifold.

More critically, the mind thence is out of control and consequently is dominated by

habitual reactions. That is why people always look for the agreeable objects and

pleasant feeling; evade the disagreeable objects and painful feeling; feel indifferent to

neutral objects. Consequently, people will try to own the agreeable objects and will feel

sorrowful, distraught or angry facing unfavorable situations. As a result, people will

react wrongly in body, in speech, and in mind. These reactions are diverse and of

different kinds. Many formulized descriptions can be found in the whole Sutta Piṭaka.

For example, some suttas (MN 18; DN 15, 34; AN 9.23) said that people would use

weapons, quarrel, dispute, etc.

In Chapter 4, some sections mention about a reciprocal relationship between two

factors or functions. This kind of reciprocal process is vividly depicted in the Vammika

Sutta. It said that what one thinks at night will manifest in actions by day; meanwhile,

what one acts by day will affect one’s thoughts at night. Just like an ant-hill flames and

then fumes day after night.1119 In this way, one’s thoughts and actions affect each other

in turn. This process can be explained in another similar way. As we know, these

reactions are all unwholesome either mentally or physically. Therefore, they will

reinforce the underlying tendencies as stated in the Chachakka Sutta (MN 148).1120 I

also explained that the underlying tendencies can affect perception and reactions in a

1118
MN I, 112.
1119
MN I, 144: yaṃ kho divā kammante ārabbha rattiṃ anuvitakketi anuvicarati. ayaṃ rattiṃ
dhūmāyanā. yaṃ kho rattiṃ anuvitakketvā anuvicāretvā divā kammante payojeti kāyena vācāya
manasā. ayaṃ divā pajjalanā.
1120
MN III, 285.

- 368 -
wrong way. These factors and functions also interact reciprocally. Whenever the

underlying tendencies manifest themselves in various perceptions and reactions, these

perceptions and reactions will make underlying tendency stronger and more tenacious.

Besides, the ordinary people’s perceptions and notions are the formations of mental

proliferation. They are the outcome of the previous mental proliferation. On the other

hand, the unwholesome perceptions and notions will affect mental proliferation in

future. In this way, all these factors and functions act in a reciprocal process.

On the basis of this reciprocal process, we can realize that these factors and

functions work repeatedly in an endless cycle. This cycle brings out two results: our

reactions become strengthened and habitual. Since these factors and functions act in

cycle, they basically follow a similar pattern in every round. This pattern can be found

in three suttas (DN 15, 34; AN 9.23) and named as “things rooted in craving

(taṇhāmūlakā dhammā)”.1121 In this list, the cognitive process begins with contact and

feeling. Under the incitement of craving, people take actions to pursue objects: i.e. quest

(pariyesanā), and finally own these objects, i.e. acquisition (lābha). The acquisition of

the objects continuously starts the next round of cognition. Even though this passage

did not explain it clearly, we may suppose that the idea of acquisition becomes the

object of the mind faculty and brings about mental contact and, therefore, mental feeling:

joy (somanassa). Then this passage used the term decision-making (vinicchaya) to

describe the thinking activity about the acquisition. Desire and lust (chandarāga) and

1121
DN II, 58-59, 288-289; AN IV, 400.

- 369 -
attachment (ajjhosāna) which represent craving and clinging respectively, follow. The

next stage is appropriation (pariggaha) which combines the meaning of grasping and

belongings. 1122 Eventually, a person will act wrongly in mind: avarice/ stinginess

(macchariya) and guarding of possessions (ārakkhādhikaraṇa); or in body: the taking

up of rods and weapons; or in speech: quarrels, contentions, and disputes, accusations,

divisive speech, and false speech. Hence, these suttas described the cognitive processes

twice according to the same pattern. An interesting point is that these suttas adopted

different terms in the second round to express the same stage. The term chandarāga is

a stronger word for craving and appropriation stands for the confirmation of quest. The

action of guarding of possessions is based on acquisition. Therefore, the second round

of cognition does not simply duplicate the first round. The whole cognition gets

stronger and worse in different rounds.

Such repeated processes can also be explained from the viewpoint of the feeling

related to household life in the Saḷāyatanavibhaṅga Sutta (MN 137). First of all, both

joy and grief are said to arise in terms of the six objects. This description does not

conform with the categorization that joy and grief are mental feelings which can arise

only from the mind faculty. Secondly, these two types of feeling are the results toward

the same attribute of an object, i.e. pleasantness. This would be a contradiction of the

cause of grief. As we have seen in the Ghosita Sutta, the quality of feeling is decided

by the attribute of an object.1123 Therefore, grief should be caused by an unpleasant

1122
PED, 423-24.
1123
SN IV, 114.

- 370 -
mental object. According to these discussions, we may consider a possibility that these

feelings related to household life are not feelings direct from the six sense objects.

This passage should be analyzed in detail into stages. First, the six sense objects

will bring out bodily pleasure or mental joy which are inevitable. These feelings are not

feelings related to household life. They are what Kuan calls “the original feeling”.1124

When such feelings cause craving and clinging, this person will respond to pursue the

objects. The result may be successful or a failure. Such results then become the object

of the mind faculty in the next round. Here the mind faculty experiences the outcome

of all the six senses. Since gain and non-gain have an agreeable and a disagreeable

nature, they bring out joy or grief respectively. The second round repeats the same

pattern once again. In the stage of thinking, this person will confirm one’s experience

as successful or a failure by identifying the object as “mine” or not. This kind of thought

is fabricated in essentia because people will never possess anything. Therefore, the

Buddha exhorted people to see the object “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my

self” as it really is with right wisdom (sammappaññāya). 1125 However, an ordinary

person will cause stronger emotional or behavioral reactions. If this person believes that

he/she obtains the object, he/she would mentally feel joyful. Otherwise, he/she would

feel grief in the case of non-obtaining. This time, joy and grief arise in the third round

of cognition which are named as the feelings related to household life.

Besides, the way the mind faculty functions parallel to the other five bodily

1124
Kuan 2008: 27.
1125
SN 22.49, 35.1-6.

- 371 -
faculties was also explained in the Saḷāyatanavibhaṅga Sutta (MN 137). When an

ordinary person recollects (samanussarati) past experience of gain or non-gain, that

indicates the object was not at present. 1126 Since recollection does not necessarily

depend on one of the five external objects, it may occur in the mental activities. In this

sense, the object which triggers one to recollect can be counted as dhamma. And the

whole cognitive process happens in the mind faculty and is irrelevant to the other five

faculties.

The Salla Sutta (SN 36.6) gave an insightful explanation regarding how the

cognitive processes are lined in rotation beginning from a single painful feeling. The

whole process involves the three types of feeling and their corresponding reactions and

the three types of the underlying tendency which are very similar to the description in

the Chachakka Sutta.1127 The Chachakka Sutta lists these three processes in parallel,

but the Salla Sutta connects them in sequence. According to the Salla Sutta, when an

ordinary person feels pain, he/she dislikes it and tries to evade it. One’s reactions cause

the underlying tendency to aversion. Then this person resorts to pleasant feeling to

counteract such painful feeling. This brings out the underlying tendency to lust. Since

these reactions are due to ignorance, then comes the underlying tendency to

ignorance.1128 This sutta showed that the underlying tendencies would get reinforced

due to inappropriate reactions.

1126
MN III, 217 - 18.
1127
MN III, 285.
1128
SN IV, 208.

- 372 -
 It is noted here that the pleasant feeling in the Salla Sutta is the object existing in

imagination for desire. This person did not actually experience the pleasant feeling. By

contrast, the Mahāsaccaka Sutta explained that when the pleasant feeling arises in an

ordinary person, this one will be eager for it. Once such pleasant feeling ceases, this

one will feel the painful feeling. 1129 Hence, the cognitive process described in the

Mahāsaccaka Sutta is basically the same with the process of grief related to household

life in the Saḷāyatanavibhaṅga Sutta as discussed above.

1129
MN I, 239.

- 373 -
 Chapter 6 Conclusion

The analysis of mind occupies the most crucial position in the Buddha’s teachings.

In fact, all his discourses have only one goal which is to help people purify their mind

so that they can attain Nibbāna. The gist of Buddhism, therefore, is usually condensed

in a well-known verse which is popular in both Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism:

“Not to do any evil, to cultivate good, to purify one’s mind, this is the teaching of all

Buddhas.” 1130 The premise of this verse is that the ordinary people’s situation is

unsatisfactory and imperfect. We should and could improve ourselves. In this sense, the

Buddha taught the Dhamma as methods or means to achieve the final goal.

However, for the ordinary people who do not realize the truth, it is quite natural

that we cannot realize our real problems or errors, so we usually consider desire or

hatred as harmless or even indispensable. Or we take false views as belief. For the

Buddha, to rectify these faults and to explain the truth were the same thing, which was

to observe the working of the mind. Therefore, the Buddha taught disciples that

whenever their sense faculties contact the objects, they should examine their mind to

see if there are any defilements arising. And this examination can be done only by

wisdom, not by belief or intelligence. 1131 Hence, the Buddha emphasized the

importance of the method to guard the doors of the sense faculties. The intention of this

method is not “to close the doors” so that no defilements can invade. In fact, such an

1130
Dhp 183; T48, no. 2008, p. 358, c1-2：秀大師說，諸惡莫作名為戒，諸善奉行名為慧，自淨
其意名為定。(六祖大師法寶壇經)
1131
SN IV, 139-40.

- 374 -
attempt is impossible and futile. The Buddha intended to admonish people that the

working of the mind is incited from the impingement of the sense object. Thereafter the

direction of mind can go to either toward liberation or degeneration. The method of

guarding the doors of the sense faculties is meant to monitor the whole process, viz. the

cognitive processes.

The Buddha’s insight of ordinary people’s mind reveals the mechanics behind the

cognitive processes. However, this mechanics does not exist self-evidently or for its

own sake. The Buddha never gave a lecture to explain what this mechanics was. It was

embodied in a number of diverse discourses for the purpose of accommodating the

audience(s). On the other hand, depending on the extant texts, we can organize his

analyses into many reappearing factors and functions which can be further incorporated

into a general map of the mind. In the past, Ābhidhammikas developed and contributed

their knowledge in this respect. The output was a sophisticated but scholastic system.

Ultimately, these theories distanced themselves from daily experience and also

estranged themselves from the contents of the Buddha’s discourses.

This study investigates the cognitive functions in Buddhist psychology mainly on

the basis of the early sources and teachings. Various factors or functions are mentioned

or emphasized from different aspects. Once we compare all these descriptions, it reveals

to us a pragmatic but profound picture. First, the features of cognitive analysis are

significant in most teachings. It is common that the Buddha usually explained the origin

of the human predicament from the meeting of the sense faculties and the sense objects.

- 375 -
Besides, it is also common that the examination of the characteristics of factors started

from the sense faculties and the sense objects. Such analysis is perceptive and cognitive

in essentia. In this case, we do not need to resort to metaphysical or abstract doctrines

to realize the Buddha’s teachings. In most cases, we do not even need to explain his

ideas from the viewpoint of transmigration. The most required task is to observe our

experiences in this life objectively.

Another feature of the analysis of cognition is the compliance of the teaching of

causality. Or to put it in another way, the teaching of causality is exemplified in the

analysis of cognition. Just as no book can exist without pages, all the pages are bound

together into a book. The core of the teaching of causality is the analysis of cognition.

However, the relationship of factors or functions is not in a linear relationship like most

passages appear to be. They are the necessary parts which are highlighted or drawn

from a mental composition in order to enlighten specific individuals or groups. Hence,

the whole picture of human mental activities has to be conceived by combining all the

pieces together. In this way, this study has found that these factors and functions

constitute a dynamic system.

In other words, the mind is always in action, not only one factor or function but

every connected one. To be the cause and the effect, the relationships of these working

factors or functions are multiple which can be sequential or simultaneous. The basic

principle is causation. Two or several factors or functions can be interdependent. They

arise at the same time. But the cause-and-effect relationship cannot be reversed or

- 376 -
rearranged. It is in this sense that the analysis of cognition can be depicted in a simple

linear relationship. Every factor or function can be picked out to be the breakthrough

point to elaborate how our mind works. Hence, the teaching of causality is diversified

in number and content. At the end, all these variations reflect different aspects of a

dynamic system. Since the mind as a whole is a dynamic system, it can be realized as

ever-changing in every moment. But this is not to say its smallest unit (i.e. citta and

cetasika) but its entirety. Within every single moment, there must have some factors or

functions working: some are arising; some are acting; some are ceasing. The mind never

keeps the same. Hence, this theory supplements the traditional theory of momentariness.

The last finding suggests a solid explanation about ordinary people’s predicament.

This study found that the cognitive processes repeat themselves according to a basic

pattern. This can be explained from the microscopic perspective of factors and from the

macro perspective of processes. Regarding the factors or functions, they follow the

basic causal relationship. Therefore, under the appropriate circumstance, ordinary

people will react accordingly and habitually. People will crave for a desirable object

and evade a disagreeable object. Although different people might have totally different

reactions toward the same object, all ordinary people are subject to the same

defilements: desire, hatred, and ignorance. Therefore, all ordinary people are very

similar in terms of these reactions.

Furthermore, some suttas also elaborate a reciprocal cycle between two factors or

functions. That is to say, one factor’s effect will become its cause in turn. This reciprocal

- 377 -
relationship can be found between perception and misconception, between thought and

actions, between perception and mental proliferation, and between defilements and the

underlying tendency. This cycle, of course, does not finish simultaneously. There is a

time gap between these factors or functions. In this sense, one factor’s outcome will

become its cause in the future. A fitting metaphor is an ant-hill “fumes by night” and

“flames by day”.1132 Fume and flame are in a reciprocal relationship with one another.

Since these factors or functions reappear in sequence, the processes constituted by

them also repeat round after round. These processes follow the same pattern which is

constituted by the same or similar factors and functions. More importantly, the

descriptions of some factors or functions become stronger and worse in different rounds.

These factors and functions get strengthened. In the Mahānidāna Sutta, craving (taṇha)

is enhanced into desire and lust (chandarāga) in the second round; quest (pariyesanā)

into appropriation (pariggaha); acquisition (lābha) into guarding of possessions

(ārakkhādhikaraṇa). 1133 Therefore, the cognitive processes do not simply repeat

themselves but gradually degenerate along a pattern. Our cognition, therefore, is the

complexity of these factors, functions, and processes running repeatedly, continuously,

and endlessly. Only by rectifying the track of the cognitive processes, can our reactions

and habitual tendencies avoid getting deteriorated and tenacious.

1132
MN I, 144.
1133
DN II, 58-59.

- 378 -
 Appendix 1 Table of the Cognitive Processes

senses / feeling perception craving clinging

thinking reactions or consequences
object (vedanā) (saññā) (taṇhā) (upādāna)
existence (bhava),
The
the six senses, birth (jāti),
Twelve feeling craving clinging
contact (phassa) aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair
Links
(jarāmaraṇaṃ sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā)
1134
element(dhātu) , desire (chanda),
DN34 feeling perception thought (saṅkappa) quest (pariyesanā) acquisition (lābha)
contact obsession(pariḷāha)
three types of desire,
SN14.12 1135
perception thought quest reacting wrongly in body, in speech, and in mind
element(dhātu) obsession
thinking (vitakketi)
feeling perception
mentally proliferate (papañceti)
delight in
perceptions and notions [born of] mental attachment
→ (abhinandati),
proliferation (papañcasaññāsaṅkhā) (ajjhosati)
MN18 greet(abhivadati)
the seven types of underlying tendency:
taking up of rods and weapons,
to sensual lust (kāmarāga), to aversion (paṭigha), to view (diṭṭhi),
→ quarrel, contention, and dispute, accusation, divisive speech, and false speech, and many
to doubt (vicikiccha), to conceit (māna), to lust for existence
other bad unwholesome things
(bhavarāga), and to ignorance (avijjā)
remain attachment
the six agreeable delight in, (ajjhosāya infatuation (sārāgo),
SN35.63
objects greet tiṭṭhati), fetter (saṃyogo)
enjoyment (nandī)
the three remain existence,
delight in,
MN38 types of attachment, birth,
greet
feeling enjoyment aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair
remain
(1) pleasant delight in,
attachment,
feeling greet
enjoyment
→ the underlying tendency to lust (rāgānusaya)
(2) painful sorrow, grieve and lament, weep beating one’s breast and become distraught
MN148
feeling (socati kilamati paridevati urattāḷiṃ kandati sammohaṃ āpajjati)
→ the underlying tendency to aversion (paṭighānusaya)
(3) neutral one does not understand the origination, the disappearance, the gratification, the danger, and the escape in regard to that feeling as it actually is
feeling (tassā vedanāya samudayañca atthaṅgamañca assādañca ādīnavañca nissaraṇañca yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāti)
→ the underlying tendency to ignorance (avijjānusaya)
contact feeling craving quest acquisition
desire and lust attachment avarice/ stinginess (macchariya),
DN15 → decision-making (vinicchaya) appropriation (pariggaha)
(chandarāga) (ajjhosāna) guarding of possessions (ārakkhādhikaraṇa)
(DN34,
taking up of rods and weapons,
AN9.23)
→ quarrel, contention, and dispute, accusation, divisive speech, and false speech, and many
other bad unwholesome things
(1) the six (pleasure /
gain (paṭilābha)
agreeable objects joy)
→(agreeable regard (samanupassati)
(joy)
dhamma) /recollect (samanussarati)
→(agreeable
joy
dhamma)
(2) the six (pleasure /
non-gain (appaṭilābha)
MN1371136 agreeable objects joy)
→(disagreeable regard
(grief)
dhamma) /recollect
→(disagreeable
grief
dhamma)
(3) the six objects an untaught ordinary person who has not conquered his limitations or the results of action and who is blind to danger.
neutral
→
feeling

1134
The term “element” means the eighteen elements which include the six sense faculties, the six sense objects, and the six sense consciousnesses.
1135
Three types of element are sensual pleasure (kāma), ill will (byāpāda), and harming (vihiṃsā). The following factors can be categorized accordingly, except the last one: wrong reactions.
1136
Factors in the parentheses are not mentioned in this sutta.

- 379 -
Appendix 2 Flowchart of the Cognitive Processes from Agreeable Form

agreeable form (raw data) visual consciousness pleasure (bodily feeling)

perceptions and notions born of mental proliferation

dhamma (sensory information) perception thinking

eye (receiving, transmitting, visual contact consciousness attention
(discriminating, designating (connect with “I”
offering a platform) (discerning sensory (manasikāra)
sensory information and in various forms)
information and feeling)
feeling through signs)
combination (samannāhāra)

the underlying tendency (anusaya) the obsession (pariyuṭṭhāna)

craving (taṇhā), clinging (upādāna), 1. reacting wrongly in body,

desire (chanda), delight in (abhinandati), remain attachment quest acquisition (lābha), in speech, and in mind
obsession greet (abhivadati) (ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati), (pariyesanā) gain (paṭilābha) 2. the underlying tendency
(pariḷāha) enjoyment (nandī) to lust (rāgānusaya)

the obsession (pariyuṭṭhāna) the transgression (vītikkama)

agreeable dhamma (acquisition) mental consciousness joy (mental perceptions and notions born of mental proliferation

dhamma (sensory information) perception

consciousness decision-making (vinicchaya),
mental contact (discriminating, designating
mind (receiving, transmitting, (discerning sensory regard (samanupassati)
sensory information and
offering a platform) information and feeling) as gain (paṭilābha)
feeling through signs)

1. reacting wrongly in body,

avarice/stinginess
desire and lust in speech, and in mind
clinging, appropriation (macchariya),
delight in, greet 2. the underlying tendency
(chandarāga) attachment (ajjhosāna) (pariggaha) guarding of possessions
to lust (rāgānusaya)
(ārakkhādhikaraṇa)

agreeable dhamma (ownership) mental consciousness joy based on household life

dhamma (sensory information) perception

consciousness
mental contact (discriminating, designating thinking,
mind (receiving, transmitting, (discerning sensory
offering a platform) sensory information and decision-making
information and feeling)
feeling through signs)

Reactions or Consequences
1. reacting wrongly in body, in speech, and in mind
2. the underlying tendency to lust lies within one
3. existence, birth, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair
4. taking up of rods and weapons, quarrel, contention, and dispute,
accusation, divisive speech, and false speech, and many other bad
unwholesome things

- 380 -
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