Curr Psychol (2011) 30:53–73

DOI 10.1007/s12144-011-9099-9

Emotion Regulation of Others and Self (EROS):

The Development and Validation of a New Individual
Difference Measure

Karen Niven & Peter Totterdell &

Christopher B. Stride & David Holman

Published online: 18 February 2011

# Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Abstract Research on affect regulation has blossomed in recent years. However, the
lack of validated scales assessing individual differences in the use of strategies to
achieve alternative types of affect regulation, e.g., the regulation of others’ affect and
the worsening of affect, has hampered research on these important processes. This
paper presents the development and validation of a brief new measure of individual
differences in the use of strategies to regulate one’s own and other people’s feelings:
the Emotion Regulation of Others and Self (EROS) scale. Two distinct samples (N=
551 and N=227) confirmed a four-factor structure: intrinsic affect-improving,
intrinsic affect-worsening, extrinsic affect-improving and extrinsic affect-worsening.
In line with predictions, these factors were associated with existing measures of
affect regulation, personality and affect. Both intrinsic factors were positively
associated with emotional exhaustion, while all factors except extrinsic affect-
improving were positively associated with health-related impairments. Convergence
between self- and other-reported scores on the extrinsic factors in a third sample (N=
50 dyads) demonstrated further evidence of validity.

Keywords Affect regulation . Emotion regulation . Scale development . Scale

validation . Strategies

Are the people who try to cheer others up also the people who try to cheer
themselves up? Do individuals who try to worsen their feelings suffer poor
psychological and physical health? Questions such as these concern individual
differences in affect regulation, but to answer them would be difficult because
existing measures do not assess different types of affect regulation simultaneously or

K. Niven (*) : P. Totterdell : C. B. Stride

Department of Psychology, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S10 2TP, UK
e-mail: k.niven@sheffield.ac.uk

D. Holman
University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
54 Curr Psychol (2011) 30:53–73

entirely. Affect regulation, “the process of initiating, maintaining, modulating, or

changing the occurrence, intensity, or duration of internal feeling states”, i.e.,
emotions or moods (Eisenberg et al. 2000, p. 137), is increasingly recognized as an
important part of everyday life. Indeed, people regularly engage in affect regulation,
using strategic cognitions or behaviors to improve or worsen their own feelings and
those of other people, in the pursuit of hedonic, relational and instrumental goals
(Niven et al. 2009; Riediger et al. 2009).
A number of theoretical models have been proposed to understand affect
regulation, which put emphasis on different features in distinguishing types of
affect regulation (e.g., the stage at which affect is regulated, Gross 1998; the aspect
of affect that is regulated, Koole 2009). Two important broad distinctions that can be
identified from these theories concern: i) whether the target of regulation is one’s
own or someone else’s affect (Gross and Thompson 2007); and ii) whether the
regulatory motive is to improve or to worsen affect (Parrott 1993). Thus, existing
theories suggest that there are at least four main types of affect regulation (Figure 1):
i) Intrinsic affect-improving, the deliberate improvement of one’s own feelings;
ii) Intrinsic affect-worsening, the deliberate worsening of one’s own feelings;
iii) Extrinsic affect-improving, the deliberate improvement of another person’s
feelings;
iv) Extrinsic affect-worsening, the deliberate worsening of another person’s
feelings.
Each of these types of affect regulation is salient to many applied domains.
Studies have documented that affect regulation can have consequences for
performance at work (Grandey 2003) and during sports (Totterdell and Leach
2001), and for psychological adjustment and social competence in clinical (Gross
and Muñoz 1995) and non-clinical populations (Gross and John 2003). But people
are likely to differ in the extent to which they engage in these types of affect
regulation, and these individual differences may explain real-life variations in the
outcomes described above. As such, it is important to be able to measure these
individual differences in a valid manner.
Individual differences in affect regulation can be measured at three conceptual
levels: beliefs, ability and behavior (Mikolajczak et al. 2009). For instance, at the
ability level, emotional intelligence measures often include subscales assessing

Fig. 1 Four main types of affect

regulation
Curr Psychol (2011) 30:53–73 55

people’s perceived ability to regulate their own or others’ feelings (e.g., the Survey
of Emotional Intelligence, SEI, Tett et al. 2005). We argue that it is particularly
important to measure affect regulation at the behavior level of strategy use, because:
i) the strategies that people use can have benefits or costs for their well-being,
performance and relationships (Gross and John 2003); and ii) beliefs and ability do
not always translate into behavior in practice (Mikolajczak et al. 2009).
Currently, there are a number of scales available to measure individual differences
in the use of affect regulation strategies, perhaps the most commonly-used being the
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ, Gross and John 2003). However, there are
three key shortcomings of existing scales that limit the insight that researchers can
provide into affect regulation, which we discuss in the next section. As such, the aim
of the current paper is to develop and present validity data for a new measure of
individual differences in the use of the four main types of affect regulation strategies.
It was our intent to develop a relatively brief measure, so that researchers could use it
in combination with measures of other constructs. The new measure is used to
address some key questions about the nature of as-yet under-researched types of
affect regulation, notably extrinsic affect regulation and affect-worsening.

Limitations of Existing Measures

The first limitation of existing measures of affect regulation strategies is that scales
have generally focused on measuring intrinsic affect regulation. Yet we know that
people also try to regulate the feelings of those around them; sometimes as a means
of giving care (e.g., doctors making their patients feel calmer to alleviate their
distress; Francis et al. 1999) and sometimes for personal gain (e.g., making one’s
partner feel guilty to gain attention, Vangelisti et al. 1991). Indeed, studies have
highlighted the importance of extrinsic affect regulation in a variety of social
contexts, including parent–child relationships, relationships with peers, family
members and romantic partners, support groups and work organizations (Gross
and Thompson 2007; Thoits 1996). However, to date research on this process has
been largely exploratory and descriptive in nature, owing primarily to the lack of
existing scales that assess the use of extrinsic affect regulation strategies. A few
scales do measure the ability to regulate others’ affect (e.g., the SEI, Tett et al. 2005),
but these scales cannot contribute towards understanding how the use of extrinsic
affect regulation might affect regulators and those around them. Thus, important
questions about the effects of extrinsic affect regulation have yet to be explored. For
instance, research has shown that the regulation of one’s own affect is effortful and
potentially damaging for people’s health and well-being (e.g., Grandey 2003), but
has not looked at whether the regulation of others’ affect might also contribute to
emotional exhaustion and health impairment.
The second key limitation of existing measures is that they usually only assess
strategies intended to improve affect. Yet people also try to worsen their own affect
and the affect of other people; sometimes for instrumental purposes (e.g., making
oneself feel angry to stand one’s ground during an argument, Riediger et al. 2009)
and sometimes as a dysfunctional way of responding to emotions in oneself or others
(Phillips and Power 2007). Studies have highlighted the use of intrinsic affect-
56 Curr Psychol (2011) 30:53–73

worsening amongst all age groups, but especially amongst those in adolescence
(Riediger et al. 2009); and the use of extrinsic affect-worsening within close familial
and romantic relationships (Vangelisti et al. 1991) and in work contexts such as
prisons (Niven et al. 2007). Some intrinsic affect regulation scales do include
subscales concerning the dampening of positive emotions (e.g., Feldman et al.
2008), but these scales do not cover strategies aimed at inducing negative emotions.
Other measures include strategies that often result in poorer affect (e.g., depressive
rumination, Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow 1991), but these tend to be strategies
enacted with the intention of improving as opposed to worsening one’s affect. Thus,
to date no scales allow researchers to directly assess the full range of strategies that
can be used to worsen one’s own or other people’s affect. This may be an important
omission, because a large body of research indicates that negative events and
emotions are more salient than positive ones (Baumeister et al. 2001), and so it could
be the case that individual differences in the use of affect-worsening strategies
explain substantial variance in people’s well-being and health.
A third limitation of existing measures is that they are often not based on a
general theoretical model of affect regulation and therefore only cover part of the
range of available strategies. For instance, several scales are based on models of
particular approaches to affect regulation (e.g., the Cognitive Emotion Regulation
Questionnaire, Garnefski et al. 2001). Likewise, some scales are based on models
that concern only specific emotion states (e.g., the Anger Rumination Scale,
Sukhodolsky et al. 2001).

A New Measure of Emotion Regulation of Others and Self (EROS)

Based on the limitations discussed, it is clear that existing measures do not

adequately assess the use of strategies to achieve all of the four main types of affect
regulation. It is important for researchers to have access to measures of each type of
affect regulation, in order to advance our understanding of the various ways in which
affect regulation can influence well-being, performance and relationships. Measuring
all four components with a uniform approach would further allow researchers to
compare and contrast the relative effects of different types of affect regulation, and to
better understand the phenomenon of affect regulation. For instance, a common
framework would enable researchers to assess inter-relationships between the four
facets of affect regulation, to answer questions like: Are people who are inclined to
use regulatory strategies to improve their own affect also inclined to use regulatory
strategies to improve others’ affect? In this paper, we therefore introduce a new
measure of affect regulation, the ‘Emotion Regulation of Others and Self (EROS)’
scale, that assesses individual differences in the use of strategies to improve and to
worsen one’s own and other people’s affect.

Structure of EROS

As discussed above, existing theories (e.g., Gross and Thompson 2007; Parrott
1993) suggest that there are four main types of affect regulation: intrinsic affect-
Curr Psychol (2011) 30:53–73 57

improving, intrinsic affect-worsening, extrinsic affect-improving and extrinsic affect-

worsening. Accordingly, we developed our new instrument to assess these four
factorial components.
Hypothesis 1: The EROS scale will form four factors, namely, intrinsic affect-
improving, intrinsic affect-worsening, extrinsic affect-improving
and extrinsic affect-worsening.
We expect that scores on the factors will relate to existing measures of affect
regulation. With respect to measures of affect regulation strategies, we expect scores
on our intrinsic affect-improving factor to be related to scores on other measures of
strategies to improve one’s affect, such as reappraisal (Gross and John 2003) and
functional self-regulation strategies (Phillips and Power 2007). Conversely, we
expect that scores on our intrinsic affect-worsening factor will be positively related
to existing measures of intrinsic affect regulation strategies that typically result in
poorer affect, such as suppression (Gross and John 2003) and dysfunctional self-
regulation strategies (Phillips and Power 2007). As no measures are available to
assess the use of extrinsic strategies, similar predictions are not possible regarding
the extrinsic factors. However, since extrinsic strategies are observable behaviors, we
expect that scores on these factors will positively relate to the perception of someone
who has a close relationship to the person.
We also expect links between the EROS factors and ability-based measures of
affect regulation. Because people tend to equate high affect regulatory ability with
success in producing positive affect and curbing negative affect (Tett et al. 2005),
and intrinsic affect-improving and affect-worsening strategies should result in the
experience of positive and negative affect, respectively (e.g., Tamir 2005; Grandey
2003), we expect that those with higher perceived ability to regulate their own
affect will score highly on the intrinsic affect-improving factor and receive lower
scores on the intrinsic affect-worsening factor. Following the same argument,
because extrinsic strategies typically result in strategy targets experiencing positive
or negative affect (Niven et al. 2007), we expect scores on the extrinsic affect-
improving factor to be positively related to perceived ability to regulate others’
affect, and scores on the extrinsic affect-worsening factor to be negatively related
to this perceived ability.

Hypothesis 2: Scores on the intrinsic affect-improving factor will be positively

related to other measures of functional intrinsic affect regulation and
perceived ability to regulate one’s affect.
Hypothesis 3: Scores on the intrinsic affect-worsening factor will be positively
related to other measures of dysfunctional intrinsic affect regulation,
and negatively related to perceived ability to regulate one’s affect.
Hypothesis 4: Scores on the extrinsic affect-improving factor will be positively
related to perceived ability to regulate others’ affect and others’
perceptions of extrinsic affect-improving.
Hypothesis 5: Scores on the extrinsic affect-worsening factor will be negatively
related to perceived ability to regulate others’ affect, and positively
related to others’ perceptions of extrinsic affect-worsening.
58 Curr Psychol (2011) 30:53–73

Substantive Relationships of EROS

To understand some of the important differences between the four types of strategies, we
propose a theoretical model regarding the nomological net of the factors (Figure 2).
First, we predict links between the factors and personality traits. Because extraversion
and neuroticism are associated with proneness to experiencing positive and negative
affect, respectively (Gross and John 2003), and people are motivated to experience
affect that is trait-consistent as this validates their self-theory (Tamir 2005), we expect
that individuals high in extraversion and those low in neuroticism would be more
likely to use intrinsic affect-improving strategies, and less likely to use intrinsic affect-
worsening strategies. With respect to extrinsic affect regulation, we consider two key
traits: agreeableness and interpersonal control. As individuals high in agreeableness
have a strong need to develop and maintain positive relationships (Diefendorff et al.
2005), and those with high interpersonal control typically use their control to develop
social relationships and maintain harmony (Paulhus 1983), we expect that individuals
high in these traits would be more likely to use extrinsic affect-improving strategies,
and less likely to use extrinsic affect-worsening.
We also include potential outcomes of affect regulation in the model. Because
intrinsic strategies are directed towards changing one’s affect, it seems likely that the
use of intrinsic affect regulation will be related to people’s current levels of affect
(Parkinson and Totterdell 1999). There is also preliminary evidence suggesting that
engaging in extrinsic affect regulation may have congruent self-consequences for
strategy agents’ affect, as a result of actual and anticipated feedback from strategy
targets (Niven et al. 2007). Thus we expect that intrinsic and extrinsic affect-
improving strategies will be positively associated with current levels of affect, while
intrinsic and extrinsic affect-worsening strategies will be negatively related to affect.
We also anticipate links between the use of intrinsic strategies and two further
outcomes: emotional exhaustion, which is a state of depletion resulting from
excessive demands (Maslach and Jackson 1981); and health-related impairments,
which refer to problems in performing daily activities as a result of physical and
emotional health issues (Ware et al. 1996). Performing acts of self control, like
intrinsic affect regulation, can be physically and emotionally demanding (Muraven
and Baumeister 2000), and the sustained use of intrinsic affect regulation may have
negative implications for mental and physical well-being (Grandey 2003). Thus, we

Fig. 2 Theoretical model of relationships between EROS and related constructs

Curr Psychol (2011) 30:53–73 59

expect the use of both intrinsic affect-improving and intrinsic affect-worsening

strategies will be positively related to both emotional exhaustion and health-related
impairments. Previous research has yet to establish whether extrinsic affect
regulation is also linked to such outcomes, but regulation of one’s own affect in
order to manage others’ emotions (e.g., employees ‘serving with a smile’ in
customer service jobs, Grandey 2003), is thought to be effortful, and so it is possible
that the use of extrinsic affect regulation might also lead to greater emotional
exhaustion and health-related impairments.
Hypothesis 6: Scores on the intrinsic affect-improving factor will be positively
related to extraversion, affect, emotional exhaustion and health-
related impairments, and negatively related to neuroticism.
Hypothesis 7: Scores on the intrinsic affect-worsening factor will be positively
related to neuroticism, emotional exhaustion and health-related
impairments, and negatively related to extraversion and affect.
Hypothesis 8: Scores on the extrinsic affect-improving factor will be positively
related to agreeableness, interpersonal control, affect, emotional
exhaustion and health-related impairments.
Hypothesis 9: Scores on the extrinsic affect-worsening factor will be negatively
related to agreeableness, interpersonal control and affect, and
positively related to emotional exhaustion and health-related
impairments.

Overview of the Present Research

To determine whether our new measure produces valid data, we conducted two
studies. Study 1 presents the development of the new measure and tests the proposed
factor structure (H1). Study 2 retests the proposed factor structure (H1) in a different
population, in which affect regulation is a core daily activity, and tests the
convergence between the factors and existing measures of affect regulation (H2-5)
and theoretically related constructs (H6-9).

Study 1: Developing the EROS Scale

We used two theoretical frameworks of affect regulation strategies to develop our

measure, one for intrinsic affect regulation (Parkinson and Totterdell 1999) and one
for extrinsic affect regulation (Niven et al. 2009). These frameworks were chosen for
three main reasons. First, each framework was empirically-tested using a
comprehensive corpus of affect regulation strategies, and so distinguishes between
the full range of available strategies, and not just strategies involving a particular
approach or those used to regulate a particular emotion. Second, the frameworks
share similarities in terms of the distinctions they make between strategy types, and
together they provide a common framework that allows a uniform approach to
assessing all four types of affect regulation. Other models of affect regulation (e.g.,
Gross 1998) are less suitable as they have not been shown to apply to extrinsic affect
60 Curr Psychol (2011) 30:53–73

regulation. Third, the distinctions made in each framework are salient to everyday
understandings of affect regulation, because they were developed by testing
theoretical predictions against laypersons’ perceptions of similarities and differences
amongst a wide range of strategies.
Parkinson and Totterdell’s (1999) framework primarily distinguishes intrinsic
strategies according to the implementation medium of the strategy (cognitive or
behavioral). A secondary distinction is made according to where a person directs his
or her attention (towards an issue or affective state or away from it). Niven et al.’s
(2009) framework primarily distinguishes between extrinsic strategies according to
the motive behind their use (affect-improving or affect-worsening), and then
distinguishes between strategies that engage the target’s attention on an issue or
feeling and those that divert attention onto the target’s relationship with the agent.
Further categories of strategy types are distinguished at lower levels of both
frameworks, based on the means used to achieve affect regulation (e.g., humor,
distraction, support, rejection).
The items in our scale were based on affect regulation strategies located within
these two theoretical frameworks. The strategies represented real life examples of
affect regulation, as they were generated by the framework authors using interview
and questionnaire studies involving a wide range of people who were asked about
the types of strategies they used to influence affect. We formed our item set to reflect
the major distinctions made in the frameworks. Thus there were equal numbers of
cognitive and behavioral strategies, and engagement and diversion strategies, within
the item set. The authors of each framework had identified the prototypicality of
strategies within each distinct category of affect regulation, and so prototypical
strategy examples were largely used. Because the intrinsic affect regulation
framework of Parkinson and Totterdell (1999) did not cover strategies to worsen
affect, we obtained such strategies from other relevant research (e.g., Parrott 1993;
Riediger et al. 2009), and a focus group of psychology researchers, who were asked
to discuss situations under which people might try to make themselves feel worse,
and then to anonymously note down examples of strategies they had used or heard
of others using.
The result of this process was a list of 24 strategies, six representing each of
the four types of affect regulation (the final set of items is listed in Table 1, and
the further omitted items are listed in the results of Study 1). Content validity was
confirmed by providing a group of ten expert psychology researchers with a
description of the four categories of affect regulation and asking them to place
each strategy into a category. The researchers each placed all of the strategies in
the expected category, and so no strategies were dropped at this point. The
strategies were rephrased as scale items that emphasized the intentional nature of
the act (e.g., ‘laughing’ became ‘I laughed to try to make myself feel better’). The
instructions for the scale asked individuals to report the extent to which they had
used the strategies over the past four weeks to try to change their own feelings
(intrinsic items) or someone else’s feelings (extrinsic items). The intrinsic and
extrinsic subscales were presented separately because of the differing instructions.
All items had the same response options marked on a five-point Likert-like scale
(1 ‘Not at all’, 2 ‘Just a little’, 3 ‘Moderate amount’, 4 ‘Quite a lot’, 5 ‘A great
deal’).
Curr Psychol (2011) 30:53–73 61

Method

A snowball method was used to recruit an opportunity sample of 551 individuals

(73% females), aged between 10 and 67 years (M=36.7 years, SD=11.8), who
completed the 24-item EROS scale in an online survey. The resulting dataset was
split randomly into approximate halves; exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was
performed on the construction half to propose a best measurement model, with the
other half used to validate the adequacy of this model’s fit via confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA). This split-half strategy was employed to avoid the inherent upward
bias on model fit caused by testing a model on the data from which it was
constructed.

Results

An initial inspection of item responses revealed that responses to all affect-improving

items formed a bell-shaped curve. However, two intrinsic affect-worsening items
(‘I spent time with someone who would bring me down’ and ‘I did something I don’t
like’) and three extrinsic affect-worsening items (‘I was rude to someone’, ‘I gave
someone a problem to sort out’, and ‘I refused to talk to someone’) had to be omitted
due to extremely limited response variability. The other affect-worsening items also
had positively skewed responses, but had enough response variability to support
retention. Responses to all items except those omitted covered the full range of
options, with all item scores ranging from 1 (‘Not at all’) to 5 (‘A great deal’).
EFA was conducted on the remaining 19 items (listed in Table 1) to determine the
latent structure of the measure. Principal axis factoring extracted four factors, as
indicated by a combination of Kaiser’s criterion and Cattell’s scree plot method
(Conway and Huffcutt 2003), which together explained 58% of the variance in the
item set (Factor 1 explained 27.6%, Factor 2 explained 15.2%, Factor 3 explained
8.2% and Factor 4 explained 7.0%). Oblique rotation was carried out to aid
interpretation of the factors, which were expected to be distinguishable yet related.
The results, displayed in Table 1, were as follows: Factor 1 comprised six extrinsic
affect-improving strategies (factor pattern coefficients ≥ .55); Factor 2 included three
extrinsic affect-worsening strategies (factor pattern coefficients ≥ 65); Factor 3
comprised four intrinsic affect-worsening strategies (factor pattern coefficients ≥ .71);
and Factor 4 included six intrinsic affect-improving strategies (factor pattern
coefficients ≥ .57). Factor pattern coefficients over .55 are considered ‘good’, while
those over .63 are ‘very good’ and over .71 are ‘excellent’ (Comrey and Lee 1992).
Cross-loading of items onto other factors did not exceed .37, while communalities for
all items exceeded 0.3. Thus, the four factors represented the four categories of affect
regulation proposed in our conceptual typology, supporting Hypothesis 1.
This four-factor measurement model was tested using CFA on the other half of
the dataset, χ2(146, N=311)=269.39, p<.01. The quality of the model was assessed
via a combination of absolute and incremental fit indices as suggested by Hu and
Bentler (1999), and the levels attained suggested a good fit to the data (RMSEA=
0.05, SRMR=0.05, CFI=.94). Further support for the four-factor model was
obtained by testing competing 3-, 2- and 1- factor models, none of which yielded
a better fit. Convergent structural validity was confirmed as each item was significantly
 62

Table 1 Factor pattern coefficients and standardized item coefficients for Study 1

Item EFA factor pattern coefficients (N=240) CFA model results (N=311)

Extrinsic affect- Extrinsic affect- Intrinsic affect- Intrinsic affect- Standardized item Standard
improving (Factor 1) worsening (Factor 2) worsening (Factor 3) improving (Factor 4) coefficient error

Extrinsic subscale
9. I spent time with someone .77 .81 .03
8. I listened to someone’s problems .67 .75 .03
6. I discussed someone’s positive .66 .77 .03
characteristics
3. I did something nice with someone .64 .66 .04
1. I gave someone helpful advice .55 .64 .04
7. I made someone laugh .44 .69 .04
5. I explained to someone how they had .72 .59 .06
hurt myself or others
4. I acted annoyed towards someone .65 .66 .06
2. I told someone about their .59 .58 .06
shortcomings
Intrinsic subscale
5. I thought about my shortcomings .82 .91 .02
1. I looked for problems in my current .71 .75 .03
situation
8. I thought about negative experiences .67 .79 .03
4. I expressed cynicism .64 .68 .04
9. I thought about something nice .73 .81 .03
10. I thought of positive aspects of my .70 .80 .03
situation
Curr Psychol (2011) 30:53–73
Table 1 (continued)

Item EFA factor pattern coefficients (N=240) CFA model results (N=311)

Extrinsic affect- Extrinsic affect- Intrinsic affect- Intrinsic affect- Standardized item Standard
improving (Factor 1) worsening (Factor 2) worsening (Factor 3) improving (Factor 4) coefficient error

6. I did something I enjoy .62 .59 .04

2. I thought about my positive .61 .68 .04
Curr Psychol (2011) 30:53–73

characteristics
3. I laughed .57 .58 .04
7. I sought support from others .57 .50 .05

In the final scale, items were presented in two separate subscales in the order specified in this table
63
64 Curr Psychol (2011) 30:53–73

Table 2 Correlations between EROS factors in Study 1 (N=551)

1 2 3 4

Factor 1. Extrinsic affect-improving – (.06) (.05) (.03)

Factor 2. Extrinsic affect-worsening .27** – (.05) (.06)
Factor 3. Intrinsic affect-worsening .03 .43** – (.05)
Factor 4. Intrinsic affect-improving .68** .23** −.02 –

*p<.05; **p<.01. Figures in brackets above the diagonal are standard errors

related to the underlying latent factor (see Table 1). When the whole sample was tested
using CFA, χ2(146, N=551)=370.08, p<.01, the results indicated similarly good
model fit for the specified four-factor model (RMSEA=.06; SRMR=.05; CFI=.94),
and competing 3-, 2- and 1- factor models did not yield a better fit to the data.
Correlations between the latent factors are shown in Table 2. Although most of
the correlations were significant, only the correlation between Factor 1 (extrinsic
affect-improving) and Factor 4 (intrinsic affect-improving) was high (r=.68, p<.01),
and no correlations exceeded the .85 recommended limit (Kline 1998). Discriminant
factorial validity was then confirmed by checking the confidence intervals (± two
standard errors) around the correlation estimate between the latent factors (Anderson
and Gerbing 1988). As none of the intervals included 1.00, this indicates that the
factors may be seen as discrete but related constructs. The internal consistency of
each factor was satisfactory (extrinsic affect-improving, α=.82; extrinsic affect-
worsening, α=.74; intrinsic affect-worsening, α=.80; intrinsic affect-improving,
α=.82), and none was improved by removing any scale item. Overall, this first test
of the EROS measure produced data that showed good internal reliability and
construct validity.

Study 2: Testing the Nomological Net of EROS

Construct validity can be supported by demonstrating predictable relationships with

established scales (Cronbach and Meehl 1955). Accordingly, the aims of Study 2
were: i) to test relationships between the EROS factors and existing measures of
affect regulation (H2-5); and ii) to test substantive relationships between the EROS
factors and theoretically-related constructs (H6-9). We also conducted exploratory
analyses investigating links with age and sex.

Method

Design and Participants

First, an online survey was administered to an occupational sample of 227

individuals (59% females) aged between 18 and 65 years (M=38.5 years, SD=
12.9), recruited from organizations where affect regulation was considered to be
salient, namely, two social work agencies (N=82 and N=48) and one paramedic
service (N=97). This survey included the 19-item version of the EROS scale
Curr Psychol (2011) 30:53–73 65

(intrinsic affect-improving, α=.87; intrinsic affect-worsening, α=.83; extrinsic

affect-improving, α=.90; extrinsic affect-worsening, α=.67) and additional measures
of theoretically-related constructs, described below.
A second online survey was then administered to another sample recruited
primarily from a University. This sample comprised 50 pairs of individuals who
shared a close relationship (17 romantic partners, 15 friends, 7 relatives, 11 co-
workers). In total, there were 55 females and 45 males, aged between 18 and
77 years (M=37.4 years, SD=14.1). In this survey, one person from each pair of
participants completed the EROS extrinsic subscale indicating the extent to which
they had used the strategies towards their relationship partner (extrinsic affect-
improving α=.93; extrinsic affect-worsening α=.83), while the other person
completed the extrinsic subscale indicating the extent to which they believed their
relationship partner had used the strategies towards them (extrinsic affect-improving
α=.89; extrinsic affect-worsening α=.74).

Additional Measures

Affect Regulation Strategy Use Two established scales measured participants’ use of
strategies to improve their own affect. The first was the ERQ (Gross and John 2003),
a 10-item measure that assesses the functional strategy of reappraisal (e.g., ‘I control
my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in’; α=.80) and the
dysfunctional strategy of suppression (e.g., ‘I keep my emotions to myself’; α=.76),
on a seven-point scale ranging from ‘Strongly disagree’ to ‘Strongly agree’. The
second was the REQ (Phillips and Power 2007), a 21-item measure of how people
respond to their emotions that has four subscales relating to different types of
strategies: internal functional (e.g., ‘I put the situation into perspective’; α=.76),
external functional (e.g., ‘I ask others for advice’; α=.79), internal dysfunctional (e.g., ‘I
harm or punish myself in some way’; α=.61) and external dysfunctional (e.g., ‘I bully
other people’; α=.65). The scale is answered on a five-point scale ranging from ‘Never’
to ‘Always’.

Affect Regulation Ability Two subscales of the SEI (Tett et al. 2005) were used to
assess perceived affect regulation ability. The first subscale comprised 12 items
concerning perceived ability to regulate one’s own emotions (e.g., ‘I can keep myself
calm even in highly stressful situations’; α=.87), while the second comprised 12
items regarding perceived ability to regulate others’ emotions (e.g., ‘When a friend is
feeling down, I can usually find a way to cheer them up’; α=.82). For all items,
participants rated their agreement on a six-point scale ranging from ‘Disagree very
much’ to ‘Agree very much’.

Traits Extraversion, neuroticism and agreeableness were measured using the short
version of the Big Five Inventory (Rammstedt and John 2007). Participants
responded to two items assessing each of the three traits (e.g., ‘I see myself as
someone who is outgoing, sociable’ for extraversion) on a five-point scale ranging
from ‘Disagree strongly’ to ‘Agree strongly’. Interpersonal control was measured
using the Interpersonal Control scale from the Spheres of Control battery (Paulhus
1983). The scale comprised 10 items (e.g., ‘I find it easy to play an important part in
66 Curr Psychol (2011) 30:53–73

most group situations’; α=.77), and participants rated agreement on a six-point scale
from ‘Disagree very much’ to ‘Agree very much’.

Current Affect A six-item measure assessed current affect. The measure comprised
mood state items from the UWIST checklist (Matthews et al. 1990) representing
each end of hedonic tone (‘Happy’ and ‘Gloomy’), tense arousal (‘Anxious’ and
‘Calm’) and energetic arousal (‘Energetic’ and ‘Sluggish’), with negative items
reverse coded. Participants indicated the extent to which they were currently feeling
each state on a seven-point scale from ‘Not at all’ to ‘A great extent’ (α=.82).

Emotional Exhaustion The four highest loading items from the emotional
exhaustion subscale of the Maslach Burnout Inventory (Maslach and Jackson
1981) were used to assess emotional exhaustion. Participants were asked how often
they had experienced the indicators of emotional exhaustion (e.g., ‘I felt emotionally
drained’) over the past four weeks, responding on a five-point scale ranging from
‘Never’ to ‘All of the time’ (α=.89).

Health-related Impairments We assessed health-related impairments using four

items from the SF-12 Health Survey (Ware et al. 1996). These items asked
participants how much of the time they had experienced health-related problems
with their work or other daily activities over the previous four weeks (e.g., ‘I have
accomplished less than I would like’). Responses were made on a five-point scale
ranging from ‘None of the time’ to ‘All of the time’ (α=.84).

Results

Analyses demonstrated construct validity of scores on the EROS measure in the

occupational sample, with CFA, χ2(146, N=227)=308.43, p<.01, indicating
adequate model fit for the specified four factor measurement model (RMSEA=.08;
SRMR=.06; CFI=.91). Thus, Hypothesis 1 was supported in this sample. Following
the strategy used by Phillips and Power (2007) and Tett et al. (2005), to test the
substantive relationships of the EROS factors we performed a series of correlation
analyses. The raw correlations between the factors and related constructs are
reported in Table 3. It should, however, be noted that partial correlations controlling
for the other EROS factors provided highly comparable results, as did Spearman’s
rank correlations involving the positively skewed affect-worsening factors.
With respect to links between the EROS factors and other measures of affect
regulation, as predicted the EROS intrinsic affect-improving factor (H2) exhibited
medium to strong positive relationships with other functional intrinsic affect-improving
strategy measures, notably reappraisal (r=.41, p<.01) and internal (r=.33, p<.01) and
external (r=.40, p<.01) functional strategies. However, this factor was not related to
perceived ability to regulate one’s own emotions. In line with expectations, the EROS
intrinsic affect-worsening factor (H3) was positively related to use of both internal
(r=.37, p<.01) and external (r=.31, p<.01) dysfunctional strategies, and negatively
related to perceived ability to regulate one’s own affect (r=−.31, p<.01), although it
was not related to suppression. The EROS extrinsic affect-improving factor (H4) was
Curr Psychol (2011) 30:53–73 67

Table 3 Correlations between EROS factors and related constructs in Study 2

Mean SD Intrinsic Intrinsic Extrinsic Extrinsic

affect- affect- affect- affect-
improving worsening improving worsening

Survey 1 (N=227)
Intrinsic affect-improving 3.08 0.93 –
Intrinsic affect-worsening 1.31 0.57 .14* –
Extrinsic affect-improving 3.53 0.88 .53** .13 –
Extrinsic affect-worsening 1.20 0.43 .03 .38** .09 –
Age 38.50 12.90 −.01 −.08 .20** −.20**
Sex (0=male, 1=female) 0.59 0.49 .12 .05 .23** −.21**
Reappraisal 4.88 1.03 .41** −.17* .27** −.11
Suppression 3.92 1.31 −.12 .05 −.06 .05
Internal functional 3.13 0.61 .33** −.09 .26** −.08
Internal dysfunctional 1.83 0.53 .03 .37** .07 .32**
External functional 2.95 0.74 .40** −.02 .34** −.05
External dysfunctional 1.31 0.32 −.06 .31** −.06 .44**
Affect regulation ability (self) 4.10 0.86 −.07 −.31** .03 −.23**
Affect regulation ability 4.60 0.61 .04 −.23** .17* −.23**
(other)
Extraversion 3.50 1.05 .12 −.18* .16* −.11
Neuroticism 2.42 1.02 −.04 .25** −.08 .17*
Agreeableness 3.98 0.89 .09 −.18* .10 −.26**
Interpersonal control 4.33 0.68 .09 −.28** .17** −.24**
Affect 4.78 1.18 .06 −.28** .05 −.20**
Emotional exhaustion 2.55 1.04 .17* .30** .04 .10
Health-related impairments 1.92 0.82 .22** .26** .08 .22**
Survey 2 (N=50)
Extrinsic affect-improving 3.34 0.91 – – –
Extrinsic affect-worsening 1.40 0.68 – – .11 –
Relationship partners’ 3.36 0.95 – – .39** −.05
perceptions of extrinsic
affect-improving
Relationship partners’ 1.35 0.58 – – .14 .51**
perceptions of extrinsic
affect-worsening

*p<.05; **p<.01

positively related to the perceived ability to regulate others’ affect (r=.17, p<.05) and
to relationship partners’ perceptions of participants’ use of extrinsic affect-improving
strategies (r=.39, p<.01). Also as predicted the EROS extrinsic affect-worsening
factor (H5) was negatively related to perceived ability to regulate others’ affect
(r=−.23, p<.01) and was positively related to relationship partners’ perceptions of
participants’ use of extrinsic affect-worsening strategies (r=.51, p<.01). As such,
Hypotheses 2 –5 were largely supported.
68 Curr Psychol (2011) 30:53–73

Regarding links between the EROS factors and theoretically-related constructs,

contrary to expectations, the EROS intrinsic affect-improving factor (H6) was not
related to extraversion, neuroticism and affect, although it was positively related to
emotional exhaustion (r=.17, p<.05) and health-related impairments (r=.22, p<.01).
The EROS intrinsic affect-worsening factor (H7) was more consistent with
expectations, as it was negatively related to extraversion (r=−.18, p<.05) and affect
(r=−.28, p<.01), and positively related to neuroticism (r=.25, p<.01), emotional
exhaustion (r=.30, p<.01) and health-related impairments (r=.26, p<.01). The
EROS extrinsic affect-improving factor (H8) was positively related to interpersonal
control (r=.17, p<.01), but was not related to agreeableness, affect, emotional
exhaustion or health-related impairments. Finally, the EROS extrinsic affect-
worsening factor (H9) was negatively related to agreeableness (r=−.26, p<.01),
interpersonal control (r=−.24, p<.01) and affect (r=−.20, p<.01), and was
positively related to health-related impairments (r=.22, p<.01) but not emotional
exhaustion. Hypotheses 6 and 8, relating to the two affect-improving factors, were
therefore only partly supported, whereas the Hypotheses 7 and 9, relating to the
affect-worsening factors, were almost wholly supported.
Partial correlations were then conducted to investigate the utility of the EROS
factors over and above established measures of affect regulation strategies (Gross
and John 2003; Phillips and Power 2007) and ability (Tett et al. 2005). The results,
shown in Table 4, highlight that all observed relationships between the EROS factors
and their hypothesized outcomes held over and above these other measures. This

Table 4 Partial correlations between EROS Factors and hypothesized outcomes in Study 2 (N=227)

Intrinsic affect- Intrinsic affect- Extrinsic affect- Extrinsic affect-

improving worsening improving worsening

Controlling for Gross and John’s (2003) reappraisal and suppression factors
Affect −.09 −.26** .01 −.19**
Emotional .27** .28** .13 .12
exhaustion
Health-related .28** .26** .12 .23**
impairments
Controlling for Phillips and Power’s (2007) internal and external functional and dysfunctional factors
Affect −.11 −.14* .08 −.14*
Emotional .26** .18* .09 .01
exhaustion
Health-related .29** .15* .07 .14*
impairments
Controlling for Tett et al.’s (2005) ability to regulate own emotions and ability to regulate others’ emotions
factors
Affect −.06 −.14* .03 −.14*
Emotional .16* .18* .09 .03
exhaustion
Health-related .22** .17* .11 .14*
impairments

*p<.05; **p<.01
Curr Psychol (2011) 30:53–73 69

suggests that the EROS factors have incremental validity, and that three of the four
factors (all except extrinsic affect-improving) add unique explanatory power for
important outcomes like emotional exhaustion and health-related impairments.
Additional analyses (shown in Table 3) revealed that both age and sex were
related to the use of extrinsic but not intrinsic strategies. Age was positively related
to the extrinsic affect-improving factor (r=.20, p<.01) and negatively related to the
extrinsic affect-worsening factor (r=−.20, p<.01), while females were more likely to
use extrinsic affect-improving strategies (r=.23, p<.01) and less likely to use
extrinsic affect-worsening strategies (r=−.21, p<.01). Overall, the data collected in
Study 2 provide further evidence for the internal reliability and construct validity of
scores on the EROS factors.

Discussion

This paper has introduced a new self-reported measure of individual differences in

the use of affect regulation strategies. The EROS scale comprises four conceptually
distinct factors, which have been shown to be factorially distinct across two different
samples and to relate predictably with a range of constructs, including other
measures of affect regulation, personality traits, and the outcomes of affect,
emotional exhaustion and health-related impairments. Scores on the extrinsic factors
also showed convergent validity with close others’ perceptions of participants’
behavior.
The incremental value of the EROS measure was demonstrated by showing that
the factors were associated with outcomes of interest over and above existing
measures of affect regulation strategies and affect regulation ability. Thus, the
individual differences captured in the new measure can explain additional variance
in important outcomes like people’s levels of exhaustion and their health-related
impairments to work and daily activities. Moreover, the new EROS measure offers a
broader scope than existing measures of affect regulation strategy use, and thus
enables us expand our knowledge of affect regulation in two main ways.
First, the new measure includes strategies used to regulate other people’s affect.
The extrinsic subscale of the EROS measure not only related as expected to a range
of self-reported measures, but also showed good convergent validity with other-
reported data. The extrinsic factors were clearly distinct from the intrinsic factors, as
we found support for our four-factor model in two independent samples, and the
correlations tested in Study 2 highlighted differences in the nomological net of the
intrinsic and extrinsic factors. Through developing a valid means of assessing the
use of extrinsic strategies, we have been able to consider some important, and as-yet
unanswered, questions about the effects of affect regulation, for instance whether the
use of extrinsic affect regulation strategies might have negative self-consequences in
the way that intrinsic affect regulation can (Grandey 2003). In the samples we used
to test outcomes of the EROS factors, regulating clients’ affect was an important part
of the job role and had potential to be emotionally and physically draining. But
neither type of extrinsic affect regulation was associated with experiencing
emotional exhaustion, and only extrinsic affect-worsening was associated with
health-related impairments. This preliminary evidence suggests that only the use of
70 Curr Psychol (2011) 30:53–73

extrinsic affect-worsening strategies might have negative self-consequences for

people, potentially due to the negative feedback that could be expected from the
target or targets of regulation. By developing the intrinsic and extrinsic subscales
using a common theoretical framework, the new measure also allows us to explore
whether individuals tend to do unto others as they would do unto themselves with
respect to affect regulation, and our results indicate that this may be the case; across
Studies 1 and 2 there were strong correlations between the use of intrinsic and
extrinsic affect-improving strategies, and medium-sized correlation between the use
of intrinsic and extrinsic affect-worsening strategies.
The second way in which the new EROS measure adds to our knowledge of
affect regulation is that it includes strategies used to worsen affect. Scores on the
affect-worsening factors were shown to relate differently to a range of constructs
compared with the affect-improving factors, suggesting that these factors assess
distinct types of affect regulation. It should be highlighted that the affect-worsening
items in both subscales suffered from low endorsement, indicating that most people
rarely use, or prefer not to report using, strategies to worsen affect. Future users may
therefore wish to convert the affect-worsening items into binary measures or to alter
the response options of these items in order to overcome the strong positive skew
exhibited across the current studies. Nonetheless, the affect-worsening items did
form internally consistent scales, and both affect-worsening factors related to
constructs in the expected directions. The new means of assessing the use of intrinsic
and extrinsic affect-worsening strategies allowed us to explore the effects of
engaging in these under-researched forms of affect regulation. Indeed, the findings
of Study 2 highlighted that both affect-worsening factors actually had stronger
relationships with many constructs—particularly the outcome variables—than did
the affect-improving factors. This pattern of findings is in line with recent research
by Riediger et al. (2009), which shows that although strategies used to worsen affect
are not used very often they do have important consequences, and more broadly fits
with the theory that bad is stronger than good (Baumeister et al. 2001).
It should, however, be noted that not all of the relationships that we predicted
between the EROS factors and related constructs were observed. In particular, no
relationships were found between the affect-improving factors and people’s current
levels of affect. This may be because people primarily use such strategies when they
or the intended targets are in a negative mood, and thus the act of regulation might
serve to neutralize what would otherwise be a negative association between affect
and strategy use. Another explanation for this pattern could be that the costs
involved in performing such effortful acts of regulation (Muraven and Baumeister
2000) counteract the positive effects such strategies have on affect.
Limitations of the EROS scale include the reliance on self-reported data for
validating scores on the scale. This leads to two possible issues, the first being that
data for our behavioral scale has not been validated with actual measures of
behavior, and the second being that social desirability responding could have biased
our results. But in Study 2, we asked close others to rate participants’ use of affect
regulation as a means of validating our self-report data. As there are no ‘objective’
measures of affect regulation strategy use, collecting this form of data provided the
most direct means possible of assessing participants’ affect regulation behaviors. The
fact that the other-reports correlated so highly with participants’ self-reports,
Curr Psychol (2011) 30:53–73 71

particularly regarding the extrinsic affect-worsening strategies, also suggests that

participants may not simply have responded to the EROS measure in a socially
desirable manner.
Another limitation is the conceptual issue of motive. Put simply, are people
consciously aware of using strategies to deliberately influence their own or others’
affect? It is possible that some of the behaviors assessed in the EROS scale,
particularly those used more frequently, are used relatively habitually (Gross 1998)
and people may not be explicitly aware that they are using such behaviors in order to
regulate affect. But this issue is not unique to the EROS scale.
Despite these limitations, the results of the present research suggest that the
EROS scale has produced valid and internally consistent scores, and can be
considered a good new measure of individual differences in the use of affect
regulation strategies. The EROS scale contributes towards the affect regulation
literature, as it provides a broader typology of strategies compared with existing
scales, enabling researchers to establish the use and effects of relatively understudied
types of affect regulation strategies. The uniform approach to measuring the four
main types of affect regulation taken in the EROS scale also allows researchers to
answer important questions about relationships between different types of affect
regulation.
The scale has clear applied value because the strategies people choose to regulate
their own and others’ affect have important implications for their well-being,
performance and relationships, in family, work, clinical and leisure contexts
(Grandey 2003; Gross and Muñoz 1995; Totterdell and Leach 2001). The EROS
scale could be used in such applied contexts to investigate individual differences in
the use of a wider range of affect regulation strategies than existing scales, and to
provide a better means of identifying people who are more or less susceptible to
suffering negative psychological, physiological and social consequences.

Acknowledgement The support of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) UK is gratefully
acknowledged (RES-060-25-0044: “Emotion regulation of others and self [EROS]”). We also thank Adam
Thompson, Nadia Hanif and Paul Woodhead for their help with data collection.

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