Philosophical Review

Waging War on Pascal's Wager

Author(s): Alan Hájek
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No. 1 (Jan., 2003), pp. 27-56
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
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 ThePhilosophical Vol. 112, No. 1 (January2003)
Review,

WagingWar on Pascal's Wager

Alan Haijek

1. Introduction
Pascal's Wageris simplytoo good to be true-or better,too good to be
sound. There must be something wrongwith Pascal's argumentthat
decision-theoretic reasoning shows thatone must (resolveto) believe
in God, ifone is rational.No surprise,then,thatcriticsoftheargument
are easilyfound,or thattheyhave attackediton manyfronts.For Pascal
has giventhemno dearthof targets.
Virtuallyall of the Wager's criticshave directed theircampaigns
againstitspremises.Otherauthorshave ralliedto itsdefense,buttress-
ingthosepremises.I willargue thattheyare fighting a lostcause: devel-
opingargumentsbyJeffrey (1983) and Duff (1986), willcontendthat
I
theWageris simplyinvalid.This motivatesa searchforreformulations
of the originalargumentthatare valid,whileupholdingitsspirit.I will
offerfour such reformulations, each of which finessesthe decision
matrixof the Wager,and in particularits problematicinvocationof
"infiniteutility."
Yet thesereformulations falltoo, albeitfora different
reason.This,in turn,mightpromptadvocatesof theWagerto conduct
anothersearch forstillfurtherreformulations. However,I will argue
thatsuch a searchis likelyto be futile.When we examinewhatis at the
rootofthefailureoftheoriginalWager,and ofthe reformulations that
I offer,
we realizethattheirfailuresare symptomatic ofa deep problem
thatanyvariantof theWagermustovercome.I willpresenta dilemma
forall such variants,and conclude thattheirprospectsforsuccessare
dim.

2. The Wager,and Some Objections to Its Premises

We willthinkof Pascal's Wageras havingthreepremises:thefirstcon-
cernsthe probabilitythatyou should giveto God's existence,the sec-
ond offersa decision matrix,and the thirdis a standarddecision-
theoreticassumptionabout rationalaction.1

Pascal's Wager

1. Rationalityrequires you to give positiveprobabilityto God's

existence.

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 ALANHAJEK

2. The decision matrixis as follows:

God exists God does not exist

Wager for God 00

f2
WageragainstGod f, f3

Here fl,f2,and f3are finiteutilityvaluesthatneed not be speci-

fiedanyfurther.
3. Rationalityrequires you to perform the act of maximum
expected utility(when thereis one).

Rationalityrequiresyou to wagerforGod.2
Conclusion:
Some clarificationis in order.Accordingto Pascal, "wageringfor
God" and "wageringagainstGod" are contradictories,as thereis no
avoiding wageringone way or another: "you must wager. It is not
optional." (Unless otherwisestated,all quotationsof Pascal are from
his 1948, Trottertranslation,?233.) The decision to wager for or
againstGod is one thatyoumake at a time-at t,say.But ofcourse Pas-
cal does not thinkthatyou would be infinitely rewardedforwagering
forGod momentarily, thenwageringagainstGod thereafter; nor that
you would be infinitely rewarded for wageringfor God sporadically-
only on everyother Thursdayafternoon,for example. What Pascal
intendsby"wageringforGod" is an ongoing action-indeed, one that
continuesuntilyourdeath-that involvesyouradoptinga certainsetof
practicesand livingthekindoflifethatfostersbeliefin God. The deci-
sion problemforyou at t,then,is whetheryou should embarkon this
course of action; to failto do so is to wageragainstGod at t.3
I understandPascal as regardingyoursalvation,withitsinfiniteutil-
ity ("an infinityof infinitelyhappy life"), as thebestthingpossibleforyou.
I take thisto be in keepingwithCatholic tradition,4but more impor-
tantlyitis supportedbyPascal's owntext.In hispreambleto theWager,
he writes:"Unityjoinedto infinityadds nothingto it ... theadditionof
a unit can make no change in itsnature."In particular,infiniteutility
is not augmentedbythe additionof a unitof utility.The pointis made
even moreemphaticallyin theWageritself,and here itwillbe usefulto
consult the originalFrench text:"si vous gagnez vous gagnez tout."
Trottertranslatesthis accuratelyas: "If you gain, you gain all." We
mightjust as accuratelytranslateit as: "If you gain, you gain every-

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 WAGINGWARONPASCAL'S WAGER

thing."So according to Pascal, nothingcould be betterforyou than

yoursalvation.There is simplynothingmore to be had.5
Some criticsquestion Pascal's assumption that a rational agent
should assignpositiveprobabilityto God's existence.Afterall, a thor-
oughgoingatheistmayinsiston the rationality ofan assignmentof0, as
Rescher (1985) pointsout. Othersattackthe decision matrix.Various
criticsargue thatPascal conflatesoutcomeswhose utilitiesshould be
distinguished. Accordingto some,thestatesare not individuatedfinely
enough. Perhaps thereis more than one God to consider,as Diderot
(1875-77) pointedout long ago, inauguratingtheflourishing industry
thathas come to be knownas "themanyGods objection."Accordingto
others,the acts are not individuatedfinelyenough. Perhaps thereis
more than one wayto wager for God-for instance,God mightnot
rewardthose who striveto believe in him onlyforthe verymercenary
reasonsthattheWagergives,asJames(1956) has observed.Maybethe
matrixis different fordifferent people-as it mightbe, a predestined
infiniterewardforthe Chosen, whatevertheydo, and finiteutilityfor
therest,a possibilityraisedbyMackie (1982). And evengrantingPascal
his assumptionofa single2 x 2 matrixforall people, one could dispute
the utilitiesthatenterinto it.Jeffrey (1983) and McClennen (1994)
findtheverynotionofinfiniteutility suspect.Then thereare thecritics
who, farfrom objecting to utilities,wantto see more
infinite of themin
the matrix.For example, it mightbe thoughtthat a forgivingGod
would bestow infiniteutilityupon wagerers-for and wagerers-against
alike (Rescher 1985); or,more pessimistically, thatwageringagainstan
existentGod yieldsinfinitely awfuldamnation.6
Finally,therehave been varioussalvosaimed at the thirdpremise.
The Allais (1953) and Ellsberg(1961) paradoxes,forexample,are said
to show that maximizingexpectationcan lead one to performintu-
itivelysub-optimalactions.So too the St.Petersburgparadox,in which
it is supposedlyabsurd thatone should be prepared to pay anyfinite
amount to play a particulargame withinfiniteexpectation.Or one
could insistthatrationalchoices mustbe ratifiable(a laJeffrey 1983 or
Sobel 1996), and thatthe act of maximal expectationmightnot be.
Moreover,while the expectationof wageringforGod is infiniteifwe
accept Pascal's earlier assumptions,as we will see, so is thevariance.
Expectationmaynot be a good guide to choice-worthiness when the
varianceis large,especiallyin a one-shotdecisionproblemsuch as this,
letalone when thevarianceis infinite-see Weirich1984 and Sorensen
1994.

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 ALANHAJEK

So Pascal's premiseshave come under heavyfire.Nonetheless,ithas

been generallyassumed thathis argumentis valid-indeed, a number
of criticshave made a point of explicitlyconceding thisto Pascal (for
example,Mackie (1982), Brown(1984), Rescher (1985), Mougin and
Sober (1994), and most emphatically,Hacking (1994)). Recall how
Pascal's reasoning,fleshedout in modernparlance,goes. Let p be your
positivesubjectiveprobabilityforGod's existence.Your expected util-
ityforwageringforGod is
.p + f2.(1- p)
=0.
As Pascal puts it, "our propositionis of infiniteforce."On the other
hand, yourexpected utilityforwageringagainstGod is

f1.p + f3.(1 - p).

This is finite.7Bythethirdpremise,youshouldperformtheact ofmax-
imum expected utility.Therefore,you should wager for God, con-
cludes Pascal.
In section 3, developing and refiningpoints made firstbyJeffrey
(1983) and Duff(1986) (see footnotes8 and 11), I willargue thatPas-
cal's reasoningis invalid.Evenwaivingtheproblemswithhis premises,
his argumentsimplydoes not go through.This promptsthesearchfor
a more satisfactory reformulation of the argumentthatis valid.In sec-
tion4 I undertakethistask,offering foursuch reformulations. I hope
thatin the process I will providesome illuminationof the notion of
infiniteutilityin general (and that my proposals for analyzingor
replacingitwillbe ofwiderinterest, withpossibleapplicationsbeyond
the philosophyof religion). However,as I willargue in section5, each
of the reformulationsis open to a new objection. Combining these
results,I willargue thatthereis a fundamentaldilemma thatanyver-
sion of theWagermustface.

3. Pascal's ArgumentIs Invalid

3.1 Mixed Strategies

GrantPascal everypremiseof his argument.It is stillnot the case that
wageringforGod is rationallymandated.This willbe the thrustof my
attackon Pascal's Wager; arguingforit,and teasingout some further
embarrassingresultsforPascal,are mymain purposesin thissection.
Pascal's speciousstepis to assumethatonlytheactionofwageringfor
To see thatthisis not the case,
God gets the infiniteexpected utility.

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 WAGINGWARON PASCAL'S WAGER

considerthefollowingstrategy: you tossa faircoin, and wagerforGod

if the coin lands heads (probability?); otherwise,you wageragainst
God. ByPascal's lights,thisstrategy'sexpected value is the averageof
infinityand somethingfinite:
-
/2(oo)
+
1/2 (fl.P + f3.(1 P)).
This is infinite:1/?(oo)= oo,and the second summandis finite.So we
have found anotherwayto get infiniteexpected value.8 Now thatwe
see the trick,we can runit again and again. WagerforGod ifand only
if a die lands 6 (a sixthtimesinfinity ...); ifand onlyif
equals infinity
yourlotteryticketwinsnextweek;ifand onlyifyou see a meteorquan-
tum-tunnelitswaythroughthe side of a mountainand come out the
otherside ... Pascal has ignoredall thesemixedstrategies-probabilistic
mixturesof the "pure actions" of wageringfor and wageringagainst
God-and infinitely manymore besides.9And all of themhave maxi-
mal expectation.Nothingin his argumentfavorswageringfor God
overall of these alternativestrategies.10
But thisstillunderstatesPascal's troubles.For isn't anything thatan
agentmightchoose to do reallya mixedstrategy betweenwageringfor
and wageringagainstGod, forsome appropriate(rationalsubjective)
probabilityweights?For whateverone does, one should assign some
positiveprobabilityto windingup wageringforGod. Even ifyou are
currently an atheist,dear reader,youshould assignpositiveprobability
toyourwageringforGod bythetimeyoureach theend ofthissentence
(a probabilitygreaterbymanyordersofmagnitude,I would hazard to
say,thanthe probabilityof the meteortunneling).In fact,I wouldhaz-
ard to say(and thenextsectionwillfurnishan argumentformysaying)
thatevery rationalagent'slifeis a constantseriesofsuch"gambles,"with
wageringforGod as one of theoutcomes.The probability ofendingup
wageringforGod should be positiveeven forthosewho single-mind-
edlydo all theycan to wageragainstGod-by practicingdevilworship,
say.The pointgeneralizesto anycourseof action.ByPascal's lights,for
everyrational agent, everyaction has maximal expected utility.11 It
seems thatwe have here a "proof"thatLeibniz was on the righttrack
afterall: in an importantsense, thisreallyis the best of all possible
worlds!

3.2 Regularity
Let us pursue thisline of attackstillfurther.
Call a probability
function
regularifand onlyifit assignsprobability1 onlyto logical truths(and

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 ALANHAJEK

0 onlyto contradictions).'Cautious' or 'undogmatic'would be more

evocativewordsfor this property,but I followstandard terminology
here. Think of regularityas the converse of the usual requirement,
honored as an axiom of the probabilitycalculus,thatall logical truths
receiveprobability1. Manyauthorsassume,and forpresentpurposes
let usjoin themin assuming,ifonlyforthe sake of the argument,that
a rationalagent'sprobabilityfunctionis alwaysregular.Otherwisethe
agent displaysa certainsortof dogmatism-totalbeliefin some prop-
osition that could be false,as far as logic is concerned-that would
remainin theface ofanyfutureevidence.12In thewordsofEdwardset
al. (1963, 211) in their own defense of regularity:"Keep the mind
open, or at least ajar,"and similarsentimentsare endorsed byvarious
writersfromJeffreys (1961) toJeffrey(1983). Shimony(1970) shows
thatregularity is required in orderforyou to avoid susceptibility to a
semi-DutchBook: a seriesofacceptable betsforwhichthereis no pos-
siblecircumstancein whichyouenjoya netgain,and some possiblecir-
cumstancein whichyou suffera net loss. Furtherproponentsof (close
relativesto) regularityinclude Kemeny (1955), Carnap (1963), Stal-
naker (1970), Appiah (1985), and Lewis (1980, 1986) (at leastforini-
tialcredence functions,and forless-than-perfectly-rational agents).
Note thatifGod's existenceis not contradictory-andit had better
not be iftheWageris to have a point-then Pascal should welcome reg-
ularity:it provides a snappy defense of his hithertounargued-for
premisethatrationalityrequiresyou to assignpositiveprobabilityto
God's existence.Be thatas it may,regularity forcesthe rationalagent
to regardanychoice as a genuine gamble,witheventualwageringfor
God as one of the outcomes-for thateventuality is surelynot a con-
tradiction,and thusby regularity cannot be assigned probability0. If
you don't wantto thinkabout theWager,go have a beer. Byregularity,
you should assignpositiveprobabilitythatyou willwindup wagering
for God nonetheless.And so it goes for anyaction that you might
undertake.So theproblemfortheWageris onlyintensified:regularity
requiresyou to stayopen-mindedto yourwageringforGod, whatever
you decide to do now; and according to many authors,rationality
requiresregularity.
Still,myappeal to regularityis reallyoverkill.All I need is foryou to
for
assignpositiveprobability, whatever reasonsyou mighthave,to the
prospect of eventuallywagering for God by some non-Pascalian
route-if regularityis not your reason, thatdoesn't matter.And my
main pointwas made before I made myappeal to regularity: theinvalid-

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 WAGINGWARON PASCAL'S WAGER

ityof Pascal's Wagerhad alreadybeen exposed. The coin tossstrategy

alone sufficedto makethatpoint.13Whatfollowedwasjustfurther skir-
mishing.
Let me summarize.The strengthof Pascal's argumentis that it is
insensitiveto the exact value of the positiveprobabilitythatfiguresin
theexpectedvalue calculation:whateverithappens to be, themultipli-
cationbyinfinity swampsit,thusyieldingmaximalexpected utility for
wagering forGod. The undoing of Pascal's argumentis thatit is insen-
sitiveto the exact value of the positiveprobabilitythatfiguresin the
expected value calculation:whateverit happens to be, the multiplica-
tion by infinity swampsit, thusyieldingmaximal expected utilityfor
any act whatsoever.What Pascal overlookedwas thatin opening the
door to all thevariouspositiveprobabilitiesforGod's existence,he also
let in all the variousmixed strategies,with theirvariousprobability
weightsforwageringforand againstGod. That is,he letin everything.
3.3 Tie-Breaking
Witheach ofinfinitely manyactionsequallysanctionedbydecisionthe-
ory, it seems we have the predicamentof Buridan's ass in spades. You
might choose one of the actions but thatwas hardlyPascal's
arbitrarily,
advice! (Indeed, even ifyou happened to choose arbitrarily to wager
forGod, thatwould stillnot count as followinghis advice.) In the face
of this multiplicity of acts that maximizeyour expectation,can you
appeal to some other tie-breaking criterion?
Schlesinger(1994) offersone: "tryand increase the probabilityof
obtaining the prospectiveprize" (97). Of course, "the prospective
prize"here is salvation.Schlesingeris suggestingthatdecision theory
should be supplementedwitha new principle.In our presentcase, it
amounts to this: rationalityrequiresyou to performthe action that
maximizesyourprobabilityofsalvation.This clearlyrulesout the coin-
tossingstrategy, the die-tossingstrategy, and all the othermixed strat-
egies, since these have lower probabilitiesof yourachievingsalvation
thanoutrightwageringforGod does. The principleis primafacieplau-
sible, and Pascal might have done well to adopt it (though, see
Sorensen 1994 fordissent). Note, however,thatSchlesingerin no way
underminesour objection: Pascal's Wager,as it stands,is invalid-
period. For nowheredoes Pascal appeal to Schlesinger'sprinciplein
his argument.The factthatthereare otherarguments in theneighbor-
I
hood thatare validdoes not change that.Indeed, willofferfoursuch
argumentsin section4. Moreover,we willsee therehow the expecta-

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 ALANHAJEK

tionsofthevariousmixed strategiescan be distinguished, so thatthere

willbe no need fora furthertie-breaking principle.Expected utilities
can stillcarrythe day.
In the meantime,it seems thatPascal's Wageras it standsnot only
fails,but failsin theworstpossibleway.All of a rationalagent'sactions
apparentlyhaveexactlythesame expectedutility, oo.Thus, all decisions
turnout to be equally good accordingto thatagent,and all practical
reasoningturnsout to be useless.Since practicalreasoningis surelynot
useless,thisis a reductioeitherofdecision theory,or ofinfiniteutilities
understoodnaivelyin thisway--inany case, it is a reductioof the use
ofsuch infiniteutilitiesindecision theory.The ironyis thatPascal,that
champion of infiniteutility,is oftentoutedas being the fatherof deci-
sion theory.It seems thatLakatos'sadage that"everyresearchprogram
is born refuted"has a confirming instancerighthere.

4. Reformulating
theWager
So it is all over forthe Wageras it stands.Can we do better?An ade-
quate reformulationof the Wager must meet the followingrequire-
ments:

RequirementofOverridingUtility
The utilityof salvationmustcompletelyoverrideanyof the other
utilitiesthatenterinto the expected utilitycalculations,thusren-
deringirrelevantthe exact value of the probabilityone assignsto
God's existence.(We impose thisrequirementin orderto uphold
the spiritof the originalargument-for otherwisewe would not
have a reformulationof it,but rathersome quite different argu-
ment.)
Requirement
ofDistinguishableExpectations
We mustbe able to distinguishin expectationoutrightwagering
forGod fromthevariousmixed strategies(based on the coin toss,
die toss,and so on) discussedin section3. In particular,thesmaller
theprobability ofwindingup wageringforGod, thesmallershould
be the expectation,so thatone is rationallycompelled to make
thatprobabilityas high as one can.
I willnow considerfourstrategiesthatI thinkmeet these require-
ments.In each case, a somewhatdelicate balance is struck:on the one
hand, reapingthe benefitof attributingan infiniteutilityto salvation
(namely,the swampingeffectin the expectationcalculationthatren-

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 WAGINGWARON PASCAL'S WAGER

dersirrelevanttheexactprobability value); on theotherhand, reaping

the benefitof attributinga finiteutilityto it (namely,immunity to the
objection thatall gamblesat wageringforGod are equallyattractive).
To putitsuccinctly, infinitudewillbe givenin each case a finite-looking
gloss. The reformulations also provideanotherfunction,I hope: pre-
cisifyingPascal's argumentwherepreviously itwas somewhatimprecise
and ambiguous (for the term 'infinite'is both). Nonetheless,I will
arguein section5 thatthereformulations faceotherdifficulties.

4.1 SalvationHas SurrealInfiniteUtility

Is therea wayof tellingapartthevariousinfiniteexpectationsthatpre-
viouslycame out the same? And indeed, can we make precisewhatis
even meant by the term'infiniteexpectation'?I thinkthatthereare
severalsuchways.For example,one can appeal to nonstandard analysis,
and thereare severalwaysof formulating it. Robinson (1966), Nelson
(1987), and Lindstrom(1988) are just some of the mathematicians
who have givensound foundationsto such a theory.The keyidea is
thatthereare nonstandardmodels of a first-order theoryof the real
numbers,containing so-called "hyperreals," with elements thatbehave
like infinitesimals,
and othersthatbehave likeinfinitenumbers.Skalia
(1975), forexample,showshow nonstandardmodels of thereal num-
bers can be used in a "non-Archimedean"decision theory.Sobel
(1996) also argues thatwe should remainopen to the employmentof
hyperrealsin decision theory.I applaud these approaches. However,
since I find Conway's (1976) constructionof what have come to be
called the surrealnumbers especiallyingenious and user-friendly, and
since it offerssimilarbenefits,I willfocusupon it instead.14
I begin withsome briefexpositoryremarks.Conwayconstructsnew
surrealnumbersout ofpreviouslyconstructedsurrealnumbersaccord-
ing to tworules.First,everynumberis identifiedwithtwosetsofprevi-
ouslyconstructednumbers,a "left"set and a "right"set,such thatno
memberof the leftset is greaterthan or equal to anymemberof the
rightset.The newlyconstructednumberlies betweenthe membersof
the leftset and themembersof the rightset. (The gistof thisidea will
be familiarto those who know Dedekind's constructionof the reals
fromtherationals.)Second, one numberx is greaterthanor equal to
anothernumbery ifand onlyifno memberofx's rightset is less than
or equal to y,and x is less than or equal to no memberofy'sleftset.
To get the constructionoffthe ground,Conwaybegins at stage 0
withthenumberwhoseleftand rightsetsare both empty,<0,0>. This

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 ALANHAJEK

numberis called '0', and byconsideringsome ofitspropertiesone can

easilyshowthatitdeservesthename.AtstageI is constructedthenum-
ber <{0},0> withleftset consistingof 0, and emptyrightset,called '1';
and anothernumberwiththesesetsreversed,called '-1'. Again,these
names are well chosen. The constructioncontinuesalong these lines,
withnew numbersbeing formedat each stage as appropriateleftand
rightsetsof numbersformedat previousstages.
Here we come to the crucialpoint.Afterinfinitely manystages,we
can defineamong otherthingsthenumberwhoseleftsetis {0, 1, 2, ...},
and whose rightset is empty.This is co,the firstinfinitenumberto be
constructed.Also at thisstagecomes 1/o),an infinitesimal greaterthan
0 but less than any positive real number, namely <{O},{1, 1/2, 1/8,
./s ...>.
Atthenextstagecomes o - 1 = <{0, 1, 2, ...}, {w}>,and co+ 1 = <{0, 1, 2,
..., ), 0O>among others.15And so on. Repeatingthisprocessad infin-
itumagain, we eventuallyconstructnumberssuch as )o/2,2), V/,02,
and o0). The systemof numbers that is finallyproduced is a totally
ordered field-thus, it is closed under all the usual operations (addi-
tion,subtraction,multiplication,division,exponentiation,extracting
roots,and so on), itis commutativeunderadditionand multiplication,
and all numberscan be compared in size.16
Now let Conwaymeet Pascal. Let the decision matrixbe as before,
except now identifythe utilityof salvationas an infinitenumber in Con-
way'ssystem. But whichone? It doesn't reallymatter:(witha qualifica-
tion to be mentioned shortly)Pascal's argumentwill go through
whicheverone youpick.Indeed, we could leave itas a variableranging
over all infinitevalues. However,for definiteness,let's pick o (on a
givenutilityscale). The decision matrixis now:
God exists God does not exist

WagerforGod (0 f2
WageragainstGod f3
fl
Assume p is some positive, finite (as opposed to infinitesimal)
7 forGod's existence.The expectationofwageringforGod
probabilityl
is

).p + f2.(1- p),

whichis infinite.The expected utilityofwageringagainstGod is
+ f3.(1 - p),
fl.p

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 WAGINGWARON PASCAL'S WAGER

whichis finite.WageringforGod wins!Since we haveassumednothing

about p other than its positivity
and finiteness,we see thatits exact
value is irrelevant(modulo thoseassumptions),swampedas it is bythe
multiplicationwitha. So we have met the Requirementof Overriding
Utility.Moreover,we can now distinguishinfiniteexpectationsofvari-
ous sizes:forexample,0/6 is smallerthan 0/2, whichis smallerthan
); and in general,a mixedstrategy,withprobabilityq > 0 forwagering-
forand probability(1 - q) > 0 forwagering-against,
has expectation
+ ft2.(1- p)) + (1 - q) (fl.p + f3.(1 - p)),
q(0o.p
which is less than the expectation of wagering-for, and indeed is a
strictlyincreasingfunction of q. Thus, the RequirementofDistinguish-
able Expectationshas been met. Notice also thatwe no longerneed a
"tie-breaking"principle,such as Schlesinger's (discussed in section
3.3), since the expectationsare not tied. Rational choice can once
again be a mattersolelyof maximizingexpectation.
Our reformulationof Pascal's Wageris valid, and it concludes that
wageringforGod is rationallymandated.Ifyou wantto resistthe con-
clusion,you mustresistone of the premises:you mustdiscrediteither
decision theory(whichI will not do), or the reviseddecision matrix
(whichI willdo in section5), or theassumptionthattheprobabilityof
God's existenceis positiveand finite.Let's consider the last of these
coursesnow.
There are twowaysto go here. The firstwe have alreadyseen: simply
challenge the assumption that this probabilityis positive,with a
reminderthat thisis not true of the atheist.The second wayis more
interesting(and thisbringsus to thequalificationthatI warnedyou of
just beforethe decision matrix).Oppy (1990) suggeststhatthisprob-
abilitymightnot be finite,but infinitesimal instead. In supportof his
point, we surelyshould be prepared to countenance infinitesimal
probabilitygiventhatwe are prepared to countenance infiniteutility.
Afterall, theinfinitesimals turnout to be simplyreciprocalsofthe infi-
nite numbersin Conway'ssystem.Indeed, infinitesimal probabilities
seem to be necessarilyconnected to infiniteutilities:forinstance,you
assignan infinitesimal probability1/0)to X ifand onlyifyou consider
1 unitofutilitythefairpriceto payfora bet thatpaystheinfiniteutility
0 if X. Furthermore,one mighteven argue in favorofjust such an
assignment.For example,it is easyto generateinfinitely manyincom-
patible hypothesesabout exactlywhich God you must wager for in
order to achieve salvation(I mentionedthe "manyGods objection"in

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section2). Lackingreasonsthatsupportsome ofthesehypothesesover

others,a flatprobabilitydistributionover them mightseem to be in
order--whichis to say an assignmentof infinitesimalprobabilityto
each one of them.
Once infinitesimal probabilitiesare allowed,the reformulated argu-
mentno longergoes throughautomatically: theinfinitesimal probabil-
itycan "cancel" the infiniteutilityso as to yielda finiteexpectationfor
wageringfor God; and thismay be exceeded by the expectationof
wageringagainstGod. For example,multiplying theinfinitesimalprob-
ability1/( by the infinite o
utility yields the finitevalue 1. And thereis
no guaranteethat
1 + f2.(1 - 1/0) = 1 + f2,exceeds

+ f3.(1 - 1/C ) = f3.

fl.1/o
sincewe did not assume thatf2exceeds f3- 1.
So the reformulatedargumentdoes not catch in its net all agents
who assign positiveprobabilityto God's existence: some agents who
assign infinitesimalprobabilityslip through.On the other hand, it
does catch someagentswho assign infinitesimal probability.Afterall,
theinfinitenumberscome in a hierarchicalordering:roughly,an infi-
nite numberof a certainorder is infinitely large compared to an infi-
nitenumberoflowerorder,in the sense thattheratiooftheformerto
thelatteris infinite.And since theyare reciprocalsofinfinitesimals,the
infinitesimals displaya similarhierarchy.For example, o is infinitely
large compared to 4~ (their ratio is /,%which is infinite);and the
infinitesimal is infinitely
large comparedto 1/w (similarly).Now
1/4o
an infinitenumber multipliedby an infinitesimal of the same order
does indeed yielda finitenumber (the case we consideredin the pre-
viousparagraph). However,an infinitenumberof higherordermulti-
plied by thatsame infinitesimal yieldsanotherinfinitenumber.So a
theologicalskepticwhoseinfinitesimal probabilityforGod's existence
(forinstance, happens to be "mismatched" withtheutility ofsal-
1/(o)
vation (co) like thismaystillfeel the pull of our reformulatedWager.
And giventhatthehierarchyofinfinitenumbersis itselfinfinite(there
are infinitely many orders), the opportunityfor such a mismatchis
ample. Still, the point remains that infinitesimalprobabilitiescan
underminetheWager.
Interestingly, Pascal seems to have takencare of thisconcern-and
to myknowledge,thispoint has been overlooked.Indeed, I thinkhe

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deserves considerable credit for apparently having a notionofinfinitesi-

yearsahead ofhis time-a somewhat indistinctnotion, to be
malprobability
sure,but I would notwantto faulthimforlackingour modern-dayrig-
orous formulationof it. He writes:"thereis here ... a chance of gain
against a finite number of chances of loss ... . wherever the infinite is
ofchances ofloss againstthatofgain,there
and thereis not an infinity
is no timeto hesitate,you mustgive all." I take him to be rulingout
infinitesimal valuesofp here,thusdispellingtheconcern.It does, how-
ever,make an earlierconcernworse.It was questionable thatrational-
ityrules out a zero probabilityassignmentto God's existence;all the
more,it is questionable thatrationality rules out all positiveinfinitesi-
mal probabilityassignmentsas well.
There is a curiousconsequence of thisreformulatedversionof the
argument.Recallingmydiscussionin section3, it seems to implythat
we all getinfiniteexpected utilitywhateverwe do, as long as the prob-
abilityof our windingup wageringforGod is positiveand finite.For
anypositivefinitenumbermultipliedbyan infinitenumberyieldsan
infinitenumber.So even ifyou are currentlyan atheist,dear reader,
you should agree thatyou are nonethelessperformingan act withinfi-
nite expectation in reading this sentence, since withpositivefinite
probability you mightwagerforGod beforereachingtheend ofit-an
expectationless than o,ofcourse,butinfinitenonetheless.Still,a pro-
ponentofthisreformulation mightbe preparedto bitethisbullet,pro-
vided the orderingof expected utilitiesis right,and I have shownabove
thatPascal should be pleased withthe orderinghere.

Value: SalvationHas Finite"Heavenly"Value

4.2 Vector-Valued
and salvation-
Infinitethingsalone-forexample,eternity
cannotbeequaledbyanytemporal advantage.Weoughtnever
toplacethemin thebalancewithanythingsoftheworld.
-Arnauld (1964,357)

Suppose thatthereare twosortsofvalue: we mightcall them"earthly

value" and "heavenlyvalue" in order to have a handywayto referto
them.It is not theirnames thatmatter,but rathertheirstructure.Sup-
pose thatthe overallexpected utilityof one's life,ratherthanbeing a
one-dimensional(scalar) quantity,is a two-dimensional (vector)quan-
of
tity, the form (x, y). And suppose that salvationhas the maximal
amountof heavenlyvalue,whichwe willstipulateto be one unit-one
eternallifein heaven,one mightsay,thoughthe interpretation is not
A
important. probabilityp of salvationcorresponds pto units of "heav-

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enlyexpectation."We can thuspictureone's overallexpectationas a

point in the plane, withthe horizontalcoordinaterepresentingone's
expectationin earthlyvalue, and the verticalcoordinaterepresenting
one's expectationin heavenlyvalue-and thanksto our stipulation,
the point lands in a horizontalstripof unitthickness.We can thinkof
thatoverallexpectationas a complex numberof the formx + iy,with
0 < y 5 1 (withoutbegging the question in favorof atheismwiththe
usual reading of the horizontalcomponentas "real,"and the vertical
component as "imaginary"!).We will not, however,be assumingany-
thingof the structureof the complex numbers,beyond the waythat
theybehave under additionand multiplicationbyreal or infinitesimal
constants.
Finally,suppose thatanyincreasein heavenlyexpectation,however
small,trumpsanyincreasein earthlyexpectation,howeverlarge. The
thoughtis thatsalvationis a good of such magnitudethatanyincrease
in thechance ofitsattainmentis worthanyearthlygood. We havea so-
called lexicographicordering:when choosingbetweentwoactions,we
compare firstly theirheavenlyexpectations,preferring the actionwith
greaterheavenlyexpectation; if these are tied, we then preferthe
action withthe greaterearthlyexpectation.18(Compare looking up
wordsin a dictionaryconsistingexclusivelyof two-letter words.)
The decisionmatrixis now as follows,withe1,e2,e3,and e4 amounts
of earthlyvalue:
God exists God does not exist

WagerforGod (el, 1) (e2, 0)

WageragainstGod (e3, 0) (e4, 0)

In the second componentwe have weak dominance of wageringfor

God over wageringagainst God, and even superdominance (the worst
payoff associatedwith is
wagering-for at leastas good as the bestpayoff
withat leastone payoffgenuinelybet-
associatedwithwagering-against,
ter;cf.McClennen 1994). The expectationof any action can now be
calculatedbyfindingthe earthlyand heavenlyexpectations.Wagering
forGod has heavenlyexpectation

1.p+0.(1- p) =p > 0.
WageringagainstGod has zero heavenlyexpectation,and so itis auto-
maticallytrumped by wageringfor God, whateverpositivevalue p
has-even infinitesimal.
Thus, the Requirementof OverridingUtility

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has been met. And trumpedalso is any gamble thathas wageringfor

God as an outcomewithprobabilityq < 1. For theheavenlyexpectation
of such a gamble is q.p < p, so its earthlyexpectationis irrelevant-
heavenlyalwaystrumpsearthly. WageringforGod uniquelymaximizes
yourexpectation,just as Pascal wants,and thehigherthe probability of
wageringfor God, the higher the expectation.The Requirementof
DistinguishableExpectationshas been met.
It maybe temptingto thinkthatthislexicographicrepresentation is
equivalent to a surrealrepresentationalong the lines of section 4.1. I
wantto stressthatthereis nosuch equivalence.As we sawin section4.1,
infinitesimalprobabilitiescould "cancel"withtheinfiniteutility so that
wagering forGod was not the optimal act. But here, any infinitesimal
probabilityforGod's existencestilldictateswageringforGod, foreven
an infinitesimalamount of heavenlyvalue trumpsany amount of
earthlyvalue. This, by the way,is as close as I can come to vindicating
Pascal's remarkthatone should wagerforGod even "iftherewere an
infinityofchances,ofwhichone onlywould be foryou."In fact,Pascal
could stipulatethat any positiveheavenlyexpectationexceeds even
infiniteearthlyexpectation:a tinychance at salvation-even infinites-
imal-is betterthana guaranteeofplayingthe St. Petersburggame. In
thatcase, we could even allowel-e4 to be infinite.

4.3 SalvationHas FiniteUtilityforan InfinitePeriod ofTime

I'm beginning
tounderstand butinfinity
eternity, is stillbeyond
me.
-Cartoon captionin Harris1989
Pascal thoughtof salvationas being incomparablybetter than any
earthlypleasure-"an infinity happylife,"as we sawin sec-
of infinitely
tion 2.19 However,one could conceivablyattributeinfiniteutilityto
even an earthlypleasure,providedthatpleasure persistedforever-an
infinity happylife,as we mightsay-and thispossibility
offinitely is not
incoherent.Here the economistwillbe quick to point out thatunder
the assumptionthatthe agent discountsthefutureat a sufficient rate,
such an infinitely protractedgood will stillyield a finitetotal utility
upon integrationoverinfinitetime.Then let us not make thisassump-
tion:assume instead thatthe agent'sdiscountrate is sufficiently small
to yieldan infinitetotalutility.For definiteness, suppose thisdiscount
rate is zero: the agent puts equal weighton periods of timeof equal
length,irrespective ofhowdistanttheyare in thefuture.It is quite con-
sistentto do this.

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We need a device for comparing finitestates of well-beingthat

extend for infinitetime. How do we recognize the superiorityof a
superbcognac to a mediocrecup ofcoffee-both "bottomless," as they
sayin some caf6s-in the case thatwe can enjoyboth After
forever? all,
the totalutilityis infinitein both cases.
Vallentyne(1993) offersa principlethatgivesthe rightverdicthere
(even thoughhis concern is reallyutilitarianism, and aggregatingutil-
ityover individuals):
PMU*: An action,al producesmore thanaction,a2, ifand only
utility
ifthereis a timet such thatfor anylater timet' the cumu-
lativeamount of utilityproduced by al up to t' is greater
than thatproduced byaction a2 up to t'. (215)
Pickanytimet thatyou like (even t = 0 willdo). It is certainlytruethat,
for any later time t', the cumulativeamount of utilityproduced by
drinkingthe cognac up to t' is greaterthanthatproduced bydrinking
the coffeeup to t'. For definiteness, suppose thatdrinkingthe cognac
produces 2 units of utilityper unit time,and thatdrinkingthe coffee
1
produces unit of utilityper unit time,on some suitablescale. Then
the cumulativeamount of utilityproduced bydrinkingthe cognac up
to t', namely2t', is greaterthan thatproduced bydrinkingthe coffee
up to t', namelyt'. So drinkingthe cognac produces more utilitythan
drinkingthe coffee.
PMU* allowsus to makequalitative,butnot quantitative,judgments
ofbetterness:itallowsus,whenitsconditionsare met,to makeverdicts
oftheform"al is betterthana2," butitdoes nottellus how muchbetter
al is thana2. Suppose thatone can also enjoyforevera schnappsthat
is slightlymore exquisitethanthecognac: itrewardsone with2.1 units
of utilityper unit time on the same scale. PMU* correctlyranksthe
threeinfinitepleasures,butitdoes not tellus thattheliquorsare closer
toeach otherin qualitythantheyare tothecoffee,letalone howmuchso.
But there is a way to make such quantitativecomparisons.An
approach familiarto economistsis to considerthe long-run averageutil-
ity of each of these: calculate the total utility of each up timet,for
to
varioust; divide thisin each case by t; thentake the limitas t tendsto
infinity.The totalutilityup to timet of thecognac is 2t; dividingthisby
t yields2; the limitas t tendsto infinity of 2 is 2, namely,the long-run
average of the cognac. This exceeds the long-runaverageutilityof the
coffee,namely1, thusaccountingforour preferenceforthe cognac.

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The long-runaverage of the schnapps is 2.1, whichis betterstill,but

onlyslightly.
Suppose that salvation consistsof a finitepleasure over infinite
time-something thatyou accord, say,one unitof utilityforeach unit
of time. (We can alwaysrescale the utilitiesto make thisso.) Then of
course thelong runaverageutility ofsalvationis 1. And suppose thatin
the case thatGod does not exist,or ifyou wageragainstGod, you get
some earthlyrewards,but onlyforthefiniteamountof timeuntilyour
death. Foreverafteryou get zero unitsof utilityforeach unitof time.
(We can alwayschoose a utilityscale so as to get thisvalue, too.) Then
whateverhappens up tillyourdeath makesno contributionto thelong-
runaverage:thesubsequentinfinite periodofzeroutility overwhelms it.
Here is the decision matrix,now with long-runaverage utilities
ratherthantotalutilities:
God exists God does not exist

WagerforGod 1 0

WageragainstGod 0 0

Note thatwe have long-runaveragesin thismatrixthathave the same

valuesas the "heavenly"componentsin thepreviousmatrix.And since
itwas those"heavenly"componentsthatdid all the workin determin-
ing what one should do, the calculations look similar here: the
expected utilityofwageringforGod is p, whichexceeds the expected
utilityofwageringagainstGod, 0. Furthermore, outrightwagering-for
exceeds in expectationanygambleat wagering-for, and in generalthe
higher the probabilityq of wagering-for, higherthe expectation:
the
q.p is an increasingfunction of q.20All thisis so even ifwe allowinfin-
itesimalprobabilities.The Requirementsof OverridingUtilityand of
DistinguishableExpectationshave both been met.
4.4 SalvationHas FiniteUtility
We mightsaythatPascal held the utilitiesfixedand "solvedfor"who
should wagerforGod (thatis, everyonebut strictatheistswho assign
zero probabilityto God's existence and, we mightnow add, certain
near-atheistswho assign it infinitesimalprobability).But we could
instead hold fixed a set of people, and solve for those utilitiesthat
would mandatewageringforGod forall people in thatset.In particu-
lar,considerthe set S ofall people who everlivedand who everwilllive
who assignpositive,finiteprobabilityto God's existence.S is clearlya

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huge set of people, includingeven someone who assignsit probability

one-in-a-googolplex, ifsuch a person ever existed/exists.(S does not
include thestrictatheistsor near-atheists,butwe alreadyknewthatthe
Wager had no of
hope convincing them.) Huge thoughS is,itis surely
as
finite, the human race willsurelynot persistforever.Now consider
thesmallestprobability thatanyonein S assignsto God's existence.Call
thisPmin.It represents,as itwere,Pascal's hardestsell-the assignment
ofthemostskepticalpersonin Sas faras God's existenceis concerned.
Now we need not assume thatsalvationbringsinfiniteutilityat all. A
finiteutilityf (on a chosen scale) willsuffice,providedfis sufficiently
large.21In thatcase salvationcould be a finite,finitelyhappylife.The
decision matrixbecomes:
God exists God does not exist

WagerforGod f f2
WageragainstGod f, f3

All thenumbersin thematrixare nowfinite.How largeisf? We merely

largethattheexpectationofwageringforGod
need itto be sufficiently
exceeds thatof wageringagainstGod even forthe mostskepticalper-
son in S:

fpmin+ - Pmin)> fi-Pmin + f3.(1 - Pmin)-

f2."(1
Thus, even in thishardestcase (so to speak), wageringforGod is the
act of maximalexpectation.There willobviouslybe a range of candi-
datesforfwiththerequiredproperty, and anyofthemwillyielda valid
reformulation of the Wager.For definiteness,we could pick one just
slightlygreaterthanthe "breakeven"point,thevalue at whichthe two
expectationsare exactlyequal. But nothingmore reallyneeds to be
said about the size off; itsexactvalue does not matter.For thatreason,
we could even treatit as a variable,rangingoverall utilityvalues that
are sufficientlylarge.
Again, this reformulationmeets the Requirement of Overriding
Thanks toft largeness,all the other utilitiesin the matrixare
Utility.
overridden.And the exact value ofyourpositiveprobabilityforGod's
existenceis irrelevant-whateverit is,wagering-for exceeds wagering-
againstin expectation.Forwithprobability p (guaranteedto be 2 pmin)
forGod's existence,yourexpectationof wagering-for is

fp + f2.(1- p)

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whileyourexpectationofwagering-against
is
+ f3.(1 - P).
fl.p
fp is so large thatthe formervalue exceeds the latter.
By hypothesis,
Furthermore,a mixed strategy, withprobabilityq > 0 forwagering-
forand probability(1 - q) > 0 forwagering-against,
has expectation

q(f.p+ f2.(1- p)) + (1 - q) (fl.p+ f3.(1- p)),

which is less than the expectation of wagering-for, and indeed is a
increasingfunctionofq. Thus, theRequirementofDistinguish-
strictly
able Expectationsis met.Ironically,it is in thissense thatwageringfor
a God thatoffersa sufficiently
large finiterewardis rationallyrequired,
whilewageringfora God thatoffersan infiniterewardof oois not (as
we saw in section 3). Moreover,this finitereformulationparries a
majorobjection (noted in section2) thatdecision theoristssuch asJef-
freyand McClennen had to the originalwager:thattheverynotion of
infiniteutilityis suspect.

5. A ProblemfortheReformulations-Anda Dilemma forAnyRefor-

mulation
Four reformulations of Pascal's Wagerare now beforeyou. These pro-
posals, I submit,yieldvalidargumentsforwageringforGod, wherePas-
cal's argumentwas invalid.Yet stilltheymaynot meet Pascal's needs.
The problemin each case, not altogethersurprisingly, concernsthe
utilityof salvation.For while all the proposalsmeet the Requirementof
OverridingUtility, they do
still not seem to
adequately capturePascal's
reasoning. Recall that to "
according him, [u] nityjoinedto infinity adds
nothing to it .... the addition of a unit can make no change in its
nature" or symbolically,oo + 1 = oo. Likewise, oo + 2 = oo,oo + 3 = oo,and
indeed oo+ x = ooforall positive x. Let us call thispropertyofoo reflexivity
underaddition. When theutilityofsalvationis reflexiveunder addition,
one cannotincreaseitbyaddingsomethingtoit.We can see whyPascal
would regardthe utilityof salvationto be reflexiveunder addition:as
I noted in section2, he thoughtof salvationas the best possiblething.
But ifthatutilityis a surrealinfinitenumbersuch as m,or a long run
averageof 1, or a finitenumberf thenadding 1 (or 2, or 3, or indeed
any positivex) to it doesincrease it; these quantitiesare not reflexive
under addition. Salvation,then,is no longer the best possible thing
afterall.

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It is an apparent virtueof the two-dimensionalrepresentation,I

think,thatit is less obviouslysusceptibleto thisobjection. Of course,
theobjectionwouldhaveto be restatedso thattheadditionhere iswell-
defined:itmakesno sense to add a scalarto a vector.The naturalgen-
eralization,to the two-dimensional case, ofreflexivity underadditionis
of
thatone cannotincreasetheutility salvationbyadding anothervec-
torto it.To be sure,one canincreasethatutility byincreasingitsearthly
component: for example, adding (1, 0) to (el, 1) yields (el + 1, 1),
whichis a greaterutilitythan (el, 1). Strictly speaking,then,reflexivity
under addition failsagain. But notice thatno addition can raise the
heavenlycomponent above its maximal value of 1, and this is the
"trumping"componentin thelexicographicordering.The increasein
utilityhere,then,is in thissense comparatively negligible,and thusthe
failureof reflexivity under addition is comparativelynegligible.We
mighteven maintainthatthe earthlycomponentis determinedsolely
byone's rewardsin one's earthlylife,and thattheheavenlycomponent
concernssomethingthathappens (or not) thereafter. What is at issue
withsalvation,we mightinsist,is the heavenlycomponent,which is
maximal.In thisimportantsense,we mightsaythatsalvationis as good
as itgetsas faras the two-dimensional representationis concerned.
The objectionwould have to go more along theselines:God settled
forjust twodimensionsofvalue,when he could have createdthree,or
four,or ... And we could thenproceed muchas before:anygain in the
thirddimensiontrumpsanylossesin thefirsttwo,and so on. Suppose,
forexample, thatwe have threedimensionsof value. The two-dimen-
sional stripthatpreviouslycontainedall expectationsoftheform(x,y)
is now identifiedwiththe set of triplesof the form(x, y,0). The utility
of salvationcorrespondsto a vectorof theform(el, 1,0). Understood
thisway,the naturalgeneralizationof reflexivity under addition-so
thatthenotionapplies at all-fails, thistimein an importantway.Add-
ing a finitevectorto theutilityof salvationcan make a big difference,
indeed an overwhelming difference-forexample, (el, 1,0) + (0, 0, 1)
= (e1, 1,1),whichis muchbetterthantheutility ofsalvationitself.So the
utilityof salvationis farfrombeing reflexiveunder addition afterall:
adding a finiteamount ofhigher-dimensional value makes a huge dif-
ference.Again,salvationis not thebestpossiblethingafterall-it's not
even close.22
The problemforeach of the reformulations stemsfromour giving,
as I said,infinitudea finite-lookinggloss.Alas,I see no wayofsquaring
thiswithPascal's viewofinfinity. "The finiteis annihilatedin the pres-

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ence of the infinite,and becomes a pure nothing,"he writes.But in

each of the reformulations of the utilityof salvation,the finiteis some-
thing.To be sure,the utilityof salvationwas carefullychosen to swamp
all other termsin the expectationcalculations,and when it comes to
merelyorderingexpectations,swampingis as good as annihilation.
Still,thechosen utilityforsalvation,in turn,is not merelybettered,but
swamped to the same degreebyanother conceivableutility: forinstance,
02standsto a as a) standsto 1; and so on. And thatotherutility, in turn,
is swampedbystillanother(0)3, say),and so on ad infinitum-an"infin-
itum"of theformthatPascal wouldrecognize!Far frombeing thebest
possible thing,salvationisn'teven close; in fact,in the eyesof Pascal it
becomes a pure nothing.It is hardlysurprising, then,thatthe notion
ofinfinity thathe envisagesis reflexiveunderaddition.Atleastthatway
infinitudestaysinfinite-looking.
And yetas we sawin section3, a kindredpropertyofoois theundoing
of the Wager: oo.x = oofor all positive, finitex. Let us call this property
of oo reflexivity
under multiplication.Of course, it was just this property
thatwe exploited in showingthatall the mixed strategies,withtheir
various weightsfor wageringfor and against God, have the same
expected utilityas outrightwageringforGod.
Reflexivityunder multiplication,however,ought to be desirable to
Pascal when the multipliers are greater than 1: we have oo.2 = oo,oo.3 =
oo, and so on, and thisis all to the good. In fact,it is all to the ultimate
good, since once again the utilityof salvationis not bettered.So really
Pascal should wantto be selectiveabout whichreflexivities hold of the
utilityof salvation: under
reflexivity multiplicationbypositive, finiteprob-
is a bad thing,sinceitopens thedoor to all themixedstrategies;
abilities
reflexivity under multiplicationbynumbers greater than1is a good thing,
since itunderscoresthe maximality of the utilityof salvation(much as
reflexivity under additiondoes).
Thus Pascal, and any advocate of an argumentin the spiritof his
Wager,facesa dilemma.If theutilityof salvationis bothreflexiveunder
additionand under multiplicationbypositive,finiteprobabilities,as O
is,thentheargumentis invalid.Iftheutility ofsalvationis neitherreflex-
ive under addition nor under multiplicationbypositive,finiteproba-
bilities,as is the case withthe reformulations, then salvationis so far
frombeing the best thingpossible thatitsutilityis swampedbysome-
thingthatis swampedbysomethingthatis swamped... infinitely many
timesover.What is wanted,then,is the seeminglyimpossible:a repre-
sentationofthe rewardofsalvationthatis reflexiveunder addition (so

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thatit cannot be bettered),but notreflexiveunder multiplicationby

positive,finiteprobabilities(so thatthemixed strategiescan be distin-
guished in expectationfromoutrightwageringforGod). But how do
we giveinfinitudea finite-looking glosswithrespectto multiplication
by positive, finite probabilities,but an infinite-looking gloss with
respect to addition? Said another way (given the correspondence
betweenmultiplicationand repeated addition), how do we giveinfin-
itude a finite-looking gloss withrespectto multiplicationby positive,
finiteprobabilities,but an infinite-looking glosswithrespectto multi-
plicationby numbers greater than 1? How do we representtheutility of
salvationin a waythatis sufficiently nuanced to make the distinctions
thatPascal wants,but not the distinctionsthathe doesn'twant?
It mightseem that the dilemma would be resolvedif there were
some maximumutilitylevelthata human could achieve,some "satura-
tionpoint"beyondwhichadditionalrewardsmade no perceptibledif-
ference.This is plausibleformostactual people and monetarywealth,
forexample: thereis some degree of affluenceso greatthataccruing
furtherdollarsdoes not improveone's situation.It is possible thatfor
all people thereis such a saturationpoint even whenit comes to salva-
tion.Perhapsit is of the essence of a human to be finite,and perhaps
a finitebeing cannot reap an infinitereward; perhaps an infinite
reward can only be finitelyappreciated by a human. Suppose, for
example, thatthissaturationpoint isfunits of utilityon some chosen
scale. Then therecould be no complaintagainstGod forhis making
salvationworthf-any additional reward would go unappreciated.
Unityjoined tofadds somethingto it,mathematically speaking,but it
adds nothingthatmakesa differenceto us. Likewisefordoublingf or
triplingit,and so on. In thatcase, the twoproblemswould apparently
be solvedwitha singlestroke:we could distinguishin expectationthe
variousgamblesat wageringforGod (f/2is smallerthanf and so on),
whilesalvationwould be the maximalgood thatwe could realize.We
could generalize thispoint to the other reformulations. Simplysup-
pose thatour capacityto enjoya reward,whilenot necessarilyfinite,is
neverthelessrepresentedbya quantitythatis not reflexiveunder addi-
tion or multiplication:the saturationpoint could be co,or an infinite
long-runaverageof 1, or thevector-valued quantity(el, 1).
But Pascal would not obviouslybe out of the firingline yet.For now
thecomplaintcould shiftto thelevelofthesaturationpoint,theobjec-
tions merelyrelocated. Whywould God create us witha saturation
point at all? And having done so, it would be swamped by another

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 WAGINGWARON PASCAL'S WAGER

choice of saturation point, which would be swamped by another one,

... ad infinitum.23It matters littlewhether it is the utilityof salvation or
the saturation point that is given a finite-lookinggloss: either way,we
fall far,far short of Pascal's promise of our "gaining everything"if we
win the Wager.

6. Conclusion
It seems, then, that Pascal's Wager and all the reformulations of it that
I have considered face a serious problem. Moreover, I believe that it is
a problem that runs deep, not one that will go away with some clever
tinkering.For I see no prospects for characterizing a notion of the util-
ityof salvation that is reflexive under addition withoutbeing reflexive
under multiplication by positive, finiteprobabilities, or reflexiveunder
multiplication by numbers greater than 1 withoutbeing reflexiveunder
multiplication by positive, finiteprobabilities. Yet it seems that nothing
less will salvage Pascal's reasoning. So we are leftwith a dilemma. If the
utilityof salvation is reflexive under both addition and multiplication
by positive, finite probabilities (as in Pascal's original argument),
wagering for God will be just one of many equally rational courses of
action, and our choice among them will be arbitrary.If the utilityis not
reflexive under either addition or multiplication by positive, finite
probabilities (as in my reformulations of the argument), salvation will
be so farfrom being the best thing possible as to be unsuitable for Pas-
cal's theology. Iwager that any futureversion of the argument will suc-
cumb to this dilemma.

CaliforniaInstituteof Technology

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Notes
Unbounded thanksto the manypeople who have helped me duringthewritingof
this paper, especially:John Barker,John Broome,John Conway,Kevin Coyle,Jamie
Dreier,PhilipEhrlich,Paolo Ghirardato,Bill Harper,Ned Hall, Allen Hazen, David Hil-
bert,Carl Hoefer,RichardJeffrey,JimJoyce,Ehud Kalai, KevinKonty,BrigitteLegare,
ReneeLegare,DavidLewis,PeterMenzies,RalphMiles,AndrewMilne,CollinMosh-
man, Daniel Nolan, Graham Oddie, JohnHawthorne,JimPryor,Gideon Rosen,Teddy
Seidenfeld, Brian Skyrms,Roy Sorensen, Peter Vallentyne,Bas van Fraassen, Peter
Vanderschraaf, JimWoodward,and anonymousreaders forthe Philosophical Review.In
particular,commentsby Alex Byrne,Fiona Cowie, Mahmoud El-Gamal,Christopher
Hitchcock,GrahamOppy,MikeThau, and LyleZyndaled to significant revisionsofear-
lier drafts.(Anotherthankyou to GrahamOppy forintroducingme to Conway'swork,
and to Alex Byrneforsuggestingthe essentialsof the second reformulation.)Thanks
also to audiences at the AustralianNational University, Universidadde Buenos Aires,
University of Bristol,Cambridge University, CaliforniaInstituteof Technology,Carn-
egie Mellon University, Universityof Colorado at Boulder, Universidadde Cordoba,
Indiana University at South Bend,JagiellonianUniversity, Cracow,La Trobe University,
London School of Economics,MIT, Monash University, Montana StateUniversity, Uni-
versityof Melbourne, Princeton University, Queens College (Melbourne), Sheffield
University, St. Stephen's College, Delhi, Texas Technical University, TrinityCollege
(Melbourne), University College, London, and University ofWashingtonat Seattle.Part
of thispaper waswritten whileI was a visitingfellowat theResearchSchool ofSocial Sci-
ences at the AustralianNational University, and I am gratefulforthe generositythatI
was shownthere.
1Pascal's presentationof the Wager is somewhatobscure, even quirkyin various
ways,frustrating a definitivereconstruction. I do wantto insist,however,thatI am adopt-
ing a perfectly standardinterpretation of ?233 in the Pensies,ifcastin the anachronistic
terminology of modernBayesiandecision theory(and thatcastingtoo is standard).
2You maysaythatPascal's conclusionis really"Rationality requiresyou to believe
in
God." But perhaps one cannot simplybelieve in God at will; and rationalitycannot
requirethe impossible.Pascal is wellawareof thisobjection:"[I] am so made thatI can-

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 WAGING WAR ON PASCAL'S WAGER

not believe" (1948, ?233), his imaginaryinterlocutorpoignantlyreplies. But Pascal

maintainsthatone can resolve tobelieve
in God-one can cultivate such belief.I willadopt
the phrase "wageringforGod" as shorthandfor"resolvingto believe in God."
3 If you wager againstGod at t,you maystillwagerforGod at a latertimet', and I
presume thatPascal would regardyou as gettinginfiniteutilityifyourbeliefin God, or
your resolveto believe, then persistsuntilyour death. One mayfairlyobject thatyou
mightpermanently lose such beliefor such resolve,and thusthe putativeinfiniteutility,
so reallythedecisionmatrixshould be more complicatedthanPascal's. This amountsto
an objection to premise2, and as suchjoins a long listof objectionsto his premisesto
whichI will turnshortly.Withoutwishingto dismissthese objections,myprimarycon-
cern lies elsewhere.
4 Cf. Augustine'sdiscussionof "the supreme good of man" in his 1966, especially
book 1.
5 Earlierin the Pensies(?229) he also writes:"nothingwould be too dear to me for
eternity."
6 Martin (1990) reads Pascal himselfthisway.However,Pascal says:"The justice of
God must be vast like His compassion. Now justice to the outcastis less vast ... than
mercytowardsthe elect" (65). I take Pascal to be suggestinghere thatfl is not --oo,as
does Sobel (1996).
7These pointscarrythrougheven ifyou thinkthatwhatyou do is not independent
ofwhetherGod exists.MaybeGod helpspeople wagerforhim,so thatP(God existsIyou
wagerforGod) > P(God existslyouwageragainstGod). Still,the expected utilitycalcu-
lationsare as before,provided the firstconditional probabilityis positive:infinitefor
wagering-for, finiteforwagering-against. In the restof the paper,I willmake the simpli-
fyingassumptionof independence,but at no pointwillthisbe essential.
Moreover,I doubt thatusingsome versionof causal decision theoryinsteadwould
reallychange matters.We wouldjust replace the assumptionthatp is positivewiththe
same assumptionabout whateverprobabilityreplaces it-the probabilityof a counter-
factual,an imaged probability, or whathave you.
8Jeffrey (1983, 153) makes a similarpoint in his discussionof infiniteutility:
If theagent takesact 1 to bestowprobability.99 on the prospectofheaven,and
he takesact 2 to bestowprobability .01 on thatprospect,and ifhe takesall other
consequences of the acts to have finitedesirabilities,it seems clear that the
agentwould and should stronglypreferact 1 overact 2. On the otherhand, in
the Bayesian account of the matter,the agent is taken to rank the two acts
togetherat the top of his preferencescale, since each of them has infinite
expected desirability; forwe have
.99 x oo= .01 x oo= oo

We willshortlysee just how muchJeffrey's point can be generalized.

9I1followhere the terminology of such authorsas Chernoffand Moses (1959) and
Pratt,Raiffa,and Schlaifer(1995).
10I1claim to have shownthe argumentto be invalid.You maythinkthatI have really
disputedpremise2, augmentingthedecision matrixto includevariousactionsthatPas-
cal did not consider.In defenseof myclaim,let me note thatit is perfectly standardin
decision theoryto takea set ofpure strategiesas given,withtheirvariouscorresponding
pay-offs tabulatedin a decision matrix;all the mixed strategiesthen come forfree,as it
were,theirexpected utilitiestherebydetermined.Obviously,it would be impossibleto
list all of the mixed strategiesas extra rowsin the matrix,for there are uncountably
manyof them.
Of course,we have recast Pascal's somewhatobscure textin modern guise-see
footnote1-and theremaybe some indeterminacy regardinghow best to diagnose the

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 ALANHAJEK

flawin his originalargument.It maynot mattermuch at the end of the daywhetherwe

judge the argumentto be invalidor to have a falsepremise-either way,the argumentis
unsound-although I have givenreasonsforpreferring mydiagnosis.Howeverwe clas-
sifyit,the flawdeservesattention,as do itsconsequences.
11 Duff(1986) has made the essentialsof thispoint beforeme. I intendmyensuing
discussionto develophis contributionfurther. I agree with(and in some cases reiterate)
almosteverything in hisversionof theargument,withthissmallcaveat:we should make
clear thatall theprobabilitiesand expectationsat issue are thoseofa particular
agent.Duff
says,forexample:
No courseofactioncan makeitabsolutelycertainthatI willnot come to believe
in God: therefore,everycourse of action has an infiniteexpected value-the
infinitevalue of believingin God multipliedbythe probabilitythatGod exists,
and bythe probabilitythatI willcome to believe in Him. (108)
We should rememberthatnotions such as "certain","the probability," and "expected
value" are subjective,and thattheseobservationswillnot hold forall agents.That is why
I do some extraworkin the nextsectionin an attemptto arriveat similarobservations
at leastforall rationalagents.
Also,as willbecome clear in section4, I disagreewiththe moral thatDuffdrawsat
the end: "This mightlook like a reductio ad absurdum of theWager.It mightmore partic-
ularlysuggestthatthereis somethingwrongwithtryingto captureinfinity withproba-
bility"(109). Indeed, I will devote much space to "tryingto capture infinity" decision-
theoretically.
12I1assume here thatbeliefrevisionin theface of such evidencegoes byconditional-
ization,Jeffrey conditionalization,or some otherrule thatkeepsprobabilityassignments
of 0 and 1 fixed.
13And whatifthe coin toss lands the "wrong"way,dictatingthatyou wageragainst
God? Running Pascal's argumentone more time,doesn't thatmean thatyou thendo
worse than you would have if the coin had landed the "right"way,and you are really
back where you started:you should act as if the coin had landed the "right"way,and
wagerforGod outright?Not so. First,thebeststrategyneed not resultin thebestconse-
quences: takingout fireinsuranceforyourhouse is a good strategyeven ifyourhouse
does notburndown (in whichcase youwould have done betternot takingout theinsur-
ance). Even Pascal could be prepared to admit thatthe strategyhe advocatesmaynot
have the best consequences (namely,if God does not exist). But second, and more
importantly, if the coin lands the "wrong"way,yourexpectationdoes not change. By
Pascal's lights,you stillenjoyinfiniteexpectationwhateveryou do next.
14Moreover,manyotherphilosophicaldiscussionsinvolvethe notionof infinity, and
of infinitesimal probability,and I suspect (though I cannot argue here) that surreal
numbersmayclarifyor illuminatethemalso. I am thinking,forexample, of the recent
spate of articleson the twoenvelope paradox (forinstance,Sobel 1994, Broome 1995,
Norton1998,Clarkand Shackel 2000, Chalmers2002); theinterpretation of probability
knownas "hypothetical frequentism";Lewis's 1980 discussionof the PrincipalPrinciple;
Skyrms1980 on causal necessity;Savage 1954 and de Finetti1972 on countable additiv-
ity;McCall and Armstrong1989 on "God's Lottery";recentdiscussionsof infiniteutili-
ties in utilitarianism, as found in Vallentyne1993, Cain 1995, Vallentyneand Kagan
1997,Fishkindet al. 2002; and so on.
15Note that o + 1 is greaterthano0(by 1). Thus, we partcompanywithPascal when
he says,"Unityjoinedto infinity adds nothingto it."More on thisbelow.
16See Conway(1976), chap. 1. One reason I have forpreferring Conway'ssystemto
those of, say,Cantor or Zermelo-Fraenkel,is the following.Startingwiththe familiar
infinitenumber o, both Cantorand Zermelo-Fraenkel generatelargerinfinitenumbers
(0o+ 1, 2o? 02, and so on). However,theydo not generatesmallerones. The beautyof

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 WAGINGWARON PASCAL'S WAGER

Conway'ssystemis thathe generateswithequal ease smallernumberssuch as o - 1,(0/

2, VCo, and so on-and it isjust thisfeaturethatwe will appeal to in order to evade my
main objection to Pascal's originalwager.
17Strictly speaking,0 is an infinitesimal (the onlyreal one, in fact),so a probability
thatis non-infinitesimal is automatically whenI speak of"infinites-
positive.But typically
imals,"I mean the positiveones. Contextshould make myusage clear.
18The concept of lexicographicutilityoriginateswithHausner (1954) and Thrall
(1954), who establishedthe existenceof a lexicographicutilityfunction.This sortof
rankingof alternatives willbe familiarto readersof Rawls (1971), who calls it a "lexical
order."
19Maybesomethingcould be incomparablybetterthananyearthlypleasure,and yet
stilllead to onlya finitetotalof utility: suppose it behaveslikea delta function,providing
an instantaneouspulse ofinfiniteutility. Pascal, of course,did not thinkofsalvationthat
way.
20Ifp is finite,the zero pay-offs could be replaced withinfinitesimal payoffswithout
harmingthe argument.
21Mougin and Sober (1994) considerfiniteversionsof the Wager,leavingit open
whetherPascal himselfofferedsuch a version:"Pascal's theologyallowshim to describe
the payoffs thataccrue to the theistand to the atheist.Heaven is of great (perhaps infi-
nite) value" (382). I do wantto insist,however,thatPascal's talkof "an infinity ofan infi-
nitelyhappy life" rules out our attributingto hima finiteversion. Sobel (1996) also
canvassesa finitewager,but it is tailoredto a particularperson ("'I'") witha particular
probability/utility profile,and it is complicatedby a concernwithnot floutingrational-
ity:"Let therebe in myviewparitybetween1/3 chance of eternalbliss,and a certainty of
not detractingfrommyrationality to the extentthatwillfulbeliefin God would do, so
that'I' value eternalbliss twiceas much as 'I' disvalue thatdetraction"(41). Myfinite
wager is thus more general.And Jordan (1998) advocates thatwe consider finitever-
sions of theWager.He then surveystheirpossible audience, a listthatincludes:"(5) the
convinced one who believesthat0.5 > Pr(G) > 0, or would so believeifs/he wereto
thinkabout atheist,
it" (428), where "G"'standsfor "God exists."Jordandoes not give us any
quantitativeinformationabout the utilityof salvation,so I am quite at a loss to explain
whyhe thinksthat"thebottom thirdof thosedescribedby (5) would be, no doubt,beyond
the persuasivescope of a finitewagersince theirprobabilityassessmentsof theismare
significantly less thanone-half"(428, myitalics). In anycase, assuming(as I thinkplau-
sible) thatno human genuinelyassignsinfinitesimal probabilityto God's existence,all
ofthosedescribedby(5) would be withinthepersuasivescope of thefinitewager(s) that
I suggest.
22There is a relatedproblemthatcan be statedin termsofthe PrincipleofSufficient
Reason-a principleassociated withLeibniz ratherthan Pascal, to be sure,but it still
providesa wayofsharpeningthe point.We can understand(even ifwe don't agree) why
Leibniz thoughtthatthisis the best of all possible worlds:God would not have a suffi-
cientreason forcreatinganyotherworld.Ifhe createdinstead,say,theseventeenthbest
world (if thereis such a thing),he would apparentlybe actingarbitrarily-why that,we
mightask, ratherthan the sixteenthbest?Likewise,it is naturalto thinkof salvationas
being the best of all possible rewards,but accordingto each of the reformulations itis
not. God, then,is portrayedas actingarbitrarily in makingit have the utilitythatit has
and not some other.Why,we mightask,should the utilityof salvationbe (o ratherthan
o+l1,or (o+2, or ... (on a givenscale)? Whyfratherthanf+1, orf+2, or ...? Whyshould
salvationhave a long-runaverage of 1, ratherthan 2, or 3, or ...? Or 2 dimensionsof
value ratherthan 3, or 4, or ...? To be sure, there are worse thingsthan actingarbi-
trarily-justask Buridan's ass-and maybe even God can so act, consistently withhis
nature.But notice thatsuch questionsdid not even arisewhenwe understoodsalvation

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 ALANHAJEK

as havinga utilityof "infinity,"

where"[u]nityjoined to infinity
adds nothingto it."Pas-
cal would simplynote thatthereis nothingarbitrary about God bestowinga rewardof o
ratherthano + 1, because theyare one and the same.
23Furthermore,therewould apparentlybe no sufficientreason whythe saturation
point should have one value ratherthan another.The choice off ratherthanf+ 1 or
f+ 2 or ... seems arbitrary;
likewiseforthe otherreformulations.

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