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    Cramer 1998

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    Coping and Defense Mechanisms: What's the Difference? Phebe Cramer Williams College ABSTRACT Defense mechanisms and coping strategies ae discussed as two different types of adaptational processes. They may be clearly differentiated on the basis ofthe psychological processes involved, but not on the basis oftheir relation to outcome measures. Criteria that critically differentiate between defense and coping processes include the conscious/unconscious status andthe intentional/nonintentional nature ofthe processes. Criteria based on the dispo- sitional or situational status ofthe process, and on the conceptualization of the rocestes as hierarchical, are found to be more a matter of emphasis than of critical difference. A criterion tat attempts to differentiate between defense and coping processes onthe bass of theirelation to psychological or physical health is found to be without support once the bias in self-report outcome measures is. recognized. ‘The study of coping strategies as mechanisms of adaptation has become ‘a mainstream interest in personality and social psychological research. Issues such as how people deal with adversity, the kinds of coping processes they use in different situations, and the benefits that accrue from engaging in different coping operations have produced a large body of empirical research (Suls & Harvey, 1996; Zeidner & Endler, 1996). While recognizing the importance of these coping strategies and their role in managing stress and adversity, theve are other psychological ‘mechanisms that may be called on for the same purpose, that is, relieve I wish to express my appreciation to Karina Davidson and Howard Tennen for their helpful comments on earlier versions ofthis paper. Journal of Personality 66:6, Decemiver 1998, Copyright © 1998 by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Steet, Malden, MA 02148, USA. and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 JE, UK. 920 Cramer stress and perceived adversity. Seen by some as the predecessor to the current interest in coping (e.g, Suls, David, & Harvey, 1996; Parker & Endler, 1996), the discovery of defense mechanisms occurred in the framework of explaining how persons managed both internal and exter- nal stressors, Defense mechanisms—i.e., mental mechanisms that alter veridical perception—were postulated to function so as to protect the person from excessive anxiety, whether the source of that anxiety be the perception of a disturbing extemal event or the presence of a disruptive internal psychological state (e.g., a wish, drive, or fear) (A. Freud, 1936), Inthe former case, anxiety resulting from extreme external threat may be reduced by failing to perceive, or to register the meaning of, the threatening event; this is accomplished through the use of the defense of denial (literally “not seeing”) or, alternatively, by not understanding the import of what one is seeing, asin the case of people living in Germany in the early 1940s who “did not know about” the Holocaust. Defense mechanisms may also protect against a disruptive inner state; for exam- ple, for a small boy who is angry at a teacher, it may be less threatening to believe that the teacher is angry at him—that is, to project the anger—than to recognize his wish to assault her. The boy is protected, at least temporarily, from the anxiety that would accompany knowledge of harboring the unacceptable wish to strike the teacher. Defense mecha- nisms, like coping strategies, are ways of dealing with adversity. ‘Because defense mechanisms, like coping mechanisms, function to protect individuals from the emotional consequences of adversity, there hhas been considerable confusion in the literature regarding these two concepts. Further confusion has been added by using the term coping to refer both tothe generic process of responding to adversity and to specific strategies or mechanisms used in the service ofthat process. To avoid this confusion, we suggest that the term “adaptational process” be used to refer to the overarching process of responding to adversity, and that coping and defense be understood as two different types of mechanisms that may serve as means for adaptation. ‘Another source of confusion stems from the proliferation of psycho- logical processes referred to as methods of coping. This category has been significantly expanded to encompass a wide variety of different behaviors reflecting what people do in situations of varying degrees of stress. Since coping and defense both have as a primary function the task of dealing with stress, there has been a tendency, in some cases, to confuse the two processes, as in the use of hybrid terms such as ‘Coping and Defense Mechanisms oan “repressive-coping” (see Weinberger, this volume). Despite the recog- nized need to distinguish coping processes from other adaptational mechanisms (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Leventhal, Suls, & Leventhal, 1993; Tennen & Affleck, 1997; for a different view, see Costa, Somer- field, & McCrae, 1996), there is currently considerable inconsistency in the identification of coping mechanisms and a lack of agreed-upon criteria to decide what is, and what is not, a coping strategy (see Suls & Harvey, 1996; Tennen & Affleck, 1997). The same proliferation has been found within the nomenclature of defense mechanisms, which began with repression as the basic single mechanism (Freud, 1936/1953, 1914/1957a, 1915/1957b) but now includes more than 40 different varie- ties of defense (Bibring et al., 1961). It is the purpose of this article to try to disentangle the confusion between defense and coping mechanisms; to indicate ways in which the two types of processes are clearly different; and to discuss ways in which they are not as different as may have been assumed. As will be discussed in subsequent sections of this article, we suggest that the following criteria may be used to differentiate between defense and coping mecha- rnisms: Coping mechanisms involve a conscious, purposeful effort, while defense mechanisms are processes that occur without conscious effort and without conscious awareness (ie., they are unconscious). Also, coping strategies are carried out with the intent of managing or solving a problem situation, while defense mechanisms occur without conscious intentionality; the latter function to change an internal psychological state but may have no effect on external reality, and so may result in nonverii- cal perception, that is, in reality distortion.! Despite these defining differences, coping and defense mechanisms have been frequently confused in the research literature. Parker and 1. Tam aware here that some researchers might use a more inclusive category for coping processes—for example, by including strategies that relieve anxiety without effor (Coyne & Gotlieb, 1996; Houston, 1987) and/or without addressing the problem (e.g, Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyders [1982] secondary control strategies). Still others would {insist on a more restrictive definition (eg, Teonen & Affleck, 1997). Likewise, there are some who would claim that defenses need not be uneonselous or unintentional Erdely, 1985, 1990), These opinions notwithstanding, the criteria suggested above represent ‘much of the current mainstream thinking about coping (Aldwin, Suton, & Lachman, 1996; Parker & Endler, 1996; Schwarzer & Schwarzer, 1996; Zeidner & Saklofske, 1996) and about defense (Cooper, 1989; Horowitz et al, 1990; Stolorow & Lachman, 1978: Vaillant, 1993). 922 cramer Endler (1996) suggest that this confusion began in the 1960s, when certain adaptive defense mechanisms, such as sublimation, began to be labeled by researchers as “coping activities.” Haan (1977), for example, included sublimation among her group of coping mechanisms, although sublimation had always previously been consistently defined asa defense that serves the purpose of discharging unacceptable internal socially acceptable manner, without awareness or conscious participation in this purpose by the person using the defense (Bibring et al, 1961). On the other hand, Vaillant (1977, 1994; see also Erdelyi, 1990) included suppression among his list of defenses, although suppression clearly /olves conscious, purposeful effort. Vaillant (1990) acknowledges this problem when he notes that “suppression allows the individual to hold all components of a conflict (subject, object, idea and affect) in mind” {ie., keep them in consciousness] “and then to postpone action” (p. 262; ‘my emphasis); he attempts to reconcile the conscious/unconscious dis- crepancy by saying that “suppression reflects a semiconscious decision to defer paying attention to a conscious impulse or conflict” (p. 262; my emphasis). Adding to the confusion, other defenses have been renamed ‘and treated as coping mechanisms (see Baumeister, this volume). Al- ‘though the confusion of higher-level defenses with coping strategies, on the basis of successful adaptation, can be understood, this does not explain the frequent inclusion among coping mechanisms of the defense of denial, a mechanism that occurs without conscious effort of which the person is unaware. Here, it seems likely that the inclusion of denial among coping mechanisms stems from the influential work of Lazarus and Folkman (1984) and their development of the widely used “Ways of Coping" questionnaire. A number ofthe items on this questionnaire seem clearly to reflect denial, for example, “Went on as if nothing had hap- pened” and “Refused to believe that ithad happened.” A further question naire, the COPE, explicitly includes denial as one of the coping strategies (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989). As a further example of the confusion, Strack and Feifel (1996) refer tall of Vaillant’s (1994) defenses, including projection, denial, and repression, as “coping strategies.” Some Early Distinctions Botween Defense and Coping Haan (1977) made a clear distinction between coping and defense: “Coping involves purpose, choice, and flexible shift, adheres to intersubjective Coping and Defense Mechanisms 923 reality and logic, and allows and enhances proportionate affective expres- sion; defensiveness is compelled, negating, rigid, distorting of intersub- jective reality and logic, allows covert impulse expression, and embo the expectancy that anxiety can be relieved without directly addressing the problem” (p. 34). Defense and coping were seen as related, in that they were alternative expressions of underlying “generic processes that people use to solve their general problems of living” (1977, p. 317). For example, Haan described the defense of denial as being related to the coping function of concentration, in that both are manifestations of the generic process of selective awareness. More recently, Plutchik (1995) has postulated a different set of correspondences between specific de- fenses and conceptually related coping styles. In addition to this distinction between defense and coping, Lazarus ‘and Folkman (1984) went on to distinguish among their emotion-focused forms of coping on the basis of those forms that do not distort reality and those that do, due to self-deception. Inthe later group were those coping strategies that “deny both fact and implication ... refuse to acknowledge the worst... actas if what happened did not matter, and so on” (p. 151). Clearly, however, these strategies are examples of the defense of denial. ‘Their inclusion among the coping strategies becomes more confusing when the authors go on to discuss the issue of self-deception, noting that self-deception cannot be successful if the person is aware of deceiving himselffherself. This leads to the logical conclusion that such self-deception must occur without consciousness, and to the further assertion that “cognitive appraisal processes need not be conscious” (p. 151). By stating that coping strategies may occur outside of consciousness, Laz- arus and Folkman made it possible to include denial among the coping processes. However, in blurring the distinction between conscious and unconscious processes as a critical difference between coping and de~ fense, they deviate from the majority of coping researchers, as discussed below. Similarities and Differences in Defense and Coping Mechanisms Both defense mechanisms and coping strategies are processes that are aroused when there is a situation of psychological disequilibrium. In this sense, they are similar in that both are adaptational processes. Further, if the purpose of coping mechanisms is (1) to decrease negative affect, 928 Cramer (2) to retum to baseline functioning as quickly as possible, and (3) to solve or manage the problem (Aldwin, Sutton, & Lachman, 1996), then defense mechanisms may be seen as similar with regard to (1) and (2). Defense mechanisms function (1) to ward off excessive anxiety or other disruptive negative affect, so as (2) to restore a comfortable level of functioning. It is with the third purpose of coping—to solve or manage the problem—that differences between coping and defense are seen. Coping strategies intentionally engage in activity that will address the problem, including diminishing negative affect. Defense mechanisms also function to diminish negative affect, but do so without the conscious intent or awareness of the person that this is happening. In addition, coping strategies will sometimes address the problem by acting directly on the problematic situation, thereby reducing negative affect, while defenses are focused on changing intemal states (negative affect) rather than external reality. ‘A number of dimensions have been used to differentiate between defense and coping. Some of these dimensions, such as the conscious/un- conscious status of the mental processes involved, the issue of intention- ality, and the concept of a hierarchy of processes, seem to reflect clear differences in the conceptions of defense mechanisms and coping strate~ ies. Other issues that have been raised by some to distinguish the two concepts, such as whether they are dispositional or situational, and whether they are related to normality or pathology, are perhaps less clearly differentiating than has been supposed. These concems are dis- cussed in the following sections of this article. Conscious Versus Unconscious Processes ‘The conscioushunconscious status of the mechanism involved is one factor that clearly differentiates defense from coping mechanisms. De- fenses are repeatedly defined as unconscious processes, while coping processes are typically described as conscious strategies (Cramer, 19913, Haan, 1977; Parker & Endler, 1996; Singer & Sincoff, 1990; Suls, David, & Harvey, 1996; Wallerstein, 1967; but see Erdelyi, 1985, 1990). Al- though, as mentioned above, Lazarus and Folkman (1984) included processes occurring outside of awareness among their ways of coping, the majority of coping researchers see these processes as under the conscious control of the person. The implications of the unconscious Coping and Defense Mechanisms 925 status of defense mechanisms as a barrier to their acceptance by research psychologists has been discussed above (Cramer, this volume). Intentionality Related to the issue of consciousness is that of intentionality. Coping strategies “refer to intentional cognitive or behavioral attempts by the individual to manage a stressor” (Affleck & Tennen, 1996, p. 914; see also Leventhal, Suls, & Leventhal, 1993). In contrast to the definition of a coping strategy as a conscious, effortful intention by the person to handle adversity, defense mechanisms function without any conscious participation on the part ofthe individual. Their occurrence is not willed; rational decision making is not involved. This distinction between inten- tional and unintentional acts is also made within the coping domain, where some researchers suggest that “habitual coping” processes such as “habits and automatic behaviors” that occur without intentionality should not be considered as coping strategies (Suls & David, 1996; ‘Tennen & Affleck, 1997). These unintentional habitual coping behaviors, which may involve “little conscious awareness or control,” are seen as alternative modes of adaptation (Suls & David, 1996, p. 999). These coping modes appear to share, at least theoretically, certain critical features of defense mechanisms, namely, lack of conscious awareness and lack of intentionality. Thus, within the coping literature, a need for alternative mechanisms of adaptation beyond intentional coping strate- gies is recognized. One implication of this intentionality distinction between defense and coping is that certain adaptational mechanisms currently considered as defenses by some investigators would be mote appropriately thought of as coping mechanisms. For example, the mechanism of suppression is grouped by Vaillant with the highest level defenses in his hierarchical model (Vaillant, 1977), and, as indicated above, is defined as reflecting “a semiconscious decision to defer paying attention to a conscious impulse or conflict” (Vaillant, 1990, p. 262; my emphasis). Suppression, thus defined, involves a conscious intention to not allow some thought or event to create psychological disturbance. If conscious intent is involved, then suppression would seem beiter considered as a coping strategy rather than as a defense mechanism (see Erdelyi, 1990, for a different opinion). For this reason, Haan (1977) placed suppression among the coping mechanisms, as contrasted with the corresponding defense, 926 cramer repression, in which thought is removed from awareness without con- scious intent Conceptualizing suppression as a coping strategy rather than a high- level defense does make a difference in how one interprets research findings, and may be relevant to the controversy regarding the relation between denial, coping strategies, and mental health (Colvin & Block, 1994; Colvin, Block, & Funder, 1995; Taylor & Brown, 1988, 1994). For example, Vaillant (1976) found that the use of suppression (which he classifies as a defense, although according to the present criteria it is better conceptualized as a coping strategy) was positively associated with rated adjustment and self-assessed happiness, and negatively associated with rated psychiatric illness. If one considers suppression to be a defense, then one would conclude that the use of high-level defenses is associated with psychological well-being, in contrast to the use of low- level defenses, such as denial, which were associated with psychiatric jllness. On the other hand, if suppression is seen as a coping strategy, then the conclusion that one draws is rather different, namely, that coping mechanisms are associated with psychological well-being, while de- fenses are associated with psychological disturbance. ‘Hierarchical Conceptualization of Defenses “Another dimension on which defense and coping processes differ is seen in the conception of defense mechanisms as characterized by a hierarchy. ‘The defense mechanism literature often assumes that defenses may be cofdered in a hierarchy, based on psychological maturity, or complexity, or in association with chronological age. While there may be some confusion between the maturity and age dimensions—for example, an age-appropriate and therefore “mature” defense for a child of 5 is nota mature defense for a man of 25—it is nevertheless possible to order defenses based on a rational dimension of maturity, as Vaillant has done (1976, 1977, 1994), or on a developmental continuum, as demonstrated by Cramer (1987, 1991, 1997). As yet, this hierarchical approach has ‘generally not been part of the coping literature. Although there has been some discussion about successful and unsuccessful coping mechanisms (@cg., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), and Haan (1992) has referred to “lower levels of coping” (p. 264), the idea of ordering coping strategies along a developmental or maturity dimension has not been developed. Investiga- tions of the use of various coping strategies within restricted ranges of Coping and Detense Mechanisms 927 childhood and adolescence have generally not been concerned with developmental differences (Ayers et al., 1996; Dise-Lewis, 1988; Gly- shaw, Cohen, & Towbes, 1989; Mooney, Graziano, & Katz, 1985; Pat- terson & McCubbin, 1987: Wills, 1985), although at least one of these studies (Dise-Lewis, 1988) suggested that some children might lag behind in developing adequate coping strategies—an idea that implies some sort of developmental hierarchy. A review of the few studies concerned with childhood age differences in coping has been provided by Boekaerts (1996), who notes that between ages 6 and 12 primary control strategies (i.e., trying to modify aspects of the situation) decline, while secondacy control strategies (trying to come to terms with unalter- able circumstances) increase; control strategies (e.g., cognit older children and adolescents. Among adults, the question of whether different coping strategies are associated with increasing age has led to inconsistent findings. Using cross-sectional studies, some investigators have found older adults (age 60-70) to use more emotion-focused coping and less problem solving; some researchers find no association between age and coping; and some find problem solving to increase steadily with age (ages 20-75) (see Folkman, 1991, and Strack & Feifel, 1996, for a review of this literature). McCrae (1982, 1989), based on longitudinal studies, has stated explicitly that, among adults, age is not related to coping strategy. (See also Costa, Zonderman, & McCrae, 1991, for a review of these studies.) Although a hierarchy of coping strategies based on a dimension of maturity or cognitive complexity is generally absent from the coping literature, the idea that coping strategies unfold in a predictable temporal sequence —which might be considered to be a horizontal hierarchy—has been considered. For example, it has been suggested (Rothbaum et al., 1982) that when primary control coping strategies— i.e., “attempts to change the world so that it fits the self’s needs” (p. 8)—are unsuccessful, the individual will then engage in secondary control strategies, “attempts to change the self so as to fit more effectively with the environment” (p. 11). Temporal sequencing in the use of coping strategies has also been demonstrated by Carver and Scheier (1994), Folkman and Lazarus (1985) and Tennen and Affleck (1997). Recently, Aspinwall and Taylor (1997) have provided a 5-stage temporal model to describe “proactive coping,” the processes involved in detecting potential stressors and acting in advance to reduce their impact. 928 Cromer Anexception to the general disinterest in the hierarchization of coping mechanisms is found in the work of Leventhal, Suls, and Leventhal (1993). In addition to developing a coping model based on the temporal sequence of events that occur in response to an adverse situation, their model also includes a vertical hierarchy of “lower-level” and “upper- level” coping. The lowest levels involve less controlled, emotional dis- plays. Atan intermediate level are overleamed coping strategies, that is, habits. Upper-level coping consists of mote varied coping intentions “to reduce stress, to be vigilant, to avoid risk, to solve problems at low cost and low effor” (p. 94). The authors also relate this hierarchy to age differences in coping; they find upper-level coping processes of risk aversion and conservation of resources to be more characteristic of persons over age 65, while lower-level emotional displays decline in this age group; avoidance and delay are more common in middle age. Te thus appears that, while the idea of defense mechanisms being arranged in a hierarchical fashion is frequently presented (see Cramer, 1991a, for several different models), it is rare for coping strategies to be characterized in this way. Evidence for temporal sequencing of coping strategies within limited time frames, however, is consistent with the notion of a hierarchical response, but evidence regarding a possible relation between age and coping is as yet inconsistent. Nevertheless, there is sufficient indication in the literature that a hierarchical concep- tualization of coping processes might be feasible. Dispositional or Situational Constructs ‘A further and heretofore major difference in the conceptualization of defense and coping mechanisms is seen in the alternative focus on either dispositions or situations as explanatory factors for the use of these adaptational mechanisms. The concept ofa defense mechanism is clearly ‘a dispositional concept. As with other mental operations, such as assimi- lation, defense mechanisms are conceived of as relatively stable, endur- ing characteristics of individuals. In contrast, coping mechanisms are ‘generally conceived of as being situationally dependent, with a number of researchers taking the position that personality dispositions are unim- portant in determining coping reactions (e.g., Folkman & Lazarus, 1984). Exceptions to this position are scen, for example, in the work of Carver and colleagues (1989) and Watson and Hubbard (1996), and a recent issue of this journal (Suls & Harvey, 1996) has been devoted entirely to Coping and Defense Mechanisms 929 a consideration of the relation between coping and personality. Never- theless, the general thrust of coping research paradigms has been to focus on the effect of situations in determining coping strategies. Thus coping mechanisms are commonly thought of as reactions to situations, while defenses are generally conceived of as dispositions that are part of the individual's enduring personality. Despite this theoretical position, there is little empirical evidence to support the assumption of the dispositional stability of defenses. Reli- ability studies of various defense mechanism measures (see Davidson & MacGregor and Cooper, this volume) are logically based on the assump- tion that defenses are relatively enduring, and use this assumption as a basis for examining test-retest stability. However, if test-retest findings are inconsistent, this might indicate defense inconsistency, or measure- ment error, or both, resulting in inconclusive information regarding dispositional stability. Other evidence for defense stability might be found in longitu. studies of defense use over time, but few such studies are available, Perry ‘and Cooper (1989) studied a small group of psychiatrically disordered viduals, and did find longitudinal consistency in defense use over periods of 3 months to 3 years. Cramer (1998b) has also demonstrated defense stability in college students over a period of 3 years. However, ‘over longer periods of time, the issue of developmental change confounds the question of dispositional stability. Inthe single known longitudinal study of this issue with adults, Vaillant (1976) assessed the use of defenses by Harvard men during their late adolescence, early adulthood (age 20-35), and middle adulthood (over age 35). He found that over this time span the use of immature defenses decreased, while mature defenses increased. Similar developmental change in the use of defenses by schoolage children has been found by Cramer (1997). Thus, both theo- retical and empirical expectations of developmental change in defense ‘use confound the issue of demonstrating longitudinal consistency. Further consideration of the disposition/situation issue suggests that this is morea matter of emphasis than a factor that critically differentiates between defense and coping, It is obvious that situational factors are also important in the use of defenses; situations of threat are more likely to elicit the use of a defense than are benign situations, as has been demonstrated experimentally (e.g., Bramel, 1963; Cramer, 1991b, 1998a; Cramer & Gaul, 1988; Holmes, 1968, 1978; Pitiner, Houston, & Spitidigliozzi, 1983; Rosenwald, 1972; Rosenwald et a., 1966). However, 930 Cramer defense mechanism research generally has not focused on the issue of demonstrating dispositional stability, which would involve assessing individual defense use under varying situations of threat. Rather, the goal has more often been to relate specific defenses to specific personality or psychosocial dispositions (for a review of this literature, see Cramer, 1991a; Ihilevich & Gleser, 1986; Vaillant, 1977, 1993). Clearly, more research focused on the elation between type of situation and particular defense use is needed. On the other hand, despite the characterization of coping mechanisms 1s being situation- rather than person-specific, there is as yet no clear ‘evidence that the same situation will elicit the same coping strategy on different occasions (Suls, David, & Harvey, 1996). Instead, evidence is mounting that coping strategies are relatively stable dispositions, that these coping dispositions are related to personality traits (Watson & ‘Hubbard, 1996), and that both situational and personality factors, and their interaction, are significant predictors of coping strategies (O'Brien & DeLongis, 1996). “Thus the distinction between defense and coping on the basis of being dispositionally or situationally determined may be more apparent than real. On the one hand, itis conceivable that situations involving different types or degrees of stress would elicit different defense mechanisms; this, is clearly an area in which more research is much needed. On the other hand, there is evidence accumulating that coping strategies may in fact be dispositional variables. In general, the either/or distinction—disposi- tion versus situation—seems unnecessary. If defenses are, indeed, endur- ing stable mechanisms within the personality of the individual, this does not preclude their being sensitive to situational factors. Indeed, one function of defense is to “ward off” threatening extemal stimuli (A. Freud, 1936). Likewise if coping mechanisms are “state-sensitive,” does this mean that they cannot also be personal dispositions? If there is variability inthe scores that people obtain on coping strategy measures, and if these measures are reliable over time, then what is it that accounts for this variability if not individual dispositions? Further, rejecting the possibility of coping mechanisms being rela- tively stable personality dispositions on the basis that itis possible to create situations in which almost all or almost none of the persons tested ‘demonstrate the use of coping mechanisms, as asserted by Taylor and ‘Armor (1996), is an unconvincing argument against coping as disposi- tional, One can create situations in which there is no threat, or in which Coping and Defense Mechanisms 931 there is extreme threat. When there is no threat, there is no need to use coping (or defense) mechanisms, and so the person variable accounts for little or none of the variance in behavior. Likewise, under conditions of extreme adversity, the person may call out any and all protective mecha- nisms available, and again, individual differences will not be demon- strated? But most of life is lived in less extreme circumstances, with ‘umerous encounters with moderate amounts of stress. It is in these circumstances that we are likely to find “individual differences.” On the fother hand, if one statistically controls for individual differences in coping (e.g., Neter, Taylor, & Kemeny, reported in Taylor & Armor, 1996), one is unlikely to find them influencing outcome behavior. Normality Versus Pathology A final consideration that has frequently been used to distinguish be- tween defense and coping isthe idea that defenses are part of psychopa- thology, while coping mechanisms are part of normal psychological functioning. As discussed above (Cramer, this volume), this distinction is based on a conception of defenses derived from pre-1930 psychoana- lytic writings; it has not been part of psychoanalytic theory for the past 60 years. In 1936, Anna Freud, in The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, stated explicitly thatthe use of defense mechanisms is a neces- sary part of normal development, and that defenses may be considered pathological only if they are used with too great intensity, or if they are age-inappropriate, or if they continue to be used in situations where they are no longer needed. Subsequently, Loewenstein (1967) noted that defenses are “essential parts of the normal human mind” (p. 797), and he warned against the “one-sided view [that] has considered them to be pathogenic or morbid in themselves” (p. 796). Further discussion in psychoanalytic theory of the role of defenses as part of normal develop- ‘ment is found in Lampl de-Groot (1957), Mahler and MeDevitt (1968), Sandler and Joffe (1967), van der Leeuw (1971), and Wallerstein (1967). (See also Cooper, this volume). Let us say then, once again, as stated in the definition of defense provided in the opening article of this special issue, that defense mechanisms are mental processes that are part of 2. Itis noteworthy tat Taylor uses this argument to explain why the coping strategy of ‘downward comparison didnot show the expected relation to indicators of reat ina 1992 study (Taylor etal, 1992), 932 Cramer normal psychological development. As with any psychological function, ‘anormal process may come to serve pathological ends if overused, orif age- or situationally inappropriate. However, the distinction between defense and coping on the basis of pathology or normality is not well founded. Several other attempts to distinguish between coping and defense ‘mechanisms on the basis of relation to pathology are equally problem- atical. For example, it has been argued that coping mechanisms must be something different from defenses, since coping mechanisms, such as, “positive illusion,” promote mental health, but defenses (cognitive dis- tortions) are not related to psychological health? However, this conclu- sion is not supported by research findings. Both theory and empirical ‘evidence indicate that the question of the relation between defense and pathology depends on which part of the defense hierarchy is being considered. While lower-level defenses, such as spitting or denial, when used by adults, are likely to be positively correlated with measures of pathology, higher-level defenses, such as sublimation, have been dem- ‘onstrated to be positively related to psychological adjustment (Vaillant, 1977, 1993, 1994). Similarly, while many studies report a positive association between certain coping strategies and positive outcome measures, other studies have found that coping scales (especially those assessing emotion-focused coping strategies) are more often associated with negative than with positive outcomes (Bolger, 1990; Carver & ‘Scheier, 1994; Watson & Hubbard, 1996). Indeed, Aldwin and Revenson (1987) concluded that “the coping strategies assessed here appeared primarily to increase emotional distress” (p. 345), although results such fas these may in part reflect an overlap between coping and distress measures, or may indicate that people who are more distressed engage in more coping strategies. To accommodate the evidence that coping strategies do not always lead to positive outcomes, Aspinwall and Taylor (1993) have created a “proactive coping” model that recognizes that there are coping strategies that create more rather than less stress, that i, that are not adaptive. ‘Beyond the question of whether defense/coping mechanisms are posi- tively/negatively correlated with adjustment, there is a critical problem 3, ‘Taylor places “positive illusions” in the group of "active coping” strategies Taylor & ‘Armor, 1996) although this strategy may not meet all ofthe criteria for coping discussed ‘atler, Nevertheless, Taylors clear that “postive illusions” are examples of coping, not of defense Coping and Defense Mechanisms 933 in using self-report measures to assess outcome status, as discussed in the next section of this paper. Briefly, the issue is this: If we assume relatively stable personality dispositions, a person who engages in posi- tive illusions (or who uses denial) when faced with psychological upset may be expected to use that same disposition when asked to report on other upset-related aspects of his or her life, such as unhappiness; this results in the person underreporting negative experiences, and thus appearing to be more happy, or better adjusted. Given the current theoretical conceptualization of defenses, and con- sidering the research findings, it is clear that the normality/pathology

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