According to eighteenth-century philosopher Immanuel Kant, human beings have vastly greater

moral value than the world's flora or inhuman fauna due to man's autonomous nature and ability
to act according to reason. However, this superiority does not entitle mankind to mistreat beasts
for mere sport or pleasure, as this cruelty fosters similar abuse of one's fellow man in violation of
the categorical imperative. Furthermore, while no direct obligation to animals exists in Kant's
philosophy, should their acts help achieve human ends, it becomes our duty to cultivate their
well-being and, by proxy, aid human goals in keeping with the categorical imperative. To further
elaborate on Kant's stance on the natural world's moral standing, we will begin by examining his
distinction between autonomous men and non-autonomous beasts.

The critical distinction that makes animals and flora morally lesser than men is their unthinking
nature. Kant articulates his stance in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, writing that
"morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in himself... Thus
morality, and humanity as capable of it, is that which alone has dignity." This line of thought
means that to be moral, a creature must act rationally. Animals, plants, and inanimates, which
are unable to operate according to higher reason as man does, act instead according to base
instinct. This enslavement to passion means that beasts lack free will, and, as such, the
categorical imperative cannot be applied to them. Thus, flora and fauna are incapable of acting
morally. Mankind, on the other hand, is capable of higher reasoning and treating other rational
beings with respect according to the categorical imperative. This distinction between man's
rationality and beast's unconscious instinct is the distinction between autonomy and non-
autonomy. This contrast in independence renders animals and flora subservient to mankind and a
means to our ends.

This subservience, however, does not justify pointless cruelty to animals. To bring harm to
animals needlessly leads to cruelty to humankind, in violation of the categorical imperative. Kant
rationalizes this stance in his Lectures on Ethics, saying, "He who is cruel to animals becomes
hard also in his dealings with men." As animals remain a means to an end, one's treatment of
them does not independently render the cruelty immoral. Instead, the brutality is evil because
bestial mistreatment is an inhuman act and "damages in himself that humanity which it is his
duty to show mankind." Therefore, to act cruelly toward animals strips one of their humanity,
leading to the mistreatment of other humans in violation of the categorical imperative.

However, Kant does not totally prohibit animal cruelty. Instead, he makes an exception for
cruelty in the pursuit of human ends. Specifically, he identifies vivisectionists' ***(scientific
researchers who experiment on animals rather than people) mistreatment of beasts, saying that
"their aim is praiseworthy, and they can justify their cruelty, since animals must be regarded as
man's instruments." Thus, he clarifies that the being relevant to the categorical imperative is the
human rather than the beast. This clarification means that one's treatment of animals is not moral
or immoral because of the pain of the animals, to whom we have no duty as they are incapable of
judgment. Instead, our treatment of beasts can be judged by their broader impact on mankind and
its effect on one's humanity. Correspondingly, if a creature's act equates to human success in
achieving his ends, we are obligated to allow that creature to prosper and, by proxy, cultivate the
flourishing of our fellow man.

In conclusion, Kant's stance on the moral standing, or lack thereof, of flora, fauna, and inorganic
things compared to mankind revolves around the nature of autonomy. While men are
autonomous and act according to their reason, beasts are slaves to instinct and desire and thus
become instruments to achieve man's ends. However, while justified cruelty to achieve human
ends is acceptable, brutality against animals for sport is unjust, as it strips man of his humanity
and can obstruct the aims of others in violation of the categorical imperative.

This argument is so well made that, in reviewing its total contents, Kant makes his theory almost
inarguable. The only way to contest his thesis is to condition moral worth exclusively on
existence. Flora and fauna, which lack reason and higher thought, can only be rendered equal to
humanity if behavior and reason do not determine their moral value. Such an argument would
imply the uprooting of all morality, the demolishing of all right and wrong, and one this author
cannot support.