THE ROLE OF THE U.S.

IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A CASE STUDY OF

ISRAEL AND PALESTINE CONFLICT

BY

NWAJAGU KENNETH CHIBUEZE

CSMSI5O95DE

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

COLLEGE OF SOCIAL AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCES,
WELLSPRING UNIVERSITY, BENIN CITY, EDO STATE, NIGERIA.

SEPTEMBER, 2018.
THE ROLE OF THE U.S. IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A CASE STUDY OF
ISRAEL AND PALESTINE CONFLICT

BY

NWAJAGU KENNETH CHIBUEZE

CSMS15O95DE

A PROJECT WORK PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, COLLEGE OF SOCIAL AND
MANAGEMENT SCIENCES, WELLSPRING UNIVERSITY, BENIN-
CITY, EDO STATE

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT FOR THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE

AWARD FOR BACHELOR OF SCIENCE (B.SC) DEGREE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

SEPTEMBER, 2018.
 DECLARATION
I, Nwajagu Kenneth Chibueze with Matriculation number CSMS15O95DE of
the department of International Relations declare that this project titled “The
Role of the U.S. in the Middle East: A Case Study of Israel and Palestine Peace
Process”. To the best of my knowledge, apart from the reference made to
previous researcher’s work and publications this work has not been previously
presented either wholly or in part elsewhere for an award in any degree in any
University or higher institution in the country. Materials used have been
properly acknowledged.

_______________________________ _______________________
NWAJAGU KENNETH CHIBUEZE SIGNATURE AND DATE
 CERTIFICATION
This dissertation entitled THE ROLE OF THE U.S. IN THE MIDDLE EAST
was researched by Nwajagu Kenneth in the department of International
Relations of College of Social and Management Sciences, Wellspring
University, Benin City, Edo State, Nigeria.

______________________ _______________
ASSOCIATE PROF. STEVE A. IYAYI DATE
PROJECT SUPERVISOR

______________________ _______________
MISS ENOMA BETTY DATE
CO-PROJECT SUPERVISOR

______________________ _______________
ASSOCIATE PROF. STEVE A. IYAYI DATE
HEAD OF DEPARTMENT

______________________ _______________
EXTERNAL SUPERVISOR DATE
 DEDICATION
This work is dedicated to God Almighty for his strength, wisdom and protection
through my study days in Wellspring University, my beloved family, my Head
of Department Prof. Steve A. Iyayi, my able course adviser Miss Betty Enoma
and to all in the Middle East.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost I acknowledge the God Almighty for his abundant
grace and love; this work won’t have seen the light of day if not for His
wisdom.
My deepest gratitude goes to my dad Rev. U. J. Nwaezeorah (Nwajagu),
for his unshaking believe in me and his constant prayers. Also gratitude goes to
my mum. Evang. E. I Nwaezeorah (Nwajagu) for her love and constant prayers
to which lni eternally grateful. This acknowledgement will not be complete is I
don’t mention the names of all those that contributed to my life, Mrs. Faith O.
Ojo, Pastor Lambert E. Nwajagu, Pastor Vivian U. Atenaga, Mr. Macdonald I.
Nwajagu, Mr. Grant G. Nwajagu, Mrs Pearl C. Isele, Mr. Moreign Nwajagu
(my realest guy) and Miss Oghenemaro M. Emamegho. I love you all and thank
you. Also my profound gratitude goes to my supervisor and Head of
Department, Associate. Prof. Steve Iyayi for his guidance and constant advice
he gave me during the course of this research work and his input he made in this
project, I thank you sir. Also to my co-supervisor, Miss Betty Enoma (my
mama) for her continuous pushes to make me better. I thank you ma.
Finally, I thank all my friends (Njar Mbe Vincent and Kure Daniel
Naomi, Usman Sifat Odion), lecturers and course mates for all their support and
encouragement to enhance my education. I love you all.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title page - - - - - - - - - -

Declaration - - - - - - - - - -

Certification - - - - - - - - -

Dedication - - - - - - - - - -

Acknowledgement - - - - - - - - -

Table of Contents - - - - - - - - -

Abstracts - - - - - - - - - - -

List of Abbreviations - - - - - - - - -

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study - - - - - - -

1.2 Statement of the Problem - - - - - - -

1.3 Objectives of the Study - - - - - - -

1.4 Research Questions - - - - - - - -

1.5 Research Hypothesis - - - - - - - -

1.6 Significance of the Study - - - - - - -

1.7 Scope of the Study - - - - - - - -

1.8 Limitations of the Study - - - - - - -

1.9 Definition of Terms - - - - - - - -

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction - - - - - - - - -
2.2 Conceptual framework - - - - - - -

2.1.1 Conflict - - - - - - - - -

2.1.2 Peace process - - - - - - - -

2.2 Review of Literature - - - - - - -

2.3 Specification Gap - - - - - - - -

2.4 Brief History of Israel-Palestine Crisis - - - - -

2.5 Where the last Administration left off: The current State of Affairs -

2.6 Key players - - - - - - - - -

2.6.1 Israel and Palestinian Narratives - - - - - -

2.7 US Role in Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process - - - -

2.8 Theoretical Framework- - - - - - - -

CHAPTER THREE

3.1 Research Design - - - - - - - -

3.2 Sources of Data Collection - - - - - -

3.3 Population Size - - - - - - - - -

3.4 Sample and Sampling Techniques Research Instrument - -

3.5 Research Instrument

3.6 Data Analysis - - - - - - - -

3.7 Ethical Consideration - - - - - - -

CHAPTER FOUR

4.1 Introduction - - - - - - - - -

4.2 Presentation of Data - - - - - - -

CHAPTER FIVE

5.1 Summary of Findings - - - - - - -

5.2 Conclusions- - - - - - - - -

5.3 Recommendations - - - - - - - -

BIBLIOGRAPHY - - - - - - - -
 CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The Middle Eastern region is also regarded the Western Asia. It is a

region which has been plagued with series of events that has threatened to tear
the region apart and has sort of slowed down growth and development process
of the region. This is so because of the power tussle in the region.

The crisis can be traced right back to Israel’s decision to return to her
ancestral home in 1948 due to Adolf Hitler’s decision to purge Germany of
every Jew in the region, and the eventual execution of that decision which saw
six million (6,000,000) Jews gassed (Konigseder and Wetzel 2001). The land
which the Jews had made strong claims to had in it habitants of the stud region.
Those inhabiting the area were the Palestine who for no reason saw the need to
hand over any portion of their “land” to any nation. The modern day Israel has
its origin in the Zionist movement, established in the late 19th century by Jews
in the Russian Empire who called for the establishment of a territorial Jewish
state after enduring persecution. In 1896, Jewish-Austrian journalist, Theodor
Herzl published an influential political pamphlet called The Jewish State. In it
he stated that the establishment of the Jewish state was the only way of
protecting the Jews from anti-Semitism (Herzl 1896). Herzl became the leader
of the Zionist Congress in Switzerland in 1897. Ottoman-controlled Palestine,
the original home of the Jews, was chosen as the most desirable location for a
Jewish state, and Herzl unsuccessfully petitioned the Ottoman government for a
charter (Herzl 1896).
 After the failed Russian revolution of 1905, growing number of Eastern
European and Russian Jews began to immigrate to Palestine, joining the four
thousand who had arrived earlier. The Jewish settlers insisted on the use of
Hebrew their spoken language. With the collapse of the Ottoman empire during
World War I, Britain took over Palestine, in 1917, Britain issued the “Balfour
Declaration”, which declared its intent to establish a Jewish homeland in
Palestine. Although protested by the Arab states, the Balfour Declaration was
included in the British mandate over Palestine, which was authorized by the
League of Nations in 1922. Because of Arab opposition to the establishment of
any Jewish state in Palestine, British Rule continued throughout the 1920s and
1930s (Beinin and Hjjar 2014).

Beginning in 1929, Arabs and Jews openly fought in Palestine, and

Britain attempted to limit Jewish immigration as a means of appeasing the
Arabs. As a result of the Holocaust in Europe, many Jews illegally entered
Palestine during World War TI. Radical Jewish groups employed terrorism
against British forces in Palestine, which they thought had betrayed the Zionist
cause. At the end of World War II, in 1945, the United States took up the
Zionist cause. Britain, unable to find a practical solution, referred the problem
to the United Nations, which in November 1947 voted to partition Palestine.

The Jews were to possess more than half of Palestine, although they made
up less than half of Palestine’s’ population. The Palestinian Arabs, aided by
volunteers from other countries, fought the Zionist forces, but in May 14, 1948,
the Jews had secured full control of their U.N. allocated share of Palestine and
also some Arab territory. On May 14, Britain withdrew with the expiration of its
mandate, and the state of Israel was proclaimed. The next day, forces from
Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq invaded. The Israelis, although
less equipped, managed to fight off the Arabs and then seize key territory, such
as Galilee, the Palestinian coast, and a strip of territory connecting the coastal
region to the western section of Jerusalem. In 1949, U.N brokered cease-fires
left the state of Israel in total control of this conquered territory. The departure
of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs from Israel during the war left
the country with a substantial Jewish majority.

During the third Arab-Israeli conflict- the six days War in 1967, Israel
again greatly increased its borders. Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization
(P.L.O) signed a major peace accord in 1993, which envisioned the gradual
implementation of Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza
strip. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process moved slowly however, and in 2000
major fighting between Israelis and Palestinians resumed in Israel and the
occupied territories.

The United States has supported Israel with foreign aids since 1985. It
has provided nearly US$3 billion in grants annually to Israel, with Israel being
the largest annual recipient of American aid from 1976 to 2004 and the largest
cumulative recipient of aid ($121 billion, not inflation adjusted) since World
War II. Almost all US aids to Israel is no in form of military assistance, while in
the past it also received a significant economic assistance. Strong congressional
support has resulted in Israel receiving benefits not available to other countries.

In addition to financial and military aid, the United States also provides
political support to Israel, having used its United Nations Security Council veto
power 42 times with respect to resolutions relating to Israel, out of a total 83
times in which its veto has ever been used.

The United States of America since World War II has vied to achieve two
main foreign policy objectives in the Middle East: Control the region and its
resources and prop-up its allies (often dictators), while maintaining a degree of
stability so that the United States is able to conduct its business unhindered.
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The Israel-Palestine conflict has lingered for so long and with several
attempts to bring about an end to the conflict meeting a dead end. The United
States of America have since the creation of the state of Israel played an active
role in the Middle East by trying to act as a mediator for the conflicting nations
(Israel and Palestine). Looking at the role of a mediator the United States plays
in the region, the research is to examine how effective her (US) role in the peace
settlement between Israel and Palestine really is.

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The objective of this project is to examine the role of United States of

America in the Middle East conflict a case study of Israel-Palestine peace
process. While the specific objectives are:

 To examine how the United States involvement contributes to the tension

in the Middle East.
 To assess how effective the role of the United States peace process aids
settlement between Israel and Palestine.
 To determine the interest of the United States in the Middle East region.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

 Has the United Stat& involvement in Middle East contributed to its

tension?
 Is the role of the United States in the peace process effective?
 What interest does the United State have in the Middle East?

1.5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS

HYPOTHESIS I
H0: The involvement of the U.S. in the Middle East conflict does not
contribute to the tension in the region.

H1: The involvement of the U.S. in the Middle East conflict contributes to
the tension in the region.

HYPOTHESIS II

H0: The role of the U.S. in the peace process does not aid settlement between
Israel and Palestine

H1: The role of the U.S. in the peace process aids settlement between Israel
and Palestine.

HYPOTHESIS III

H0: U.S. has no special interest in the Middle East region

H1: U.S has a special interest in the Middle East region

1.6 SIGNIFICANCE TO THE STUDY

The study is significant in exposing the role the United States plays in the
Middle East region. It is especially important because it tries to shine more light
on the cause of the lingering crisis in the Middle East. Aside shining more light
on the cause of the Middle East crisis, it also tries to give possible solutions to
the problems.

1.7 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The study is limited to Israel and Palestine. It involves a comparative

analysis of articles and journals. It further examines the role of the United States
in the diplomatic relations between Irue1 and Palestine with regard to both the
economic, political and social standings of both Mites. Both primary and
secondary sources are used for the study. The data are reviewed for relevant
theories, key concepts, thoughts, opinions and other facts bearing on the subject.
1.8 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

They are the shortcomings, difficulties that try to hinder the researcher
from successful execution of the study. The limitations which the researcher
encountered during the course of the research work are;

o The problem of the inability to get the necessary source of information

o Inadequate data
o Individual bias

Despite all these limitations, which almost hindered the study, the researcher
still handled it in such a way that it did not affect the findings of the research
work.

1.9 DEFINITION OF TERMS

During the course of this research work, various concepts have been used.
Also the use of acronyms has also been used to aid speed in the delivery of this
intellectual materials which would aid in making the research work concise.
Some of these words are;

 Middle East: This is a transcontinental region centered on Western Asia.

Turkey (both Asian and European), and Egypt (which is mostly North
Africa). This term was used to replace the term Near East (as opposed to
the Far East) beginning in the early 20th century. Until World War II, it
was customary to refer to areas centered on Turkey and the eastern shore
of the Mediterranean as the “Near East” while the “Far East’ centered on
China, and the Middle East then meant the area from between the Near
East and the Far East.

 Zionist Movement: This is best known as Zionism. It is a national

movement of the Jewish people that supports the reestablishment of a
 Jewish homeland in the territory defined as the historic Land of Israel
(roughly corresponding to Canaan, the Holy Land, or the region of
Palestine).

 Balfour Declaration: This is was a public statement issued by the British

government during World War I announcing support for the Jewish
People in Palestine, then an Ottoman region with a minority Jewish
population.

 United Nations: This is an association of states which have pledged

themselves, through the signing of the Charter, to maintain international
peace and security and to co-operate in establishing political, economic
and social conditions under which this task can be securely achieved. It
formally came into existence on 24n October 1945. It was formed to right
the wrongs of the shortcomings of the League of Nations.

 NGOs: Non-governmental organizations are usually non-profit and

sometimes international organizations independent of government and
international governmental organizations (though often funded by
government) that are active in humanitarian, educational, health care,
public policy, social, human rights, environmental, and other areas to
effect changes according to their objectives.

 Persian Gulf: Is a Mediterranean sea in Western Asia. The body of water

is an extension of the Indian Ocean (Gulf of Oman) through the Strait of
Hormuz and lies between Iran to the northeast and the Arabian Peninsula
to the southwest. The Shatt al-arab river delta forms the northwest
shoreline.

 Palestine Liberation Organization: Is an organization founded in 1964

with the purpose of the “liberation of Palestine” through armed struggle,
with much of its violence aimed at Israeli civilians. It is recognized as the
 sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people by over 100 states
with which it holds diplomatic relations, and has enjoyed observer status
in the United Nations since 1974.

 Veto: This is a Latin word for “I forbid”. It is the power (used by an

officer of the state, for example) to unilaterally stop an official action,
especially the enactment of legislation. A veto can be absolute as for
instance in the United Nations Security Council, whose permanent
members (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States
of America) can block any resolution.

 Sovereignty: This is the right be-stalled on a state to manage its affairs

without any form of external interference whatsoever by another state be
it great or small.
 CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter looks at the basic causes of the Middle East looking mainly
at the long standing unrest between Israel and Palestine as well as the role the
United States is playing to bring about a lasting solution between the two
nations.

About forty years ago, Pearcy had provocatively asserted that the Middle
East is indeed an unidentified region (Pearcy 1964, 1-12). However in
September 1902 A. T. Mahan, an American naval historian, has published an
article called “The Persian Gulf and International Relations” in the British
National Review magazine where for the first time he used the phrase of the
Middle East for the Gulf of Aden and India (Davison 1963, 17). According to
the concept of Mahan, the Middle East was the region between the Suez and
Singapore.

Two months later after Mahan’s article, Valentine Chirol a reporter of the
British Times Newspaper began to publish a series of articles titled “the Middle
East Question” (Davison 1963, 17), Thus, term of the Middle East centered by
India was settled in the international literature after the publication of Mahan
and Chirol.

2.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1.1 CONFLICT

From the literature reveals that scholars have made on the subject matter
shows that dispute is unavoidable in all human interactions and relationships
both within and across national boundaries.
 According to Ivorgba (2005), conflict is as old as the history of mankind
and therefore normal, natural and unavoidable, yet it can generate negative and
very destructive impacts, as well as awareness, economic growth and
development. Conflict refers to a state of discord caused by the actual or
perceived opposition of needs, values and interest. It occurs whenever one
activity prevents, interferes or blocks the occurrence of effectiveness of another
activity.

International conflicts are conflicts that occur between governments of

different countries for the right to monopolize the exploitation of resources in
the disputed territory. This can also occur where the nationals of one nation-
state are attacked, killed or dehumanized by another national. International
conflicts are sometimes perceived as inter-government struggles and the bone of
contention are usually, territory or some form of natural endowment that are
very essential economically.

Asobie (2003) reveals that a deeper examination of international conflicts

is mainly struggles between primary social classes, clashes across national
boundaries. Some international conflicts are instigated by monopolistic
capitalist under the umbrella of the government such as major oil and mineral
exp1oitin companies etc. These capitalist belong to different ruling classes in
the exploitation of resources in both countries which bring about corruption
because it serves the interest of these multinational capitalists at the expense of
the people. These people include the youth, women, men, children and people in
that territory who may find it hard to escape conflict zone or seek refuge in
another territory.

2.1.2 PEACE PROCESS

“We’ll fight terror like there‘s no peace, and make peace like there‘s no
terror.” – Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Despite the ongoing violence,
Israeli and Palestinian leaders have undertaken several serious efforts to
negotiate a settlement in the last two decades. With the continuous turnover of
leadership on both sides, the parties’ approach to peacemaking has ranged from
the underground talks that produced the Oslo Accords to the formalized summit
at Camp David under the oversight of President Clinton. While none of these
previous peace processes has yielded a conclusive settlement, each attempt
illuminates important lessons with respect to the parties’ bottom line positions
and the necessary degree of U.S. involvement, which must inform future
negotiation efforts.

The Madrid Conference, 1991

The first notable effort to negotiate an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement

took place in the context of a formalized international conference in Madrid.
Under the joint chairmanship of U.S. President George I-LW. Bush and Soviet
President Gorbachev. The conference convened representatives from Israel,
Syria, and Lebanon, as well as a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation (Quandt,
1993). This held particular symbolic significance because the conference
authorized the Palestinians to speak on their o behalf for the first time in an
official diplomatic setting. The Palestinians agreed to participate primarily
because of substantial pressure from the U.S. Secretary of State Baker, who
persuaded Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) leaders that the
conference represented their only viable avenue to halt Israeli settlements
(Kurtzer, Lasensky and Quandt, 2013). While Israel was unwilling to accept the
PLO as a satisfactory negotiating partner by itself, Bush and Baker astutely
engineered a joint delegation with Jordan that was suitable for all parties. The
conference itself held value more in its symbolic significance than in the actual
substance of the negotiations, which yielded little tangible progress toward
peace (Quandt 2013). The discussion did not approach the topic of establishing
a territorial basis for Israeli-Palestinian peace, which represents an essential
framework for future ogress (Kurtzer, 2013). However, the conference
succeeded in breaking the taboo of open discussion between Israel and the
neighboring Arab states. Moreover, the meeting demonstrated a commitment
among the parties to an ongoing negotiation process (Kurtzer, 2013). While the
United States did not assume a proactive mediator role, it played an essential
part in convening the conference and yielding its symbolic achievement.
Overall, this achievement stemmed from President Bush and Secretary Baker’s
resolute leadership and the receptivity of the parties themselves (Kurtzer, 2013).

The Oslo Accords, 1993

Following the Madrid Conference, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations

reached a stalemate due to the conflicting approaches to the peace process.
Israel wanted to buy time through an interim agreement allowing a more
palatable Palestinian negotiating partner to emerge, and the P.L.O sought
recognition as a state as soon as possible (Quandt, 2013). While President
Clinton’s Secretary of State Christopher mediated ongoing talks between Israeli
and Palestinian representatives in Washington, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin also
permitted Israeli negotiators to meet with delegates acting on P.L.O Chairman
Arafat’s behalf in Norway. With the Washington talks at a standstill, Rabin
eventually selected Oslo as an official channel of negotiations. Under the
oversight of Norwegian mediators, Rabin and Arafat arrived at a declaration of
mutual recognition and produced the Oslo Accords. Although the United States
remained generally informed about the status of the negotiations, Clinton
expressed little interest in becoming significantly involved (Kurtzer, 2013). The
Oslo Accords represented the most significant step yet in the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process. For the first time, Israel recognized the PLO as the legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people and put in place steps to transfer to them
jurisdiction over Gaza and parts of the West Bank. Implicitly, these initial land
transfers would provide the Palestinians with a small territorial base to begin
building their state, although the text did not specifically acknowledge the
Palestinians’ right to independent nationhood. After a five-ear transitional
period, the parties were to hold final status negotiations over the contested
issues of borders, security, Jerusalem, and the Palestinian refugees’ right of
return (Quandt. 2013). While the progress advanced in Oslo painted an
auspicious picture for future relations, the agreement ultimately collapsed as the
parties struggled to implement its terms to each other’s satisfaction. The
Accords’ text included too many generalities that the parties could interpret
ambiguously as they formulated the terms of implementation, resulting in
significant dissent. Moreover, the agreement failed to address the most
contested issues that fundamentally defined the conflict, fallaciously assuming
that the parties would resolve them incrementally in the interim period. The
parties’ reluctance to confront these deep-rooted controversies limited the extent
of feasible progress. It remains unclear if a more active U.S. role in the
negotiations could have served to mitigate these issues. Clinton remained
detached due in part to the other channels of negotiation occurring
simultaneously, including in Washington, and may have believed that
substantive progress could not be made without the indispensable involvement
of the United

States (Quandt, 2013). Moreover, Clinton did not regard the PLO as a
viable negotiating partner and perceived the Syrian track of negotiations as a
greater priority (Kurtzer, 2013). While the presence of a determined third party
mediator could have directed the parties to a more decisive resolution, the lack
of U.S. involvement at Oslo calls into question its role as the sole indispensable
broker of an agreement. However, the agreement’s ultimate collapse suggests
that sustainable progress cannot be made without a decisive third party.

Wyes River, 1998

 After a sustained stalemate in the peace process, Clinton sought to re-
engage the parties by inviting Netanyahu and Arafat to the Wyes River
Plantation in Maryland to resume talks. In a reversion to President Carter’s
summit diplomacy that had yielded success on the Israel-Egypt track, Clinton
and his advisors engaged in active back-and-forth mediation to help the parties
arrive at a compromise (Quandt, 2013). This return to a more traditional style of
formal diplomacy yielded some degree of progress. While Arafat agreed to
bolster security and revoke the section of the PLO charter questioning Israel’s
right to exist, Israel promised further withdrawal and prisoner release in return.
Problems arose primarily in the implementation process; Netanyahu’s rightwing
government refused to act on withdrawals, claiming that the Palestinians had
not complied on security (Quandt, 2013). These types of setbacks illustrate the
effects of contemporary leaders’ political leanings on the dynamics of
implementation. In this instance, Netanyahu’s opposition to the terms of Oslo
informed his unwillingness to enact peacemaking measures as planned (Kurtzer,
2013)

Camp David II, 2000

At the end of his second term, Clinton devised a final attempt to push the
parties toward a conclusive settlement through traditional summit diplomacy,
inviting Arafat and the new Israeli Prime Minister Barak to Camp David to
debate the contested issues of borders, security, settlements, and the right of
return (Quandt, 2013). While Clinton set forward a proposal for borders and
settlement withdrawal that seemed palatable to both parties, they ultimately
could not overcome the intractable impasse over Jerusalem. Arafat sought
Palestinian sovereignty over all of East Jerusalem, but Barak remained
unwilling to relinquish certain areas. Although Clinton tried to develop creative
solutions such as assigning the Palestinians “limited sovereignty” over the inner
neighborhoods, however, Arafat ultimately rejected the final offer, declaring,
“If I sign this deal I will get killed” (Kurtzer, 201 3). Following the failure of
the talks, Clinton and several of his advisors placed the blame on Arafat’s
shoulders. Whether or not Arafat is solely to blame remains disputed. While the
Camp David talks represent the most viable peace effort in the conflict’s
history, a multitude of political and circumstantial factors contributed to their
collapse. First, the parties experienced the effects of putting off the most
complex issues in Oslo; while they had envisioned an incremental process of
partial agreements that facilitated eventual cnscnsus, these issues were simply
too intractable for agreement to occur naturally (Quaidt. 2013). Moreover,
Clinton failed to prepare sufficiently for the negotiations themselves; he lackc1
complete information on the parties’ bottom line positions and seemed to
improvise as the discussion unfolded, putting off Jerusalem until the summit’s
final days (Kurtzer and Quandt, 2013). Primarily, however, the negligible
substantive basis for discussion about the core issues was the driving force
behind the agreement’s collapse, as little progress on these disputes had made in
the seven years since Oslo. After the summit, Clinton’s decision to blame Arafat
had the effect of classifying the summit as an absolute failure; this weakened
the sense of trust among the parties and undermined any progress that had been
made (Kurtzer, 2013). With the outbreak of the second intifada and the end of
Clinton’s second term, the opportunity for peace seemed to have passed.

Annapolis, 2007

After the Camp David talks, the peace process remained stagnant for the
majority of the President George W. Bush’s administration. At the end of his
second term, however, Bush expressed interest in resuming negotiations. This
was due in part due to the Hamas takeover in Gaza in 2007, which emphasized
the need for diplomatic intervention (Kurtzer. 2013). To inaugurate the renewed
effort, Bush assembled Palestinian Authority President Abbas, Israeli Prime
Minister Olmert, and representatives from dozens of other nations that
supported a two state solution at an international “meeting” in Annapolis in
November 2007. In a manner similar to the Madrid Conference, the meeting
represented more of a symbolic diplomatic achievement than a matter of
substantive progress. While the parties produced a joint declaration reaffirming
their commitment to a two-state solution, the document offered no advancement
on the final status issues that had triggered the Camp David impasse. Moreover,
Bush exhibited a limited strategic vision beyond simply bringing the parties to
the table (Kurtzer, 2013). The Annapolis Conference signified the parties’
symbolic commitment to resume the negotiation process. This paved the road
for Olmert’s unprecedented peace offer to Abbas in September 2008, after
thirty- six secret meetings between the two leaders. Under Olmert’s proposed
agreement, Israel would recognize an independent Palestinian state under the
pre-1967 border with land swaps, forego its claim to the Temple Mount,
surrender Jerusalem’s Old City to international control, and allow for the
absorption of 5,000 Palestinian refugees into Israel (Avi lsacharof1 2013).
Ultimately, however, Abbas declined the offer, claiming later that he had not
been permitted to study the map. Although Olmert offered truly uncomfortable
concessions such as relinquishing Israel’s claim to the Old City of Jerusalem,
Abbas did not deem the circumstances of the Palestinian people appropriate to
accept the agreement. As Bush left office, the situation quickly reverted to its
status quo of stalemate.

In this special issue of International Negotiation, we explore the various

facets of inclusion and exclusion in peace processes. Negotiations among the
parties involved in a war are among the most critical and sensitive of all
bargaining processes. The internal and international wars of the post-cold War
era have claimed millions of lives, most of them civilians already living in
challenging environments of human development. This alone makes peace
negotiations a topic worthy of sustained academic and diplomatic attention
(Wanis 2008). Peace negotiations even when they result in agreement, may not
definitively resolve the underlying conflict issues and, worse still, they may not
mark an end to the violence. The outcome of a Peace process therefore is not
necessarily peace, even if the principal parties sign a peace agreement before
applauding global leaders and gratified mediators. Despite all our knowledge
and experience with structuring the substance and process of peace negotiations,
they resist predictability (Wanis, 2008).

According to Fisas (2008) a peace process is understood as being the

consolidation of a negotiation once the thematic agenda (the list of substantive
issues forming the object of negotiation), the procedures to be followed, the
timetable and facilitation has been defined. Negotiation is therefore just one
stage in a peace process. A negotiation is understood as being the process by
which two or more opposing parties (either countries or internal actors within a
country) decide to discuss their differences within an agreed framework in order
to find a satisfactory solution to their demands (Fisas 2015).

The peace process makes use of seven major methods which are;

1. Lawsuits (litigation)
2. Arbitration
3. Collaboration
4. Mediation
5. Conciliation
6. Negotiation
7. Facilitation

Litigation is the encompassing the use of court processes to resolve a

dispute, according to the rules in that jurisdiction (David Tupper. 2011).

Arbitration is a private method of dispute resolution in which the parties

select the individuals who will finally decide the matters in issue
following a process agreed upon by the parties, with no or a minimal
court intervention (Tupper, 2011). Tupper went further to categorize it
into two; Domestic arbitration which involves parties from the same
country and international arbitration which involves parties from different
countries (Tupper 2011).

Collaboration is a dispute resolution process by which parties’ choice to

separate the adversarial court method. It involves face to face negotiation
assistance from professional third part, a strong cooperating partnership, a
cordial relationship between conflicting parties and the settlement that
meet the need of both party (Etim 2017).

Mediation is an effective method of settling conflict in which the dispute

moves around a specific issue or a few issues. By most definitions used in
the I mediation is a third party intervention that is voluntary, which
implies that acceptance by the parties is needed for international
mediation to be pursued (Sevenson:2009:448).

Conciliation is the process whereby the parties to a dispute with the help
of the conciliator identify the issues in dispute, develop options, consider
alternatives and aim to reach an agreement (Etim 2017)

Negotiation is understood as being the process by which two or more

opposing parties (either countries or internal actors within a country)
decide to discuss their differences within an agreed framework in order to
find a satisfactory solution to their demands (Fisas 2015).

Facilitation is the process in which the parties with the assistance of a

neutral third party identify problem to be solved, tasks to be
accomplished or dispute issue to be resolved, However, conflict
resolution processes are categorized into two main types;
 Adjudicative processes: this includes litigation or arbitration in
which a judge or arbitrator determines the outcome of the case.
 Consensual processes: this includes collaboration law, conciliation,
mediation or negotiation in which the parties attempt to reach
agreement.
2.2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Jimmy Carter the former U.S. President in the state of the union address,
January 23, 1980, said, ‘Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any
outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an
assault on the vital interests of the United States America, and such an assault
will be repelled by any means necessary, including military (Carter, 2001,
p.857).

According to Zoe number (2001) the United States foreign policy

regarding the Arab world has changed noticeably since the attacks of September
11, 2000. She further went on to say that until that date, the United States
government had no significant national interest in shaping the political and
social landscapes of the Arab countries. It was not until the terrorist attacks of
9/11 that the Middle East became an area of increased focus for the United
States, due to national security reasons. By spreading freedom and democracy,
the goal was to neutralize potential havens for terrorism.

Adams Garfinkle (2008) outlined some default assumption of the United

States’ interest in the Middle East. He saw the flow of oil as the most critical of
the United States interest in the ecion. This is as a result of the increased global
demand and other stresses on the world’s still dominating liberal trading system.
Israel’s security is still a principal Western and American interest. During the
1960s the United States security guarantee to Israel became more explicit, but
most important for practical purposes was revolution in United States’ policy
set off the Nixon Administration in 1970. In the wake of the War of Attrition
and its culmination in the Jordan Crisis, the Nixon Administration rebalanced
the basis of the American commitment to Israel away from “soft factors like
democratic affinities and guilt over the Holocaust to “hard” strategic factors.
The basic view was that Israel must not be harmed, let alone defeated by any
Soviet client state, for that would redound to the disadvantage of the United
States in the seamless reputational competition of the Cold War. Moreover,
Israel’s strength could serve as a means of trumping the Soviets effort to
penetrate the Middle East. Effort to promote democracy and socio-economic
reform in the region is seen to constitute not so much a new interest, but a new
instrument to achieving existing interests.

Atallah S. Al Sarhan (2011) also outlined what he saw to be the United

States interest in the Middle East is securing strategic access to oil in the Gulf
region. This he placed key emphasis on, saying it is the major interest of the
United States interest in the region. Another is supporting and protecting
Israel’s sovereignty. This is so because maintaining a strong Israel in the Middle
East is securing the United States’ national security interest there. Another is
maintaining the United States military bases in the region. Maintaining military
bases especially those in the Arab oil-rich states along trade routes and pressure
point that will allow the United States policy to, directly and indirectly,
influence the entire region. Another is defending client-states and friendly
regimes and also resisting Islamic movements and terrorist groups.

Toby Craig Jones (2012) said that American oil wars have not been about
establishing direct control over oil fields nor about liberation or freedom, at
least not political freedom for the people of the region. Instead, they have
primarily been about protecting friendly oil producers. The objective has not
necessarily been to guarantee that Middle Eastern oil made its way to the United
States, although meeting basic domestic energy needs remained a vital part of
the broader calculation. Keeping price stable (not low) and keeping pro-
American regimes in power were central to United States strategic policy.
Capturing oil and oil fields and establishing direct or imperial control over oil
has not been part of the United States strategic logic for war. But protecting oil,
oil producers, and the flow of oil has been.
2.3 SPECIFICATION GAP

Zoe Nautre in her article only looked at what made the United State focus
more on the Arab world. She failed to recognize that the United States have
been in close contact with the Arab world prior that time (the 9/li attack). She
also failed to look at it from the point of view that the bombing was as a result
of a sour relationship between the United States and the Arab world. She also
did not look at it from the fact that the Arab world was trying to make a
statement to the United States.

The statement made by President Jimmy Carter in his speech clearly

states America’s interest in the region. It goes further to show how important
the Persian Gulf region is to the United States. By this, it clearly shows the true
motives behind the United States interest in the protection of the region. This
shows that it goes far beyond protecting and maintaining the peace in the
region, but rather for the preservation of the States interest.

Toby Craig Jones looked at the direct interest of America in the region
and how much interest it has in the oil in the region. For this reason America
strive to keep pro-American leaders in the region to ensure that her interest is
preserved.

Adam Garfinkle looked at the role the United States plays as a mother
hen that protecting her chic (Israel). This he summed up as a result of the power
struggle between the United States and the then Soviet Union (now Russia). By
this he has succeeded in attributing the power tussle between both rival states
(United States and Russia) in other to gain a maximum advantage of over the
other.

2.4 BRIEF HISTORY OF ISRAEL-PALESTINE CRISIS

 The crisis can be traced right back to Israel’s decision to return to her
ancestral home in 1948 due to Adolf Hitler’s decision to purge Germany of
every Jew in the region, which saw six million (6,000,000) Jews gassed. The
land which the Jews had made strong claim had in it habitants of the said
region. Those habiting the area were the Palestine who for no reason saw the
need to hand over any portion of their “land” to any nation. The modern day
Israel has its origin in the Zionist movement, established in the late 19th century
by Jews in the Russian Empire who called for the establishment of a territorial
Jewish state after enduring persecution. 1896, Jewish-Austrian journalist
Theodor Herlz published an influential political pamphlet called The Jewish
State, which he argued that the establishment was the only way of protecting the
Jews from anti-Semitism. Herlz became the leader of the Zionist Congress in
Switzerland in 1897. Ottoman-controlled Palestine, the original home of the
Jews, was chosen as the most desirable location for a Jewish state, and Herlz
unsuccessfully petitioned the Ottoman government for a charter.

After the failed Russian revolution of 1905, growing number of Eastern

European and Russian Jews began to immigrate to Palestine, joining the four
thousand who had arrived earlier. The Jewish settlers insisted on the use of
Hebrew has their spoken language. With the collapse of the Ottoman empire
during World War I, Britain took over Palestine, in 1917, Britain issued the
“Balfour Declaration”, which declared its intent to establish a Jewish homeland
in Palestine. Although protested by the Arab states, the Balfour Declaration was
included in the British mandate over Palestine, which was authorized by the
League of Nations in 1922. Because of Arab opposition to the establishment of
any Jewish state in Palestine, British Rule continued throughout the 1920s and
1930s.

Beginning in 1929, Arabs and Jews openly fought in Palestine and

Britain attempted to limit Jewish immigration as a means of appeasing the
Arabs. As a result of the Holocaust in Europe, many Jews illegally entered
Palestine during World War II. Radical Jewish groups employed terrorism
against British forces in Palestine, which they thought had betrayed the Zionist
cause. At the end of World War II, in 1945, the United States look up the
Zionist cause. Britain, unable to find a practical solution, referred the problem
to the United Nations, which in November 1947 voted to partition Palestine.

The Jews were to possess more than half of Palestine, although they made
up less than half of Palestine’s’ population. The Palestinian Arabs, aided by
volunteers from other countries, fought the Zionist forces, but in May 14, 1948,
the Jews had secured hill control of their U.N. allocated share of Palestine and
also some Arab territory. On May 14, Britain withdrew with the expiration of its
mandate, and the state of Israel was proclaimed. The next day, forces from
Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq invaded. The Israelis, although
less equipped, managed to fight off the Arabs and then seize key territory, such
as Galilee, the Palestinian coast, and a strip of territory connecting the coastal
region to the western section of Jerusalem. In 1949. U.N., brokered cease-fires
left the state of Israel in total control of this conquered territory. The departure
of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs from Israel during the war left
the country with a substantial Jewish majority.

During the third Arab-Israeli conflict- the six days War in 1 967, Israel
again greatly increased its borders. Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization
(P.L.O) signed a major peace accord in 1993, which envisioned the gradual
implementation of Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza
strip. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process moved slowly however, and in 2000
major fighting between Israelis and Palestinians resumed in Israel and the
occupied territories. Approaching the history of the Israeli—Palestinian conflict
first requires a proper contextual understanding of both modern and ancient
history. The roots of the conflict and its various and often competing narratives
can be understood intuitively through the larger historical processes of the 20th
century (Benny Morris, 2009). The history of the conflict is deeply nuanced and
contradictory both sides often interpret the same events in completely different
fashions. The following history section will provide a summary of the past
century, with a focus on the development of nationalist identity, and how these
respective events contributed to and formed the current situation.

Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916

One of the principal documents outlining Western intentions in the

Middle East, the Sykes-Picol Agreement was a secret pact signed by the foreign
ministers of England and France agreeing to separate spheres of influence in the
region. The two powers agreed that, should the Ottoman Empire collapse
following the conclusion of the First World War, France would take control of
the Lebanon and Syria region, while England would rule southern Palestine and
southern Iraq (David Fromkin, 1989). Additionally, the powers nominally
agreed to support an independent Arab state in greater Syria and “Transjordan”
after the fall of Ottoman Empire. The French and British made these promises
to Hussein bin Ali, a local leader from Mecca, in return for guarantees of
uprisings against Turkish forces (Fromkin, l989).

Balfour Declaration, 1917

Submitted by the United Kingdom’s foreign secretary Arthur Balfour,

and later incorporated into the peace agreement resolving hostilities between the
allied powers and the Ottoman Empire, this declaration explicitly outlined allied
intent to establish a “national home” for the Jewish people in Palestine. This
agreement would run counter to promises made by various British officials,
including Lord Kitchner, Sir Henry McMahon, and T.E. Lawrence, to Arab
leaders in the region. Though the exact motivations for the incorporation of the
declaration are still subject to historical debate, the declaration physically and
politically alienated Arab communities in the region (Shlomo Ben-Ami, 2006).
Alienation, feelings of betrayal and incursion, and continued Jewish
immigration to the region among other factors helped set the stage for patterns
of retributive violence over the following decades.

The British Mandate, 1920 – 1948

After the official adoption of the Balfour Declaration in 1917, the British
proceeded to establish administrative control over Palestine. Formally
recognized by the League of Nations in the early 920s, the mandate sought to
create a Jewish national homeland in the region and to maintain control until
local Arab populations were capable of self-rule. Though Britain did not
formally facilitate Zionist colonization in the region, their control did abet
immigration, which significantly increased during the 1920s. As Jewish
emigration and settlement in Palestine continued, resentment among local Arabs
flourished and erupted into periodic episodes of violence, primarily due to
tensions about access to religious holy sites, particularly the Western Wall, and
subsequent misunderstandings about each side’s intent, for example, during the
1929 Hebron Massacre, Arabs killed dozens of Jewish settlers over a false
rumor that they intcnded to destroy the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Eruptions of violence
like this continued unabated, and helped foster a mentality of victimization and
suspicion on either side (Karna, Connolly, Estill, Furnary, Hufforrd,
klingenberger, Mentrek, Ogren, Plencha, Shallow, Sitko and Wallace, 2015).

Arab Revolt, 1936-1939

Initially a strike, which later developed into a violent uprising, the Arab
Revolt was primarily led by Palestinian lower classes against British rule in the
formally established Mandate of Palestine. Stemming from frustration over
colonial control, as well as continued Jewish immigration to the country, which
first sparked riots in Arab riots in 1933, the violence in this instance was much
more universal across the region. First instigated by the Palestinian mufti, the
conflict was notably brutal. 1 he British took extreme measures to quell the
rebellion, unilaterally exercising force to suppress Palestinian gucrilla
movements and rioting civilian populations. The British response effectivelY
left the Palestinians “without leaders and representative institutions,” as they
were either forced into exile or dissolved, like the Arab Higher Committee, as
legitimate bodies (Shlomo, 2006). The British reaction ended the violence, but
helped to solidify Palestinian narratives of heroism against colonialist powers
and fueled exclusivist nationalist rhetoric (Shlomo, 2006). Some of the rebel
groups could solidify small regions of territorial control, giving some a nominal
sense of authority, but relations between British colonial rulers, Jewish settlers,
and local Palestinians remained hostile. Despite their success in containing the
uprising, the event further compounded British beliefs that long-term control of
the region would he untenable.

1948 Arab-Israeli War

Subject to competing definitions and interpretations, the Israelis

characterize this war as the first liniment of independence and founding of the
Israeli state under the leadership of the First Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, while
the Palestinians view it as an unmitigated disaster. Wishing to prevent the
establishment of a Jewish state, as outlined in the UN plan, forces from Egypt,
Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon attacked Israel. The Israelis pushed back these
forces along all borders, secured a large portion of Jerusalem, and gained large
swaths of territorial control in the Negev Desert. However, the Gaza Strip
remained under Egyptian control. After Israel achieved military victory, a series
of tense armistices were set between Israel and other surrounding nations in
1949, the establishment of the Green Line demarcation zones. The Green Line,
which still has political significance in current peace discussions, initially
defined boundaries with the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and
the Gaza Strip. Though never intended to serve as more than an armistice
boundary, the line has largely been construed and interpreted as the 1967
borders (Karna et.al, 2015).

1967 Arab-Israeli War

Israel’s military decisive victory in this war between Israel and the
combined forces of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon produced Israel’s
dominant position in the region. Beginning with a devastatingly successful
Israeli attack on Egyptian airfields, which resulted in immediate Israeli air
superiority, Israel captured and occupied the Sinai Peninsula, Syrian Golan
Heights, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Old City of Jerusalem - all
areas previously defined as beyond the Green Line (William B. Quandt, 1993).
The scale of the victory for the Israelis had extremely important political and
geopolitical ramifications, leaving the defeated Arab countries both demoralized
and militarily decimated. The war created hundreds of thousands of new
Palestinian refugees and brought more than one million West Bank residents
under Israeli rule. In response to the war, the United Nations passed Resolution
242, which called for mutual respect for the territorial sovereignty of every state
involved in the conflict, an Israeli withdrawal from occupied lands and a just
settlement of the refugee problem caused by the war. Considered a basis for
future peace talks, UN Resolution 242 is still valid under accepted international
law.

1973 Arab-Israeli War

Beginning with a surprise attack by Syrian and Egyptian forces in

October I973, the Yom Kippur war showed the limits of Israeli military power
in the region (Quandt, I 993). Though the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) were
quickly able to respond and recapture lost territory in the Sinai and the Golan
Heights, they did so at a heavy cost, namely 2,000 casualties and significant
losses in terms of military equipment, which shattered the image of Israeli
invincibility. UN Resolution 338 called for an immediate ceasefire by ill parties,
ending the conflict. The motion additionally called for the enactment and
reaffirmation of Resolution 248.

First Intifada, 1,987-1993

The first significant Palestinian uprising since the 1930s, the Intifada was
a collective uprising in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip aimed at ending
Israeli occupation and creating an independent state. Responding to increased
Israeli security measures and the growth of settlements in the West Bank.
Palestinians orchestrated a series of mass riots in 1987; The United States and
other international actors quickly called for an end to the violence and urged the
PLO to follow the UN guidelines established in resolutions 242 and 338 (Karna
et.al, 2015).

Second Intifada (M-Aqsa Mosque Intifada), 2000-2005

Jeremy Pressman (2003) viewed as an Israeli attempt to assert more

control over the Temple Mount, Mel Sharon’s visit sparked Palestinian protests
throughout Jerusalem. IDF security forces brutally suppressed these riots. High
tensions violence against civilians on either side generally characterized this
period: More notably, the frequency of suicide bomber attacks and rocket
strikes from Gaza increased dramatically. Israel also took pre-emptive measures
including conducting raids in the West Bank as well as security sweeps of
Palestinian refugee camps (BBC, “AI-Aqsa intifada Timeline”, 2004). Though
Sharon’s visit was the spark. The failure of the Camp David accords in 2000
largely caused the Palestinian malaise. After thousands of casualties, the
violence generally subsided in 2005, when Prime Minister Arid Sharon and
President Mahmoud Abbas agreed that both sides needed to cease violent
activities against the other. Moreover, the cessation of violence helped to secure
the beginning of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza as well the dismantling of
Israeli settlements in exchange for peace.

Gaza Wars, 2008 and 2014

In 2008, Israel invaded the Gaza Strip in response to continued rocket

Gre into Israel territories as well as continued Hamas-led weapons smuggling
into the country. The short three-week operation vas devastating for Hamas
belligerents, resulting in nearly a thousand Palestinian casualties (The Guardian,
The Israeli Attacks on Gaza”, 2009). The conflict weakened Israeli trust in
Palestinian leadership, because the PLO could not control Hamas’s continued
use of violence alter agreeing to the Gaza withdrawal plan of 2005. The summer
of 2014 followed a similar pattern to the 2008 Ga7a War. Responding again to a
series of Hamas rocket attacks, the IDF invaded Gaza with the sole objective of
stopping the attacks. In addition to conventional ground forces, the IDF
extensively employed airstrikes to neutralize targets throughout the strip.
Casualties for the Palestinians by the end of the summer were nearly 2,000,
while Israeli forces suffered only 63 losses (The BBC, “Gaza Crisis, Toll of
operation in Gaza”, 2014). Though Operation Protective Edge critically
weakened Hamas’ ability to attack, Israel was widely criticized for employing
excessive force.

Current Situation, 2015

Beginning in the summer of 2014 with the kidnapping and eventual

murder of three Israeli teenagers by Hamas, tensions have escalated because of
a series of reciprocal attacks carried out by both Israelis and Palestinians. The
attacks themselves have been individual and random in nature, targeting
innocent civilians solely because of their nationalities. The intimate, yet
unpredictable nature of these attacks has left the population of Jerusalem,
particularly the Old City, constantly on edge. Though some have referred to this
flair up as the beginning of a “Third Intifade,” some experts on the matter,
particularly Middle East analyst Mouin Rabbani, disagree. Rabbani observes
that the situation disturbing, does not represent an organized uprising or
movement as has been seen in the past Mouin Rabbani, 2015). As the majority
of the assailants are minors, below the age of 18, and since no leadership organ
has taken responsibility over the past year, it is not reasonable to attribute these
incidents to a larger movement. Though the attacks may not be explicitly
organized, they will likely further tighten Israeli security measures, which could
result in an even greater frequency of these occurrences. More disturbing on
how these attacks have largely been normalized by both populations. Indeed,
the select few that were interviewed anticipate or expect continued violence
which speaks to the tense nature of the current status quo.

2.5 WHERE THE LAST ADMINISTRATION LEFT OFF: THE

CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

The Kerry Talks, 2013-14 in 2013. U.S Secretary of State John Kerry
launched as revitalized initiative to broker an Israeli-Palestinian settlement,
expressing his willingness to invest serious efforts in the process. Under Kerry’s
oversight, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators met in Washington in July 2013,
setting April 29, 2014 as the deadline for arriving at an agreement on final
status issues (Jodi Rudoren and Isable Kershner, 2014). While both Abbas and
Netanyahu declared themselves amenable to resuming negotiators, each side’s
negotiators refused to concede on their opening maximalist positions.
Meanwhile, in an effort to avoid alienating the Israeli far right, Netanyahu
continued to approve the construction of new settlements in the West Bank and
East Jerusalem over the course of the peace talks. As Abbas publicly
condemned the settlements and demanded full Palestinian control aver the West
Bank, this undermined the process’s viability. When it became clear that
reaching an agreement by the April deadline proved infeasible, Kerry attempted
to convince both parties to accept a U.S. “Framework for negotiations” that
delineated parameters on all of the final status issues (Ben Birnban and Amir
Tibon, 2014). Kerry worked particularly to assuage Netanyahu’s concerns about
security to persuade him to accept the less palatable criteria, such as the pre-1
967 borders. By January, it appeared that Kerry had made progress persuading
Netanyahu to accept the U.S. parameters for borders, although he refused to
yield with respect to Jerusalem (Birnbaum and bon, 2014). When Netanyahu
failed to deliver on the agreed-upon release of Palestinian prisoners, Abbas
grew increasingly perturbed. As Abbas reasoned, the United States failure to
compel Israel to release just a few dozen prisoners would translate to even
greater futility in persuading Israel to yield on truly contested issues like Last
Jerusalem. Although Kerry offered the release of notorious Israeli spy Jonathan
Pollard as an incentive to deliver the prisoners, Netanyahu remained immovably
reluctant to anger his allies on the Israeli far right; it appeared that Kerry was
trying to force the hand of parties resistant to negotiation. In late April, Hamas
and Fatah announced their intention to hold elections for a joint unity
government to govern the PA Unwilling to negotiate with a Palestinian
government backed by llamas, the Israeli Cabinet voted the following day to
suspend the peace talks indefinitely and impose economic sanctions un the PA
(Attila Somfalvi, 2014). The formal negotiation process again reached an
impasse, and has not subsequently been resumed.

2.6 Key Players and Their Interests

2.6.1 ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN NARRATIVES

“Two people claim the same land and all of it” - Ophir Kariv, Israeli
Foreign Ministry. Although the Israelis identify the United States as their
closest ally, the Israeli government complains that the United States meddles
without understanding Arab-Israeli issue. As Senior Fellow Charles Freilich of
the Harvard Kennedy School explained, “Americans are bordered by two
oceans and two friendly allies. They do not know what it is to be surrounded by
a sea of Instability (Charles Freilich, 2015).” Even former PLO member Ali
Abu Awwad lamented that if the United States wanted to help solve the Israeli-
Palestinian crisis, it needed to “restudy the situation (All Abu Awwad, 2015).”
Thus, before forming U.S. policy toward the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, it is
important to first absorb the stories of each side—to understand each people’s
attachment to the land, their way of thinking, their way of living, and their way
of governing. To this end, the following section provides an overview of the
Israeli and Palestinian narratives. Only after internalizing both sides’ stories will
the United States be in a position to broker a long-lasting peace agreement.

Israeli Narrative

“We, on the other hand, are always restless, for we live between great
fires. We thrive between calamities. That’s why we are so quick and vital and
creative. That’s why we are so neurotic and loud and unbearable. We dwell
under the looing shadow of smoking volcano.” – Ari Shavit (Ari Shavit, 2013).

To understand Israel is to understand the journey of an ancient people

looking for a place of belonging. It is to understand that even when the Jewish
people were scattered across the world in Germany, France, Morocco and Iraq,
they still felt rooted in Jerusalem. Secular Jews came to the lands between the
Jordan River and the Mediterranean attempting to cease the annihilation first of
Jewish culture and then of the Jewish people. Religious Jews too fled Nazis,
Communists and Fascists alike. However, they saw their journey not only as
survival, but also as the fulfillment of a promise they had prayed for each week
at shabbat – that they would return to Jerusalem.

Thus, the creation of an Israeli State should be seen as the homecoming

of persecuted people seeking refuge in the only land they have known to keep
them safe, for secular and orthodox Jews alike, land is sacred. To give up land is
to give up security and buffer from foreign threats.

To give up land is to give up art of the very promise of God. The Jewish
people faced near extinction in the 20th century-a true crisis. In that time of
vulnerability, Israel became the last line of defense. Even if all other countries
were to turn on the Jewish people, or they were to be conquered by a foreign
oppressor. Israel would be the Jewish people’s safe haven. Today, Israel
continues to see itself as the homeland of the Jewish people; a place where all
Jews have the right to return. Without the safety and security of Israel, there is
no guarantee for the Jewish people. That is why the burden of proof regarding
security will always be highest in Israel. Israeli intelligence and Israeli defense
cannot ignore even the smallest of risks. Thus, peace talks, when assessing
whether to accept a particular agreement, what must be proven is that Israel’s
security will not be compromised even if everything about the agreement goes
wrong.

Only when fully assured of its security, can Israel move forward with a
two-state solution? The country must think in such doomsday terms, because it
has felt the knock of doomsday before.

To understand Israel is to understand too that there is no one homogenous

Israel. The country is a hodgepodge of communities that previously existed and
developed separately from one another for hundreds of years. Between Arabs
and Ashkenazi, orthodox and secular, Russian and Ethiopian, the country’s
changing demographics mean that it has multiple personalities. As Shaul
ludeman of the Friends of Roots organization put it, the country can be
“schizophrenic’ (Shaul ludeman, 2015).

Palestinian Narrative
 “Their deep and abiding sense of injustice instilled in the Arabs of
Palestine a belief in entitlement. They were entitled to the land-it was theirs,
they had been promised independence over it, they need not surrender it to
those coming from the outside. “Dennis Ross (Dennis Ross, 2004). Any
description of the Palestinian narrative must begin with al-Nakbah, the Arabic
word for “The Catastrophe”. This occurred in the 1948 conflict between the
Israelis and Arabs prior to and during the founding of the State of Israel. During
al-Nakbah, over 700,000 Palestinians were expelled from their homes in what
became the State of Israel. This is looked at is the beginning of Israeli
aggression against the Palestinian people, who had not yet truly developed into
a national movement. Palestinians often cite quotes such as one by Theodore
Herzl stating, “spirit the penniless [indigenous Palestinian population across the
border” to support this claim (Nur Masalha, 1992). While there is dispute
among historians over how many Palestinians were expelled versus how many
left on their own, how many left on their own, even the lowest expulsion
estimates are too high for the Palestinian people to tolerate. They view such
expulsions as the first sin of Israel against Palestinians.

2.7 US Role in Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

The role of the United States of America in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace

process has been very crucial particularly after the end of Second World War.
Though its political involvement in the Palestine issue started with the birth of
the problem itself after the First World War, LI U.S. maintained a distance and
disinterest to get directly involved in the conflict resolution activity.
Immediately following the Second World War, the U.S. remained disinterested
and showed little interest of getting directly involved in the resolution of the
dispute. The pressure from the American Zionist organization as well as the
space provided by the termination of the British mandate due to the weakened
British Empire was fully utilized by the rejuvenated economically and militarily
strong and powerful United States. It proactively involved itself and assumes
the role of mediator in the Palestine-Israeli conflict, through it in the
strategically important Middle East region. During the cold war period, the
major thrust of the US foreign policy were guided by the containment of
communism theory for the protection of the so called institutional liberalism,
which was ostensibly threatened by the emergence of communism in the Soviet
Union and the emergence of the powerful socialist block. The strategic
importance of the West Asia was therefore important for the U.S., which had
emerged as the leader of the capitalist world. West Asia was also an excellent
market for the US manufactured goods and the richest source of oil in the
world. The furtherance of its economic and strategic interests during the cold
war period the US, policy in the Middle East remained one of strengthening and
supporting Israel economically and militarily in order to make it a military base
and a satellite state in the region. The policy was also guided by directly
involving itself in the Arab-Israel conflict and through it in the Middle East
region. The policy also was directed to win over the support of the Arab states.
In this direction, it sought to seek the support of anti-communists and pro-west
authoritarian and nondemocratic and traditional states of the region. In order to
ensure the security for transiting the flow of oil, from the region the potential
beneficiary states were provided with economic incentives of business
expansion and, therefore made part of the western alliance. Since the 1967 war,
the United States has been an active participant in Middle East peacemaking,
and American involvement has usually been considered as a sine-qua non for
the successful negotiations of any Arab Israeli agreement. While the US did not
initiate most successful negotiations, it took a central and forceful role in all the
peace processes leading to these agreements once they came to light. But US
did not play a role of impartial mediator in the peace process. Therefore, the
role of the US in the Middle East region and particularly in Israeli- Palestinian
conflict has been one of indifference and non-involvement and disinterestedness
to more proactive and direct involvement with the problem at different times in
the history of the conflict. At times, it has taken a back seat, and allowed
arbitration by the UN and other statutory organizations of peace making that it
created from time to time. The behind the scene activities of the US were also
resorted to when these organizations and institutions were in the peace process.
Such contradictory and conflicting roles that the US has played in the long
history of the peace process has been the subject of investigation and analysis in
this work. The US Middle East policy which has been riddled with paradoxes
appears to be an important factor leading to the continuance and no resolution
of the Palestinian conflict and the creation of the Palestinian state in the Middle
East. In order to evaluate and assess the precise role that the US has played in
the resolution of the peace process has been undertaken for careful analysis.

2.8 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In international relations, different theories could be used to explain

issues or events. Theories are used as a tool for organizing intellectual
knowledge and as a guide for the formulation of priorities in research design. As
such the mediation theory would he used in this study as it best explains the
Israel-Palestine conflict and the role the United States play in resolving the
conflict.

The generally accepted view for settling a dispute under negotiation

recognizes that “there must be both common interest and interests of conflict
without common interest, there is nothing to negotiate for, without conflict,
nothing to negotiate about.’ Mediation is an effective method of settling conflict
in which the dispute moves around a specific issue or a few issues. Arbitration
on the other hand means ‘the settlement of dispute by the award of a tribunal
which gives effect to existing laws and which binds the parties.’ As it is
binding, mediation procedure is adopted if both the parties agree to submit their
case for mediation. Extensive negotiation and persuasions, therefore, precede
mediation, representatives of both parties place themselves vis-visa the issues or
contentions and argue their position, placing and shifting evidences. Once the
argument is over, the mediator places his decision before the parties, which is
binding. (Sevenson: 2009:415)

By most definitions used in the field, mediation is a third party

intervention that is voluntary, which implies that acceptance by the parties is
needed for international mediation to be pursued. In this sense, the occurrence
of mediation is a function of acceptance at two levels-the supply side (the
potential mediator) and the demand side (the parties in the conflict). Mediators
have different motivations and rational for their involvement. Neutral
mediators, which have not supported any of the sides directly, engage
themselves because of their interest to end of the war. This interest can be
derived by truly humanitarian impulses and altruistic motivations but can also
result from political concerns about their image and reputation. Given their
preferences, the neutral mediators suffer costs if war continues but have no
particular preferences over the outcome of the conflict. (Sevenson:2009:448).

Biased mediators, on the other hand, engage themselves as third party

mediators at least partly because they want to ensure that the interest of their
proteges are taken into account when the dispute is settled. Biased mediators
have preference over the context of the agreement and incentives to try to get
agreements that have stipulations beneficial for their side. Mediators need not to
be impartial, but they must deliver the side to which they are perceived to be
close. An empirical example is the U.S. mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, in which the government biased mediator (United States) has been
accepted and even seen as necessary by the Palestinians because the Americans
are basically the only ones, who are perceived as capable of convincing Israel to
make costly concessions. Either through protecting their proteges or through
delivering their side to costly concessions, biased mediators will therefore be
associated with peace-agreement stipulations that are either beneficial for one
side or particularly exploitable for other. (Sevenson:2009:449)

Moreover, biased and neutral mediators will also have different

capabilities as mediators to contribute to the quality of the agreement. This
plays out in two dimensions - leverage and credibility. First, the biased
mediators commonly have more ability to press the parties to make concession.
Bias is commonly linked with a certain capacity to protect and influence one’s
own side: a mediator is biased because he has a history of special relationships,
for instance, as a supplier of material support to one side during the conflict
with one of the parties in the conflict, the difference in incentives will influence
the credibility of the mediators and have implications for how mediation
processes are pursued. The bargaining position of the biased mediator will be
better than the neutral mediator, implying a relatively larger ability to bring out
stipulations. Turning to the demand side of the analysis of mediation, this
difference in biased and neutral mediators incentives are also likely to influence
the conditions under which belligerent will accept these different types of
mediators. The belligerents will accept biased mediators either because they
have incentives to protect their interests or because they hold particular
possibilities to deliver the other side. So there are three reasons why neutral
mediators will be less likely to be associated with agreements of higher quality
compared to biased mediators: (i) they have different incentives; neutral
mediators have incentives to hasten the reaching of an agreement that protect
their side; (ii) neutral mediators will have less capability in terms of leverage
and credibility to bring about concessions: and (iii) parties in conflict would he
primarily biased rather than neutral mediators in situations in which they
foresee that substantial concessions are about to be made. (Kataria: 2007:94)

Mediation is particularly effective, if mediators/arbitrators have not been

identified previously with either side, if they seek with a united voice and most
crucial, if they have a mandate for representing the public whose interest and
point of view have been drowned in the charges and counter charges. Mediators
might be able to persuade both sides to principles of reciprocity in negotiation;
in the give and take of bargaining gains and losses to both sides should balance
out. (Kataria: 2007:94).

The Arab-Israeli dispute basically a contest between two distinct nations

seeking their claims on the same territory, has become a very complex problem
in the course of more than half a century of its existence, involving issues like
the border settlements, recovery of lost territories, disengagement of armies,
liberation of Jerusalem, compensation and repatriation of refugees and a
plethora of subsidiary issues flowing there from. Over the long decades, the
Arab-Israeli dispute has attracted new disputants with the result that it has now
become a crowded battle arena. There is the Palestinian-Zionist dispute at the
centre, the Israeli border disputes with the frontline Arab states, the conflict
between Arab nationalism and the state of Israel, and the Super Power contest at
the outer most perimeters. The battle arena, therefore, doesn’t represent a neatly
drawn picture as there are crooked lines, broken angles and overlapping
borders. (Dhannani: 1982:78)

The disputant’s perceptions of the dispute are also different. The Israelis
perceive the problem as one of survival and security. The Arab perception is not
uniform. For the Palestinians, it is essentially the reassertion of their right to a
nation state. For Saudi Arabia, the principal issue is the liberation of Palestine.
For the Baath ideology it is the task of erasing Israel which is considered a blot
over the vast, continuous stretch of the Arab land, and so on. Even in the
political plane, there are variations in the Arab perceptions of the problem at
any given time, which are reflected in the rival groupings, mutual denunciation
and an ever-shifting alliance pattern among the Arab countries. Thus, from a
mediator’s point of view, the Arab-Israeli dispute is a very complex and a
difficult task. At the same time because of its complexities it is open to clever
manipulation and exploitation if the mediator is so inclined. (Dhannani:
1982:78).

SUMMARY

The Israel-Palestine conflict is one that has lingered for decades and has
over year posed to have no end to it. The United States have since sought to
bring about peace between both conflicting nations.

The United States has been accused by many to have a positive bias
towards Israel as it shares same ideologies with them unlike the case of
Palestine. The United States has taken to the role of a mediator to try bringing
about a lasting solution to the seemingly unending crisis between Israel and
Palestine that have lasted since 1948.
 CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter will show the systematic method and procedure that will be
adopted to achieve the aim of research. The chapter describes the sources of
data collection, the research design, the population of the study, sample and
sampling technique, and research instrument and data analysis.

3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN

Research design refers to the systematic approach of collecting and

analyzing data in order to provide solutions to research problems. This study
adopted the ex-post-lacto design research, the ex-post-lacto means “alter the
fact” or “retrospectively’ and refers to studies that investigate possible cause-
effect relationships by observing an existing condition and searching back time
for plausible causal factors. This method is appreciated because the subject
matter has occurred and the researcher cannot manipulate events and conditions.
The ex-post facto design is justified because it ignores random placement or
assignment and ensures that are collected from people who have prior
knowledge on the subject matter.

Kerlinger (1973) defines the ex-post-facto research design as a form of

descriptive research in which an independent variable has already occurred and
in which an investigator starts with the observation of a dependent variables,
then the independent variable in retrospeut tor its possible relationship to and
effects on the dependent variables.

3.2 SOURCES OF DATA COLLECTION

 There are two sources of data namely; primary data and secondary data.
Secondary data is data already collected or produced by others; the secondary
data is available to the public through publications, journals and newspapers.

Primary data means the raw data which has just been collected from the
respondents by the researcher; it is sometimes referred to as firsthand
information through experiments, surveys, questionnaires, focus groups,
conducting interviews, and measurements. For the purpose of this particular
investigation the above mentioned two sources of data will be used. The
primary data will be collected using unstructured questionnaire from the
members of academic, civil society and civil rights. Secondary data will be
collected from published materials as well as from the internet.

3.3 POPULATION SIZE

The population of the study is made up of participants in Benin who are

well informed about the Israel-Palestine issues. The population study comprised
of staffs from the Observer newspaper, Ministry of information, Edo
Broadcasting Services and Academicians of the department of International
Studies and Diplomacy of University of Benin. A total of 50 respondents’
responses were analyzed.

3.4 SAMPLE AND SAMPLING TECHNIQUES

This study will adopt the random sampling. Random sampling is one in
which all the elements have equal chances of being selected for a study,
Akinade and Owolabi (2009).

A sample size of 50 respondents was selected through random sampling

from the population of study. The researcher consciously selected twenty (20)
Ministry of Information staffs, ten (10) Edo Broadcasting Service staffs, ten (0)
staffs from observer, and ten (10) academicians from University of Benin.
3.5 RESEARCH INSTRUMENT

The main instrument the researcher used to carry out this study is a self-
constructed questionnaire which was divided into sections; section A and B. the
section A is to obtain personal information of the respondents a such as sex,
qualification and institutions. Section B contains question that capture the
research questions and research hypothesis. Questionnaire is preferred because
it saves time, easy to analyze and best method to collect data.

3.6 DATA ANALYSIS

The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics table and simple
percentage.

3.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERA11ON

There is need for every work to adhere to ethical principles. The ethical
principles observed are:

• Voluntary participation: The participation of the respondents was

voluntary. No respondent was coerced to participate in the study.
• Disclosure: The researcher provided some information about the study
to prospective respondent before data collection lo decide whether or
not they wish to Participate in study.
• Confidentiality: The researcher assured the respondent of utmost
confidentiality of their participation in the study. The data obtained
from them are solely for academic purpose
• Anonymity: The researcher instructed the respondents not to mention
their names or position on the questionnaire in order to protect their
interest and future wellbeing.
 CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter concentrated on the presentation of data, analysis and

interpretation. The research instrument, which is a structured questionnaire, was
administered to 50 respondents, who are staffs of Observer newspaper, Edo
Broadcasting Service (EBS), Ministry of Information Edo State and
academicians of the department of International Studies and Diplomacy of the
University of Benin. The study made use of a well-structured questionnaire
which was designed taking cognizance of the research questions, the researcher
therefore analyzed the responses of the respondent to the questions and
proceeds to test the hypotheses based on the stated problems. Table and simple
percentages were employed for the analysis of data and testing of the
hypotheses. The findings of the study were in order words stated in the chapter.

4.2 PRESENTATION OF DATA

A sum of fifty (50) questionnaires were administered to respondents,

however, only 48(96%) were appropriately filled and returned. The analysis of
data was based on the 45 correctly filled questionnaires. The results are
presented as follows:
SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHICS OF RESPONDENTS

Table 1: Breakdown of Questionnaire Distribution

Specialty Questionnaire Questionnaire Return rate

Distributed Returned

Ministry of Information 20 19 95%

Edo Broadcasting Service 10 10 100%

Observer 10 9 90%

Academicians 10 10 100%

Total 50 48 96%

Source: Field Survey (2018)

Table 1 shows that out of 50 copies of questionnaire distributed to the

target respondents, 48 (98%) were returned, while 2 (2%) copies were not
returned.

Table 2: Sex Distribution of Respondent

Sex Frequency Percentage %
Male 30 62.5%
Female 18 37.5%
Total 48 100%
Source: from Field Survey (2018)

Table 2 shows that 30 (62.5%) of the respondents are male while 18 (37.5%) are
female. This reveals that there are more male than female respondents in the
study.
Table 3: Age Distribution of Respondents
Age Frequency Percentage %
15 – 20 7 14.6
20 – 30 16 33.3%
31 – 40 8 16.7%
41 – 50 8 16.7%
51 Above 2 4%
Total 48 100%
Source: Researcher’s Computation from field Survey (2018)

Table 3 presents respondents age distribution. It shows that 7 (16.7%) are

between age of 15 – 20, 16(33.3%) are between the age of 21 – 30, (16.7%) are
between the age of 31 – 40 and 41 — 50 respectively and 2 (4%) are between
the age of 51 and above.

Table 4: Educational Qualification

Qualification Frequency Percentage %

WAEC/GCE 8 163%

NCE/OND 10 20.8%

HND/BSC/BA 20 41.7%

MSC/MBA 6 12.5%

OTHERS 4 8.3%

Total 48 100%

Source: Field Survey (2018)

Likely responses on the level of educational qualification of respondents

were in five categories; WAEC/GCE, NCE/OND, HND/BSC/BA, MSC/MBA
and OTHERS. 16.7% of the respondents had WAEC/GCE, 20.8% had
NCE/OND, 4 1.7% had HND/BSC/13A, and 12.5% had MSC/MBA while
8.3% had others.

Table 5: Marital status of respondents

Marital status Frequency Percentage %

Married 22 45.8%

Single 25 52.1%
Divorced 1 2.1%

Others 0 0%

Total 48 100%
Source: Field Survey (2018

Table 5 indicates that 22 (4.o) ui respondents are married. 25 (52.1%) are

single. 1 (2.1%) is divorced while 0 (0%) arc others.

SECTION B

PART A: RESPONDENTS OPINION ON WHETHER THE U.S.

INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONTRIBUTED TO THE
TENSION IN THE REGION

Table 6: Question 1, Does the involvement of the U.S. in the Middle East
conflict contribute to the tension in the region

Response options No of Respondents Percentage%

Yes 28 58.3%
No 15 31.3%
Not sure 48 10.4%
Total No of Respondents 100%
 Table 6 shows that 28 of the respondents representing 58.3% indicated
“Yes” that the involvement of the U.S. in the Middle East conflict contributes to
the tension in the region. 15 indicated “No” that the involvement of the U.S. in
the Middle East conflict contributes to the tension in the region, while 5 pointed
“Not sure” on the question.

Table 7: Question 2 Do you believe the United State of America’s open support
of Israel against Palestine contributes to the Israel-Palestine conflict?
Response options No of Respondents Percentage %

Yes 22 45.8%

No 20 417%

Not sure 6 12.5%

Total 48 100%

Source: field survey, 2018

Table 7 shows that 22 (45.8%) respondents indicated ‘Yes” that the U.S.
open support for Israel over Palestine contributes to the tension, 20 (41.7%)
indicates No” that the U.S. open support for Israel do not contribute to the
tension, while 6 (12.5%) respondent are opted on “Not sure”.

Table 9: Question 4 The U.S. interest in the region, does it contribute to

the tension between Israel and Palestine?
Response options No of Respondents Percentage %
Yes 32 66.7%
No 12 25%
Not sure 4 8.3%
Total 48 100%
Source: Field Survey, 2018
Table 9 shows that 32 (66.7%) of the respondents which range the highest
responded “Yes” that the U.S. interest in the region contributes to the Israel-
Palestine conflicts. 12 (25%) that the U.S. interest in the region do not
contribute to the Israel-Palestine conflict, while 4 (8.3%) opted “Not sure”.

Table 10: Question 5 Do you think the U.S. has a positive bias towards Israel?
Response options No of Respondents Percentage %
Yes 18 37.5%
No 22 45.8%
Not sure 8 10.4%
Total 48 100%
Source: Field Survey, 2018

The pattern of responses shown in the table that 37.5% of the respondents
said Yes” that the U.S. has a positive bias towards Israel, 45.8% of the
respondents opted “No’ that the U.S. does not have a positive bias towards
Israel, while 10.4% are “Not sure” about it.

Table 11: Question 6 Do you think that the similarities in the political ideology
between Israel and the U.S. contribute to the U.S. continuous support of Israel
over Palestine’?
Response options No of Respondents Percentage %
Yes 23 47.9%
No 20 41.7%
Not sure 5 10.4%
Total 48 100%
Source: Field Survey, 2018

The analysis implies that 47.9% of the respondents opted “Yes” to the
fact that the similarities between the political ideologies contributes to the U.S
continuous support for Israel over Palestine, 41.7% opted “No” that the
similarities between the political ideologies between the U.S. and Israel do not
contribute to the continuous support of Israel over Palestine, while 10.4% opted
for “Not sure”.

Table 12: Question 7 Do you think if Palestine becomes fully democratized that
it will get a different treatment in terms of support from the U.S.?
Response options No of Respondents Percentage %
Yes 14 29.2%
No 28 58.3%
Not sure 6 12.5%
Total 48 100%
Source: Field Survey, 2018

The responses above in table 4.4.7 indicate that 14 respondent’s chose

“Yes” the Palestine will get a better treatment if it becomes fully democratized,
28 other respondents chose the option of” No” while 6 went for the option of
“Not sure”

Fable 13: Question 8 Do you think that the U.S. stance to secure Israel at all
cost contributes to the tension in the region?

PART B: IS THE ROLE OF THE U.S. IN THE PEACE PROCISS

EFFECTIVE?

Table 14: Question 9 Has the role of a mediator that the U.S. has taken had any
tangible impact positively on the resolution of the conflict?
Response options No of Respondents Percentage %
Yes 18 37.5%
No 25 52.1%
Not sure 5 10.4%
Total 48 100%
Source: Field Survey, 2018
 Table 14 shows that 37.5% of 48 respondents said “Yes” that the U.S.
role as a mediator has had a tangible positive impact in the conflict resolution,
52.1% opted “No” that the U.S. role as a mediator has had no tangible impact
positively in the conflict resolution, while 10,4% opted “Not sure”

Table 15: Question 10 Does the U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as the

capital of Israel discredits her from being an unbiased mediator?
Response options No of Respondents Percentage %
Yes 14 29.2%
No 20 41.7%
Not sure 14 29.2%
Total 48 100%
Source: Field Survey, 2018

From the above table there appears to be a clear indication that few
respondents of I 4 out of 48 respondents’ response was “Yes” that the U.S.
recognition of Jerusalem as Israeli capital discredits her from being an unbiased
mediator, majority of the respondents of 20 out of 48 response was “No” that
the U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israeli capital discredits her from being an
unbiased mediator, while another 14 respondents were not sure.

Table 16: Question 11 Have the U.S. been true to her quest for the
signing of a two state agreement?
Response options No of Respondents Percentage %
Yes 39 81.2%
No 8 16.7%
Not sure 1 2.1%
Total 48 100%
Source: Field Survey, 2018
 Table 16 shows that 39 respondents response was “Yes” that the U.S. has
been true to her quest or the signing of a two state system, 8 of the respondent
opted “No” that the U.S. have not been true to her quest for the signing of a two
state system, while 1 of the respondent opted for “Not sure”

Table 17: Question 12 Is the effectiveness of the U.S. in the peace process
stalled as a result of lack of understanding of the Arab-Israeli issues?
Response options No of Respondents Percentage %
Yes 26 54.2%
No 12 25%
Not sure 10 20.8%
Total 48 100%
Source: Field Survey, 24)18

The analysis in the table 7 is a clear indication that most of the “Yes”
respondents believe that the effectiveness of the U.S. in the peace process
stalled as a result of lack of understanding of the Arab-Israeli issues, followed
by “No” that the effectiveness of the U.S. in the peace process was not stalled as
a result of lack of understanding of Arab-Israeli issues, while few opted “Not
sure”.

Table 18: Question 13 Did the failure of the United States to compel Israel to
release just a few dozen prisoners of Palestinians discredit her role in the peace
process?
Response options No of Respondents Percentage %
Yes 30 62.5%
No 18 37.5%
Not sure 0 0%
Total 48 100%
Source: Field Survey, 2018
 Table 18 analyzed shows that 30 of the responses think that the failure
of the IS, to compel Israel to release just a few dozen prisoners of Palestine
discredits her in the peace process, on the other hand 18 of the respondent
believe that it does not discredit her in her role in the peace process. Hence there
was none who was not sure of their stance.

PART C: WHAT INTEREST DOES THE U.S HAVE IN THE MIDDLE

EAST?

Table 19: Question 14 Do you think the U.S. has an economic interest in the
Middle East

Response options No of Respondents Percentage %

Yes 30 62.5%
No 10 20.8%
Not sure 8 0%
Total 48 100%
Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 19 indicated 30 respondents believe that the U.S. has an economic interest
in the Middle Last region. 10 Of the respondent believe the U.S. do not have an
economic interest in the Middle East, while 8 of the respondent are not sure.

Table 20: Question 15 Do you think that the U.S. interest in the Persian Gulf
contributes to the Israel-Palestine conflict?

Response options No of Respondents Percentage %

Yes 27 62.3 %
No 21 43.7%
Not sure 0 0%
Total 48 100%
Source: Field Survey, 2018
 Table 20 states that 56.3% responded with “Yes” that the U.S. interest in
the Middle East contributes to the Israel-Palestine conflict, 45.7% opted “No”
that the U.S. interest in the Middle Fast do not contribute to the Israel-Palestine
conflict.

Table 21: Question 16 Does the U.S. have an interest in socio-economic reform
in the Middle East?

Response options No of Respondents Percentage %

Yes 36 75%
No 12 25%
Not sure 0 0%
Total 48 100%
Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 21 shows that 75% of the response indicated ‘Yes” that the U.S.
have an interest in socio-economic reforms. 25% of the response indicated ‘No”
that the U.S. do not have an interest in socio-economic reforms.

HYPOTHESIS ONE

H0 The involvement of the U.S. in the Middle East conflict does not
contribute to the tension in the region.

H1 The involvement of the U.S. in the Middle East conflict contributes to

the tension in the region.

The above stated hypothesis will be analyzed using table 6

The involvement of the United States in the Middle East contributes to the
tension in the region
 Response options No of Respondents Percentage %
Yes 28 58.3%
No 15 31.3%
Not sure 5 10.4%
Total 48 100%
Source: Field Survey (2018)

We can see from the above table that the United States involvement in the
Middle Last contributes to the tension in region, 28 representing 58.3% filled
“yes”. 15 representing 31.3% filed “no” so we accept the alternate hypothesis
that states that the U.S. involvement in the Middle Last contributes to the
tension in the region and reject the null hypothesis that states that the U.S.
involvement in the Middle East contributes to the tension in the region.

HYPOTHESIS TWO

H0 The role of the U.S. in the peace process does not aid settlement
between Israel and Palestine

H1 The role of the U.S. in the peace process aids settlement between Israel
and Palestine. The above stated hypothesis will be analyzed using table
14. The role of a mediator the U.S. play in the peace process aids
settlement between Israel and Palestine

Response options No of Respondents Percentage %

Yes 18 37.5%

No 25 52.1%

Not sure 5 10.4%

Total 48 100%
Source: Field Survey, 2018

From the above statistics we can see thatl8 respondents representing

37.5% indicated the role of the U.S. in the peace process aids settlement
between Israel and Palestine, 25 respondents representing 52.1% indicated that
the role of the U.S. in the peace process does not aids settlement between Israel
and Palestine while 5 respondents representing 10.4% indicated that they were
not sure. So we accept the null hypothesis that states the role of the U.S. in the
P’ process does not aid settlement between Israel and Palestine and reject the
alternate hypothesis that states that the role of the U.S. in the peace process aids
settlement between Israel and Palestine.

HYPOTHESIS THREE

H0 U.S. has no special interest in the Middle East region

H1 U.S has a special interest in the Middle Last region.

The above hypothesis will he analyzed using table 19

The U.S. contribution and involvement in the Middle East is one born out of the
States interest in the region

Response options No of Respondents Percentage %

Yes 30 62.5%

No 10 20.8%

Not sure 9 16.7%

Total 48 100%

Source: Field Survey, 2018

From the above statistics we can see that 30 respondents representing

62.5% which represents the largest agreed that there is a special interest by the
U.S. in the Middle Last region, so we accept the alternate hypothesis that states
that the U.S has a special interest in the Middle East region and reject the null
hypothesis that the U.S. has no special interest in the Middle Last region.

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The major findings of the study are:

That the U.S. involvement has contributed to the tension in the Middle
East though it is intended to bring an end to the problem. The U.S. has taking
steps to try bringing about a lasting solution to the Middle East crisis but as a
result of proper understanding of the root cause of the problem She (U.S.) have
failed to bring the problem to an end.

Also the role of the mediator that the U.S. has taken up is one geared
towards the actualization of a peace settlement that will help bring about the age
long unrest that exists between Israel and Palestine.

Another major finding is the fact that the U.S. has a special interest in the
region taking into consideration the fuel that the region is one blessed with oil
which is the most sought after mineral in the world now.

For a mediator to be effective there must be a proper understanding of the

conflict. Table 17 above shows that the lack of a proper understanding of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict has made her role as a mediator to be less effective.
 CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND

CONCLUSION

5.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This study was carried out to examine the role of the U.S. in the Middle
East using Israel and Palestine as a case study; to find out how effective she is
as a mediator and also what her interest might he in the region. The study found
out that the U.S. involvement in the Middle Last do not contribute to the tension
in the region, however she plays the role of a mediator to help bring about a
lasting solution to the unending conflict.

The data collected from the respondents were analyzed using simple percentage
and tables to analyze the research questions. The findings reveal that:

 The involvement of the U.S. in the Middle East conflict not contribute to
the tension in the region
 The role of the U.S. in the peace process is intended to bring about
settlement between Israel and Palestine but that has not been achieved
following the failed peace conferences starting from the Madrid
conference of 1991 to Annapolis of 2007.
 U.S has a special interest in the Middle East region.
 The continuous support for Israel over Palestine is linked with the
similarities in the political ideology of the U.S. and that of Israel. Being
that Israel is a democratic state.
 Also that the United States of America have an economic interest in the
Middle East region.
 That the signing of the two state system will not end the conflict.
  And that the United States has not being and effective mediator being that
it has in several occasions stood on the side of Israel over Palestine which
makes the Palestinians has lack of trust in the mediating capability of the
U.S. seeing them as only going to favor any settlement that will favor
Israel.

5.2 CONCLUSIONS

The Middle Eastern region is also regarded the Western Asia. It is a

region which has been plagued with series of events that has threatened to tear
the region apart and has sort of slowed down growth and development process
of the region. This is so because of the power tussle in the region. Conflict
refers to a state of discord caused by the actual or perceived opposition of
needs, values and interest Based on the data generated in the course of the
research and the outcome of the analysis, it’s concluded that the U.S. role as a
mediator is on that has been seen by the people of Palestine as biased. However
the U.S. has been the forerunner of the peace process and hopes to bring about
an agreement that will be favored by both parties.

The Israel-Palestine conflict is one that has lingered for decades and has
over year posed to have no end to it. 1 he United States have since sought to
bring about peace about between both conflicting nations. Although the Israelis
identify the United States as their closest ally, the Israeli government complains
that the United States meddles without understanding Arab-Israeli issues.

The United States has been accused by many to have a positive bias
towards Israel as it shares same ideologies with them unlike the case of
Palestine The pressure from the American Zionist organization as well as the
space provided by the termination of the British mandate due to the weakened
British Empire was fully utilized by the rejuvenated economically and militarily
strong and powerful United States. The United States has taken to the role of a
mediator to try bringing about a lasting solution to the seemingly unending
crisis between Israel and Palestine that have lasted since 1948. Mediation is an
effective method of settling conflict in which the dispute moves around a
specific issue or a few issues. The Israel-Palestinian conflict is one which since
its inception in 1948 the U.S. has tried to end. This effort can be seen in the
various peace settlements starting from the Madrid Conference of 1 991 to the
Annapolis in 2007.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

In view of the above findings and conclusion, the following

recommendations are made: The Palestine nation should be given a territory
which will make the sovereign state. This will help reduce the feeling of being
“homeless”. This has been what the Palestinians have been clamoring or
decades. Giving them their own territory that will guarantee them sovereignty
and statehood will bring to an end all of these conflict I believe.

Israel should grant them access to the temple for prayers. The holy
Temple of Jerusalem is one on the principal cause of these Israel—Palestine
conflicts. If the Temple is made to be a neutral ground for both Palestinians and
Israeli Jews to worship, the problem should be reduced by half.

A ceasefire agreement should be made by both Israel and Palestine. Both

nations has been at each other’s throat since 1948. Although many attempts to
broker a peace settlement have been made, the need for a ceasefire by both
parties is of utmost importance as no settlement can be made when there is lack
of trust and there is a constant shelling of guns and rockets.

The U.S. should be less prone to taking the side of Israel if she is to be
regarded as an unbiased mediator. For a mediator to be effective, he must be
seen as neutral hence distrust sets in it will halt any negotiation (Paul Kitchin,
2018). For the U.S. make any headway in the peace process, she must first be
perceived as unbiased from both parties.

The imposing of sanctions on any nation that attacks the other, this will
go a long was to curbing any of the parties that thinks they can exert violence on
the other. Knowing this will give room for further and better negotiations.
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