Professional Documents
Culture Documents
a
School of Accounting, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, Nanjing, China; bSchool of Accounting,
Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, China
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
This paper examines whether the mandatory implementation of an internal Mandatory internal control
control system influences listed firms’ earnings management in China. We system; accrual-based
use firms that are mandated for implementing internal control as the treat earnings management; real
earnings management
ment group, and firms that do not implement internal control as the control
group. We find that the mandatory implementation of an internal control JEL
system results in an increase in both real and accrual-based earnings man G38; D82; M41
agement. We also find that the extra institutional compliance cost induced
by implementing a mandatory internal control system was the main cause of
the increase in earnings management. Our conclusions thus provide empiri
cal evidence that differs from that on the developed market regarding the
research about mandatory internal control and earnings management.
1. Introduction
Along with the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States in 2002, mandatory internal
control systems became the worldwide mainstream in corporate internal control practices. Under the
influence of globalization, China’s internal control system has undergone a transition from voluntary
to mandatory implementation. To fully implement an internal control system in the Chinese listed
firms, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) of China and the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) jointly formulated the “Announcement on Implementing Internal Control System for the
Main Board Listed Companies by Categories and Batches” (hereafter referred to as the
“Announcement”). The “Announcement,” stipulates that all listed companies on the Main Board
should establish an internal control system from 2012 onward. However, given the costly expenses
involved in the construction of an internal control system, and the differences in the nature of the
property rights and the economic basis of the listed companies in China, the government decided to
implement the mandatory internal control system by categories and batches.1
While the promulgation of the “Announcement” undoubtedly had a critically positive effect on the
listed firms’ implementation of an internal control system, it is noteworthy that, against this backdrop,
the levels of the listed firms’ earnings management increased during the same period. We find that the
means and the medians of both real and accrual-based earnings management of the listed companies
increased between 2009 and 2014. We wonder whether this earnings management increase was really
caused by the promulgation of the “Announcement.” If so, what was the channel through which the
“Announcement” influences the firms’ earnings management?
Traditional earnings management theories contend that, in a stringent regulatory environment,
there is a substitutional relationship between real and accrual-based earnings management (Zang
2012). However, when it comes to the effects of the policies that might influence the listed firms’
CONTACT Jiaxin Wang wang_charity@163.com School of Accounting, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,
Building, No. 182, Nanhu Avenue, Donghu High-tech Development Zone, Wuhan City, Hubei Province 430073, China
*Ying Liu is co-first author.
**These authors equally contributed to this work.
© 2022 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
3440 Z. SONG ET AL.
earnings management strategies, the traditional theories do not apply to the Chinese context. This is
because mandatory internal control could impose heavy institutional compliance costs upon firms,
which is confirmed by a substantial amount of research (Kinney and Shepardson 2011). The excessive
compliance costs might impose excessive cost pressure on firms (Iliev 2010), and cause firms to change
their earnings management strategies. This is especially factual in China, as the Chinese economy is
currently undergoing a structural adjustment and thus its market competition is extremely intense,
which strongly stimulates firms’ incentives to pursue financial performance.
This study explores the effect of the implementation of a mandatory internal control system on the
firms’ earnings management in the Chinese context. Taking the promulgation of the “Announcement”
as the exogenous event, we test this effect using a difference-in-difference (DID) method and a unique
panel data set from 6,981 publicly traded A-share main board firm-year observations for the years
2009–2014 in China. We find that the promulgation of the “Announcement” indeed resulted in the
increase in both real and accrual-based earnings management. We also find that the extra institutional
compliance cost induced by implementing a mandatory internal control system was the main cause of
the increase in earnings management.
This study contributes to related literature in three ways. First, this paper extends the internal
control literature by enriching the research regarding the economic consequences of mandatory
internal control. Second, this study complements the earnings management literature that focuses
on the incentives of firms to evade monitoring and on the substitutional relationship between real and
accrual-based earnings management. Third, by analyzing the peculiarities of emerging economies, this
paper adds to the literature regarding public policy assessment. Due to the differences between China
and Western countries, the internal control system formulated in the “Announcement” in China is
quite different from that formulated under the framework of the SOX Act of the United States. In
particular, the mandatory internal control system in China was implemented by categories and
batches, which makes the research setting more interesting and distinct. These differences make the
implementation mode and the economic consequences of the Chinese internal control system
different from those in the US. We are thus the first to find that the mandatory internal control
system in China, instead of acquiring its intended effects on improving earnings quality, leads to firms’
distorted reporting behavior and a lower earnings quality. Therefore, it is more accurate and practical
to consider the context-specific peculiarities when assessing such mandated public policies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: First, we present a review of related literature
and develop hypothesis. Next, we describe our research method and present the results of our analyses.
Finally, we provide conclusions and discuss implications.
This transitional process could be justified by the mandatory institutional transition hypothesis in the
institutional economic theory. Specifically, the government’s intervention into policy implementation
could mitigate the problem of insufficient institutional supply caused by an institutional transition that
is inducing, albeit not regulatory (Lin 1989).
However, such governmental intervention might have opposite effects. One of such effects is the
excessive costs caused by mandated policy implementation. As Iliev (2010) points out, “Section 404
costs and regulatory burden are far beyond what Congress intended and well in excess of the benefits to
shareholders and management,” a mandatory institutional arrangement does impose excessive costs to
firms. Related studies additionally confirm that mandatory internal control causes substantial institu
tional compliance costs. The 2004 Financial Executives International Survey showed, for example, that
the average compliance cost of the SOX Act of the American listed firms was approximately USD
4.36 million per year,2 which dramatically exceeded the USD 0.91 million3 that was originally
estimated by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Other research indicates that the
SOX Section 404 increased firms’ audit fees significantly (Kinney and Shepardson 2011). In addition,
Kinney and Shepardson (2011) find that the implementation of the SOX Section 404 (b) imposes
a heavier burden of audit costs on small companies, which seriously hinders the growth of such
enterprises.
As a mandatory institutional arrangement, the “Announcement” could bring about extra institu
tional compliance costs (Iliev 2010), including explicit and hidden costs. The “explicit cost” refers to
the actual expenses that firms incur by implementing a mandatory internal control system; this
includes the cost of designing and implementing the system, such as the fees paid to internal control
consulting organizations, the operation and maintenance costs of an information system, and the
labor costs of relevant personnel. Internal control audit and information disclosure costs are impor
tant constituents of the explicit costs as well (Maher and Weiss 2010). The “hidden cost” refers to the
opportunity cost of a firms’ loss; this includes such things as the decision-making mistakes caused by
an increasingly complicated process, the decrease in employee initiative and work enthusiasm caused
by over-monitoring, and the decline in work efficiency caused by employees’ resistance to strict
control. Although difficult to measure by accounting numbers, these hidden costs have a negative
impact on corporate performance.
Specifically, the institutional compliance costs are reflected in the internal control implementation
process. On the one hand, although mandatory internal control helps to improve business manage
ment security, the management is more concerned about the extra costs, including the service fees for
purchasing technology, internal control audit fees, and the implementation and maintenance fees of
the system. These costs typically require additional budget for which it is difficult to generate
significant benefits in the short term, and thus would reduce managerial performance. On the other
hand, from the employee perspective, many of them have some opposition to the mandatory internal
control system. Since internal control requires strict approval and monitoring of the employees’
operations, it typically reduces work satisfaction, leads to a decline in labor productivity, and thus
increases the hidden costs for the system. The employees may additionally consider the imposed
business management security to be contradictory to the convenience of routine work. This is
particularly true in transitional economies, where the suspicion of internal control exists overwhel
mingly in the employees’ mind-set.
Given the deleterious effects, the extra institutional compliance costs would be an essential concern
of the management. Since extra costs could undermine corporate financial performance and thus
managerial performance, the performance-sensitive and self-serving managers would attempt to
compensate for the explicit and potential losses (Chung, Firth, and Kim 2002) caused by implementing
a mandatory internal control system. From this perspective, earnings management would be a viable
option that is extremely likely to be used by managers. After the promulgation of the
“Announcement,” the increase in institutional compliance costs would severely reduce firms’ profits,
imposing excessively higher performance pressure on the management. To meet or beat their
corporate financial targets, to secure managerial performance remuneration, and to increase the
3442 Z. SONG ET AL.
probability of exercising their options (Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 2002), the managers may use the two
types of earnings management simultaneously (Zhu et al. 2015). Qin, Cai, and Wei (2021) find that
managers manipulate the earnings management when facing mandatory contributions, for example,
FASB mandates disclosure of pension asset composition and a description of investment strategy
under SFAS 132 R. In addition, existing research points out that due to the relative lack of institutional
investor supervision, it is difficult for external investors in China to detect earnings management
behaviors (Gao et al. 2020). Therefore, we anticipate that the promulgation of the “Announcement”
would lead to an increase in both real and accrual-based earnings management. Based on the above
analysis, we propose the following hypothesis:
H: Compared to voluntary implementation, the mandatory implementation of an internal control
system is more likely to increase both accrual-based earnings management and real earnings
management.
3. Research Design
3.1. Sample and Data
To test our conjecture empirically, we take the promulgation of the “Announcement” in 2012 as the
benchmark and use all of the A-share listed firms on the main board in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock
Exchanges in 2009–2014 as the sample. The years 2009–2014 are selected as the sample interval
because China conducted a major reform of the internal control system of enterprises in 2008 and
implemented it in the following year.4 According to the “Announcement,” the year 2014 is designated
as the completion period because all the firms listed on the Main Board should have their mandatory
internal control construction completed by then. Our main data source is the CSMAR database, which
contains both financial and non-financial information of the Chinese listed firms. The initial sample
contains all of the data for the three years before and after the promulgation of the “Announcement.”
The sample is filtered according to the following procedures: 1) We exclude the firms that belong to
the financial and insurance industries, and those that have been marked ST, *ST during our sample
period. 2) We exclude the firms with missing financial data. 3) To avoid the influence of extreme
outliers, we winsorize all of the continuous firm-level variables at the 1% and 99% levels. Using these
procedures, we obtain 6,977 observations.
TACi;t NDAi;t
DAi;t ¼ (3)
TAi;t 1 TAi;t 1
EMERGING MARKETS FINANCE AND TRADE 3443
where DA represents discretionary accruals. The higher DA is, the more accrual-based earnings
management there is. TAC is total accruals, computed as net profit minus net operating cash flows.
TA is total assets. Sales is the change in net sales. PPE is the original value of fixed assets. NDA is non-
discretionary accruals. AR is the change in accounts receivable.
DISXi;t 1 Salesi;t 1
¼ β0 þ β1 þ β2 þ εi;t (5)
TAi;t 1 TAi;t 1 TAi;t 1
where PROD represents total production cost, which equals to cost of goods sold and the change
in inventories. DISX means discretionary expenses, computed as the sum of selling, general, and
administrative expenses (SG&A). CFO means net operation cash flows. TA is firm’s total assets. S
is net sales. S is the change in net sales. ROA is return on assets.
In accordance with Zang (2012), we then calculate the indicator for real earnings management
(REM ROA) with the following model:
where the larger REM ROA is, the more real earnings management there is.
adopt probit regressions to conduct one-to-one matching with the estimations. To test the
relationship between the mandatory implementation and real earnings management, we design
the following DID model:
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of the main variables are presented in Table 2. The standard deviations of the
accrual-based earnings management (0.104) and the real earnings management (0.264) are relatively
high, meaning that there is a big difference in the earnings management among the Chinese listed
firms. In addition, the mean of LEVERAGE (0.514) indicates that the leverage ratios of the Chinese
listed firms are relatively high. The means of LASSET (22.36) and ROA (0.043) indicate that the
average scale of the assets and profitability of the Chinese listed firms is not very ideal. Moreover, the
standard deviations of BM; TENURE; LASSET and CR are all quite high, indicating high fluctuations
of book-to-market ratios, auditors’ terms of service, firm scales and current ratios among the Chinese
listed firms.
EMERGING MARKETS FINANCE AND TRADE 3445
Table 3. (Continued).
Panel B: Mandatory Internal Control and Firms’ Real Earnings Management
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables REM ROA AB PROD ROA AB DISX ROA AB OCF ROA
CR 0.008*** 0.004** −0.001 −0.003***
(3.04) (2.53) (−0.77) (−3.32)
AGEEST 0.014 0.011 −0.003 0.002
(0.96) (1.43) (−0.58) (0.34)
BOAIND −0.082 −0.043 0.037 −0.017
(−0.97) (−0.97) (1.14) (−0.64)
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −0.415*** −0.214*** 0.126*** 0.059
(−3.11) (−3.06) (2.66) (1.32)
N 6754 6754 6754 6754
R2 0.249 0.274 0.139 0.170
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
and TREAT � Post1+ are significant, and carry the right signs, indicating that after the mandatory
implementation of internal control, the earnings quality of the treatment group is significantly worse
than that of the control group. This finding verifies our main results.
Finally, we randomly select the same number of samples from the original regression model as
a new experimental group and the remaining samples as a new control group. We do the DID test
again with the new groups and we repeat the simulations 5,000 times. The results show that the
coefficients of TREAT � AFTER are all insignificant, indicating that the main regression results are
not driven by accidental factors; therefore, the conclusion is robust.
5. Extensions
5.1. Channel
As discussed above, the institutional compliance cost induced by mandatory internal control is
the main factor that stimulates the firms’ earnings management. Under this conceptual frame
work, we can identify the channel from the following two aspects: First, the implementation of
a mandatory internal control system is very likely to cause the institutional compliance costs to
increase. Second, the extra compliance cost pressure spurs the management to use more earnings
management.
To verify the first aspect of the channel, we replace the dependent variable of Model (8) with the
institutional compliance cost, proxied by three variables (Inter_Audit_Fee, Mana_fee and Audit_fee).
Inter_Audit_Fee indicates the natural logarithm of the internal control audit fees paid by listed
Table 6. Channel.
Panel A: The Influence of Mandatory Internal Control on Institutional Compliance Cost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Institutional compliance cost Internal control Classification shifting
quality
Variables Inter_Audit_Fee Mana_fee AuditFee ICQ DCE
companies; Mana_fee represents the natural logarithm of the administrative fees of the listed compa
nies for the current year; Audit_fee denotes the natural logarithm of the listed firms’ annual report
audit fees. The results are displayed in Columns (1)-(3) of Panel A of Table 6. The interaction term
TREAT � AFTER is significantly and positively correlated with all the three measures of institutional
compliance costs, indicating that the implementation of a mandatory internal control system caused
the institutional compliance costs to increase.
To test the second dimension of the channel, we conduct a group test based on the firms’ financial
performance pressure, proxied by an indicator of whether the corporate financial performance was
higher or lower than the average industrial level. We expect that higher financial performance pressure
would create stronger incentives for managers to manipulate the corporate financial performance,
leading to a stronger effect of the “Announcement” on the earnings management. The results are
reported in Panel B of Table 6. The coefficients of TREAT � AFTER in the group with low perfor
mance pressure is insignificant, while those in the high-pressure group are significantly positive. This
finding holds for both the accrual-based and the real earnings management. These results indicate that
the stimulating effect of the “Announcement” on the firms’ earnings management is stronger in the
group with higher performance pressure, while no such an effect exists in the group with lower
pressure. Taken together, the channel is verified.
6. Conclusion
Taking the promulgation of the “Announcement” by the MoF of China and the CSRC as the exogenous
event. We find that, the mandatory implementation of an internal control system in China is more likely
to stimulate the firms’ real and accrual-based earnings management. Furthermore, we find that the extra
institutional compliance cost is an important channel through which mandatory internal control
stimulates the firms’ earnings management. In addition, the results show that the firms’ internal control
quality did not improve after the promulgation of the “Announcement,” which may be the result of the
resistance brought by the extra compliance cost among the firms’ management and employees. In
examining the impact of mandatory internal control on classification shifting, we find that, unlike
accrual-based and real earnings management, classification shifting was reduced significantly after the
“Announcement.” This finding indicates that the increase in the firms’ earnings management was
driven by the managers’ incentive to beat or meet their financial performance targets, and thus confirms
our conclusion that the extra cost pressure imposed by the mandatory internal control was the main
cause of the increase in the firms’ earnings management.
These findings have several implications both for policy-makers and for the research related to
internal control practices. First, in contrast to that on the developed markets, such as the US, where the
implementation of the SOX Act has improved firms’ internal control quality, mandatory internal
control in emerging economies, such as China, would have contradictory effects, causing the dete
rioration of internal control quality, and even more, a decline in earnings quality. Therefore, manda
tory internal-control-related studies should differentiate the research contexts to provide more reliable
conclusions. In this sense, this study provides new theoretical and empirical evidence for the reform of
the internal control systems in transitional economies. Second, there are practical implications in the
finding that the excessive institutional compliance cost brought by the mandatory internal control was
the main cause of the increase in earnings management. Thus, improving measures could be taken on
3452 Z. SONG ET AL.
both regulatory and implementing levels. On the regulatory level, the internal control system should
be further improved, and the responsibilities for internal control information disclosure and internal
control violations should be further clarified. On the implementation level, enterprises should link
internal control responsibility with the employees’ performance evaluation, which would help to
reduce the institutional compliance costs and diminish the incentives for earnings manipulation.
Notes
1. The “Announcement” stipulates that both the central and the local state-owned companies listed on the Main
Board should fully implement an internal control system beginning in 2012; the non-state-owned companies
listed on the Main Board with a total market capitalization of more than RMB 5 billion before December 31, 2011,
and with an average net profit of more than RMB 30 million between 2009 and 2011 should fully implement an
internal control system beginning in 2013; Other companies listed on the Main Board should fully implement an
internal control system beginning in 2014.
2. Date source: FEI Survey: Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance Costs Are Dropping[R]. Financial Executives Research
Foundation, 2006, http://www.fei.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=74.
3. Date source: SEC. Final Rule: Management’s Reports on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports (Release No. 33–8238) [S]. Washington, D. C.:
SEC Government Printing Office, 2003, http://www. Sec.gov/rules/final/32-8238.htm.
4. This is formulated in the “Standards.”
5. They are a dummy of whether there is a material weakness in the internal control (MW), and the natural
logarithm of the sum of the inventory turnover length and the accounts receivable turnover length (OP CYCLE).
6. For the calculation of classification shifting please refer to McVay (2006).
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding
Jiaxin Wang acknowledges the financial support from National Natural Science Foundation of China [Project
No. 72102229], Ministry of Education in China [Project No. 20YJC630143] and Zhongnan University of Economics
and Law [Project No. 2722021BZ030]. Zilong Song acknowledges the financial support from Ministry of Education in
China [Project No. 19YJC790113], National Natural Science Foundation of China [Project No. 71802105].
ORCID
Jiaxin Wang http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2110-5111
References
Bartov, E., D. Givoly, and C. Hayn. 2002. The rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations. Journal of Accounting
and Economics 33:173–204. doi:10.1016/S0165-4101(02)00045-9.
Chung, R., M. Firth, and J.-B. Kim. 2002. Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings management. Journal of
Corporate Finance 8:29–48. doi:10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00039-6.
Cohen, D. A., A. Dey, and T. Z. Lys. 2008. Real and accrual-based earnings management in the pre-and post-Sarbanes-
Oxley periods. The Accounting Review 83:757–87. doi:10.2308/accr.2008.83.3.757.
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1995. Detecting earnings management. The Accounting Review
70:193–225.
Gao, H., Z. Shen, Y. Li, X. Mao, and Y. Shi. 2020. Institutional investors, real earnings management and cost of equity:
Evidence from listed high-tech firms in China. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 56:3490–506. doi:10.1080/
1540496X.2019.1650348.
Gong, Q., O. Z. Li, Y. Lin, and L. Wu. 2016. On the benefits of audit market consolidation: evidence from merged audit
firms. The Accounting Review 91:463–88. doi:10.2308/accr-51236.
EMERGING MARKETS FINANCE AND TRADE 3453
Gunny, K. A. 2010. The relation between earnings management using real activities manipulation and future perfor
mance: Evidence from meeting earnings benchmarks. Contemporary Accounting Research 27:855–88. doi:10.1111/
j.1911-3846.2010.01029.x.
Iliev, P. 2010. The effect of SOX section 404: Costs, earnings quality, and stock prices. The Journal of Finance 65:1163–96.
doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01564.x.
Kinney, W. R., Jr, and M. L. Shepardson. 2011. Do control effectiveness disclosures require SOX 404(b) internal control
audits? A natural experiment with small U.S. public companies. Journal of Accounting Research 49:413–48.
doi:10.1111/j.1475-679X.2011.00400.x.
Lin, J. Y. 1989. An economic theory of institutional change: Induced and imposed change. Cato Journal. 9:1–33.
Maher, M. W., and D. Weiss. 2010. Costs of complying with SOX - measurement, variation and investors’ anticipation.
SSRN working paper.
McVay, S. E. 2006. Earnings management using classification shifting: An examination of core earnings and special
items. The Accounting Review 81:501–31. doi:10.2308/accr.2006.81.3.501.
Qin, Y., J. Cai, and S. Wei. 2021. Earnings management when firms face mandatory contributions. China Finance Review
International 11:522–51. doi:10.1108/CFRI-01-2021-0020.
Schroeder, J. H., and M. L. Shepardson. 2015. Do SOX 404 control audits and management assessments improve overall
internal control system quality? The Accounting Review 91:1513–41. doi:10.2308/accr-51360.
Shen, H., M. Zhang, M. Wang, J. Zhang, and Z. Guo. 2020. Does teacher-turned businessmen curb accrual-based earning
management and real activity manipulation. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 58: 655–667.
Tan, Y., X. Tian, X. Zhang, and H. Zhao. 2015. The real effects of privatization: evidence from china’s split share
structure reform. SSRN working paper.
Xu, Z., and P. Rao. 2021. Does guarantee network reduce firms’ earnings management? Emerging Markets Finance and
Trade 57:2604–15. doi:10.1080/1540496X.2021.1939669.
Zang, A. Y. 2012. Evidence on the trade-off between real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings
management. The Accounting Review 87:675–703. doi:10.2308/accr-10196.
Zhu, T., M. Lu, Y. Shan, and Y. Zhang. 2015. Accrual-based and real activity earnings management at the back door:
Evidence from Chinese reverse mergers. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 35:317–39. doi:10.1016/j.pacfin.2015.01.008.
Copyright of Emerging Markets Finance & Trade is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and
its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the
copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email
articles for individual use.