Early phenomenological accounts: The body is the locus of intentionality that is essential to all conscious experience.

Here intentionality is understood as the ability of a body to direct itself towards, establish linkages with or act and locate itself in relation to a world, not as the action of a guiding consciousness. Ponty critizise Husserl's embodied consciuousness. Husserl understands body as a subject. He denies consciousness and intentionality which can be divorced from its embodiment in the world: "My body is to the greatest extend what everything is: a dimensional this, it is the universal thing". 1968:260

MERLEAU PONTY

Filosofa de la ambigedad

La ontologa de MP desplaza las nociones transparentes de sujeto y objeto y las convierte en una lgica diferencial opaca de la carne. En su pensamiento temprano el cuerpo era la fuente unicada de los mltiples aspectos de la percepcin. Luego, en The visible and the invisible, la experiencia del encarnar, de la encarnacin, se da en los dobleces de la carne. MP temporaliza la encarnacin en trminos de lo visible y otros modos de percepcin, introduciendo la idea de la contingencia fundamental de signicado que desafa la nominacin de cualquier atributo pre-dado, incluyendo el sexo, a un cuerpo. La encarnacin es el efecto de una sntesis precaria o "intertwinings" "entrelazamientos". El proyecto ponteano, se opone a una conciencia desengranada. Flesh in refers to the body as a living substance, or existence which must be assumed contingently as the condition for the expression of a point of view. Neither subject nor object, but implicated in both, esh is itself that which offers its body to biology as a thematizable object, or to art as an aesthesiological consciousness: Is my body a thing, is it an idea? It is neither, being the measurant of the things.