Group Decision and Negotiation 8: 89–108, 1999

DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 89

© 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands

Dimensions of International Negotiation: A Test of

Iklé’s Typology1
DANIEL DRUCKMAN, JENNIFER MARTIN, SUSAN ALLEN NAN AND DIMOSTENIS YAGCIOGLU
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030-4444, USA

Abstract

Results from statistical analyses of 30 cases of international negotiations supported Iklé’s

typology of negotiating objectives. The cases, sampled from the collection of Pew Case
Studies in International Affairs, were distinguished in terms of five objectives: innovation,
redistribution, extension, normalization, and side effects. In addition, a sixth objective
was identified: negotiations concerning the creation of multilateral regimes. These cases
focused on issues that surfaced on the international agenda during the 1980s. Each type
had a relatively distinct profile based on such aspects of negotiation as the number of
parties and issues, bargaining strategies, media exposure, stability of the process, and
types of outcomes. The methodology contributes to the state-of-the art in comparative
analysis and the results have implications for the development of middle-range theories
of negotiation. They also contribute to practice, by enabling negotiators to evaluate future
cases in terms of knowledge about past cases.

Key words: comparative analysis, international negotiations, multidimensional scaling, negotiating objectives,
Pew case studies, profiles of negotiation

Students of international negotiation search for ways to organize the diversity of

negotiations that occur among nations and other international actors. A number of
conceptual frameworks have gained popularity as organizing devices for depicting the
common elements of negotiation. These elements have become part of the lexicon of the
field and even appear in popular writings about negotiation. However, despite their apparent
influence on thinking about negotiation, these frameworks have not been subjected to
empirical evaluation. A question of interest is whether the frameworks can be used to
distinguish among a variety of cases in terms of their similarities and dissimilarities. An
attempt in made in this article to address this issue.
Writing about labor negotiations, Walton and McKersie (1965) distinguished among
four systems of activities, distributive bargaining, integrative bargaining, attitudinal
structuring, and intraorganizational bargaining. These systems refer to overlapping
subprocesses set in motion by negotiators’ objectives and aspects of the situation. Writing
about international negotiations, Iklé (1964) distinguished among five objectives, namely,
extension, normalization, redistribution, innovation, and side effects. Rather than overlapping
subprocesses, these objectives are conceived of as distinct types with corresponding issues
90 DRUCKMAN, MARTIN, NAN, YAGCIOGLU

and processes. Iklé’s redistribution and innovation objectives are similar to Walton and
McKersie’s distributive and integrative bargaining subprocesses. This distinction is the
basis for current debates about the relative importance of competitive bargaining and
cooperative problem-solving processes in negotiation (e.g. Bartos 1995; Hopmann 1995).
If, as Iklé contends, international negotiations can be distinguished in terms of his
typology, then it should be possible to demonstrate distinct patterns of characteristics for
each of the objectives. For example, a distinct pattern would show that redistribution
negotiations are characterized by bargaining processes and compromise outcomes while
innovation negotiations consist of problem-solving processes and integrative outcomes.
However, if, as Walton and McKersie contend, most negotiations consist of overlapping
subprocesses, then the patterns may not be distinct but rather reflect differences among
cases in their emphasis on bargaining or problem-solving processes. (A similar argument is
made more recently by Thompson 1998.) By coding a variety of different types of cases in
terms of their characteristics, this study also provides evidence that addresses this distinction.
Drawing on research in social psychology, Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965) developed an
elaborate framework that distinguishes among antecedent factors (goals and background
factors), concurrent factors (processes and conditions) and consequences (outcomes).
By identifying these elements, their framework provides a more differentiated conception
of negotiation than described by both Walton and McKersie and Iklé. (See also Randolph
1966, for a similar framework.) It also identifies the specific aspects of the negotiation
influenced by Walton and McKersie’s subprocesses and by Iklé’s objectives. Further, the
framework has been used in several ways: for example, to organize reviews of research
literature (Druckman 1973, 1977; Weiss 1994), to structure analyses of cases (Ramberg
1978; Weiss 1997), to guide the design of experimental simulations (Bonham 1971;
Druckman 1993a; Graham et al. 1994), and to provide dimensions for diagnosing
negotiating flexibility (Druckman 1993b). In this paper, we provide another application
of the Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965) framework. Its elements are used as variables for
distinguishing among diverse cases of international negotiation.
Iklé’s (1964) objectives of negotiation were distinguished in terms of issues, processes,
conditions, and outcomes, considered also as elements of Sawyer and Guetzkow’s (1965)
framework. An attempt to connect these typologies was made by Druckman (1973). He
proposed three models. If the objective is redistribution (model I), the key processes are
bargaining and the use of influence tactics. These processes lead to compromises or
asymmetrical outcomes and are affected primarily by the conditions of negotiation such
as time pressure, incentives, the visibility of the talks, and the opposing negotiator’s
concession pattern. If the objective is innovation (model II), the process consists primarily
of debate, communication, and problem solving. Negotiators consider an expanded range
of possible outcomes and the process is influenced primarily by background factors such
as culture, cognitive structures, and ideology. The third model is mixed in the sense of
including both the conflicting interests emphasized in the first model and the cooperative
problem-solving processes made salient in the second. As a depiction of Iklé’s
normalization and extension negotiations, this model highlights both bargaining and
debating processes leading to a range of possible outcomes limited only by the present
(in the case of normalization) or previous (in the case of extension) situation. These
DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 91

processes are influenced by both the conditions of the negotiation and by the backgrounds
of the negotiators. These models suggest but do not demonstrate that Iklé’s types of
negotiating objectives can be distinguished in terms of the kinds of processes, conditions,
and outcomes identified in Sawyer and Guetzkow’s framework. This study provides an
empirical demonstration of these hypothesized relationships.
This study builds on the methodological approach for comparative analysis developed
by Druckman (1997) and Chasek (1997) in an earlier issue of this Journal. Using
multidimensional scaling (MDS) techniques, Druckman performed three sets of analyses
based on secondary sources (12 cases), interviews with delegates (23 cases), and primary
descriptions of cases from the Johns Hopkins’ Foreign Policy Institute series (15 cases).
Results of the scaling analyses showed that the cases could be organized along such
dimensions as types of issues discussed, size of the negotiation, and complexity of the
issues. Chasek’s analysis of eleven cases of multilateral environmental negotiations
distinguished among those cases in terms of whether the process was deductive (proceeding
from goals or formulae to details) or inductive (agreements drafted from proposals) and
the role of the secretariat as either central or peripheral to the process of drafting agreements.
The analysis reported in this paper differs from the earlier analyses in terms of approach
or design and types of cases. An attempt is made to test an hypothesis that cases can be
distinguished in terms of Iklé’s typology. Types of negotiation were defined prior to the
coding and analysis of the coded variables. The cases were drawn from a universe of
cases that ranged widely in terms of issue-types and regions. The analysis is done in three
parts: first, a common set of elements were coded for each of the 30 cases in the sample
– for example, number and type of issues, extent to which the process consists of
bargaining, type of agreement reached; second, the set of coded variables provided data
for computing correlations among the cases, and, third, the correlation matrix was scaled
to discover possible dimensions as well as to identify clusters of cases with common
characteristics. Details on procedures are discussed in the next section.
The paper is organized into three parts. Methods are described in several sections:
First, the universe and sample of cases used in the analysis are described. Second, the
way the cases are categorized in terms of their objectives are illustrated. Third, the coding
procedures are described. And, fourth, the analysis procedures are discussed. Then, the
results are presented in terms of the patterns obtained from the scaling, cluster, and
discriminant analyses as well correlations among the variables across the cases. Finally,
the results are discussed in terms of both theoretical and practical implications.

Methods

The cases

Analyses were performed on 30 cases from the Pew Case Studies in International Affairs
(see Table 1 for a listing). These cases were drawn randomly within clusters from a universe
of 176 case studies listed in the 1993 catalog.2 (The sample consisted of 17% of the
completed case studies.) The cluster sampling method was designed to increase the
92 DRUCKMAN, MARTIN, NAN, YAGCIOGLU

representativeness of the sample, at least in terms of region and type of issue. The sampled
cases are distributed almost equally across the regions of the world: Africa (4), the
Americas (7), Asia (6), Europe (4), the Middle East (5), and other (5). The sampling of
issue-types was proportionate to the distribution in the universe of cases: 16 trade or
economic cases, 9 negotiations on security issues, 4 on environmental issues, and one
case on hostage negotiations that combines several of these categories. (The ratio of 61
trade to 37 security cases in the population is comparable to the 16:9 ratio of cases in the
sample). All the cases are prepared in a common format. Ranging in length from 10–15
printed pages, each case consists of four major sections: background information on the
actors, issues, and context; a description of the unfolding course of the negotiation; an
analysis of the negotiation process and outcome, and teaching notes which include
questions for discussion. All the cases are peer-reviewed before publication. These cases
were chosen for use in this study for several reasons. One is that they are coherently and
uniformly organized, concise, and readable. Another is that many of them use such primary
sources as interviews with the participants as the bases for description and analysis. A
third is that the series is the largest pool of case studies in international negotiations,
showing considerable diversity in topic and geographical region. And, a fourth reason is
that they are more descriptive than analytic. As pedagogical tools, they allow for varied
interpretations. As material for research, they provide information that is useful for coding
in terms of an investigator’s conceptual framework.

Categorizing the cases by objectives

The sampled cases were organized in terms of Iklé’s five objectives (see Table 1). In
order to insure that these judgments did not influence the coding decisions, they were
made by knowledgeable non-coders (the first author and members of his graduate class
on negotiation processes) prior to, and independent of, the coding process. In order to
enhance reliability, the final decisions, based on summaries of the cases, were a consensus
reached by at least two persons (the first author and a class member familiar with Iklé’s
categories and many the Pew case studies). The cases were distributed among the
categories as follows: innovation cases (8), normalization (5), redistribution (10),
extension (5), and side effects (2).
Each of Iklé’s objectives describes a type of negotiation with distinct characteristics
regarding subject matter, processes, and possible outcomes. Negotiation for the purpose
of redistribution emphasizes the conflicting interests of the parties. One party, referred
to as the offensive side, attempts to achieve gains by demanding concessions from the
defensive (and usually less powerful) party. Threats and warnings are frequently used to
coerce the defensive party into complying with the offensive party’s demands. The classic
illustration is the Munich agreement and its sequel in 1939. The Pew case on the French
Withdrawal from NATO (Q in Table 1) is another example. Responding defensively, the
United States accommodated the French government’s threat to withdraw their
Mediterranean fleet from NATO. As a result, disagreements between them over military-
strategic planning were resolved in favor of France’s demands.
DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 93

Table 1. Cases categorized according to negotiation types

Innovation negotiations
Aa (031-FPI)b The Role of the Secretariat in Multilateral Negotiations: Maurice Strong \& the UN
Environmental Conference
E (214-96)c Sustainable Development or Environmental Imperialism? Guinea- Bissau \&
Hazardous Waste Trade
K (423-95-R) Negotiating an International Regime to Mine the Deep Seabed
P (154-93-N) The Ivory Trade
S (335-93-R) Anglo-American Negotiations on Sharing Atomic Secrets, Dec. 1942-July 1943
Y (137-88-O) The Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and the Cultural Industries
Z (142-93-R) The US-Canadian Free Trade Negotiations: The Canadian Dilemma
AA (326-88-O) The Russo-Japanese Alliance, 1916

Redistribution negotiations
D (133-92-R) Political Crisis and Debt Negotiations: The Case of the Philippines, 1983–86
G (129-92-R) Korean Joggers
H (135-88-O) Meeting the Japanese Challenge, 1969–71
I (139-95-R) The US-Japanese Semiconductor Problem
O (104-93-R) Holding Over Tokyo: US-Japanese Air Service Negotiations
Q (301-95-R) Negotiations on the French Withdrawal from NATO
T (452-93-N) US-Canadian Negotiations for Acid Rain Controls
V (118-92-R) The 1980 Grain Embargo Negotiations: The US, Argentina, and the Soviet Union
X (333-94-R) Negotiating with Terrorists: TWA Flight 847
BB (213-95-R) The IMF Structural Adjustment Program for Zambia’s Agricultural Sector
Extension negotiations
B (203-88-O) Multilateral Debt Negotiations in the 41st General Assembly of the UN
C (103-93-R) The Algerian Gas Negotiations
F (121-93-R) US-European Negotiations to Clarify the GATT Aircraft Agreement
R (134-93-R) Negotiating a Minerals Regime for Antarctica, 1981–88
U (131-88-O) Negotiating the 1988 US-Soviet Long-Term Agreement on Grain Purchase

Side-effects negotiations
W (126-92-R) The Suez Crisis, 1956
DD (349-92-N) Diplomacy During the Persian Gulf War

Normalization negotiations
J (312-92-R) The May 1983 Agreement over Lebanon
L (327-88-O) The US and Nicaragua: Anatomy of a Failed Negotiation for Regime Change, 1977–
79
M (348-93-R) The Iranian Hostage Negotiations, Nov. 1979–Jan. 1981
N (309-89-O) Contadora: The Limits of Negotiations
CC (161-94-N) Hazardous Waste Trade, North and South: The Case of Italy and Koko, Nigeria
a
Letters used for the cases in Figure 1;
b
Number of case in the Johns Hopkins Univ. Foreign Policy Institute Series;
c
Number of case in the catalog of the Pew Case Studies in International Affairs.

Innovation talks are intended to create new relationships or other arrangements of

mutual interest between the parties. One party may be the initiator while the others go
along to avoid being excluded from an agreement. Rather than to use coercive tactics, the
initiator attempts to convince the others that there are important benefits to be gained
94 DRUCKMAN, MARTIN, NAN, YAGCIOGLU

from the proposed new arrangements. Examples include the talks over a nuclear test ban
and the many negotiations to establish new international agencies such as the Atomic
Energy Commission (e.g., S in Table 1), economic organizations such as the European
Union (also cases Y and Z), security alliances (cases S and AA), or regimes (cases F and
K). Many environmental negotiations are also examples. The 1988 talks involving the
government of Guinea-Bissau and an international waste trader (case E) was an attempt to
seek a new arrangement that would benefit both parties. Although the parties were very
close to reaching an agreement, the negotiations failed due to concerns over the
environmental impact of the proposed arrangement.
Extension negotiations are intended to continue or renew agreements previously reached.
The prior agreements exert a strong influence on these negotiations by framing the issues,
setting precedents, and prescribing procedures. Examples are renewing base-rights and status-
of-forces agreements between allies as well as cultural exchange provisions. The Algerian
Gas talks (case C) is typical of this type of negotiation. A series of talks between Algeria
and its customers (the U.S., France, Spain, Belgium, and Italy) during the early 1980s were
intended to meet Algeria’s demands for a new and higher price base for natural gas. Each
negotiation was influenced by the conditions and language of previous agreements. Even
during impasses, temporary extensions were negotiated to continue uninterrupted deliveries.
Although the eventual agreement consisted of a price rise favoring Algeria, the form and
substance of the contracts were very similar to the previous agreements.
Attempts made by governments to normalize their relations occur after wars or a
period of hostility. These talks are influenced by the situation that exists at the time of
the negotiation. Governments often use cease-fire talks to strengthen their military position
in preparation for another offensive. They may, on the other hand, negotiate peace
agreements that end the fighting, because the parties have exhausted their resources, the
stronger party in effect dictates the terms of surrender, or a powerful third party intervenes.
The case of the May 1983 Agreement over Lebanon (J) is a good example. Responding to
pressures from the United States and to domestic pressures (especially in Israel), the
Israeli and Lebanese governments supported a withdrawal of foreign troops from its soil.
By doing so, they took a step closer to normalizing their relationship.
Sometimes governments enter negotiations for purposes other than reaching an agreement.
Side effects include such benefits as maintaining contact, obtaining information, propaganda,
or impacts of third parties. An interesting, if extreme, example is the talks between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact over reducing conventional forces in Europe. Instead of achieving the purported
goal of reducing forces, the 13-year talks, known as MBFR, served the actual purpose of
preventing (or postponing) unilateral reductions from being taken by either side. The case of
Diplomacy During the Persian Gulf War (DD) is another example. Although both the U.S.-
led coalition and Iraq were willing to negotiate, both were reluctant to reach an agreement.
Side effects stemming from negotiating included Iraq’s desire to bide time in the hope that
the coalition would lose its cohesiveness and the coalition’s (particularly the U.S.) desire
to punish Hussein by destroying Iraq’s economic and military infrastructure. To accomplish
their goals, the coalition needed to shape public opinion by making it evident that a
negotiated solution was not possible. Thus, as described by the author of this case, both
sides used strategies that would prolong the talks and ultimately lead to an impasse.
DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 95

Coding the cases

The 30 cases were divided randomly into four roughly equal sub-sets. Each set was assigned
(also on a random basis) to one of four coders.3 The sixteen coding categories, shown in
Table 2, are organized according to aspects of negotiation highlighted in Sawyer and
Guetzkow’s (1965) framework: Parties (number, relative power, length and type of
relationship, delegation divisions and status), issues (number, type), process (length, types
of exchanges, frequency of impasses), conditions (time pressure, media coverage, political
changes), and outcomes (comprehensiveness and type of agreements). In addition, these
particular variables were chosen because information was available within the case
descriptions. These were the variables that formed the basis for the statistical analyses
discussed below. Less information was available about such conditions as information
about the other side’s positions and values, stresses and tensions, and such processes as
concession rates or (in many of the cases) a prenegotiation process. The cases also provided
limited discussion about cultural factors.
In order to insure reliable judgments, an attempt was made to define the coding
categories as precisely as possible. For example, with regard to delegation status, coders
were instructed to use “high” for ambassadorial or higher levels, “medium” for consuls
from embassies, “low” for attaches, and “asymmetrical” when the negotiating delegations
differ in status. On the type of relationship, coders were instructed to use “friendly” for
allies (or when antagonisms are limited to the issues under discussion), “neutral” for no
significant contact or when relationships are not clearly either friendly or unfriendly, and
“unfriendly” for relatively long-term antagonisms that exist in addition to the issues on
the table. Regarding changes in the political context, coders were instructed to include
government change or loss of support, initiation of war, revolution, or natural disasters as
indicators of change. When judging outcomes, coders were told not to consider
implementation. They were also instructed to consider statements made by the parties
about satisfaction with the agreements. Satisfaction was considered in evaluating the
parties’ relative benefits from an agreement.
A smaller sample of the cases was used to assess the extent to which coders, working
independently, agreed on their judgments. Although high levels of agreement (above 90%)
were obtained for most categories, a few resulted in less than 80% agreement. To raise
the level of agreement, we developed more precise definitions of the variables and the
choices. The revised definitions led to over 90% agreement for all of the categories.
Upon completion of the reliability study, the coding of the sampled cases began.

Analysis procedures

The analysis strategy consisted of using multiple statistical techniques in a planned

sequence. All of the techniques ask the diagnostic questions: How alike are the cases?,
and can they be distinguished in terms of Iklé’s negotiation types? Two of the techniques
were computed directly on the coded data – correlations and discriminant analysis.
Three other techniques were derivative in the sense of being computed on the
96 DRUCKMAN, MARTIN, NAN, YAGCIOGLU

correlations (multidimensional scaling) or on the locations of the cases in the obtained

multidimensional space (significance tests, cluster analysis).
We began by computing correlations among the 30 cases across the 16 coded variables.4
The correlation coefficient is used as an indicator of similarity between the profiles of

Table 2. Coding categories

PARTIES TIMING OF NEGOTIATION PROCESS

Number of parties Time pressures
1. bilateral 1. firm deadline
2. small (3 or 4) 2. not firm deadline
3. large (5 or more) 3. no time limits

Relative power of the parties Length of negotiations

1. symmetrical 1. days
2. somewhat asymmetrical 2. months
3. very asymmetrical 3. years

Relationship among the parties NEGOTIATION PROCESS

1. short-term Negotiation process primarily
2. long-term 1. hard bargaining
2. bargaining
Relationship among the parties 3. mixed
1. friendly 4. problem solving
2. neutral
3. unfriendly Breakdowns in negotiation
1. frequent (more than 2) and/or intense
Significant intra-party disagreement 2. infrequent (1 or 2) and/or less intense
1. symmetrical (all parties have or don’t have 3. never
internal constituency disagreement)
2. asymmetrical (some parties have and some NEGOTIATION ENVIRONMENT
don’t have internal constituency disagreement) Exposure to mass media
1. high – constant, press releases after each round
Delegation status 2. medium – outcome coverage
1. high – ambassadorial level 3. low-little notice
2. medium
3. low Changes in political context
4. asymmetrical between parties 1. yes
2. no
ISSUES
Number of issues OUTCOMES
1. many (16 +) Agreements reached
2. moderate (9–15) 1. comprehensive (all issued resolved)
3. few (1–8) 2. partial (some issues)
3. no agreements
Type of Issues
1. trade/economic Type of outcome
2. security 1. symmetrical benefits, compromise
3. environment 2. asymmetrical benefits, capitulation
4. other 3. enlarged joint benefits/integrative
5. mixed 4. impasse
DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 97

two cases. The 30 × 30 matrix of correlations was then used as data for a multidimensional
scaling (MDS) procedure. The technique searches for dimensions that can organize diverse
cases in terms of their similarities and dissimilarities: Cases that are close to each other,
forming clusters in the 2 or more dimensional space, have similar profiles on the 16
coded variables; a measure of goodness-of-fit used as a guide for dimensionality is referred
to as “stress.” (For details on MDS, including the measure of stress, see Kruskal and
Wish 1990).5
Significance tests and clustering techniques were then used for hypothesis testing.
The distances between the locations of the cases in the MDS space were evaluated by the
nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance and multiple comparisons
among the various pairs of groups. The question asked is whether the size of the distances
between the MDS clusters are significant. Distances were also evaluated by a K-means
cluster analysis. The technique is similar to performing a one-way analysis of variance
where the groups are unknown and the largest F-value (maximizing between- relative to
within-cluster variation) is sought by reassigning members to each group (Wilkinson
1987).The goal was to identify homogeneous categories when these categories are
unknown prior to the analysis. The question asked is whether the cases are combined into
clusters that distinguish among Iklé’s types of negotiation. (See Norusis 1994, for a
discussion of this technique).
An alternative to cluster analysis when category membership (Iklé’s objectives) is
known a priori is discriminant analysis. An advantage of this technique is that it does not
depend on the scaled locations of the cases. It is computed on the coded variables and, as
such, is also an alternative diagnostic procedure to MDS. The question asked is whether
the coded profiles can be sorted in terms of the categories of negotiating objectives.
This question is addressed with the classification function of the discriminant analysis
program: It calculates probabilities of category membership based only on the profiles
of coded data; each case is assigned to the category with the highest probability and the
classifications are compared to actual category membership for assessing accuracy of
the postdiction. (See Klecka 1980, for a discussion of this technique).
Finally, correlations were computed among the 16 variables across the 30 cases. This
analysis revealed relationships between the various parts of the framework – for example,
between process and outcome, issues and process, conditions and outcome. It is intended
to contribute further to an understanding of the profiles by ascertaining why certain
processes (e.g., bargaining) and conditions (e.g., media exposure) occur together for
certain types of negotiations (e.g., redistribution talks).

Results

The results of the scaling analysis are shown in Figure 1. A two-dimension solution was
selected. Our preference for this configuration is based on the criterion of interpretability.
Although added dimensions reduced stress or fit to 18% for the three-dimension solution
and to 9% for a four-dimension solution, these solutions were very difficult to interpret.
(The lower the stress, the better the fit.) Our preference for interpretability, a practical
98 DRUCKMAN, MARTIN, NAN, YAGCIOGLU

Figure 1. Scaling of the cases by type of negotiation: Extension cases are C, R, and U; Multilateral regime cases
are A, B, F, and K; Normalization cases are J, L, M, N, and CC.

criterion, over reduced stress, a theoretical criterion, is supported by Kruskal and Wish:
“Since it is generally easier to work with a two-dimensional configuration than with those
involving more dimensions, ease of use considerations are also important for decisions
about dimensionality” (1990: 58). Further, our use of MDS is primarily to display clusters
as a basis for further hypothesis-testing. Again, following Kruskal and Wish: “For example,
when an MDS configuration is desired primarily as the foundation on which to display
clustering results, then a two-dimensional configuration is far more useful than one
involving three or more dimensions . . . [i]t is not useful to examine only a configuration
with so many dimensions that you cannot comprehend it” (1990: 58). Thus, the discussion
and analysis to follow concentrates on the two dimensions shown in Figure 1.
Moving along the horizontal axis, from west to east, it is apparent that the cases cluster
in terms of Iklé’s categories. The six cases located furthest west are all innovation
negotiations: for example, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade talks, the Anglo-American talks
on sharing atomic secrets, and the Russo-Japanese alliance of 1916. The nine cases
clustered to the east of the innovation talks are all redistribution negotiations: for example,
the Korean Joggers, the Philippine debt negotiations, and the U.S. Japan semiconductor
problem. To the south are the three cases of extension talks, including the Algerian gas
negotiations and the U.S.-Soviet long-term agreement on grain purchases.
Just to the east are five multilateral cases of talks about international regimes (a new
category not in Iklé’s scheme): for example, negotiating an international regime to mine
the deep sea-bed and the multilateral debt negotiations in the General Assembly. And,
furthest to the east are the five cases of normalization talks (e.g., the Contadora negotiations
and the May 1983 agreement over Lebanon) and the two side-effects negotiations
(diplomacy during the Persian Gulf War and the 1954 Suez crisis). Only the 1980 Grain
Embargo negotiations between the U.S., Argentina, and the Soviet Union (case V in Figure
1) is an outlier. As a redistribution negotiation, it is located closer to the multilateral
regime cluster than to the redistribution cases.
DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 99

These results support the hypothesis that cases of international negotiation can be
distinguished in terms of Iklé’s objectives. However, the set of cases referred to as
multilateral regime talks does not correspond to any of his categories. Issues concerning
the establishment of economic, security, and environmental regimes became a basis for
large conferences in the 1980s and 1990s, two decades after Iklé published his book (see
Krasner 1983). Like the other types of negotiation, this type has a distinct profile of
characteristics to be discussed below. It is also used as a category in the statistical analyses
to follow.
The labeling of the horizontal dimension, going from innovation in the west to
normalization-side effect cases in the east is less clear than the labeling of the clusters.
Interestingly, however, the distinction between cases located along the vertical dimension,
from north to south, is relatively clear. Those in the northern quadrants are characterized
primarily by friendly or unfriendly relationships, many issues, frequent breakdowns, high
exposure to the media, frequent changes in the political context, and a variety of types of
outcomes. The cases located in the southern quadrants are characterized by the opposite
features: neutral relationships, relatively few issues, infrequent impasses, moderate
exposure, few changes in the context, and compromise outcomes. These distinguishing
features suggest a dimension going from more complex or difficult to less complex or
easier negotiations. This dimension is independent of the negotiation types distinguished
along the west to east axis.
By ranking the coordinates of all the cases on the west to east dimension, it is possible
to ascertain the extent to which the distances among the clusters are significant. Results
of a Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance show a significant difference among
four clusters, H = 22.48, 3 df, p < .001.6 Multiple comparisons revealed that the distances
(average rank of locations) between the innovation and regime cases (average rank
difference of 15.1), the innovation and normalization/side effect cases (average rank
difference of 20.6), and the redistribution and normalization/side effect cases (average
rank difference of 12.1) were significant. The difference between innovation and
redistribution (8.5) was close to borderline significance (a difference equal to or larger
than 8.7 needed). The differences between the average locations of the other adjacent
clusters, redistribution vs. regimes (6.7) and regimes vs. normalization (5.5), were not
large enough to be significant.
The K-means cluster analysis revealed three clusters. The first consisted of multilateral
regime and normalization cases. The second consisted of innovation cases and the third
cluster included cases whose objective was redistribution. The results of this analysis
highlights the distinction between innovation and redistribution cases as well as the
similarity between regimes and normalization cases. Interestingly, the redistribution cases
were also distinct from their adjacent regimes cluster. Although these cases are adjacent
to both innovation and regimes cases (see Figure 1), this analysis shows that they are
sufficiently distinct not to be combined with them.
Two discriminant analyses were performed. One consisted of using the 16 coded
variables to discriminate among the known categories. This is a ratio of 1.7 (27 cases) to
1 (16 variables). Classification results showed that all 27 cases were categorized
accurately. Another analysis consisted of using the averages for each of the six types of
100 DRUCKMAN, MARTIN, NAN, YAGCIOGLU

Table 3. Classification results

Predicted group membership

Actual Innovation Redistribution Multilateral Normalization Number of cases

group regime
membership

Innovation 5 1 0 0 6

Redistribution 1 8 0 1 10

Multilateral 0 1 4 0 5

Normalization 0 2 0 4 6
6 12 4 5 27

% of cases correctly classified: 78%.

variables: parties, issues, timing, processes, conditions, and outcomes (see Table 2). This
produced a ratio of 4.5 (27 cases) to 1 (6 variables). Although the coded data are aggregated
for this analysis, the larger ratio of cases to variables suggests that the solution is likely
to be more stable than the one based on the smaller ratio. Classification results shown in
Table 3 indicate that 78% of the cases (21 of 27) are categorized accurately. Four of the
six misclassifications were in the redistribution category; one of these redistribution
cases (V) was an outlier. These results bolster the findings of the earlier analyses, indicating
that the sampled cases are clearly distinguished in terms of Iklé’s categories of negotiating
objectives.
Profiles of variables for each of the clusters are shown in Table 4. This table identifies
the specific similarities and differences among the clusters. For example, multilateral
regime talks, the new category, involve a large number of parties, deal with many issues,
take a long time to reach an agreement, consist of mixed (problem solving and bargaining)
processes but usually conclude with a compromise outcome, and are not exposed to
media coverage. Interestingly, this profile contrasts with that shown for innovation
negotiations: a small number of parties, dealing with few issues, consisting of bargaining
processes but integrative or impasse outcomes, and only moderate media coverage of the
process. The coupling of mixed processes with compromise outcomes for regime talks
contrasts with bargaining leading to integrative or impasse outcomes for innovation talks.
Pressures on multilateral regime negotiators to reach agreement may cause them to settle
for available terms, which may be a compromise but may also often reflect the positions
of the toughest parties.
Differences in profiles are also found among the other types of negotiations. Talks
concerning normalization consist of bargaining over security issues and are characterized
by frequent breakdowns in a highly visible process that leads to impasses or compromise
outcomes. These talks are quite similar to the two side-effects negotiations (the Suez
crisis and diplomacy during the Gulf War) in the set of cases analyzed and, to a lesser
extent, to the regime talks. Their profile is, however, quite different from the others. All
 Table 4. Profiles of negotiation-type clusters

Typesa → Innovation Redistribution Extension Multilateral Side-Effects Normalization

Variables n=6 n = 10 n = 3b n=4 n = 2b n=5

DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION

↓ E,P,S,Y,AA D,G,H,I,O,Q,T,V,X,B C,R,U A,B,F,K W,DD J,L,M,N,CC

1. Number of
parties bilateralc large (5+) small (3–4) large (5+) large (5+) large (5+)
2. Relative power somewhat very somewhat somewhat.asym. somewhat asym.
of parties asymmetrical asymmetrical asymmetrical symmetrical & very asym.d & very asym.
3. Expected duration
of relationship
among the parties long-term long-term long-term long-term long-term long-term
4. Relationship neutral friendly neutral friendly unfriendly unfriendly
among the parties & neutral
5. Intra-party
disagreement symmetrical symmetrical symmetrical asymmetrical asymmetrical asymmetrical
6. Delegation asymmetrical high medium high high high
status b/w parties
7. Number of few (1–8) many (16+) moderate (9–15) many (16+) few (1–8) & many (16+)
issues many (16+)
8. Type of issues trade/economic trade/economic trade/economic trade/economic security security
9. Time firm deadline firm deadline firm deadline firm deadline
pressures & no firm deadline & no firm deadline no firm deadline no firm deadline & no firm deadline & no firm deadline
10. Length of years years years years years months &
negotiations years
11. Types of bargaining bargaining mixed mixed mixed & bargaining
process problem-solving
12. Breakdowns infrequent/ frequent/ frequent/ never never frequent/
in negs. less intense intense intense intense
13. Exposure of negs medium high high low high high
to mass media outcome coverage little notice
14. Significant changes
in political context no yes yes no yes yes
15. Agreements comprehensive comprehensive comprehensive partial agr. comprehensive partial agr. &
reached & partial agr. & partial agr. no agreement
16. Type of integrative agr. compromise asym. benefits compromise compromise impasse &
outcome & impasse capitulation & partial compromise
integrative agr.

101
a
For the number of cases (and the cases themselves) corresponding to each category, see Table 1;
b
Modal ratings are less meaningful in categories with less than four cases;
c
These are the modal ratings;
d
These are bi-modal ratings, i.e., equally frequent categories.
102 DRUCKMAN, MARTIN, NAN, YAGCIOGLU

the other types, including the regime talks, deal with trade or economic issues and consist
of parties whose relationship is friendly or neutral. Like normalization talks, negotiations
concerning redistribution are large, characterized by frequent breakdowns, media coverage,
and deal with many issues. Like innovation talks, extension negotiations are small, have
fewer issues on their agendas, are characterized by neutral relationships between the
parties, and result in comprehensive agreements. Like redistribution talks, extension
negotiations have frequent breakdowns during a process that is exposed to the media. The
extension negotiations can also be construed as a connection between the innovation and
redistribution clusters, on the one hand, and the regime and normalization-side effects
clusters on the other; these three cases are located in the center of the west-to-east
dimension and do not differ statistically from either set of clusters. Implications of these
patterns are discussed in the next section.
Correlations among the 16 variables, computed across the 30 cases, also show some
interesting relationships (see Table 5). The number of issues on the agenda was related
strongly to both media exposure and the nature of the relationship among the negotiating
parties. More issues were on the agenda of talks involving parties with long-term
relationships (r = –0.64) and in negotiations well covered by the media (r = 0.60).
Breakdowns or impasses occurred more frequently in negotiations covered by the media
(r = 0.77). And, hard bargaining tactics were characteristic of negotiations between parties
whose relationship was relatively short-term (r = 0.86). These correlations suggest a pattern
that corresponds to the contrasting profiles of two types of negotiations, normalization and
innovation talks. Parties in the normalization cases discussed many issues, were in long-
term relationships in talks well-covered by the media, and characterized by frequent impasses
leading either to partial or no agreements. In contrast, the innovation cases dealt with fewer
issues, were subjected to limited media coverage, and experienced few breakdowns in a
process that led either to integrative agreements or impasses (see Table 4).

Discussion

This study is a first attempt to subject Iklé’s taxonomy of international negotiation to an

empirical test. We found it to be a useful framework for organizing a sample of diverse
and complex cases. Statistically significant differences among the clusters, running from
west to east along the horizontal dimension in Figure 1, support the hypothesis that each
type of negotiation has a distinct profile of characteristics: only one case was an outlier,
the 1980 redistribution negotiation among the US, Argentina, and the Soviet Union over
a grain embargo. The scaling results were strongly supported by cluster and discriminant
analyses: more than three-quarters of the cases were accurately classified by type of
negotiation based only on the coded variables. These are encouraging results which, despite
some limitations, contribute both to further research and to practice. Those contributions
are discussed following an interpretation of the clusters.
In addition to Iklé’s categories, we discovered a sub-set of cases referred to as
multilateral negotiations for establishing international regimes. These cases focused on
issues that surfaced on the international agenda during the 1980s, two decades after Iklé’s
 DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION
Table 5. Correlations between variables

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

1. Number of parties
2. Relative power .50
3. Length of relationship .46 –.11
4. Type of relationship .36 .34 –.48
5. Intra-party disagreement .80 .02 .24 .53
6. Delegation status –.40 .07 –.22 .01 –.38
7. Number of issues –.07 .42 –.64 19 .00 .40
8. Type of issues .30 .09 –.66 .49 .34 –.64 .24
9. Time pressures .05 .24 –.05 .12 .02 –.25 –.06 –.15
10. Length of talks .12 –.35 .23 .00 .31 –.04 –.09 .23 .25
11. Type of process .19 –.31 .86 –.46 .11 –.36 –.35 .04 –.14 .10
12. Breakdowns .16 –.35 –.14 –.14 –.15 .14 .14 –.19 .13 .04 .17
13. Media exposure .28 –.38 .02 –.29 –.58 .19 .60 –.21 .39 –.02 .23 .77
14. Changes in context .02 –.44 –.52 .00 –.41 .54 .49 .26 –.38 .69 .09 .23 .22
15. Type of agreement .40 .37 .22 .36 .07 .26 .35 .03 .11 .01 –.13 –.22 .06 –.07
16. Symmetry of benefits .03 –.15 .26 –.08 .17 .14 .21 .07 –.20 .23 –.17 –.14 –.10 –.11 .39

Note: correlations are gamma coefficients.

103
104 DRUCKMAN, MARTIN, NAN, YAGCIOGLU

book appeared. They are distinguished from the other categories by their size (parties
and issues), symmetry in power among the parties, and stability as defined by infrequent
impasses or breakdowns (see Table 4). More generally, with regard to process, they take
the form of conference diplomacy characterized primarily by shifting issue coalitions.
With regard to outcomes, they seek to achieve principles and declarations that form the
basis for regimes that govern the course of relations among nations.
Although talks about international regimes are a relatively recent type of negotiation,
the four cases were initially placed in Iklé’s categories of innovation (A and K) and
extension (B and F). Two other cases were regarded as overlapping types: W as side
effects and normalization; R as extension and multilateral regimes. Case R, Negotiating a
Minerals Regime for Antarctica (1981–1988), illustrates overlapping objectives. The
twenty negotiating countries initially sought to build on the 1959 Antarctic Treaty by
adding agreements on regulating the exploitation of minerals in the continent. The talks
expanded to include such other issues as territorial claims and decision-making methods
on the environmental and economic implications of mineral activities. What began as an
extension negotiation evolved into a convention on a minerals regime. Due to the influence
of environmental groups in several of the countries, the convention was not ratified as a
treaty. However, a consensus did develop for an environmental protocol to the original
agreement, serving both to extend the 1959 treaty and to establish a minerals regime for
the region. Overlapping objectives may also produce overlapping processes and issues as
shown for the extension and multilateral regime talks in Table 4.
Most of the cases show the expected relationship among objectives (redistribution,
innovation), processes (bargaining or problem solving), and type of outcome (compromise
or integrative). For example, the redistribution cases consisted of bargaining leading to
compromise outcomes. However, there were exceptions. It was surprising to discover
that bargaining strategies were used in several of the innovation cases, leading to integrative
outcomes. This suggests that the relationship among these variables is not invariant across
cases. It suggests also that the types are overlapping subprocesses, reflecting differences
in emphasis on bargaining or problem-solving processes (Walton and McKersie 1965).
In fact, most negotiations combine both competitive and cooperative processes (Thompson
1998). The outcome that results may be due in large part to the emphasis placed on one or
another of these processes. The innovation cases were divided between integrative
outcomes and impasses. Of interest is the question about the conditions that led these
negotiators toward or away from discovering integrative agreements.
Yet a distinction can be made between the innovation and redistribution cases. Although
they are neighbors in the MDS space shown in Figure 1, they did not form a common
cluster and the average distance between them was close to being statistically significant.
Compared to the innovation cases, the redistribution talks resulted in more compromise
outcomes, had more frequent breakdowns, discussed more issues, consisted of more
parties, and had higher media exposure. These cases were closer to the extension
negotiations which also dealt mostly with a relatively large number of economic issues,
had frequent breakdowns, and were exposed to media coverage (see Table 4).
Although considerable variation was found among the types of negotiations – and this
variation defined the clusters shown in Figure 1 – there were three variables on which
DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 105

little variation occurred from one type to another. In most of the cases, the parties had
long-term relationships, negotiated over a period of years, and were represented by
relatively high-status delegations (see Table 4). These may be regarded as features of the
sort of complex, intergovernmental negotiations in our sample of cases. Whether the
talks dealt with trade or security issues or were aimed at redistributing resources or
constructing regimes, the delegates needed time to devise formulae and to deal with their
relationships in order to get an agreement. Where these concerns are less important as,
for example, in some domestic negotiations, the sampled cases are more likely to vary
on these features.
The clusters may be regarded as “islands” of theory about the negotiation process.
Guetzkow’s (1957) islands metaphor seems to capture the distinctions made among types
of negotiating objectives. These distinctions are a basis for developing middle-range
theories of negotiation. These theories could, however, be a step on the way toward a
more unified theory of negotiation. Progress toward that goal depends on the kind of
synthetic work that draws on similarities among the types of negotiation. Walton and
McKersie’s (1965) overlapping subprocesses of labor negotiations may be a good model
for linking the overlapping types of objectives in international negotiations. Building on
Guetzkow’s metaphor, the search is for organizing themes that will enable the “islands”
to expand and eventually form a “continent.”
More generally, the analyses contribute to the state-of-the-art in comparative analysis.
They demonstrate that secondary source material can be used as data to test hypotheses
derived from theories of negotiation. By coding a large number of case studies in terms
of a common framework, we created sufficient “replications” for a statistical analysis.
By coding them in terms of the processes and influences identified by that framework,
we were able to explore relationships among variables in a manner similar to experimental
analysis. In fact, the correlation between media coverage and breakdowns supports a
replicated experimental finding: more media coverage led to more impasses (see
Druckman and Druckman 1996). Further, the correlation between hard bargaining tactics
and short-term relationships supports findings and arguments suggesting the use of
problem-solving processes for developing long-term relationships (Bartos 1995;
Druckman et al. 1988; Hopmann 1995).
Yet, despite the contributions made by our results, the analyses have some limitations.
One is the limited sampling of cases: Only 17% of the Pew case studies were analyzed.
Another is the fact that the sample (as well as the population from which it was drawn)
consists primarily of cases in which the United States was either one of the parties or a
third party and, for this reason, are typically asymmetrical in terms of the power of the
delegations (an exception is the multilateral regime talks; see Table 4). A third limitation
is that the coding system emphasizes parties and process somewhat more than issues,
events, and context. These emphases reflect the predominant themes in the conceptual
literature and the variables explored in empirical studies on negotiation. And, although
the case studies are primarily descriptive, they also include the author’s interpretation of
events. Unlike the actual transcripts of discussions, the cases are presented, at least in
part, in terms of the authors’ conceptual perspective.7 Each of these limitations can be
addressed in further analyses: By increasing the size and characteristics of the sampled
106 DRUCKMAN, MARTIN, NAN, YAGCIOGLU

cases, by expanding or changing the coding categories, and by coding available unclassified
transcripts of negotiations.8
The approach taken in this study also has practical implications. For negotiators and
their support staffs, the framework provides a structure for thinking about the various
parts of a negotiation and how these may be related. The similarity assessments provide a
way of distinguishing among different types of negotiations in terms of their processes,
influences and outcomes. This enables them to compare and understand a present or future
negotiation in terms of a similar past case about which more is known. The profiles provide
a basis for projecting likely patterns of negotiating behavior in contemporaneous and
future cases, going beyond the strong postdictive results shown in Table 3.
Such analyses are similar to the way that Bloomfield and Beattie (1971) projected
patterns of violent international conflicts from systematized knowledge of many past
cases. For negotiation, this would consist of, for example, categorizing a new case as
redistribution and, then, projecting frequent impasses during a visible bargaining process
leading to a compromise outcome (see the profile in Table 4). In contrast, a negotiation
about establishing a new regime would be expected to have infrequent impasses during a
low-profile mixed bargaining and problem-solving process leading eventually (after many
sessions) to a compromise outcome. Further, the location of the regime cases in the
southern quadrants of Figure 1 indicate that they were relatively easy to resolve. The
redistribution cases, like those in the innovation and normalization clusters, span the
north to south quadrants, indicating that some were easier to resolve than others. A research
challenge is to further distinguish among cases within these long clusters. A practical
challenge is to devise approaches that would effectively resolve the frequent impasses
that occur in many of the cases.

Notes

1. This project was supported by the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University.
Thanks go to Kevin Clements for arranging for the support and to Peter Paraschos for providing the case
studies.
2. A case catalog can be obtained by writing to Peter E. Paraschos at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy,
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057-1052.
3. Thanks go to Toy Ping Tiara who served, along with the three junior authors, as a coder. All the coders had
completed a graduate course on negotiation, were familiar with the variables, and had practice experience
coding cases not in the study’s sample. They also participated in the reliability task which was completed
before the coding of the sampled cases began.
4. Because many of the variables are categorical rather than scaled in terms of ordinal or interval distinctions,
the gamma coefficient was calculated. (See Goodman and Kruskal 1954, for a description of this statistic).
5. The SYSTAT statistical package was used to compute the correlations, scaling, clustering, and discriminant
analyses. Interested readers can consult the manual by Wilkinson 1987.
6. Because of the small number of cases in the extension and side-effect clusters, these categories were not
included in the analysis. Case R (Minerals Regime for Antarctica), categorized a priori as belonging to the
extension category, was included in the regimes cluster for this analysis. Similarly, case W (The Suez Crisis)
was categorized as both side effects and normalization and included in the normalization cluster for this
analysis. (The shading around these cases in Figure 1 indicates overlapping categories.) Case V, the outlier,
was included with the other redistribution cases in the analysis. The total N for this analysis was 27, divided
DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 107

among the categories as follows: 6 (innovation), 10 (redistribution), 5 (regimes), and 6 (normalization).

7. The Pew cases are less interpretive than a number of alternative sources for case materials. One source, the
Johns Hopkins’ Foreign Policy Institute series, is based on a particular conceptual framework of staged
processes. Similarly, case studies reported in edited volumes usually follow the framework devised for the
volume or consist of empirical demonstrations of the authors’ conceptual approaches (e.g., Zartman 1995).
8. Indexed case materials for a number of declassified negotiations occurring during the 1940s and 1950s can be
found at the Library of Congress and at many university libraries under the subject heading of United States
Foreign Policy.

References

Bartos, O.J. (1995). “Modeling distributive and integrative negotiations.” The Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 542, 48–60.
Bloomfield, L.P., and R. Beattie. (1971). “Computers and policymaking: The CASCON experiment.” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 15, 33–46.
Bonham, G.M. (1971). “Simulating international disarmament negotiations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 15,
299–315.
Druckman, D. (1997). “Dimensions of international negotiations: Structures, processes, and outcomes.” Group
Decision and Negotiation 6, 395–420.
Druckman, D. (1993a). “The situational levers of negotiating flexibility.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, 236–
276.
Druckman, D. (1993b). “Statistical analysis for negotiation support.” Theory and Decision 34, 215–233.
Druckman, D. (ed.), (1977). Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspectives. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Druckman, D. (1973). Human Factors in International Negotiations: Social-Psychological Aspects of
International Conflict. Sage Professional Paper in International Studies 02-020. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Druckman, D., and J.N. Druckman. (1996). “Visibility and negotiating flexibility.” Journal of Social Psychology
136, 117–120.
Druckman, D., B.J. Broome, and S.H. Korper. (1988). “Value differences and conflict resolution: Facilitation or
delinking?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 32, 489–510.
Goodman, L.A., and W.H. Kruskal. (1954). “Measures of association for cross-classification.” Journal of the
American Statistical Association 49, 732–764.
Guetzkow, H. (1957). “Isolation and collaboration: A partial theory of inter-nation relations.” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 1, 48–68.
Hopmann, P.T. (1995). “Two paradigms of negotiation: Bargaining and problem solving.” The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science. 542, 24–47.
Iklé, F.C. (1964). How Nations Negotiate. New York: Harper & Row.
Krasner, S.D. (1983). International Regimes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Kruskal, J.B., and M. Wish. (1990). Multidimensional Scaling. Sage University Paper Series on Quantitative
Applications in the Social Sciences, 07-011. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Norusis, M. (1994). SPSS Professional Statistics, 6.1. Chicago: SPSS Inc.
Ramberg, B. (1978). The Seabeds Arms Control Negotiations: A Study of Multilateral Arms Control Conference
Diplomacy. Monograph Series in World Affairs, vol. 15, book 2. Denver CO: University of Denver.
Randolph, L. (1966). “A suggested model of international negotiation.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 10, 344–
353.
Sawyer, J., and H. Guetzkow. (1965). “Bargaining and negotiation in international negotiations.” in H.C. Kelman
(ed.), International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis. New York: Holt.
Thompson, L. (1998). The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Walton, R.E., and R.B. McKersie. (1965). A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: An Analysis of a Social
Interaction System. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Weiss, S.E. (1997). “Explaining outcomes of negotiation: Toward a grounded model for negotiations between
organizations.” Report 13–97, Schulich School of Business, York University, North York, Ontario, Canada.
108 DRUCKMAN, MARTIN, NAN, YAGCIOGLU

Wilkinson, L. (1987). SYSTAT: The System for Statistics. Evanston, IL: SYSTAT Inc.
Zartman, I.W. (ed.), (1995). Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution.

Daniel Druckman is professor of conflict resolution at the Institute for Conflict Analysis
and Resolution, George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia. He has been a research
scholar at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis near Vienna, Austria
and a principle study director at the National Research Council in Washington. He has
published widely and received the 1995 Otto Klineberg Intercultural and International
Relations Award for his work on nationalism. His earlier article on “Dimensions of
International Negotiations” appeared in vol. 6, no. 5 of this Journal.

Jennifer Martin will receive a doctoral degree in organizational psychology from George
Mason University in 1999. In addition to negotiation, she has done research on executive
leadership, meta cognition, and family issues. She also works as an organizational
consultant on many of these topics.

Susan Allen Nan is a doctoral candidate at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and
Resolution at George Mason University. Her dissertation research examines coordination
among the diverse third-parties attempting to resolve the conflicts over Abkhasia, South
Ossetia, and Transdniestria in the former Soviet Union. She co-edited a special issue on
“Zones of Peace” for Peace Review.

Dimostenis Yagcioglu is a doctoral candidate at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and
Resolution at George Mason. His dissertation research examines the conflict between
the Turkish Muslim minority and the Greek government in the region of Western Thrace,
Greece. His study places this case in the broader context of ethnic minority-government
conflicts. He is also interested in the psychological aspects of nationalist ideologies.