Durkheim's Division of Labour in Society

Author(s): J. A. Barnes
Source: Man, New Series, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Jun., 1966), pp. 158-175
Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2796343
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 DURKHEIM'S DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY

J.A. BARNES
TheAustralian
NationalUniversity

Introduction
The firsteditionof EmileDurkheim'sThedivision oflabourinsociety:
a studyof
theorganizationofthehigher societies
was publishedin I893 while the authorwas
professor ofsocialscienceattheUniversityofBordeaux.It constitutedthemajorof
the two theseswhichhe presentedat the Universityof Parisforhis doctorate.
Durkheimhad previouslypublishedseveralreviewsand articles,but thiswas his
firstbook. He gainedhisdoctorateand hisbook madea significant impact,forit
so annoyedthe orthodoxeconomiststhatforsome timehe could not obtaina
teachingpostinParis(Mauss I958: 2). The book wentto fiveFrencheditions,the
onlyworkby Durkheimto do so, and was first publishedin an Englishtranslation
in I933. It has been describedby its translator as Durkheim'sgreatestwork
(SimpsonI933: 4). Yet despitetheseindications of importance, some criticshave
seen littlevalue in the book. Thus, in his Historyof ethnological
theory,where
he devotesfifteen pagesto Durkheim,Lowie has absolutelynothingto sayabout
theDivisionoflabour.Its translationintoEnglishwas greetedin thepagesof the
American journalofsociologywiththecomment:

Publishedwhentheauthorwas thirty-five yearsold,theworkacceptsas accurate the

crudemisconceptions ofthei88o'sconcerning
thelifeofprimitive
manassetforth inthe
booksofthosewhowerenomorecompetent todescribe themthana botanist
wouldbeto
writea treatise
inhisfieldwithouteverhavingseena plant....
Nottobesevere withawriter
who,forty-oneyearsago,acceptedwhatisnowknowntobe
untenable,it wouldat leastseemthatextended discussion
of an argument basedon
abandoned premises mightbe consideredan unnecessaryexpenditureof energy(Faris
I934: 376).

The Englishtranslation is poor. The development ofsocialconditions,as well as

thefindings of scientific research, duringtheseventyyearsthathave elapsedsince
theworkwas first publishedhavecumulatively demonstrated ofmanyof
thefalsity
its substantivepropositions. If thenwe are to understand in what contextthe
Divisionoflabouris stillofinterest, we haveto look elsewherethanat introductory
courseson occupational specialisation,
or socialevolution,or thechangingpatterns
of legal organisation,or any otherof thevariousthemesdiscussedin thebook.
We need,however,go onlytotheveryfirst sentenceinthebooktofindtheanswer:
'This book is pre-eminently an attempt to treatthefactsofthemorallifeaccording
to themethodof thepositivesciences'(DOLl 32).
Here we have a clear statementof Durkheim'sprogramme,a programme
workedoutin subsequent publications andwhichremainednotfarfromthecentre
of his intellectualgoal throughout his life.In thisbook we can easilysee the
beginningsfromwhichhis laterstudieson suicide,education,law and religion

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 DURKHEIM S DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY I59

developed. In orderto understand whatDurkheim meantby'collective represen-

tations'orby'anomie'wehavetostudy notonlyhisElementaryforms ofthereligious
lifeandhisSuicide, butalsothosesections oftheDivision oflabourwherethesecon-
ceptsarefirst discussed at length(forreligion, seeDOL 288-9;forsuicide, see
DOL 246).Therulesofsociological method, published a yearlater,was,Durkheim
said,implied in theDivision oflabour(Ruleslx).
Durkheim proclaims thathe intends to studymoralfactsby themethods of
science.We havecometo realise, perhaps moreexplicitly thandidDurkheim,
thatoneof thedistinguishing marksofscienceis thatit is cumulative, andthat
eachgeneration ofinvestigators incorporates thediscoveries ofitspredecessors into
itsestablished corpusoforganised understanding. In thehumanities, thingsare
different; Sartreand Audenin no sensesupersede Shakespeare andHomer.In
philosophy, PlatoandAristotle areneveroutofprint. Butin science, Euclidand
Hippocrates areeither incorporated ordiscarded andhavebecomeonlyofhistorical
value;thecartographer doesnotgo backto Axanimander beforedrawing a map.
Likewise, ifsociology isscientific,asDurkheim stated itshouldbe,we donotneed
togo backtoDurkheim, andcertainly nottohisfirst majorwork,todiscover how
to tacklea newanalysis ofsocialphenomena. For,ifwhathe hadtosayistrue,it
shouldlongago havebecomepartofthecorpusofsociological propositions and
theorems utilised bysubsequent sociologistsoreveninDurkheim's ownlaterwork.
It is an indication of Durkheim's lackof clarity as a writer thatit is,alas,still
necessary to return to theDivision oflabour forguidance on howto interpret his
laterwritings andforclarification on thevalidity ofthemanydiverse criticisms
thathavebeenlevelled against Durkheim as a sociologist.Butmoreimportantly,
it is also an indication that,forone reasonor another, Durkheim's effortsto
makesociologyscientific havenotbeenwhollysuccessful and thatwe can still
readhimforhelpin interpreting theresults ofcurrent enquiries.The organised
corpusofpositive sciencestillremains an unfulfilledprogramme.
According to Mauss,Durkheimintended, whilestillat theAcolenormale,
to writean accountof therelationship ofindividualism andsocialism butlater
recasttheplanofhisthesis to dealwiththerelation between theindividual and
society.Thebookwasoutlined in I884 whilehewasteaching ina lyce'e
nearParis,
andwas first written in i886 afterhe hadreturned fromhisyearin Germany.
It waspresented as a doctoral thesissevenyearslater(MaussI958: i). Thisthesis
wasnotmerely anacademic exercise,foritaroseatleastinpartoutofDurkheim's
concern fortherevivalof French society following thedefeatof Francein the
Franco-Prussian warandhisbookstresses thenecessity ofpoliticalaction,evenif
thedetails areleftunspecified. He says:
weshouldjudge ourresearches tohavenoworth atalliftheyweretohaveonlya specula-
tiveinterest
... there isa stateofmoralhealthwhich sciencealoneisabletodetermine
competently .., science,in furnishing
us thelawofvariations whichmoral
through
healthhasalready passed,permitsustoanticipate
those coming intobeing,
which thenew
orderofthings demands. Ifweknow inwhat thelawofproperty
sense associeties
evolves
become larger anddenser, andifsome newgrowth insizeanddensitymakenewmodifica-
tionsnecessary,weshallbeabletoforesee them, andforeseeing them,willthem before-
hand.Finally, comparing thenormal type
withitself-a scientific
strictly operation-we
shall
beabletofind ifitisnotentirely
inagreementwith ifitcontains
itself, contradictions,
which istosay,imperfections, andseektoeliminate
them ortocorrect
them. (DOL33-4)

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i6o J. A BARNES

Durkheim calledforactionintheworldoflearning,inpartasa necessary prelimin-

arytopoliticalactioninthenation.He wasdirectly concernedwiththeestablish-
mentofsociology asanacademic discipline
recognisedinFrance, andalthough, at
leastin thefirsteditionofhisbook,hisnationalpoliticalcomments aremainly
negative,hisarguments haveimmediateimplicationsfortheacademic politics
of
thetimeonthisissue.Inhislaterwritingshesetsoutin greater detailhispleasfor
theseparationofsociologyfrom philosophyanditsdevelopment as,insomesense, a
specialkindofpsychology (DOL 359-62; cf.Benoit-Smullyan I948: 50i, n. 7).
Likewise,in the second editionof Divisionof labour,issuedin 1902, he added
specificpoliticalproposals,entitled'Some noteson occupationalgroups',aimedat
restoringthe countryto a betterstateof socialhealth.These were followedby
practicalsuggestions forsocial changesin a varietyof fields,advocatedin many
publications.
Perhapsbecausethiswas Durkheim'sfirstmajorwork,theintellectual climate
in whichhe had been trained,and againstwhichhe was now rebelling,had a
decisiveinfluence on theformof his argument.Unfortunately Durkheimnever
succeededin freeinghispresentation ofsociologicalargumentfromtheintellectual
heritagehe soughtto repudiate,and muchof the difficulty now experienced in
understanding what Durkheimmeansor, to an even greaterextent,in under-
standing whyhe wrotein thewayhe did,stemsfromourignoranceofthemenand
positionsthatDurkheimwas attacking.Simpson,Durkheim'stranslator, may go
too farin tryingto reduceSpencerto Durkheim'sDiihringwhen he says,in
of his editorialpolicyof not givingreferences
justification to Spencer'soriginal
works:
WhereDurkheim inordertocriticize
quotesSpencer himadversely, of
asinthemajority
cases,therewouldseemto be no reasonforbeinginterested
in Spencer's
ideasafter
Durkheim hasfinished
withthem.(DOL x)
Yet it is Durkheim'sattackon HerbertSpencer-who had beentranslated into
FrenchbyEspinasandRibot-and on theutilitarian traditiongoingbackto Adam
Smith,thatled to Durkheim'sbeingidentified as an anti-individualist
andtherefore
a socialrealist(ParsonsI960: II9; PeyreI960: 24; AlpertI939: Iso). In the later
chaptersof theDivisionoflabourDurkheimadvocatesa politicalindividualism in
whichsocialharmony,or specifically organicsolidarity,is achievedonlyby each
individualbeingfreeto exercisehistalentsand fulfil hisnaturalambitions.But this
politicalstancewas overshadowed by hisattackon utilitarianismand by hisuse of
many of the same metaphorsas the social realists.For the modernreader,his
intellectualpositionis further
complicated by whatseemsto be hisfrequent use of
biologicaland organicanalogiesthatseemat firstglanceto puthimin thecampof
themanhe is attacking:Spencer.His commentators arguethatDurkheimfought
againsttheuseof analogiesdrawnfrombiology(PeyreI960: 24), but by present
standards he didnotfighthardenough(e.g.DOL 2I7-8). Similarly, theattention
givenby Durkheimto Comte has to be seenin thelightof Comte'spersisting
influencein Frenchthinkingas providingthe stereotypeof sociology-over-
ambitious,impreciseand heretical.
Durkheimbeganhisprofessional careerwhenevolutionary doctrines
inanthropo-
logy were at theirheight,and the notionof a broadtransition fromsavageto

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 DURKHEIM 'S DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY i6i
civilisedis takenforgrantedin his workwithoutspecific of the
discussion
assumptions thathavetobe made.Someofhiscommentators
notethatDurkheim
was an opponentof unilinearevolution(ParsonsI93 7: 3 72); yetDurkheimexpects
hisreadersto knowwhatis meantbysocialevolutionandbringsforwardevidence
thatconforms to latenineteenthcentury canonsin supportoftheparticular kindof
evolutionary processhe was seekingto establish. Formally,he treatsevolutionas a
process,but in facthe arguesmost of the timein merelydichotomousterms,
primitiveversuscivilised,and does littletowardsdemonstrating thatthereare
societiesat intermediate pointson thescale.The nearesthe getsto doingthisis in
comparison ofthelegalcodesoffivesocieties, theancientHebrews,theRomansof
thefifth century, theFranksunderSalic law, theBurgundians and theVisigoths.
Yet, even here,Durkheimis interested merelyin demonstrating thatthereare
quantitative differencesbetweenone code and another,and he neithercorrelates
thesewithotherfeaturesof the societiesnor worksout how thesefivesocieties
mightbe regardedrelativeto one another.He merelyassertsin a footnotethat'if
the genealogicaltablesof social typescould be completelydrawnup, it would
resemblea tuftedtree,with a singletrunk,to be sure' (DOL I4I, n. 2I; Cf
AlpertI939: I96-8). It hasbeensaidthatthesubtitle oftheDivisionoflabour should
beAgainst dilletantism,
butDurkheim'sefforts to establish
sociologyas a professional
specialismhave givenan appearanceof amateurism to much of his own work.
His arguments remain,however,despitetheinadequateevidencehe was ableat the
timeto musterin theirsupport.
Some commentators have drawnattentionto the similarities betweenDurk-
heim'stypology, whenseenas dichotomous, andtheviewsofTonnieson Gemein-
schaftand Gesellschaft. Earlier,Maine had made a distinction betweensocieties
basedon statusand thosebasedon contract, and Spencer'sdivisionofsocietiesinto
industrial and military was along similarlines.Redfield'sfolk-urban continuum
may be viewed as a modernessayin the same tradition(BohannanI960: 88;
Freeman & Winch I957: 46I), and even Robert Park's sacred and secular
AlbionSmall'scultures
societies, and civilisation,
and Riesman'stradition-oriented
and other-directed have been fittedinto the same pattern.The fact
personalities
thatthissimpleanalyticalprocedurestillyieldsinteresting resultsshowshow far
we stillarefroma satisfactory calculusof societies.

Concepts
In thecourseofhisworkDurkheimintroduces a numberof conceptswhichhe
links by several propositions.Concepts and propositionsare intermingled
in his presentation,
and it is oftennot clear whethera conceptis deliberately
introducedas an analyticaltool or as the name of some phenomenonalready
existingin therealor metaphysicalworld.For ourpurposesit maybe convenient
to tryto unravelthismixture.Let us takefirsthisbatteryof concepts.
Durkheimdealswitha plurality of discretesocieties,
eachcontaininga number
ofhumanbeings,individuals who belongto thesociety.Each individualhassome
qualitiesthataremerelyhuman,commonto all humanity, andhe hasotherdistinc-
tive qualitiesthatderivefromheredity, presumablyhis own physicalancestry
seenas distinctfromtheancestry of anyoneelse.The individualhas aptitudesand

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I62 J. A. BARNES

ambitions andholdsideasandbeliefs; hehasfeelings, themostrelevant feelingin

thecontext oftheDivision oflabourbeingthatoffeeling coerced. Withina single
society, individualsaregroupedeither intosegments, sub-unitsofsociety largely
similar tooneanother, orintoorgans, sub-units thatarecharacteristicallydifferent
fromoneanother.
By examining societiestheobserver discovers factsaboutthem.In theRules
Durkheim saysthatsocialfactsareto be treated as things andthissloganhasbeen
widelymisunderstood. Benolt-Smullyan (I948: soi) has notedthatDurkheim
employs thename'thing'forfourdifferent concepts andthathencehismethodo-
logicalpremise maybereadinfourways.Theinterpretation thatDurkheim claims
ashisownintheRules(xliii),isthatsociology dealsonlywithexternally observable
facts, butthisis notalwaysborneoutin hiswritings. In theDivision oflabour
he distinguishesseveralkindsoffacts. Internal facts,theevents andphenomenona
thatoccurin themindsofindividuals, necessarily escapeus.We canstudythese
internal factsonlythrough theexternal facts thatareanexpression of,andwhichin
somesensesymbolise, theinternal facts.Thenotionofexteriority, ofbeingexternal,
Durkheim applies
intwoways.Somefacts areexternal totheobserver; theybelong
to theintractable realitytheobserver records andwhichhe seeksto understand;
he cannotaltertheexternal factsto fithistheories, buthistheories mustbe fitted
to them.But Durkheim also designates somefactsas external becausetheyare
experienced orperceived bytheactoras external to him.
One sub-class ofexternal factscontains socialfacts. Thesearecharacterised not
onlybytheirexteriority, butalsoby theconstraint thattheyexertandbytheir
generality. The mainsocialfactsthatDurkheim discussesarelawsandcustoms,
fortheseareclearly externalandobservable. IntheDivision oflabourheisnotmuch
concerned withthatotherkindofsocialfact,socialstatistics, whichwaslaterto
form thebasisofhisenquiry intosuicide. Itiseasytoagreethata lawconstrains those
towhomitapplies, butagainwefindthatDurkheim usesthenotionofconstraint
in a variety ofways.Sometimes constraint meanstheneedto conform to social
standards, butatother timesconstraint isusedforpressure stemming from persons
withprestige orauthority,orelseformeremechanical necessity(Lacombe I926:40-
8). In theviewofBenoit-Smullyan, whodistinguishes sevendifferent meanings of
constraint in Durkheim's writings, he failsto distinguish betweencollective
constraint, asintheenforcement ofa law;cultural determination, intheacceptance
of theambient scaleofvaluesby adolescents growingup in a culture; physical
determination, wheregeographical andothermaterial factslimitpossibilities;
and
psychological compulsion, as whenindividuals in a crowdact in unisonin a
distinctive way (Benoit-Smullyan I948: 529). By shifting fromone kindof
constraint to another,Durkheim is able to set out his propositions in forms
difficulteitherto verifyorto disprove.
Laws and customs arethengeneralin thattheyapplywidelythroughout a
society, andtheyexertconstraint. Theyandotherexternal factsenableustoinfer
thepresence ofinternalfacts,themostrelevant internalfactbeingthatofsocial
solidarity.Inviewoftheinsistence thatsocialfacts mustbeexplained byother social
facts,andthatthesearethefactswithwhichthesociologist hasto operate, it is
important to stressthat,byDurkheim's definition,socialsolidarityis notitselfa
socialfact.He says:

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 DURKHEIM S DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY I63
Butsocialsolidarity
is a completely
moralphenomenon which,takenbyitself,doesnot
lenditself
toexactobservationnorindeedtomeasurement.To proceedtothisclassification
andthiscomparison, we mustsubstitute
forthisinternal
factwhichescapesusanexternal
indexwhichsymbolizes itandstudy
theformer inthelightofthelatter
(DOL 64).
Despitethis,Durkheim'sbook is arrangedaroundthedistinction betweentwo
kindsof solidarity. We are therefore in the unsatisfactory positionof havingto
distinguish betweentwo sub-types of a phenomenonwhichis not itselfdefined
or observable. We haveto takesolidarity forgranted.Durkheimdividessolidarity
intotwo types,positiveand negative,and thenfurther dividespositivesolidarity
intotwo types,mechanicaland organic.All threekindsof solidarity are present
in everyrealsociety,but in varyingproportions, and it is possibleto distinguish
themanalytically.
Mechanicalsolidarity bindstheindividualdirectlyto the societywithoutany
intermediary (DOL I29) and is predominant in thosesocietiesbelongingto the
collectivetype,in whichthebeliefsand sentiments of eachmemberarethesame,
not merelybecauseof theircommonhumanitybut becauseof theircommon
membership in a specificsociety.Organicsolidarity ariseswhenthemembersor
sub-unitsof a societydiffer fromone anotherbutdependon one anotherand are
controlled or constrainedor regulatedby one anotheror by somesinglespecialised
sub-unit.Durkheimjustifies hisuse of termsby saying:
Theterm[mechanical solidarity]
doesnotsignifythatitis produced bymechanical and
artificial
means. We callitthatonlybyanalogy tothecohesion whichunites theelements
ofaninanimate bodyas opposedto thatwhichmakesanunityoutoftheelements ofa
livingbody.... Theindividualconscience,
considered is a simple
inthislight, dependent
uponthecollectivetypeandfollows allofitsmovements, as thepossessedobjectfollows
thoseofitsowner (DOL 130).
On theotherhand,organicsolidarity is producedby thedivisionof labourin
society,so thateach memberhas his own specificactivitywhich makessome
contributionto thelivesof othermembers.No membercan live alone,foreach
dependson theactivitiesof othersforhisown well-being.He says:
In effect,
ontheonehand,eachonedepends asmuchmorestrictlyonsocietyaslabouris
moredivided; and,ontheother, theactivityofeachisasmuchmorepersonal asitismore
specialized....This solidarity resembles thatwhichwe observeamongthe higher
animals.
Eachorgan, ineffect, hasitsspecialphysiognomy, itsautonomy.And,moreover,
theunityoftheorganism is as greatas theindividuationofthepartsis moremarked.
Becauseofthisanalogy, we propose to callthesolidarity
whichis dueto thedivision
of
labour,
organic' (DOL I3I).
Organicand mechanicalsolidarity together constitute thetwo formsofpositive
solidarity,in contradistinction
to negativesolidarity. Durkheimmakeslittleuse of
theconceptofnegativesolidarity. He saysthatitdoesnotproduceanyintegration
by itself(DOL I29), and thatit corresponds to a certainclassof legalrules;butin
facthe usesthetermas a synonym fortherulesthemselves, thoserulesthatdefine
rightsto realproperty. As faras I can tell,he makesno distinction betweenreal
propertyand chattelsand hence speaksof 'the solidarityof things',another
synonym fornegativesolidarity or 'real solidarity'(DOL i i6). He saysthatthese
rules'do not cause the people whom theyput in contactwith one anotherto
concur;theydo notdemandanyco-operation; buttheysimplyrestore or maintain,

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I64 J. A. BARNES

inthenewconditions whichareproduced, thisnegative whosecircum-

solidarity
stanceshavetroubled itsfunctioning'
(DOL ii8).
He mentions yetanother kindofsolidarity,industrial
or contractualsolidarity
(DOL xviii,200) attributedto Spencer.Durkheim toitprincipally
refers toshow
thatit is spurious.
It wouldbe thesolidarity ofa society in whichindividuals,
eachwithhisowngoalsandvalues, werelinkedonlybya vastsystem ofparticular
contracts(DOL 203) spontaneouslyenteredinto.Durkheim refutes
this,
principally
by reference to thelimitationsplacedby everyknownsocietyon thekindsof
contracts thatare validand by theexistence of elaboratelegalmachinery for
regulating
andenforcing
contracts
(Parsons
I960: I I9-20). inthe
'Foreverything
contract is notcontractual' (DOL 2iI), anditis in thenon-contractual elements
thatwe can findthetruesourcesof organicsolidarity (cf.Parsons1937: 319,
wherehesaysDurkheim wasmistaken). Indeed,inhiseagerness tooverthrow the
Hobbesianview of society, and to rejecttherandomness of individual goals,
Durkheim almostoverlooks thesimilarity between suchsolidarity as theremay
beinspontaneous contractualrelations andhisownorganic solidarity.Indeed, ina
laterpassage, hereinstatescontractual asoneoftheimportant
solidarity varietiesof
organic solidarity (DOL 38I).
Durkheim makesa distinction between lawsandcustoms. By law,he meansa
law as written in a codeoflaws.Therearetwosub-categories oflaw,repressive
and restitutive, classified
according to thekindsof sanctions attached to them.
Somesanctions, saysDurkheim, 'consist in suffering,
essentially or atleasta loss,
inflicted
ontheagent.Theymakedemands onhisfortune,oronhishonour, oron
hislife,oron hisliberty, anddeprive himofsomething he enjoys.We callthem
repressive.Theyconstitute penallaw'. 'As fortheothertypeitdoesnotnecessarily
implysuffering fortheagent,butconsists onlyofthereturn ofthings as theywere,
in there-establishment of troubled relations to theirnormalstate'(DOL 69).
Restitutive lawsarefurther dividedintotwotypes, thosedealing withrealrights,
i.e.rightsoverthings, as mentioned above,andthosedealing withinterpersonal
rights,
anditisthesethatDurkheim makesuseofastheexternal signoftheinward
organicsolidarity. The conceptof customis notdividedup in thesameway,
andDurkheim haslittle
tosayinthisbookaboutcustom otherthantotreat itas a
feebleversion ofthelaw.He says:
'Theactswhichcustom alonemustrepress arenotdifferentinnature from those
thelaw punishes'(DOL 30I). 'Normally',hesays,'customis notopposedtolaw,
but is, on the contrary,its basis'. 'If, then,thereare typesof social solidarity,
whichcustomalone manifests, theyare assuredlysecondary;law producesthose
whichareessential and theyaretheonlyoneswe needto know' (DOL 65-66).
The individuals who together makeup a societyarethoughtofas eachhavinga
conscience or consciousness,
whatwe mightcalla valuesystem, andthisconscience
can be analysedintoitsparts.
'Therearein eachofus ... two consciences: onewhichis commonto ourgroup
initsentirety,which,consequently, isnotourself, butsocietylivingandactingwith-
in us; the other,on the contrary, represents thatin us whichis personaland
distinct,thatwhichmakesus an individual.... However,thesetwo consciences
are not in regionsgeographically distinctfromus, but penetrate fromall sides'
(DOL I29-30). The socialcomponentoftheconscience, thecommonor collective

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 DURKHEIM S DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY i65

conscience(cf. DOL 79), is itselfdividedinto two parts.There is an affective

elementconsisting of sentiments and 'phenomenaof sensibility', and thereis a
representative elementconsistingof ideas and doctrines(DOL I70). As with
solidarity andlaws,theproportions in whichthesedifferent varietiesofconscience
are foundin different individualsin any society,and in different societies,vary.
It is withthe mannerin whichtheseproportions vary,relativeto one another,
thatDurkheimis principally concerned.
Solidarity,law andconscience arethreeofDurkheim'svariables, andonlyone of
theseis readilyaccessibleto scientificobservation.Thereis,therefore, thelikelihood
of thewhole systemof analysisbecomingtautologousand self-fulfilling, were it
notforthefourthvariable,thedivisionoflabour,an aspectofsocialmorphology.
Itis thisvariablethatgivesthebookitstitle,andwhichperhapsprovidedthenewest
elementin Durkheim'sthesis.The conceptofdivisionoflabourseemsnowhereto
be definedexplicitly and,as we shallsee,thereis no cleardistinction
betweenwhat
we would call specialisation and fragmentation of activities.Durkheimmerely
says:
... co-operation.. . doesnotcomeaboutwithout thedivisionoflabour.To co-operate,
in short,is to participate in a commontask.If it is dividedintotasksqualitatively
similar,butmutually indispensable,
thereisa simpledivisionoflabourofthefirstdegree.
Iftheyareofa different character,
thereis compound division
oflabour, specialization
properly called.
(DOL 124)
The divisionoflabour,however,is onlywhatwe wouldcallan intervening variable
for,in Durkheim'sterms,it is 'a derivedand secondaryphenomenon'which
'passeson the surfaceof social life'. He therefore warnsus againstmistakinga
superficialdivisionof labour,acquiredby imitationor diffusion, forthegenuine
article(DOL 282, n. 30). The divisionof labouris likewisenot to be confused
withmutualism, wherebytwo mutuallyhostilesocieties'exchangeproductsin a
more or less regularmanner'(DOL 28I-2), nor with differentiation 'pure and
simple',as whencertainpersonsspecialisein crime,forthisis the'verynegationof
solidarity'(DOL 353). Thus, to this extent,Durkheimadmitsas divisionof
labouronlythosekindsofoccupationalspecialisation whichsatisfy therelationship
betweendivisionof labourand socialsolidarity thathe is seekingto demonstrate.
As befitsa scientist,Durkheimrecognisesthe value of measurement and uses
severalquantitative concepts.Yet, in manycasesno attemptis made to provide
rulesfordetermining thesequantities and we are givenonlystate-
operationally,
mentsabout'larger'and 'smaller'and thelike.Durkheimrefers to thevolumeof
sociallife(DOL I98), thevolumeofa legalcode (DOL 205),thesizeand intensity
of variousphenomena.Indeed,he gives considerableattentionto the way in
whicha givencomponent, in thelaw or in theconscience,can varyin size both
absolutelyand relativelyto the othercomponents.Most of his commentators
have overlookedthisaspectof Durkheim'smethodology, but it is interestingto
notethattheanalyticaltool of concomitant whichDurkheimdevelops
variation,
considerably in Suicide,is presentin embryonic formin theDivisionoflabour.
'Vivacity' (DOL 237) is anotherapparentlyquantitativeconcept,but the
notionof quantityand measurement is most developedin Durkheim'suse of
'density'. He deals with 'materialdensity'which we would call population
density, and 'moralor dynamicdensityof society',whichis therelationbetween

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i66 J. A. BARNES

'individuals sufficiently in contact to be ableto actandreactupononeanother'

and 'theactivecommerce resultingfromit' (DOL 257). The 'condensation of
society'and 'socialdensity'(DOL 260) seemto be synonyms forpopulation
density.
Therearetwo otheranalytical concepts by whichDurkheim triesto linkhis
fourvariables: 'function' and'type'.He says:'To askwhatthefunction ofthe
division oflabouris,is to seekfortheneedwhichitsupplies' (DOL 49). Endless
confusion has followedDurkheim's popularisationof thisterm,and I cannot
unravel thisconfusion here.Itmustbe sufficient tonotethatin Merton's termino-
logyDurkheim is concerned with'latentfunction' ratherthanwithmanifest or
mathematical function (MertonI949: 22, 62). In theDivision oflabour theterm
'function' isrestricted tobeneficialfunction. Thusinoneofhisnumerous biological
analogies Durkheim says,withreference to crime:
... cancerandtuberculosis increase oforganic
thediversity tissues
withoutbringing forth
a newspecialization ofbiologic functions.Inallthese
cases,
thereis no partitionofa
common function, but,in themidst oftheorganism, whetherindividual or social,
anotherisformed which seekstoliveattheexpenseofthefirst.
Inreality,
thereisnoteven
a function,fora wayofacting merits nameonlyifitjoinswithothers
this inmaintaining
life(DOL 353-4).
general
FrequentlyinhisbookDurkheim refers
tothe'collective type'asopposedtothe
'individualtype' (DOL I06-3 3). The English-speaking readerat leastasks
'typeofwhat?'andtheanswer isnotimmediately clear.Sometimes itseemsthat
thecollective
andindividual types aretypesofconscience inwhichoneortheother
corresponding component predominates; at othertimesit seemsthattheseare
typesofsociety inwhichconsciences ofthesekindsaretobe found.Ineither case,
Durkheim useshistypesas whatwe wouldcallpolaroridealtypes.
Durkheim alsousesa batchofevaluative concepts,usually in adjectival
form.
He describes phenomena as 'abnormal'(DOL I90), 'decadent'(DOL I96),
(DOL I96, 27I) or 'morbid'(DOL 2I9). Thesewordsseemto be
'pathological'
interchangeable,andarecontrasted withanother set:'normal'(DOL 375), what
'oughtto be' (DOL I90), 'healthy', 'spontaneous'(DOL 377) andthelike.This
useofterms springs fromDurkheim's convictionthatscientific enquiryprovides
theonlyreliablebasisforpoliticalaction,butit involveshimin considerable
inhisefforts
difficulties to finda scientific
basisforthegood.
Finally,
he introducesa useful typology ofsanctions. Thisis fairly straightfor-
wardandI neednotdiscuss it,forithasbecomepartofthegeneral stock-in-trade
ofsocialenquiry (DOL 69; cf.Radcliffe-Brown I952: 205-I9).

Propositions
Usingthisconceptual scheme,Durkheim makesseveral substantive
propositions.
Manyofthesearemadeenpassant, buttwocentral theses
emergefromthebook.
Firstly,
itisasserted
thatsocieties
may,inbroadterms, beplacedona morphological
andatleastpartlyhistorical
continuum. Atoneendofthecontinuum areprimitive
societies;
thesearecharacterised
by internaldifferentiation
intosimilarsegments
withnegligibledivision
oflabour,legalcodesthataremainlyrepressive,
a collective
consciencethatpredominatesineachindividualmember'smindovertheindividual
component, low moraldensity, smallpopulation and mechanical
solidarity.At

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 DURKHEIM 'S DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY I67

theotherendarethehigher societies
characterisedbyinternal differentiation
into
manydistinct organs,a greatdivisionoflabour, a legalcodethatispredominantly
concerned withrestitutive
regulation of inter-personal rights,
a collectivecon-
sciencethatconstitutesonlya modestportionof themindof eachindividual,
highmoraldensity, largepopulation and organicsolidarity. As we haveseen,
solidarity
andconscience areinternal facts,
so thatessentiallythefirst
proposition
amounts to no morethansaying(though Durkheim mightprotest at this)that
theextent ofthedivisionoflabourina society is correlated
positivelywithmoral
densityandwiththepredominance ofrestitutive
lawsconcerned withinter-personal
rightsinitslegalcode,andcorrelatednegatively withthepredominance ofrepres-
sivelaws.
Thesecondproposition is thata society's
movement awayfromtheprimitive
andtowards thehigher endofthecontinuum is dueto a causalchainrunning as
follows.A societybeginstoincreaseinpopulation andtohavea higher population
density.Consequently, thestruggle forexistence becomesmoreacuteand,in
orderto survive,members ofthesociety developa division oflabour.Durkheim
says:
Thanksto[thedivision
oflabour]
opponents
arenotobliged
tofighttoa finish,
butcan
exist
onebesidetheother.
Also,inproportion itfurnishes
toitsdevelopment, themeansof
maintenanceandsurvival
toa greater
number ofindividuals
who,inmore homogeneous
societies,
wouldbecondemned toextinction
(DOL 270).
Theincreasing divisionoflabourthenleadstoa higher moraldensity, a decline
in thecollectivecomponent in theconscience, a shiftin thestructure ofthelaw,
andthegrowth oforganic solidarity attheexpense ofmechanical solidarity.
Thisproposition hasbeendescribed as theonlyseriousattempt anywhere in
Durkheim's writings toprovide anexplanation ofsocialchange(Benolt-Smullyan
I948: 5i8), butthereislittle
evidence to supportit(cf.Schnorei958:627).Durk-
heimdevotes almost as muchspacetoattacking thearguments ofhisopponents as
hedoestoputting forward evidence forhisownassertions. He doesnotdiscuss the
manypossible alternativeresponses to increasedcompetition (cf.Alpert I939: 94).
He reliesquiteheavily on theargument byelimination, inwhichheputsforward
an arrayofalternatives andadvances arguments to eliminateallbutone,whichis
thendeclared to be provedcorrect. However,I thinkthatone reasonwhythe
evidence advanced byDurkheim appears toustobesoinadequate isthat, although
thewholebookisproclaimed tobeananalysis according tothemanner ofscience,
infactDurkheim continually triesto showthatinsomesensehisconclusions are
inherent inhisdefinitions,anddo notrequire thesupport offresh empirical data.
Itis significant
thatinthishisfirst bookthereiscomparatively littleappealtothe
factsofhistoryandethnography, whereas inhislater
writings heismuchmoreclosely
concerned withtheanalysis ofspecific facts.AsLevi-Strauss remarks: 'Durkheim
struggled between hismethodological attitude,which madehimconsider socialfacts
as "things", andhisphilosophical formation whichusesthose"things" asa ground
onwhichthefundamental Kantian idealscanbefirmly seated. Hence,heoscillates
betweena dullempiricism and an aprioristic frenzy'(Levi-Strauss I945: S28).
In theDivision oflabour we arestillin therealmofthephilosophy ofhistory and
havenotyetentered thefresh fieldsofsociological enquiry.In fact,itwouldbe
2-M.

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i68 J. A. BARNES

toprovethissecondproposition
quitedifficult byreference tothefacts,
sinceeven
thedivisionoflabouris hardto quantifyandthereis littleconclusive
evidence
forthelevelofmoraldensityatanytimeanywhere.Inanycase,Durkheim hedges
hisassertion
byintroducingseveralsecondary thoughhedoesnotdiscuss
factors,
thereis between
whatlogicaldifference a primarycauseanda secondary factor
(AlpertI939: 96). Heredityhas influencedthe divisionof labour (DOL 305),
particularlyamongthemoreprimitivesocieties.The physicalenvironment may
causea segmentof societyto specialiseitsactivities and becomean organwitha
recognisedfunction (DOL 263). As thescaleof socialinteraction becomeswider,
therealentitiessymbolised by thecollectiverepresentations becomemorenum-
erous,and hence the common consciencebecomesmore abstract(DOL 287),
anditscharacteristic dogmais thecultoftheindividual (DOL I07, I72). Under
conditions ofsocialchangethewisdomoftheagedis lessreveredand thebondsof
traditionare loosened,as, likewise,theyare in citieswherethe aged are com-
parativelyless numerousthantheyare in the country.Hence individualsfeel
freerto followtheirown inclinations and thereis greaterdiversityin occupations
is
(DOL 294-6). It thena multiplechainof causationthatDurkheimis putting
forward,and it is difficult
to eitherverifyor disproveit.
Partof thefirstmainthesis,thatthedivisionof labouris positivelycorrelated
withthepredominance ofrestitutivelawsconcerned withinter-personal rightsand
negatively withthepredominance ofrepressivelaws,is easierto tackle,andindeed
to disprove,and its disproofin turnthrowsdoubt on the secondproposition.
Durkheimsupportshis argumentswith some comparativeevidenceon legal
codeswhichI havealreadymentioned, buttheevidenceis confined to onepartonly
of thecorrelation. He showsthatvariouslegal codes do differ fromone another,
butonlytakesforgrantedthecorresponding differencesin thedivisionof labour.
Durkheimspeaksonlyin generaltermsof thelevelof thedivisionof labourin
specifiedsocieties,and some of his criticstoo have not been verysuccessful in
givingprecisionto thisterm.Thus, for example,one attemptto disprovethe
'primitivecommunismtheory',i.e. thatthedivisionof labouris non-existent in
theprimitive world,usingmaterialofthekindavailableto Durkheim,managedto
assertthatamongtheArandaofcentralAustralia thereweresevendistinct domestic
functions performed by women and threeby men, and thatin the whole of
Aranda activitiestherewere ten different occupationsfor men and threefor
women.The unreliability of thismethodof analysisis shownby thefactthatthis
sameinvestigator foundonlyone recognised domesticactivity forwomenamong
theWarramungaand noneformen(WatsonI929). Yet, in fact,thesetwo tribes
arequitecloseto oneanotherandin thedivisionoflabourtheyarealmostidentical.
But themainweaknessofthefirstthesisis thattheethnographic evidenceshows
that,in general,primitive societiesarenot characterised by repressive laws.Durk-
heimtook his evidenceon legal codesfromclassicalantiquityand earlyEurope,
and somehistorical progression of thekindhe had in mindmayhave takenplace
there,thoughevenin thisareaMertonholdshe was mistaken (MertonI934: 326).
But thisprogression cannotbe extendedto theprimitive world,wherelegalcodes
do not existin writing,if at all. In stateless
societiesalmostalljural rulesare,in
theseterms,restitutive ratherthanrepressive. Indeed,it is interesting thatin an
inquirybasedon evidencefromforty-eight societies,and aimed to testwhether

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 DURKHEIM S DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY I69

or not Tonnies,Durkheim,Park, Small,Maine, Redfieldand Riesmanare all

talkingin different termsabout the same dimensionof societalcomplexity,
theauthorshave,perhapsunconsciously, quiteoverlookedwhatDurkheimhad to
sayaboutthedevelopment oflaw. Theyexamineeightvariablesin termsofgreater
or lesssocietalcomplexity, by thesetheorists,
as suggested and equatepunishment
by government actionwithgreatercomplexity, and punishment by the person
wrongedwith less complexity(Freeman& Winch I957: 46I, 463). Yet, the
ethnographic recordshowsthatitis governmental actionthatistypicallyrepressive,
and redressby self-helpthatis restitutive.
As Nisbet(i965: 30) notes,it is perhaps
thatinhislaterwritings
significant Durkheimdoesnotrefer atallto socialsolidarity
generated by repressivelaws.
Durkheimis on firmergroundwhenhe correlates thedivisionof labourwith
moraldensity, thoughthisis hardto statequantitatively.In theDivisionoflabour
Durkheimweakenshisown casesomewhatby treating moraland materialdensity
as interchangeable,and in theRuleshe correctsthisfault.Herskovits citesDurk-
heim'sproposition:
oflabourvaries
Thedivision indirect ofsocieties,
ratiowiththevolumeanddensity and,if
it progresses
in a continuous
manner in thecourseofsocialdevelopment,
it is because
societies
becomeregularly andgenerally
denser morevoluminous (DOL 262).
Herskovitscomments:'It is notpossibleto documentthisstatement, especially
precisionit impliesis not insisted
in its dynamicaspects.Yet if the quantitative
upontheposition
carries
a considerable
validity'
(i952: I42).
Thusthedifficulty of testingDurkheim'smainassertions in thisbook liespartly
in the absenceof data with historicaldepthfroman adequatelywide rangeof
societies,
andpartlyfromthefactthathispropositions involvetermswhich,on his
own definitions, are not accessibleto observation.Mechanicaland organicsolid-
arityand collectiveand individualtypesof consciencemay be handynamesfor
recognised constellationsofobservablefactsconcernedwithlegalsystems, occupa-
tionalspecialisation,populationdensityand populationsize. But theycannotbe
morethanmerenamesunlessindependent criteriaare introduced by whichtheir
existence can be provedor disproved.ThisDurkheimsingularly failedto do. The
term'solidarity'did come to have a clearmeaninglater,in thewritings of Leon
Bourgeois,but his book, La solidarite, was publishedafterthe Divisionof labour
(AlpertI939: I78; I94I; RichterI960: I).
Despitethislackofoperational definition,thenotionofsocialsolidarity remains
centralto Durkheim'sargument.Formsof thedivisionof labourare assessedas
normalor pathologicalaccordingto thekindof socialsolidarity theyengender.
We havenotedearlierthatDurkheimrejectedthenotionofprofessional crimeas
an exampleof thedivisionof labour.Nevertheless he does admitthreekindsof
thedivisionof labourthathe classesas exceptionalor pathological(DOL 353-4).
Firstthereis thedivisionoflabourcharacterised bychronicconflict betweencapital
andlabour.Thisanomicformarisesbecausethereisinadequatecontactbetweenthe
variousorgansof society,and thisin turnis due in partto thelack ofjuridical
determination of the rightsof capitaland labour(DOL 367), and in partto the
factthat,as organisedsocietydevelops,theproducercannotappraisethemarketfor
his productat a glance. Hence productionbecomesunregulated and thereare

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 I70 J. A. BARNES

periodiccrises(DOL 370). This is pathological, forundernormalconditions, the

workeris 'not a machinewho repeatshis movementswithoutknowing their
meaning,but... he feelshe is servingsomething'' . . . thisessential characterof
thedivisionof labour... is above all a sourceof solidarity'(DOL 372-3).
Yet, if under-regulation and insufficient
contactlead to an anomicdivisionof
labour,too muchregulationmay lead to anotherpathologicalform,theforced
divisionof labour.Thereis no spontaneity ifpeopleare linkedto theirfunctions
only by constraint, and we have only an imperfectand troubledsolidarity.
Durkheimherehas in mindcastesocieties, and he goes on to distinguishbetween
inequalityof incomeand status,whichis not necessarily bad, and inequalityin
whathe callstheexternalconditionsof conflict (DOL 379),whichis bad. Over-
regulation, or occupationalspecialisationby prescriptionratherthanby achieve-
ment,preventsthatdesirablestateof affairs in whichsocial inequalitiesexactly
expressnaturalinequalities and labouris dividedspontaneously. This is achieved
by contracts spontaneously enteredintoand adheredto (DOL 377).
Finally,in some societies,thefunctional activityof each workeris insufficient
to producetherequireddegreeofsolidarity. Durkheimdoesnotgiveanymodern
examplesof thispathologicalcondition,but notesapprovinglythatas societies
advancethereis less leisure.'In societieswhichare exclusivelyagricultural and
pastoral,labouris almostentirely suspendedduringthe seasonof bad weather'.
But as we advance,work becomesa 'permanentoccupation'and 'if sufficiently
strengthened, a need'. The divisionoflabourmakesindividuals solidary'not only
becauseit limitstheactivityof each,butalso becauseit increasesit' (DOL 394-5).

Developments
Beforemakingsomeassessment of theDivisionoflabour, it maybe convenient
to notesomeofthedevelopments thathavesprungfromit.In a sense,thegreatest
of theseis theworkof Durkheimhimselffor,as alreadymentioned, theseedsof
muchof hissubsequent writings, theRules,SuicideandElementary formsare to be
foundin theDivisionoflabour. In theRuleshe stresses theautonomyofsocialfacts
to a greaterextentthanin theDivisionoflabour, so thatthephysicalenvironment
andfactors ofheredity becomelessadmissable aslinksinthechainofsocialcausation.
The collectiveconscienceis conceivedin theDivisionoflabouras containingan
affectivecomponent, butitis thecognitiveor representative elementthatis mainly
dealtwith.In laterwork,particularly in theElementary forms, theserepresentative
elements beginto acquirean autonomyoftheirown,theircoerciveforceon thein-
dividualisstressed,andhencetheaffective element comesalsoto bestressed attheex-
penseof sentiments arisingin theindividualcomponentof theconscience.In the
Divisionoflabourthecollectiveconscienceis linkedcloselywiththefactthatthe
membersof a societyare,and perceivethemselves to be, similarto one another;
Durkheimis concernedwith culturally homogeneous,and not plural,societies.
But in Suicidethecollectiveconscience is seenas merelythesystemofmoralbeliefs
and sentiments commonto membersofa society(ParsonsI937: 337; cf DOL I29)
whetheror not theyhave the same occupationsand socialstatuses.Durkheim's
nextstepis to concentrate on theseideasand beliefsratherthanon thelegalcodes
and occupationalgroupings, so thatsociologycomesto be thestudyof systems of
ideasratherthansystemsof action(ParsonsI937: 446). Thistrendis now in full

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 DURKHEIM S DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY I7I

floodin Frenchanthropology on whom the

undertheleadershipof Levi-Strauss,
mantleof Mausshas descendedand who maybe regardedas Durkheim'sheir.
We can distinguish, betweenthecollectiveconscienceexist-
at leastanalytically,
ing as an entityon itsown,independent of anyindividualmanifestation,
and any
individual'simperfect comprehension of it. But Durkheimis neverclearon this
distinctionand hisfumbling towardsit exposeshimto thechargeof advocatinga
groupmind.Some modernwritersassertthatthe distinction can be understood
byanalogywiththelawsofgrammar, whichunconsciously constrain
thespeechof
even the ignorantunschooledpeasant.Durkheimacceptedthe existenceof the
unconsciousmindin an articlehe publishedin I898 (DurkheimI953: 2I-3; Cf
NeyerI960: 6I-2). Yet Levi-Strauss comments:

Thesolution of Durkheim's
factitious
antinomy liesintheawarenessthattheseobjecti-
vatedsystems or thatunconscious
ofideasareunconscious structures
psychical underlie
themandmakethempossible. Hencetheircharacteras"things"andatthesametimethe
dialectic-Imeanun-mechanical-character
ofthisexplanation.
(Levi-Strauss
1945: 528)

WhileMoliereallowsMonsieurJourdain to discovermerelythathe hasbeentalk-

ingproseall hislifewithoutknowingit,Levi-Strauss makeshimobeytherulesof
grammaras well.
A no lessfruitfulconsequenceofDurkheim'sbook hasbeenthedevelopment of
thenotionoforganicsolidarity through Mauss'studyofexchangeas an integrating
mechanism, as seenin his book Thegift.Durkheimin theDivisionoflabourstill
regardssocialsolidarity as derivedin partfromsuchnon-socialfactorsas 'The
affinities
thatthecommunity ofblood bringsabout' (DOL I75), butin laterwork
hisfollowers haveexpandedthesocialcausesof solidarity. The exchangeofgoods
and servicesthroughthe divisionof labouris seento be only one sourceof the
multiplex and diversesocialtiesthatbindtogether themembersofa differentiated
society.
I have alreadyreferred to theworkof Radcliffe-Brown on theclassification
of
sanctions, where,as in hiswritings on law andin hisuseoftheconceptoffunction,
hefollowsDurkheimclosely.Yet itis curioustonotehow littleinfluence Durkheim
seemsto havehadon anthropology in America,at leastuntilquiterecently.
Lowie,
despitedevotinga chapterto DurkheiminhisHistory ofethnological
theory,
managed
to writehis threemajor books on social organisation(Primitive society,Social
organization and The originofthestate)withouta singlereference to Durkheim.
Evenmoresurprising is thatin theweightyAnthropology today,with966 pagesand
fiftybibliographies, thereareonlyfourreferences to Durkheim,two ofthesebeing
by Levi-Strauss. This is the more remarkablein thatit was an anthropologist,
Radcliffe-Brown, who was partlyresponsible forintroducing Durkheim'swork
to sociologistsin America,as Nisbet (I964: 4) stresses.Durkheim'swritings
on religionwere closerto Americananthropological interests
priorto I950 than
anything he hadto sayaboutsocialorganisation, andtheformer mayhavebecome
so mucha partof anthropological thinking thatdirectcitationwas unnecessary.
Yet theapparentirrelevance oftheDivisionoflabourforstudiesof social organisa-
tionis strange.SinceDurkheim,therehavebeenonlytwoseriousattempts to study
thedivisionof labouron a world-widescale.The firstwas in 1915 by Hobhouse,
Wheelerand Ginsberg,and the secondin i9s5 by Udy in a book whose title

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I72 J. A. BARNES

exactlymirrorsDurkheim's-Organization of work:a comparativeanalysis

of
production
among non-industrial
peoples.In neither to
book is thereanyreference
Durkheim.It seemsthathisbookis already
partofprehistory.

Assessment
Therearetwo waysoflookingat theDivisionoflabour. Eitherwe can see it as a
contribution towardsthe defeatof the social nominalists, and of Spencerin
particular,and towardstheestablishment of sociologyas a recognised professional
academicdiscipline in France;or elsewe can view it as a contribution to present-
day thinking aboutsocialcohesion,legal development, occupationalspecialisation
and so on. The latter,if fullydeveloped,would takeus too farforour present
purposeand would, as I have alreadysuggested,yield rathermeagreresults.
To exploretheformerwould requirea muchgreaterknowledgeof Durkheim's
philosophical and sociologicaladversaries thanI have.All I can do is to offer a few
comments on pointsofDurkheim'smethodthat,evenseventy yearsafterhewrote,
stillseemrelevant.
In the firstplace, Durkheimseemsto have been verypoorlyservedby his
terminology. He wrote,so Alpertclaims,in as mechanicalan idiom as possible
(AlpertI939: 85) forpolemicalreasonsand henceit is not surprising thatsome
people took him literally.He was misunderstood by Malinowski,who said
thatDurkheimclaimedthattherewas 'slavish,fascinated, passiveobedience'to
socialcodes(MalinowskiI926: 4; AlpertI939: 208). He didnotsupportsyndicalism
(ParsonsI937: 339), nor did he advocatethefascistcorporatestate(RichterI960:
I96), althoughboth theseaccusationswere broughtagainsthim. He has been
accusedofbreakinghisown canonsof explanation by sayingthatthecauseof the
growthof organicsolidarity is to be foundin a non-socialfact,the growthof
population,and on thisscore his latestdefender(SchnoreI958: 624) gives the
impressivelist of Alpert,Benoit-Smullyan, Parsonsand Sorokinas all having
misunderstood Durkheim.All of theseire pointsof substance and he can scarcely
be excusedon thegroundsthathe could not be expectedto writeclearlyabout
everything he had to say.More seriousis hisconfusion abouttheaverage,thenor-
mal, thehealhy and theideal. In Rules,Durkheimsaysthatthenormaltypeis
identicalwiththe averagetypeand thateverydeviationfromthisstandardis a
pathologicalphenomenon(Rules:64; Benoit-Smullyan I948: 504), but he never
followedconsistently even thisclear,if surprising,statement. Halbwachspoints
outthattherisingsuiciderate,whichDurkheimregardedas so undesirable, should,
by Durkheim'sown criteria,be judged to be quite normal(Benoit-Smullyan
I948: 529, n. 2I). In the earlierDivisionof labourthereis greaterconfusion, for
Durkheimwritesthatsickness is not 'partof thenormaltypeof old age. On the
contrary, the illnessesof old age are abnormalfactsjust as thoseof the adult'
(DOL 433, n. 22). He seeksto identify the 'normalmoralfactfora givensocial
type' by therepressive diffusesanctionattaching to it (DOL 435), but whilethis
may work forrulesof conductit cannotapplyto phenomenalike crimerates.
Peristiany (1953: viii-xx)devotesmostof his introduction to the translationof
Durkheim'sSociology andphilosophy to commenting on thesepoints,but Durk-
heim's usages stillremainconfusedfor me. It is perhapssignificant that the

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 DURKHEIM S DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY I73

longestdiscussion oftheseconceptsin theDivisionoflabour occursin thatportionof

theprefaceto thefirsteditionwhichwas omittedfromthesecondand subsequent
editions.Therewould seemto me to be a fundamental conflictbetweenDurk-
heim'sattemptto look at valuesrelativistically, in the contextof the societyin
whichtheyareheld,andhisinsistence atthesametimethatcertainsocialconditions
areintrinsically pathological.This conflict is obscuredby lack of clarityaboutthe
statusof the norm,whichis equatedat one momentwith the averageand at
anotherwiththehealthy,withwhat oughtto be. Unfortunately thisparticular
confusion stillpersists,
at leastterminologically.
AlpertclaimsthatDurkheimrecognisedthe integrative value of conflictin
sociallife(Alpert 1941: 173; cfRichter I960: I94) butthere islittleintheDivision
oflabourto supportthisview. Indeed,thecontemptuous dismissalof whatDurk-
heimcallsmutualism, limitedco-operation betweenenemies,and hisrestriction of
theconceptoffunction to beneficial
function, suggestthathe lookeduponinternal
conflictas essentiallyunhealthyand destructiveof solidarity.Solidarityand
integration areseenas good in themselves, and themorethebetter.The conceptof
altruism is useda littlein the Divisionof labour(DOL I96, I97, 228) butit is not
linkedto suicide,whilethosesuicideswhichby the criteriaof Suicidewould be
classed as altruisticare here referred to as not 'true suicide' (DOL 246-7).
Hencethereisno needto discussthedangersofexcessiveintegration. Instead,as we
haveseen,Durkheimarguesthatthedivisionoflabourproducessolidarity onlyif
it is spontaneous, notforced(DOL 376-7). Theremustbe externalequalityso that
'harmonybetweenindividualnatures andsocialfunctions cannotfailto be realised,
at least in the averagecase. For, if nothingimpedesor undulyfavoursthose
disputing overtasks,itis inevitable thatonlythosewho aremostaptat eachkindof
activitywill indulgein it'. 'It will be said thatit is not alwayssufficient to make
men content,thatthereare some men whose desiresgo beyondtheirfaculties.
Thisis true,buttheseareexceptionaland,one maysay,morbidcases'(DOL 376).
The freedomto findtherightnichein societycan be securedonlyby conscious
actionon the partof the state,and only by thisactioncan a societybased on
organicsolidarity survive,sinceit cannotrelyon itsweak collectiveconscience.
Hence 'libertyitselfis theproductof regulation.Far frombeingantagonistic to
socialaction,it resultsfromsocialaction'(DOL 386).
It is truethatin thepolitically mostcontroversial sectionoftheDivisionoflabour
Durkheimproteststhatthisidyllicstateof affairs is farfrombeing realisedin
contemporary France.He mighthave been surprised to findthatit was to be in
SovietRussiabetweenthewarsthathisnotionsoftheconnexionbetweenorganic
solidarity andthedivisionoflabourfoundmostexplicitexpression, in thestresson
thesocialvalue of thehumblesttasksperformed by factoryworkers(Friedmann
I955: 49). This view is foundin the poem 'The funeral'by StephenSpender
(1955: 53), publishedin the early1930S.
Deathis another milestoneon theirway.
Withlaughter lipsandwithwindsblowing
on their roundthem
Theyrecord simply
How thisoneexceeded allothers inmaking driving belts.2
However,it shouldbe remembered thatsimilarsentiments are to be foundin a
seventeenth poembyGeorgeHerbert
century (194I: I85).

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174 J. A. BARNES

A servant
withthisclause
Makesdrudgeriedivine:
Whosweepsa room,as forthylaws,
Makesthatandth'actionfine.
Divine determinism and dialecticalmaterialism
both providethe solidarity
Durkheim reserved
forappliedpositive
science.
But Durkheim's recipeforharmony in twentieth
centuryindustrial
society
talliesneither
withthechanges in industrial
organisation
sincehisday,brought
aboutbyincreased mechanisation,norwiththefindingsofindustrial
psychology.
Georges Friedmannendshisdiscussion
of'Durkheim'sthesis
andthecontemporary
forms ofthedivision
oflabour'bysaying:
Duringthehalf-century
whichhasfollowedthepublication
ofthisreport,
theforms taken
inindustrial
byspecialisation haveonlyenlarged
society thegapbetweentheidealconse-
quencesofthedivision
oflabouras Durkheim themandtherealeffects
expounded that
in oursocieties.
we observe (Friedmann
I955: 58)

Inmuchthesamespirit,
Richterwrites
thatDurkheim
neverinvestigated
political
withanything
institutions likethecarehegavetohisworkonsuicide
andreligion.
He says:
Thelimitations
ofDurkheim's
political arenowhere
thought more clear than when
putin
theperspective
oftwentieth
centurytotalitarianism.
(Richter
i960: I99, 204)
The virtuesof theDivision
oflabourmustbe foundelsewhere. it
Negatively,
providedarguments againstutilitarianism.
Positively, it was thefirstsubstantial
statementof theview thatvalues,beliefsand aspirations werenot randomly
distributed
throughout the population,nor diffused independently fromone
to another,
society nordirectly
derived froma commonhumanity. Rather,
they
wereto a significant
degreesharedby members of a society by reasonoftheir
membership. The formand contentof thesecommonvalueswerelikewise
connected withtheformsof organisation of thesociety, so thata changein
wasfollowed,
organisation soonerorlater,bya changeinvalues,andviceversa.
We takeallthisso muchforgranted thatwe tendtoforget whereitcamefrom.
NOTES
IReferencesto Durkheim's own writings areindicated as shown:
DOL Thedivision oflaborinsociety.
Simpson,G. (trans.).Glencoe,Ill.: The FreePress,I947.
Rules Therulesofsociological
method.Solovay,S. A., & J. H. Mueller(trans.).Chicago:
ChicagoU.P., I938
I953 Sociologyandphilosophy.Pocock,D. F. (trans.).London:Cohen& West.
2Quoted withacknowledgments to theauthorand thepublishers, MessrsFaber& Faber.
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Benoit-Smullyan, Emile I948. The sociologismof Emile Durkheimand his school.In An
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