THE EPIGENESIS OF PURE REASON

A Note on the Critique of Pure Reason, B, sec. 27, 165—168

by J. Wubnig, Waterloo/Can.

In the Transcendental Deduction of the categories in the second edition of the

Critique of Pure Reason Kant discusses three possible ways in whidi "we can
account for a necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects"
(B166), In so doing he makes analogies between these three different kinds of
explanation and biological theories about the origin and nature ofliving organisms.
He describes his own theory of the categories "äs a System, äs it were, of the
eptgenesis of pure reason" (B167)1. He contrasts it with an empiricist theory, whidi
he describes äs a "sort of generatio aequivoca" theory, and also with the theory of
pre-established harmony, whidi he describes äs "a kind of preformation-system
of pure reason" (ibid.). In this paper I would like to discuss the biological theories
of epigenesis, generatio aequivoca, and preformation, and the significance of the
analogies Kant makes between them and theories about justification of the
categories.
Kant's interest in biology has think, been sufficiently appreciated. Most
discussions of Kant's scientific views have concentrated on his interest in mathe-
matical physics and its foundations 2. Like many intellectuals in the eighteenth
Century, Kant was widely versed in all the then-current fields of science — phy-
sics, astronomy, chemistry, geography, anthropology, and biology. He refers to
many biologists in his major works; for example, in the Critique of Pure Reason
he refers to Aristotle (A313=B370, A854=B882) and to Charles Bonnet (A668 =

1
Citations of Kant's writings occur in bra&ets in the text. The numbers cited for the
Critique of Pure Reason indicate pages in the first edition by the letter "A" and in the
second edition by the letter "B"; all other page numbers refer to the pagination accord-
ing to the Academy edition of Kant's works. The abbreviatlons used in citing Kant's
works are äs follow: (a) Critique of Judgment — Kr. d. U., (b) Critique of Pure Reason
— Kr. d. r. V. The translation of passages from the Critique of Pure Reason is that of
Norman Kemp Smith (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1929).
2
E. g. Gottfried Martin, Kant's Metapbysics and Theory of Science, trans. P. G.
Lucas (Mandiester: Mandiester Unlversity Press, 1961). But see Gabriele Rabel, Kanf
äs a Teacher of Biology, Monist, vol. 41 (1931), pp. 434—470. RabePs collection of
writings by Kant contains many of Kant's biological writings: G. Rabel, Kant (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1963).

147
B696), and in thc Critique of Judgment to Johann Blumcnbach (424), Peter Cam-
per (163, 386), Ren£ Descartes (464, fn. 1), and Carl von Linne (Linnaeus)
(427)3. Kant's great interest in biology reflects itself in his comparison of
theories of knowledge with biological theories, Let us consider each biological
theory in turn and the significance of its comparison with a theory of knowledge.

A. Generatio Aequivoca

The theory Kant refers to äs that of "generatio aequivoca" was the theory of
spontaneous generation or, äs it is now referred to, abiogenesis. According to this
theory, certain substances, like manure, ferment, and the living organism, like the
maggot, forms from this fermenting material. Generation is the process by which
the material takes the form of the living organism. It is "spontaneous" in the
sense that the material takes this form without the agency of other living
organisms. Thus maggots, according to this theory, are no more the offspring of
living organisms than bubbles in fermenting wine are the offspring of bubbles4.
Kant describes the theory that the categories have an empirical origin äs a
theory of "generatio aequivoca".
"... since they [the categories] are apriori concepts, and therefore Independent of ex-
perience, the ascription to them of an empirical origin would be a sort of generatio
aequivoca" (Kr. d. r. V., B167).
The similarity between the biological theory and such an empiricist account of the
categories is that just äs living organisms are supposed to arise spontaneously from
matter, according to the biologicai theory, so^the categories are supposed to arise
spontaneously from sense experience, according to this empiricist account. Since the
living organism is matter organized into a particular form and it organizes any
new matter (i. e. food) that it takes in into the same form, the theory of spon-
taneous generation explains the organization of formed matter (the living or-
ganism) äs being spontaneous. Analogously, an empiricist account of the origin
of the categories, which are the principles for organizing the matter of experience

3
Kant refers to many other biologists in other writings. For example, see references
to Boerhave, Buffon, Forster, Haller, Maupertuis, and Sömmering in Rabel, ibid. Bonnet
and Blumenbadi are referred to on pages 3 and 6 of this paper; also see footnotes 8 and
13.
4
This theory was widely held äs an account of certain kinds of living organisms from
at least the time of Aristotle until Louis Pasteur refuted it in 1860. Kant seems to have
accepted it äs an account of the origin of vermin (die Gewürme) when he wrote the
Critique of Pure Reason (A835=B863), but he rejects it in the Critique of Judgment
(411, 419 fn. l, 424). Cf. Aristotle, De Generatione Animalium, 715a24, 715b5, 715b26,
721a8; Historia Animalium, Bk. V, dis. l, 31. Joseph Needham, A History of Embryo-
logy, 2nd ed. rev. with the assistance of Arthur Hughes (New York: Abelard-Sdiuman,
1959), di. iv, esp. see. 7, pp. 211—218.

148
(sensible intuitions), would be that these basic forms of organization themselves
arise spontaneously from sensible intuitions5.

B. Preformation

The preformation theory, also referred to äs the theory of "evolution" 6, was

the theory that the "germ" of the living organism, such äs the egg (ovum) or
spermatozoon, contains the reproduced organism fully formed and that growth is
merely a process of increasing size (though proportions may change). This implies
that all living creatures were actually created at the same time, at the Creation
of the universe, and that conception is merely a process of stimulating the orga-
nism to "evolve".
The theory depended on the theory that in sexual reproduction only one parent
contributes the actual "germ" while the other provides the Stimulus to "evolution".
The theory originated with the development of the microscope and the discovery
of the reproductive cells, the ova and the spermatozoa. Some preformationists,
like Antony van Leeuwenhoek, Nicolas Hartsoeker, and Gottfried Leibniz,
thought that the spermatozoon was the germ, and Hartsoeker even drew a dia-
gram of what he thought the'human spermatozoon was really like, with the
human fetus inside7. Other preformationists, like Charles Bonnet and Albrecht
von Haller, thought that the ovum was the germ, and their theory is referred to äs
the ovist theory 8. Thus the spermaticist-preformationists thought there is a com-
5
Cf. Kant, Kr. d. r. V., A834=B862 — A835=B863 where Kant describes how
systematic knowledge seems to be formed through a generatio aequivoca, although in
fact it is not. In this passage Kant again makes an analogy between the origin and
development of living organisms and the origin and development of Systems of thought.
6
Cf. Kant, Kr. d. i/., sec. 81, 423.
7
Antony van Leeuwenhoek, Correspondence in the Philosophical Transactionsy Royal
Society of London: XXI (1677—1678), 1040—1046; XVII (1693), 593; XXI (1699),
270—272; XXII (1700), 744; XXIII (1702), 1140.
Nicolas Hartsoeker, Essay de Dioptrique (Paris: J. Anisson, 1694), articles 88—94.
The diagram is for article 89, on p. 230. It is reproduced in Needham, op. cit.y p. 206,
p. 206, fig. 24.
Gottfried W. Leibniz, Letter to Wagner (June 4, 1710), in: Die Philosophischen Schrif-
ten, ed. C. I. Gerhardt (Berlin: 1880), VII, 531; translation in The Philosophical Works,
trans. G. M. Duncan (New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse, &: Taylor, 1890), No. XXIX,
p. 192. — Letter to Bourget (Mardi 22, 1714), G., III, 565. Letter to Bourget (July 11,
1714), G., III, 571. Letter to M. M. Remond de Montmort (June 22, 1715), Opera
Philosophica, ed. J. E. Erdmann (Faksimile der Ausgabe 1840, Meisenheim/Glan; Anton
Hain K. G., 1959), No. XCII, sec. II.
J. Needham, op. cit., pp. 205—211, spermaticist-ovist controversy.
8
Charles Bonnet, Considerations sur les Corps Organises (Amsterdam: M. Rey, 1768).
Albrecht von Haller, First Lines of Physiology, trans., printed under inspection of Dr.
William Cullen (Troy: Obadiah Penniman, 1803), translated from Primae lineae physio-
logiae in usum praelectionum academicarttm (3rd Latin edition, 1765).
—, Elementa Physiologiae Corporis Humani (Bernae: Societatis typographicae, 1764—
1766), Vols. 7—8.

149
 !
pletcly formed crcature in a spermatozoon, and the ovist-preformationists thought
sudi a creature is in an ovum. Morcover, according to the spermaticists, if the '
creature inside the spermatozoon were male (i. e. with spermatozoa), then the
spcrmatozoa of this male also contained completely formed creatures, and so on
from the Crcation, and similarly if the creature in the ovum were female, accord-
ing to the ovists.
A theory of the pre-established harmony between the activities of minds and
bodies depends on a theory of the preformation of minds and their thoughts and
bodies and their behavior at the Creation of the universe, since the activities of
these minds and bodies are independent of each other and are in harmony only
because they were created so that their activities would be in parallel. Leibniz
himself held both a preformation theory of mind and of living bodies. His theory
of mind was that all thoughts are developments of thoughts we have always had. j
".. the mind at every moment expresses all its future thoughts and already thinks
confusedly of all that of whidi it will ever think distinctly" 9.
Since Leibniz believed that souls are immortal, his theory is that all thoughts
a mind will ever think were preformed at the Creation, when all souls were
created 10. He also held a preformation theory of biology. He thought it ana-
logous to his theory of mind and important for his theory of pre-established har-
mony, since it provided for the parallel between activities of living bodies and
minds n. Thus according to Leibniz, minds gain knowledge of the world because
God has created minds and living bodies to act independently in pre-established
harmony. The ability to gain knowledge is not, according to this theory, in-
strinsic to thinking but only a result of God's creation of the pre-established har-
mony between minds and bodies.
Kant refers to the theory of pre-established harmony and the preformation
theory it requires äs one way of demonstrating the validity of the categories.
Such a demonstration would be to argue that
".. the categories are .. subjective dispositions of thought implanted in us from the
first moment of our existence, and so ordered by our Creator that their employment is
9
G. W. Leibniz, Discours de metaphysique, G., IV, 451, sec. xxvi.
10
G. W. Leibniz, op. dt., G., IV, 460, sec. xxxiv.
—, Systeme Nouveau de la Nature et de la Communication des Substances, aussi bien
que de l'Union, qu'il y a entre VAme et le Corps, in: G., IV, 479; translation in Philo-
sopbical Papers & Leiters, trans. and ed. Leroy E. Loemker (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1956), Vol. I, p. 742.
— Primae veritates, in: Opuscules et fragments inedlts de Leibniz, ed. Louis Couturat
(Paris: 1903), p. 523; translation in ?*/>erj-Loemker, op. dt.y Vol. l, p. 417.
11
G. W. Leibniz, Letter to M. M. Remond (June 22, 1715), op. dt. — Letter to Ar-
nauld (October 9, 1687), in: G., II, 111—129; translation in Pdpers-Loemker, op. dt.,
Vol. l, No. 36—11.
—, Systeme Nouveau de la Nature et de la Communication des Substances, op. dt.
—, Considerations sur les Prindpes de Vie, et sur les Natures Plastiques, par l'Auteur
du Systeme de l9Harmonie preetablie (1705), in: G., VI, 539—555; translation in Works-
Duncan, op. dt., No. XXV.

150
in complete harmony with the laws of nature in accordance with whidi experience pro-
ceeds — a kind of preformation-system of pure reason" (Kr. d. r. V., B167).
The analogy between such an account of the categories and the biological theory
of preformation is that just äs the organism is completely formed in the germ
and needs only to be stimulated and nourished to increase in size, according to
the biological theory, so the categories are implanted in us and happen to give
us knowledge because the Creator has pre-established the harmony between their
use and the physical world. According to such an account the mind does not
actually organize experiences of the world and so know the world by the use of
the categories; and the categories can be shown to be valid only by reference to
God's way of creating the universe rather than by analyzing the nature of ex-
perience and thought.

C. Epigenesis

The biological theory to whidi Kant himself subscribed was the theory of epi-
genesis (Kr. d. U., sec. 81) 12. This is the theory that living organisms have the
ability to take in materials, and reform them. For example, the cow has the
ability to take in grass and water and to form flesh, blood, bone, milk, etc. from
them. The cow, indeed, forms herseif from the materials she takes in. According
to this theory, the germ (which comes from both parents in sexual reproduction)
does not contain the fully formed organism but only the power to form itself
into the more developed organism when it has the proper materials. For example,
the fertilized egg of the ducken does not contain the whole actual ducken at the
time of fertilization but develops into the ducken.
Caspar Wolff and Johann Blumenbach, who were major proponents of the
theory of epigenesis, emphasized that the living organism has the power to form
materials in this way13. Wolff called this the "vis essentialis" and Blumenbach
called it the "formative impulse" („der Bildungstrieb" or "nisus formativus"). Ac-
cording to Kant, then, the mind is like the living organism in that it has the
power to form materials (sensible intuitions) into objective experience, and the
categories are the principles of the organization of these materials. Just äs the
grass becomes the cow's bone by the bone-forming activity of the formative im-
pulse according to the principle of bone-structure, so the sensed sequence of a

12
See footnote 4.
13
Caspar F. Wolff, Theoria Generationis (editio nova, aucta, et emendata; Halae ad
Salam: Christ. Hendel, 1774) Ist. edition in 1750.
Johann F. Blumenbach, Über den Bildungstrieb (Göttingen: J. C. Dietridi, 1789). In
English translation, An Essay on Generation, trans. A. Criditon (London: T. Cadeil, 1792).
Kant thanked Blumenbadi apparently for this book, äs well äs for other writings in a
letter of August 5, 1790 (Ak. vol. 11, letter no. 411).
—, De nisu formativo et generationis negotio nuperae observationes (Göttingen: J. C.
Dietridi, 1787).
J. Needham, op. cit., eh. iv, sec. 8, pp. 213—223.

151
boat sccn upstrcam and then downstrcam becomes the objective experience "the
boat went downstrcam" by the mind's activity of synthesis according to the
catcgory of causality (Kr. d. r. V., Second Analogy).

D. Conclttsion
The analogy Kant makes between his theory of mind and the theory of epi-
genesis makes vivid the nature of his "Copernican revolution". According to a
tabula rasa empiricist account, the mind is merely a receptacle in which sense im-
pressions collect and spontaneously organize into objective experience — which
neither explains nor justifies the principles of organization. According to a
theory of pre-established harmony, the activities of the mind can result in ob-
jective experience only because the Creator designed a coincidence between the
operations of the mind and the world — which means that the principles of
organization cannot be justified by analyzing experience and thought but must
depend on theology for a guarantee of their validity. According to Kant's own
"epigenetic" theory of the mind, however, the mind itself forms objective ex-
perience, and the principles of organization — the categories — can be and are,
so Kant thinks, justified by examining experience and thought, äs he does in the
Transcendental Deduction.

152