The Morality of Hunting

Natalie Sebunia

While hunting has long been a necessity for the survival of mankind, the morality of

hunting has become a commonly discussed topic because of the reduced need for hunting to

acquire food resources coupled with a growing concern for animal welfare. Furthermore, it has

long been established that many animals can feel pain, most notably through comparisons of

chimpanzees and humans,1 although this topic is still debated by philosophers. While some argue

that humans have more reasoning capabilities and therefore are more morally-driven than other

creatures, there is growing support for ethical animal consideration.2 Jeremy Bentham makes the

claim that animals are treated similarly to slaves and asks us to consider how we approach

animal sentience by not asking “Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”3

Moral philosopher Christine Korsgaard takes this notion a step further when claiming humans

have moral obligations to animals:

When you pity a suffering animal, it is because you are perceiving a reason. An animal’s
cries express pain, and they mean that there is a reason… to change its conditions…
Another animal can obligate you in exactly the same way another person can… So of
course we have obligations to animals.4

With the established assumptions that hunting is no longer a necessity of all mankind and

that animals can feel and suffer, this paper seeks to explore the question: Is it natural and moral

for us to hunt? To clarify, this paper will make the assumptions that humans have moral

obligations to animals in terms of inflicting potentially undue harm, as agreed upon by

Korsgaard and Peter Singer, who also claims we cannot exclude any being that can suffer from

moral consideration.5 I will focus on the intention of the hunt as the main grounds for

determining its moral status, with execution of the hunt serving as a secondary indicator of

morality. I wish to first define each form of hunting and then explore its morality.

1
The Meliorist View and Types of Hunting

The meliorist view claims that “humanly caused death and suffering should be reduced as

much as possible, hence allowed only if necessary,” with necessary referring to “goods of

ecosystems, or human goods or rights, sufficient to justify the animal death or harm.”6 This view

seems sufficient for the purposes of this paper, and I do not wish to argue against it. Humans are

a technologically advanced species, and with this advantage comes an awareness of the power

held over animal species. This power must be viewed within the intention of hunting to

determine the morality of hunting actions, as the intention of the hunt will reveal whether the

death of the animal can be considered necessary. Gary Varner, an environmental philosopher,

clarifies three different forms of hunting: subsistence hunting, therapeutic hunting, and sport

hunting.7 Each will be explored in both intention and execution to determine whether it is

considered moral or immoral in the context of a meliorist perspective.

Subsistence Hunting

Subsistence hunting perhaps serves the most basic, primitive purpose of securing food.8 I

have no qualms in saying that predator-prey interactions are a natural part of life. Lions and

tigers stalk and hunt, pythons strangle their prey, sharks bite down on their targets, and early

humans worked in groups to track and hunt animals. None of these actions are inhumane as they

are done out of necessity and via environmental adaptations that have equipped these species for

survival. Therefore, as there is no intrinsic unnecessary harm in subsistence hunting and the

action is done for the purpose of survival, I am willing to say that subsistence hunting is moral

on the basis of self-preserving intention.

Some may be inclined to argue that subsistence hunting can cause undue harm, as with

animals that violently kill their prey or cause their prey to suffer before being killed. Take, for

2
example, wolves, who hunt in packs and ambush prey after chasing it down, injuring the prey

throughout the hunt.9 The prey suffers before eventually being killed, so should a human hunting

in this same way be considered immoral? I do not think so. The intention of the hunter is not to

cause harm; the hunter is purely attempting to gain food resources and is doing so in the optimal

way for survival. If it were possible for the hunter to kill the prey quickly and painlessly, they

would do so in order to conserve their own energy. Therefore, they are still acting out of

necessity, making the action not immoral.

Therapeutic Hunting

Therapeutic hunting refers to hunting aimed at controlling species populations and

maintaining ecosystems.10 Take, for example, white-tailed deer, an invasive species in the eastern

United States that lacks natural predators and has rapidly become overpopulated, having negative

effects on forest ecosystems.11 It seems only natural for the betterment of other species and the

surrounding ecosystem that some sort of population control exists for the introduced deer. By

taking a regulated approach to population control via hunting, the deer populations can be

reduced, and the functioning of the ecosystem can be restored. From a utilitarian perspective, this

seems like a moral action; the pain inflicted on the deer killed is far less than the benefits given

to the rest of the animal species in the ecosystem. However, there are animals that are suffering

for a reason that is not necessarily the fault of their own when therapeutic hunting takes place.

Are their lives worth less than the well-being of the ecosystem, even if letting the individual live

could potentially cause harm to or destroy the ecosystem? Ecological ethics often claims that the

ecosystem on which all species are dependent is more important, or deserves more consideration,

than any one individual in the ecosystem.12 This ecosystem includes biotic and abiotic factors

3
that make up the habitat, working in conjunction to maintain the environment; in an ecological

sense, some suffering is unavoidable for the maintenance of the ecosystem.

A simple analogy demonstrates the harms of letting every individual in an overpopulated

ecosystem live. Say an individual is given a basket of apple slices, and the bowl is so full it is

practically overflowing. The person is the only individual in the area and the fruit must be eaten

now or else it will rot. Therefore, the person has two options: eat all of the apple slices or eat

some of the fruit and throw the rest of it away. Eating all of the apples would result in a large

stomachache, and the individual would suffer, whereas only eating some of the fruit would keep

the individual healthy at the expensive of throwing some of the fruit away. Granted, apples are

not living beings that can suffer, but it is still clear that more harm will come by eating all of the

fruit. This analogy mirrors population control in that letting every individual live within the

ecosystem will cause more harm than good. Perhaps relocation would be more moral than

therapeutic hunting, if the economic resources allow for such a large-scale project, but a project

such as this could potentially cause psychological harm to the animals and put them at a

disadvantage in their new environment.

While I have deemed subsistence and therapeutic hunting morally acceptable reasons for

hunting, it is important to clarify that these actions are only moral if they do not cause

unnecessary harm to the animal. Environmental philosopher Joshua Duclos uses the term

‘objection from unnecessary harm’ to describe how hunting done by humans can differ from

hunting done by animals. He writes:

Today, it is hard to argue that human hunting is strictly necessary in the same way that
hunting is necessary for animals. The objection from necessary harm holds that hunting is
morally permissible only if it is necessary for the hunter’s survival. “Necessary” could
refer to nutritional or ecological need, which would provide moral cover for subsistence
and therapeutic hunting.13

4
 Following this sentiment, it seems logical to say that hunters without a direct need for

food resources (i.e. they could purchase food for survival), but hunt with the main intention of

obtaining and consuming animal meat, are still acting immorally. If taken in this strict sense,

subsistence hunting would only apply to and be moral for groups that live more primitive

lifestyles, catching or hunting all of their own food and not consuming or having access to food

from other resources. Likewise, if there are alternate ways of reducing overpopulation, such as

introducing new predators or relocating individuals, then therapeutic hunting would be

considered immoral.14

Sport Hunting

Sport hunting is perhaps slightly more nuanced. For Varner, sport hunting includes

hunting for pleasure, poaching, and hunting for ritual. He writes:

Many would prefer to recognize a distinction… between hunting for sport and hunting as
a ritual… I class them together because both activities serve human needs (which is what
distinguishes both sport and subsistence hunting from therapeutic hunting), but needs
which are less fundamental (in the sense of universal) than nutrition (which is what
distinguishes subsistence hunting from both ritual and sport hunting).15

I disagree with Varner’s grouping of hunting for pleasure with ritual hunting, more commonly

referred to as animal sacrifice. Clearly, no aspect of sport hunting can be defended by Duclos’s

‘objection from unnecessary harm,’ as there is no ecological or nutritional need associated with

sport hunting.16 However, we may also consider cultural traditions a necessity in some instances.

If the cultural tradition is deemed a necessity, then I am inclined to view that instance of hunting

as moral. Take for example, the Talensi people who believe offering animal blood sacrifices can

cleanse them of their evil actions and aid them in their journey to peace in life.17 There is a deep

spiritual connotation and sense of being in the act of animal sacrifice for these people. Is this

necessary for survival? Perhaps not in the physical sense, but these people feel incomplete

5
without their traditions and rituals; these actions are a necessary aspect of their lives in being a

complete being, passed down from generation to generation.

Now, if someone says, “I’m from a family of poachers, so for me, killing rhinoceroses is

moral,” this does not stand because there is no deeper meaning behind the action, besides

monetary gain. The aspect that separates the ritual hunting as a necessity is the intrinsic worth it

holds for the individual. Many times, with cultural traditions, the animal is killed or sacrificed as

a display of honor, and the action is done so respectfully and humanely. To say that one’s

cultural traditions are not a necessity seems to disregard a part of their being.

A common argument for hunting follows similar logic: hunting is a natural action that

runs far back in human history; therefore, it is a natural activity that cannot be immoral.18 To me,

this argument holds no ground. An action is not moral purely because it is ‘natural.’ I could use

this logic to say that anything is moral if it feels natural to me. Furthermore, to live purely in

accordance with nature so that anything in nature is deemed morally good presents many

problems when we consider diseases, natural disasters, and other environmental inequities.19

Duclos introduces an idea he calls ‘the objection from character,’ which states that

hunting is immoral due to the harm it inflicts on the animal and the violent nature it reveals about

the hunter.20 In essence, if one is willing to kill animals for pleasure, who is to say he won’t

eventually do the same to another man? Kant has a similar disposition when he writes:

If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no longer capable of service, he does not
fail in his duty to the dog, for the dog cannot judge, but his act is inhuman and damages
in himself that humanity which it is his duty to show towards mankind. If he is not to
stifle his human feelings, he must practice kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel
to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men.21

While I would say equating hunting to violent tendencies is a stretch, these notions further

express the unnecessary nature of sport hunting that makes it immoral. The intention in sport

6
hunting, with the exclusion of ritual hunting, is purely human-focused for pleasure or monetary

gain. However, this action is not exclusive to humans; plenty of other animals, including coyotes,

orcas, honey badgers, and spiders, among many others, also engage in what biologists call

‘surplus killing.’22 These animals will kill prey for fun with no intention of consuming the prey,

causing, in a sense, undue harm. Therefore, while humans are not alone in sport hunting, the

action is still immoral.

While sport hunting is immoral due to the unnecessary infliction of harm and death, some

actions are taken to reduce the amount of pain caused to the animal, such as killing in one shot

and avoiding prolonged suffering.23 In some cases, there may be less suffering in a human kill

than in a predator kill. However, the emergence of trapping counteracts this by lengthening the

suffering of captured animals.24 Typically, the main intention of sport hunting is to develop a

connection with nature, to experience a thrill, or to collect some sort of animal skin, antler, or

horn for display. While these are frivolous intentions that make the action immoral, hunters will

also claim that killing animals prevents future suffering via starvation, sickness, or being struck

by a vehicle (essentially claiming a therapeutic purpose),25 but I view this reasoning as

speculative, serving as an afterthought or justification for hunting for pleasure, making it invalid.

Poaching is perhaps the most immoral of hunting intentions because of the violent nature

in which it is carried out, leaving the animal harmed with no care taken for a painless kill. The

intention of poaching is monetary gain, and no consideration is given to the welfare of the

animal; the harm is intentional. Humans are the only animals that participate in poaching because

humans are the only animals driven by monetary gain. This reveals a darker side of hunting that

Kant was perhaps referring to in revealing the true nature of how men may respond to other

men.26

7
Other Considerations

A fourth reason for hunting is often presented as self-defense (i.e. killing an animal that

attacks), but I do not acknowledge this as hunting.27 To me, self-defense does not seem to be a

form of hunting, as it serves to protect oneself from harm; one is not seeking to kill an animal.

While some say that hunting can serve as training for self-defense, I see this as falling under the

sport hunting category and therefore being immoral, as there are other ways to train for self-

defense.28

Many may also be inclined to argue that the meat industry is much worse than the actions

of a single hunter and purchasing meat causes more harm than hunting. Lawrence Cahoon argues

that when animal deaths per unit of nutrition are lower than that of farming, hunting should be

considered moral.29 While this may be true, as the meat industry causes much pollution and

almost 70 billion animals are slaughtered each year,30 the meat consumer is not directly involved

in causing the animal’s suffering. This does not make that animal’s suffering okay by any means,

but the meat industry will persist even if an individual chooses to hunt their own meat.

In the end, the morality of hunting is dependent on the intentions of the hunter and the

way the hunt is carried out. I have concluded here that hunting for subsistence is moral given

hunting is the only or main food source available. Hunting for therapeutic reasons is moral in a

utilitarian sense, and ritual hunting is moral if the action is an intrinsic part of the individual’s

identity. On the other hand, hunting for subsistence is immoral if there are other available food

sources that would cause less harm, and sport hunting is immoral in both the casual hunting and

poaching realms, with poaching being deemed more harmful. As animals ourselves, we must

consider other animals in our actions and be aware of our intentions’ impacts on the morality of

our actions.

8
1
Chimpanzees are seen as the closest relative to humans and therefore are often used as a connection when comparing
human states and animal states. Analyses have found that, at the very least, most vertebrates seem to have the capacity
to feel pain, and chimpanzees have even been thought to have the capacity to think and self-identify by some
philosophers, encouraging debates on whether these animals should be granted legal protections and even personhood.
See Allen, C., & Trestman, M. (2016). Animal consciousness. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/#cog-and-con. and Gruen, L. (2017). The moral status of animals.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/.

2
While more ethical considerations have been put in place in recent years regarding animal testing, animal care, and
animal study subjects, the requirement for ethical treatment of animals is still a widely debated topic in philosophy. See
Gruen, L. (2017). The moral status of animals. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/.

3
See Bentham, J. (1907). An Introduction to the Principles and Morals of Legislation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/bentham-an-introduction-to-the-principles-of-morals-and-legislation.

4
See Korsgaard, C.M. (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press, pp. 7-166.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/sources-of-normativity/5A85034A6566FDFDE374073A015CBD2A
#:~:text=Christine%20Korsgaard%20identifies%20four%20accounts,and%20the%20appeal%20to%20autonomy.

5
See Gruen, L. (2017). The moral status of animals. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/. and Singer, P. (1995). Animal Liberation. HarperCollins.
https://philpapers.org/rec/SINAL.

6
See Cahoone, L. (2009). Hunting as a Moral Good. White Horse Press. http://www.environmentandsociety.org/
sites/default/files/key_docs/ev181_cahoone.pdf.

7
See Varner, G.E. (2002) In Nature’s Interests? Interests, Animal Rights and Environmental Ethics. Oxford University Press,
Chapter 5: Can Animal Rights Activists Be Environmentalists? pp. 98-103. https://books.google.
com/books?id=vCbdgWesHtQC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false. and
Duclos, J. (2017). Is hunting moral? A philosopher unpacks the question. Associated Press. https://apnews.
com/article/3c6f13a8c37c44a5894daa62fd68fd05.

8
See Duclos, J. (2017). Is hunting moral? A philosopher unpacks the question. Associated Press.
https://apnews.com/article/3c6f13a8c37c44a5894daa62fd68fd05.

9
See Lake, C.B. (2015). Wolves on the Hunt: The Behavior of Wolves Hunting Wild Prey. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Publications.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/usfwspubs/541/.

10
See Duclos, J. (2017). Is hunting moral? A philosopher unpacks the question. Associated Press.
https://apnews.com/article/3c6f13a8c37c44a5894daa62fd68fd05.

11
See United States Department of Agriculture Natural Resources Conservation Service (2008). New Jersey Fact Sheet:
White-tailed Deer Impacts and Forest Management. New Jersey Audubon Society. https://www.nrcs.usda.
gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/nrcs141p2_017804.pdf.

12
See Cahoone, L. (2009). Hunting as a Moral Good. White Horse Press. http://www.environmentandsociety.org/
sites/default/files/key_docs/ev181_cahoone.pdf.

13
See Duclos, J. (2017). Is hunting moral? A philosopher unpacks the question. Associated Press.
https://apnews.com/article/3c6f13a8c37c44a5894daa62fd68fd05.

14
See Martin, E.W. (1959). The Case Against Hunting. D. Dobson, Chapter 2, pp. 57-106. https://www.uvm.edu/
rsenr/wfb175/wood_chapter2.pdf.
15
See Varner, G.E. (2002) In Nature’s Interests? Interests, Animal Rights and Environmental Ethics Oxford University Press,
Chapter 5: Can Animal Rights Activists Be Environmentalists? pp. 98-103. https://books.google
.com/books?id=vCbdgWesHtQC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.

16
See Duclos, J. (2017). Is hunting moral? A philosopher unpacks the question. Associated Press.
https://apnews.com/article/3c6f13a8c37c44a5894daa62fd68fd05.

17
Haun, W. (2018). Power in Blood: Animal Sacrifice in West Africa. International Mission Board.
https://www.imb.org/2018/05/07/animal-sacrifice/.

18
See Causey, A.S. (1989). On the Morality of Hunting. Environmental Ethics, 11(4), pp. 327-343.
https://www.pdcnet.org/enviroethics/content/enviroethics_1989_0011_0004_0327_0343. and Duclos, J. (2017). Is
hunting moral? A philosopher unpacks the question. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/
3c6f13a8c37c44a5894daa62fd68fd05.

19
See Duclos, J. (2017). Is hunting moral? A philosopher unpacks the question. Associated Press.
https://apnews.com/article/3c6f13a8c37c44a5894daa62fd68fd05.

20
See Duclos, J. (2017). Is hunting moral? A philosopher unpacks the question. Associated Press.
https://apnews.com/article/3c6f13a8c37c44a5894daa62fd68fd05. and Martin, E.W. (1959). The Case Against Hunting. D.
Dobson, Chapter 2, pp. 57-106. https://www.uvm.edu/rsenr/wfb175/wood_chapter2.pdf.

21
See Gruen, L. (2017). The moral status of animals. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/. and Broadie, A. & Pybus, E.M. (1974). Kant’s Treatment of Animals.
Philosophy, 49(190), pp. 375-383. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3750236.

22
See Kruuk, H. (1971). Surplus killing by carnivores. Journal of Zoology. 166(2), 233-244. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-
7998.1972.tb04087.x. and Short, J., Kinnear, J.E., and Robley, A. (2002). Surplus killing by introduced predators in Australia
—evidence for ineffective anti-predator adaptations in native prey species? Biological Conservation, 103(10), 283-301.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0006-3207(01)00139-2. and Oskanen, T., Oskanen, L., Fretwell, S.D. (1985). Surplus Killing in the
Hunting Strategy of Small Predators. The American Naturalist, 126(3), 328-346. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2461358.

23
See “Hunting is conservation - the morality of hunting.” (2019). Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation.
https://www.rmef.org/elk-network/hunting-is-conservation-the-morality-of-hunting/.

24
See “Cage-trapping wildlife.” (2021). Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife. https://www.maine.
gov/ifw/fish-wildlife/wildlife/living-with-wildlife/avoid-resolve-conflict/cage-trapping.html

25
See “Hunting is conservation - the morality of hunting.” (2019). Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation.
https://www.rmef.org/elk-network/hunting-is-conservation-the-morality-of-hunting/.

26
See Gruen, L. (2017). The moral status of animals. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/. and Broadie, A. & Pybus, E.M. (1974). Kant’s Treatment of Animals.
Philosophy, 49(190), pp. 375-383. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3750236.
27

See Ainsworth, K. (2020). The Intersection of Hunting and Self-Defense. U.S. Concealed Carry Association.
https://www.usconcealedcarry.com/blog/the-intersection-of-hunting-and-self-defense/.

28
See Ainsworth, K. (2020). The Intersection of Hunting and Self-Defense. U.S. Concealed Carry Association.
https://www.usconcealedcarry.com/blog/the-intersection-of-hunting-and-self-defense/.
29

See Cahoone, L. (2009). Hunting as a Moral Good. White Horse Press. http://www.environmentandsociety.org/
sites/default/files/key_docs/ev181_cahoone.pdf.
30
See “FAOSTAT: Food and Agriculture Data.” (2021). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#home.