Institutional Engineering and the Nature of Representation: Mapping the Effects of Electoral

Reform in Colombia
Author(s): Brian Crisp and Rachael E. Ingall
Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Oct., 2002), pp. 733-748
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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Institutional and
Engineering

the Nature of
Representation:

the Effects of Electoral

Mapping

Reform in Colombia

BHan Crisp University of Arizona

Rachael E. Ingall University of Arizona

Representation can vary depending of the most perplexing issues of representation (defined here
on whether legislators view constitu? as responsiveness) is that legislators are elected by a geographi-
ents as best represented by aggre- One cally limited sector ofthe population to represent its interests, and
gated, programmatic universal poli- yet their job is to govern the nation as a whole. Pitkin argues that the alter-
cies or by parochial, particularistic natives are not mutually exclusive; a representative should be responsive to
policies. In 1991 Colombia adopted a both local and national concerns (1967, 215-218). The polar extremes of
major institutional reform intended to this continuum are elected
representatives who pursue exclusively pro?
change the "electoral connection" grammatic, universal
policies and those who pursue exclusively parochial,
between voters and senators, en- particularistic policies. The balance between programmatic and parochial
couraging members of the upper policies is determined by a legislator's "particular constituency" (Pitkin
chamber to adopt a more national, 1967, 218). One might expect legislators chosen in small, geographic sub-
programmatic vision. We explain units to favor the parochial or local end ofthe spectrum. Legislators chosen
variations in geographic patterns of from a larger geographic unit, including those chosen in at-large nation-
electoral support in the post-reform wide districts, might place greater emphasis on programmatic, national
era and show how the spatial pattern concerns.
of votes for a senator influences his We examine one country's efforts to use electoral reform to change the
or her "hill style" in terms of bill-initia- balance struck by legislators between parochial and programmatic priorities.
tion priorities. Although reformers Personalistic or clientelistic ties between legislators and their constituents
created the option of a more dis- have long characterized Colombian democracy. The adoption in 1991 of a
persed pattern of support, it is still new constitution intended to alter traditional political practices provides us
possible for senate candidates to a natural quasi-experiment with which to test hypotheses about the rela?
gain election with geographically tionship between institutional design and the nature of representation.
concentrated constituencies. These
senators have a higher probability
of initiating bills with a pork-barrel
Brian F. Crisp is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Arizona, 315 So?
propensity cial Sciences Building, Tucson, AZ 85721 (crisp@u.arizona.edu). Rachael E. Ingall has
an M.A. in Latin American Studies, University of Arizona, Douglass Building, Tucson,
AZ 85721 (r_ingall@hotmail.com).

Research for this paper was supported by the National Science Foundation (Grant #
SBR-9708936), the Tinker Foundation, the Center for Applied Spatial Analysis, and the
Department of Political Science and the Latin America Area Center at The University of
Arizona. In Colombia, the Department of Political Science at the Universidad de Los
Andes, the Presidency of the Senate, the Senate's Office of Laws, and the Legislative
Archive of the Congress were particularly helpful and supportive. The authors would
like to thank Bill Dixon, Kris Kanthak, and Bill Mishler for their comments.
American Journal ofPolitical Science, Vol. 46, No. 4, October 2002, Pp. 733-748
?2002 by the Midwest Political Science Association ISSN 0092-5853

733

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734 BRIAN F. CRISP AND RACHAEL E. INGALL

Reformers reasoned that if legislators had wider-ranging tion of rural areas. Despite hopes for sweeping reform,
geographic bases of support, they would focus less on pa- the most significant changes were those made to the Sen?
rochial, clientelistic matters. With data from both before ate (Archer and Shugart 1997; Nielson and Shugart 1999;
and after the adoption of major institutional changes, we Gaceta Constitucional 1991).
test whether the institutional changes they adopted led to Under the previous constitution, all legislators in the
the more dispersed patterns of support they sought and bicameral Colombian Congress were elected under a
whether geographic patterns of support are related to the closed-list system from circunscripciones territoriales, re-
policies that a representative pursues once in congress. gional districts congruent with the country's administra-
On December 9, 1990, Colombians elected from a tive departments and akin to American states. Party lead-
nationwide district a seventy-member Asamblea Natio? ers had no control over the party label; therefore, several
nal Constituyente (National Constituent Assembly) to re- closed lists with the same party label competed in a de?
write the Colombian constitution. This election marked partment. Voters could vote for one member of the
the culmination of more than a decade of attempts by Chamber of Representatives and one member ofthe Sen?
Colombian presidents to bring about political reform. ate, with both votes pooled only to the level of the
The electoral system encouraged excessively particularis- subparty list on which their preferred candidate appeared.
tic behavior by legislators making them responsive to Because multiple lists from the same party competed in
narrow clientelistic, largely rural networks (Archer and each district, intraparty competition was rife. Given that
Shugart 1997). Legislators typically neglected national is? candidates had to distinguish themselves from members
sues, and corrupt practices abounded. Furthermore, of their own party, the electoral system enhanced the im-
members of Congress were not inclined to alter a politi? portance of candidates' personal reputations and encour-
cal system under which they had experienced electoral aged personalistic politics (Carey and Shugart 1995).
success.1 Presidents were more attuned to programmatic Reformers left the electoral system for the Chamber
concerns because of their nationwide constituency, but of Representatives largely unchanged, but transformed
were often unable to push their own policy agenda (in- the Senate into a 100-member body elected from a
cluding reform attempts) through Congress. Attempts to single nationwide district (previous districts ranged in
bypass Congress were frequently foiled by the Supreme district magnitude from two to fifteen). The Constituent
Court, and consequently, the majority of Colombians, Assembly had been elected from a single nationwide dis?
especially those living in urban areas, felt excluded from trict, and many of its members hoped to replicate their
the country's political system. Many expressed their re- interest in programmatic, national concerns by creating
sulting frustrations and dissatisfaction through protest a legislative chamber elected in the same manner. It was
and violence (Archer and Shugart 1997; Nielson and hoped that senators would be forced to refrain from re-
Shugart 1999). Protest marches and demonstrations liance on traditional clientelistic
machinery, choosing
about insufficient services and infrastructure in towns instead to build a national
reputation based on their
and cities multiplied, general crime levels rose, and "tra- programmatic policy priorities. Furthermore, the politi?
ditional" guerrilla activity in rural areas increased. By cal arena would be opened to nontraditional candidates
1990, pressure for reform was so great that when voters who, lacking a strong regional support base, would be
in a referendum supported the creation of a constituent able to pursue a "dispersed strategy" of winning smaller
assembly, the Supreme Court finally allowed this extra- numbers of votes across all the country's departments
constitutional process. that would, when totaled, be sufficient to ensure elec?
According to Botero (1998), reformers hoped (1) to tion. The new-look Senate was first elected in 1991 with
increase the political participation of regional, ethnic, subsequent elections taking place in 1994 and 1998.
and political minorities, (2) to rid the political system of These elections provide us with three sets of results to
clientelism and the associated corruption, and (3) to alter examine the extent of the reform's impact on the nature
the nature of representation by fashioning an upper of representation in Colombia.
chamber for national concerns and a lower house focus-
ing on regional and local matters, albeit after a reappor-
tioning of the districts to correct for the overrepresenta-
Hypotheses
!Under the old constitution, reform was possible only if an abso-
lute majority in both the Chamber and the Senate passed a legisla? We pursue two basic research questions. Firstly, is a dis?
tive act. Thus, it was easy for legislators to block reform attempts
that did not meet their approval. After several thwarted attempts persed geographic pattern of support common among
the executive resorted to extra-constitutional means. the candidates getting elected in the post-reform era? And

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INSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING AND REPRESENTATION 735

secondly, do senators represent geographically dispersed difficult and expensive to abandon. Such candidates
supporters by initiating programmatic, nationally focused might be forced to look across the entire country for
bills? We capture geographic patterns of support with the votes, but they may try to do so without forfeiting their
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) (Hirschman 1945; old strongholds. Thus, we test whether a previous victory
Herfindahl 1950). For our purposes, the proportion of his in a subnational district, promotes a more concentrated
or her vote that a senator wins in each department is pattern of support
squared, and these figures are then added together. This Candidates of parties that prospered under the old
sum can vary from .0303, when votes received are distrib- rules may also find it difficult to adopt a different elec?
uted evenly across all thirty-three departments, to L00, toral strategy. The party itself may have geographically
when votes are received in a single department. This mea? defined networks or machines for delivering votes and
sure takes into account the relative size and distribution of campaign norms that make a concentrated pattern of
a department's contribution to a senator's base of sup? support more likely. The Conservatives and Liberals de-

port. We reason that the relative concentration of votes is signed the previous system with its dependence on
a function of the length of time candidates and voters clientelistic networks and particularistic rewards and
have had to adjust to the new incentive structure and of dominated electoral politics during the democratic era.
the experience that the legislator and his or her party had Thus, senators from these parties would be inclined to
under the old incentive structure. As experience with the maintain their parochial orientation longer than those
new rules accumulates, candidates who campaign on from parties who had not fared well or perhaps even ex-
broad programmatic platforms with appeal across the en- isted, under the old rules.
Conversely, nontraditional
tire country are more likely to succeed. Reformers rea- candidates are, in many instances, those unable to gain
soned that voters would use their vote for the Chamber of election under the old system. The new system was de-
Representatives to pursue particularistic concerns, and signed partly with the aim of making Senate seats more
over time, their Senate vote would be used to pursue pro? accessible to such candidates. Thus, we also note the par-

grammatic issues. Unlike the pre-reform era, when all of tisan identification of each legislator.
a senator's votes came from a single department, it is now Time and previous experience may interact. Over
possible to win election with small numbers of votes in time, the average senator may cultivate a more dispersed
departments across the entire country. Thus, a would-be constituency, but candidates with personal or party suc-
senator known as "the environmental candidate," "the cess under the previous constitution would be least likely
health-care candidate," or "the evangelical candidate" may to adopt a geographically dispersed campaign strategy. In
generate nationwide support with citizens for whom these other words, we might expect that hardheaded "dino-
issues resonate. Under the previous system, it was unlikely saurs" who predate the current rules of the game (or who
that there would be sufficient voters motivated by such an represent parties that did so with success) would be the
appeal in a single department for it to form the basis of a slowest to recognize new exigencies. Newcomers and the
victorious campaign. Looking at the consequences of ma- traditionally underprivileged might be quicker to jump
jor electoral reform in Japan, Reed and Thies state, at new opportunities presented by a reformed institu-
"[t]here is no reason to assume that the first election un? tional environment.
der a new system represents the final equilibrium. The This reasoning leads to the following formal hy-
best evidence for the strength of various incentives and potheses:
the final equilibrium point is not how things are at any Hl: will seek votes more widely the
Candidates
given point in time, but how things change over time.
longer the new rules are in place.
Equilibrium should be thought of and analyzed as a dy-
H2: Candidates with a previous victory in a subna?
namic concept" (2001, 387). Therefore, we hypothesize
tional district will have a more concentrated pat?
that each successive election?1991, 1994, and 1998?
tern of support.
should be characterized by increasingly dispersed patterns H3: Candidates from traditionally strong parties will
of support as the impact of the new rules are reflected in
have a more concentrated pattern of support.
campaigning and voters and candidates abandon en-
H4: Candidates with a previous victory in a subna?
grained patterns of clientelistic, geographically concen-
tional district or from a traditionally strong party
trated relations.
will be the slowest to build a more dispersed pat?
Previous electoral success under the old rules is likely
tern of support.
to discourage a candidate from pursuing a new campaign
strategy. For one reason, a geographically concentrated Having delineated possible explanations for the rela-
support base from the previous electoral era would be tive dispersion of patterns of support, let us outline

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736
expectations of how these patterns impact legislator be?
havior. When a legislator's constituents are geographically
concentrated, the probability that the legislator will ini-
tiate parochially targeted bills increases.2 Geographically
concentrated constituents are easy to identify and serve
with bills that, for example, build schools, pave roads, and
construct sporting facilities. A more dispersed group of
supporters cannot be represented effectively by the same
types of bills. Constituents in one part of the country will
not benefit from, or even hear about, village roads paved
or elementary schools built in other parts of the country.
Instead, legislators must "specialize" in programmatic
themes where the goods produced by the legislation are
distributed widely (or lack a geographic
target).3
As with campaign strategies, legislative "hill style"
may not change overnight in a new electoral context. In-
dividuals and parties that fared well under the previous
set of rules may remain inclined to propose bills that are
particularistic and geographically targeted. Thus, legisla?
tors who were elected previously in a department-level
district, or who come from the traditionally strong Con?
servative and Liberal parties, are likely to retain their par?
ticularistic propensities.
Regarding bill initiation patterns, our expectations
are as follows:
H5: Parochially targeted bills will tend to be initiated
by legislators with geographically concentrated
support.
H6: Parochially targeted bills will tend to be initiated
by legislators with a previous victory in a subna-
tional district.
H7: Parochially targeted bills will tend to be initiated
by legislators from traditionally strong parties.
Patterns of Support for Senators
in Post-Reform Colombia
In the post-reform Senate, the sum of squared propor-
tions, or Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI), for the
2For example, in the United States context, Lee (2000) points out
that representatives can only claim credit for particularized ben-
efits, including earmarks and narrow categorical programs, be?
cause these benefits can be focused on a geographically limited
constituency. United States senators, on the other hand, have the
option of claiming credit for much broader programs, formula
grants for example, because senators represent entire states. In Co-
lombia, the scale is different?the lower house is elected from
states and the upper house in a nationwide district.
3Ames (1995a) shows that in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies,
legislators who dominated particular municipalities were more
susceptible to offers of pork-barrel rewards from the executive that
allowed them to claim credit for "bacon" brought home to their
constituents.
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BRIAN R CRISP AND RACHAEL E. INGALL
300 individual senators varied from a concentrated
high
of almost .957 to a more
dispersed low of less than
.060.4 The kinds of vote patterns that lead to scores like
these, and to the score most closely
approximating the
average for all senators, are depicted in Figure 1. Elec?
toral success can be achieved in a number of ways, with
the new institutional arrangements allowing for mul?
tiple equilibria.5 Candidates could pursue a variety of
strategies between the concentrated and the dispersed
extremes to win election.
Jaime Calderon Dussan had the most dispersed pat?
tern of support of any senator elected in the post-reform
era. He had never occupied a seat in the national legisla-
ture prior to 1994 when he won as a member of a new
movement, Educacion, Trabajo y Cambio Social (Educa?
tion, Work, and Social Change). He was able to generate
widespread support by focusing on the issue of education,
and the major teachers' union in the country strongly
supported his candidacy. On the other hand, Tiberio
Villareal Ramos, whose vote pattern in 1991 most closely
approximates the overall average, was a member of the
Liberal party elected to the Chamber of Representatives in
1982, 1986, and 1990. Finally, Jorge A. Hernandez
Restrepo received the most concentrated pattern of sup?
port of any legislator in the post-reform era under the la?
bel of Nueva Fuerza Democrdtica (New Democratic
Force), a new movement with conservative leanings cre-
ated immediately prior to the 1994 elections.6
4The average score was .5079, and the standard deviation was
.2576. The Senate has 100 seats, and there have been three post-
reform elections.
5A histogram showing the distribution of vote-concentration
scores is available from the author. It indicates that senators did
not fall into two groups, one pursuing a national strategy for get-
ting votes and the other following a localized strategy. Instead, it
appears that a variety of patterns resulted from the new rules.
6Note that our measure of concentration does not require that the
departments (states) be contiguous. Imagine two senators, each of
whom got .75 of their vote in one department and .25 in a second
department, but in one case the departments shared a common
border but in the second they did not. We reasoned that both sena?
tors had an incentive to initiate pork-barrel legislation directed at
that .75 department (and to a lesser extent the department from
which they get a quarter of their votes) and that the vote gain for
the senator whose second department was proximate would be
quite marginal. Had the districts under consideration been geo?
graphically smaller, we might have considered contiguity to be
more relevant. Contiguous concentration is typically captured us-
ing Moran's I, but it does not treat highly concentrated patterns in
a manner we thought appropriate. It looks for patterns or clusters
of similar levels ofa given variable, and so a senator with .25 of his/
her vote from each of four adjoining departments would score
highly on the Moran's I scale with a value approaching 1. However,
a senator who received .99 of his/her vote from one department
would have a value of Moran's I, close to 0?i.e., no autocor-
relation across contiguous departments?because there would ef-
fectively be no pattern of similarities.
INSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING AND REPRESENTATION 737

Figure 1 Vote Concentration Patterns

Mean Vote Concentration

Maximum Vote Concentration

Percentageof Votes Earned

r~l0%-2.5%
| [2.5%-5% 300 300 600
1 15%-7.5%
M 7.5%-10%
110%-15% Kilometers
BMI15%-20%
|B 20% - 25%
^25%-50% <D
|^50%-75%
H 75% -100%

The determinants of vote concentration in the post- elected to the Chamber of Representatives or pre-reform
reform Senate are presented in Table l.7 All our hypoth- Senate from a statewide district. Prior success for his or
esized causes are statistically discernible (model 1). Prior her party is a dummy variable for membership in the
success of a senator or his or her party under rules that Liberal or Conservative parties. Contrary to the expecta-
promoted parochialism is positively associated with vote tion of reformers, and our hypotheses, increased experi-
concentration. Prior success of an individual is
legislator ence with the new rules is also associated with a more
measured as a dummy variable if the senator had been concentrated pattern of support (experience with the
new rules is merely a count variable for the number of
elections since reform). We had hypothesized that candi?
7Multicollinearity is not an issue?no two independent variables
were correlated at a level greater than .31. Autocorrelation is not a dates and voters would adapt to the new rules over time,
problem given the limited number of time periods observed? with patterns of support becoming ever more dispersed.
three?and the fact that only a handful of senators was elected for
all three periods. Cook-Weisberg tests for heteroskedasticity did Instead, vote patterns have become more concentrated
not approach statistical significance at any level. with time. Given this finding, one might expect that the

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738 BRIAN F. CRISP AND RACHAEL E. INGALL

Table 1 Explaining Vote Concentration in the holding, we would expect a candidate from a nontradi-
Post-Reform Colombian Senate tional party to have a score of only .364.10 Clearly, Liberal
and Conservative are likely to have much more
senators
concentrated patterns of support. This is the substan-
tively most powerful of our hypothesized causes: The
parties that designed the old rules and prospered under
them have a predicted vote-concentration score approxi-
mately 1.68 times the size of their counterparts in the
new electoral context.
Another statistically significant determinant of vote
concentration is geographically concentrated constituen-
cies establishedthrough a previous win in a department-
level district.
If we hold experience with the new rules
constant at one previous election, and fix party identifi-
cation at "member of a traditional party," the predicted
vote concentration for someone without a previous sub-
Robust standard errorsclustered on senator in parentheses. Colombians national victory is .522,11 whereas a senator with such a
have elected 300 senators in the post-reformera, but data were missing previous victory is likely to have a pattern of support
for 8 individuals,thus our n = 292.
concentrated at a level of .611.12 While not as dramatic as
*p < .05, **p< .01 the impact of party membership, previous success in a
subnational district diminishes the impact that the new
electoral incentives have on candidates. Once a constitu-
interaction term for experience and party identification
ency is constructed, the pattern of support endures de-
would indicate that candidates from traditional parties
spite changing rules.
would revert more quickly to parochial ways (model 2).
As already noted, the least expected finding was the
This expectation is also refuted. The negative sign on the effect of accumulating experience with the new rules. We
interaction term indicates that while patterns of support
hypothesized, and Colombian reformers assumed, that
for candidates from traditional parties are becoming candidates and voters would adjust to the new rules over
more concentrated over time, they are doing so more time. They did, but not in the expected direction. Re?
slowly than those for candidates from new and tradition?
formers reasoned that candidates would seek votes more
ally small parties.
widely as they became familiar with the opportunities af-
To make these findings more comprehensible, we
forded them by the new nationwide district. However,
present predicted values of vote concentration based on
while the reforms adopted made this possible, they did
simulations where one factor of interest is allowed to
not make it mandatory. After an initial dispersion of
vary while all other independent variables are held con-
votes in 1991, when the mean vote concentration score
stant. This simulation-based approach conveys numeri-
(HHI) was .423, patterns of support had reconcentrated
cally precise estimates of the quantity of greatest substan- to .574 by 1994. Prior to reform, senators were elected
tive interest, vote concentration, and a reasonable
from departments with between two to fifteen seats ap-
measure of uncertainty (a 90 percent confidence inter-
portioned to each according to population. In 1986, in
val) about those estimates (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg the election ofthe last full congress before reform, the av?
2000).8 Assuming that voters and candidates had only
erage winning senator received 33,723 votes. The win-
one experience with the new incentive structure, and the
ning senator with the fewest votes, from sparsely popu-
candidate in question has had a previous legislative vic-
lated Choco, received 16,584 votes. In 1991, the first
tory in a subnational district, membership in a tradi?
election after the adoption of a nationwide district, the
tional party leads to a vote concentration prediction of
average winning senator received 35,402 votes, and the
.611.9 On the other hand, with the same assumptions
winning senator with the fewest votes received 21,861.
Thus, the sheer number of votes required to win did not
8We use the statistical simulation program Clarify (Tomz, and there was no formal require-
change dramatically,
Wittenberg, and King 1999) in conjunction with the statistical
software package Stata to calculate the expected vote concentra? 10The 90 percent confidence interval for this estimate is .310-. 416.
tion where each independent variable in turn takes on its observed
11The 90
values, while holding all other variables constant at a chosen value. percent confidence interval for this estimate is .470-. 576.
9 The 90 12The 90
percent confidence interval for this estimate is .581-. 641. percent confidence interval for this estimate is .581-. 641.

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INSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING AND REPRESENTATION 739

Table 2 The Effect of Experience with the New Rules on Vote Concentration by Type of Party
(from model 2)

Senators from Non-Traditional Parties Senators from Traditional Parties

No Previous Experience .269 .585

(.189-.341) (.543-.629)
One Previous Experience .364 .611
(.310-.416) (.581-.641)
Two Previous Experiences .459 .636
(.395-.521) (.596-.677)

*90%confidence intervalsin parentheses.

(Assumes that candidates have had a previous legislative victory in a subnational district.)

ment that votes come from more than one department.
Simulations for candidates from traditional parties with
a previous victory in a subnational district show vote
concentration scores of .585 in 1991, .611 in 1994, and
.636 in 1998.13 Candidates reverted back to a more geo?
graphically focused pattern of support as the initial zeal
for the expected impact of reforms faded.
In model 2 (see Table 1), as mentioned above, we in-
teracted experience with the new rules and party mem-
bership to see whether members of traditional parties
were reverting back to geographically concentrated pat?
terns more quickly. We found that while candidates from
both types of parties had increasingly reconcentrated
support over time, members of nontraditional parties
were doing so most rapidly (see Table 2). Over time, the
gap between members of nontraditional and traditional
parties narrowed. In the first post-reform election, the
predicted vote for candidates of the traditional parties
was more than twice as concentrated as the vote for can?
didates from nontraditional parties. However, by 1998,
the gap had shrunk to 1.38 times more concentrated.
Candidates from traditional parties maintain more con?
centrated patterns of support than do candidates from
nontraditional parties,14 but members from nontradi?
tional parties increasingly recognized that concentrated
vote patterns were still a recipe for electoral success.
From these results, we can conclude that the reforms
adopted by Colombians were not sufficient to achieve the
results they desired. They made clear that their intent was
to create a chamber where elected representatives would
be more responsive to national issues and would
13The 90
percent confidence intervals for these estimates are .542-
.629, .581-. 641, and .596-.677 respectively.
14We cannot be confident about the extent to which candidates
from traditional parties are seeking even more concentrated pat?
terns than they had in 1991. Our simulations do predict higher
scores but the confidence intervals encompass the predicted value
for the adjacent election(s).
paign widely on programmatic themes to achieve a
broad base of support. The adoption of a single, nation?
wide district made this possible, and in the immediate
post-reform context, the more dispersed patterns of sup?
port indicate that candidates and voters took reformers'
intent into account. However, it quickly became clear
that although the reforms made dispersed patterns of
support possible, they did not make them necessary.
Senator Renan Barco Lopez has a pattern of
Victor
voter support that generally reflects the overall trend iden-
tified through our simulations (see Figure 2).15 Barco is a
member ofthe
Liberal Party and has secured a seat in the
Senate in every race since 1974.16 Prior to the constitu?
tional reforms, Barco was elected from the department of
Caldas. In 1994, for example, he received more than 1,000
votes in only one state other than Caldas.
We asked him about the impact of the reforms, es-
pecially the creation of a single, nationwide district for
the Senate, his sense of what "representation" meant,
and his methods of campaigning.17 In his opinion, not
much had changed since the creation of a nationwide
district (no cambio nada) because a senate candidate
without a regional base was still unlikely to be successful
{no sale cotno senador). Regarding representation, he ar-
gued that senators must combine regional and local
concerns with a focus on larger national issues. Barco
claimed that those who do not are unlikely to be re-
elected. He personally carries out this two-pronged
15Senator Barco's sum of
squared proportion of the vote is .428,
.770, and .658 for 1991, 1994, and 1998. These figures do not
cam- match exactly the predicted values from Table 2 but, of the sena?
tors elected in every race from 1986 through 1998, Barco's vote
concentration patterns most closely reflected our predicted values.
16Prior to 1974 the Liberals and Conservatives alternated power
through a national front arrangement. Given the orchestrated na-
ture of power sharing prior to 1974, we begin observation of po?
litical careers after the breakdown of the arrangement.
17Interview conducted November 16,2000 in Bogota, Colombia.

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740 BRIAN R CRISP AND RACHAEL E. INGALL

Figure 2 Vote Concentration Pattern for Victor Renan Barco Lopez, 1986-1998

(D
300 0 300 600

Kilometers
ofVotes
Percentage Earned
0%-2.5%
2.5%-5%
5%-7.5%
__ 7.5%-10%
?? 10ft-15%
M8il5%-20%
??20%-25%
? 25%-50%
? 50%-75%
075%-100%

strategy by trying to generate resources for Caldas while 1998 for members of a traditional
party with a previous
establishing a national reputation as an expert on tax re? victory in a subnational
district) is a far cry from the
form, especially fiscal decentralization. As a result, he is score of 1.0 that was mandated under the old rules. What
able to maintain his traditional base in Caldas while remains to be determined is whether more dispersed pat?
picking up votes outside the department. However, his terns of support are associated with a different form of
comments about campaigning and the spatial distribu- behavior once in office.
tion of his support make it clear that "region" still domi-
nates his thinking. Barco only campaigns for reelection
in Caldas (ufuera de Caldas no hago nada"), visiting sev- Parochial versus Programmatic
eral communities where a "friend" {amigo mio) has re- Representation
served a plaza or theater for his campaign stop. Whoever
introduces him is provided with a list of the projects he In order to test our hypotheses regarding institutional in-
has initiated?such as public housing, schools, and hos- centives to carry out specific forms of representation, we
pitals?and is sure to refer to him as the "Father of the collected data on patterns of bill initiation in the pre-
Municipality" (elpadre del municipio). and post-reform Colombian Senate. Our research design
While this trend is not what reformers would have approximates a natural experiment: we have data from
preferred, it should be noted that even a vote concentra? the last complete congress before reform (1986-1990)
tion score of .637 (the predicted score for the elections of and the first complete congress after reform (1994-

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INSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING AND REPRESENTATION
Table 3 Bill Targets Before and After Electoral Reform
aA senator is counted once per target (per era) even if he or she initiatedmore than one bill aimed at a par-
ticular level of aggregation.
1998). Examining the same legislative chamber in the
same country only a few years apart holds constant many
factors that might otherwise confound our analysis. Us?
ing the coding scheme developed by Taylor-Robinson
and Diaz (1999), we designated each bill as having either
a national, regional, sectoral, local, or individual (includ-
ing a single legal entity) target.18 In the United States, leg?
islators routinely introduce bills narrowly focused on
their own congressional district. Whether the bill actually
becomes law is often irrelevant, for a major function of
legislative initiation is simply to show constituents that
the elected representative has their preferences in mind.
"Credit claiming" can take many forms?from commit-
18Along with three colleagues, we collected the bill initiation data
from Colombian congressional archives. We discussed the coding
scheme at length with Taylor-Robinson and Diaz and learned how
they handled bills that might be difficult to categorize. We then se-
lected approximately thirty bills and had each member of the team
classify them by target. Where there were discrepancies, a consen-
sus rule was reached about how to handle similar bills. We then
collected data on bills initiated during the 1986-1990 and the
1994-1998 legislature. The team member who entered the data on
initiator, committee assignment, and chronology of consideration
also wrote a brief summary (four to five lines) of the bilTs content.
He or she classified the bill based on his or her reading of the origi-
nal text. A second team member then classified the bill based on
the first team member's summary. The few discrepancies that re-
mained were resolved through further discussion and occasionally
returning to the original text.
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741
tee assignments to votes on the floor to bill initiation
(Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978; Fiorina 1989; Arnold 1990;
Jacobson 1997). In Brazil, Ames points out that "deputies
introduce legislation with no intention of shepherding
their bills through to final passage. Deputies submit bills,
the Chamber prints them, and the printed versions
(avulsos) are sent to constituents as proof of'service'"
(2001, 142).19 Bills that are not national in focus are
likely to provide legislative pork for the "folks back
home," while bills with national focus are unlikely to tar-
get effectively specific electoral constituencies.
Table 3 provides an overview of bill initiation trends
in the pre-reform and the post-reform congress. As we
would predict, and as reformers hoped, the number of
19InColombia, the number of bills initiated by Senators that actu-
ally become law appears to be quite low, but our data on the sub-
ject is not ideal. Our data collection occurred in the summer of
1999, shortly after the 1994 to 1998 congress ended. As a result,
many bills initiated in the earlier congress were still under consid-
eration. Furthermore, few bills are ever actually declared "dead"?
instead they languish in committee or at some other point in the
legislative process. Thus, it is difficult to say definitively what pas?
sage rates look like.
With these concerns about the quality of the data, the relative
passage rates of bills seem to support our theory. Compared to the
1986-1990 congress, twice as many nationally targeted bills initi?
ated during the 1994 to 1998 congress had already been passed by
1999. The number of local and individual bills passed into law fell
by approximately 44 percent between the same two congresses.
74* BRIAN E CRISP AND RACHAEL ?. INGALL

Table 4 Explaining Bill Targeting in the Colombian Senate

Robust standard errorsin parentheses

n= 749 for post-reformonly models, n = 1469 for pre- and post-reformmodels.
*p<.05,**p<.01,***p<.001

bills targeted at the national level increased dramatically from throughout the country. Vote concentration scores
after reform. The number of nationalbills increased by ranged from .06 to .96 (see the data appendix for more
more than 90 percent, while the number of bills in all details). In models 3 and 4 we combine the pre-reform
other categories combined increased by less than 1 per? and post-reform congress bill initiation data. Senators in
cent (sectoral bills were initiated more frequently and re- the pre-reform congress were elected in department-
gionally targeted bills less frequently). Given this in? wide districts?so, by law they had a vote concentration
creased effort towards national agenda items, all other score of 1.0. In some sense, the latter is a more difficult

categories of legislation consumed proportionally less of test of our theory because we will have underestimated
the Senate's time. It would seem that reformers were at the likelihood of any national, programmatic behavior
least partially successfiil. While many legislators initiated in the pre-reform era. Using ordered logit, we analyzed
more than one bill aimed at each target, the number of the probability each type of bill will be initiated by a

unique initiators in each category suggests that particular senator with a particular electoral history. We also col-
kinds of legislation were not the private reserve of just a lapsed the data to calculate, using logit, the relationship
small handfiil of legislators.20 between nationally targeted bills (as opposed to all other
Table 4 shows the relationship between a bilPs target types) and the initiator's electoral characteristics. In the
and the electoral characteristics of its author.21 In mod- ordered logit model, presented below, bills are arrayed
els 1 and 2 we look at the post-reform congress alone on a scale of increasing "parochialism" from national to
when senatorial candidates were allowed to seek votes sectoral to regional to local to individual. In the logit
model, individual, local, regional, and sectoral bills are
20As part of the reform package, the number of senators was re-
all coded as having a higher potential to serve particu-
duced from 114 to 100?so the pool of potential initiators is re-
duced in the post-reform era. laristic purposes.22

21Multicollinearity is not a major problem?no two independent 22Our observations are bill initiator attempts?meaning each bill
variables were correlated at a level greater than .43. Robust stan- appears as many times as it has authors (who are senators) and
dard errors were used to ameliorate the effects of any hetero- each senator appears as many times as he or she sponsored or co-
skedasticity. sponsored a bill.

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INSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING AND REPRESENTATION 743

Table 5 The Probability of Initiating Pork-Barrel Bills

(from model 2)

*90%confidence intervalsin parentheses. Membershipin a traditionalparty set at its modal value.

Membership in a traditional or a nontraditional with a previous victory in a subnational district and at

party was not significant in any of our models. As we dis- least average vote concentration are more likely to ini-
covered above, party membership has a significant im- tiate a pork-barrel bill than to introduce a project fo-
pact on the geographic concentration of support. But cused on broad, national issues.
once we account for that geographic pattern, senators Model 4 in Table 4 shows the results of an ordered
from different types of parties are indistinguishable from logit analysis where sectoral,
regional, and indi?
local,
one another in how they carry out representation. Vote vidual bills are not collapsed into a single category. These
concentration patterns (measured with the Hirschman- coefficients and their standard errors are used to run
Herfindahl Index) and previous legislative victory in a simulations predicting the probability of initiating each
subnational district (a dummy variable for previous vic? of the five types of bills. The predicted probabilities fol-
tory in a statewide district for the Chamber of Repre? lowed our expectations in every category. The probability
sentatives or the pre-reform Senate) has the expected ef? of initiating a nationally targeted bill decreased with vote
fect. Geographically targeted bills are more likely to be concentration and a previous victory in subnational dis?
initiated by legislators, with a concentrated reelection trict, and the inverse was true for every other type of bill.
constituency. Previous representation of such a constitu- In Table 6 we report the predicted probability of initiat?
ency remains important even after we account for a ing national and local bills?the two archetypes of pro?
senator's current pattern of votes. We use simulations grammatic versus parochial representation.23 Again, it is
(based on models 3 and 4) to help interpret our substan- senators with the most dispersed patterns of electoral
tive findings. support who stand out.24 Nationally targeted bills are al-
The probability that a bill will be particularistic is ways the single most frequent type of bill predicted, but
determined by the vote pattern and previous electoral their likelihood varies significantly across previous and
base of the initiator. The rows in Table 5 (based on model current patterns of support. If geographically dispersed
3 from Table 4), indicate that the probability of a bill be- voters elect senators who have no historical connection
ing particularistic or pork-barrel increases with the vote to a single department, the probability that those sena?
concentration of the initiator. The columns show the ex? tors will initiate a nationally targeted bill any time they
tent to which the predicted probability of initiating a introduce a piece of legislation is .665. This is .231 points
project whose benefits can be targeted to a particular greater than the probability for a senator with a historical
constituency increases when a senator has a previous leg? geographic constituency and a continued concentrated
islative victory in a subnational district. In terms of vote pattern of support. The prospects of initiating a locally
concentration, the biggest substantive gap is between
those senators with highly dispersed patterns of support 23Likethe predicted values reported for local bills in Table 6, it was
and all others. The predicted probability that a senator's possible to discern those with a previous victory from those with-
out, as well as those with the most dispersed pattern of support
bill proposal will have pork-barrel potential goes up .085
from those with an average or more concentrated pattern. What
from the lowest to the average observed vote concentra? was often less clear was the predicted difference between senators
tion pattern, and .119 from the lowest to the highest. The with average vote concentration scores and those with highly con?
centrated scores.
impact of having served previously a geographically lim?
24The
ited constituency is consistent across all vote concentra- predicted values for senators with average and most concen?
trated patterns of support are in the direction we predicted, but
tions. Senators with a previous connection to a depart-
the confidence intervals around these predictions indicate that we
ment-level district have a nearly .10 greater chance of should be circumspect about stressing differences between these
initiating a bill with pork-barrel propensities. Senators categories.

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744 BRIAN F. CRISP AND RACHAEL E. INGALL

Table 6 Probabilities of Initiating National and Local Bills

(from model 4)

Minimum Observed Average Observed Maximum Observed

Vote Concentration Vote Concentration Vote Concentration

Probabilities of Initiating National Bills

No Victory in a Subnational District

Victory in a Subnational District

Probabilities of Initiating Local Bills

No Victory in a Subnational District

Victory in a Subnational District

90% confidence intervalin parentheses. Membershipin a traditionalparty set at its modal value.

targeted piece of legislation follow an inverse pattern, strategy, base of support, and bill initiation pattern.25
changing by nearly .1 from the lowest to highest pre? Suarez said that the senator relied on the association of his
dicted probability. name with popular stands on prominent issues to gener-
The detailed legislative records of two selected sena? ate support (in Colombia this is somewhat ambiguously
tors are presented to illustrate how representation varies referred to as a voto de opinion). To campaign nationally,
based on geographic patterns of support. We chose these he uses the mass media to effectively spread news of his
illustrative examples based on variation in our indepen- accomplishments in Congress.26 Suarez complained that
dent variables?geographic patterns of support and his? it was difficult to break the old department-based patterns
torical relationship to a single department. While no in? of support, maintained by longstanding clientelistic net-
dividual legislator represents exactly the predicted values works, and to sustain Caicedo's methods of winning re-
presented in Tables 5 and 6, the following examples election.
come close. Parmenio Cuellar Bastidas had been elected to the
Senator Juan Martin Caicedo Ferrer, a member ofthe Chamber of Representatives in 1990 representing a coali-
traditionally strong Liberal party, was elected in 1994 with tion of parties, but the Congress was dissolved by the Na?
a relatively dispersed vote pattern (HHI = .3571, see Fig- tional Constituent Assembly shortly thereafter. He won
ure 3). He had not been elected to Congress previously, election to the Senate in 1991 as a Liberal and reelection in
but had served as mayor of Bogota from 1990 through 1994 as a member of the Movimiento Nueva Colombia
1991. Prior to that he had a distinguished career in the (New Colombia Movement). During the 1994-1998 term,
business sector both in Cali and nationally, including a he initiated a dozen bills, and nearly 60 percent of them
stint as president of National Federation of Merchants had particularistic qualities. These bills included homage
(Federacion Nacional de Comerciantes?FENALCO) from to a notable local poet, the celebration of the 65th anni-
1978 through 1987 (Candidatos Visibles 2000). During versary of the rebuilding of a small town, recognition of
the 1994-1998 term, he initiated twenty-two bills, fifteen 100 years of labor by the Capuchin Brothers (a religious
(nearly 70 percent) of which were national in focus. These order) in three particular departments, and the creation
bills dealt with several diverse issues, including efforts to of a postage stamp honoring a regional university. The bill
increase penalties for sexual offenses, to reform the cus- paying homage to the poet included provisions for pur-
toms collection agency, to stamp out administrative cor- chasing his birthplace, increasing the budget of the re-
ruption, and to regularize retirement and disability pen-
sions. All of the bills that were not national in focus were
designed to reform the governance of Santafe de 25Interview conducted November 15,2000 in Bogota, Colombia.
Bogota?the federal district. We interviewed Caicedo
26During our visit to his office we were given copies of op-ed pieces
Ferrer's legislative assistant, Francisco Suarez, about the that Caicedo regularly published in the country's major news-
senator's understanding of representation, campaign papers and magazines.

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INSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING AND REPRESENTATION 745

Figure 3 Vote Concentration Patterns for Bill Initiators

Parmenio Cuellar
Bastidas
ofVotes
Percentage Earned
0%-2.5%
2.5%-5%
5%-7.5%
| 7.5%-10%
10%-15%
_15% -20%
25%-50%
50%-75%
75%-100%
120%-25%

Juan Martin
Caicedo Ferrer
ofVotes
Percentage Earned
0%-2.5%
(D 2.5%-5%
5%-7.5%
200 0 200 400 600 Kilometers r^ 7.5%-10%
raio%-i5%
??15%-20%
???20%-25%
? 25%-50%
??50% -75%
^ 75%-100%

gional university, sculpting a bust in his honor, painting Senate's 100 seats means that the "electoral connection"
his portrait, and issuing a postage stamp bearing his like- between voters and senators can vary spatially from sena?
ness (the proceeds from which would accrue to the de? tor to senator (Mayhew 1974). Political reformers were
partment government). The bill celebrating the rebuild- correct in assuming that highly concentrated vote pat?
ing of Cumbral included provisions to pave several local terns are inversely related to interest in national issues.
roads and to build three schools in the area. All of these One of the reformers' primary goals was to fashion the
were to take place in Narino where the senator
activities Senate into a legislative chamber that would tackle some
earned nearly 88 percent of his vote (see Figure 3). Cuellar of the very tough issues currently confronting Colombia.
narrowly lost his bid for reelection to the Senate in 1998, It is now possible for candidates to campaign widely for
but he used this legislative record to help propel himself to support, and when elected, those same candidates are in-
the governorship of Narino in October 2000. deed more national in their orientation. However, citi?
Our models and interviews indicate that Colombian zens' expectations that all senators would change their
legislators are fully aware of their patterns of electoral behavior may have been unrealistic. In particular, the as-
support and that they tailor their behavior to reflect the sumption that all senators would cultivate a national
relative geographic concentration of their constituents. constituency was clearly mistaken. Thus, many deem the
The adoption of a single, nationwide district for the reforms a failure.

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746 BRIAN F. CRISP AND RACHAEL E. INGALL

Getting the Engineering Right Colombia shows that when the district magnitude is high,
previous electoral success (directly by candidate or indi-
While Colombian reformers did not entirely achieve rectly by party) in geographically bounded districts en-
their goal of persuading candidates to think in terms of a courages a concentrated pattern of support. Comparative
nationwide some dispersion of votes has work is necessary to discern the impact of a lower district
constituency,
taken place. Where it has, it contributes to more pro? magnitude (and hence a greater proportion of votes cast
for winning candidates), as well as institutional configura-
grammatic legislative behavior. Candidates have discov-
ered that a variety of strategies?mixing tions during the pre-reform era, and district variations for
parochial and
concerns?are available to them as suc- the second chamber (where there is one). Nationwide, at-
programmatic
cessful means of getting elected. Despite a reconcentra- large districts may create incentives for programmatic,
tion of constituent bases in successive post-reform elec? nationally focused behavior by legislators where they are
tions, the average senator still captures support more more clearly separated from other races with subnational
districts, or where there are a sufficiently small number of
widely than prior to reform. Some senators have clearly
the potential for a career based on issues of seats elected in the nationwide race.
recognized
national importance. Striking a balance between programmatic and paro-
A major hindrance to achieving a more program? chial forms of representation is not an easy task. Pol-
matic form of representation in Colombia is the contin- iticians interested in national,
programmatic concerns,
ued use of personal lists. Members from the same party including presidents, findoften
their efforts stymied.
This has certainly been the case in Colombia.28 Extra-
compete against one another in general elections, and
do not constitutional means were once used to carry out re?
party leaders restrict the use of the party label
forms, but the reformers failed to achieve all the desired
through any formal nomination procedure.27 As a result,
candidates, including incumbents, must build a personal changes in legislator behavior. The cynicism generated
reputation to distinguish themselves from co-partisans. by their failure makes additional changes even more dif-
This is a major incentive for candidates to focus on pork- ficult. Institutional change is "sticky" or episodic. Be?
barrel rewards rather than on what their party has done cause institutions by definition involve the formaliza-
while in office. Drafters of the new constitution tion of a set of practices or norms, they are not merely
recog?
nized the role of a more dispersed base of support in en- the reflection of underlying social or economic forces. A

couraging legislators to think less parochially, but did not disjuncture may emerge between preferences and insti?
eliminate other personal vote seeking incentives?most tutional structures. Unfortunately, just because the dis?
notably intraparty competition in general elections. A juncture is sufficiently severe to motivate reform, there
more dispersed constituency the introduc- is no guarantee that the reforms undertaken will have
encourages
tion of nationally targeted legislation, even while intra? the intended effect.

party competition persists. More pervasive attention to

programmatic concerns is unlikely as long as concen?
trated constituencies are still possible and intraparty
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INSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING AND REPRESENTATION 747

Data Appendix

Descriptive Statistics for Explaining Vote Concentration

(Table 1)

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(Table 4)

aForthe ordered logit models bills are coded as national,sectoral, regional, local, and individual,and in the logit models bills are coded as national
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