Professional Documents
Culture Documents
hundreds of men are screaming and shouting as two small wooden balls are
hit up the slopes by opposing teams of players. Women in intricately designed,
brightly coloured dresses are looking on, talking and laughing. One player
draws back his long wooden club and hammers the ball onward. Cries of joy
fill the air.
"What just happened?" I ask the player. "We cheated," he laughs. "The ball
was lost in the snow so I took a ball from my pocket and hit that one. Don't tell
the other team. If they knew, we would lose this point."
The ball flies on up the four-mile-long course, over rivers and up banks. That
night, the winning team will sacrifice an ox, paid for by the losers. Everyone
will get drunk. It is winter and there is not much to do. The game is chikik gal.
In February this year, the Taliban assassinated Pakistan's Christian minister
for minorities, Shahbaz Bhatti. He was the only politician representing the
non-Muslim populations of Pakistan. His smallest ward was the Kalash, a
3,000-strong animist tribe living in the mountains of the Hindu Kush, in
Pakistan's wild northwest frontier. A persistent myth tells of their descent
from members of an errant division of Alexander the Great's army, which
ripped through the mountains of northern Pakistan more than 2,000 years
ago.
In Rudyard Kipling's time, the Kalash were known as the "black Kafirs" and
their land was Kafiristan, the setting for his tale of insanity and idolatry, The
Man Who Would be King. The "red Kafirs", their neighbours, the subjects of
Kipling's story, were brutally converted at the end of the 19th century. They
became Nuristanis, "enlightened ones", and their rugged mountain land is one
of the centres of the war against the Taliban.
Children play on a traditional flat roof.
The Kalash live in three valleys (Bumboret, Birir and Rumbur) by the Afghan
border in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In winter, flights to Chitral,
the nearest town, are routinely and consistently cancelled without warning.
My journey from Islamabad was by road, through Mardan and Dir up to the
Lowari tunnel and then down the other side. In the winter, when the Lowari
pass is blocked by snow, the tunnel is the only way of travelling to Chitral by
road. Its construction began in 2005 and it is now open for a few hours every
day. It is less a tunnel and more a 9km-long cave.
But in spite of the constant sense of peril it evokes, the tunnel is changing
Chitral and the Kalash valleys. Previously, getting to the nearest city,
Peshawar, meant a trip through Afghanistan. Now the tunnel brings supplies
from the rest of the country. With access comes fear. "Extremists use the
tunnel to come here," says Taj Udeen, a local police commander. "We have to
make sure we know who is coming to our district."
They certainly knew we were coming. Tourism has dropped off steeply since
9/11 – in the 1990s thousands of people visited Chitral annually, now that
figure is below 100 – and we were among few outsiders to visit the Kalash
valleys in the past year. Desperate to make sure nothing happened to our four-
strong team, 10 armed policemen accompanied us. We spent a month in the
valleys. They never left our side.
For centuries, the Kalash have been fighting to preserve their traditions.
People are converted to Islam every year. "Extremist Muslims prey on weak
people and create internal divisions," Imran Kabir, a Kalasha polymath (he
reveals that he is, variously, a butcher, teacher, writer and junkyard owner)
tells me.
A policeman stands outside the Bashali, the house of menstruation and childbirth.
A local teacher, Akbal Shah, recounts the story of his father, who worked as a
frontier policeman and converted to Islam because he was the only Kalash
man in an all-Muslim unit. "He was not educated, so they said to him that if he
didn't convert he wouldn't go to heaven. He ended up believing them because
he didn't want to stand out. The Muslims are a big majority, they are pressing
us everywhere." Deathbed conversions are common and people talk of being
offered wives and money if they convert. When I interviewed one of the local
imams, Nasir Abdul, at his newly built mosque, he spoke of the love he has for
the Kalash people before going on to say that he "hopes they will convert to
Islam so that they can go to paradise". He is a friendly man who does not pay
people to convert, but his objective is the same: the end of the Kalasha
religion.
Not all Muslims in the area feel this way. One convert who everyone calls
"Mullah" tells me: "Everyone should be free to believe what they like." And
while Muslims are not allowed to convert to the Kalash religion, men like
Mullah participate in Kalash festivals and rituals in a way that makes you
believe that if they could convert back, they would.
Wali Khan, the Kalash headmaster of a primary school in Bumboret valley and
a charismatic and popular figure, has worked tirelessly to improve the
standards of schooling in the valleys (until the 1990s, there were no official
schools). His family is typical in that two of his three brothers have converted
to Islam (the one who hasn't is confusingly nicknamed Mujahideen). He tells
me that for "two years my brother was living like an imam. But then he got
bored and now he is drinking and smoking and dancing!" Drinking means the
local moonshine, tara, which tastes like schnapps, or homemade wine, which
tastes like sherry. Kalash dealers routinely and illegally sell both drinks to
Muslims.
In 2009, a Taliban unit stole into the valleys at night and kidnapped Lerounis.
They had been tipped off by locals sympathetic to their cause and came to the
Kalasha Dur during a night when only two security guards were posted. One
guard fled while the other stood his ground and was killed. Lerounis was taken
swiftly across the Afghan border to Nuristan. The Greek teacher's ransom,
thought to be up to £1m, was paid and he returned to Greece. The security
services will not let him return to Pakistan because they believe his presence in
the country is dangerous. Lerounis, who wants to come back to the valleys,
tells me he does not want to talk about the kidnapping because doing so would
endanger the Kalash people. Whatever they think of the Taliban's policies, the
Kalash stress their neutrality: they are too vulnerable to court trouble.
The kidnapping highlights the security risk presented by the lavish Greek
building: in a small, rural community, it sticks out. Locals say that there is a
Taliban plot to blow up the Kalasha Dur. The building's detractors say that the
exclusion of Muslims from the school only adds to the resentment felt by those
who feel that the Kalash get too much money from outsiders.
Wali Khan used to work with Lerounis compiling a Kalasha alphabet, but left
because he didn't like the division the Kalasha Dur had created. "The Kalash
and the Muslims have to get along; they have to live side by side," he says. "So
why make a school in which only one kind of person can be taught?" Lerounis
argues that the school was built in response to a need highlighted by the
Kalash community: "I asked them what they wanted and they told me they
needed a school… There are many Muslim schools and many madrasas. The
Kalash need this. There is a division because of their tradition, not because of
our building."
The Kalasha Dur's first-aid centre treats Muslims, and Greek Volunteers have
also built Muslim schools and secured a clean-water supply that is used by
everyone. Yet the suspicion remains that they do as much harm as good.
Imran Kabir believes that Lerounis created a culture of dependence so that in
the end people "treated him like a God". Instead of praying to their maker,
Kabir told me, they would pray to Lerounis. Since he has been gone, the
Kalash have started helping themselves again, something Lerounis would
probably approve of.
Nabaig (like Prince, he has no second name) is the first Kalash lawyer. He
works in Chitral and, when he is in court, wears a suit and tie that makes you
think of Reservoir Dogs. Back in the valleys, in his traditional clothes, he tells
me that the United Nations Development Programme money that comes to
the valleys "goes in the pockets of the politicians and higher personalities".
The same is said of the international money that came to the country to help
relieve flooding in 2010.
"None of the money came to us," says Nabaig, who points out that food is now
twice the price as a result.
Almost all accounts of the Kalash fixate on the tribe's mythological descent
from Alexander the Great. The romance of Alexander's tribe is a key part of
Kalash tourism, although "they did a DNA test and they found no connection"
is a familiar refrain here. Lerounis calls the area an "open museum"; the
valleys' reputation as a Garden of Eden, a lost land of innocent people, meant
that a summer stop to see the Kalash used to be an adventurous part of the
hippie trail. But another form of tourism has developed: young Muslim men
from the south, deprived of contact with women their own age, come here to
chat up Kalash girls and watch them dance.
A girl in Birir wearing a traditional Kalash headdress.
The government has a confused relationship with the Kalash. Wali Khan says
it "protects the Kalash people very well now because we are a unique culture".
But there is also worry that this kind of cultural tourism can be exploitative.
Abdul Sattar, a village elder who has converted to Islam, tells me that "before,
when I was Kalash, I was very happy. But the government and people from the
rest of Pakistan were coming here and making us dance and perform. I
became a Muslim because I couldn't enjoy performing for outsiders."