Person. individ. DI@ Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 33-46, 1994 0191-8869/94 $6.00 + 0.

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DO IT YOUR OWN WAY: COGNITIVE STRATEGIES,

INTELLIGENCE, AND PERSONALITY

MAZGORZATA KOSSQWSRA and EDWARD NECKA

Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, 31-007 Cracow, Poland

(Received 8 April 1993)

Summary-Three experimental studies provided evidence that the choice and usage of cognitive strategies
depended on intelligence, personality, and ‘intelligence-related’ personality traits. A modified version of
the analogical reasoning task was employed in order to examine the qualitatively different strategies
adopted by subjects. In Experiment 1, two strategies were identified: analytical and global. They differed
in the amount of time allocated to consecutive stages of the task. Psychometric intelligence appeared to
be related to the analytical strategy. In Experiment 2, the analytical strategy was more frequent in the
case of verbally fluent or neurotic (EPQ) subjects, whereas the global strategy appeared more typical of
subjects who obtained higher scores in strength of excitation and mobility (Strelau’s STI-R), or
extraversion (EPQ). In Experiment 3, these findings were replicated. Additionally, an Absorption subscale
from a newly developed Intellectual Experience Scale was negatively associated with use of the global
strategy. The data are interpreted in terms of the information-processing demands of both strategies. It
is suggested that the analytical strategy is associated with increased working memory capacity, and
narrowed focus of attention. By contrast, the global strategy may be associated with decreased working
memory capacity, and wider focus of attention. An alternative explanation based on semantic memory
mechanisms is also suggested.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to examine the role of individual differences in the use of problem
solving strategies. The term ‘strategy’ implies one’s preferred mode of thinking and problem solving,
conceived in a qualitative way, rather than level of performance, understood quantitatively. In
other words, a cognitive strategy may be defined as a unique pattern of information-processing
which takes place in a problem solving situation (Baron, 1978, 1985; Kirby, 1984a; Scholz, 1987;
Wood, 1978). Conceived of as ‘ways of trying to reach some goal’ (Baron, 1985, p. 28) cognitive
strategies are usually highly task-specific, and are therefore difficult to identify prior to obtaining
experimental data. For instance, MacLeod, Hunt and Mathews (1978) were able to distinguish two
strategies in a sentence verification task, a linguistic one and a pictorial-spatial one, only when they
realized that some subjects did not fit properly the original linguistic model of the task.
In this article, we focus on the relationship between cognitive strategies and selected dimensions
of individual differences. The question arises, which dimensions are most worth investigating in this
context. Since the domain of cognition is explored, many authors stress the significance of
intellectual abilities. For example, Baron (1978) remarked that the ability to do a cognitive task
may be limited by inadequate proficiency, limited capacity, or inappropriate strategy. He also
suggested the existence of ‘central’ strategies, defined as those that underlie intelligence, but he did
not offer empirical support. Sternberg (1985) introduced the notion of ‘metacomponents’, i.e.
higher-order factors in thinking and problem solving, whose role amounts to planning and
monitoring the cognitive process in order to reach a desired outcome. Kirby (1984b) has argued
that strategy use is close to planning, and that planning ‘is really intelligence under a different label’
(P. 85).
In spite of such strongly expressed theoretical opinions, empirical evidence is neither abundant
nor consistent. Hunt (1980) showed that intelligence was not connected with any particular strategy
but rather with the ease with which one changes strategy if the task situation requires it. It also
appears that some widely used intelligence tests may support the use of qualitatively different
strategies (Hunt, 1974), and that choice of strategy affects one’s final test score, which, nevertheless,
may be increased through the process of strategy instruction (Kirby & Lawson, 1983; Lawson &
Kirby, 1981). In an ingenious experiment recently carried out by Hany (1991), Ss were required
33
34 MAISORZATA KO~~OWSKAand EDWARD NFCKA

to build pictorial analogies out of sets of elements available to them. Intelligent Ss preferred to
use a ‘reduction of complexity’ strategy, in which they would construct analogies that were more
elaborated yet, due to a higher-order principle involved, easier to apprehend and memorize. Several
studies also showed the possibility of improving Ss’ performance in intellectual tasks by teaching
them efficient problem solving strategies (e.g. Malloy, Mitchell & Gordon, 1987; Rabinowitz, 1988).
Ferretti and Butterfield (1992) demonstrated that children at three levels of intellectual performance
(gifted, average, retarded) differed in speed of learning cognitive rules, as well as in maintenance
and transfer of these rules.
However, if one wishes to explore the determinants of the ‘ways of trying to reach some goal’,
rather than simply test scores, certain personality variables may be equally important. Unfortu-
nately, the empirical evidence in this area is even sparser, although psychologists have been looking
for the personality traits related to intellectual performance for more than half a century. The
majority of these efforts concentrated on identifying correlations between basic personality
dimensions (e.g. extraversion, neuroticism, field dependence) and intelligence test scores. Not much
has been accomplished within this paradigm. For example, Cattell and Butcher (1968) found that
extraverts performed slightly better on the Verbal subtests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
(WAIS), whereas introverts performed slightly better on the Performance subtests. However,
Robinson (1985) reported just the opposite finding, and Rawlings and Carnie (1989) found some
evidence that this relationship depended on testing conditions. Eysenck (1967) suggested that there
was a tendency for extraverts to perform faster and less accurately than introverts in a variety of
situations, including semantic memory tasks. This thesis has not obtained empirical confirmation,
however (Corcoran, 1972; Casal, Caballo, Cueto & Cubas, 1990). Several studies have shown slight
relationships between strategy use and of cognitive style (e.g. Kurian, Sharma & Santhakumari,
1987) as well as between strategy use and personality variables (e.g. Andres, Vigil & Tous, 1989;
Goebel & Harris, 1980) but these effects have been neither strong nor well replicated.
The scarcity of relevant empirical studies raises the question whether appropriate correlates of
cognitive strategy use were taken into account in previous research. Perhaps a more productive
approach may be based on the view that there exists a ‘grey area’ between general intelligence and
traditionally viewed personality (Mayer, Caruso, Zigler & Dreyden, 1989). According to this view,
traits belonging to this area are still regarded to be personality variables but, at the same time, they
are responsible for the outcomes of the human intellectual performance, and for the way intellectual
activities are performed. It is of course a purely academic question where intelligence really ends
and personality begins, but there are traits like ‘absorption’ (Roche & McConkey, 1990; Tellegen
& Atkinson, 1974) and ‘autotelic personality’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, 1988) which may meet this
criterion. Absorption is defined as a characteristic that amounts to openness to experience and deep
involvement in the problem at hand. It is believed to be associated with attention and creativity.
‘Flow’, typical of the autotelic personalities, is both a source of positive intellectual experience and
an important determinant of the exceptional intellectual performance, since it counteracts fatigue,
boredom, and indifference (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1984; Mayer et al., 1989; Nakamura, 1988).
Taking into account the scarcity of conclusive data concerning the relationship between
intelligence and personality on the one hand and cognitive strategies on the other hand, we decided
to carry out three experiments. It was our goal to explore the personality-intelligence connection,
or the area of ‘intellectual personality’, both at the psychometric level of analysis and in reference
to the basic question of which dimensions of individual differences play the most important role
as determinants of the choice and usage of the problem solving strategies.
The problem seems important both for theory and for applied research. First, the more we know
about cognitive strategies connected with intelligence and personality the more likely we are to
advance the processual theory of individual differences, that is, to specify cognitive processes
underlying intellectual and personality variables. Second, improved understanding of the role of
intelligence and personality in human cognitive functioning would greatly facilitate practical efforts
to adapt instructional devices, curricula, and problem solving procedures to the relatively stable
characteristics of learners and solvers. At present, schools seem to assume one ‘official’ cognitive
strategy, mostly verbal and analytical, thus handicapping children with other preferences (Shade,
1982). It is also possible that some individuals can compensate for their lack of exceptional
cognitive abilities with relevant personality traits, while some others quite often lower their
 Cognitive strategies 35

cognitive abilities because of incompatible personality traits; these inadequacies might be dealt with
through counseling. But before entering into such practical considerations, we need more basic
knowledge about the joint influence of intelligence and personality on the level of human
intellectual performance, as well as on strategic decisions and preferences.
In this study, we employed a modified verbal analogy task in order to investigate cognitive
strategy use. This kind of task was not chosen arbitrarily. Being one of the basic patterns of human
inductive reasoning, analogy has played an important role in psychological research on thinking,
problem solving, and creativity (Holyoak & Nisbett, 1988; Keane, 1988; Necka, 1985). It is also
a component of many aptitude assessment tools, including IQ tests (Sternberg, 1977). The
significance of inductive thought processes and reasoning by analogy has also been explored with
regard to knowledge acquisition, concept formation, classification, and categorization (Anglin,
1977; Nelson, Rescorla, Gruendel & Benedict, 1978). The analogical reasoning task also showed
its relevance to the study of cognitive strategies (Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979).
Normally, analogies take the form ‘A: B:: C: D’, in which case the same relationship exists
between A and B as exists between C and D. In psychometric tests, such analogies are usually
presented in the form ‘A: B :: C: ?‘, and the tested person is instructed to select the correct answer
from a number of response alternatives D,. In the present study, every analogy was preceded by
a short statement concerning one of its terms. Ss were supposed to deal with the task as if this
statement were true, although it was absurd. This version of the verbal analogy task was first
proposed by Marr and Sternberg (1986) in an experiment on coping with novelty, and has been
replicated by Necka, Stocki and Wolski (1990). Sternberg and Gastel (1989a, b) developed other
versions of unusual inductive reasoning tasks, including series completion and sentence verification
procedures. In order to gain an insight into the strategy of solving the verbal analogy task, we
introduced still more procedural modifications. Our goal was to measure the amount of time Ss
devote to consecutive stages of the task if they are allowed to decide on their own. Since the
procedure was completely self-paced, and no time pressure was imposed on Ss, we hypothesized
that the allocation of time over the consecutive stages of the task would reveal qualitatively different
patterns of problem solving. Then, we investigated the intellectual and personality correlates of
these strategic patterns.

EXPERIMENT 1

Method
Subjects
Ss were 38 first year psychology students of the Jagiellonian University. There were 13 males
and 25 females in the sample.

Experimental task
Figure 1 shows the modified verbal analogy task, as Ss saw it. The computer-based version of
the task consisted of 36 analogies. Each of them was preceded by a short statement involving one

1. Foxes arc Needles

I I
2. FtICistOFOlWt

3. PsFoxLsto?

NOtCZ
1. stage1 @rsuc statemew
2. stpor 2 (A:B)
3. stage 3 (C:?)
4. stage 4 hvspoMe choke)

Fig. I. Arrangement of stimuli on the computer screen.

36 MAZGORZATA KOSSOWSKAand EDWARD NFCKA

of its terms. Ss were instructed to take this counterfactual precue statement as given. They were
instructed to select an accurate solution to the analogy from among four response alternatives,
assuming the correctness of the counterfactual premise. The four parts of the task, i.e. precue
statement, the terms A: B, the terms C:?, and four solution alternatives, appeared on the screen
one after another, as the S pressed the red button of the joystick. Once all the elements of a problem
were visible, moving the joystick in a chosen direction (left, right, bottom, top) implied the choice
of a given response. The amount of time for processing each element of the analogy depended on
a S him/herself. The computer registered the latency of every button press, allowing us to assess
how much time was devoted by a S to every stage of the problem solving process (Fig. 1).

Psychometric tests
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (Raven, Court & Raven, 1983) and Urban and Jellen’s
(1986) Test for Creative Thinking-Drawing Production (TCT-DP) were applied in this study. The
TCT-DP is a divergent production assessment tool which requires a testee to complete a pictorial
answer sheet in the way he/she wishes to. The authors elaborated 14 qualitative assessment criteria;
the inter-rater reliability scores are between 0.60 and 0.80, depending on the criterion.

Procedure
First, the computerized version of the analogy task was administered. It consisted of four training
items with feedback, and 36 test items with no feedback. Ss were tested individually, with no time
pressure. When they were finished, the psychometric tools were applied after a short break. The
whole procedure took about 2 hr per S.

Results
First, we report the reliability scores for the experimental task. Both Cronbach’s alpha and
Guttman’s split-half reliability coefficients were computed separately for every stage of the analogy
task. Thirty six precue reading time observations gathered from 38 Ss served as a separate set of
items to assess reliability scores. These computations were then repeated for other stages, i.e. A: B
reading time, C:? reading time, and solution latency. The respective reliability coefficients were as
follows: 0.84 (alpha) and 0.53 (split-half); 0.92 (alpha) and 0.77 (split-half); 0.96 (alpha) and 0.92
(split-half); 0.98 (alpha) and 0.94 (split-half). Except for the moderate split-half reliability of
response latencies in the first stage (note the acceptable level of alpha, however), all coefficients
appeared rather high, thus showing good internal consistency of the scale devised to assess
individual differences in cognitive strategies. These data also confirmed the relative superiority of
computerized elementary cognitive tasks over ‘paper and pencil’ assessment tools, as far as internal
consistency is concerned.
Two strategies for solving the analogy task were then identified: the global one and the analytical
one. They differed in the proportion of time used by Ss on the consecutive four stages of the task.
Ss were assigned to one of two groups, representing different patterns of time allocation across
stages. Figure 2 shows that most time was used-regardless of the group-on the fourth stage, in
which the solution decision had to be made. Ss in the analytical group used relatively more time
on the preparatory stages of the task, and relatively less time on the fourth executive stage. Ss in
the global group, on the other hand, used relatively less time on the preparatory stages and more
time on the executive stage. The average overall amount of time used to complete the task was
almost identical in both groups. This means that the choice of allocation strategy, and not the
general speed of task processing, distinguished the two groups. In other words, the analytical
strategy amounts to being relatively slow at the preparatory stages of the task so as to be quicker
at the executive stage, whereas the global strategy shows the reverse pattern of relationship. It seems
that the ‘analytical’ Ss preferred to solve the task step by step, whereas the ‘global’ ones preferred
to have all of the necessary information before them on the computer screen. We call this strategy
global because it may be preferred by people who are unable, or unwilling, to rely on incomplete
pieces of information. These people may decide to speed up the process of information acquisition.
The opposite strategy characterizes people who prefer to analyze the task from the very beginning,
no matter how incomplete the information may be at the given stage of processing.
It appeared that in analyzing reaction times, it is the proportion that matters rather than the
 Cognitive strategies 37

Response latency (sec.)

I
16

14

12

10

4
------Analytical
2 subjects
-Global
sublects
0
Precue A’B & Response

St ages

Fig. 2. Analytical and global strategy.

absolute amount of time spent on the given stage of processing. Having found this, we created an
artificial variable ‘strategy’, defined as the proportion of time spent on processing the preparatory
stages of the task (i.e. precue statement, the terms A:B, the terms C:?). Thus, the formula for the
strategy index is as follows:

rtl +rt2+rt3
strategy = x 100
rt 1 + rt2 + rt3 + rt4

where rt 1, rt2, rt3, and rt4 equals mean time used on the first, second, third, and fourth stage of
the task, respectively. If one’s score on this variable is low, it indicates use of the global strategy.
If it is high, it indicates use of the analytical strategy.
With regard to individual differences, we found that intelligence, assessed with Raven’s test, was
negatively correlated with the number of errors produced while doing the analogy task (r = -0.38,
P -c 0.01). At the same time, intelligence was positively correlated with the ‘strategy’ variable
(r = 0.33, P < 0.01). These results indicate that intelligent Ss both committed fewer errors and
preferred to use the analytical strategy. We also found a weak negative correlation between the
number of errors and the ‘strategy’ variable (r = -0.25, P = 0.05). These findings, if replicated,
might suggest that the analytical strategy is more ‘intelligent’ in two meanings of the word: it is
typical of intelligent Ss and it is associated with greater accuracy in analogical problem solving.
In order to examine these effects more thoroughly, we divided Ss into two ability subgroups,
according to their Raven’s test scores. In addition, we divided Ss into ‘slow’ and ‘fast’ subgroups,
according to the overall mean time required by them to solve the task, as well as into the ‘accurate’
and ‘inaccurate’ subgroups, according to their mean error rate in this task. In this way, we looked
at the analogy task as a kind of IQ test to assess Ss’ level of performance, and then to relate this
level to their preferred mode of performance. It appeared that intelligent Ss’ time allocation policy
resembled the one revealed by the ‘analytical’ Ss, whereas less intelligent Ss behaved similarly to
the ‘global’ ones (Fig. 2). This intelligence by stage interaction was marginally significant (F = 2.58,
P < 0.05, MANOVA, repeated measures model), and it is consistent with what we obtained with
the use of the ‘strategy’ index. We also found that the ‘fast’ group obtained shorter reaction times
only in the last stage of the task, consisting in the choice of solution. This stage by group interaction
was highly significant (F = 24.56, P < 0.001). The number of errors and the Raven’s scores, on the
other hand, were insignificant both separately and in interaction with the stage. This suggests that
the correlation between these variables and the ‘strategy’ index should be treated rather cautiously.
38 MAZGORZATA KOSOWSKA and EDWARD NQCKA

No relationship was found between creativity test scores and analogy task performance,
suggesting that the effects presented in the previous paragraph are specific to the abilities measured
by traditional IQ tests.

Discussion
First, it is worth stressing that the modified verbal analogy task appeared to be a useful means
to study cognitive strategies and their individual correlates. Of course, it is risky to infer about
‘preferences’ on the basis of reaction time data alone (Marquer & Pereira, 1990); all we can be sure
about is the allocation of time over the consecutive stages of the task. Nevertheless, it may be
hypothesized that ‘global’ Ss preferred to press the response button very quickly so that all the
information needed was available for them as soon as possible-and only then did they perform
encoding, inference, mapping, application, and response execution. ‘Analytical’ Ss preferred to
perform a given component of analogical reasoning, as identified by Sternberg’s (1977) theory, as
soon as the partial information necessary to execute a given component was provided. It required
them to spend more time on the preparatory stages, especially the third one in which the crucial
operation of ‘mapping’ probably took place, but they benefitted from the fact that they were better
prepared for the response choice and execution. That is, they were relatively quicker on the last
stage.
The data also indicate that intelligent persons preferred to use the sequential way of coping with
the task’s material. Although this effect is consistent with several previous studies, which showed
that intelligent people pay more attention to the preparatory stages of a cognitive task in order
to be more fast and efficient in the executive stage (see: Sternberg & Gardner, 1983) it should be
treated rather cautiously because of its marginal statistical significance. It is necessary to seek
replication with an increased sample size. In order to find out whether our data replicate when the
number of Ss is increased, and the battery of the tests is slightly modified, we decided to carry
out the second experiment.

EXPERIMENT 2

Method

Subjects
Fifty five male Ss from the Secondary School of Technology in Cracow took part in this study.
Their mean age was about 17.

Materials
The same version of the experimental task was administered in this study. Additionally, the
following battery of psychometric tools was employed: Eysenck Personality Questionnaire
(Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975), Strelau Temperament Inventory-Revised (Strelau, 1983),
Choynowski’s Vocabulary Test, Form B, (Choynowski, 1967), Raven’s Progressive Matrices, series
A through E (Raven et al., 1983).
The change in the battery of tests was motivated by our intention to introduce the classic
personality and temperamental variables, which are believed to be biologically rooted (Eysenck,
1967; Strelau, 1983). The vocabulary test, on the other hand, was applied due to the verbal nature
of the analogy task-we wanted to control the level of Ss’ verbal competence. The TCT-DP was
removed from the battery because virtually no relationship was found previously between this
creativity test and cognitive strategies.

Procedure
During the first, individual session Ss completed the computerized verbal analogy task. After
several days, a group session took place, during which Ss were given the battery of psychometric
tests. This session was organized in their school building.
 Cognitive strategies 39

Results
Table 1 shows the zero-order correlations between psychometric variables and indices of task’s
performance. Raven’s test lost its predictive value in reference to the ‘strategy’ index, albeit its
scores still correlate negatively with error rate and mean solution latency in the fourth stage. The
pattern of correlations brought about by the Vocabulary test, however, closely resembles the one
that we could observe in reference to Raven’s test, Experiment 1. High verbals appeared faster in
the fourth stage, generally more accurate, and preferred the analytical strategy of doing the task.
This finding was confirmed with the MANOVA repeated measures model, when Ss were divided
according to their vocabulary scores. The group by stage interaction, when response latencies were
treated as a dependent variable, appeared slightly significant (F = 2.88, P < 0.05).
With respect to temperamental variables, it was the ‘mobility of nervous processes’ that mattered:
mobile persons were quicker in the second and third stages (mapping!), but still not particularly
error-prone. On the other hand, they more frequently employed the global strategy. STI-R’s
mobility is interpreted as a facility to switch from excitation to inhibition in the neo-Pavlovian
sense. It is closely related to impulsivity and correlates with EPQ’s extraversion (r = 0.54,
P < 0.001, in this study). It is therefore not surprising that extraversion showed the same pattern
of results as mobility did (i.e. negative correlations with response latencies during the preparatory
stages, no correlation with error rate, and negative correlation with the ‘strategy’ index).
Neuroticism, on the other hand, was positively correlated with ‘strategy’, and negatively correlated
with response latencies in the first and fourth stages of the analogical reasoning task. It may
therefore be concluded that the neurotic Ss were slightly faster than the stable ones, and at the
same time they chose to apply the analytical strategy of task’s completion.
Stepwise multiple regression was also employed to assess the joint influence of the individual
traits on the main parameters of task’s performance. When error rate served as a dependent
variable, only Raven’s test and the Vocabulary test entered the equation (R = 0.45, adjusted
R 2 = 0.16, F = 5.06, P < 0.01, p = -0.26, Raven, /3 = -0.28, Vocabulary). No equation was built
with overall speed of task’s performance as a dependent variable. When the ‘strategy’ index served
as a dependent variable, three variables entered the equation: mobility of nervous processes
(/? = - 0.33), neuroticism (p = 0.29) and vocabulary level (/? = 0.24). The regression statistics are
as follows: R = 0.54, adjusted R 2 = 0.24, F = 5.43, P < 0.01. It may therefore be concluded that
the level of task’s accuracy is best predicted by intelligence measures (Raven and Vocabulary),
whereas the mode of task’s performance is predicted by joint influence of temperamental,
personality, and intellectual variables.

Discussion
In Experiment 2, it was the Vocabulary test rather than Raven’s matrices that better predicted
both the level of performance on the analogy task (negative correlations with error rate) and the
mode of performance (positive correlations with ‘strategy’). This result may be due to the relative
difficulty of both tests. In fact, Raven raw scores were quite high in this sample, probably because
the regular version was applied this time. A range effect may therefore have been obtained in which
correlations were lower than they might have been if the range of this variable was not restricted.

Table 1. Correlations between scores obtained from the analogy task and Raven’s
Test, Vocabulary Test, and EPQ (Experiment 2)
RTI RT2 RT3 RT4 Error Strategy
Raven 0.02 0.09 0.07 -0.2s -0.37** 0.18
Vocab. 0.19 0.11 0.11 -0.47*** -0.34** 0.30*
SE -0.20 -0.22 -0.17 0.09 0.04 -0.25’
SI -0.17 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.08
MO -0.13 -0.40” -0.41** 0.17 -0.00 -0.37.’
BA -0.09 -0.33’ -0.35’. 0.14 0.01 0.31
P -0.09 0.07 0.10 -0.01 0.04 0.08
E -0.27. -0.29. -0.17 0.12 0.05 -0.30’
N -0.301 0.23 0.16 -0.34; -0.18 0.36”
L -0.30’ -0.13 -0.09 0.23 0.20 -0.32’
*P <0.05; **f’ <O.Ol; ***P < 0.001. SE= Strength of Excitation (STI-R),
SI = Strength of Inhibition (STI-R), MO = Mobility (STI-R), BA = Balance
(STR-I), P = Psychoticism (EPQ), E = Extraversion (EPQ), N = Neuroticism
(EPQ), L = Lie (EPQ).
40 MAHXRZATA KOSWWSKA and EDWARD N~CKA

On the other hand, Ss recruited from the technical secondary school do not tend to have extensive
vocabulary, at least in comparison to university students. In fact, both measures were correlated
r = 0.48, P < 0.001 in this study) which means that they shared some amount of variance. There
are grounds, therefore, to conclude that the Vocabulary test did assess Ss’ intellectual ability, being
more discriminative than Raven’s matrices concerning this specific sample. Hence, the previously
found relationship between intelligence and analytical strategy choice may be regarded replicated.
Two competing hypotheses concerning the influence of extraversion and mobility on the strategy
preferences may be formulated. The ‘carelessness hypothesis’ states that extraverts tend to solve
cognitive tasks rather quickly, carelessly, and with a tendency to make risky assumptions (Eysenck,
1967). In other words, extraversion and its correlates (e.g. mobility of nervous processes) make
people behave impulsively, and therefore lead them to apply a global strategy, whereas reasoning
tasks by nature rely on the ability to reflect and to curb one’s responses. The ‘flexibility hypothesis’,
on the other hand, emphasizes the mobility notion. Although this trait was originally defined in
physiological, neo-Pavlovian terms, it may easily be redefined as an ability to flexibly change one’s
mental processes and to overcome mental set (Strelau, 1983). In this way, mobility may be perceived
as a cognitive rather than physiological trait (Necka & Rychlicka, 1991; Stocki, 1991) that prompts
people to take into account all the information available before the final response is generated. In
other words, it is reasonable to ascribe the strategic preferences mainly to the ‘mobility of nervous
processes’, whereas the extraversion versus strategy connection might be treated as being
subsequent to the mobility-extraversion correlation. Note that neither mobility nor extraversion
is correlated with error rate (Table 2) which makes the ‘carelessness hypothesis’ rather disputable.

EXPERIMENT 3

The motivation for carrying out Experiment 3 was 2-fold. First, we wanted to increase the
number of Ss substantially, in order to find out whether quite weak relationships found in previous
experiments would replicate, showing that they are weak in nature, or rather vanish, indicating that
they were serendipitous. Second, we wanted to introduce a new assessment tool, intended to
measure the ‘grey area’ between personality and intelligence. Previously obtained data suggested
that the choice of strategy may depend both on personality and intelligence; we therefore
hypothesized that some more clear relationships would appear if such a tool is introduced.

Method

Subjects
Four groups of university students were investigated in the present study: 51 of the department
of Polish, 23 of the department of psychology, 27 of the computer science department, and 22 of
the department of engineering. The total sample consisted of 127 Ss, including 77 females and 50
males, but four Ss had to be removed from analyses because of missing values found in their
records.

Materials
In addition to the verbal analogy task, which remained unchanged, the following psychometric
tools were employed: Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices, Eysenck’s EPQ and the Intellectual
Experience Scale (IES).
The IES is a modified version of the tool proposed by Mayer et al. (1989). We translated the
American version of the scale into Polish and tested it on Polish university students. After this pilot
study, we had to change more than 60% of the original items because of culture and language
specificity, which introduced a lot of confusion and misunderstanding. We kept only those items
from the original which achieved high factor loadings in both American and Polish samples. Then,
we constructed new items to complete the questionnaire, and tested it again. The second pilot study
allowed us to extract four factors: Pragmatic-Utilitarian Attitude, Intellectual Aversion, Intellectual
Absorption, and Intellectual Satisfaction. The Pragmatic-Utilitarian attitude characterizes people
who take up a problem solving activity if they have to or if it is related with some external reward.
People scoring high on Intellectual Aversion avoid every kind of problem solving activity, since
 Cognitive strategies 41

Table 2. Correlations between scores obtained from the analoev task

and psychometric tools (Experiment 3) -’
Intelligence Personality
coefficient r
Raven E N P
‘Strategy’ 0.15 -0.24*+ 0.02 -0.08
Error -0.49*** -0.06 0.12 -0.08
Latencv -0.19 0.12 0.03 -0.12
l*f< 0.001: l*P < 0.01

they perceive problems as a source of anxiety and frustration. Intellectual Absorption amounts to
the tendency to submerge oneself into the problem, to become deeply involved in the process of
thinking. And Intellectual Satisfaction reflects a tendency to enjoy thinking and problem solving,
to be intrinsically rewarded by these kinds of activity. Although some of these factors, especially
absorption and pleasure, may easily be viewed as transitory states, the items are clearly trait-like.

Procedure
The computerized test was applied individually, whereas the ‘paper and pencil’ methods were
presented several days later in small groups.

Results
Table 2 presents the zero-order correlations between psychometric variables (excluding IES) and
parameters of the experimental task’s performance. The negative correlations between Raven’s test
and error rate, as well as between extraversion and the ‘strategy’ index, are consistent with the data
obtained in Experiments 1 and 2. The lack of correlation between Raven and ‘strategy’, on the other
hand, is contradictory to what was obtained in Experiment 1 but compatible with results of
Experiment 2. It is also worth noting that the choice of analytical strategy is not related to
heightened levels of neuroticism in this experiment.
In order to reveal the ‘pure’ relationship between psychometric intelligence and the ‘strategy’
index, we decided to employ a partial correlation approach. This decision was motivated by the
fact that three variables: Raven, error rate, and ‘ strategy’, were mutually intercorrelated, and
therefore might camouflage one another. In fact, the correlation between the ‘strategy’ index and
error rate increased from not significant r = 0.11 (zero-order) to marginally significant r = 0.24,
P -K 0.05 (when Raven scores were partialled out). Unexpectedly, the correlation was positive this
time, showing that the increased number of errors was associated with the choice of analytical
rather than global strategy. However, this effect was too weak to be confirmed by MANOVA: the
stage by accuracy interaction was not significant. The Raven versus ‘strategy’ correlation increased
from not significant r = 0.15 (zero-order) to r = 0.29, P < 0.01 (when error rate was controlled).
We may therefore conclude that there is a tendency for intelligent people to use the analytical
strategy, although this dependency is weak enough to be resistant to the masking influence of other
factors.
With respect to the IES variables, it is interesting to note that only Intellectual Absorption
showed some relationship to task performance: it was negatively correlated with the ‘strategy’
variable (Table 3). The idea that people who easily get involved in the problem at hand tend to

Table 3. Correlations between scores obtained from IES and intelligence, personality, and
the analoav task’s variables (Exoeriment 31
Intellectual Experience Scale
coefficient r
Pragmatic-
utilitarian Intel. Intel. Intel.
attitude aversion absorption satisfaction
‘Strategy’ 0.07 -0.03 -0.33” -0.01
Error 0.06 -0.05 -0.04 0.16
Latency -0.02 0.10 0.15 - 0.08
Raven -0.10 -0.02 -0.01 0.12
Extraversion -0.12 -0.38”’ 0.27** 0.02
Neuroticism 0.23’ 0.30” -0.17 -0.11
Psychoticism -0.15 -0.17 -0.07 0.09
l**P < 0.001; l*P < 0.01; ‘P < 0.05
42 MAZG~RZATA KOS.WWSKAand EDWARD NFCKA

Table 4. Mean latencies of processing four stages of the analogy task for high and low
intelligent, and high and low absorption groups (Experiment 3)
Intelligence Absorption
LOW High LOW High

Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD

RTI 1.43 0.74 1.05 0.61 1.24 0.8 I 0.93 0.52
RT2 0.94 0.90 1.14 I .oo 1.32 1.12 0.78 0.73
RT3 0.85 0.70 1.13 0.98 I .08 0.71 0.91 I .oo
RT4 13.71 7.19 10.80 4.35 10.48 5.37 13.35 6.70

use the global strategy was confirmed through the analysis of variance. The stage by absorption
interaction, when response latencies in the consecutive stages of the analogy tasks served as multiple
dependent variables, appeared statistically significant (F = 3.33, P < 0.03). This effect is shown in
Table 4, along with the corresponding effect of stage by intelligence interaction (F = 3.48,
P < 0.02). At the same time, the IES showed interesting relationships with EPQ (Table 3).
Extraverts scored low on Intellectual Aversion and high on Intellectual Absorption, thus suggesting
that their pursuit of external stimulation and willingness to get involved in various kinds of
activities has not only social and physical but also intellectual aspects. Neurotics, on the other hand,
tended to avoid intellectual activities (the third IES factor), unless they were necessary or suitable
for pragmatic reasons (the first IES factor). In this way, they probably avoid being ‘unnecessarily’
exposed to failure they expect to result from their problem solving activity. These findings look
sensible in the context of Eysenck’s theory of personality. Moreover, they confirm our belief that
the IES is an adequate and theoretically valid tool to assess people’s attitudes toward thinking and
problem solving.
The results revealed by the multiple regression approach were basically consistent with those
obtained through the correlational analyses and MANOVA. With error rate as a dependent
variable, only Raven’s entered the equation, explaining about 25% of variance. Speed of
performance was not related to any other variable, whereas when the ‘strategy’ index served as a
dependent variable, both Raven’s scores and Absorption entered the equation. The parameters of
this equation were not very good, however: R = 0.30, adjusted R2 = 0.06, F = 3.69, P < 0.03,
fl = 0.22 (Raven), B = -0.20 (Absorption).

Discussion
The data support our previous findings that the level of task’s performance is determined mainly
by intellectual factors whereas the mode of performance is determined by joint influence of
personality and intelligence. However, the analytical strategy may be called ‘intelligent’ only in one
sense of the word: it is more typical of intelligent persons (albeit this dependency is rather weak).
It is not ‘intelligent’ per se, since its relationship with error rate was even positive in Experiment
3. It is a somewhat strange result because more intelligent Ss preferred the analytical strategy, and
at the same time they committed fewer errors. It is therefore quite likely that the analytical strategy
may be helpful for effectively solving intellectual tasks, but only for intelligent persons.
Intellectually ‘absorbed’ Ss prefer to use the global strategy. In this respect they were similar
to extraverts and to less intelligent Ss, but there are probably different reasons for this. For less
intelligent Ss, the analytical strategy may simply be too difficult, since its serial, step-by-step nature
probably requires increased processing capacity, particularly-increased working memory ca-
pacity. As we know, increased working memory capacity is an important cognitive prerequisite of
psychometric intelligence (Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Necka, 1992); it may also be a prerequisite
of the choice of analytical strategy. For the ‘absorbed’ people, on the other hand, analytical strategy
may not be compatible with their external orientation, as well as their tendency to get ‘caught into’
a task by its external features-exactly as is the case with extraverts (note the positive correlation
between absorption and extraversion). In other words, people scoring high on absorption may not
be willing to deal with incomplete segments of the task, since these segments do not reveal all
peculiarities of the task. Rather, they proceed as quickly as possible to the final stage in order to
know precisely what kind of task they are dealing with. However, we cannot provide any evidence
to support this speculation.
 Cognitive strategies 43

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Although the relationships observed in these experiments were not very strong, they were
consistent enough to allow us to conclude that the proficiency of doing the analogical reasoning
task depends on intellectual abilities (general reasoning ability and verbal competence), whereas
the strategy of dealing with the task depends both on intellectual abilities and personality variables.
It appears that intelligence and, probably, neuroticism, are associated with the analytical strategy,
whereas extraversion, mobility of nervous processes, and absorption are more likely to be
associated with the global strategy.
In order to understand the theoretical meaning of these relationships, let us speculate on possible
information-processing characteristics of both strategies. In terms of Sternberg’s (1977) componen-
tial theory, the analytical Ss seem to perform each component of the problem solving process as
soon as they have acquired enough information to do so. In particular, they probably perform
encoding and inference in the second stage, and mapping in the third stage. In this way, they are
better prepared for the components of application and response execution, which probably take
place in the fourth stage. Besides, because of the unusual nature of the task, an extra operation
must be performed, i.e. the substitution of meaning of one of the analogy terms; this operation
is probably performed by ‘analytical’ Ss in the first stage. ‘Globalists’, on the other hand, seem
not to perform any component, even substitution of meaning and encoding of initial terms of the
analogy, until the fourth stage, in which all necessary information is available to them. These
allocation policies may account for the reaction time differences we have observed, but they can
hardly account for the effects of intelligence and personality. Because there is no good theory to
account for these effects, let us speculate briefly.
An explanation in terms of working memory and attentional mechanisms supposes that the
analytical Ss possess greater working memory capacity and more focused attention. Therefore, they
can retain the already established partial outputs of reasoning for further elaboration but they
cannot perceive many elements of the problem simultaneously. The global Ss, on the other hand,
may demonstrate lesser working memory capacity but wider focus of attention. Therefore, they
may not be able to store temporarily the partial outputs of reasoning, brought about by encoding
etc., but they may be able to perceive many elements of the task simultaneously. In other words,
the strategy choice may be predetermined by the basic parameters of one’s information processing
system. The analytical, sequential, step-by-step strategy seems to be the best choice for somebody
whose working memory is quite capacious and selective attention quite focused. The global, holistic
strategy, on the other hand, is the best choice for somebody who demonstrates lesser working
memory capacity but wider focus of selective attention.
According to these speculations, intelligent people choose the analytical strategy more frequently
thanks to their increased working memory capacity. In fact, there is evidence to link high level
intellectual abilities with increased working memory capacity (Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Necka,
1992) but not with diffused attention, which might cause the global strategy preferences. As for
neurotics, they probably apply the analytical strategy because of an increased anxiety level. In fact,
the analytical strategy is sometimes associated with negative emotions, whereas the global
(intuitive) one is sometimes associated with positive emotions (Scholz, 1987). In terms of our
theoretical considerations, neurotic anxiety makes one’s attention more narrowed and focused, an
effect well illustrated in the literature (e.g. Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Mathews, 1990). Therefore,
neurotic Ss are predisposed to choose the analytical strategy, since it allows them to control the
problem solving situation more efficiently, that is, to be on time with the solution as soon as the
task allows to-which reduces anxiety and makes them feel secure.
The effects of extraversion and mobility may be accounted for in terms of increased impulsivity,
a trait closely related to both dimensions (Eysenck, 1967). In other words, it is quite probable that
Ss scoring high on the extraversion and mobility scales press response buttons as quickly as possible
because of lowered response activation thresholds, not because of the information processing
prerequisites. A competing line of explanation, however, emphasizes working memory and
attentional mechanisms. As was mentioned elsewhere (see Discussion section, Experiment 2),
extraversion and temperamental mobility may be associated with the notion of cognitive flexibility,
or mental mobility (Necka & Rychlicka, 1991; Stocki, 1991). In terms of physiological constructs
44 MAZGORZATA KO~~OWSKAand EDWARD NFCKA

proposed by Eysenck (1967) and Strelau (1983), extraversion and mobility of nervous processes
are connected with lower cortical arousal. This, in turn, provokes exploratory behavior to increase
the arousal level, on one hand, and widens the attentional focus, on the other hand. In consequence,
extraverts and mobile persons may prefer the global strategy as the one which is best suited for
basic parameters of their both physiological and cognitive functioning.
As to absorption, it is stressed that this trait is connected with ‘diffused’ or ‘dissociated’ attention
(Roche & McConkey, 1990; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974) which probably amounts to the ability
to perceive numerous items of information simultaneously. Thus, the relationship between the
global strategy and absorption may be accounted for in terms of widened attentional focus typical
of intellectually ‘absorbed’ people.
A second line of explanation refers to semantic memory mechanisms. According to the spreading
activation model (Collins & Loftus, 1975), an encoded notion activates its mental representation,
which, in turn, spreads over related representations. Importantly, the ‘energy’ of activation decays
in time. Although the spreading activation model has not been created to account for individual
differences, there are probably good reasons to treat the initial time needed to activate a mental
representation, as well as the tempo of decay of this activation, as individually differentiated
parameters on one’s semantic memory functioning. Hence, analytical Ss might be viewed as
demonstrating slow tempo of activation and slow tempo of decay. Therefore, they may need more
time during the stages l-3 in order to make the terms of analogy activate their representations.
However, due to the slow tempo of decay, the semantic memory nodes-once activated-are still
active in the fourth stage, thus being ready for a relatively quick retrieval and response execution
processes. The global Ss, on the other hand, might be interpreted as showing high tempo of
encoding and high tempo of decay. Due to the first characteristic, they may be relatively quick in
stages l-3, when they start to activate their semantic nodes, but because of the quick tempo of
decay, they have to re-activate these nodes in the fourth stage-and this process takes them some
extra time.
This line of speculation requires that the spreading activation model be substantially recon-
structed with the use of differential notions. It also suggests that high psychometric intelligence and
increased neuroticism may be related to the increased difficulty in making the semantic nodes active,
as well as to slower decay of activation, once triggered. Extraversion, mobility, and absorption,
on the other hand, may be connected with the opposite: quick triggering the activation and its quick
decline. There is no space to discuss the cognitive theory of personality here, the more so that these
mechanisms are highly speculative. It is also quite probable that other models of memory, e.g. the
cue utilization model (Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988) may be more suitable than the classical spreading
activation theory. However, these speculations seem promising in two respects: they are apt to
account for the individual differences in strategy choice and use, and they are likely to advance
the unified theory of personality and intellect-a theory rooted in basic mechanisms of cognition.
It is why we decided to confess to these speculations, realizing how risky a task it was.
Further research is needed to corroborate these speculations. It is also worth investigating what
would happen if experimental trials differed in terms of predictability of mental operations which
are required in the consecutive stages of the task. The analytical strategy looks like a rational choice
in the high predictability conditions, exemplified by our experiments, whereas the global one seems
to be better suited to the low predictability conditions. If intelligent Ss still preferred the analytical
strategy in the low predictability conditions, it might mean that they are ‘psychometrically’ rather
than ‘generally’ intelligent. If, on the other hand, they would demonstrate flexible change in their
strategic preferences, it would mean that abilities assessed by IQ tests are basic enough to
encompass not only the skills needed in test taking but also the capacities required to adapt oneself
to changing environments.

Acknowledgements-This study has been supported by the Grant No. l-1053-91-01 from the Scientific Research Committee
(KBN) to Edward Necka. Selected portions of the results included into this paper were already presented in the form of
posters at the following meetings: the European Conference on Learning and Instruction, Turku, August 1991, the Sixth
European Conference for Personality Psychology, Groningen, June 1992, and the XXVth International Congress of
Psychology, Brussels, July 1992. The authors wish to thank Renata Potyrata and Jolanta Nosal for their cooperation in
data gathering and data analysis (Experiments 1 and 2, respectively). Beata Kozak and Blaiej Szymura contributed a lot
of effort and many creative ideas to the Polish version of the Intellectual Experience Scale. Dr Wolfhart Matthaus,
Ruhr-Universitiit Bochum, Germany, was very helpful in developing the experimental procedure and data interpretation.
 Cognitive strategies 45

Members of Professor R. J. Stemberg’s research group helped us to clarify the theoretical implications of our results. Dr
Joseph A. Horvath deserves specials thanks for critical reading of the first draft of the manuscript.

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