D THE STRICT 60 DAYS CAN EQUITY STRETCH IT FILING

[2020] 1 LNS(A) lxxiv Legal Network Series 1
THE STRICT 60 DAYS, CAN EQUITY STRETCH IT? FILING

REPRESENTATION FOR REINSTATEMENT ON TIME
by
JOHN MARK*
Introduction
An employee who seeks to file a reinstatement claim with the Industrial

Relations Department (IRD) has to do so within 60 days of the dismissal.
Section 20 (1A) reads:
“The Director General shall not entertain any representations under

subsection (1) unless such representation are filed within sixty days
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of the dismissal. Provided that where a workman is dismissed with
notice he may file a representation at any time during the period of
notice but not later than sixty days from the expiry thereof.”
The employee must file the case on time which means there can be no
premature filing or late filing. To emphasize the strictness of the time
limit, the provision specifically states that the Director-General shall not
entertain any representations unless such representations are filed within
60 days of the dismissal.
Purpose of the 60 day Limitation
The obvious purpose of the 60 days limitation according to Dr Ashgar Ali

Ali Mohamed [1] is twofold:
i. Bring the impending application to the attention of the

employer so that the dispute could be resolved expeditiously;
and
ii. Allow the workmen to obtain a cheap and speedy remedy to

be reinstated into his former position as if no dismissal has
taken place.
In V Sinnathamboo v. Minister for Labour and Manpower [2] the Federal

Court said a strict interpretation was needed:
“…desirable in our case. To conclude otherwise would result in

serious consequences, in that the Industrial Court would be flooded
with stale appeals, and employers would be left in a state of
uncertainty as to when a dismissed workman would exercise his
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right under section 20(1). Such state of affairs would certainly not
help in promoting industrial peace in this country…”
The twofold purpose was made clear in the Federal Court in Fung Keong
Rubber Manufacturing (M) Sdn Bhd v. Lee Eng Kiat & Ors, Raja Azlan
Shah CJ stated: [3]
“In our view the whole purpose of this part of the legislation is to
provide workmen with a cheap and speedy remedy to obtain
reinstatement. Quite clearly it would be extraordinarily difficult for
employers to keep the industry going if claims for reinstatement on
the ground of wrongful dismissal could be made many months or
years, instead of the statutory period of one month, after dismissal
had taken place. Under section 20(1) of the Act, a workman who
claims reinstatement for wrongful dismissal is bound to comply

with a very strict time limit. He must present his claim within one
month of the dismissal. …It is so strict that it goes to the
jurisdiction of the industrial court to hear the complaint. By that we
mean that, if the claim is presented just one day late, the court has
no jurisdiction to consider it…An innocent workman can be
expected to put forward his claim at the earliest moment.”
It would be impractical for employers if employees could file many

months or years after dismissal as the employers would have probably
employed another person in the employee’s place and if reinstatement
was allowed even at conciliation stage, it would require the employee to
be reinstated status quo without losing any benefits and required to pay
back wages; this would obviously bring huge financial implications to the
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employer. [4] An employer might be reluctant to reinstate if he is required
to pay back wages and at the same time undue delay may cause the
workman’s security of tenure of service to be compromised as the
position might be taken by someone else. [5]
Further, in applying the Fung Keong Rubber case, the Industrial Court in
Soh Guan Heng v. Lindeteves-Jacoberg (M) Sdn Bhd reminded that:[6]
“…if s. 20(1A) of the Act is not duly and strictly observed, its
implications and effect therefrom would not be conducive to the
economy of the country and the industry concerned.”
The Right Time to File Representation of Reinstatement - When does

time start to run?
It is pertinent to start off with the Interpretation Acts 1948 And 1967 to
have an accurate computation of time.
Section 54(1) states:
“(a) a period of days from the happening of an event or the doing

of any act or thing shall be deemed to be exclusive of the day
on which the event happens or the act or thing is done;
(b) if the last day of the period is a weekly holiday or a publi c

holiday (referred to in this subsection as excluded days) the
period shall include the next following day which is not an
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excluded day;”
Based on the above in the context of section 20(1A) the event i.e. the date
of actual termination would be excluded for the purposes of computing
the time. If an employee is terminated on 1st May 2020, time would
begin to run from 2 nd of May 2020.
For the purposes of computing the 60 th day, one has to be wary of weekly
holidays or a public holiday. If the 60 th day falls on a rest day, say for
example on a Sunday, then the time would end on Monday. If the 60 th day
falls on a public holiday, say for example on May 1 st Labour Day then the
last day for purpose of computing 60 days would fall on 2 nd of May.
While it is clear the representation can only be made once the employee
has been terminated, but when does the time actually run? Earlier there
was some uncertainty on this issue with regards to filing of a

representation when an employee was given notice as there were
inconsistent awards [7] by the Industrial courts where some courts held
that filing representations during the notice period when the employee is
still working is premature and the employee has to wait for the notice to
end. There are also cases which held that the employee does not need to
wait for the notice to end to file representation. The later portion of the
new 20(1A) was inserted by amendment in 1989 to resolve the conflicting
decisions with regards to the filing of cases once notice of termination is
given. The workman based on the new section 20(1A) can file
reinstatement either anytime during the notice period or within 60 days of
the expiry of the notice period.
In Ladang Johor Labis And Plantation Des Terres Rouhes v. Muniande
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Sennasamy [8] the Industrial Court considered the issue when time starts to
run. It observed:
“Section 20(1A) of the Industrial Relations Act provides that the

representation must be made within 60 days of the dismissal. It
does not provide for 60 days from the date of dismissal. Is there
any difference between the two phrases? Is it the intention of the
legislature that there should be a difference? It is the decision of
this court that “within 60 days of the dismissal” does not mean
within 60 days from the date of the dismissal. The dismissal is an
act, being an act it is completed when the letter of dismissal is
handed to the person dismissed. The court would agree up to this
point with learned counsel for the claimant. In this dispute I would
agree that the important period of 60 days commences not one day
from the date of dismissal [24 March 1989] but one day from the
dismissal which would be the day the dismissal is effectively
brought to the notice of the person dismissed. To hold otherwise
would lead to the absurdities mentioned by learned counsel for the
claimant. A company may date the dismissal letter on one date and
deliver it on another date and it reaches the workman or yet another
date. If we take the date of dismissal (by the company) the
workman would be prejudiced in that he has less than the 60 days
allowed by the Act.”
The above case illustrates the common situation where a letter of

termination which bears a particular date is delivered or handed over to
an employee on a later date. In such situations, time should start to run
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when the notice of termination has been effectively brought to the
attention of the employee (for notice of termination sent via post see
Gardenia Sales & Distribution Sdn Bhd v. Ramadzan Omar [9] ).
In cases of constructive dismissal or forced resignation it would be based

on the individual facts or circumstances. The Court of Appeal case of
Ang Beng Teik v. Pan Global Textile Bhd, Penang [10] explained in detail
when time begins to run in such cases:
"Time… begins to run from the moment the workman considers

himself to have been dismissed without just cause or excuse…". It
further held that in this case, “…it was beyond question that the 60-
day time frame did not commence from the date of demotion … but
from the date of the impugned termination. Therefore, the
representations were made within the prescribed time limit.

Consequently, the Industrial Court had the jurisdiction to entertain
the reference.”
Based on the above, time starts to run when the employee considers
himself dismissed from the date of termination. The Court of Appeal gave
an illustration on how this would actually work. Say an employee who
suffers demotion, there are three possible scenarios:
a) An employee who consider himself demoted, he treats

himself as constructively dismissed without just cause or
excuse. Once he treats the demotion as a dismissal then the
60 days would run from that date.
b) An employee who does not treat demotion as unjust
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dismissal, he may ask the employer to reinstate him to his
former position and if the employer does not, he may treat
himself as being dismissed. Then the time would start from
when he considers himself to be dismissed.
c) An employer dismisses the employer who does not agree with

the demotion. Then the time would run from the date of
dismissal.
Strict compliance of Section 20 (1A) - representation on time, not

premature nor late
The filing of representation is very strict, the employee can not file early
or late, if employee does so the Industrial Court would be seized with
jurisdiction. The Federal Court in Fung Keong Rubber is the main

authority on the strictness of filing a representation, even if the
employees files just a day late, the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction. [11]
Even if the employee files prematurely it would be fatal. In Southern

Bank Bhd. v. Ng Keng Lian & Anor [12] where the High Court succinctly
reminded that filing of a representation cannot be made prematurely
before the act of termination, the court stated:
“…The legislative intent that there should be a dismissal before the

representation was also found in s 20(1A) of the IRA, which
required the representation to be made ‘within 60 days of the
dismissal’. Those provisions clearly prescribed the ‘dismissal
before representation’ formula. Accordingly, where a representation
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was made before or preceded the dismissal, the dismissal would in
law be premature and the Industrial Court would not be seized with
jurisdiction to hear the claim of dismissal based on the
representation (see p 566F-1)...”
The Conundrum - when filing of representation is disrupted or not

possible due to an external event
The current unique situation with the global pandemic and the
government declaring a Movement Control Order has resulted in a
conundrum with employees having difficulty filing a reinstatement claim
“on time”. [13] Obviously workmen’s movement is restricted and the
Industrial Relations Department was not open to the public until the 4th
of May 2020. Section 20(1A) does not prescribe a method of filing.
The term “filed” is defined in P Ramanathas Aiyar’s Advanced Law

Lexicon [14] as:
“Delivered to the proper officer and by him received to be kept on a

file. The derivation and meaning of the word, as defined in the
dictionaries, carries with it the idea of permanent preservation;
becoming part of the permanent records of the public office where
it is filed, and includes the idea that the paper is to remain in its
proper order on the filed in the office. (Bergeron v. Hobbs, 65 Am.
St. Rep. 85.)”
Based on the above definition, it is possible cases can be filed by

Registered Post or email during lockdown (the IRD has allowed for filing
by emails. [15] There might be employees who have thought of such
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methods but it would be unfair to expect or assume all workmen who are
ordinary laymen to be forward-thinking or to think of such methods.
As seen in Fung Keong Rubber and other authorities, the compliance to

the time limit is very strict and this obviously puts the workmen in a
precarious situation. In the UK, unfair dismissal cases must be filed
within three months, less one day, from the ‘effective date of
termination’ of the employment (Section 111(2)(a) Employment Rights
Act 1996) but the time period can be extended if the tribunal finds it was
not reasonably practicable for the complainant to file it within the
required time (section 111(2)(b). The Malaysian section 20(1A) does not
have such a flexibility to extend time when a situation of impracticability
arise.
It is suggested that a similar provision should be introduced in the IRA

for the DG of Industrial Relations to deal with such unique situations. It
is argued that this provision should only invoked in exceptional situations
such as:
i. Movement restrictions, lockdown and curfews
ii. Wars
iii. Riots for a period of time
iv. Natural disasters for a period of time
v. Workmen is confined at a medical facility or home due to

serious illness or injury
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vi. Lack of Mental Capacity
Equity and purposive approach as an interim solution?
It is explicitly clear that under section 30(5) the Industrial Court shall
take into account equity and good conscience. [16] The Federal Court in
Tanjong Jara Beach Hotel Sdn Bhd v. National Union of Hotel, Bar &
Restaurant Workers Peninsular [17] reminded the Industrial Court in this
regard:
“[5] Section 30(5) of the Act stipulates that the IC shall act
according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of
the case without regard to technicalities and legal form. In applying
the powers under s. 30(5), the IC has to bear in mind the underlying
objectives and purposes of the Act itself, namely, that it is a piece
of legislation designed to ensure social justice to both employers

and employees and to advance the progress of industry by bringing
about harmony and cordial relationship between the parties; to
eradicate unfair labour practices; to protect workmen against
victimization by employers and to ensure termination of industrial
disputes in a peaceful manner. Therefore the raison d'etre of the IC
is to endeavour to resolve the competing claims of employers and
employees by finding a solution which is just and fair to both
parties with the object of establishing harmony between capital and
labour and fostering good relationship. (pp 671 h & 672 c-d).”
In Today's Plastics Industries Sdn Bhd v. Kalaiselvan P Krishnan, [18] the

claimant argued on the basis of “equity, good conscience and substantial
merits of the case without regard to technicalities and legal form
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conscience” in reliance of the Tanjong Jara Beach case to set aside
employers preliminary technical objection that the claimant did not
comply with section 20(1A). The Industrial Court, while agreeing with
the claimant's submission that it has wide-ranging powers under section
30, it rejected the claimant’s attempt to circumvent section 20(1A). It
stated that the jurisdiction and powers are found within the four corners
of the Act. It is submitted that the case above can be distinguished based
on the fact that the claimant himself was at fault and his argument based
on equity to circumvent the time limit failed; rightly so. It is argued that
based on the obvious statement in the Tanjong Jara Beach case, the
Industrial Court is duty-bound to consider to interpret section 20(1A)
liberally based on section 30(5) at the current situation of the pandemic
and lockdown which resulted in the unique situation of employees not

being able to file on time.
It is imperative to have a good understanding of equity to understand how

the Industrial Court can apply equity in exceptional circumstances due to
the MCO and pandemic. The learned authors of Janab's Series to Law,
Practice and Legal Remedies explain equity as: [19]
“Equity in relation to legal remedies means justice administered

according to fairness as opposed to strict rules of common law.”
Authoritative author on equity, Edmund Snell lists down 12 equitable

principles:[20]
(a) Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy;
(b)
(c)
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He who seeks equity must do equity;
He who comes into equity must come with clean hands;
(d) Equity follows the law;
(e) Delay defeats equity;
(f) Equality is equity;
(g) Equity looks to the intent rather than to the form;
(h) Equity looks on that as done which ought to have been done;
(i) Where the equities are equal, the first in time shall prevail;
(j) Where there is equal equity, the law shall prevail;

(k) Equity imputes an intention to fulfil an obligation; and
(l) Equity acts in personam.
It is believed that three of the above equitable principles would be

relevant to the Industrial Court in dealing with the time limit.
i. Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy;
ii. Equity follows the law;
iii. Equity looks to the intent rather than to the form.
The obstacle the Industrial Court would face in applying equity is the
principle of “equity follows the law” or “Aequitas sequitur legem”, the
law being section 20(1A) and the strict interpretation [21] by Fung Keong
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Rubber and other authorities. It is argued that if the current narrow
interpretation is used, it would defeat the purpose of the IRA itself and
would create a situation of absurdity in the current situation. The
workmen could not move freely due to the MCO and the Industrial
Relations Department itself was closed until the 4 th of May 2020. The
workmen should not be faulted and deprived of their right to file a
representation.
Section 20(1A) ought to be given a liberal interpretation. The Industrial

Court being a court of equity should employ the ancient “doctrine of the
equity of the statute” or more commonly known as the purposive
approach.
Black defines “purposive interpretation” as: [22]

“An interpretation that looks at the evil that the statute is trying to correct
(i.e., the statute’s purpose)”.
Black [23] explains equity of statute in similar terms as:
“In statutory construction, the principle that a statute should be

interpreted according to the legislator’s goal or its purpose and
intent, even if this interpretation goes well beyond the literal
meaning of the text, the doctrine that supposed fair application
intended for an enactment is the interpreter’s paramount concern,
allowing departures from the statute’s literal words.”
It is argued that based on the above definition there is no difference

between the purposive approach and the “the doctrine of equity of
statute”.
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A similar approach to statutory interpretation was adopted by the Privy
Council in the New Zealand case of Railton v. Wood (1809)15 AC 363-67
pg 347,[24] where Earl Cain explained how a statute should be constructed
to achieve fairness:
“If an enactment is such that by reading it in its ordinary sense you

produce a palpable injustice, whereas by reading it in a sense which
it can bear although not exactly its ordinary sense, it will produce
no injustice, then I admit one must always assume that the
legislature intended that it should be so read as to produce justice.”
NS Bindra explains that when the court is faced with two possible
methods of interpretation, the one which avoids injustice and gives effect
to the intention of the statute should be preferred; the learned author

states:[25]
“where there are two constructions, the one which will do great and
unnecessary injustice, and the other of which will avoid injustice,
and will keep exactly within the purpose for which the statute was
passed, it is the bounded duty of the court to adopt the second and
not to adopt the first of those constructions.”
The author further stated: [26]
“The construction which operates in a harsh, unreasonable and

absurd manner does not represent the legislative intent because it
should be presumed that the legislature has acted for the welfare of
the people.”
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In Malaysia the purposive approach is explicitly recognised via s ection
17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 which states:
“Regard to be had to the purpose of Act
17A. In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction

that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act
(whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or not)
shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that
purpose or object.”
The Federal Court in Hoh Kiang Ngan v. Mahkamah Perusahaan

Malaysia & Anor, per Gopal Sri Ram JCA, [27] encouraged the use of the
purposive approach by reminding that it is “well-settled” that the IRA as
a piece of beneficent social legislation by which Parliament intends the

prevention and speedy resolution of disputes between employers and their
workmen, should receive a liberal and not restricted or rigid
interpretation within well-settled canons of constructions.
In Tunku Yaacob Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Kedah & Ors , [28]
the Federal Court considered the “settled general rule” that “when a
statute is susceptible of two or more interpretations, normally the
interpretation that should be accepted as reflecting the will of the
legislation which is presumed to operate most equitably, justly and
reasonably as judged by the ordinary and normal conceptions of what is
right and what is wrong and of what is just and what is unjust. ”
Since there was a MCO, it would impossible for the workmen to file a
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representation physically at the IRD. Again it is emphasised that it would
unfair to expect the workmen as laymen to think of alternative filing
methods such as using registered post or email. Further, the IRD office
was in fact closed to the public until the 4 th of May 2020. This
circumstance is beyond the control of the workmen and the lacuna in
section 20(1A) which does not provide for such situations should not
deny the workmen their rights.
It is argued that the word “filed” used in section 20(1A) is a condition

precedent before the 60 days’ time period can commence. Hence it is
submitted that time should be suspended for a moment when the act of
filing becomes impossible. There might be situations where workmen
might be able to file before or after the MCO but due to the MCO, the
workmen might only have a few days but not the full 60 days available to
them. In such cases, it is submitted that suspension of time should still

apply to allow the employee to have the full benefit of 60 days for filing
a representation.
Section 20(1A), interpreted using a purposive approach or the doctrine of

equity of statute, will avoid a situation of absurdity, injustice and give
effect to the intention of Parliament in this unique situation. Applying
this doctrine would hence be consistent with the principle that “equity
follows the law”, the use of the doctrine merely supplements section
20(1A) to rectify its weakness. Since the hurdle of “equity follows the
law” has been overcome, other principles of equity would just naturally
fall into place as the same argument used above would also apply to the
other principles.
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Conclusion
The observance of strict compliance as emphasised by the Fung Keong

Rubber case is necessary and is still good law. But the current situation
of the MCO has created a unique situation where it is impossible for the
workmen to file a representation at the IRD. This exceptional situation
has revealed a weakness or a lacuna in section 20(1A) where it is unable
to provide for such situations. Parliament can rectify this lacuna or
weakness by introducing a provision similar to the one in the UK where it
allows the tribunal to extend time if it is impracticable for the workmen
to file a claim. It is suggested that in the Malaysian context, both the DG
of IR and the Industrial Court should be empowered to do so only in
“exceptional situations” as pointed above.
In the meantime it is submitted that the Industrial Court should use their
powers under section 30(5) to take into account equity and good
conscience. Further, by virtue of section 17A of the Interpretation Acts
1948 and 1967, the courts as courts of equity and good conscience should
employ a purposive approach or the doctrine of equity of statute to
interpret section 20(1A) and distinguish the Fung Keong Rubber case to
give effect to the purpose of the statute and prevent injustice.
____________________________________________________________
*LL.B (Hons), Industrial and Employment Law Practitioner.
Endnotes:
[1]
Dr Ashgar Ali Ali Mohamed, Dismissal from Employment and the
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Remedies, Lexis Nexis 2007, at pages 215-216, para 6.2.1.
[2]
[1978] 1 LNS 249.
[3]
1980] 1 LNS 156.
[4]
See: Soh Guan Heng v. Lindeteves-Jacoberg (M) Sdn Bhd [2008] 2 ILR
562.
[5]
See: Coshare Sdn Bhd v. Wan Masnizam Wan Mahmood [2006] 1 ILR
35, page 4041
[6]
Supra note 4, page 563.
[7]
For Conflicting decisions see: Cotra Enterprises Sdn. Bhd. v. Long Say
Wee [1987] 1 ILR 589 and Ranbaxy (M) Malaysia Sdn Bhd v. Ravindra
Kumar Jaganathan [2005] 1 ILR 702.
[8]
[1994] 1 ILR 399.
[9]
[2001] 3 ILR 365 refd (1).
[10]
[1996] 4 CLJ 313.
[11]
Supra note 2, at page 240.
[12]
[2002] 2 CLJ 514.
[13]
“Sacked supervisor unable to file complaint within 60 days due to
MCOV Anbalagan - May 24, 2020”, https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/
L A W
category/nation/2020/05/24/sacked-supervisor-unable-to-file-complaint-
within-60-days-due-to-mco/.
[14]
P Ramanathas Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon, Lexis Nexis 2017, 5th
Edition, Volume 2, at page 2009.
[15]
IRDs website mentions that representation can be emailed to
jppm@mohr.gov.my:https://mohrpouch.mohr.gov.my/index.php/s/cMFr
Oyu9jQ63b88
[16]
See section 2 of IRA, "award” means an award made by the Court in
respect of any trade dispute or matter referred to it or any decision or
order made by it under this Act.
[17]
[2004] 4 CLJ 657.
[18]
[2005] 2 ILR 365.
[19]
Janab’s Series to Law, Practice and Legal Remedies Vol II, Janab M
Sdn Bhd 2005, at page 316.
[20]
Snell, E., “Principles of Equity, Intended for the Use of Students, and
of Practitioners” London, Stevens & Haynes 1905, 14 Edition, The
Maxims of Equity Part I: Introductory: Chapter II at Page 7.
[21]
Some authors argue that there is a difference between the words
“statutory construction” and “statutory interpretation”. Black's Law
Dictionary, Thompson Reuters 2014, 10th edition. Black’s, at page 1637
under “statutory construction” indicates no difference between the two
words. In this article the words “statutory interpretation” is preferred. It
is argued that based on the above definition there is no practical purpose
[22]
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to differentiate between the two words.
Ibid note 21 at page 945.
[23]
Ibid note 21 at page 657.
[24]
See NS Bindra’s Interpretation of Statutes, Lexis Nexis 2017, 12th
Edition, at page 347.
[25]
Ibid at page 347.
[26]
Ibid at page 34.
[27]
[1996] 4 CLJ 687, at page 707.
[28]
[2015] 3 CLJ 1017; [2016] 1 MLJ 200, at page 218.

D THE STRICT 60 DAYS CAN EQUITY STRETCH IT FILING

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[2020] 1 LNS(A) lxxiv Legal Network Series 1

THE STRICT 60 DAYS, CAN EQUITY STRETCH IT? FILING

An employee who seeks to file a reinstatement claim with the Industrial

Section 20 (1A) reads:

“The Director General shall not entertain any representations under

Purpose of the 60 day Limitation

The obvious purpose of the 60 days limitation according to Dr Ashgar Ali

i. Bring the impending application to the attention of the

ii. Allow the workmen to obtain a cheap and speedy remedy to

In V Sinnathamboo v. Minister for Labour and Manpower [2] the Federal

“…desirable in our case. To conclude otherwise would result in

claims reinstatement for wrongful dismissal is bound to comply

It would be impractical for employers if employees could file many

The Right Time to File Representation of Reinstatement - When does

Section 54(1) states:

“(a) a period of days from the happening of an event or the doing

(b) if the last day of the period is a weekly holiday or a publi c

was some uncertainty on this issue with regards to filing of a

In Ladang Johor Labis And Plantation Des Terres Rouhes v. Muniande

“Section 20(1A) of the Industrial Relations Act provides that the

The above case illustrates the common situation where a letter of

In cases of constructive dismissal or forced resignation it would be based

"Time… begins to run from the moment the workman considers

representations were made within the prescribed time limit.

a) An employee who consider himself demoted, he treats

b) An employee who does not treat demotion as unjust

c) An employer dismisses the employer who does not agree with

Strict compliance of Section 20 (1A) - representation on time, not

jurisdiction. The Federal Court in Fung Keong Rubber is the main

Even if the employee files prematurely it would be fatal. In Southern

“…The legislative intent that there should be a dismissal before the

The Conundrum - when filing of representation is disrupted or not

The term “filed” is defined in P Ramanathas Aiyar’s Advanced Law

“Delivered to the proper officer and by him received to be kept on a

Based on the above definition, it is possible cases can be filed by

As seen in Fung Keong Rubber and other authorities, the compliance to

It is suggested that a similar provision should be introduced in the IRA

i. Movement restrictions, lockdown and curfews

iii. Riots for a period of time

iv. Natural disasters for a period of time

v. Workmen is confined at a medical facility or home due to

Equity and purposive approach as an interim solution?

of legislation designed to ensure social justice to both employers

In Today's Plastics Industries Sdn Bhd v. Kalaiselvan P Krishnan, [18] the

and lockdown which resulted in the unique situation of employees not

It is imperative to have a good understanding of equity to understand how

“Equity in relation to legal remedies means justice administered

Authoritative author on equity, Edmund Snell lists down 12 equitable

(a) Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy;

He who comes into equity must come with clean hands;

(d) Equity follows the law;

(e) Delay defeats equity;

(f) Equality is equity;

(g) Equity looks to the intent rather than to the form;

(j) Where there is equal equity, the law shall prevail;

(k) Equity imputes an intention to fulfil an obligation; and

(l) Equity acts in personam.

It is believed that three of the above equitable principles would be

i. Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy;

ii. Equity follows the law;

iii. Equity looks to the intent rather than to the form.

Section 20(1A) ought to be given a liberal interpretation. The Industrial

Black defines “purposive interpretation” as: [22]