Padura, Krystal Grace D.

University of Immaculate Conception, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor

When the Union went on strike after two members were dismissed by the UNIVERSITY during
the cooling-off period, the Secretary of Labor issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor
dispute pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code. The individual respondents were terminated after
claiming that they could still retain their confidential positions while being members or officers of the
Union but the Secretary of Labor ordered their reinstatement which was later modified by the acting
secretary for them to be placed under payroll reinstatement until the validity of their termination is finally
resolved. The UNIVERSITY questioned the legality of the order of the Secretary of Labor after assuming
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court upheld the legality of the order of the Secretary of Labor. The Court
stated that the exercise of management prerogatives is not absolute, but subject to exceptions and one of
which is when the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over labor disputes involving industries
indispensable to the national interest under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code.

Baron vs. EPE Transport, Inc.

The petitioners filed three separate complaints for violation of the CBA, unfair labor practice and
illegal dismissal against respondent. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents, setting aside
the decision of NLRC and affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter that the petitioners went on AWOL
and failed to establish the fact of their dismissal. Petitioners asserted that they were unceremoniously
dismissed after they charged respondents of violating the CBA before the NLRC. The Supreme Court
ruled that abandonment of work does not per se sever the employer-employee relationship but dismissal
of the employee after complying with the procedure prescribed by law. Since petitioners’ abandonment
was not proven by respondents in this case, the NLRC correctly ruled that the petitioners were illegally
dismissed.

Estate of Nelson R. Dulay vs. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc

The widow of Dulay, Merridy, filed a complaint with the NLRC against GCI for death and
medical benefits and damages when the former refused to grant the said benefits based on the CBA. The
respondents filed a petition for certiorari after the CA ruled that the jurisdiction belongs to the voluntary
arbitrator which ordered the payment of the benefits claimed by Merridy less the benefits already received
by Dulay’s brother. The Supreme Court held that Articles 217(c) and 261 of the Labor Code are very
specific in stating that voluntary arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases arising from the interpretation or
implementation of collective bargaining agreements. In the case, Merridy’s issue in her complaint was the
interpretation of the provisions of the CBA insofar as death benefits due to the heirs of Nelson are
concerned. It is only in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement that parties may opt to submit
the dispute to either the NLRC or to voluntary arbitration.
Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC

The employees of the NEECO I were ordered to accomplish Form 87, which were applications
for either retirement, resignation, or separation from service and then some members of the UNION were
compulsorily retired by management and received their separation pay under protest. Petitioners instituted
a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages where the LA ruled in their favor but on appeal, the NLRC
removed the awards of damages. The petitioners questioned the NLRC’s deletion of the awards of
damages. The Supreme Court held that since the Labor Arbiter found that the dismissal of the employees
by NEECO I was attended by unfair labor practice, it was proper to impose moral and exemplary
damages. To warrant an award of moral damages, it must be shown that the dismissal of the employee
was attended to by bad faith, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy.

Reyes vs. Trajano

On a certification election, the votes of the employees who were members of the Iglesia ni Kristo
were segregated and excluded from the final count by virtue of an agreement between the competing
unions, "because they are not members of any union and refused to participate in the previous
certification elections." The officer-in-charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Trajano affirmed the
declaration of the Med-Arbiter that the petitioners do not possess any legal personality to institute the
cause of action since they were not parties to the petition for certification election. The petitioners
assailed this decision. The Supreme Court held that the right to form or join a labor organization, which is
guaranteed by the Labor Code, necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising said
right. The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes of the majority of
the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be represented by a labor organization.

Kapatiran sa Meat and Canning Division vs. Ferrer-Calleja

NEW ULO, members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect, filed a petition for a certification
election and TUPAS (the previous sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of the workers
in the Meat and Canning Division of ROBINA) moved to dismiss the petition because NEW ULO
refused to affiliate with any labor union for the previous three years. TUPAS assailed the resolution of
the respondent dismissing its appeal of the Med-Arbiter ordering a certification election to be conducted
among the regular daily paid rank and file employees/workers of Universal Robina Corporation-Meat and
Canning Division to determine which of the contending union shall be the bargaining unit of the daily
wage rank and file employees in the Meat and Canning Division of the company. The Supreme Court
held that the right of members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect not to join a labor union for being
contrary to their religious beliefs does not bar the members of that sect from forming their own union.
The fact that TUPAS was able to negotiate a new CBA with ROBINA within the 60-day freedom period
of the existing CBA, does not foreclose the right of the rival union, NEW ULO, to challenge TUPAS’
claim to majority status, by filing a timely petition for certification election before TUPAS’ old CBA
expired and before it signed a new CBA with the company.
Pan American World Airways, Inc. vs. Pan American Employees Association

The President of the Philippines certified the strike of respondent union to the Court of Industrial
Relations as being an industrial dispute affecting the national interest, the parties being called to a
conference. After several conferences, Judge Bugayong issued an order requiring petitioner to accept the
five union officers pending resolution on the merits of the dispute involved in the strike. The petitioner
assailed the order of the judge. The Supreme Court held that upon certification by the President under
Section 10 of Republic Act 875, the case comes under the operation of Commonwealth Act 103, which
enforces compulsory arbitration in cases of labor disputes in industries indispensable to the national
interest when the President certifies the case to the Court of Industrial Relations. If the said court has the
power to fix the terms and conditions of employment, it certainly can order the return of the workers with
or without backpay as a term or condition of the employment.

Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard vs. Bureau of Labor Relations

The respondent Hanjin filed a petition with DOLE for the cancellation of registration of
Samahan’s association on the ground that its members did not fall under any of the types of workers
enumerated in the second sentence of Article 243 that only ambulant, intermittent, itinerant, rural
workers, self-employed, and those without definite employers may form a workers’ association and that
one-third of the members of the association had definite employers. The issue raised in this case was
whether the right to form a workers’ association is not exclusive to ambulant, intermittent and itinerant
workers. The Supreme Court held in the affirmative and ruled that Workers can also form and join a
workers’ association as well as labor-management councils (LMC) as provided in Section 3, Article XIII
of the 1987 Constitution And Section 8, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. A union refers to any labor
organization in the private sector organized for collective bargaining and for other legitimate purpose,
while a workers’ association is an organization of workers formed for the mutual aid and protection of its
members or for any legitimate purpose other than collective bargaining. While every labor union is a
labor organization, not every labor organization is a labor union.

FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation, Inc. vs. Trajano

The alliance filed a petition for certification election but it was denied by the MED arbiter and
secretary of Labor on the ground that the petitioner was a non-stock, non-profit medical institution,
therefore, its employees may not form, join, or organize a union pursuant to Article 244 of the Labor
Code. Pending resolution of the aforesaid petition, Batas Pambansa Bilang 70 was enacted amending
Article 244 of the Labor Code so the new petition for certification election was granted by the MED
Arbiter. The petitioner then assailed the order of the MED Arbiter in granting the new petition, despite the
pendency of a similar petition before the Supreme Court which involves the same parties for the same
cause. The Supreme Court held that any judgment which may be rendered in the petition for certiorari
pending before the Supreme Court will not constitute res judicata in the petition for certification election
under consideration, for while in the former, private respondent questioned the constitutionality of Article
244 of the Labor Code before its amendment, in the latter, private respondent invokes the same article as
already amended. Under the provision, rank and file employees of non-profit medical institutions are now
permitted to form, organize or join labor unions of their choice for purposes of collective bargaining.

GSIS Family Bank Employees Union vs. Villanueva

Royal Savings Bank was a thrift bank which later became GSIS Family Bank when Government
Service Insurance System effectively owned 99.55% of the bank’s outstanding shares of stock. Upon
demand of the GSIS Union of their Christmas bonus as stipulated in their CBA, the Bank argued that it is
not at liberty to negotiate economic terms with its employees and cannot set its own salary or
compensation scheme for being a government financial institution covered by the Compensation and
Position Classification System. The question in this case was the personality of the GSIS Family which
the Supreme Court held to be a government-owned or -controlled corporation since 99.55% of its
outstanding capital stock is owned and controlled by the Government Service Insurance System. When it
comes to collective bargaining agreements and collective negotiation agreements in government-owned
or -controlled corporations, Executive Order No. 203 unequivocally stated that while it recognized the
right of workers to organize, bargain, and negotiate with their employers, “the Governing Boards of all
covered government-owned or -controlled corporations, whether Chartered or Non-chartered, may not
negotiate with their officers and employees the economic terms of their collective bargaining agreement.”

Department of Public Works and Highways, Region IV-A vs. Commission on Audit

The DPWH, pursuant to Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 135, issued a memorandum authorizing
the grant of Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA) Incentive to rank-and-file employees in the DPWH
which included the Engineering and Administrative Overhead (EAO) of each office (Central Office and
Regional and District Offices). The COA auditors issued a notice of disallowance and explained that the
CNA Incentive was disallowed because it was paid out of the Engineering and Administrative Overhead
(EAO), in violation of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Budget Circular No. 2006-1.
The petitioners posited that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction when it disallowed the subject CNA Incentive. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the
COA correctly affirmed Notice of Disallowance as there are factual and legal justifications therefor.
Further, the COA has the power to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purpose for which
they had been intended.

Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Commission on Audit

To settle the labor issue of benefits between Development Bank of the Philippines and its
employees, its Board of Directors adopted a Board Resolution approving a one-time grant called the
Governance Forum Productivity Award to DBP’s officers and employees. DBP then assailed the notice of
disallowance, sent by COA to DBP, which held that the power of DBP’s BOD to enter into a compromise
agreement has no basis in law. The Majority held that the grant of GFPA was indeed beyond the authority
of DBP’s BOD. While Sec. 13 of DBP’s charter, as amended, exempts it from existing laws on
compensation and position classification, it concludes by expressly stating that DBP’s system of
compensation shall nonetheless conform to the principles under the Salary Standardization Law.
However, Justice Leonen, in his dissent, stated that the rights and duties of the Development Bank of the
Philippines’ employees are comparable with those in government corporations under the Corporation
Code who enjoy full collective bargaining rights.

Holy Child Catholic School vs. Sto. Tomas

A petition for certification election was filed by private respondent HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS but
the same was opposed by HCCS contending that members of private respondent do not belong to the
same class; it is not only a mixture of managerial, supervisory, and rank-and-file employees but also a
combination of teaching and non-teaching personnel. Since it is not consistent with Article 245 of the
Labor Code, private respondent is an illegitimate labor organization lacking in personality to file a
petition for certification election. The CA upheld the conduct of two separate certification of election for
the teaching and non-teaching personnel, thus, it was assailed by the HCCS. The Supreme Court held that
the teaching and non-teaching personnel of petitioner school must form separate bargaining unit, thus, the
order for the conduct of two separate certification elections, one involving teaching personnel and the
other involving non-teaching personnel. Since the decision of the Supreme Court in the U.P. case
prohibits us from commingling teaching and non-teaching personnel in one bargaining unit, they have to
be separated into two separate bargaining units with two separate certification elections to determine
whether the employees in the respective bargaining units desired to be represented by private respondent.

Tagaytay Highlands International Golf Club Incorporated vs. Tagaytay Highlands Employees
Union-PTGWO

Petitioners opposed the respondent’s petition for certification election on the ground that there
were names and signatures of supervisors included in the petition. The Med-Arbiter ordered the holding
of a certification election but it was dismissed by the undersecretary of DOLE. The petitioners assailed
the affirmation of the CA to the decision of the undersecretary. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of
respondents, holding that petitioners failed to present substantial evidence that the assailed employees are
actually occupying supervisory positions. While petitioner submitted a list of its employees with their
corresponding job titles and ranks, there is nothing mentioned about the supervisors’ respective duties,
powers and prerogatives that would show that they can effectively recommend managerial actions which
require the use of independent judgment.

Manila Electric Co. vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment

The STEAM-PCWF filed a petition for certification election which was premised on the
exclusion/disqualification of certain MERALCO employees pursuant to Article I, Sections 2 and 3 of the
existing MEWA CBA that excludes high ranking employees and those in Patrol Division and Treasury
Security Services in joining the bargaining unit. MERALCO moved for the dismissal of the petition and
one of the grounds was that security services personnel who are prohibited from joining or assisting the
rank-and-file union are sought to be presented by STEAM. The MED Arbiter and Secretary of Labor
ruled in favor of STEAM-PCWF and this order was assailed by the petitioner. The Court held that upon
the issuance of E.O No. 111 which eliminated the provision on the disqualification of security guard in
Article 245, security guards were thus free to join a rank and file organization.

Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines vs. Laguesma

The Union PBSTSE, instituted a Petition for Certification Election to determine the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory and technical staff employees of PICOP for collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) purposes. When the MED Arbiter issued an order for the holding of the
certification election, PICOP questioned and objected to the inclusion of some section heads and
supervisors in the list of voters whose positions were reclassified as managerial employees in the light of
the reorganization effected by it. The Supreme Court, upon dissecting the job description of the concerned
supervisory employees and section heads, ruled that they are not actually managerial but only supervisory
employees since they do not lay down company policies. Designation should be reconciled with the
actual job description of the employee, for it is the job description that determines the nature of
employment.

A. D. Gothong Manufacturing Corporation Employees Union-ALU vs. Confesor

The Union filed a petition for certification election in its bid to represent the unorganized regular
rank-and-file employees of respondent company excluding its office staff and personnel, which was
opposed by the Company. The Certification election yielded the result having YES as the majority with
the votes of Plaza and Yap challenged on the ground that they are supervisory employees. The Union
assailed the affirmation of the Secretary of Labor to the findings of the MED Arbiter that Plaza and Yap
are rank-and-file employees. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of respondents since the petitioner Union
failed to present concrete and substantial evidence to establish the fact that challenged voters are either
managerial or supervising employees. Following established precedents, it is inappropriate to review the
factual findings of the MED Arbiter regarding the issue whether Romulo Plaza and Paul Michael Yap are
or are not rank-and-file employees considering that these are matters within their technical expertise.

Tunay na Pagkakisa ng Manggagawa sa Asia Brewery vs. Asia Brewery, Inc.

ABI renegotiated its CBA with the Union which provides that it shall not represent or accept for
membership employees outside the scope of the bargaining unit including Confidential and Executive
Secretaries and Purchasing Quality Control Staff. A dispute arose when ABI’s management stopped
deducting union dues from some employees, believing that their membership in BLMA-INDEPENDENT
violated the CBA because they were part of the Quality Control Staff and secretaries/clerks. The nature of
the job of the employees was in question. The Supreme Court ABI failed to indicate who among these
numerous secretaries/clerks have access to confidential data relating to management policies that could
give rise to potential conflict of interest with their Union membership. Confidential employees are
defined as those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine,
and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations and thus, ineligible to join, form and
assist any labor organization.

Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor

PEPSI assailed the Order of the Med-Arbiter and the Decision and Order of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment ordering the conduct of a Certification Election to be participated by and among
the supervisory workers of the respondent company. The Supervisory workers were identified as
managers of different departments and chief checker. The nature of the job of the said employees was in
question. The Supreme Court found merit in the submission of the OSG that Route Managers, Chief
Checkers and Warehouse Operations Managers are supervisors while Credit & Collection Managers and
Accounting Managers are highly confidential employees. Designation should be reconciled with the
actual job description of subject employees so the mere fact that an employee is designated manager does
not necessarily make him one.

Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union (SCBEU-NUBE) vs. Standard Chartered Bank

During the renegotiation of the parties, petitioner sought, in their proposal, the exclusion of only
the following employees from the appropriate bargaining unit—all managers who are vested with the
right to hire and fire employees, confidential employees, those with access to labor relations materials,
Chief Cashiers, Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex Department and one Human Resources (HR)
staff. The Secretary, however, maintained the exclusions in the previous CBA because petitioner failed to
show that the employees sought to be removed from the list qualify for exclusion. The issue raised was
whether or not the Bank’s Chief Cashiers and Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex Department and
HR staff are confidential employees. The Supreme Court ruled that bank cashiers, radio and telegraph
operators and personnel staff, in which human resources staff may be qualified, are confidential
employees as previously held by the Supreme Court. Petitioner failed to show that the employees sought
to be removed from the list of exclusions are actually rank and file employees who are not managerial or
confidential in status and should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit.

Central Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Sec. of DOLE

Prior to the submission of the proposal for CBA renegotiation, CURE members, in a general
assembly, agreed that “all union members shall withdraw, aw, retract, or recall the union members’
membership from CENECO because of settled jurisprudence that employees who at the same time are
members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join a union. CENECO denied the
withdrawal of the membership but CURE filed a petition for direct recognition or for certification
election. The issue raised was whether or not the employees of CENECO who withdrew their
membership from the cooperative are entitled to form or join CURE for purposes of the negotiations for a
collective bargaining agreement proposed by the latter. The Supreme Court held that membership in the
cooperative is on a voluntary basis, hence, withdrawal therefrom cannot be restricted unnecessarily. The
policy of the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote the primacy of free collective
bargaining mandates that the employees’ right to form and join unions for purposes of collective
bargaining be accorded the highest consideration.

International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja

This is a consolidated case of International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMI) which was
one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing center in Bataan
for processing Indo-Chinese refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries and International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI) which was intended to be an autonomous, philanthropic, tax-free, non-profit,
non-stock organization designed to carry out the principal objective of conducting "basic research on the
rice plant. Both opposed the petition filed by their respective local unions on the ground that they enjoy
diplomatic immunity being international organizations. The scope of the immunity was in question if it
extends to the certification election. The Supreme Court held that a certification election is not beyond the
scope of that immunity as it could trigger off a series of events in the collective bargaining process
together with related incidents and/or concerted activities, which could inevitably involve the
international organizations in the legal process. The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC
and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their international character and respective purposes to avoid the
danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings.

Singer Sewing Machine Company vs. Drilon

The respondent union filed a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all collectors of the Singer Sewing Machine Company—Baguio but the Company opposed the
petition mainly on the ground that the union members are actually not employees but are independent
contractors as evidenced by the collection agency agreement which they signed. The existence of an
employer-employee relationship was in question for the determination of the approval of the petition for
certification election. The Supreme Court ruled that using the four-fold test, it was found that there was
no employer-employee relationship, hence, no right to organize for purposes of bargaining, nor to be
certified as such bargaining agent can ever be recognized. The Court agreed with the petitioner’s
argument that Article 280 is not the yardstick for determining the existence of an employment
relationship.

Mactan Workers Union vs. Aboitiz

The profit-sharing bonus of petitioner MWU was deposited with the Labor Administrator when
the members of MWU failed to receive their share from their rival union, ALU, the exclusive bargaining
representative of the company. For the recovery of this amount this case was filed with the lower court
which ordered the company to deliver the amount to ALU for distribution to the members of MWU but
this order was appealed by the ALU. Petitioner’s claim in the collective bargaining agreement was in
question. The Supreme Court held that it is a well-settled doctrine that the benefits of a collective
bargaining agreement extend to the laborers and employees in the collective bargaining unit, including
those who do not belong to the chosen bargaining labor organization. The labor union that gets the
majority vote as the exclusive bargaining representative does not act for its members alone but it
represents all the employees in such a bargaining unit.