Chapter 3 Problems Problem #1 The court should rule in favor of the plaintiff.

The New York court has a personal jurisdiction under a long-arm statute, assertion of which is reasonable and hence consistent with due process given the circumstances. The defendant had sufficient minimum contact with the forum state, to which it purposefully availed itself. Weighing in the burden imposed on Navitas, the exercise of the jurisdiction over the defendant does not offend the traditional notion of fair play and substantial justice. The Due Process Clause provides that the court can exercise jurisdiction, so long as there exists minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state, and exercise of jurisdiction is fair and reasonable. The minimum contacts is established when, (1) the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum, (2) the claim arises out of or relates to the defendants forum-related activities, and (3) the defendant could reasonably foresee being haled into court there. In the instant case, all three minimum requirements are met. First, the plaintiffs claim relates to the defendants contact with New York, in which the defendants product has caused injury to the plaintiff. Second albeit indirectly, Navitas purposefully availed itself to the benefits of transacting business in New York. The defendant intentionally placed its products to the stream of commerce by entering into an exclusive sales right agreement with Kurz. Through Kurz, Navitas manifestly attempted to serve the New York market. Third, Navitas could foresee being haled into court in New York. Through the contract with Kurz, Navitas was more than aware that its equipment would find their ways to residents of the forum State. Therefore, Navitas expected or should reasonable have expected that its actions would have consequences in New York. According to Navitas, it has no offices, employees or assets in the United States; also, it never provided any service in New York, nor has it ever made a contract in New York. However, absence of physical contact with the forum state cannot be a sufficient reason to avoid personal jurisdiction, as long as the defendant purposefully directed his efforts toward residents of another State. In other words, indirect sellers can be subjected to the jurisdiction, if he otherwise takes an overt steps aimed at the forum consumers. Navitas manifestly directed his efforts to the residents of New York by placing its products in the stream of commerce; hence the defendants purposeful direction defeats its absence of physical contact with New York. Having demonstrated the minimum contacts requirement of Due Process Clause, reasonableness of exercising the jurisdiction must be discussed. In determining the reasonableness, we look to the burden imposed on the defendant. The defendant resides in Japan, the distance to which may seem to be substantial burden. However, changes in modern transportation have made it much less burdensome for a party to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity,

and the substantial burden imposed on the defendant alone cannot overcome the plaintiffs threshold showing of minimum contacts. The defendant attempted indirectly to serve the New York market, while being shielded by the laws of the State. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burden of litigation in that forum as well. Navitas movement to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied.

Problem #2 The court should rule in favor of the defendant. The Maryland court does not have personal jurisdiction under a long-arm statute, assertion of which is consistent with due process given the circumstances. The plaintiff has failed to give sufficient evidence that the defendants minimum contacts with the forum is strong enough to constitutionally subject them to personal jurisdiction. The Due Process Clause provides that the court can exercise personal jurisdiction, so long as there exists minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state, and exercise of jurisdiction is fair and reasonable. To establish minimum contacts, the plaintiffs claim (1) must arise out of or relates to the defendants contact with the forum state; (2) the defendant purposefully availed himself to the privilege of doing business in the forum state; (3) the defendant could foresee being haled into court there. In order to meet the second prong of the minimum contacts, the plaintiffs claim must satisfy the Calder effects test. To pass the test, the defendant (1) must have committed intentional act, which was (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, and (3) caused harm, the brunt of which is suffered and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state. The plaintiffs claim did not meet the test. It failed to show evidence that the defendant committed intentional act expressly aimed at the forum state. The only acts identified by the plaintiff as being directed to Maryland are the website with the domain name ebs.com and joint venture with a U.S. firm located in Maryland. These acts are not individualized targeting at Maryland. The defendants operation is legitimate and is expressly aimed at African market, not Maryland. Therefore, regardless of foreseeable effect, the above acts are insufficient to establish jurisdiction. Hence the nature and quality of the defendants contacts with the forum state was not substantial enough to prove minimum contacts. Failure to meet minimum contacts coupled with considerable burden imposed on the defendant, exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant by Maryland court would violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Accordingly, the defendants motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction should be granted.

Chapter 5 Holman v. Johnson Every action tried in England must be tried by the laws of England. The English law says, with regard to the contracts legally made abroad, the laws of the country where the cause of action arose shall govern. The present case involves the violation of a revenue law, which no country would ever take notice of. The defendant contends that the English court will not lend its aid to a man whose cause of action was upon an immoral or an illegal act. In the instant case, however, the contract was completed at Dunkirk. Regardless of knowing the plaintiffs intent to violate the English tax law, the defendant delivered the goods at Dunkirk, at which his interest was at an end. The original contact was good and valid. Therefore, as the contract was legally made and performed in France, the French law should govern the case. Consequently, the French court would not recognize the revenue law of England; hence, the contract must be enforced and plaintiff be paid.

Government of India v. Taylor Every action tried in England must be tried by the laws of England. English court will not enforce the penal or revenue laws of another country at the suit of that country; because no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another. Besides not recognizing revenue laws of another, according to Judge Learned Hand, the court tends not to make judgment for public order of another State. Unlike the case between private persons, cases that concerns relations between two sovereign countries require much discretion. Tax gather is not a matter of contract but of authority and administration; it involves diplomatic issue. Therefore, in deciding whether to apply a particular foreign penal or revenue law, courts risk insulting the foreign State; it is best to stay out of the business altogether.

Regazzoni v. Sethia Every action tried in England must be tried by the laws of England. The English law says, with regard to the contracts legally made abroad, the laws of the country where the cause of action arose shall govern. It is settled by prior cases that the English court will not enforce the penal or revenue laws of another country at the suit of that country; because no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another. However, we are concerned with different question whether a court will enforce a contract, which involves doing in a foreign country of an illegal act prohibited by that country.

This case does not involve the enforcement of Indian law in England, but the respect to the justification of that countrys government. We do not desire to prejudice the international relations, by putting in our judgment. Time has changed. As Lord Somervell mentions, one country takes no notice of the revenue law of another seems to have been based on the principle that smuggling and freedom gang together, the courts should no longer put national interest to the prejudice of international comity. We must begin to view the issue through the lens of comity. By recognizing this Indian law so that an agreement which involves a breach of that law within Indian territory is unenforceable we express no opinion whatever either favorable or adverse, as to the policy which caused its enactment. Therefore, the appeal by the defendant should be dismissed.

Pasquantino v. United States Every action tried in the U.S. must be tried by the American laws. Concept of revenue rule has flexibility that rather than barring any recognition of foreign revenue law, it allows the courts to refuse to enforce the tax judgment of another; therefore, the revenue rule does not preclude government from prosecuting petitioners who committed domestic criminal conduct. Accordingly, federal wire fraud statute holds the petitioners guilty. Petitioners contention that the U.S. should not recognize the revenue laws of Canada, and hence the components of wire fraud statute are not satisfied, is not valid. A court would not stop an action, of which the primary object is to deter and punish fraudulent conducts. Hence, the purpose of awarding restitution is not to collect foreign tax at the suit of that country, but to promote appropriate punishment against criminal acts. Although the court will not aid a foreign countrys effort in enforcing its revenue laws, it also will not forego a just and equitable administration to preserve the former revenue rule.

Chapter 6 Problem #1 (A) The court should rule in favor of the plaintiff. The New York court has a personal jurisdiction under a long-arm statute, assertion of which is reasonable and hence consistent with due process given the circumstances. The defendant had sufficient minimum contact with the forum state, to which it purposefully directed his efforts to the residents of New York. Weighing in the burden imposed on Fallwell, the exercise of the jurisdiction over the defendant does not offend the traditional notion of fair play and substantial justice. The Due Process Clause provides that the court can exercise jurisdiction, so long as there exists minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state, and exercise of jurisdiction is fair and reasonable. The minimum contacts is established when, (1) the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum, (2) the claim arises out of or relates to the defendants forum-related activities, and (3) the defendant could reasonably foresee being haled into court there. In order to meet the first prong of the minimum contacts, the plaintiffs claim must satisfy the Calder effects test. To pass the test, the defendant (1) must have committed intentional act, which was (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, and (3) caused harm, the brunt of which is suffered and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state. In the instant case, the Calder effects test is satisfied. Fallwell intentionally started a countertakeover rumor, expressly aimed at the plaintiff resided in New York, in which the monetary damages are felt and suffered. Hence, the second prong of minimum contacts test is also satisfied. Lastly, Fallwell could foresee being haled into court in New York. Through numerous phone calls and personal meetings with Leasco, Fallwell was more than aware that Leasco was based in New York, and expected or should reasonable have expected that his actions would have consequences in New York. Having demonstrated the minimum contacts requirement of Due Process Clause, reasonableness of exercising the jurisdiction must be discussed. In determining the reasonableness, we look to the burden imposed on the defendant. The defendant resides in London, the distance to which may seem to be substantial burden. However, changes in modern transportation have made it much less burdensome for a party to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity, and the substantial burden imposed on the defendant alone cannot overcome the plaintiffs threshold showing of minimum contacts. Weighing the given circumstances and burdens upon Fallwell, it is not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burden of litigation in New York.

(B) Judgment would be given to dismiss the motion by Fallwell that the U.S. Securities Act does not apply to him. Jurisdiction to prescribe the laws of one country to the citizens of another should be approached in three parts: (1) Does the deceptive practice by Fallwell affect, or was it intended to affect, the foreign securities exchange in the United States? (2) Is it of such a type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a violation of the U.S. Securities Act? (3) As a matter of international comity and fairness, should the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States be asserted to cover it? Assuming that the allegations by the plaintiff are true and proven, the second prong is satisfied. In regards to the first, Fallwells deceptive practices in sales of securities affect the foreign securities exchange in the United States. Soliciting Americans to buy stocks on false information, and thereby cause damages to investors would discourage American from engaging in foreign securities exchange. Third, although the defendant is the citizen of England, there has been no indication of any conflict with the law or policy of English government; because the English governments policies were not vitiated by the American courts prescribing securities laws upon Fallwell. It is true that the agreement to buy the Fallwells stocks took place in London. Nevertheless, as Judge Wilkie stated, it is against the fairness how the effects easily pierce our borders and sovereign walls, yet our laws are reflected back. Especially in modern business world, it has become irrelevant from where the cause of action arosethe issue should be where are the effects felt? And in the present case, the substantial effects were felt in the United States. Therefore, even though business agreement affecting the United States was made outside the forum, the Fallwells transaction ought not to be immunized. Under these circumstances, the court should deny the defendants motion that the U.S. Securities Act does not apply to him.

Problem #2 CasinoWorld would first make an argument to dismiss that United States has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. It would contend that the gambling at issue arose from Antigua, where gambling is legal. If this does not work, it would then argue that crimes can only be prosecuted in the country in which they were committed. The alleged crime was committed in Antigua; therefore, Antiguan court should have the predominating prescriptive jurisdiction over the defendant. If proven innocent in the Antiguan court, accordingly to the international comity, the United States court should respect and recognize the judgment delivered by the Antiguan court, laws of which do not come as repugnant to the United States court.

Judgment would be given to dismiss the motion by Casinoworld. The New York court has a personal jurisdiction under a long-arm statute, assertion of which is reasonable and hence consistent with due process given the circumstances. The defendant had sufficient minimum contact with the forum state, to which it purposefully directed his efforts to the residents of New York. Weighing in the burden imposed on Casinoworld, the exercise of the jurisdiction over the defendant does not offend the traditional notion of fair play and substantial justice. The Due Process Clause provides that the court can exercise jurisdiction, so long as there exists minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state, and exercise of jurisdiction is fair and reasonable. The minimum contacts is established when, (1) the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum, (2) the claim arises out of or relates to the defendants forum-related activities, and (3) the defendant could reasonably foresee being haled into court there. In order to meet the first prong of the minimum contacts, the plaintiffs claim must satisfy the Calder effects test. To pass the test, the defendant (1) must have committed intentional act, which was (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, and (3) caused harm, the brunt of which is suffered and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state. In the instant case, the Calder effects test is satisfied. Given the dominant American customer base, Casinoworld expressly aimed at the residents of New York, in which the harms are felt by the economy of New York. Hence, the second prong of minimum contacts test is also satisfied. Lastly, Casinoworld could foresee being haled into court in New York. The defendant was more than aware that the targeted customers resided in New York, and expected or should reasonable have expected that his actions would have consequences in New York. Having demonstrated the minimum contacts requirement of Due Process Clause, reasonableness of exercising the jurisdiction must be discussed. In determining the reasonableness, we look to the burden imposed on the defendant. The defendant resides in Antigua, the distance to which

may seem to be substantial burden. However, changes in modern transportation have made it much less burdensome for a party to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity, and the substantial burden imposed on the defendant alone cannot overcome the plaintiffs threshold showing of minimum contacts. Weighing the given circumstances and burdens upon Casinoworld, it is not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burden of litigation in New York

Having established the personal jurisdiction, jurisdiction to prescribe must then be addressed. The laws of one country to the citizens of another should be approached in three parts: (1) Does the gambling business by Casinoworld affect, or was it intended to affect, the residents of New York? (2) Is it of such a type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a violation of the U.S. Wire Wager Act? (3) As a matter of international comity and fairness, should the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States be asserted to cover it? Assuming that the allegations by the plaintiff are true and proven, the second prong is satisfied. In regards to the first, Casinoworlds gambling business affect the commerce in New York. The effect is felt by New York, where the act of gambling occurred. By encouraging Americans to spend money on online gambling against the law, the New York economy suffered. Third, although the defendant is the citizen of Antigua, there has been no indication of any conflict with the law or policy of Antiguan government; because the Antiguan governments policies were not vitiated by the American courts prescribing securities laws upon Casinoworld. It is true that the defendants business took place in Antigua. Nevertheless, as Judge Wilkie stated, it is against the fairness how the effects easily pierce our borders and sovereign walls, yet our laws are reflected back. Especially in modern business world, it has become irrelevant from where the cause of action arosethe issue should be where are the effects felt? And in the present case, the substantial effects were felt in the United States. Therefore, even though business transaction affecting the United States was made outside the forum, the Casinoworlds transaction ought not to be immunized. Under these circumstances, the court should deny the defendants motion.