ELUCIDATION ONE * God produces whatever is real in the mind’s impulses and in the determinations of these impulses; nevertheless, He is not the author of sin. God produces whatever is real in sensations of concupiscence, and yet He is not the author of our concupiscence. Some people hold that I gave up the mind’s comparison with matter too soon,* and they imagine that it is no more capable than matter of determining the impression God gives it, They would have me explain, if 1 can, what God does in us and what we ourselves do when we sin, because in their opinion, my explana- tion would make me either agree that man is capable of giving himself some new modification, or else recognize that God is the true cause of sin. I answer that faith, reason, and the inner sensation I have of myself force me to abandon my comparison where I do; for I am entirely convinced that I have within myself a principle of my determinations, whereas I have reasons to be- lieve that matter has no such principle. This will be proved later. But here is what God does in us and what we ourselves do when we sin. First, God unceasingly impels us by an irresistible impression toward the good in general. Second, He represents to us the idea of some particular good, or gives us the sensation of it. Finally, He leads us toward this particular good. God unceasingly impels us toward the good in general, for (1) God made and preserves us for Himself, (2) He wills that we love everything that is good, (3) He is the prime, or rather, the only, mover. Finally, this is clear from an infinity of things I have said elsewhere, and those to whom I am speaking agree with it. God presents to us the idea of a particular good or gives us the sensation of it, for only He can enlighten us. The bodies that surround us cannot act on our mind, nor are we our own light or happiness. This I have proved at length in the third book and elsewhere. Finally, God leads us toward this particular good; for since God leads us toward all that is good, it is a necessary consequence that He lead us toward *Ch. 1. 547548 Nicolas Malebranche particular goods when He produces the perception or sensation of them in our soul. This is all that God does in us when we sin. But since a particular good does not contain all other goods, and since the mind when it considers this good clearly and distinctly cannot believe that it contains them all, God does not lead us either necessarily or invincibly to the love of this good. We feel that we are free to halt this love, that we have an impulse to go farther—in short, that the impression we have for the universal good (or, to speak as others do, our will) is neither constrained nor necessitated to halt at this particular good. Here then is what the sinner does. He stops, he rests, he does not follow God's impression —he does nothing, for sin is nothing. He knows the great rule he must observe is that he must make as much use of his freedom as he can, and that he must not be content with any good unless he is inwardly convinced that not to will to rest with it would be to contravene order. If he does not discover this rule through the light of his reason, he will at least come to know it through the secret reproaches of his conscience. He ought, then, to follow the impression he re- ceives for the universal good and to think of goods other than the one he is actually enjoying and of which he should only make use. For by thinking about goods other than the one he is enjoying, he can excite in himself new determina- tions of his love, and make use of his freedom by consenting to these new determinations. Now I shall prove that through the impression God gives him for the good in general he can think about goods other than the one he is enjoying, because it is in precisely this that the difficulty consists. It is a law of nature that the ideas of objects are presented to the mind as soon as we will to think of them, provided that our capacity for thought is not exhausted by the lively and confused sensations we receive upon occasion of bodily events. Now, we can will to think about all things, because the natural impression carrying us toward the good extends to all the goods we can think about—and we can at all times think about all things, because we are joined to Him who contains the ideas of all things as I have proved elsewhere.* If it is true, then, that we can will to consider more closely what we already see, as it were, at a distance (since we are joined to Reason, which contains the ideas of all beings), and if it is certain that in virtue of the laws of nature ideas come to us as soon as we will so, then we must conclude: First, that we have a principle of our own determinations. For the actual presence of particular ideas positively determines toward particular goods our impulse toward the good in general and changes our natural love into voluntary love when we rest. Our consent or our inactivity upon perceiving a particular good is nothing real or positive on our part, as I shall explain below. Second, that this principle of our determinations is always free with regard to particular goods. For we are not invincibly lead to love them, since we can examine them in themselves and compare them with the idea we have of the sovereign good or with other particular goods. Thus, the principle of our freedom “Read the chapter of the third book entitled, ‘“That we see all things in God,”” and the Elucidation on this chapter [10].550 Nicolas Malebranche with a constant force toward Himself; for He urges us toward the good in general to the extent that we are capable of it, and we are at all times equally capable of it because our will, or natural capacity for willing, is always equal to itself. Thus, the impression or natural impulse that leads us toward the good never increases or diminishes. I grant that we have no clear idea, nor even an inner sensation, of this con- stancy of impression or natural impulse toward the good. But this is because we do not know ourselves by idea, as | have proved elsewhere,* and because we are not aware of our faculties when they are not actually in operation. Whatever is natural, commonplace, and always the same in us, such as the warmth and beating of our heart, goes unnoticed, We are not even aware of our habits, and whether we are worthy of the love or wrath of God.” Perhaps there are countless faculties or capacities in us of which we know nothing, for we do not have an inner senation of all that we are, but only of what is actually taking place in us. If we had never felt pain or desired particular goods, the inner sensation we have of ourselves would not enable us to discover whether we were capable of feeling pain or of wishing for such goods. Our memory, and not inner sensation, informs us that we are capable of feeling what we no longer feel. Thus, nothing precludes us from believing that God always urges us toward Himself with a constant force, though in quite different ways, or that He always conserves in our soul an equal capacity for willing, or the same will, as He conserves in all matter taken as a whole an equal quantity of force or motion in the same direction. But even if this were not certain, I do not see how the increase or decrease of our soul's natural impulse could be said to depend on us, because we cannot be the cause of the scope of our own will, and because it does not depend on us to wish to be happy. It is also certain from what I have said before that God also produces and preserves in us whatever is real and positive in the particular determinations of our soul’s impulse, viz., our ideas and sensations. For this is what naturally determines our impulse for the good in general toward particular goods, though not in a way that is invincible, because we have an impulse to carry on farther. Consequently, all that we do when we sin is not to do all that we nonetheless have the power of doing as a result of the natural impression we have toward Him who contains all goods, which impression gives us this power, for we can do nothing except through the power we receive from our union with Him who does all things in us. And it seems evident to me that if we did not desire to be happy, or if we did not have an impression for the good in general, we would be incapable of loving any particular good. Now principally what makes us sin is that since we prefer enjoying things to examining them (on account of the pleasure we feel in enjoying them and the pain we feel in examining them), we cease using the impulse given us for seeking out and examining the good and we stop at the enjoyment of things we ought only to use. But if you attend to this closely, you will see that in it there is nothing real on our part except a lack or See the second part of book 3, chapter 7, number 4, and the Elucidation where I return to this matter [11]. >«Nemo scit utrum amore, vel odio dignus sit."" Eccles. 41 [9:1].552 Nicolas Malebranche that it exist, and He wills it to exist either here or there, for He cannot create it nowhere. And if He creates it here, is it conceivable that a creature should displace it and move it elsewhere unless God at the same time wills to create it elsewhere in order to share His power with His creature as far as it is capable of it? But if this be assumed possible or not to contain a metaphysical contradiction, for only that is impossible for God, by what principle of reason or religion can the dependence of creatures be diminished? But I shall speak elsewhere of the supposed efficacy of secondary causes.* I shall now retum to the topic. T say, then, that this action, or rather this impression or natural desire we have for happiness, depends on us in this sense, that it is not invincible with regard to particular goods. For when a particular good is presented to us, we have an inner sensation of our freedom with regard to it, just as we have of pleasure and pain when we feel them. We are even convinced of our freedom by the same reason that convinces us of our existence, for it is the inner sensation we have of our thoughts that informs us of our existence. And if, while we sense our freedom with regard to a particular good, we must doubt that we are free because we have no clear idea of our freedom, then we would also have to doubt our pain and our existence while we are miserable, because we have no clear idea of our soul or of our pain, but only an inner sensation of them. Inner sensation is different from our external senses. The latter always deceive us in some way when we follow their reports; but our inner sensation never deceives us. Through my external senses I see colors on the surface of bodies, hear sound in the air, feel pain in my hand, and I fall into error if I judge these things on the basis of what my senses report. But through inner sensation I know that I see color, hear a sound, suffer pain; and I do not err in believing that I see when I see, that I hear when I hear, that I suffer when I suffer—provided that I let it go at that. I do not explain these things at greater length because they are clear by themselves. Thus, since we have an inner sensation of our freedom while a particular good is present to our mind, we must not doubt that we are free with regard to this good. Nonetheless, since we do not always have this inner sensation and since we sometimes consult only its confused residue in our mem- ory, we can by thinking about abstract reasons, which prevent us from being aware of ourselves, convince ourselves that it is not possible that man should be free —just as a Stoic who has everything and who philosophizes in comfort might imagine that pain is not an evil because the inner sensation he has of himself does not actually convince him of the contrary. Like Seneca he may prove by reasons which in a sense are quite true that it is even a contradiction that the wise man should be unhappy. Yet even if the inner sensation we have of ourselves were not enough to convince us that we are free, we could persuade ourselves of our freedom through reason. For, convinced as we are through the light of reason that God acts only for Himself and that He cannot give us an impulse that does not tend toward Himself, the impression toward the good in general might be invincible; See the Elucidation [15] on this subject and the seventh Dialogue on MetaphysicsElucidations of the Search after Truth 555 amount of time is necessary to determine whether some good is a true or false good, and even whether while pausing over some good represented or felt as a true good or cause of some actual pleasure, this good might not become an evil because while pausing over it possession of some greater good might be lost. It follows from what I have just said, first, that we are materially predeter- mined toward the good in general, because we necessarily will to be happy and because the desire for happiness is in us independently of us. Second, that we are also materially predetermined toward particular goods in this sense, that we are urged toward what we know and relish as good. The soul’s natural impulse toward particular goods is, in effect, but a natural consequence of its impulse toward the good in general. Thus, all pleasure is by itself efficacious in relation to the will, for it moves and urges it, as it were, toward the object. Third, that every pleasure or material motive, although efficacious by itself in relation to the will it moves, is not efficacious by itself in relation to the will’s consent; for it does not remove the soul’s desire to be genuinely happy, or the power to withhold its consent and to examine whether such a pleasure accords with the sovereign happiness it invincibly desires. Fourth, that therefore the grace of Jesus Christ,* prevenient delight, although efficacious by itself in relation to the will that it excites and moves, is not efficacious by itself in relation to the consent of the will, which can consent to it, and which resists it only too often—either because as the soul withholds its consent too long spiritual delight does not continue, or because concupiscence constantly provides motives that are contrary to it. Fifth, that it is nonetheless God who through His grace operates in us our volition and conduct, for it is He who begins our conversion. His grace must dispose our will, for we must be aware [sentir] before consenting [consentir]. Thus, God does not cooperate as the Pelagians would have it; rather, He operates and it is we who cooperate—for He who begins, and without whom nothing is possible, is He who, strictly speaking, operates. God’s grace travels, as it were, both before the will and with the will, not by producing the act of consent, but by letting the active faculty of the soul, the will that it moves, produce it. And God’s omnipotence seems all the greater in that He makes use of free causes as success- fully as He does of necessary ones, and His goodness all the greater in that in making us act in complete freedom, He (through the help of His entirely gratui- tous grace) makes us worthy of the rewards He has promised and wills to bestow with justice upon those who cooperate with Him. ‘*His ergo modis,”’ says Saint Augustine, ‘‘quando Deus agit cum anima rationali, ut ei credat, neque enim credere potest quodlibet libero arbitrio, si nulla sit suasio vel vocatio cui credat; perfecto & ipsum velle credere Deus operatur in homine, & in omnibus mis- ericordia ejus praevenit nos: consentire autem vocationi Dei, vel ab ea dessentire, sicut dixi, propriae voluntatis est’’ (De spiritu & littera, ch. 34). Here is an objection usually raised against what I said above, that God pro- duces everything of a real nature in us when we sin; and although it is quite weak, *This is explained at greater length in the first of four letters in the second volume of my replies to Amauld.558 Nicolas Malebranche The soul’s pleasure, as well as its impulse or its love, is materially good; and there is no good that God fails to do. The rebellion of the body and the malignity of pleasure come from sin, just as the soul's attachment to a particular good, or its rest, comes from the sinner; but these are only privations and nonbeings of which the creature is capable. All pleasure is good and to some extent even makes those who enjoy it happy, at least while they are enjoying it. But pleasure may be said to be evil because instead of raising the mind to Him who causes it, through our mind’s error and our heart’s corruption it lowers the mind to the sensible objects that seem to cause it. It is evil because, given that we are sinners and consequently deserving more to be punished than to be rewarded, it is unjust for us to require God as a result of His decrees to reward us with pleasant sensations. In short (for I do not want to repeat here what I have said elsewhere), it is evil because God now forbids it since it turns the mind away from Him, the mind that He created and preserves only for Himself. For what God had formerly ordained to preserve man in his innocence now fixes the sinner in his sin, and the sensations of pleasure He had wisely established as the quickest means of informing man (without distracting his reason from its true good) whether he should unite with the bodies surround- ing him now exhaust his mind's capacity and attach him to objects incapable of acting on him and infinitely below him (because he considers these objects as the true causes of the happiness he enjoys upon their occasion, and because it is not up to him to arrest the motion they excite in him).