Third World Quarterly

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Orientalism in a globalised world: Said in the

twenty-first century

Ahmad H. Sa’di

To cite this article: Ahmad H. Sa’di (2021) Orientalism in a globalised world: Said in the twenty-
first century, Third World Quarterly, 42:11, 2505-2520, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2020.1788935

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Third World Quarterly
2021, VOL. 42, NO. 11, 2505–2520
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1788935

Orientalism in a globalised world: Said in the

twenty-first century
Ahmad H. Sa’di
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Politics & Government, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev,
Beer-Sheva, Israel

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

From its publication in 1978, Edward Said’s magnum opus Orientalism Received 13 October 2019
has generated fierce and unrelenting debates regarding its epistemol- Accepted 25 June 2020
ogy and scope, and the interpretive validity of its Western cultural rep- KEYWORDS
resentations of the self and other. Since then, however, the world has orientalism
become increasingly governed by different sets of assumptions, ideol- neo-orientalism
ogies, relations of production and reproduction, and matrixes of power Islamophobia
relations. This article considers whether orientalism has kept its hold on migration
Western public opinion, media presentations, political elites, and sec- decline of the West
tions of the scholarly community’s mode of thinking in the current racism
new racism
neo-liberal, globalised, digitalised and securitised world. It also consid-
ers whether its mutation has shifted to engender a paradigmatic change
and argues that alongside the old-style orientalism, a more sophisti-
cated, subtle, and up-to-date perspective has appeared. Although its
emphases, concerns and methodologies might represent a certain
departure from old orientalist dogmas, its objective seems to remain
largely intact.

Framing orientalism
In his classic book Orientalism, Edward W. Said1 explored the production of colonial knowl-
edge, which was generated in established – and aspiring – colonial centres about dominated
races and territories. Allied with European expansionism and growing power, this knowledge
had been developed by major Western institutions including universities, and scholarly and
political associations such as the Royal Anthropological Society (founded in 1863), the
Colonial Society (formed in 1869), the Imperial Maritime League, the Imperial Institute, the
Primrose League (which existed until 2004),2 cultural and entertainment organisations, think
tanks and colonial offices. It was then propagated through novels, biographies, travel and
children’s stories, textbooks, newspapers, films, plays, exhibitions and scholarly literature.3
In its heyday, the premises of this colonial knowledge – which Said termed ‘orientalism’ –
became the overpowering system of thought. It constituted the defining grammar for the
European-self as opposed to the native-other, a hierarchy that gave Europeans and North
Americans the right not only to rule over and colonise remote territories but also to coerce

CONTACT Ahmad H. Sa’di ahsaadi@bgu.ac.il

© 2021 Global South Ltd
2506 A. H. SA’DI

natives to change their livelihoods to accommodate the colonial order,4 or to eliminate

indigenous peoples.5 This knowledge has also been used to create, maintain and justify the
evolution of a world system, comprising a centre/periphery polarity and reproduced through
exploitation.6 Symbolic, cultural and personal attributes, such as civility, the right order of
things and proper sensibilities, had been defined accordingly.
In his major oeuvres, Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism,7 Said surveyed the main
tenets and representations of orientalist thought. However, he was aware of the mounting
challenges that this discourse had faced since the early 1960s following the ascendance of
Third-Worldism and a consciousness of liberation, which engulfed wide audiences not only
in the ex-colonies but also in the centre. Disenchantment with and opposition to colonialism
and its associated discourse have been articulated through a multitude of perspectives such
as existentialism, structural Marxism, Third World national liberation,8 dependency theory,
world-system theories, etc. These currents constituted powerful counter-discourses but
largely failed to alter the Eurocentric prism through which the world had been conceived
and conceptualised.
Probably Fanon and more generally the Negritude’s proponents9 were those who posed,
in pre-Saidian scholarship, the most serious challenge to the Eurocentric perspective and
its claim to universality. In this regard, it is worth recalling Hegel’s assertion that:
It is in the Caucasian race that mind first attains to absolute unity with itself. Here for the first-
time mind enters into complete opposition to the life of Nature, apprehends itself in its abso-
lute self-dependence, wrests itself from the fluctuation between one extreme and the other
[the material and the spiritual], achieves self-determination, self-development, and in doing so
creates world-history.10

Hegel, in his totalising idealist theory of history, not only excluded the legacies and expe-
riences of non-European cultures and nations (or races in his presentation) from any positive
and productive role in world history but also asserted their inherent inability to contribute
to that history. In line with this, most history books published between the late eighteenth
century – when history was institutionalised as an academic discipline – and the early
twentieth century dated colonies’ historical beginning to the arrival of the white man.11
Contrasting this narrative, Fanon and his colleagues graphically exposed one grim side of
the history that Hegel and early European historians exuberantly outlined. Yet, regardless
of the shocking facts that critics of imperialism unveiled on the excesses, flaws and even
large-scale abuses in the deployment of colonial power, these did not in themselves inval-
idate the whole colonial endeavour. Indeed, there are not many proponents of colonialism
who would deny hard facts regarding colonial rule without conceding the beneficial moral
and civilisational impact they attribute to it.
Edward Said thought that the binaries that both the proponents and the critics of colo-
nialism had produced were restrictive and limiting to the understanding of this endeavour’s
past and present. He approached it in a worldly manner, as a totalising system that is geared
to reap profit and achieve political influence. As such, it has had a deep and lasting impact
on peoples’ lives on both sides of the colonial divide. This is particularly so given its
embodiment in a power/knowledge duality. Following Michel Foucault, Said approached
power as Janus-faced – oppressive and creative and always allied with knowledge production.
For example, medicines that Europeans invented to cure or prevent tropical diseases were
meant to save European lives in faraway territories and as a way to bolster colonial control.12
 Third World Quarterly 2507

Yet this medicine also saved native peoples’ lives. The same could be argued regarding the
building of infrastructure in the colonies and Europeans’ interest in local knowledge. This
dialectic of modernisation and repression, with regard to the railways that the Raj built in
India, was summed up by a native journalist in 1884 as ‘iron roads mean iron chains’.13
As a scholar of European culture, Said was interested in the impact that colonialism has
had on Europe’s societies and culture. His survey shows that orientalist views had been
pervasive in all aspects of European life and their legacies are far from fading away.
Therefore, many sociological questions today relating to race and ethnic relations in the
West, such as Islamophobia and the marginalisation of people of colour, assume different
meanings. These inequalities are not unintended results of social processes, but rather the
product of the long history of colonialism. More broadly, Said challenged the claims to
neutrality and universalism that supposedly characterise Western modernism. Western
culture, he argues, has been shaped not only by Western history but also by its interaction
with and domination and oppression of other ‘races’. This unpacking of Western culture
has opened up a space for all sorts of dominated groups including Third World peoples,
racial minorities in the West, and women,14 not only to give their version of history, current
affairs and life experiences but also to present them as at least as valid and credible as the
official Western version. Indeed, Said’s epistemology has revolutionised the social sciences
and humanities and created the basis for many research initiatives aimed at re-evaluating
historiographies and perceptions of Third World peoples,15 such as those in Africa16 and
Latin America and racialised minorities.17 In fact, Said himself was engaged in the writing
of Palestinian history.18
Besides its impact on academia, Said’s Orientalism fed into a significant current in the
West which called for multiculturalism at home and more equitable relations in the interna-
tional arena. The claims to rights, equality, dignity, sustainability and non-coercive relations,
raised by many groups during the 1970s and 1980s, forced Western governments not only
to pay lip service to these slogans but also to take some corrective measures, particularly in
issues relating to multiculturalism, feminist issues and the environment (these demands
were raised by what came to be known as new social movements and identity politics).
However, the neo-liberal thrust since the 1970s and the advent of globalisation a decade
later also shaped new realities.
Although Said’s critique was powerful enough to show the spuriousness of the ori-
entalist discourse, it did not bring about its substitution by more humane ones; in par-
ticular, orientalism continues to serve the interest of the powerful nations and elites.
Thus, even today, a mild form of orientalist discourse is a common refrain in liber-
al-minded circles. Western powers are often described – including in left-leaning pub-
lications – as the ‘civilised world’, the ‘free world’, ‘the international community’, etc. and
their representatives and the mainstream media are labelled the ‘international public
opinion’. More ominously, the ‘civilisation mission’ and the ‘white man’s burden’, which
are articulated through different slogans such as the spreading of democracy or the
liberation of women, continue to constitute a smokescreen for soiled imperialist quests,
particularly after 9/11. In this regard, the United States’ occupation of Iraq has been
framed as bringing democracy to the nation, and even to the broader Arab and Islamic
regions. For example, in a speech in London on 19 November 2003, then-President
George W. Bush19 stated:
2508 A. H. SA’DI

In our conflict with terror and tyranny, we have an unmatched advantage, a power that cannot
be resisted, and that is the appeal of freedom to all mankind.

As global powers, both our nations serve the cause of freedom in many ways in many places.

By promoting development and fighting famine and AIDS and other diseases, we’re fulfilling
our moral duties as well as encouraging stability and building a firmer basis for democratic
institutions ….

By extending the reach of trade, we foster prosperity and the habits of liberty.

And by advancing freedom in the greater Middle East, we help end a cycle of dictatorship and
radicalism that brings millions of people to misery and brings danger to our own people.

More recently, in discussing Africa’s problems, French President Emmanuel Macron stated
at the G-20 summit held on 7–8 July 2017 in Hamburg that, ‘The challenge of Africa, it is
totally different, it is much deeper, it is civilizational today. What are the problems in Africa?
Failed states, the complex democratic transitions, demographic transitions …’.20 Macron’s
statement is in line with the French refusal to take responsibility for the abuses and torture
that were conducted during French colonialism in Africa, including the massive oppression
during the Algerian war of independence. It is also in line with the positive values of colo-
nialism that French schools are obliged to teach according to a law passed in February 2005.21
Meanwhile, ‘Oriental women’, particularly veiled Muslim women, have always constituted
a salient component of the orientalist discourse and an object for the civilising mission. It is
likely that former first lady Laura Bush’s ill-informed remarks on Muslim women following
the American invasion of Afghanistan – which echoed pronouncements made by Lord
Cromer, the British governor of Egypt, some nine decades earlier – show how the ‘liberation
of women’ is to be allied with military power or rather used to justify Western military inter-
vention.22 Behind such offers of help there lie deep-seated feelings of contempt towards
and condemnation of Arab and Muslim societies and cultures. The derogatory remarks made
by current British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, describing veiled Muslim women as ‘letter-
boxes’ and ‘bank robbers’, without facing condemnation by his peers in the Conservative
party illustrate the acceptance of such an attitude by considerable sections of British soci-
ety.23 This jumble of apparent compassion and real contempt – which mostly characterises
the popular, official, and occasionally scholarly-orientalist discourse that is not only in relation
to women – was noticed long ago by critics of colonialism. Therefore, Fanon writes in A Dying
Colonialism, with reference to French colonialism in Algeria,
The dominant administration solemnly undertook to defend this woman, pictured as humil-
iated, sequestered, cloistered …. It described the immense possibilities of women, unfortu-
nately transformed by the Algerian man into an inert, demonetized, indeed dehumanized
object. The behavior of the Algerian was very firmly denounced and described as medieval and
barbaric. With infinite science, a blanket indictment against the ‘sadistic and vampirish’ Algerian
attitude toward women was prepared and drawn up. Around the family life of the Algerian, the
occupier piled up a whole mass of judgments, reasons, accumulated anecdotes and edifying
examples, thus attempting to confine the Algerian within a circle of guilt.24

These examples might represent an old-style ‘vulgar’ orientalism. However, another more
mundane, veiled and macabre one has appeared since the 1980s, which I shall call neo-­
orientalism.25 Before going into this, however, I shall explore the intricate relationships among
colonialism, globalisation and orientalism.
 Third World Quarterly 2509

Colonialism and globalisation

Colonialism has been a globalising force; it entails the movement of people, products and
ideas. Only as a system characterised by flows, transformations and alterations could it be
sustained as a profit-making enterprise. However, while the transfer of products, slaves and
capital was seen as essential to the colonial order, the movement of people of colour to
colonial centres and interracial mixing were viewed as ominous. Consequently, alongside
colonialism, two interrelated ideological currents emerged that justify the separation of
people along racial lines and the sustainment of a racial system of categorisation. These are
racism and its derivative ‘sciences’ eugenics and racial hygiene26 on one hand and a ‘national
character’ on the other. Racist ideologies had been prevalent in the West during the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. According to their essentialising discourse, racial affil-
iation is the determinant of physical appearance, temperament, morality, sensibilities, bodily
expressions and intellectual abilities.27 Consequently, races were hierarchised according to
their level of development through ‘scientific methods’, and clear boundaries were drawn
between them.
Meanwhile, the ‘national character’ discourse had been expressed through stereotypes
which supposedly give expression to nations’ essence, such as ‘English-ness’, ‘French-ness’,
etc.28 This discourse had been consciously tailored to be inclusive and exclusive at the same
time. It was inclusive towards working classes and those living in peripheral regions in order
to enlist their support for overseas adventures. At the same time, it was exclusive to all those
who did not belong to the nation.
Therefore, the existence of ‘mixed-blood children’29 constituted an enduring and vexing
problem that colonial administrations and the colonial offices in Europe grappled with for
a long time. Their numbers, social and legal status, and political orientations became the
subject of many investigating committees as well as voluminous secret and published pro-
tocols and correspondences.30 The underlying question was: Have these populations
acquired European sensibilities and to what extent could they be incorporated in the colonial
system? Or, given their closeness to the native, could they become a menacing force and
undermine the colonial rule? The question of the mixed-blood children highlights colonial
elites’ anxieties regarding populations that might have a ‘European’ appearance and adopt
external European manners and therefore could pass as European without genuinely being
so. Such populations could constitute an enemy from within and wreak havoc on the colonial
system and European societies.
This fear of the stealthy enemy from within had received its ultimate presentation in Bram
Stoker’s Dracula, first published in 1897.31 The count made a journey in the opposite direction
to that taken by millions of European conquerors, soldiers, administrators, sailors, traders,
colonists, explorers, and missionaries. He travelled from the periphery to the heart of Europe.
His design was to rejuvenate himself by sucking the blood of European women – the markers
of the racial and national boundaries – and to colonise England, the largest and most pow-
erful colonial empire, with his offspring. Stoker insinuates that Dracula’s design was possible
in large due to Europe’s demographic decline and the weakness of its elites.
Many of the themes that Stoker raised, such as the fear of reverse colonisation, the fear
of decline, and dangerous sexual anxieties that strangers’ existence in Europe pose, have
been abundantly depicted by novelists, politicians and social scientists. Indeed, the fear of
decline – real or imaginary – has been a recurrent theme in Western culture. For example,
2510 A. H. SA’DI

when Oxbridge, the two elite universities in the UK, began admitting non-Protestant, white
British male students in 1856, English students viewed the change as triggering a preor-
dained decline. Expressing these sentiments, one Cambridge undergraduate student wrote
in a prominent Cambridge magazine Granta:

It is not only a black peril which threatens the University, but a yellow peril and a brown peril
to boot. The University is in the peril of submersion. The vital principles of our existence are
at stake. Shall Cambridge be a Colony of Bombay, shall she be affiliated to Pekin, shall her
streets grow darker and darker until she sinks at last into seething vortex of unmitigated
melanthropy?32

A more serious publication is Oswald Spengler’s book The Decline of the West,33 first pub-
lished in 1918. Spengler thought that the decline of Western civilisation follows universal
laws of becoming or the transformation from culture to civilisation. He argued that Western
civilisation had reached maturity and would be challenged by emerging cultures. Spengler’s
thesis has recently been echoed by Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations.34 It is
interesting that despite its global dominance, the West since the late nineteenth century
has developed a discourse which reflects deep anxieties regarding decline, reverse coloni-
sation and coming under siege, alongside its triumphalism.35

Neo-orientalism
In his afterword to the edition of Orientalism published in 1995, Said36 wrote:
Not that Huntington, and behind him all the theorists and apologists of an exultant Western
tradition, like Francis Fukuyama, haven’t retained a good deal of their hold on the public
consciousness. They have, as is evident in the symptomatic case of Paul Johnson, once a Left
intellectual, now a retrograde social and political polemicist. In the 18 April 1993 issue of the
New York Times Magazine, by no means a marginal publication, he published an essay entitled
‘Colonialism's Back – And Not a Moment Too Soon’, whose main idea was that ‘the civilized
nations’ ought to take it upon themselves to recolonize the Third World countries ‘where the
most basic conditions of civilized life [have] broken down’, and to do this by means of a system
of imposed trusteeships.

Johnson is part of a large chorus of orientalists who had been invigorated by the inten-
sification of Western intervention in the Middle East following the end of the Cold War and
the identification of ‘Islam’ by Western powers as the new enemy. This group includes orien-
talists of various sorts such as Ibn Warraq,37 Irwin38 and Kaplan,39 among many others. As
some critics of these new orientalists have unfailingly shown (eg Sadowski;40 Tuastad;41
Samiei42; Hamdi43) they have not added much to orientalism’s governing assumptions.
Rather, they repeat conventional orientalist propositions regarding the uniqueness of
Western civilisation and Orientals’ ontological incompetence. For example, Ibn Warraq argues
that the Occident is uniquely characterised by three traits: ‘rationalism, universalism and
self-criticism’.44 Furthermore, he and several other orientalists – such as Irwin – have claimed
that orientalism has been driven by intellectual curiosity and is devoid of instrumental goals,
as if the orientalist wrote in a socio-political and cultural vacuum. Such claims paradoxically
support Said’s thesis regarding orientalism’s epistemology of setting up false binaries and
decontextualising facts. It is beyond the scope of this article to dwell on the conservative
nature of the orientalist discourse. It is sufficient to point to its citational methodology, and
 Third World Quarterly 2511

essentialising and decontextualising practices, which tend to block rather than encourage
the introduction of new ideas and interpretations.
However, given that neither the intent of dominance nor the Machiavellian methods of
colonialism (called by political science scholars ‘realism’) have changed, a new and more
sophisticated orientalist knowledge has been growing alongside and often overshadowing
the above-mentioned old-style shrill and argumentative one. This neo-orientalist discourse
has embodied various conceptual changes, which would make it appear more benign and
‘respectable’ so that it could be safely used by all sorts of groups, including liberals, in the
public sphere. The most noticeable change is the disappearance of the construct of race and
its substitution by the inoffensive and supposedly neutral terms of ‘culture’, ‘ethnicity’ and
‘religion’. Moreover, the hierarchal ordering of groups has given way to a supposedly egali-
tarian classification based on difference. Yet these concepts are decoded – to use Hall’s con-
ceptualisation45 – according to a time-honoured legacy of orientalism. Consequently,
extreme right-wing parties and movements in Europe and the United States who advance
orientalist and racist agendas quite often argue that they are not against non-White immi-
grants per se; rather, they claim that people feel more comfortable among those who share
their religion and culture and are threatened by strangers. Therefore, social distance, exclu-
sionary practices and a ban on immigration along ethnic or cultural lines are acceptable,
particularly against unassimilated minorities. They contend that such policies are justifiable
on the grounds that they help maintain social cohesion and the essence of national identity.
Yet sociologists realised long ago the racialisation of cultural identities, a phenomenon they
call the ‘new racism’, whereby culture instead of biology becomes the criterion for social
ordering.46
A similar strategy of otherness construction was advocated by Huntington, one of the
most influential and articulate right-wing intellectuals, who was paradoxically a supporter
of American interventionist foreign policy. He called for a restriction on the migration of
those who did not adhere to the American creed, which he described as
[T]he product of the distinct Anglo-Protestant culture of the founding settlers. Key elements
of that culture include the English language; Christianity; religious commitment; English con-
cepts of the rule of law, including the responsibility of rulers and the rights of individuals; and
dissenting Protestant values of individualism, the work ethic, and the belief that humans have
the ability and the duty to try to create a heaven on earth, a ‘city on a hill’.47

Although Huntington’s main concern was the fight against the migration of Mexicans,
the tenets of his thesis are generalisable. More important is his allusion to the confluence
of race and religion, variables through which large sections of ordinary Americans and some
right-wing elites tend to construct the American (and the world) demographic landscape.
Thus, Islam has been racialised, and like all racial categories, it has become a blanket label
which is attached to a wide variety of peoples according to certain observable features. In
this regard, Erik Love48 writes:
Remember, because of race, nearly all references to ‘Muslims’ in discussions like these [on terror-
ism and counter terrorism] actually point to a racial category – the racial category that includes
Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs and South Asians. Bigoted statements like ‘Most terrorists are Muslims’,
or ‘Islamic culture encourages terrorism’ (as though there is only a single ‘Islamic culture’) are
therefore necessarily racial statements that reinforce the perception that anyone who ‘looks
Muslim’ may be dangerous. When public officials … propose policies to increase surveillance of
2512 A. H. SA’DI

‘Muslims’, they not only place Muslim Americans in harm’s way, they also endanger Arabs, Sikh,
and South Asian Americans as well because of race.

Obviously, such a categorisation is a poor guide to making sense of social reality. For
example, in a solo vengeance mission for the 9/11 attacks, a White American man shot and
killed a Sikh. Later he stated that he wanted to shoot ‘… some towel-heads’.49 Several
non-Muslims were victims of such racially motivated hate crimes. Even worse, Muslims have
become the ultimate other for populist and right-wing movements in the United States and
Europe. According to these movements, not only do Muslims not adhere to our ‘cherished
values’, but they are essentially different. A considerable pseudo-scholarly literature has been
published on such topics as the incompatibility of Islam with democracy and the violent
nature of Islam.
Despite the semantic and representational changes, both classical orientalism and
neo-orientalism still employ binaries and oppositions in establishing their ‘facts’ and weaving
their narratives. Yet the existence of various groups that do not fit their categorisations, such
as hybrid populations and certain cultures – for example, the Japanese – defy their assertions.
Moreover, the black populations who achieved citizenship in Western countries and have
turned many Western societies into multi-cultural ones contest sweeping generalisations
regarding a unified Western culture or ethnically based national identities. Therefore, the
fight against the migration of people of colour has become a burning political and scholarly
topic in the West.
Immigrants are frequently portrayed by new-right and populist movements, and often
by respectable media outlets and politicians, in the form of a new Dracula. They are
accused of draining the country’s resources by their over-dependence on welfare and
putting extra pressure on public services.50 They are also suspected of having double
loyalties and hidden agendas. In Europe, immigrants are frequently accused of aiming to
Islamise the continent.
The emergence of the surveillance state since the early twenty-first century and along
with it the securitisation of both the public discourse and public spaces amplifies the mis-
trust of immigrant (Muslim) populations in the West. The intense milieu of suspicion and
fear that has consequently evolved, and the new technologies of surveillance that have
been introduced, help to justify racial profiling, stigmatisation and the victimisation of inno-
cent people of colour by putting them under surveillance.51 The relationships between
neo-orientalist discourses and the technologies of security, war and surveillance are more
complex and macabre and fall outside the scope of this paper. However, a telling example
will be given later.
The linguistic and representational shift from orientalist to neo-orientalist discourse,
discussed above, is reflective of a wider transformation in the socio-economic and polit-
ical relations between the West and the rest of the world. The orientalist discourse pre-
vailed in a period when the West was interested in exploiting the labour and minerals
of the colonies. Within it, the darker races were described as inferior and lacking the
faculties needed for Homo economicus. Colonialism in this regard was the system by
which the colonised people were incorporated into a rapidly growing world economy.
However, in the globalised world, the population of the developing nations is not con-
trolled directly by Western powers but rather through a variety of international bodies
such as the IMF and the World Bank and exploited through structural adjustment
 Third World Quarterly 2513

programmes and debt payments as well as by international corporations which receive

favourable conditions from local elites, through political pressure or other means.52 Force
is used in cases of refusal by local elites to open their countries to international corpo-
rations and play according to Western rules. Indeed, regime change has been pursued
through direct intervention – such as in Iraq and Libya – as well as through numerous
covert operations.
Given this, the aim is no longer to ‘normalise’ or discipline the ‘incompetent Orientals’
but to prevent them from reaching the West and sharing the wealth that has been accumu-
lated there over centuries, largely as a result of colonialism.53 In this regard, various scholars
have described the current world order as ‘global apartheid’,54 where a minority possesses
the bulk of the wealth, enjoys educational opportunities and improved social conditions,
and acts forcefully to maintain its privileges. The emergence of such an apartheid system
had been discerned long ago. Various policies to this effect have been put in place to con-
stitute ‘fortress Europe’, although through more sophisticated means than the wall which
US President Trump proposes to build on the Mexican border, along with his travel ban on
people from certain Muslim countries.
This change in conditions has two implications; the first is the demand for a new type of
knowledge. While colonialism had given rise to anthropology and ethnology – two disci-
plines that focus on the study of native populations – the globalised world created a need
for the study of migration and foreign languages. Indeed, migration studies programmes
have flourished in Western universities, and neo-orientalism draws heavily on this field of
knowledge. However, the demand for knowledge of foreign languages has been essential
for orientalist and neo-orientalist knowledge. In the globalised world, it is deemed essential
to surveil and decipher messages which are passed on social media and other communica-
tion platforms. Messages are tracked, surveilled and analysed not only for ‘security’ and
commercial purposes but also to help understand the ‘popular mood’, thus unveiling hidden
transcripts and rendering developing societies visible to the Western gaze. Moreover, social
media is used to influence individuals and societies.55 Yet while they are accessible to all
social and political actors, that does not determine who possesses the resources, means and
grand designs to harness them. It seems that research on social media has been substituted
to some extent for the field research in the colonies that anthropologists conducted in the
heyday of colonialism.
The second implication is the alteration of the message. Unlike the triumphalism of
orientalism, neo-orientalism is characterised by a fear of decline and the uncontrollable
flux of dark-skinned immigrants who will change Western societies beyond recognition.
A crude variety of this message is evident in President Trump’s pledge to ‘make American
great again’, to ban migration from certain Muslim countries, and to build a wall on the
Mexican border. More subtle, though not less forceful, messages are quite often conveyed
by many Western leaders. Internally, this stand is manifested by the decline of multicul-
turalism in Western countries in favour of acculturation discourses. It is also associated
with the retreat of the internationalist agenda and the dwindling of the forces which
support it.
Mass migration is feared not only for changing Western societies by diluting their national
identity but also for altering the sensibilities of Western populations. For example, it is often
cited as the cause for the rise of extreme-right currents in Western politics.56 Warning of such
a development, Huntington57 wrote:
2514 A. H. SA’DI

[T]he various forces challenging the core American culture and Creed could generate a move
by native white Americans to revive the discarded and discredited racial and ethnic concepts
of American identity and to create an America that would exclude, expel, or suppress people
of other racial, ethnic, and cultural groups. Historical and contemporary experience suggests
that this is a highly probable reaction from a once dominant ethnic-racial group that feels
threatened by the rise of other groups. It could produce a racially intolerant country with high
levels of intergroup conflict.

The neo-orientalist discourse portrays migration as an outcome of push factors that exist
in the developing world, including large-scale corruption and mismanagement by local
elites, wars and the absence of a culture of tolerance. Yet it conceals Western-induced causes
such as global warming, imposed structural adjustment programmes, inequitable trade,
arms export and Western military intervention (including in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya,
Syria, Yemen, Palestine, etc.).
The discussion presented so far on neo-orientalism has focussed on the immigrant/
black population in the West. This does not mean, however, that orientalism in its most
vulgar forms has disappeared. Evidently, Islamophobia and other forms of racism are
prevalent in the West and promoted by considerable sections of the elite, particularly the
neocons and their supporters in the media. However, I am more interested in the neo-ori-
entalism that has been promoted by those who claim to fight racism and promote trust
and cooperation among peoples of different backgrounds, such as Barack Obama, Tony
Blair, Gordon Brown, Bill and Hillary Clinton, etc. For such Western elites, neo-orientalism
constitutes a component in their governmentality. Following the neo-liberal principles of
governmentality, the peoples of developing countries are to be controlled from afar, and
part of this control is to be assumed by local neo-liberal elites. They are to be governed
by international bodies and imposed treaties, and those who defy the Western-fashioned
order are to be eliminated. For example, unlike George W. Bush and his neocon aides who
were quick to send American troops to Iraq and Afghanistan and who criticised Obama
for not taking a direct role in the Syrian civil war, Obama and those adhering to the neo-ori-
entalist discourse preferred to use drones and stealthy bombers, inequitable treaties,
sanctions, etc.
Here I shall briefly discuss the use of drones and their relation to neo-orientalism. Drones
are part of a pre-emptive security philosophy whereby ‘terrorists’ – or other sources of
threat – ought to be identified and neutralised before threatening Western societies or
interests. Understandably, it is not possible to have a list of all or even a substantial propor-
tion of those deemed hostile and their characteristics. Moreover, despite considerable
advances in surveillance of the digital communication system, it is not possible to gather
full and accurate data due to processing problems and the continuing prevalence of other
‘traditional’ methods of communication. Therefore, pre-emptive security targets the social
environment in which the suspects live – in Heideggerian terms, the world in which being
takes place, and without which being cannot exist. The aim is to control not only the present
but also the future of such environments. These environments become the object of data
collection, storage and analysis by drones, satellites, cameras, servers, algorithms and
analysts – ie orientalists. The object of this surveillance is not the individual ‘terrorist’ but
the ‘patterns of life’ which are suggestive of hostile intent. Everyday habits and routines thus
become signatures that trigger a strike. This rationality follows Bourdieu’s notion of habitus
whereby a set of dispositions suggest a future course of action. Yet, unlike Bourdieu and
 Third World Quarterly 2515

other social scientists who incorporated change in their analysis, deviation from the routine,
according to the pre-emptive security doctrine, is an indication of hostility which could lead
to elimination.58
Although the systems of surveillance and strikes are presented as scientific and largely
autonomous, they are, nevertheless, fed by variables which experts – ie orientalists – identify
as significant for the understanding of the functioning of surveilled societies. For example,
social gatherings have been classified as potentially hostile actions. Consequently, thousands
of people – Afghans, Iraqis, Yemenis and Syrians – living in ‘zones of death’ were killed while
attending weddings or funerals.59 Moreover, mistranslations from local dialects have fre-
quently caused tragic errors.
To conclude, my argument is that the combination of neo-orientalist knowledge and
automated systems of surveillance and elimination with global reach has increased the
confidence of Western powers in their ability to interrupt, degrade or reshape ‘Oriental/
Muslim’ societies without a Western presence on the ground. This reality, I argue, gives rise
to a new understanding of this imagined geographic domain, a discourse I call neo-orien-
talism. It is far beyond the classification of Orientals/Muslims according to, for example, bad
Muslims vs good Muslims or ‘crimigrants’ vs bona fide travellers.60
Furthermore, I think that along with the changes from liberalism to a neo-liberal-based
globalisation, from racism to new racism, and from conservatism to neo-conservatism, etc.,
Said’s thesis should be updated so as to grasp the new reality. A repetition of Said’s thesis
with new examples might not be enough to advance our understanding of the unfolding
reality. However, Said’s epistemology remains a crucial guide for understanding the repre-
sentation of power in our world.

Acknowledgements
This article is based on a paper presented at the conference Orientalism, Neo-Orientalism and Post-
Orientalism in African, Middle East, Latin American, Asian/Chinese Studies, held at The Institute of Global
Studies, Shanghai University, People’s Republic of China, 17–18 May 2018. The author wishes to thank the
organiser Professor Tugrul Keskin for inviting him to give a presentation, as well as the participants for
their comments and remarks. The author also wishes to thank Paul Kelemen, Sylvia Saba-Sa’di, Lila Abu-
Lughod, Andre Mazawi and the three anonymous reviewers for the comments and suggestions they made
on previous drafts.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor
Ahmad H. Sa’di is an Associate Professor in the Department of Politics and Government at Ben-Gurion
University of the Negev. He is the co-editor of Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory (with
Lila Abu-Lughod), and the author of Thorough Surveillance: The Genesis of Israeli Policies of Population
Management, Surveillance & Political Control towards the Palestinians. His publications have appeared
in English (mainly), Arabic, Hebrew, Japanese, German, Spanish and Farsi. He was formerly a Visiting
Professor at the Universities of Waseda, Tokyo, Japan; The National University of Singapore; and
Columbia, New York, USA.
2516 A. H. SA’DI

Notes
1. Said, Orientalism.
2. Sherwood, “Race, Empire and Education: Teaching Racism.”
3. The list of publications dealing with this topic is immense. See, for example, Said, Culture and
Imperialism; Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt; Sherwood, “Race, Empire and Education: Teaching
Racism”; Dunae, “Boys’ Literature and the Idea of Empire”; Joseph-Gheverhese, ‘Eurocentrism
in the Social Sciences.”
4. See eg Said, Orientalism; Patterson, Cult of Imperial Honor in British India; Thorp, “Going Native in
New Zealand and America”; Deslandes, “Foreign Elements”; Waters, “Dark Strangers”; Sharkey,
“Colonialism, Character-Building and the Culture of Nationalism”; Bush and Matby, “Taxation in
West Africa.”
5. Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native.”
6. See eg Baran, Political Economy of Growth; Amin, Unequal Development; Frank, Capitalism and
Underdevelopment in Latin America; Cardoso, “Dependency and Development in Latin
America.”
7. Said, Orientalism; Said, Culture and Imperialism.
8. I refer here to the works of such authors as Fanon, Sartre, and Farrington, Wretched of the Earth;
and Alavi, “Imperialism Old and New.”
9. Césaire, Notebook of a Return to the Native Land; Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks.
10. Hegel, “Anthropology,” 42 (emphasis in original).
11. Sherwood, “Race, Empire and Education: Teaching Racism,” 12–13.
12. Brockway, “Science and Colonial Expansion.”
13. Pinney, “Sepia Mutiny: Colonial Photography,” 72.
14. See eg Abu-Lughod, “Orientalism and Middle East Feminist Studies.”
15. See eg Ileto, “Orientalism and the Study of Philippine Politics.”
16. Considerable literature is available on this subject. See eg Mazrui, “Black Orientalism? Further
Reflections”; Andreasson, “Orientalism and African Development Studies.”
17. Wilson, “Orientalism: A Black Perspective.”
18. Said, Question of Palestine; and Said, After the Last Sky: Palestinian Lives.
19. “Full Transcript of President Bush’s Remarks on US–British Relations and Foreign Policy in
Whitehall Palace in London, 19 November 2003.” Accessed April 3, 2018. https://www.mtholy-
oke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/whitehall.htm
20. Quoted in Attiah, “Macron Blames ‘Civilization’ for Africa’s Problems.”
21. Löytömäki, “Law and Collective Memory of Colonialism.”
22. Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Need Saving?, 30–34.
23. The Guardian, “Boris Johnson Accused of ‘Dog-Whistle’ Islamophobia over Burqa Comments.”
Accessed October 5, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/aug/06/boris-john-
sons-burqa-remarks-fan-flames-of-islamophobia-says-mp
24. Fanon, Dying Colonialism, 38.
25. This concept has been used by several scholars; I am using it here in a different sense.
26. Hawkins, Social Darwinism in European and American Thought.
27. Sa’di, “Colonialism and Surveillance”; Ryan, Picturing Empire.
28. Colley, Britishness and Otherness: An Argument.” See also the debate around the schooling of
Muslim pupils in France in Mazawi, “Also the School Is a Temple.”
29. Stoler, “Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers.”
30. Stoler, Duress: Imperial Durabilities in Our Times.
31. Stoker, Dracula. For a colonial reading of Dracula, see eg Arata, “Occidental Tourist.”
32. Deslandes, “Foreign Elements,” 80.
33. Spengler, Decline of the West.
34. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations.
35. See eg Murray, Strange Death of Europe.
36. Said, “Orientalism: An Afterword.”
37. Warraq, Defending the West.
 Third World Quarterly 2517

38. Irwin, For Lust of Knowing.

39. Kaplan, Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams.
40. Sadowski, “New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate.”
41. Tuastad, “Neo-Orientalism and the New Barbarism Thesis.”
42. Samiei, “Neo-Orientalism?”
43. Hamdi, “Edward Said and Recent Orientalist Critiques.”
44. Warraq, Defending the West, 12.
45. Hall, “Encoding/Decoding.”
46. Barker, New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe.
47. Huntington, “Hispanic Challenge.”
48. Love, Islamophobia and Racism in America, 7.
49. Ibid., 1.
50. For public opinions in the UK regarding migration, see eg Olorunshola, “8 Surprising Facts
About Migration.” For example, according to a 2014 survey, almost one-quarter of the surveyed
believe that the most common motive for immigration was welfare.
51. See eg Love, Islamophobia and Racism in America, 104–08.
52. Harvey, New Imperialism; Perkins, Confessions of an Economic Hitman; Owusu, “Pragmatism and
the Gradual Shift from Dependency to Neoliberalism.”
53. Such ideas were expressed, for example, by Schulze-Gaevernitz, who argued that ‘[Europe] …
will shift the burden of physical toil, first agriculture and mining, then the more arduous toil in
industry – on to the coloured races, and itself be content with the role of rentier, and in this
way, perhaps, pave the way for the economic and later, the political emancipation of the co-
loured races’, quoted in Hobsbawm, Age of Empire: 1875–1914, 83.
54. Richmond, Global Apartheid.
55. A considerable literature is available on the impact of Facebook and Twitter on the ‘Arab
Spring’; this impact came to light when such methods were used by Cambridge Analytica to
influence the American elections. See The Guardian’s special report on this. The Cambridge
Analytica Files: https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/cambridge-analytica-files
56. See eg Lozada, “Samuel Huntington, a Prophet for the Trump Era.”
57. Huntington, Who Are We?, 20.
58. See eg Chamayou, Drone Theory; Curtis, “Explication of the Social.”
59. Ibid.
60. Aas, “‘Crimmigrant’ Bodies and Bona Fide Travelers.”

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