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The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory

Article  in  International Journal of Quantum Chemistry · January 1998

DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1097-461X(1998)66:1<107::AID-QUA9>3.0.CO;2-Z

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Frederick Gregory
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<—
Book Review
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental
Theory. By David J. Chalmers, Oxford University
Press, New York, 1996. xviii + 414 pp., bibliography
and index.
David Chalmers is a superb writer. He is able to
make the subject of consciousness interesting, even
to the nonphilosopher, because of his talent to
address the topic in a style that is admirably clear.
He does not presume we already know what the
issue is, nor is he in the least condescending as he
invites us to follow him down paths of complex
reasoning.
Chalmers’ focus is the phenomenal aspect of
mind, that is, the conscious experience of a subjec-
tive agent as opposed to the mental states that are
commonly used as the causal or explanatory basis
of behavior. He wants to explore the feeling of
being conscious that we all have when experienc-
ing things like color or pain. This concept of mind
has been thoroughly rejected in behaviorist psy-
chology as illusory if it is taken as an aspect of
reality that cannot be accounted for completely in
physical terms. Chalmers does not think it illusory.
Through a series of fascinating thought experi-
ments Chalmers argues for what he calls
‘‘naturalistic dualism.’’ Because phenomenal con-
sciousness is not logically entailed in the physical,
he accepts that it cannot be reduced to the physi-
cal. But while consciousness is a feature of the
world over and above physical features, it is not a
separate ‘‘substance’’ that can influence matter.
‘‘Consciousness arises from a physical basis even
though it is not entailed by that basis’’ Žp. 125..
Hence Chalmers can continue, as he notes more
than once throughout the book, ‘‘to take science
seriously.’’ Phenomenal consciousness will follow
natural laws, albeit psychophysical laws that spec-
ify how phenomenal properties depend on physi-
cal properties.
International Journal of Quantum Chemistry, Vol. 66, 107]108 (1998)
Q 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
—<
The question remains, from what sort of physi-
cal properties will consciousness arise? Once
again Chalmers resorts to a series of intriguing
thought experiments, this time to establish the
beginnings of a fundamental theory of conscious-
ness. Chalmers suggests that Žphenomenal. con-
scious experience is determined by functional or-
ganization; i.e., as long as there is an invariance
between the functional organizations of two sys-
tems, they will have qualitatively identical experi-
ences. If there is functional invariance between the
organization expressed by neurons in the brain
and that in a set of silicon chips or that in the
population of China, the same consciousness will
be experienced. He is aware that such a claim does
not yet begin to constitute a fundamental theory
because the nature of the psychophysical connec-
tion is too underdetermined. So he presses on by
exploring the possibility of linking physical pro-
cesses and conscious experience through the orga-
nization encountered in information theory. What
results is a proliferation of consciousness in the
universe in both quality and quantity.
It will come as no shock that Chalmers defends
the program of strong artificial intelligence in
which machines can in theory experience con-
sciousness. Nor should one be surprised that he
wants to fit his understanding of consciousness
into the bizarre world of philosophical interpreta-
tions of quantum mechanics. Defining the core of
quantum mechanics according to the twin pillars
¨
of the Schrodinger equation and the measurement
postulate, Chalmers opts to join those who have
jettisoned the latter as unneeded. The resulting
interpretation involves a perfectly deterministic
system, but it requires that there be distinct sub-
jects of experience corresponding to each potential
collapsed state of the wave function. Chalmers is
careful to distinguish this view from that in which
a measurement causes reality to split into many
worlds. In his view the superposed states of the
CCC 0020-7608 / 98 / 010107-02
BOOK REVIEW
wave function constitute a single world that is the
real world. Corresponding to the components of
the superposition are separate minds that perceive
an individual discrete world. These ‘‘miniworlds’’
are not the real world; they are merely in the
minds of the subjects. In this speculation, as in
108
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many other issues in the book, Chalmers draws on
the work of philosophers and scientists who have
preceded him. His virtue is that he does so in a
most creative and readable manner.
FREDERICK GREGORY
VOL. 66, NO. 1