Illusion of The Peoples

Illusion of the Peoples
L ex in g to n Stu d ies in So c ia l , P o l it ic a l ,
and L eg a l P h il o so ph y
Series Editor: James P. Sterba, University of Notre Dame
This series encourages work that is centrally concerned with the

major political, social, and legal ideals, institutions, and practices
of our time. The analysis may be historical or problem-centered;
the evaluation may be theoretically or methodologically focused.
Illusion o f the Peoples: A Critique of National Self-Determination, by Omar

Dahbour
A Critique o f National
Self-Determination
Omar Dahbour
LEXINGTON BOOKS
Lanham • Boulder *New York • Oxford
LEXINGTON BOOKS
Published in the United States of America
by Lexington Books
A Member of die Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706
PO Box 317
Oxford
OX2 9RU, UK
Copyright © 2003 by Lexington Books
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without die prior permission of the publisher.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Date
Dahbour, Omar.
Illusion of the peoples: a critique of national self-determination / Omar Dahbour.
p. cm. — (Lexington studies in social, political, and legal philosophy)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7391-0524-8 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. Nationalism. 2. Self-determination, National. 3. Political science. I. Title.
II. Series.
JC311 .D33 2003

320.54—dc21 2002152262
Printed in the United States of America
© ’ The paper used in this publication meets die minimum requirements of American
National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library
Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.
[Exponents of this [idealistic] conception of history have...only been able
to see in history the political actions of princes and states, religious and all
sorts o f theoretical struggles, and in particular in each historical epoch have
had to share the illusion o f that epoch.
— Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology
It would be unseemly o f us...to forget the immense significance of the

national question—especially in a country which has been rightly called the
“prison of the peoples.”
— V. I. Lenin, “The National Pride of the Great Russians”
Contents
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xiii
Introduction: Nationalism as Belief and as Doctrine 1
1 National Identity and Political Autonomy 17
2 Peoples and Nations in International Law 59
3 Cultural Rights and the Ethics of Self-Determination 91
4 Consent Theory and Democratic Self-Determination 123
5 The Nation-State as an Ethical Community 155
6 The Contradictions o f Liberal Nationalism 195
Conclusion: Self-Determination without Nationalism 215
Bibliography 231
Index 247
About the Author 261

I
Preface
Most o f political life in the last two hundred years has been motivated by
remarkably few distinct ideas. Liberalism since John Stuart Mill, for
instance, has been motivated by the notion that individual liberties ought
to be paramount in a just society. The socialist alternative has, since Marx,
asserted the political importance of class interests and, therefore, the
necessity of class struggle for workers to end their exploitation. But
alongside the burgeoning contest between liberal and socialist notions of
justice, movements for the independence o f what came to be called nation
states were also developing. The central rallying cry o f such movements
was that o f national self-determination.
It is accordingly the case that national self-determination is one of the
three or four most important political ideas of the last two centuries.
Moreover, it seems, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, to be the
one that has survived best. This would not have been an expectation of
most political commentators even twenty-five years ago. Yet, today, the
idea that individual liberty is a paramount value, trumping any
considerations o f social equality or justice, has been relegated to the
margins of political discourse—or, at the very least, it is no longer
characteristic of what passes for “political liberalism.” Similarly, radical
social movements have, for some time, been based on the idea that class
cannot be a sufficient characterization of the struggles for liberation by
oppressed peoples—independent o f or paramount over considerations of
racial, sexual, or environmental justice, for instance.
But the desirability o f the nation-state continues to inform—or perhaps,
distort—political struggles around the globe. A short list of only the most
volatile places where such struggles are occurring today would include
Quebec, Ireland, Yugoslavia, Russia, Tibet, Indonesia, and Palestine. In all
these places, and many more, the idea of national self-determination
continues to be invoked. It has become the most durable, if not necessarily
the most sensible, idea in modem politics.
Yet, curiously, the idea itself has rarely been examined as such—that
ix
X Preface
is, for its philosophical coherence and value. Occasionally, claims have
been made for its importance.1 Just as occasionally, studies—usually by
international jurists or historians—have surveyed its usage.2 But no
systematic philosophical study o f the principle has been made. This seems
odd if it is considered that the idea o f self-determination itself—unlike, for
instance, that of class—is of philosophical origin, principally in the work
o f Kant
In the last twenty years or so, there has been a now widely
acknowledged renaissance of scholarship on nationalism.3 In the last ten
years, philosophers—always slow, as Hegel famously noted, to examine
historical phenomena—have started to consider the concept o f national
identity in various ways. But even here, self-determination has usually been
discussed in passing—as with one o f the first to do so, Michael Walzer,
who wrote about self-determination in works having to do primarily with
war and with justice.4 Most philosophers subsequently have been content
to advocate or dismiss the notion, as the case may be, solely on the basis o f
principles they have antecedently established.
This book seeks to systematically survey the principle o f national self-
determination—not in terms of its historical or political usage, but in terms
o f its philosophical justification. It is not, however, a neutral, analytical
study of a concept The idea is found to be flawed, fatally so. Yet, even
more frequently, it is found to have been misunderstood and misused or
applied. Conceptual clarification and ideological critique therefore will go
together in the pages that follow. Y et it is never too early—even, I would
venture, before the argument has been made—to clarify the terms of debate
and outline the conclusions that will result.
The principle o f national self-determination is equivalent to the idea
that nations have a legitimate claim (perhaps even a right) to states o f their
own. It is not equivalent to the idea that independent, sovereign states o f all
sorts have a right to maintain their independence. So national self-
determination is distinct from the idea o f sovereignty, classically
conceived. Nations are also not groups of any kind—for instance, peoples
or communities defined by geography or history. Nationalism as an
ideology that revolves around the idea of self-determination only makes
sense—only refers to something definable—if nations are specific entities,
distinct from other sorts o f groups. Nations must therefore be defined in
relation to ethnicity—that is, to the belief in a common ancestiy. It is
groups o f this sort alone that can claim national self-determination. Finally,
the principle cannot be claimed as a remedy for injustice, in the sense of
political tyranny, economic exploitation, or social oppression. It is the
Preface xi
denial o f the principle itself—the lack of self-determination—that is the

injustice, from the nationalist point o f view. Nations are entitled to self-
determination, not because it will solve problems of various sorts, but
because it is a good in itself.
These are the key elements of the doctrine o f national self-
determination—a doctrine that has been the core o f nationalist ideology
worldwide for much o f the twentieth century, and even the century before.
It is a doctrine with several possible justifications, none of them however
sufficient in my view to do the job. This does not mean, though, that self-
determination is either itself a flawed idea or one already exhaustively
codified in existing international law. In fact, one purpose of this book is
to rescue self-determination from its nationalist misuse. Neither is it
acceptable to maintain agnosticism with regard to self-determination
claims, recognizing (as some would advocate3) such claims to the extent
they are forcibly pressed, without worrying overmuch about justification.
It is only self-determination without nationalism, I argue in conclusion, that
is a philosophically and politically cogent goal. Giving up self-
determination altogether risks allowing the cause of global justice to be
compromised by a renascent imperialism—however disguised by
humanitarian or internationalist arguments about the immorality and
irrelevance o f sovereign states. But acquiescing in the nationalistic misuse
o f the self-determination principle risks just as grave a danger—the
discrediting o f political autonomy as a necessary element o f a more just and
peaceful world.
Reconceiving self-determination to avoid nationalism is o f course an
agenda for the future. To begin, it is necessary to distinguish self-
determination from the ideological usage to which nationalists have put it.
That is the purpose of this book.
Notes
1. See Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, 4th ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
2. See Alfred Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination,
rev. ed. (New York: Crowell, 1970), W. Wentworth Ofuatey-Kodjoe, The Principle
of Self-Determination in International Law (New York: Nellen Publishing Co.,
1977), Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy o f Self-Determination (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978), and Dov Ronen, The Questfo r Self-
Determination (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979).
xii Preface
3. For surveys of some of this historical scholarship, see Peter Alter,

Nationalism, trans. Stuart McKinnon-Evans (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), and
E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
4. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with
Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), and Spheres o f Justice:
A Defense o f Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
5. See, e.g., Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, chap. 6, and, more recently,
Daniel Philpott, “In Defense of Self-Determination,” Ethics 105 (1995): 352-85.
Acknowledgments
This book was long in the making; the debts incurred have been many. I
would like to acknowledge, in particular, two scholars whose work and
teaching have been a continuing source of inspiration for scores o f students,
including myself—Virginia Held and Marx Wartofsky. Virginia retired
from teaching and Marx, tragically, passed away before this book saw
publication. Yet each was constantly encouraging of my efforts. They were
also members o f a remarkable collection o f philosophers at the City
University of New York Graduate Center in the 1990s, several of whom
gave me invaluable assistance in developing the arguments in this book; I
want to thank especially John Kleinig and Douglas Lackey in this regard.
Several members o f the small community o f scholars working on
international ethics and national identity were crucial in helping me to
persevere; a partial list includes Allen Buchanan, Mitchell Cohen, Carol
Gould, James Nickel, Kai Nielsen, Ross Poole, Robert Schaeffer, and Iris
Young. A number o f personal and professional friends also offered
invaluable assistance and encouragement, among them were Elizabeth
Collins, Celeste Friend, Nanette Funk, Judith Genova, Andrew Light, Sibyl
Schwarzenbach, and Edward Souffrant
I want to thank my editor at Rowman & Littlefield/Lexington Books,
James Sterba, for his interest in this book. The author expresses
appreciation to the University Seminars at Columbia University for their
help in publication. The ideas presented here benefited from discussions in
the University Seminar on Political Economy and Contemporary Social
Issues.
In addition, one context for my work that has proved invaluable was a
resurgent Radical Philosophy Association, which began holding biennial
conferences in the 1990s. The R.P.A.’s Anti-Intervention Group, formed in
response to the N.A.T.O. bombing of Yugoslavia, was crucial for my
rethinking many matters related to this book. From this group, I want to
particularly acknow ledge several who w ere continually
encouraging—Matthew and Biljana Ally, Betsy Bowman, Mitchel Cohen,
Carl Lesnor, Robert Stone, and Karsten Struhl. My colleagues and students
xiii
xiv Acknowledgments
at Hunter College, both in the Philosophy Department and the Honors

Program, exhibited understanding and patience in hearing more than they
probably wanted to know about national identity, self-determination, and
related matters. In philosophy, my department chair, Frank Kirkland,
couldn’t have been more helpful; in addition, John Lango and Gerald Press,
and in the honors program, Elizabeth Beaujour and Robert White, were
always welcoming of my efforts to think through the confusing issues with
which this book deals. O f course, as the faculty know, Hunter’s students are
in many ways a unique group, the best of them combining unsurpassed
acumen with life experience (including political engagement) that is
extremely rare on U.S. college campuses. They have been a continual
challenge and delight to teach and to get to know.
Finally, I want to thank my mother and father, who encouraged a love
of learning in me from the earliest age; my wife, Cynthia; and my daughter,
Lina, who managed to overlook the many times that I chose work over play
in order to finish this book.
Introduction
Nationalism as Belief and as Doctrine
Nationalism [is] largely a doctrine of national self-determination.
— Elie Kedourie, Nationalism
The current state o f discussion on nationalism is best characterized as

confused. On the one hand, there is widespread revulsion against the recent
reappearance of a type o f nationalist politics thought to have been relegated
to historical memory—a type embodied in, for example, the siege of
Sarajevo, intercommunal strife in India and Africa, and vigilantism against
immigrants in Germany. On the other hand, there is now greater acceptance
of claims made by nationalist parties and movements than at any time since
the 1940s.1
This contradictory perception of nationalism has been described by John
Dunn when he writes that nationalism is the “starkest political shame o f the
twentieth century” and at the same time the “very tissue o f modem political
sentiment.”2 But neither the political history of nationalism nor the reasons
for why it seems to have become a part o f modem political “common
sense” will be discussed here.
Rather, what I examine is the assumption upon which all nationalist
politics is based—that nations have a legitimate claim to self-determina-
tion. Toward the end o f this book, I suggest some reasons for why so many
contemporary philosophers have been predisposed to accept this assump
tion and to provide justifications for the nation-state. But the major part of
this study is a systematic and critical examination of the types of justifica
tion that have been or could be given for the principle. And my conclusion
is a critical one: namely, that the central claim of nationalist political
thought—that nations ought to have their own states—is unwarranted, at
1
2 Introduction
least as it is commonly understood today.

The belief in a principle o f national self-determination—that nations
ought to have their own states—is what Marx and Engels called an
“illusion of the epoch.” It is an illusion that is voiced early in this century
by V. I. Lenin. In his essay, “On the National Pride o f the Great Russians”
(1914), Lenin referred to the idea that Russia was a “prison of the peoples”
because it contained many nationalities living under Tsarist rule in a
condition of subservience to the Russian dynasty that dominated the state.3
Along with Lenin, Woodrow Wilson was also one o f the earliest advocates
of national self-determination.4 For Wilson, invoking this principle was
meant to serve the freedom of peoples who had been subjugated not only
by the Romanovs, but also by other imperial regimes such as the Hapsburgs
and the Ottomans. I contend that the idea that national self-determination
actually contributes to political freedom in this way is what constitutes the
“illusion” that has been so prevalent among “the peoples” in this century.
The historical importance of the idea of national self-determination has
long been recognized. For instance, Charles Tilly has written that,
for almost two centuries [national self-determination] has had extraordi

nary force as a justification for political action by ostensible leaders of
peoples who lack states, by rulers of states who speak in a nation’s name,
and by third parties...who intervene in the political struggles of particular
states.3
The historical trajectories of nationalist movements that have used this

idea have been amply studied; the new synoptic studies that have appeared
in the last twenty years can now be regarded as constituting a renaissance
of scholarship on nationalism.6
Those who believe that nations do have a right to self-determination are
to be found not only among those, like Lenin and Wilson, who were
engaged in the political struggles of the early twentieth century, but also
among many who are fighting for political power today. The most telling
current examples of this belief come from political discourse in the
postcommunist countries of eastern Europe. For instance, a Serbian
nationalist, Milorad Ekmecic, stated in 1992 that, “The Serbian people do
not want a state determined by the interests of the great powers and of
European Catholic clericalism, but one which emerges from the ethnic and
historical right possessed by every people in the world.”7 Irenej Ciutti, a
Slovakian nationalist, similarly stated in the same year that,
Nationalism as Belief and as Doctrine 3
Without doubt, all people feel having our own state is a right. Those
believing in God feel it is a God-given right.... It is my duty [as a priest]
to inform people of what religion says about rights and duties. The people
have a right to hear that to have their own state is a God-given right8
But the idea o f national self-determination also has considerable

currency among more liberal postcommunist figures such Czech president
Vaclav Havel and Polish Solidarity party leader Adam Michnik. Havel, for
instance, writes that “[n]ations that have never had states of their own feel
an understandable need to experience independence.”9 And, in asserting
that a legitimate “struggle for one’s national rights” is not nationalism as
such, Michnik has written of
a dispute between two ideas of nation and state: between the idea of a
civil society and an open nation on the one hand and, on the other, the
idea of a “Catholic State of the Polish Nation” and intolerance toward
those who are different.10
Not only those involved in immediate political struggles hold such

notions. Consider a statement by a U.S. historian of nationalism, William
Pfaff. In discussing the Yugoslav civil war, he writes that
Behind what Serbia is doing is the superficially reasonable, but in practice

pernicious, theory that every “nation” should have its own state.... That
the state and nation should coincide is defensible in theory. In practice it
has produced war, terrorism, and what we have now learned to call
“ethnic cleansing”.... In theory, one can accept an argument that if the
Serbs want their own state, or the Croatians, then they should have it. The
practical objection is that, as they conceive the state, they can only have
it at the expense of others.11
What is most interesting about this statement is the assumption that

national self-determination is “superficially reasonable” and theoretically
unproblematic. This is the assumption that I challenge here.
The questionable nature of such a statement is the result of confusion
between nationalism as a political belief and nationalism as a philosophical
doctrine. Most scholarly treatment o f nationalism has focused on the depth,
origins, and causes o f popular belief in the existence o f national identities
and the desirability o f nation-states. Only recently have philosophers begun
to examine the legitimacy of nationalism as a political doctrine, mandating
the rights of peoples as nations and the duties of individuals to these
4 Introduction
nations.12
But the lack o f a coherent philosophical doctrine lies just below the
surface of nationalists’ assertions of their beliefs. Consider the statements
quoted above. What exactly are the nations, not to speak o f the peoples, to
which nationalists make such frequent reference—as if they were simply
facts or states of affairs unproblematically existent in the world? And what
about the needs and rights that these nations or peoples supposedly
have—where do they come from and upon what basis can they be claimed?
Or, what about the deeper concepts, less often brought to the surface of
political rhetoric—the notion o f (national) identity, for instance, or that of
(national) community? These concepts too frequently serve as unjustified
theoretical foundations for the assertions o f nationalist politicians.
A number o f philosophers have recently seen fit to try to give philosoph
ical shape and coherence to such notions—often in service to their own
beliefs in a liberal or pacific nationalism. These efforts recall those of
earlier philosophers who viewed nationalism as politically liberat
ing—liberating, that is, in relation to the imperial or dynastic regimes that
prevented establishment of democratic states in France, Germany, Italy, and
other European countries throughout the nineteenth century.
Yet, by the beginning the twenty-first century, such imperial and
dynastic regimes are gone, long gone. What then justifies this revival of
nationalism as a philosophical doctrine? The answer to this question is a
central concern of this book. Considering nationalism as a doctrine, as well
as a belief, is a prerequisite for evaluating it seriously as a particular form
of politics and ideology—and it is this, rather than another study of the
nature o f nationalist beliefs, that I believe is needed now.
As Elie Kedourie emphasized in his 1960 book on nationalism, the
principle that lies at the heart o f nationalist doctrine is that of self-
determination.13When self-determination is applied not to individuals but
to nations, it leads to the conclusion that nations ought to have their own
states—and it is this idea that informs most nationalist political programs.
While Kedourie can be criticized for turning nationalism into nothing but
a philosophical doctrine, he is surely correct to emphasize the fact that what
underlies assertions of national rights is the idea that nations ought to be
self-governing.
But this idea, like any that defines the nature o f a good society or
government, needs justification—philosophical justification. Why, actually,
ought nations to be self-governing? Because it is consistent with other
rights that people(s) may claim today? Because it contributes to their
welfare? Because it is part o f the very definition of self-government, which
is itself now recognized as a fundamental good? Because it is ultimately

necessary in order to maintain a human community o f any kind? This book
is a critique o f attempts to use these (and other) reasons to justify the idea
that nations ought necessarily or ideally to have self-determination.
Ideology and Philosophy of Nationalism
The fact that nationalist beliefs have (as philosophers might say) a rational
core, embodied in the idea o f self-determination, has been neglected in
most studies of nationalism until recently. Why? For their own reasons,
both historians and philosophers have not focused on this rational aspect of
nationalism. Historians have generally preferred to regard nationalism as
an ideology about which the crucial question to be asked is why it has been
so historically powerful—not whether people should believe in its core
doctrine. Philosophers, on the contrary, have tended to ignore nations and
political self-determination as philosophically uninteresting subjects,
assuming the existence of particular societies—exactly what is at issue
when self-determination is invoked—and examining the bases o f legitimate
government within these societies.
Until recently, the dominant school of historical scholarship on
nationalism tended to regard its object of analysis as the nation-state. This
emphasis on the political or state-building aspects o f nationalism predis
posed historians to ignore the ideological, not to mention the philosophical,
aspects o f their subject. Hugh Seton-Watson, an otherwise perceptive
historian of nationalism, typified this view of the subject when he wrote in
1977 that,
I...see little point in trying to analyse nationalism itself as an ideology. It

may even be doubted whether nationalism deserves to be called an
ideology. Its essence.Js very simple: it is the application to national
communities of the Enlightenment doctrine ofpopular sovereignty.... The
rest of nationalist ideology is rhetoric.14
But in the last generation, a number of historians have turned their

attention more to the ideological, than to the strictly political, aspects of
nationalism.15One o f the most celebrated scholars o f nationalism, Benedict
Anderson, represented this new approach in arguing that nationalism is
similar to phenomena such as kinship or religion—and is to a great extent
their replacement in modernized or modernizing societies.16
6 Introduction
Yet, there is a tendency within the new historiography o f nationalism as

well that tends to preclude much concern with the doctrines espoused by
nationalists. This tendency is one that, as with Anderson, regards national
ist ideology not as an ideology in the more strictly political sense of ideas
with a programmatic content, but in the sense of a worldview. One way to
put the difference between these two views o f nationalist ideology is that,
while such ideologies as liberalism or socialism are ideologies in modem
society, nationalism is the ideology o f modem society—the most commonly
voiced and yet least examined set of beliefs about how political life ought
to be organized in the modem era. To a great extent, other ideologies either
assume or ignore the existence and validity of the major goal of national
ism—the nation-state—that few provide arguments for or against it.
Certainly, there is substantial truth in such a characterization of
nationalism. For one thing, the assumption that the nation-state is the
legitimate form o f political organization operates ideologically by giving
the nation-state a substance and reality that it does not necessarily
possess—as well as setting nationalism somewhat apart (in the eyes of
many) from other, more particularistic, political ideologies.17 For another,
the pseudopolitical nature o f nationalism makes it possible to view national
identities as natural, even necessary, features of modem life. Anyone who
studies nationalism cannot fail to confront the deep-seated convictions of
many that the nation-state is an inevitability—if not for all societies or
historical periods, certainly for ours. However ill-informed such a view
may be, it is extraordinarily prevalent. And this perceived “naturalness”
indicates the ideological character of nationalist doctrine since, as Iris
Young has put it, “Ideas function ideologically...when they represent the
institutional context in which they arise as natural or necessary.”18
In this vein, Anderson has famously characterized nations as “imaginary
communities.” For him, this means that some form o f an “imaginary” is
necessary in order to have a community at all. The nation(-state) is the
currently prevalent form this imaginary will (must?) take. He then refuses
the obvious criticism contained in this designation o f nations as imaginary,
insisting that all communities are imagined.19 Such a view, however
suggestive of nationalism’s historical importance, overlooks its politi
cal—and ultimately doctrinal—significance; it renders impossible attempts
to actually evaluate the consequences of accepting nationalism’s political
project—including its central doctrine of self-determination—in compari
son with other political orientations.
The philosophers have not done much better with this task since, with
some recent exceptions, they have ignored (often by assuming) the nation
state as an entity requiring legitimation. It may appear strange in a book

devoted to a critique of recent philosophies o f nationalism to make the
claim that the subject has largely been ignored by philosophers. But in
terms o f political philosophy as a whole, nationalism still is not integrated
into the main concerns o f the discipline.
This is certainly true o f John Rawls’ work, which is generally regarded
as having revived political philosophy in the current period. For Rawls and
other contractarian philosophers, the primary problem o f political
philosophy is one of distributive justice—how to distribute the goods
produced domestically within a society. As communitarian critics o f Rawls
have been lately pointing out, this begs a crucial question: for which
political community are these problems to be examined, and who is entitled
to be a member o f that community?20
Rawls seems to have no answer to this question, even in his latest work
on human rights and international law.21 A student o f Rawls, Thomas
Pogge, who has attempted to extend Rawls' work to the international arena,
also does not consider the specific role of nations in international affairs,
beyond an observation that nationality is a “contingency” similar to class
and ought to be disregarded as a precondition for participation in deciding
the nature o f a just distribution of goods (i.e., from the “original
position”).22 One philosopher influenced by Rawls who has considered
nationalism and self-determination is Charles Beitz. But he considers them
only in terms o f colonial situations, which he regards as embodying a
problem of social injustice, rather than o f political membership.23For such
political philosophers, a “nation” continues to be a state and “self-determi-
nation” simply means self-government within an already existing state.
Traditional and Critical Theories of National Identity
Among those contemporary scholars, historians or philosophers, who have

studied nationalism—and national identity, more broadly—there has been
a very powerful impetus to considering it as an inherent feature of modem
life. This is what I will call here the traditional theory o f national identity:
it assumes that some form of national identity will (always?) exist and that,
therefore, nationalism is not be criticized but to be understood, ameliorated,
pacified, or otherwise accepted in one way or another.
This view o f national identity—that it is an inherent feature o f modem
society— is evident in Anderson’s view, discussed above, that nations are
the “imaginary communities” of post-traditional societies. It is also present
8 Introduction
in Ernest Gellner’s similar argument that national identities are the

necessary correlary o f the creation o f large states and corporations in a
global market economy. There are, in addition, scholars who do not limit
the scope o f national identity to modem times, but attribute it in one form
or another to many, perhaps all, historical epochs.24
Philosophers such as Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer have also
adopted this view by regarding the nation as the inevitable modem form of
cultural identity or popular government. The question for these thinkers
then becomes how to distinguish positive from negative versions of
national identity and the nation-state, since some version will continue to
be with us. An interesting recent example o f such a view is Paul Gilbert’s
book, The Philosophy o f Nationalism—interesting because Gilbert is less
favorably disposed to nationalism than the above-mentioned figures.
Nevertheless, Gilbert maintains in his book that different attitudes toward
nationalism result from different conceptions of what nations are, not from
affirmative or critical attitudes toward the very idea o f a nation.25Another
instance o f this view is that o f Ross Poole’s work, Nation and Identity, in
which Poole, following Benedict Anderson, defines national identity
loosely enough to suggest that some form o f nationalism is virtually
unavoidable, at least given the nature o f the modem state.26
A critical theory o f national identity, in contrast, would be one in which
nations are regarded as contingent—that is, as products o f a particular
reaction to the problems and deficiencies o f modem life.27 In addition, a
critical theory of national identity would not be concerned to reconstruct
the idea of the nation in order for it to be made compatible with other,
purportedly liberal, values. Rather, it would seek to find the historical and
political limits of national identity—of the contingency and historicity of
the concept—as well as intimations o f postnational forms of political and
personal identity. Such an approach would view nations as involving
specific forms of personal loyalty and attachment and o f political belief and
action. Nationalism is, on this account, one possible political theory under
modem conditions, alongside liberalism, socialism, feminism, environmen
talism, and so on. From this perspective, nationalism is not a natural feature
of modem society, culture, or politics, but a specific (even if prevalent)
political reaction to particular historical circumstances.
The result of this view, of course, is that nationalism is a theory (and a
political strategy) that it is possible to accept or reject—not an inherent
feature o f modem life. As Ross Poole put it in an earlier book, nations are
not imaginary communities, but “illusory communities”—communities in
name only, based on nostalgia, warfare, and manipulation, rather than real
attachments formed by historical struggles or current needs.28This illusion

may be prevalent at present, but it is also criticizable—above all, it is not
an inevitability.
In historical scholarship on national identity, there has been important
work contributing to a critical theory by Walker Connor and John Breuilly,
among others. The focus o f this work is to show that nationalism is a much
more contingent and particularistic ideology than it is portrayed as being
by traditional theorists. Connor, for instance, argues for the specificity of
national identity in beliefs about ancestry and kinship, rather than
generalized reactions to “modernity”; and Breuilly demonstrates that the
efficacy o f nationalist politics is limited to historical situations in which
civil society and class-based political organizations are underdeveloped.29
But in terms o f a philosophical critique of the doctrine o f national
ism—and the idea of self-determination that is central to it—there has been
little comprehensive work. The most detailed treatments o f nationalist ideas
have either been explicitly apologetic or traditionalist in the way described
above. Yet, the principle of national self-determination is extraordinarily
vague and has, until recently at any rate, seldom been defended in any
thoroughgoing way, as a number of commentators have noted in passing.
The nationalist doctrine is past due for a thoroughly critical examination,
an examination that at the same time does not try to explain away the real
needs that have sometimes provoked a nationalist reaction.
Self-Determination without Nationalism (or Liberalism)?
Such a critical examination must differentiate itself from the two camps
that have recently been in contention over the normative significance of
national identity—on the one hand, those who utilize a universalistic
concept of international justice to downplay the principle o f self-determina-
tion and, on the other hand, those who attempt to modify liberal ideas to
incorporate some version o f the nationalist principle.
For those philosophers who consider self-determination from a
universalistic perspective, self-determination is viewed as providing
reasons for violating individual rights in some instances, as well as
inhibiting efforts to achieve a just international distribution of wealth.
Jttrgen Habermas has written on the first point and has been especially
concerned with restrictions on immigration and the rights o f “guest
workers” in foreign countries.30Charles Beitz has made the case against the
nation-state on the basis of the second point—that is, in terms of its
10 Introduction
violation of principles o f international distributive justice.31 In both cases,

a concept of a just procedure that will ensure a fair distribution of goods on
the global level motivates criticism of the idea of national self-determina-
tion. O f course, whether such a just procedure can find embodiment in any
actual political community—and whether it would command assent from
the “world community”—are questions to which such an approach must
give answers.
A second perspective is that of those philosophers who have argued for
the validity o f a principle of national self-determination, as long as it is
limited by adherence to liberal principles of individual rights.32 This view
is essentially a return to John Stuart Mill’s own attempt in the mid
nineteenth century to argue for the nation-state, while at the same time
maintaining the liberty of individuals within such states. This idea was
regarded as incoherent at the time by Lord Acton; it has some critics today
as well—and this book is meant to contribute to such a critique.33 What
present-day Millians must explain, o f course, is how creating nation-states
is compatible with the individual liberties of those who may oppose or be
indifferent to such nation-states.
While my own position in this book draws on the universalists’ critique
of nationalist ideas, it ultimately rejects both positions for their common
advocacy o f liberal regimes. Instead, I write from a position critical of both
liberal accommodations to the nation-state and liberals’ acceptance o f a
global market economy. Liberal nationalism, as will be argued below, is a
philosophically contradictory and politically ineffective theory, combining
incompatible ideas and beliefs. Liberal internationalism, in contrast, is an
unrealistic attempt to generate global consensus and action on principles of
justice, while assuming the legitimacy of the institutions of world
capitalism that undermine such schemes of global justice.
A critical perspective, I argue, advocates the legitimacy of limited
political communities (limited both in scope and sovereignty), but based on
locally sustainable political ecologies, not ethnonational identities.34It also
involves a principled rejection o f the hegemony o f the global market
economy from the perspective of a popular internationalism.35 In the
conclusion, I call this perspective “self-determination without nationalism”;
while the full elaboration of this view would require another book, it does
involve focusing on legitimate aspirations for self-determination that are
not served either by traditional liberal theories of rights, by nation-states,
or by a new global order.
What are these aspirations for self-determination that are neither liberal
nor nationalist? In the twentieth century, four kinds of claims to self
determination have been made by a variety of political movements and

thinkers.36 All o f these claims have historical roots in the revolutionary
democratic movements o f nineteenth-century Europe, movements which
were also nationalistic in certain respects. In nineteenth-century Germany
and Italy, democratic and national aspirations intermingled in opposition
to monarchical rule.37 But with the unification of these countries under
conservative regimes, nationalist and democratic ideas diverged.
First, with the fall o f the European monarchies and the dissolution of
multinational empires in central and eastern Europe, self-determination was
taken up as a demand in the colonial world. ‘"National liberation” became
a slogan for the anticolonial movements. But there was a crucial difference
between these movements for national liberation and earlier nationalist
movements for statehood in Europe. While the idea of national liberation
was essentially a conception of the legitimacy o f self-government applied
to colonized peoples, the idea o f national self-determination is an idea of
ethnically based citizenship. The difficulty in separating these two ideas in
colonial cases lay in the fact that the achievement of self-government often
seemed to require the enfranchisement of specific nationalities in the
colonies. Today, demands for self-determination in neocolonial set
tings—for instance, Palestine or northern Ireland—seem to fit the model of
national liberation. But this does not necessarily mean that they are
equivalent to the nationalist demand for independent states.
Second, attempts to develop nation-states in newly independent
countries have in fact generated a new claim of self-determination—that of
national minorities denied the right to cultural expression. Contemporary
movements for cultural rights are often found among nationalities that have
at various times been denied the right to practice their culture openly—the
Kurds in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, the Basques in Spain, the Tibetans
in China, and so forth. Yet, though such nationalities sometimes also
engender political movements advocating statehood, this does not mean
that national self-determination is equivalent to a right to cultural expres
sion.
Third, self-determination can be seen essentially as a demand for the
political, not cultural, expression o f national will—that is, in an independ
ent state. In fact, one of die most effective images of-self-determination is
that of a people exercising its right to democratic self-government by
establishing its own state. Yet, a more careful consideration of the idea of
self-government suggests that political and national self-determination are
not the same at all. While the exercise o f self-determination by a people
concerns whether its political will is expressed democratically, the
12 Introduction
nationalist conception of self-determination is concerned with the ways in

which it is decided whether a group or population constitutes a people in
the first place. Historically, so-called captive nations—such as the U.S.
South, East Pakistan, or the Baltic republics—have sometimes claimed self-
determination on this basis. But while substate regions have sometimes had
legitimate grievances in terms of lack o f self-rule, this is different from
claims that such regions constitute “captive nations”—that is, nations
lacking states o f their own. Furthermore, the determination o f whether or
not a people is a people or not is much harder to achieve democratically
than the expression o f the already existing political will o f a people in
particular policies.
Fourth, self-determination has sometimes been claimed by regions or
localities that seek greater autonomy from central authorities for the
purposes of local or regional development or the protection o f natural
resources. This has been particularly the case with indigenous peoples, such
as American Indians in the United States, Canada, or Mexico, and with
distinctive regions o f large countries such as the United Kingdom, Brazil,
or India. But there is no necessary connection between claims to regional
autonomy and assertions o f national self-determination, since the latter
primarily serves to enhance ethnonational identities. While nationalists are
concerned with establishing the political independence o f national groups,
the self-determination o f regional communities is designed to protect or
enhance a particular local way o f life.
The issue raised by the use o f self-determination as a demand in cases
of national liberation, cultural rights, self-government, or regional
autonomy is whether these facets of political freedom, all properly
applicable claims to particular instances of oppression, are best captured by
the nationalist principle o f self-determination. Put differently, is political
autonomy an appropriate claim o f groups with particular cultural identities?
The origins o f the idea that identity and autonomy are necessarily linked
are explored in chapter 1. This idea has found expression in this century in
certain conceptions o f international law, moral philosophy, democratic
theory, and political communitarianism. These tendencies— and the
justifications o f national self-determination that have arisen from
them—are described and criticized in the subsequent four chapters. In
chapter 6, the ideological revival of liberal nationalism, which has
motivated the development of these theories, is examined. Finally, a
conclusion suggests a way o f justifying legitimate demands for self-
determination by separating them from the nationalist principle which I
have called the “illusion o f the peoples.”
Notes
1. W. Wentworth Ofuatey-Kodjoe, in The Principle o f Self-Determination

in International Law (New York: Nellen Publishing Co., 1977), 30-31, discusses
how the use of the concept of national rights by Nazi propagandists in the 1930s
and 1940s to argue for the expansion of Germany discredited the idea for a
generation afterward.
2. John Dunn, Western Political Theory in the Face o f the Future
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 57.
3. V. I. Lenin, “On die National Pride of the Great Russians,” in On the
National Question and Proletarian Internationalism (Moscow: Novosti Press
Agency Publishing House, 1970), 84.
4. For Wilson’s views, see his MAddress to a Joint Session of Congress,
8 January, 1918,” in Arthur Link (ed.), The Papers o f Woodrow Wilson, vol. 45
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), esp. 539.
5. Charles Tilly, “National Self-Determination as a Problem for All of
Us,” Daedalus 122 (Summer 1993), 30.
6. E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme,
Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3-4. Among the
studies that he mentions are the following: Benedict Anderson, Imagined
Communities, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991); John Armstrong, Nations Before
Nationalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); John
Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982);
and Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1983); to these should be added, at a minimum, Peter Alter, Nationalism,
trans. Stuart McKinnon-Evans (London: Edward Arnold, 1989); Walker Connor,
Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1994); William McNeill, Polyethnicity and National Unity in
WorldHistory (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986); Hugh Seton-Watson,
Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins o f Nations and the Politics o f
Nationalism (London: Methuen, 1977); and Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins
of Nations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
7. Quoted in the Nation, Sept. 14,1992.
8. Quoted in the New York Times, Oct. 9,1992.
9. Vaclav Havel, “Post-Communist Nightmare,” New York Review o f
Books (May 27,1993): 8.
10. Adam Michnik, “Nationalism,” Social Research 58, no. 4 (Winter
1991): 758,763.
11. William Pfaff, in the New York Review o f Books, Sept. 24, 1992
(italics added).
14 Introduction
12. But this examination is in fact a return to the work of an earlier period
in the history of philosophy (from the late eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth
century), in which philosophers were similarly concerned with the role of national
identities in political life; see, e.g., works by Kant, Herder, Fichte, Hegel, Mazzini,
and Mill, all excerpted in Omar Dahbour and Micheline R. Ishay (eds.), The
Nationalism Reader (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1995).
13. Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, 4th ed. (1960; reprint, Oxford: Blackwell,
1993), 23.
14. Seton-Watson, Nations and States, 445.
15. Most of the scholars listed in note 6 above would fall within this
tendency.
16. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 5.
17. Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” in Robert Tucker (ed.), The
Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), 34.
18. Iris Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1990), 74.
19. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6.
20. Michael Walzer is the critic who has emphasized this problem of
“membership” the most; see his book, Spheres o f Justice: A Defense o f Pluralism
and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983). Harry Beran has done the most to
theorize membership from a quasinationalist perspective; see his book, The
Consent Theory o f Political Obligation (London: Croom Helm, 1987). Also see the
discussion of both thinkers in chapters 4 and 5, below.
21. See John Rawls, The Law o f Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1999), esp. 24-25.
22. Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1989), 247; see also Pogge’s more recent article, “The Bounds of
Nationalism” (in Rethinking Nationalism, ed. Jocelyne Couture, Kai Nielsen, and
Michel Seymour, Supplementary Volume 22 of the Canadian Journal o f
Philosophy (1996): 463-504), which, however, still treats nationalist claims as a
limitation on considerations of distributive justice, rather than as a means of
determining state boundaries and legitimacy.
23. See Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979). While his treatment of the
question of “eligibility” for citizenship includes consideration of the nationalist
view of this matter, he does not discuss the thornier issue of whether national
groups might have rights to determine eligibility-only whether nationality can
reasonably be considered a relevant criterion of membership. Beitz’s discussion,
while critical of the nationalist view in a thoughtful way, has the marks of a
digression from the more important issue of international distributivejustice, rather
than of the consideration of a political principle that could potentially trump claims
for any particular distribution of goods.
24. See, e.g., the works by Armstrong and Smith cited in note 6 above.
25. Paul Gilbert, The Philosophy o f Nationalism (Boulder, Colo.:

Westview Press, 1998).
26. See Ross Poole, Nation and Identity (London: Routledge, 1999), esp.
chap. 3.
27. The distinction between traditional and critical theories is, of course,
loosely taken from Max Horkheimer’s seminal essay, ‘Traditional and Critical
Theory,” in Horkheimer’s Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. Matthew J.
O’Connell and others (New York: Continuum, 1982). Horkheimer notes that the
traditional theorist’s “achievements arc a factor in the conservation and continuous
renewal of the existing state of affairs, no matter what fine names he gives to what
he does” (196).
28. Ross Poole, Morality and Modernity (London: Routledge, 1991), 108.
29. See Connor, Ethnonationalism, and Breuilly, Nationalism and the
State, passim.
30. See Jflrgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity: Some
Reflections on the Future of Europe,” Praxis International 12 (April 1992).
31. See Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, passim.
32. See, e.g., works by Harry Beran, David Miller, Yael Tamir, and
Michael Walzer, discussed in chapters 3-6 of this book, as well as the writings of
Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, and others mentioned throughout.
33. On the Mill-Acton debate, see John Stuart Mill, “Considerations on
Representative Government,” in “On Liberty” and Other Essays (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991), chap. 16, “Of Nationality, as connected with
Representative Government,” and Lord Acton, “Nationality,” in History o f
Freedom and Other Essays (London: Macmillan, 1907); for contemporary critics
of national self-determination, see, e.g., Allen E. Buchanan, Secession: The
Morality o f Political Divorcefrom Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), and several of the articles in Omar Dahbour (ed.),
“Philosophical Perspectives on National Identity,” a special issue of the
Philosophical Forum 28, nos. 1-2 (Fall-Winter 1996-97), especially those by Judith
Lichtenberg, Joseph Carens, and Jonathan R6e.
34. For some suggestions along these lines, see Warren Magnuson, The
Search fo r Political Space: Globalization, Social Movements, and the Urban
Political Experience (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996).
35. On the development of such a popular internationalism, see Jeremy
Brecher and Tim Costello, Global Village or Global Pillage: Economic
Reconstruction from the Bottom Up (Boston: South End Press, 1994), and Bron
Raymond Taylor (ed.), Ecological Resistance Movements: The Global Emergence
ofRadical and Popular Environmentalism (Albany: State University ofNew York
Press, 1995).
36. For an insightful discussion of the historical changes in this century
in the political uses of the principle of self-determination, see Rupert Emerson,
“Self-Determination,” American Journal o f International Law 65 (1971). In
addition, the four aspects o f self-determination discussed below are more
16 Introduction
thoroughly differentiated from the nationalist principle in chapters 2-5,

respectively.
37. Jfirgen Habermas, “Interview: Ethics, Politics, and History,”
Philosophy and Social Criticism 14 (1988): 436-37.
Chapter 1
National Identity and

Political Autonomy
Once one concedes that people have a “need” for national identity, the
study of nationalism ceases to be one based on rational and demonstrable
criteria.
— John Breuilly, “Nationalism and the State”
The Identity of the “Self” In National Self-Determination
Historically, the concept of self-determination came into political usage in

tandem with the development o f the idea o f the nation-state. But what does
the concept itself mean and what is its relation to the fundamental concerns
of political philosophy? This chapter attempts to provisionally define the
concept o f self-determination and to suggest what role it must play once it
is applied specifically to national groups. In particular, I will argue for two
points: (1) that in order for the idea of national self-determination to have
even minimal coherence, a strict definition of “nation” must be employed
—in contrast to what most commentators have maintained; and (2) that,
while the ideas o f self-determination and political sovereignty are
necessarily connected, they contradict one another once nations are
regarded as the “self’ that is seeking self-determination. These points will
set the stage for a critique o f the different justifications for national self-
determination in the chapters that follow.
Self-determination necessarily involves two component concepts. There
is the “se lf’ that is seeking self-determination and there is the state of
affairs being sought by this self. If the self is narrowed to the category of
“nation,” the obvious question to be asked is, “What is a nation?” Some
prior consideration of what sort o f an answer would be satisfactory is
required, however. Since nations are most generally human collectivities
of one sort or another, what is really needed is some specification of the
17
18 Chapter 1
features o f collectivities designated as nations. This is, philosophically

speaking, a question about what is usually called “identity.” So, the first
task is to consider what sort of identity nations might have.
The second aspect o f defining self-determination is to delineate the
nature o f the goal that is sought when self-determination is mentioned. A
self-determining self would, in general, be one that determines the
conditions o f its own actions—a self that is free or autonomous. So the
second thing we need to define is the type o f autonomy to which self-
determination refers, when it is given a political, and especially, a national,
connotation. (This aspect will be addressed in the second half of this
chapter.)
Those who follow recent debates in political philosophy will know that
“identity” has become a contested term in a way that was not true a
generation ago. Today, it has become common (if not uncontroversial) to
attribute political intentions or claims to the identities of actors or
claimants. This attribution is usually justified by theories o f what is
sometimes referred to as “identity politics,” or more commonly (in
philosophical discourse), the politics o f difference or recognition.1
The current interest in identity politics has not often been connected
explicitly with the earlier development o f nationalism. But it is increasingly
clear that, as Charles Taylor notes, nationalism was the first historical
manifestation o f a political theory that derived normative claims from
attributions o f identity to groups.2
Nations are—in some sense—groups with distinct identities; nationalists
are those political actors who seek to utilize these identities to make various
political claims. But it is far from easy to determine what distinguishes
national groups from other entities such as peoples, countries, or states, on
the one hand, and political movements, ethnic groups, or minorities, on the
other. Much o f the difficulty lies in the historical origins o f the idea o f the
nation. Two sources o f this idea were critical—the emergence o f the
“people” as a politically important entity within the context of the early
modem democratic, and particularly French, revolutions, and the political
mobilization of different cultural communities resident within the Central
European empires in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.3
These two sources have, in contemporary usage, led to frequent
confusion between distinct meanings of “nation”—on the one hand, the
political meaning o f a nation in the sense o f the people or inhabitants o f a
state, and on the other hand, the cultural meaning o f a nation as a social
group defined by kinship ties, or by particular linguistic, folkloric, or
religious characteristics. Some contemporary scholars, such as Leah
National Identity and Political Autonomy 19
Greenfeld, locate the origins o f modem nation-states as early as the

sixteenth century—largely because they employ a “political” conception of
national identity that does not involve a clear distinction between nations
and states (since nations are considered to be equivalent to the populations
of states).4 If there is a special character to nation-states on this account, it
lies in their ability to mobilize political allegiances among a much wider
population than was possible for earlier dynastic or theocratic empires.5
But this view o f nations differs from that o f most historians, who—at
least until recently—have regarded ethnic or racial singularity as essential
to a definition of nationality.6 Though the significance o f ethnicity—or
race, as it usually was designated in earlier scholarship—was given
different weights by various scholars, it was always an important part o f the
mix. Walker Connor is probably the most prominent contemporary adherent
o f this scholarly tradition. Connor argues that if a nation is understood in
what he calls its “pristine” sense, it is simply a “group o f people who
believe they are ancestrally related.”7 An earlier, and slightly more
succinct, formulation that he used was that o f a nation as a “self-aware
ethnic group.”8
Contemporary philosophers, on the other hand, tend to agree with those
historians such as Eric Hobsbawm, who have virtually given up the
definitional effort.9 For instance, Ross Poole and Paul Gilbert have
followed and attempted to codify this definitional agnosticism because they
think it avoids what they regard as the excessive specificity o f the
ethnically-based definition. Poole, for instance, has defined the nation,
utilizing Benedict Anderson’s terminology, very broadly as an “imagined
political community.”10 Gilbert has used a different but similarly nonspe
cific definition, which highlights what he considers to be the inextricable
connection o f national identities with nationalism as a political ideology:
“[A] nation is a group which has...a right to independent statehood by
virtue o f being the kind o f group it is.”11
These definitions may seem rather opaque; but they are formulated in
order to include the widest possible set o f cases within the class o f
“nation.” Proponents consider this an advantage: a loose definition is better
able to include different sorts o f entities that have commonly been
designated as nations. But the danger, which will be emphasized here, is
that this approach risks a debilitating nominalism: it may fail to define an
object o f inquiry at all.
20 Chapter 1
What Is a Nation?
We are thrown back to the question that Ernest Renan asked in 1882:
“What is a nation?” Renan’s own definition is explicitly subjectivistic:
A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which are really only
one, go to make up this soul or spiritual principle. One of these things lies
in the past, the other in the present. The one is the possession of a rich
heritage of memories; and the other is actual agreement, the desire to live
together, and the will to continue to make the most of the joint inheri
tance.12
Renan emphasized the ways in which nations were continually reconsti

tuted by almost constant choices o f affiliation by living persons. Hence, his
most famous comment on the subject:
A nation implies a past; while, as regards the present, it is all contained in

one tangible fact, viz., the agreement and clearly expressed desire to
continue a life in common. The existence o f a nation is...a dailyplebiscite,
just as that of the individual is a continual affirmation of life.13
But Renan’s insight into the fluctuating character o f nations destabilizes

any attempt to clearly define the essential beliefs that might denote the
existence of a national identity. This is one reason why many contemporary
scholars, influenced by Renan’s insights into the malleability of national
identities, have effectively given up on developing a more determinate
definition o f a nation.
A source for a more objectivistic view can be found in the now little-
known work by the Austro-Marxist, Otto Bauer, The Nationalities Question
and Social Democracy (1907). The crucial element in Bauer’s definition o f
nation was it constituted a “totality of men bound together through a
common destiny into a community o f character.”14 While Bauer outlined
a number o f constituents o f such communities o f character, his emphasis
was on the different ways in which they could be constituted. No one
element—language, territory, history—was absolutely required to
constitute nations. Rather, it was the coming together in different ways of
these and other elements that created a common culture from which a
national community could arise. And crucially, it was the experience of
people as being such a community o f character that was the basis for
national identities.15
Bauer’s most influential critic, Joseph Stalin, thought Bauer’s definition
too psychologistic and implicitly nationalist.16 There is some truth to this

criticism; but Stalin’s own solution was to define a nation as an entity that
must include a large number o f characteristics —including some that Bauer
had maintained might upon occasion be omitted. A nation, in Stalin’s view,
must have a history, common language, territory, economic life, and
“psychological make-up.” Moreover, “It must be emphasized that none of
the above characteristics taken separately is sufficient to define a nation.
More than that, it is sufficient for a single one of these characteristics to be
lacking and the nation ceases to be a nation.”17 Here, the objectivistic
definition collapses, since the list of necessary constituents o f national
identity eliminates from consideration many, if not most, groups often
regarded as nations.
A fresh start was made by Max Weber, who supplied some o f the
elements of what Walker Connor was later to call a strict, or “pristine,”
definition of nations. In Economy and Society, Weber links nationality with
ethnicity in that they both share “the vague connotation that whatever is felt
to be distinctively common must derive from common descent.”18 Then,
when Weber considers the nation as a specific form of political community,
he notes that it “cannot be stated in terms o f empirical qualities common to
those who count as members.” In fact, “the concept belongs in the sphere
of values.”19
For Connor, it is Weber’s attempt to distinguish ethnic groups from
nations that is most interesting. What is required is a certain sort o f belief:
“until the members [of an ethnic group] are themselves aware o f the
group’s uniqueness, it is merely an ethnic group and not a nation. While an
ethnic group may, therefore, be other-defined, the nation must be self
defined.”20
An ethnically-based definition of the nation such as Connor’s therefore
emphasizes the relation o f national identity to an incipient belief in ethnic
commonalities. This definition consists o f three component concepts. First,
as mentioned above, a nation is a self-defined entity, as opposed to ethnic
groups, which may be defined by others (whether prejudicially or in terms
of scientific criteria).
Second, there is the matter o f what this self-definition consists in. This
is where ethnicity becomes important: it is the perception of ancestral or
kinship ties (regardless o f the reality o f them) that is significant here.21
Objective features o f national identity (such as language or custom) are
important “only to the degree to which they contribute to this notion or
sense o f the group’s self-identity and uniqueness.”22It is the ‘‘psychological
bond” that is important. Furthermore, this bond must be one of ancestral
22 Chapter 1
relations or “felt kinship ties”;23 otherwise, the group identity would be of

another kind (religious, occupational, class, racial, and so on). Connor also
remarks that this conception o f nations does not preclude changes in the
“outward characteristics” of a national identity (for instance, the loss of a
distinctive language, as in the case of Ireland), as long as the consciousness
o f uniqueness is preserved.24
Third, there is the way in which nations come to be self-defined. This
is inevitably a political process—one involving some claim to a distinct
political community. Again, it is the difference between an unreflective
awareness o f group identity and a politically oriented consciousness o f it
that separates ethnicity from nationality—though the content of the beliefs
that form this identity may be substantially the same.
A nation, then, is a determinate thing—but one defined not by social
facts (e.g., kinship) but by beliefs about what these facts are (i.e., convic
tions about kinship ties). On this account, a nation is therefore necessarily
an ethnically self-defined —as well as politically self-conscious —group;
and national identity is essentially an ethnic identity, though one which has
achieved some political expression.
This definition raises the question of whether it is appropriate to make
a sharp distinction between nations and states (i.e., political communities
of any kind). Do all states contain a nation (or nations) by virtue o f the fact
that they contain a people (or peoples) united in relation to that state?
Confusing examples abound: is there a Swiss nation, a people, or just a
state? Could there be several (language-based) nations within Switzerland
—e.g., German, French, or Italian ones? Are there people(s) who have (or
states that contain) no nation(s) at all? Empirical evidence o f the high
degree o f variability between national and political boundaries adds to the
confusion.23 Advocating an ethnically-based definition of the nation
constitutes an attempt to solve these puzzles by keeping a stringent
conception of nations that distinguishes them from communities o f other
kinds. A strict definition is therefore realist in that it constitutes an attempt
to fix the meaning o f national identity by reference to a certain determinate
property—ethnicity, though one understood subjectivistically as a belief in
common ancestry.
Recent philosophical treatments o f national identity have tended to
reject this realist approach for a looser definition that can be considered
quasinominalist. The incoherence o f this nominalistic approach is evident
even in two o f the most sophisticated recent studies o f national identity.
For instance, Ross Poole views national identity as a combination o f
several elements—a particular conception o f personal identity, a view o f
what constitutes political community, and a certain type of moral commit

ment. These elements are all combined so that it is impossible to separate
out anything absolutely distinctive about nations from other forms of
identities, communities, and moralities. Poole regards this as a strength
—not a weakness—of his approach.
To begin with the aspect o f personal identity, Poole advocates a
conception of personhood as “a form of identity created and sustained by
certain forms o f social life.”26 Persons are not the “foundations” o f social
practices, but their “effects.”27 This means that nations are not going to be
defined in terms of a prior conception o f what an identity would be (for
persons). Rather, the procedure should be to define a form o f social life (the
nation) such that it can be shown to be the foundation o f a certain kind of
person. The key concept used to distinguish nations from other social
entities is that o f intentionality: nations are to be understood as collective
agents that have particular sorts o f goals or intentions.28
These goals or intentions have sometimes been equated with the need
or desire for a new sort o f political community (i.e., die nation-state) that
can play an objective or functional role in modem societies. But Poole is
critical o f scholars, such as Ernest Gellner, who regard the creation of
nations as a rational accommodation to the uprooting o f traditional ways of
life in the wake o f the industrial revolution.29 Gellner is probably the most
influential exponent o f the objective or substantivist view that nations are
a product o f the development o f modem industrial society. National
identities provide a means for individuals to relocate their personal loyalties
in a society of “sustained and perpetual growth,” in which all old verities
and affinities are put in question.30 The need for formal education and a
literate culture in order to train an emergent commercial and bureaucratic
class means that national languages must be developed that can be utilized
for this purpose. These languages, the schools that teach them, and the
social classes that use them, become the basis for national identities in the
modem era.
One problem with this view, Poole notes, is that it does not account for
those national identities that do not seem to be rational accommodations to
the imperatives o f industrialization. Here one could make reference to
atavistic manifestations o f national identity, or to the dissolution of
functioning states brought about by national enmities. Nations, in other
words, are as frequently dysfunctional as they are functional accommoda
tions to modem conditions. As Poole puts it, “For those who find their
identity in the nation, the nation is the whole which gives meaning to their
lives, and it is for this reason that it so often inspires them to act in ways
24 Chapter 1
which are inconsistent with the demands o f formal consistency or

instrumental reasoning.”31
When Poole, following Benedict Anderson, designates nations as
“imagined communities,” he is highlighting the role o f beliefs without
necessarily imputing to these beliefs any underlying rationality.32 Aside
from Gellner’s functionalist account of national identity, Anderson’s
Imagined Communities is the most influential recent book on the subject.
Anderson’s definition has certain advantages over both the account o f
Gellner and o f extreme subjectivistic accounts, such as Renan’s. The
principal advantage is that it highlights the role o f beliefs (“imagination”),
while still attempting to give some account o f the nature of those beliefs.
This account is actually quite similar to Gellner’s in emphasizing the role
o f ‘Vernacular languages” in bringing disparate peoples into association
with each other. What establishes the dominance o f these national
vernaculars is not industrialization per se, as in Gellner, but what Anderson
calls “print-capitalism” —that is, the actual book and newspaper businesses
that sought readerships in the new languages.33
This extremely specific account o f the actual origins o f national
consciousness could be criticized. But the more fundamental problem lies
with Anderson’s concept o f imagination. It is ultimately just as indetermi
nate a means of characterizing national identity as talk of “soul” (Renan)
or “character” (Bauer). Put somewhat differently, nations are certainly not
the only possible “imagined communities”—there are, for example,
religious communities.34 O f course, Anderson’s point is that, in modem
times, it is nations which are increasingly the only available communities
for those peoples who live in modernizing, post-traditional societies.
But the real issue here is definitional: how do we know a “national”
community when we see one? Various characteristics, above all a common
language, cannot be sufficient conditions for constituting national
identities, since attempts to account for nations in this way—for instance,
by Gellner or Anderson—founder on the many exceptions.35 But Poole
seems to regard another feature o f national identity—its importance in
setting a “moral agenda”—as what ultimately determines when a commu
nity is a national one.36This moral agenda involves, not a “comprehensive”
morality that is special to particular nations—as might be the case with
religious communities, for instance—but the assumption by individuals o f
“special obligations” to others within the nation.37So when persons believe
they have special obligations—in the sense o f greater reasons to act
beneficially—to others, these others constitute a nation (unless they are part
o f some smaller community within which such obligations obtain, such as
a family or neighborhood).
This means that defining national identity depends on answering the
question of when a belief in the existence of special obligations obtains.
Determining this will be hard, since what counts as a moral obligation, for
instance, varies so widely from culture to culture. Without an answer to this
question, national identity will retain a quasinominalistic character that
equates it variously with virtually any community, culture, or (personal)
identity o f importance to a substantial number of individuals. Only if the
belief itself \s recognized as equivalent to the identity it characterizes can
we make headway.
There seem to be two options in this regard: to define the belief that
characterizes a national identity as embodied in certain political claims or
to define it as equivalent to certain prepolitical features o f personal identity.
Paul Gilbert takes the first approach in claiming that the type o f belief
characteristic o f nations is not moral, but political—it is a belief in the right
of a group to claim political independence that constitutes that group as a
nation. In other words, for Gilbert, it is completely impossible to define
national identity separately from defining nationalism. 11118 is because we
do not think about nations outside of particular contexts and these contexts
are “unavoidably political”38 This view yields what Gilbert calls his
“constitutive principle of nationalism”—the idea that nationalism
constitutes the existence o f (or belief in) the nation, not the other way
around. The nation, therefore, is “a group o f a kind that has, other things
being equal, the right to statehood.”39
Nations, then, are just those communities about which it could be said
that they have a legitimate claim to states. But said by whom, and for what
reasons? Though the focus on beliefs is useful, it is still not clear which
beliefs would in fact be sufficient to constitute a national identity. Gilbert
himself focuses on a belief in the legitimacy o f claiming self-determination
—presumably the political goal o f national groups:
nationalism as such does not specify what kinds of groups have the right
to statehood: It claims only that there are groups of such a kind. It
claims...only that there are nations and all it tells us about nations is that
they are the kind of group that has this right.40
This is a deceptively simple solution to the problem o f definition. It has the

result o f designating every claim to statehood as nationalist—as involving
the existence o f a nation apart from existing states.
Gilbert ends up advocating a kind of second-order nominalism, since a
26 Chapter 1
claim to political independence (whatever the reasons) is sufficient to make

the claimant a nationalist (i.e., someone speaking on behalf of a nation).
Yet, there are many kinds of claims to statehood, several o f them having
little if anything to do with nations as usually conceived.41 For instance,
anticolonial movements would by this definition necessarily be nationalist,
despite their frequent use o f justifications for ending colonialism—such as
those that focus on economic exploitation or racial discrimination—that are
not specifically nationalist.42 What Gilbert seems not to want to admit is
that postulating the existence o f nations in this way is itself a particular
kind of argument—having to do with the rights o f certain sorts o f groups
—for seeking statehood. Nationalism, in other words, is a specific type o f
claim to self-determination—it is not itself the very idea of self-determina-
tion, since there may be other reasons that can be given to justify the
principle.43 Gilbert, o f course, would reply that any (and every) argument
for self-determination is necessarily nationalist just because it is such an
argument. His book gives a typology o f reasons for claiming self-determi
nation and designates them all as different types o f nationalism. But this
ignores two features of the nationalist argument that mark it off from
others.
First, it is by nature an argument that postulates the existence o f a nation
that seeks to be self-determining. Other arguments do not necessarily do so;
they may make claims in the name of the people, classes, human beings, or
disadvantaged groups. This indicates that the political language o f
nationalism is distinct from the political languages of populism, socialism,
or liberalism, among others, all o f which also make use o f the principle o f
self-determination—but not necessarily of the concept o f the nation.44
Second, the nationalist argument, unlike others, is always a general
claim to self-determination—not a special one to rectify particular
injustices.45 For instance, if the injustice o f colonialism is used to justify
self-determination for the colonies, this is not a nationalist argument since,
absent the injustice, there is no legitimate claim to self-determination.
These features o f nationalism mean that it cannot be used to name all
justifications for self-determination—though it is o f course possible to
stipulate that any justification must be a nationalist one. But such a
stipulation obscures the differences between principles more than it
demonstrates their similarities —this is, among other things, the reason for
Connor insisting on what he calls a “pristine” definition.46
This pristine, or strict, definition has to do with the second sort o f belief
that might be constitutive o f national identity—that is, beliefs that
constitute personal identities prepolitically, namely in terms o f their ethnic
character. One contemporary scholar who has emphasized this approach,

without advocating a strict definition o f nations, is Anthony Smith. In his
book The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, Smith is concerned to find middle
ground between what are commonly designated as “primordialist” and
“modernist” accounts o f nationalism. Neither viewing nations as rooted in
premodem histories (as do the primordialists), nor as wholly constructions
of modem nationalist ideologies (as do the modernists), is satisfactory,
according to Smith. The middle (and correct) path is to view nations as
modem entities constructed out of the raw material of preexisting ethnie
(ethnic communities). Thus, nations are neither simply ideological
inventions (imagined communities?) nor primordial survivals, but have
their origins in really existing, premodem ethnicities.47
There are at least three problems with this approach. The first and most
fundamental is simply that Smith’s theory ultimately does not help in
accounting for the existence of current national identities: whether or not
these identities are based on preexisting ethnicities or invented ethnicities
is unimportant. What is crucial is that people now believe in their common
ancestry as a nation. Second, there is the questionable realism o f Smith’s
approach to ethnicity. While undoubtedly some ethnic groups can trace
their origins to actual ancestors, this is of marginal importance in assessing
the existence o f national identities compared to the actual belief that they
can. One important historical example: modem Greeks’ belief in their
relatedness to ancient Greeks, despite evidence of their more recent Slavic
ancestry.48 Finally, there is the matter o f how ethnicity is defined. Smith is
able to make such broad claims for the actual ethnic origins o f national
identities because o f his vague definition of ethnicity as involving the
“quartet of ‘myths, memories, values, and symbols.’”49 But, myths,
memories, values, and symbols of what? Smith can only make his sweeping
claim by defining ethnicity so broadly as to be functionally equivalent to
culture in general (which, of course, consists of myths, memories, values,
and symbols).30A more specific conception of ethnicity is required, as well
as a more precise delineation from nationality.
The argument so far advanced has consisted o f advocating a definition
of the nation as a group believing themselves to be ancestrally related. It is
worth comparing the advantages of such a strict definition o f national
identity with the looser definitions offered by Poole, Gilbert, and others.
Two features of these definitions are especially comparable —the emphasis
on communal imagination and the necessity of political self-consciousness.
But where the strict definition is most sharply differentiated lies in the
basic philosophical commitments underlying it—that is, to a realist and
28 Chapter 1
subjectivist account o f national identity.

The strict definition is similar to others in emphasizing the important
role o f creating a community through the imaginary construction o f a
common identity. This is a prominent theme in Weber and Connor, as well
as in Anderson, Poole, and others. But the difference lies in how to
characterize the type o f beliefs necessary for the creation of such a
community. As Connor notes, it is only the belief in ethnic commonality or
consanguinity that can make a group—in particular, an ethnic
group—cohere into a nation.31 What transforms an ethnic group into a
nation is its self-identification in this way.
The political dimension o f national identity is also something about
which there is some common ground between strict and loose definitions.
Gilbert focuses his definition of nations on the emergence o f a political
self-consciousness o f nationhood, one that he associates with claims to self-
determination. But while the strict definition is in accord with the view that
nations are politically self-conscious, the difference is that national identity
is not equated with political self-consciousness in general, but rather entails
a specific sort o f political belief—the notion that ethnic nations ought to
have their own states. While other political entities—for instance, colonies,
geographical regions, or religious sects—may seek their own states, this
does not mean that they do so as nationalities. As John Breuilly has argued,
rather than identifying national identity with political consciousness as
such, “what is needed is...to identify the conditions...in which a stress on
a particular national role will become significant.”32
Two things separate those who resist a strictly defined concept of
nations from those who advocate such a concept. First, as noted above, a
quasinominalistic approach to identity characterizes advocacy of the loose
definition. The problem with this nominalistic approach is that the concept
o f national identity comes to lack any specific content, beyond whatever is
given by the simple use of the word, “nation.” As Gilbert has noted, “then
there is no set o f beliefs which count as nationalism”;33 so the object o f
inquiry—whether nationalism or nations as such—vanishes. Needless to
say, Gilbert exempts his own account o f national identity from the
nominalistic charge. But his approach is also nominalistic to the extent that,
since nations are regarded as being specifically constituted by claims to
statehood, any such claim, no matter what the reasons given for it, is
sufficient as the basis for defining a nation.
A second difference between a strict and a loose definition of nations is
that, while adherents o f a strict definition usually assume that nations are
defined subjectivistically, that is, in terms of beliefs, critics tend to assume
that an objectivistic definition o f national identity is necessary in order to

use the concept in a strict fashion. Absent an objectivistic conception of
nations, we are supposedly forced back into a nominalistic view. But the
strict definition does not require nations to be viewed objectivistically. It
is not the possession o f any particular features—such as language or
territory—that denotes nations, but the belief that a group has a common
origin that is crucial. As Connor notes, “tangible characteristics such as
religion and language are significant to the nation only to the degree to
which they contribute to [a] sense o f the group's self-identity and unique
ness.”54An implication of this subjectivistic view o f national identity is that
such characteristics may be changed or lost without the identity o f a group
necessarily dissolving; it is the belief in a group’s unique origin or ancestry,
rather than any particular manifestations o f them, that is essential.
Nations and Ethnic Groups
It should be clear from the foregoing that, though the relation o f national
to ethnic identities is a close one, this does not mean that nations are the
same as ethnic groups, since nations must have attained a measure of self-
consciousness which usually (though not always or necessarily) gives them
apolitical purpose (i.e., self-determination). Nevertheless, the identification
o f nations with ethnic groups in this sense is still often thought to be too
narrow. Why?
According to Poole, there is the well-known fact that most nations are
ethnically diverse: “there is no plausibility in the identification of the
modem nation with an ethnic community. Almost all nations are ethnically
diverse and recognised to be such.”55But, while most national groups (e.g.,
the French, the Koreans) may be ethnically diverse, this is very different
from the claim that they are perceived to be so. Connor, for instance, never
denies the reality o f ethnic diversity, but focuses on the apparently
widespread existence of aperception of common ancestry among nationali
ties. What evidence is there that nations are generally perceived to be based
on ethnic groups? Most importantly, there is the historical record of
nationalist politicians and thinkers who have appealed to this perception:
Unlike most writers on nationaiism...political leaders of the most diverse

ideological strains have been mindful of the common blood component
of ethnonational psychology and have not hesitated to appeal to it when
seeking popular support Both the frequency and the record of success of
30 Chapter 1
such appeals attest to the fact that nations are indeed characterized by a
sense—a feeling—of consanguinity.56
But, irregardless o f this usage, Poole contends that the ethnonational

definition is in fact unhelpful, since “What is needed is an explanation o f
why ethnicity becomes important in certain circumstances.”57Referencing
national identities to ethnic identities just pushes the need for definition
back one step, but doesn’t actually tell us much. For Poole, there is no
determinate connection between nationality and ethnicity, since national
sentiments are always the product of “ongoing political struggles and
debates.”58
This conclusion comes perilously close to what Gilbert designates as the
nominalist definition o f nations: “many theorists have given up the struggle
to find a unitary account o f nationhood. Instead they have concluded that
there is no single concept of the nation but that a nation is just whatever
people who take themselves to be a nation take themselves to be.”59But the
problem with this approach is that it evacuates any meaning at all from the
concept of the nation; nations become a name to designate—what?
There is, in fact, no need to reach such a conclusion. Historians of
nationalism have been able with some success to specify the historical
conditions under which a discourse of national identity arises. John
Breuilly, for instance, after an exhaustive survey of historical cases,
maintains that nationalism arises when other forms of political opposition
to governments are foreclosed. In such situations, “an effective nationalism
develops where it makes political sense for an opposition to the government
to claim to represent the nation against the present state.”60 In addition,
there are also cases o f “governmental nationalism,” in which regimes seek
to maintain their power through the suppression of national minorities or
the annexation of national territories.61 But the main point is that it is
possible to specify a set o f historical circumstances under which ethnic
affiliations become the basis for national identities.
Another way o f putting the sort of objection to a strict definition raised
by Poole is contained in the view that nations are an amalgamation o f
different traits and that focusing exclusively on ethnicity results in too
narrow a definition. David Miller, for instance, makes this argument in his
book On Nationality. Listing five features o f national identity, Miller
remarks that ethnic groups and nations have many similarities. Neverthe
less, there can be nations that contain a multitude o f ethnic groups,
especially if we consider that “nations that originally had an exclusive
ethnic character may come, over time, to embrace a multitude of different
ethnicities.”62 The “clearest example,” Miller asserts, is the “American

nation”—o f course begging the question as to whether the population o f the
United States constitutes, in any meaningful sense, a nation.
Why does Miller think that a country as large and diverse as the United
States is a nation? Certainly it is not because he believes it is characterized
by cultural homogeneity, much less consanguinity. Poole acknowledges this
difference in designating die United States, among other countries, a
“multinational nation.”63 While there is a possible logical contradiction
contained in this phrase—how can a nation be both singular and
multiple?—it is also the case that postulating entities such as “multinational
nations” obscures rather than clarifies obvious differences between
societies. As Connor writes,
Whatever the American people arc (and they may well be sui generis),
they are not a nation in the pristine sense of the word. However, the
unfortunate habit of calling them a nation and thus verbally equating
American with German, Chinese, English, and the like, has seduced
scholars into erroneous analogies.64
“Nation,” when defined broadly enough to include the United States and
other multicultural communities, comes close to being an equivalent term
for “countiy.” Yet, it should be clear that such countries (Brazil, Spain,
India, or Russia, for instance) need not be described as nations; “state,”
“empire,” “federation,” or simply “country” itself would be more appropri
ate.
O f course, not regarding the United States, Russia, et al. as nations
seems counterintuitive in view of the fact that they are widely referred to
as such. But there is also an awareness o f the diversity of these so-called
nations—a diversity that suggests that nationhood in these cases is a
normative, rather than a descriptive, concept (as Weber had originally
asserted).65 As historians and geographers might view it, it is a politics of
“nationbuilding” that generates the perception that large and diverse
countries share a national identity. But, o f course, the reality o f great
regional diversity within these “nations” to some extent undercuts this
perception.
One ought to ask the question of what is to be gained by reducing an
elaborate vocabulary designed to distinguish between human communities
of different kinds—e.g., states, countries, empires, federations, peoples,
regions, tribes, groups—to one term—nations. The conceptual problem
with Miller’s view—and those o f others such as Poole who espouse a
32 Chapter 1
multifactoral definition o f nations—is that the factors cited constitute such

a general catalog o f human behaviors as to be characteristic of virtually any
collectivity. At the same time, when ethnicity is referred to, it is regarded
as actual consanguinity, rather than the perception o f (or belief in) common
kinship; so it is easy to dismiss as uncharacteristic o f the vast majority of
nations.
An objectivistic account o f ethnicity is therefore combined with a vague
subjectivism that regards such things as mutual recognition and national
character as defining features of nations. Gilbert, in referring to Miller,
among others, notes that,
attempts to combine subjectivist with nonsubjectivist accounts [of

national identity] seem bound to lead to disaster, for either it is, say, their
belief that they share certain characteristics which constitutes people as
a nation, or it is the shared characteristics themselves which do so; it
cannot be both.66
Miller, like Poole, resists the ethnic concept o f nations because it seems too
constricting—too little characteristic of the diversity of nations and not
cognizant enough o f the political and associative aspects o f national
identity. In particular, as Miller noted above, it is the apparent malleability
of nations that seems to separate them from ethnic groups.
By simply stipulating that the United States and other “multinational
nations” are nations, Poole, Miller, et al., equate nations with (political)
communities as such. Yet what precisely differentiates nations from other
sorts o f communities, if not their foundation in the beliefin (not necessarily
the reality of) a common ethnicity? Absent this belief, communities of
some sort may still exist—but not national communities.
This does not o f course mean that nations are unchanging entities. The
point is that nationalism must involve the belief in a natural, stable social
group, defined in terms of an ascribed identity, regardless o f the reality.
Nevertheless, a question remains: since ethnic groups change in reality,
why can our conceptions of their identity not also change? Even if the
origins of nations lie in ethnic groups, why could these groups not become
more associative and open to a diverse membership over time?
Nationalists sometimes maintain that it is possible for national identities
to encompass the increasingly diverse populations of areas or regions of a
state from which they are advocating secession. For instance, Kai Nielsen
has written, with reference to Quebec, that,
It may even be the case that all nations were originally ethnic nations.
But...many of them are no longer ethnic nations and they do not now,
whatever may have been true in the past, have an ethnic nationalist
agenda. Their nationalism, if it exists, is not exclusionist.67
But, as Donald Horowitz notes in his study of ethnic conflicts, in cases of

ethnically based identities, this emphasis on “contiguity” can only “coexist
uneasily” with relations o f consanguinity, with “neither displacing the
other.”68 Changes in “group boundaries” (i.e., ethnic, or by extension
national, identities) are possible but limited by “their dependence on
antecedent affinities that are not easily manipulated.”69
The “antecedent affinities” of national groups can be characterized as
identities that are ascribed to individuals, rather than common practices or
ideas which might serve as the basis for association. The fact that nations
are ascriptive, rather than associative, groups means that transforming them
(e.g., making them more ethnically diverse) is a matter o f changing the
characteristics ascribed to the group. This is not easy, since, as Iris Young
has noted, “our identities are defined in relation to how others identify us,
and they do so in terms of groups which are always already associated with
specific attributes, stereotypes, and norms.”70
Isn’t it possible, however, for ascriptive groups to become increasingly
associative over time, emphasizing common interests, geographical
contiguities, and so forth, rather than ethnicity? Nielsen has argued that
nations could become associative groups by opening their membership to
others. As noted above, he regards the common stigmatization o f Quebe9ois
nationalism as based on an exclusionary French ethnicity to be mistaken.
But there are two problems with this view.
First of all, the strict definition of national identity need not insist that
such identities never change, or that the signs of such identities are forever
fixed; but merely that to denote a national identity, in the first place, a
belief in a common ethnicity is required. What is crucial in this regard is
that arguing for the establishment o f a (true) nation-state requires identify
ing the nation in question according to a strict sense of national identity. It
is here that Breuilly’s work on nationalist movements is important; as he
maintains, a nationalist group intent upon achieving political independence
would have to maintain belief in an ethnically based national identity—or
risk political failure as a result o f diluting the source of their appeal in the
first place.71
Secondly, a national identity that is ethnically based is prone to revival
in times of social crisis—even when such an identity has supposedly been
34 Chapter 1
superceded by other, less exclusionary, loyalties. This is of course the case

when nationalities already hold state power. As Ross Poole put it in an
earlier book, nationalism is the “guardian discourse o f modem society” and
is liable to overpower constraints upon it, under conditions o f social
disintegration.72But it is also the case within nationalist movements that are
losing support or political momentum. For instance, despite Nielsen’s
claims discussed above, the inability o f Quebe$ois nationalism to achieve
statehood has led to a renewed emphasis on “ethnic” identity among some
elements o f the movement.73
Why Is a Strict Definition of National Identity Necessary?
The argument so far has asserted the necessity o f a strict definition of

national identity in order to avoid indeterminacy in specifying what
constitutes a nation in the first place. But it is precisely this indeterminacy
that advocates o f national self-determination deem appropriate. Yet, as was
asserted at the beginning of this article, this claim is disingenuous, given
the commitment to a concept o f self-determination.
This is a result o f the ambiguities contained in the concept of the nation.
Only by using both ethnic and nonethnic connotations can nationalists
make their case. In order to identify the nation in the first place, nationalists
must use an ethnic definition o f it, since otherwise, it would simply refer
to the people inhabiting an already existing country. But to make their
political claim, they m ust use “nation” in its nonethnic, political sense,
since there is nothing in the existence of ethnic groups per se that requires
political expression.
So when nations are identified initially as deserving o f self-determina
tion, they are referred to quite unproblematically as ethnic nations; but
when the actual object o f self-determination—the state—is mentioned, the
strictly ethnic definition of the nation is dropped in favor o f a looser,
“political” one (based, perhaps, on the “contiguity” o f people within a
region). Breuilly’s comment on this move is worth quoting:
Nationalist ideology never makes a rational connection between the

cultural and the political concept of the nation because no such connec
tion is possible. Instead, by a sort of sleight of hand dependent upon using
the same term, “nation,” in different ways, it appears to demonstrate the
proposition that each nation should have its nation-state.74
The upshot o f this ambiguity is that an “essentialist,” ethnic definition

of the nation must be assumed for self-determination to be applied to
national groups.
The role that this assumption plays is to distinguish the goal of national
self-determination from general conceptions o f political emancipation or
communal self-government. Without an implicit assumption of ethnic
nationhood, the distinction collapses. Liberal nationalists argue that the
concept o f the nation, while it may have its historical roots in ethnic
affiliations, is susceptible to change—and in particular, to an elastic
conception o f national identity that admits o f diverse ethnicities (at least
potentially). Yet, this argument is undercut by the fact that an ethnic
definition of national identity must play at least an initial role in determin
ing the group that can legitimately claim self-determination. Furthermore,
the malleability o f ethnic nationalities must be limited if the goal of
national self-determination is to remain applicable to the group originally
claiming it.
There are two ways in which this strict, ethnically based definition of
nations works to legitimate claims to self-determination in the first place.
On the one hand, it is essential in order to differentiate nationalism from
other political movements seeking state power. On the other hand, it is
necessary in order to give the idea o f national self-determination—as
opposed to conceptions o f self-determination that equate it with democratic
self-rule—a specific meaning.
As Breuilly has shown, nationalism is based not on a preexisting nation
o f some kind, but itself forms and creates the nation in the course of
establishing political claims.75 In numerous historical cases, nationalists
have sought power in rivalry with liberal, socialist, and other movements.
It is only where nationalists are able to make distinctive claims that
differentiate them from other oppositional movements that they have a
possibility of success. In order to do this, nationalists must claim that the
nation does exist and that it is a determinate entity, not one that is malleable
and indeterminate.
The strict definition of the nation, in other words, is politically
efficacious for nationalists. This strict definition must be based on
nonpolitical characteristics o f a populace; otherwise, nationalists risk losing
out to rivals who appeal to political communities defined in other ways—as
the working class or the “people,” for instance. The important thing is to
find something to which nationalists have exclusive appeal, even if this
thing has to be imagined or invented. Thus, “the key idea in nationalist
ideology [is] that there are certain natural non-political features on which
36 Chapter 1
a legitimate state should be based.”76

If the nation must appear natural in order for nationalists to claim a
distinctive role, so must self-determination be a general claim in order for
nationalists to make their case. The reason that nations must be defined
strictly in terms o f “natural”—i.e., ethnic—characteristics is that only if a
distinction between the nation and the people is maintained does nationalist
politics have any purchase. Without this distinction, other meanings of self-
determination—popular, democratic, economic, ecological—might become
paramount. Above all, the necessity of a nation-state might be undercut, in
favor of other policies within existing states that address grievances.
Similarly, only if self-determination is a legitimate claim of nations “as
of right”—not a contingent claim, but a general right—is its status as a
distinctive goal secure. But to make a rights claim there must be a clearly
identifiable claimant—in this case, a nation. Otherwise, a variety o f
considerations enter in—i.e., questions of justice—to be weighed against
other claims. Under these conditions, the nation-state is no longer a right,
but simply a desideratum.77
In order to make self-determination a claim-right, the claimant must be
defined in terms o f stable features. A nation must appear to be, not a
shifting amalgamation of attributes, conditions, and members, but a strictly
defined social group based on ascribed characteristics—an ethnic group, in
short. A nation must, in other words, seem to exist as a natural (i.e.,
prepolitical) and stable (i.e., strictly defined) entity.
Fundamentally, nationalists are always quick to use the discourse o f
ethnonational identity, as it suits their purposes.78 Since the main goal o f
nationalist politics is to obtain independent nation-states, a strict conception
o f national identity is important in order to define the territory upon which
the new state will exist. Having done this according to an ethnonational
definition, liberal nationalists seek to employ a looser, more tolerant
conception o f nationality. But this looser conception cannot serve the
original purpose o f claiming national self-determination (as Nielsen seemed
to admit, above)—since there is no nation to be self-determining unless it
is defined by criteria prior to its establishment. Such criteria cannot be left
“open,” since there would then be nothing to determine the extent or limits
of the (future) nation-state.
There is, accordingly, a contradiction contained in the views of those
nationalists who reject the necessity of a strict definition of national
identity. While continuing to insist that this strict definition is unnecessary,
they tacitly employ it at crucial points to maintain the integrity o f their
concept o f the nation. For instance, Yael Tamir, in an article justifying a
right of national self-determination, employs both the loose and strict

definitions of national identity at different points. While, she writes,
“[t]here is only one subjective fact necessary for the existence of a nation
— a national consciousness,” it is also the case that “belief in the existence
o f some shared characteristics, which will allow members to recognize each
other, as well as exclude nonmembers, is essential for the formation of a
nation.”79
The loose definition, which appears to be tolerant of ethnic diversity
— and therefore consistent with other liberal principles—merely postpones
the accounting to the moment at which “consciousness” must be defined.
So the strict definition is brought in to stabilize and further define “con
sciousness” (i.e., national identity), with, however, the unfortunate
consequence of necessarily justifying the exclusion o f others that was a
moment ago judged illiberal. What is crucial is that the strict definition of
national identity must be used at some point in order for the notion of the
nation to have any meaning at all.
Avoiding the inconsistency and incoherence of using two conflicting
definitions of national identity is the primary reason for adhering to a strict
definition. Nationalists insist that this strict definition is unnecessary, while
tacitly employing it at crucial points to maintain the integrity of their
concept o f self-determination.
The Autonomy of Nations and States
But what is the specific nationalist meaning o f “self-determination”?

Among other things, it includes a certain understanding of political
autonomy. The crucial issue for evaluating this understanding of autonomy
is that o f determining the relation of nationalism to the traditional doctrine
o f state sovereignty. This relation is ambiguous: on the one hand, national
ism constitutes an assertion of the importance of statehood for national
groups. On the other hand, it also embodies an attack on the sovereignty of
existing states.
While nationalists advocate political autonomy for national groups, they
only conditionally endorse state sovereignty —and often actually challenge
it, at least as the most important consideration in dealing with conflicts
between groups. In other words, there is nothing absolute about nationalist
advocacy of sovereignty. It is the autonomy of nations that is paramount;
states are legitimate to the extent that they contribute to such autonomy.
But when state sovereignty is used as a reason for denying the claims of
38 Chapter I
national groups, nationalists challenge the doctrine.

The positive connection between national rights and state sovereignty
is easy to discern. In order for nations to be self-determining, they must
have states of their own—or at least the right to have such states. This
means that nations, when they obtain independent states o f their own, are
entitled to govern them autonomously—and this requires that the new states
be sovereign powers. As David Miller remarks, there are in principle no
limits to the scope o f (state) sovereignty, “[o]nce you combine the principle
o f national self-determination with the proposition that what counts for the
purposes o f national identity is what the nation in question takes to be
essential to that identity.”80
There is also a second positive connection between nationality and
sovereignty: national identities seem to contribute to the ability o f states to
be sovereign. As Anthony Giddens puts it, “Nationalism is the cultural
sensibility of sovereignty”—that is, the set of beliefs that states often use
to mobilize their populations in defense o f the states’ authority.81 This
seems especially evident when states are newly created: national identities
often constitute the very “basis for founding a sovereign political commu
nity.”82
But there is a negative relation between national identity and sover
eignty as well. In this case, there exists a contradiction between the political
autonomy o f national groups and state sovereignty. The creation o f new
nation-states necessarily entails the destruction o f older, often multina
tional, states. If state sovereignty were taken to be the fundamental meaning
o f political autonomy, it would override considerations o f national identity.
So, in this case —and it is the paradigmatic case o f secession on nationalist
grounds —state sovereignty is rejected in favor o f the principle of national
autonomy. It turns out that sovereignty is part o f the nationalist conception
of political autonomy only when it is equivalent to the sovereignty of
nation-states, not of states in general.
With the advent of the modem democratic revolutions, the traditional
concept of sovereignty was challenged on a number o f grounds. As
nationalism developed into a distinctive political philosophy in nineteenth-
century Europe, it mounted one o f the most successful o f these challenges.
At the same time, the principle of national self-determination involved the
change in the meaning of autonomy just discussed—the autonomy o f
nations was regarded as more important than that o f existing states. In
traditional political philosophy (i.e., before Rousseau), national groups had
no political status at all.83 As nationalist movements arose, however,
nations came increasingly to be viewed as political entities seeking self
determination. In this way, they were analogous to both liberal and socialist
movements in challenging the sovereignty of existing states. But, while
liberals and socialists contested the doctrine o f (internal) state sovereignty,
nationalists also often criticized the territorial integrity o f states that
included multiple nationalities.
National self-determination, therefore, involved a conception of
autonomy that rejected general advocacy of state sovereignty, whether
internally or externally. The new idea of autonomy was a composite idea
that can be expressed as follows: the autonomy o f nations consists in their
possession o f an independent state (regardless o f the sovereignty ofalready
existing states) and all nations are entitled to such a state. The assumptions
underlying these two components o f a nationalist conception of political
autonomy are that: (1) states have no necessary claim to sovereignty and (2)
all national groups possess equal standing politically. These assumptions
will be examined in turn in this section and the next.
As just indicated, the nationalist challenge to traditional states was, at
first, connected —if only coincidentally —with other challenges emanating
from politically unrepresented classes and groups within these states.
Jttrgen Habermas has put this the following way: nationalism and republi
canism were originally allies in the fight against absolutist states. This
alliance, however, did not mean that the two movements were conceptually
equivalent. While the republican conception of autonomy consisted in the
idea of the freedom o f citizens from the domination o f absolutism,
autonomy for nationalists meant the political independence o f nations from
the multinational empires within which they had been subsumed.84 What
distinguished these two conceptions was the nationalists’ denial of any
legitimacy to the doctrine of state sovereignty per se—unless of course it
pertained to nation-states (and then only because they were nation-states).
Is this nationalist conception of autonomy—which combines strong
advocacy o f the autonomy o f national groups with a rejection o f state
sovereignty (at least in terms o f states devoid o f national identities)—a
coherent one? That depends on whether sovereignty is given a maximalist
or a minimalist interpretation. The maximalist doctrine of state sovereignty
—namely, that any politics that challenges, not the policies o f a state, but
its legitimacy, is prima facie wrong—is found in the philosophies of
Hobbes and Hegel. They asserted that, for different reasons perhaps,
sovereignty considerations necessarily override the claims of political
movements when they conflict with the goal of maintaining state power.
But this view of state sovereignty as the paramount political good was
challenged by the critique of sovereignty developed by Rousseau and Marx.
40 Chapter I
This critique showed that, since the state is an institution with its own
interests and imperatives (rather than a neutral or objective arbiter o f
others’ concerns), there is, as Christopher Morris has recently emphasized,
no reason why states cannot themselves be subject to constraints based on
moral or legal norms.85 A generalized skepticism about limitations on state
sovereignty seems unwarranted.
However, a minimalist view o f sovereignty may be more sustainable. F.
H. Hinsley, for instance, states a version o f this view: “[Sovereignty] is the
concept which maintains no more...than that there must be an ultimate
authority within the political society if the society is to exist at all, or at
least if it is to be able to function effectively.”86 There are ambiguities in
this statement, however, and they get us to the heart o f the matter in
defining the nationalist conception o f political autonomy. What does it
mean for a society to “exist at all,” or to “function effectively”? Usually,
what these phrases refer to is the ability o f a society to remain intact—and
this leads to the distinction between internal and external sovereignty.
Populist or socialist criticisms o f state sovereignty have generally
focused on internal sovereignty—on the legitimacy of a state’s authority in
relation to elements of (civil) society such as classes or groups. But these
criticisms did not extend to states' external sovereignty—to their claims to
ultimate authority in relation to other states. This is the crucial differ
ence— for nationalists must attack the legitimacy o f states' external
authority if they are to be able to argue for the rearranging o f boundaries
and citizenship in accordance with nationalities. State boundaries can have
no necessary —let alone ultimate—legitimacy, if such rearrangements are
to be made. O f course, once they are made, the legitimacy o f the new states
will be conditional on the extent to which they are nation-states—but that
is a different matter, and not dependent on an antecedent doctrine o f state
sovereignty.
Is there a necessary connection between a critique o f internal sover
eignty and one o f external sovereignty (such as nationalists would make)?
Morris, for one, seems to think so. He regards the idea of external
sovereignty as being equivalent to the notion that there are no moral
constraints on state action internationally. But this is wrong, on his account,
since “the classical view o f unlimited sovereignty [e.g., in Hobbes] is not
sustainable.”87 If internal sovereignty is susceptible to moral or legal
limitation, then external sovereignty is as well.
But Morris assumes that the doctrine o f external sovereignty operates
in the same way as that o f internal sovereignty—that is, in overruling
restraints on the prerogatives o f state power. In fact, it is the opposite: there
is an asymmetry between internal and external sovereignty dial often goes

unnoticed. Hinsley summarizes this asymmetry as follows:
Applied to the community, in the context of the internal structure of a

political society, the concept of sovereignty has involved the belief that
there is an absolute political power within the community. Applied to the
problems which arise in the relations between political communities, its
function has been to express the antithesis of this argument—the principle
that internationally, over and above the collection of communities, no
supreme authority exists.**
The critique of internal sovereignty has as its goal the undermining of any
exclusive claim on the part o f a state to final authority. But in terms o f
external sovereignty, it is the role of the sovereignty doctrine itselfto assert
such a limitation—no state (whether an imperial state, or simply a powerful
one), nor any other superstate authority, has legitimacy to the extent that it
tries to impose its will on (other) states.
In the case o f state sovereignty viewed internally, legal or other
limitations on the state’s authority are generally imposed by substate
entities (e.g., “the people”). In the case o f states viewed externally, the
limitations are imposed by the doctrine o f sovereignty, as it is espoused in
international law and enforced by the community o f states upon errant
members. There is, therefore, a radical disjunction between internal-
domestic relations between states and peoples and external-international
relations between different states. The nationalist attempt to use a particular
construal o f the people (as equivalent to the “nation”) to undermine the
authority o f existing states overlooks this disjunction and replaces a
coherent doctrine of sovereignty within international law with an evocative
but illogical emphasis on nations instead of states as the fundamental units
of international relations.
Sovereignty and the Equality of Nations
This difference is apparent if we examine the relative status of states in

international law. As Ian Brownlie has noted, it is the sovereignty and, in
particular, the equality of states that constitutes the “basic constitutional
doctrine”o f international law. This doctrine defines a community
“consisting primarily o f states having a uniform legal personality.”89
Corollaries o f this doctrine are respect for the territorial integrity of
42 Chapter I
recognized states, the duty of states to nonintervention in the affairs o f

other states, and the consensual assumption o f international obligations on
the part o f states.
The nationalist innovation lies in asserting a doctrine of self-determina-
tion that substitutes an equality of nations (regarded as distinct, usually
ethnically defined, entities) for one o f states. State sovereignty per se —that
is, separate from the makeup of the state as national or multinational—has
no necessary normative force. As a consequence, the corollary principles
of territorial integrity, nonintervention, and voluntary obligation are also to
be disregarded as basic principles o f international law. Otherwise, they
might function as reasons for preventing the creation of nation-states, even
when the principle o f self-determination is invoked.
How has this alteration in the doctrine o f sovereignty—its attempted
replacement by a principle of the autonomy o f nations—been justified?
This is the subject of much of the next four chapters. But a few preliminary
comments on the historical germination of this idea may be made. There
seem to have been three stages in the argument for a distinctive nationalist
conception of political autonomy. First, the idea of a political community
had to be detached from the concept of the state as such; this was a theme
that was evident particularly in the work of Rousseau and Hegel. Second,
some recognition o f the cultural equality of nations was necessary; this was
expressed most forcefully by J. G. Herder and J. G. Fichte. Third, the idea
that nation-states in particular possessed a political legitimacy that other
states did not was a consequence that had to be drawn—and was drawn in
different ways by Giuseppe Mazzini and J. S. Mill.
The first steps beyond a classical theory o f sovereignty that focused
exclusively on the state were made by Rousseau and Hegel. In reconstruct
ing the idea of sovereignty in order to account for the limitations o f an
absolutist conception of the state, the ideas of the “people” (in Rousseau’s
case) or society (“ethical life,” in Hegel’s case) were introduced. In these
ways, the legitimacy of the state was given a substantive foundation, rather
than one which referred either to the brute fact (or divine sanction) of state
power (as in, perhaps, Grotius or Filmer) or to the formal conditions for
contractual acceptance of state power (as in Hobbes or Locke).90In the case
o f Rousseau, the idea o f a social contract was wedded to an older civic
republicanism that replaced the relation between individuals and rulers with
a relation between a people and its will.91 In the case of Hegel, the state was
reconceived within a philosophy o f history that accorded states with
“rational” constitutions hegemony over others on the basis o f their ethical
superiority.
The key contribution of Rousseau to a theory of sovereignty that is part

of the idea of a self-determining will is his concept o f the “general will,”
developed in the Social Contract. The general will is an attribute o f persons
that have agreed to join together into a people. It is their attention to
matters o f joint concern and interest —and with only these considerations
in mind— that transforms the “will o f all” (the sum o f private interests) into
the general will.92 So it is by basing the legitimacy of a state on the will of
a people that Rousseau introduces a notion o f sovereignty somewhat
distinct from the simple affirmation o f the authority of existent states.
Does this make Rousseau himself a nationalist, in the sense of advocat
ing the equality o f nations as the basis o f political legitimacy? Hardly: a
people, a general will, was still not, in any unqualified sense, a nation. For
Rousseau, the nation seems to have functioned primarily as a “precondition
for good political life...not a guarantee.”93 Still, he seems to have regarded
political autonomy as possible mainly for those states which could muster
“national institutions”; without these, individuals could not become the
citizens who could alone have a general will.94
Hegel, more directly than Rousseau, reconceived the state as a complex
amalgamation of social, economic, and cultural life, culminating in state (or
state-sanctioned) institutions. While it is true that, as Elie Kedourie has
written, “[Hegel’s] political thought is concerned with the state, not the
nation,”95 it is also the case that the state, for Hegel, requires for its
existence a nation, in some sense. Hegel drew a distinction between
nations, as cultural communities, and states, as political communities, and
argued that nations without states are without importance in world history.96
But nations are, as for Rousseau, in some sense a precondition for the
creation of states —since they cannot be formed simply from philosophical
principles, however important these ultimately become in determining the
legitimacy o f the state. It is what Hegel called the “national spirit” that is
the content of the particular principles underlying a constitutional regime.97
While “the state is the more specific object of world history in general, in
which freedom attains its objectivity,” the state is itself “animated by this
[national] spirit in all its particular transactions, wars, institutions, etc.”98
This does not mean, however, that Hegel ever regarded nations as, in
even a formal sense, equal to one another. Nations, in Hegel’s view, had
value only to the extent that they embodied the “universal principle,” that
is, reason.99 Hegel thought it a hopelessly romanticized view o f history to
think that all nations would or even could further the realization o f reason
through the working out o f a more rational constitution. As he put it in his
Philosophy o f World History, nations only become “world-historical” to the
44 Chapter 1
extent that they are “moments o f the one universal spirit”;100this is because
“[i]t is only the right o f the world-mind which is absolute without qualifica
tion.”101 In any given historical epoch, only one nation can lay claim to
playing an important role on the world-historical stage. In contrast, the
other nations “are without rights, and...count no longer in world history.”102
A belief in the equality o f nations found its initial expression, not in
Rousseau or Hegel’s theories o f the state, but in the ideas of the counter-
Enlightenment philosopher Herder.103Herder played a key role in formulat
ing an intellectual reaction to the universalistic view o f human capacities
found in Enlightenment thinkers. In particular, Herder’s view that only in
the multiplicity o f human cultures could such capacities be realized was
crucial.104
This idea was based on the notion that different cultures or nations
exemplify human adaptations to diverse physical environments. Herder’s
well-known view that “each [nation] bears in itself the standard o f its
perfection, totally independent o f all comparison with that o f others”105
follows from this belief in the nature o f human adaptation. These divergent
adaptations do not generate conflict (as in Hegel’s view) because all
nations act in accordance with a single principle, that o f reason, even while
they realize this principle in quite distinct ways.106
Fichte espoused a similar conception o f the cultural value of national
identities, but politicized it to a greater degree than Herder—in part because
he was less concerned about hypothesizing a universal harmony between
all nations. Fichte, like Hegel, began with the state. Using Kant’s moral
conception of freedom, he argued that the principal purpose o f government
was securing the conditions under which a people can be free.107And what
is this freedom for? It is to ensure that the “higher purpose” o f the nation
is achieved—that higher purpose being “that the eternal and divine may
blossom in the world and never cease to become more and more pure,
perfect, and excellent.”108
A great emphasis is placed on patriotism or “love o f fatherland” in
Fichte’s philosophy, since it is this that provides the crucial link between
the “eternal, regular, and continuous development o f what is purely human”
and the possession of the state power that can ensure a secure environment
in which this development can occur.109 Fichte, like Herder before him,
affirmed the intrinsic (if not, perhaps, quite equal) worth o f nations; yet, at
the same time, he maintains that only the use of the state can realize this
worth.
But how exactly can the worth o f nations be embodied in the state? Two
somewhat different answers to this question were given in the mid
nineteenth century by the Italian writer Giuseppe Mazzini and the English
philosopher John Stuart Mill.
For Mazzini, it is imperative that all nations aspire to a higher purpose
than simple national aggrandizement. In his best-known work, The Duties
o f Man, Mazzini combines advocacy of the “duties to country” with
recognition of the “duties to humanity.” In fact, it is the purpose, in a sense,
of nationalism to achieve the common good o f humanity: “In laboring
according to true principles for our country we are laboring for humanity;
our country is the fulcrum of the lever which we have to wield for the
common good.”110
According to Mazzini, the nation provides a means of realizing goods
that are desired by all human beings; thus any nation can, and indeed must,
claim an equal role in providing these means. But the immediate task for
Italians, as well as for other nationalities, is to secure the political unity of
the nation. Only then can Italy or other nations play the equal role to which
they are entitled in the community of nations: “Before associating ourselves
with the nations which compose humanity we must exist as a nation. There
can be no association except among equals; and you [Italians] have no
recognized collective existence.”1"
It appears that Mazzini, while influenced by Herder, Fichte, and other
German nationalistic thinkers, was also critical of what he saw as an
“immoderate” focus on national exclusivity.112It was only to the extent that
nations were instrumental in securing universal ends for humanity that their
autonomy was justified. In this sense, Mazzini was only partially and
conditionally a nationalist, despite his rhetoric affirming the equality of
nations.113
It was John Stuart Mill, in his Considerations on Representative
Government, who most clearly connected the doctrine of sovereignty with
the equality of nations to generate a principle o f national self-determina
tion. Mill's argument was based on a conditional and consequentialist claim
that nation-states are most conducive to self-government. Mill maintained
that wherever “the sentiment o f nationality exists in any force”—in other
words, for every actual nation—“there is a prima facie case for uniting all
the members o f a nationality under the same government, and a government
to themselves apart.”" 4 This was because “[f]ree institutions are next to
impossible in a country made up of different nationalities.”115
O f course, this theory did not go unchallenged in Mill’s time; the British
historian Lord Acton wrote an essay criticizing Mill in which Acton
maintained that only if nationality was politically derived from an
attachment to an already existing country would it not inhibit people’s
46 Chapter 1
freedom. In general, cultural diversity guaranteed a free society, since

*‘[t]his diversity in the same State is a firm barrier against the intrusions of
the government beyond the political sphere.... The coexistence o f several
nations under the same State is a test, as well as the best security of its
freedom.”116
But Acton was fighting a rear-guard action in support o f the multina
tional empires such as Austria that were being undermined by the incipient
nationalisms that Mill favored. In Mill’s view, all the themes o f the
nationalist conception o f political autonomy come together. But what
remains to be seen is whether, when this idea of autonomy is applied to the
claims o f national groups, strictly defined, it can be realized (even in
theory) without contradiction.
National Autonomy, Strictly Defined
The first thing to consider, in this regard, is what national autonomy means
when it is strictly defined. The conclusion to be drawn from the history of
the emergence o f this idea is that, while national self-determination
undoubtedly involves a number o f complex notions concerning community,
culture, and the state, it must be clearly distinguished from related
philosophies which also conceptualize these subjects. It is easy to
differentiate nationalism from contractarian theories that link individuals
directly to the state, without acknowledging the importance o f intermediary
phenomena such as history, memory, culture, or solidarity. But how is
nationalism to be distinguished from, e.g., communitarian, “identitarian,”
or republican philosophies?
In other words, what makes Rousseau, Hegel, Herder, Mazzini, et al.,
nationalists or non-nationalists? It is only a strict definition of national
autonomy which accords legitimacy only, or primarily, to nation-states that
makes it possible to make appropriate distinctions between these theories
and theorists. National self-determination as a doctrine involves, not only
an implicitly ethnic definition of nations, but also a definition of political
autonomy as necessarily involving the construction of nation-states —not
just as advocating (for instance) a strong civil society, the recognition o f
cultural minorities, or loyalty to specific communities.
The reason that nationalism only emerged philosophically in Mill’s
work is that prior thinkers diverged on whether the recognition o f
nationalities necessarily required nation-states. In some cases (Rousseau
and Mazzini, for instance), this was because the existence of national
sentiments were important only to the extent that they contributed to the
formation of a people that could embody loyalty to a state—irrespective of
what sort o f state it was. In other cases (e.g., Hegel), the idea o f an equality
of nations was rejected—or if accepted (as by Herder), its political
instantiation was regarded as of secondary importance.
It is the specific importance o f the nation-;tote that marks off national
ism from these other views. While Rousseau and Hegel established the
bases o f communitarian and/or (in Rousseau’s case) republican conceptions
of political legitimacy, these remained distinct from a nationalist concep
tion. Whether or not nationalism is even compatible with
communitarianism has been the subject o f recent debate (and will be
discussed further in chapter 5).117 What should simply be clear now is that
a communitarian argument for the importance of a prepolitically defined
community for the legitimacy o f states is not equivalent to the nationalist
argument along these lines. It is not necessarily the nation, ethnically
defined, that will comprise the “people” or “ethical life”; it may actually be
antithetical to the establishment of a popular or rational state.
When the cultural life o f nations is made a central feature of political
legitimacy (as in Herder and Fichte), this still may not result in a distinc
tively nationalist definition o f autonomy. Today, theories o f “identity,”
“difference,” or “recognition” are often articulated without explicitly
affirming the legitimacy o f nation-states.118 It is an open question to what
extent such theories eventuate in a nationalist conception o f political
autonomy.119 But, again, they are conceptually distinct from that concep
tion. It is entirely possible that nationalities might have legitimate claims
to recognition o f some sort within states, without having legitimate claims
to states of their own.
Two current examples o f this difference may be mentioned. On the one
hand, current advocates of the rights of indigenous peoples often reject
nation-states as adequate instantiations o f such rights.120On the other hand,
theorists o f secession also sometimes reject the “nationalist principle” as
an adequate argument for secession or political independence.121 In both
cases, it should be clear that identity-based claims to political recognition
are not equivalent to claims to political autonomy when the latter are based
on attributions o f national identity.
Finally, when the nation is regarded as equivalent to a county (or
people, in the sense mentioned earlier)—and national identity is equated to
a patriotic attachment to one’s countiy—a strict definition o f national
autonomy that would necessarily imply the legitimacy o f nation-states is
still lacking. From Mazzini, and to some extent, Rousseau, a republican
48 Chapter 1
theory o f the state can be generated; but this is not the same as a nationalist
theory, since republican virtue and loyalty (patriotism) essentially involves
a relation to the state which is not necessarily mediated by national
sentiment. Patriotism is, on republican principles, generated by the ability
of a country to embody certain freedoms for its citizens—this is quite
distinct from whether the state embodies a (prepolitical) national identity
o f some sort.
Whether or not republicanism is today a viably distinct political
philosophy in its own right is a point o f some controversy. Poole, for
instance, argues that republicanism must become nationalism under current
conditions.122But the two theories are certainly conceptually distinct —and
some theorists today argue that a renewed republicanism could be an
alternative to nationalism.123
In the end, a strict definition o f national autonomy as the right o f nations
to states o f their own is required in order for the principle of self-determi
nation to be clearly applied to nationalities. It is only the sovereignty of
nation-states (not states in general), coupled with the equality o f all nations
in seeking such states, that can give a determinate meaning to nationalism.
But the political and legal recognition of this conception o f autonomy
—which had perhaps first found clear expression in Mill’s writings from
the 1860s — was a long time in coming.
Self-Determination Recognized?
As early as the Congress o f Vienna (1815), there had been some recogni
tion of the idea that nations, even when they were not embodied in
independent states, had certain rights. The Congress stated that Poland, a
country that had been forcibly partitioned between Russia, Austria, and
Prussia in the century before, had rights to political representation and
cultural autonomy. These rights were in fact institutionalized in the largest,
Russian-ruled section of the country, as well as, much later, in the granting
of autonomy by Austria to the largely Polish region o f Galicia.124
Nevertheless, the idea o f self-determination was not definitively stated
until just before the First World War—and not until the end of that war
would it gain wide exposure as an idea that could constitute the basis for
a new international order. In 1914, just a few months before the outbreak
of World War I, V. I. Lenin wrote in his essay “The Right o f Nations to
Self-Determination” that
tineprincipal practical task...of [all] nationalities [is] that of day-by-day

agitation and propaganda against all state and national privileges, and for
the right, the equal right of all nations, to their national state.123
Four years later, and less than a year before the conclusion o f the war,
President Woodrow Wilson addressed the United States Congress and
outlined fourteen points as the basis for a new postwar order. In his
address, Wilson made the following statement:
An evident principle runs through the whole programme I have outlined.

It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right
to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they
be strong or weak. Unless this principle be made its foundation no part of
the structure of international justice can stand.126
Both the meaning and the import o f these statements were ambiguous.
Lenin’s article in favor of national self-determination was actually part of
an argument with the Polish socialist Rosa Luxemburg, who opposed self-
determination for nationalities.127Yet, it was in line with the main tendency
of the Russian Social Democratic Party, which was struggling with ways
to unite the various nationalities o f the Russian Empire in opposition to the
Tsarist state. As early as 1903, the party had, at its second congress,
adopted an article in favor o f national self-determination.128
Following Lenin’s articulation of the doctrine that would become known
as “proletarian internationalism”—that is, the view that socialists ought to
support movements for national self-determination, including seces
sion—this doctrine was substantially adopted after the Bolshevik Revolu
tion by two different bodies. In 1920, both the Second Congress of the
Communist International and the First Congress of the Peoples o f the East,
held in Baku, affirmed their support for the rights o f all nations to self-
determination.129Once Stalin consolidated his control over the Soviet state
in the 1920s, his own pamphlet on nationalism, written in 1913 and
possibly the basis for some of Lenin’s ideas, became the canonical work on
the subject and the basis for Comintern policy, as well as Soviet foreign
policy, at least until the mid-1940s.1,0
Wilson attempted to incorporate his advocacy of national rights, not
only in the settlements arising from the Versailles conference, but also in
the covenant of the new League of Nations. Yet, he faced substantial
opposition within his own administration as well as from other parties to
the negotiations concerning the covenant. Both Wilson’s Secretary of State,
Robert Lansing, and his legal adviser, David Hunter Miller, opposed
50 Chapter I
mention o f national rights in the text of the League o f Nations covenant.'31

Wilson himself was to admit to confusion and anxiety about the large
number o f demands for consideration due to his articulation o f a principle
of national self-determination.132 In response, he maintained that the
principle applied only to the settlement of postwar disputes and not as a
basis for “inquiry into ancient wrongs.”133
Nevertheless, Wilson’s efforts were largely in vain. The League o f
Nations covenant, to which the United States Congress refused to be a
signatory, did not end up incorporating Wilson’s proposed Article 3 on the
recognition o f national rights. And in 1920, in the Aaland Islands case, the
League o f Nations’ Committee o f Jurists refused to recognize national self-
determination as a valid principle o f international law.134
The principle of national rights thus did not become an issue within
international relations until the adoption of the U.N. Charter in 1945. The
fact that the Charter contained a mention of the “self-determination of
peoples” initiated debate about the applicability o f the principle in terms o f
international law. While jurists prior to World War II for the most part
agreed that there was no legal recognition o f nations outside o f their
existence as states, and that self-determination was not a legal principle,
legislation and interpretation following the war has made this a point o f
controversy.135 Consequently, consideration o f the claims on both sides of
the issue about whether nations are recognized to have a claim to self-
determination in international law has become a principal arena o f
contention between nationalists and internationalists since 1945.
O f course, there is a philosophical issue underlying this legal dispute
—and it concerns the relation between the two aspects of self-determina
tion just discussed. If self-determination consists o f the territorial sover
eignty o f the nation that is claiming it, as well as the recognition o f all other
nations’ equal claims to such sovereignty, can this principle be applied
consistently? This is the question that will ultimately come to the fore in a
discussion o f the principle as a doctrine in international law. But from a
nationalist perspective, the question o f consistency might be put quite
differently: is it not simply a matter of fairness in the application o f
international legal principles to accord all national groups rights similar to
those of already recognized groups—that is, o f the peoples who presently
have states o f their own?
Notes
1. See, e.g., Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference
(Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1990), and Charles Taylor, “The
Politics of Recognition,” in Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism and the Politics
of Recognition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
2. Charles Taylor, “Nationalism and Modernity,” in Robert McKim and
Jeff McMahan (eds.), The Morality o f Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1997), 46.
3. Peter Alter, Nationalism, trans. Stuart McKinnon-Evans (London:
Edward Arnold, 1989), 14-18.
4. See, e.g., Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).
5. Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique o f Historical Materialism,
vol. 2, The Nation-State and Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1987), 209-10.
6. See, e.g., Carlton J. H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism (New York:
Macmillan, 1926); Ernest Barker, National Character and the Factors in Its
Formation (London: Methuen, 1927); Hans Kohn, The Idea o f Nationalism: A
Study in Its Origins and Background (New York: Macmillan, 1944); Rupert
Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion o f Asian and African
Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); William H. McNeill,
Polyethnicity and National Unity in WorldHistory (Tomato: University ofToronto
Press, 1985).
7. Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest fo r Understanding
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), xi.
8. Walker Connor, MA Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group,
Is a...”, excerpted in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 45; when this article was included in
Ethnonationalism and retitled “Terminological Chaos,” this formulation was
deleted.
9. E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme,
Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
10. Ross Poole, Nation and Identity (London: Routledge, 1999), 12; cf.
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread
of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).
11. Paul Gilbert, The Philosophy o f Nationalism (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1998), 19.
12. Ernest Renan, “What Is a Nation?,” in Alfred Zimmem (ed.), Modem
Political Doctrines (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), 202-3; reprinted in
Omar Dahbour and Micheline R. Ishay (eds.), The Nationalism Reader (Atlantic
Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1995).
13. Renan, “What Is a Nation?” 203 (italics added).
52 Chapter I
14. Otto Bauer, Die Nationalit&tenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie,

excerpted in Tom Bottomore and Patrick Goode (eds.), Austro-Marxism (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1978), 107 (italics added).
15. Note that Michael Walzer explicitly revives Bauer’s concept of the
“community of character” in his 1983 book, Spheres o f Justice: A Defense o f
Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books), 62.
16. Josef V. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (Tirana, Albania:
8 Nentori Publishing House, 1979), 21,51.
17. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, 16.
18. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline o f Interpretive
Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1978), 1: 395.
19. Weber, Economy and Society, 2: 922.
20. Connor, Ethnonationalism, 102-3.
21. Connor, Ethnonationalism, 197.
25. For instance, Connor (Ethnonationalism, 96) noted the following
differences between 132 states (as of 1971), in terms of national identities
contained therein:
1. Only twelve states (9.1 percent) can justifiably be described as nation

states.
2. Twenty-five (18.9 percent) contain a nation or potential nation
accounting for more than 90 percent of the state’s total population
but also contain an important minority.
3. Another twenty-five (18.9 percent) contain a nation or potential nation
accounting for between 75 percent and 89 percent of the population.
4. In thirty-one (23.5 percent), the largest ethnic element accounts for 50
percent to 74 percent of the population.
5. In thirty-nine (29.5 percent), the largest nation or potential nation
accounts for less than half of the population.
26. Poole, Nation and Identity, 53.

28. Larry May, TheMorality ofGroups: Collective Responsibility, Group-
Based Harm, and Corporate Rights (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1987), 32.
29. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1983), 22.
30. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 22.
31. Poole, Nation and Identity, 22-23.
32. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin

and Spread o f Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), 15.
33. Anderson, Imagined Communities, chap. 3.
35.Anderson, Imagined Communities, chap. 4; see also Connor,
Ethnonationalism, 104-5.
37. Poole, Nation and Identity, 70, 82.
38. Gilbert, Philosophy o f Nationalism, 11.
41. See Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality o f Political Divorce
from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,
1991).
42. Allen Buchanan, “Self-Determination, Secession, and the Rule of
Law,” in Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (eds.), The Morality o f Nationalism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 312-13.
43. See, e.g., Omar Dahbour, “Self-Determination without Nationalism,”
in Fred Dallmayr and Jos6 Maria Rosales (eds.), Beyond Nationalism ?Sovereignty
and Citizenship (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001), 57-71.
44. John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1982), 370.
45. Buchanan, Secession, 50-51.
47. Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1986), 17.
49. Smith, Ethnic Origins o f Nations, 15.
50.1am indebted to Poole, Nation and Identity, 39, for this point.
52. John Breuilly, “Nationalism and the State,” in Roger Michener (ed.),
Nationality, Patriotism, and Nationalism in Liberal Democratic Societies (Saint
Paul, Minn.: Professors World Peace Academy, 1993), 38.
60. Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 382.
62. David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 20.
54 Chapter I

65. For a popular version of this awareness, see Joel Garreau, The Nine
Nations o f North America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981); for some scholarly
treatments, see Robert D. Mitchell and Paul A. Groves (eds.), North America: The
Historical Geography o f a Changing Continent (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1987).
67. Kai Nielsen, “Cultural Nationalism, neither Ethnic nor Civic,” in
Omar Dahbour (ed.), HPhilosophical Perspectives on National Identity,” a special
issue of the Philosophical Forum 28, nos. 1-2 (Fall-Winter 1996-1997), 46.
68. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1985), 88.
69. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 66.
70. Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference, 46.
71. Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 370-71.
72. Ross Poole, Morality and Modernity (London: Routledge, 1991), 105.
73. “‘Ethnic’ Criticism Divides Quebecois,” Washington Post, Dec. 24,
2000.
76. Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 383-84. Cf. Connor,
Ethnonationalism, 197,205.
77. Gilbert, Philosophy o f Nationalism, 170-71.
79. Yael Tamir, “The Right to National Self-Determination,” Social
Research 58, no. 3 (Fall 1991), 574, 576-77.
80. Miller, On Nationality, 100-101.
81. Giddens, Nation-State and Violence, 219.
82. Niraja Gopal Jayal, “Ethnic Diversity and the Nation State,”Journal
o f Applied Philosophy 10, no. 2 (1993), 147.
83. See Maurizio Viroli, For Love o f Country: An Essay on Patriotism
and Nationalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), esp. chap. 4.
84. Jflrgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity: Some
Reflections on the Future of Europe,” Praxis International, no. 12 (April 1992):
4.
85. Christopher W. Morris, An Essay on the Modem State (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 194-96.
86. F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986), 217.
87. Morris, Essay on the State, 226.
88. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 158.
89. Ian Brownlie, Principles o f Public InternationalLaw, 4th ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1980), 287.
90.See Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism

and the Modem World (London: Routledge, 1990), as well as the discussion in
chap. 6 below.
91.For an interpretation of Rousseau’s political philosophy that
differentiates it sharply from other contract theorists, see Carole Pateman, The
Problem o f Political Obligation: A Critique o f Liberal Theory (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1979), esp. chap. 7 (For Pateman’s argument that
Rousseau’s theory is not properly contractual, see 170).
92. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, trans. Judith R.
Masters (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1978), bk. 2, chap. 3.
93 .Christopher Kelly, “Rousseau on the Foundation ofNational Cultures,”
in History o f European Ideas 16, nos. 4-6 (Jan. 1993), 524.
94. See Rousseau, The Government o f Poland, cxccrpted in Omar Dahbour
and Micheline R. Ishay (eds.), The Nationalism Reader (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.:
Humanities Press, 1995), 30-34.
95. Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, 4fhed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993),28-29.
96.Hegel, Philosophy o f Mind, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), sect 549.
97.G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy o f World History,
Introduction: Reason in History, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1975), 96-97.
98. Hegel, Philosophy o f World History, 97.
101. G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy o f Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1967), 34.
102. Hegel, Philosophy o f Right, 218.
103. For the concept ofthe counter-Enlightenment, see Isaiah Berlin, “The
Counter-Enlightenment” (1973), reprinted in Berlin, Against the Current: Essays
in the History o f Ideas (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), 9-10.
104. J. G. Herder, Reflections on the Philosophy o f History o f Mankind,
trans. T. O. Churchill (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 98.
105. Herder, Reflections, 98.
106. Herder, Reflections, 99.
107. J. G. Fichte, Addresses to the German Nation, trans. R. F. Jones and
G. H. Turnbull (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 119.
108. Fichte, Addresses, 118.
109. Fichte, Addresses, 125.
110.Joseph Mazzini, "The Duties o f Man " and Other Essays, (London:
J. M. Dent & Co., n.d.), 55.
111. Mazzini, Duties o f Man, 55.
112. Viroli, For Love o f Country, 145.
113. Viroli, For Love o f Country, 152.
56 Chapter 1
114. John Stuart Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government,”

chap. 16; excerpted in Dahbour and Ishay, Nationalism Reader, 99.
115. Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government,” 99.
116. Lord Acton, “Nationality,” excerpted in Dahbour and Ishay,
Nationalism Reader, 112-13.
117.See John O’Neill, “Should Communitarians Be Nationalists?”
Journal o f Applied Philosophy 11, no. 2 (1994): 135-42, and David Archard,
“Should Nationalists Be Communitarians?” Journal o f Applied Philosophy 13, no.
2 (1996): 215-20.
118. See, e.g., Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory
o f Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), as well as Young, Justice and
the Politics o f Difference, and Taylor, “Politics of Recognition.”
119. See various approaches to this question in Will Kymlicka (ed.), The
Rights o f Minority Cultures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
120. Ross Poole, Nation and Identity (London: Routledge, 1999), 132-37.
121. Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality o f Political Divorcefrom
Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 48-
52.
123.See Viroli, For Love o f Country, 161-87; cf. Philip Pettit,
Republicanism: A Theory o f Freedom and Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1997).
124. On the Congress of Vienna, see Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The
Legitimacy o f Self-Determination (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1978), 61; on Polish nationalism in the nineteenth century, see Breuilly,
Nationalism and the State, 83-85; on Galicia, see Robert A. Kann, A History o f the
Hapsburg Empire, 1526-1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974),
349-50.
125. V. I. Lenin, “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination,” in Lenin,
On the National Question and Proletarian Internationalism, (Moscow: Novosti
Press Agency Publishing House, 1970), 31.
126. Woodrow Wilson, “An Address to a Joint Session of Congress, 8
January, 1918,” in Arthur Link (ed.), The Papers o f Woodrow Wilson (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), 45: 539; see also Wilson’s February 11
address to Congress, in which he makes the following statement:
Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an

international conference or an understanding between rivals and
antagonists. National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be
dominated and governed only by their own consent “Self-determination”
is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which
statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril. (“An Address to a Joint
Session of Congress, 11 February, 1918,” in Link, Papers o f Woodrow
Wilson, 46: 321)
127. Rosa Luxemburg, “The National Question and Autonomy,” in

Horace B. Davis (ed.), The National Question: Selected Writings by Rosa
Luxemburg (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), 101-287.
128. Horace B. Davis, Toward a Marxist Theory o f Nationalism (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), 57.
129. Ronaldo Munck, The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism
(London: Zed Books, 1986), 89-90.
130. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, 31 -32.
131. Robert Schaeffer, Warpaths: The Politics o f Partition (New York:
Hill & Wang, 1990), 51-52; Buchheit, Secession, 65-66. See also Lansing’s
interesting critique of national self-determination in his article, MSelf
Determination: A Discussion of the Phrase,” Saturday Evening Post, May 1921.
132. See Wilson’s statement that
When I gave utterance to those words [“that all nations had a right to self-
determination”], I said them without the knowledge that nationalities
existed, which are coming to us day after day.... You do not know and
cannot appreciate the anxieties that I have experienced as the result of
many millions of people having their hopes raised by what I have said,
(quoted in Buchheit, Secession, 115)
133. Woodrow Wilson, cited in Buchheit, Secession, 63.

134. Heather Wilson, International Law and the Use o f Force by National
Liberation Movements (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 56-58.
135. Wentworth Ofuatey-Kodjoe, The Principle o f Self-Determination in
International Law (flew York: Nellen Publishing Co., 1977), 149-50; Wilson, Use
ofForce by National Liberation Movements, 78-79.
Chapter 2
Peoples and Nations in
International Law
[T]o assert that the right of self-determination means the right of a group
to choose the sovereignty under which it shall live is simply incorrect
— W. Wentworth Ofuatey-Kodjoe, The Principle
o f Self-Determination in International Law
National Rights and International Law

Today, claims for self-determination are often made by reference to the
Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the original signatory states in
1945. In that document, one puipose of the new organization is said to be
‘T o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle o f equal rights and self-determination o f peoples, and to take
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”1Further on, it
is stated that the U.N. should take measures “with a view to the creation of
conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples.”2
These passages, by linking a number o f undefined concepts of great
suggestive power, have subsequently provided a basis for the assertion of
a principle o f self-determination within international law. But as we have
seen, this does not necessarily mean that self-determination for nations has
been recognized in international law. To decide whether it is, it is necessary
to determine whether nations—in some sense of that term—correspond to
the concept o f a people as it is used in international legal documents. A
perusal of the legal literature on self-determination reveals that peoples are
the entities that may claim (in certain circumstances) a right of self-
determination. An essential part o f assessing what status nations have in
59
60 Chapter 2
international law is therefore determining whether a nation can be a people

(and therefore be entitled to the legal rights of peoples).
Two Cases: Palestine and Lithuania
A consideration o f two cases in which this has been an issue may help to
illuminate the problem. These two cases are sometimes characterized as
instances o f legitimate demands for “national liberation”—that is, to the
attainment of an independent state by an oppressed people. The first step
toward national liberation is according the status o f a people to an
oppressed group.
The Palestinians were one o f the first groups to obtain such status, as a
result of the increasing acceptance o f the notion o f the rights of peoples in
the late 1960s. In being accorded the status of a distinct people, and later
being regarded as meriting a right of self-determination, the Palestinians
constituted the first instance o f a nonstate entity achieving official
recognition by the U.N.3
O f course, the question here is whether they should have been accorded
such recognition, since some commentators have argued that this is an
inconsistency with the body of international law as a whole.4 1 will argue
in conclusion that this is not an inconsistency; on the contrary, to argue that
national rights can be included within the international legal system itself
results in inconsistencies in the application of the resultant legal principles.
The basic criterion for the recognition of national liberation movements has
been whether the peoples they purport to represent are oppressed or
subjugated.3 In the era o f decolonization, this was a relatively simple
matter; but in the postcolonial era, it is not. The fundamental question is:
are there still instances or circumstances in which national groups come to
have the status o f peoples, due to their de facto subjugated, or neocolonial,
status?
Another case in which this question has come to the fore is in the secession
of Lithuania from the U.S.S.R. This is often regarded as one of the clearest
cases of a legitimate claim to self-determination.6 But I will disagree with
this assessment in the conclusion o f this chapter. In any case, the issue to
be decided is whether Lithuania had a clearly subjugated status within the
former Soviet Union. Part of deciding this lies in determining whether a
historical injustice was committed in incorporating Lithuania into the
U.S.S.R. But the more fundamental issue is whether the international legal
Peoples and Nations in International Law 61
system does or can include a principle o f self-determination that applies to

such cases o f “national liberation.”
A Legal Principle of National Self-Determination?

International law may include a principle o f national self-determination to
the extent that the principle is consistent with other already established
norms and doctrines. In this way, national self-determination may be
justifiable solely in terms o f its formal or rule-like adherence to basic
international legal norms—or at least that is what some advocates of die
principle contend. The idea that national self-determination is (or should
be) a principle o f international law is based on the general idea that all
agents o f a particular kind are entitled to equal consideration because of
their capacities as agents. If nations are agents o f a certain kind—that is, if
they are equivalent to peoples as defined in international law—then they
are entitled to equal consideration on that basis. The underlying idea of
such a justification is that the “essence o f self-determination is human
dignity and human rights.”7 Thus, the supposed dignity of nations would
mandate that they have a right to claim self-determination to the extent that
nations are equivalent to other groups that already justifiably have such a
right (i.e., those recognized as having such a right in international law).
The fact that self-determination has increasingly become a part of
international law in the last fifty years means that, i f nations have the
requisite characteristics, capacities, or traits that mandate such a principle,
international law would be an appropriate venue for its recognition. Such
recognition would take the form o f according “nations” the status of
“peoples” in international law. But should nations be accorded this status?
The idea that all nations should be able to claim self-determination, simply
because it is a consistent application of the idea of the equality o f rights for
all equivalent groups in international relations, has been asserted by various
parties since Woodrow Wilson’s statement o f this view toward the end of
World War I.8 But the idea that all nations should be able to claim self-
determination is to assert something more fundamental than that such
claims may or should be guaranteed in international law.
Deriving national self-determination from the formal equality of all
groups is an ethical idea at least as much as it is a legal one. Yet, interpreta
tions o f international legal doctrine provide the best context for understand
ing this idea since such doctrine already recognizes a wide array o f rights
for individuals and peoples.9 Why, then, should nations not be accorded
62 Chapter 2
such rights as well? This question raises the issue of how legal principles
(including rights) are justified. At this point, a distinction between types o f
justification in legal and in political discourse needs to be made.10A formal
or deontological justification o f a principle is particularly suited to the
context of a legal system because laws establish categories which can serve
as the basis for claims concerning the proper extent o f particular norms.
Membership in a legal category (e.g., peoples) mandates recognition of all
rights and duties pertaining to that category.
This form of justification can be contrasted with that which pertains in
political discourse, where not the formal properties o f a right but the
consequences o f its recognition for human welfare (variously defined)
dictate whether it is to be recognized. Deontological justification, though
it may not be applicable to ethical norms of all kinds, is highly relevant to
discussions o f legal norms.
Once the legal system o f rights, duties, prohibitions, and so forth is
considered as a whole, however, a deontological form o f justification seems
inadequate. This is because, within certain broad limits, whether a
particular legal system is justifiable or not is itself dependent on prior
normative commitments of a different nature.11 Thus, as will be shown
below, while the rights of nations can be argued for on the basis of an
existing system o f legal rights, such an argument—even if correct on its
own terms—must ultimately refer back to more fundamental commitments
in order to justify why the system o f rights ought to be construed in a
certain way.
The operative assumption of the nationalist reinterpretation o f interna
tional law is that nations and peoples are equivalent entities—and therefore
entitled to claim the same rights and to be covered by the same principles.
This assumption was challenged in the last chapter, in which I argued that
there are important differences between nations and peoples (that is, groups
or associations that are not ethnically based). But this does not mean that
they could not be equivalent in some other sense—for instance, because
they are subject to similar conditions of oppression or subjugation. At least
this is what some interpreters of international law argue. It is this type of
equivalence that might provide a reason to expand legal doctrine to include
nations under a principle of self-determination—i f such a principle does not
already apply to them.
Self-Determination in Modern International Law
The nature of international law is a matter o f considerable controversy. Its

sources—whatever their standing as binding legal documents—are various:
U.N. General Assembly resolutions, special U.N. covenants, World Court
decisions and opinions, state constitutions, interstate treaties,
nongovernmental organizations* charters and declarations, and special
declarations from ad hoc international meetings o f jurists. For the purpose
o f this discussion, the significant categories of potential precedent in
international law are as follows: (1) U.N. General Assembly Resolutions,
(2) World Court decisions, (3) discussions among international jurists of
attempts at secession, and (4) special declarations and charters concerning
collective rights in international law.
The period o f the late 1940s and 50s was not marked by any significant
developments in terms o f the law of self-determination. Yet, this era saw
the growth—and increasing success—of national liberation movements
aimed at overthrowing the colonial empires o f France, Britain, Portugal,
and Belgium. These movements eventually contributed to a shift in
international diplomacy in favor of decolonization and the recognition that
formerly subjugated peoples could possess rights on the basis o f their status
as oppressed groups. In the 1960s, this shift was explicitly institutionalized
in international law, both at the U.N. and in other ways.
The first indication o f this shift was the passing o f U.N. General
Assembly Resolutions 1514 and 1541 in I960.12 Resolution 1541 consti
tuted a set of criteria that was meant to be used to determine when a trust
territory had become self-governing. The earlier and more influential
Resolution 1514, however, set out principles pertaining to the process of
decolonization, which was already well underway. Above all, the resolution
included the statements that there should be “respect for the principles of
equal rights and self-determination o f all peoples,” that “all peoples have
an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty
and the integrity o f their national territory,” and above all, that “All peoples
have the right to self-determination.”13
This U.N. document was the first o f almost yearly reaffirmations of
peoples’ rights to self-determination that were expressed in General
Assembly Resolutions and other documents.14One example of this was the
resolutions concerning Algerian independence that were passed in 1960 and
1961, recognizing the right o f the Algerian people to self-determination,
even though Algeria had previously been formally incorporated into
64 Chapter 2
France.15 Another example was the recognition of the Palestinians as a

people, as discussed above. There were limits to the international recogni
tion of claims to self-determination during this period, however. For
instance, the attempted secession of Katanga province from the former
Belgian Congo (1960-1963) went unrecognized by the U.N.16
By the mid-1960s, there was an increasing interest in the U.N. in
formally recognizing some right to self-determination. This interest was
demonstrated by the General Assembly’s final passage of the International
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights in 1966. These covenants accorded self-determination a
prominent place. Article 1 of both covenants states that “All peoples have
the right of self-determination,” and that “The States Parties to the present
Covenant...shall promote the realization of the right of self-determina
tion.”17 Even under the new dispensation of an increasingly accepting
attitude toward some version of self-determination, limits could still be
reached. The case of the Biafran war of secession from Nigeria (1967-
1970) was an example of this. Not only was it widely held that the Biafran
case was not covered by the legislation mentioned above, but the case was
never even brought up for discussion at the U.N.18
In many ways, the culmination of a decade of U.N. and other interna
tional legislation and debate about the rights ofpeoples and nations was the
adoption of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) in 1970
(designated the “Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations”). This declaration was in some ways a
reaffirmation and extension ofthe 1960 Resolution 1514 on decolonization.
But in other ways it was something of a departure. Resolution 2625 was a
combination of an affirmation of self-determination with a reassertion of
the rights of existing states against foreign interference or dismemberment.
On the one hand, the declaration states that “the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples constitutes a significant contribution to
contemporary international law,” and that ‘The use of force to deprive
peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable
rights and of the principle of non-intervention.” On the other hand, the
declaration stresses the point that “Every State shall refrain from any action
aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial
integrity of any other State or country,” and that “All States enjoy
sovereign equality.... The territorial integrity and political independence of
the State are inviolable.”19
The ways in which such statements may or may not be consistent will
be discussed below. But in any case, Resolution 2625 ushered in a new era
of even greater recognition o f collective rights in international law. Another
institution, the International Court o f Justice (the “World Court”), also
played a role in this process o f increasing recognition. Two cases in the
early 1970s were noteworthy in this regard. In its “advisory opinions” in
both the Namibia and Western Sahara cases (1971 and 1975, respectively),
the World Court recognized the increasing support for self-determination
in international law.20 Another instance of this increase in support for the
principle of self-determination was the recognition o f former East Pakistan,
or Bangladesh, as a member of the U.N. after a war o f secession from
Pakistan in 1971.21
Finally, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, two non-U.N. documents
became instrumental in furthering the general cause of the equality of
peoples or nations through self-determination. First, the Universal
Declaration on the Rights o f Peoples, or Algiers Declaration, was issued by
a group o f jurists without official status, in 1976. One feature of this
declaration was the distinction that it made between peoples, as bearers of
particular rights, and their states. The status o f this declaration as an
influential edict in international law, however, remains unclear.22Following
the Algiers Declaration, the Organization o f African Unity adopted the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (also called the Banjul
Charter) in 1981 (though it was not completely ratified by members until
1986). In this document, the concept of peoples’ rights was given formal
recognition by one o f the largest interstate organizations other than the
U.N.23
The Current Status of Self-Determination in International Law
Given this history of the gradual development of a right o f peoples to self-

determination, the definition o f a “people” is a notoriously difficult
problem in international law. What one commentator has remarked about
the International Covenants on Rights is generally true of most international
documents—that they offer “no useful guidance as to what counts as a
‘people.’”24 In all the numerous declarations in which the rights of peoples
are affirmed, an explicit delineation o f what entity can claim these rights
is never found. Some have maintained that this lack o f explicit definition
renders the very idea of self-determination problematic.25
66 Chapter 2
Historically, the problem of defining a “people” in contradistinction to

other entities such as nations only gradually became a recognizable issue
in international law. In the first flush o f concern for the interests and rights
of groups that were not states, there was little explicit distinction made
between different kinds o f groups that might make claims o f existing states
and interstate organizations. When, in the era o f World War I, the rights of
peoples were invoked, it was not clear to what they referred. It was,
however, commonly thought at that time that culturally-defined nations
were able to claim these rights, at least in some instances.26
Nevertheless, nations have never been accorded equal standing with
states in international law, despite some early indications to the contrary.27
There are a number of reasons for this. Certainly one is the vagueness of
the concept o f a nation, and the inability o f politicians or jurists to reach
agreement on its meaning.28Another reason is the historical provenance of
the concept o f national rights, which has served, until recently, to discredit
it as a basis for claims to self-determination. During the 1930s and 1940s,
this idea was used by German diplomats to justify reordering the states and
boundaries o f Europe.29 Subsequent concepts o f a people have been
circumscribed in order to avoid association with this usage.30
Some jurists, nevertheless, have argued for the recognition of nations as
peoples in international law.31 Whether this is justifiable is to a great extent
an issue o f whether such recognition is compatible with other norms and
mandates o f international law. What then is the current status o f national
self-determination as a legal right? There is considerable controversy even
with regard to a right o f self-determination for peoples. Most commentators
make a distinction between the self-determination o f peoples as a political
principle and as a legal right. Many argue that while it may be a legitimate
political principle, self-determination cannot be viewed as a legal right of
peoples.
Some have viewed self-determination as no different from any other
principle o f international law, inasmuch as, once the basic principle has
been formulated in legal documents, it simply requires further definition
before it is conclusively accepted within the body o f international law.32
Yet, in light o f other juridical opinions, this view appears too sanguine. For
instance, an extremely different assessment was given by Gerald
Fitzmaurice, who wrote in 1973 that, “juridically, the notion o f a legal
‘right’ of self-determination is nonsense...for can [an] as yet juridically
non-existent entity be the possessor o f a legal right?”33 Another critic o f
self-determination, Leo Gross, reached much the same conclusion about the
same time: “it is clear that nowhere has a right to self-determination in the
legal sense been established”34
Other jurists hold diametrically opposed views. U. O. Umozurike, for
instance, maintained in the early 1970s that self-determination was already
established as a “fundamental principle o f positive international law.”35
Lung-chu Chen agreed with this view, though with the caveat that no legal
principle admits o f “unlimited application.”36 More recently, Michla
Pomerance has referred to what he calls the “New United Nations Law of
Self-Determination” as being widely accepted.37 Probably the fairest
assessment of the current state o f legal opinion with regard to this concept
is that of G. H. Tesfagiorgis, who wrote in 1987 that “The debate on
whether self-determination is a political right or a legal principle itself is
far from settled in international law circles.”38 Subsequent developments in
international law have done little to settle the issue.39
Why is it that a right of self-determination in international law is so
controversial? Here a reminder o f the problems mentioned above is
appropriate. Defending self-determination (and even more so, national self-
determination) as a concept in international law encounters two difficulties.
First, it must be shown to have a purpose that connects it with other central
concerns of contemporary international law, such as human rights. Second,
it must not be incompatible with central rights and priorities that have
already been incorporated into international legal doctrine, above all the
rights o f existing states. In order to claim a right o f self-determination for
nations, the additional problem of establishing the standing o f nations as
such in international law must be solved.
Before considering (and then rejecting) the central assumption of
nationalists—that nations qualify for the same claims and rights as peoples
in international law—it is important to get clear about what self-determina
tion actually means in a legal context. Far from being a general assertion
of the political rights o f particular groups, self-determination is viewed as
legitimate only when certain conditions apply. It is these conditions that
determine the applicability o f the principle to particular groups or
situations.
Self-determination has often been characterized as being o f two types
—internal and external. Internal self-determination means that a people
possesses the ability to choose its own political institutions and authorities,
without interference from others.40 It could accordingly be taken to be a
mandate for the creation o f democratic decisionmaking processes within
existing states. But this would suggest a separation between the people or
68 Chapter 2
citizenry o f a country and its state—a point o f continuing controversy in

international law. A more frequent interpretation is that internal self-
determination constitutes a prohibition against intervention by some states
in the affairs o f other states, and is thus somewhat redundant when
considered in conjunction with the general advocacy o f nonintervention in
international law.41
External self-determination means the ability o f a people to create
institutions o f self-government when they are in a condition o f dependency
or subjugation.42 It thus has meaning primarily in the context o f the
transition o f non-self-governing territories such as colonies to independ
ence. External self-determination constitutes the chief impetus behind the
1960 declaration on decolonization, as well as other documents addressing
the status of colonies or former colonies. As in the case of internal self-
determination, in the absence of a clear colonial situation to which the
principle can be applied, external self-determination tends to shade over
into the general body o f customary international law that prescribes respect
for the sovereignty o f states (and, by extension, of the peoples inhabiting
those states).43 For both internal and external self-determination, the
principle is justified only when the fundamental right o f peoples to self-rule
has actually been violated. A simple assertion o f the rights of a people,
independent o f the presence or absence o f specific types of governance, is
insufficient to warrant a claim to self-determination.
Whether self-determination is therefore considered to be internal or
external, it is not generally applicable to groups (e.g., nations), unless they
have a certain status—that is, as a people. So the question of what a people
is in international law, and whether nations are to be considered peoples,
becomes paramount.
The Definition of “Peoples” in International Law

Despite continuing controversy about this point, some jurists insist that
state and interstate practice can set useful guidelines for determining the
nature of a people even when international legal documents have not.44 It
is therefore worthwhile surveying the different possibilities concerning the
legal character o f peoples to ascertain whether there is some consensus
about it.
A preliminary distinction may be made for purposes o f clarification
between a people and a nation, and the rights o f self-determination
appropriate to them. Tesfagiorgis points to this distinction in writing that
“the right of a people to self-determination” has come to mean the right

of a people to have a government resulting from its own free choice
without any external or internal domination [while] “the right of a nation
to self-determination” has come to mean the right of a nation to independ
ence.45
This distinction between peoples and nations seems to be one o f consider

ing peoples to be essentially territorial entities—that is, inhabitants of
existing states—while nations may be groups o f persons defined
nonterritorially (above all, by their ethnic identities).46 This sense of
“peoples” accords with the emphasis put on states and boundaries in
international law and its strong presumption against recognition of nonstate
entities.
The emphasis on territory as the principal determinant o f a people was
codified only after 1945, and even more so, after the 1960 U.N. declaration
on decolonization. Prior to that, especially in the interwar period, peoples
were often considered to embody an ethnic identity. This was, however, as
pointed out in the discussion o f Lenin and Wilson, a contentious and ill-
defined view at the time. Above all, it gained (temporary) currency in the
context o f the reorganization o f Europe after World War I. The more
current definition, and the one that finds seemingly more emphasis in
international documents, is o f a people as a group that shares some political
identity—for instance, as the citizenry o f a state or as a population subject
to rule by another state.47
It should be remembered that “peoples” have largely been defined in
international law within the context o f particular resolutions or declarations
dealing with specific problems o f interstate relations. The primary context
o f the original definitions o f peoples (such as in the U.N. Charter and in the
1960 declaration) has been one o f decolonization.48 This means that the
primary category o f “peoples” that may uncontroversially lay claim to self-
determination is that o f the populations o f “non-self-goveming territories”
such as colonies or trust territories.49
A couple o f implications follow from this emphasis on peoples as the
inhabitants o f non-self-governing territories. First, the claim o f self-
determination, which is by definition limited to “peoples,” must be
understood to also be limited to that o f dependent peoples—those who are
denied self-government.30Second, self-determination applies to peoples as
the populations o f whole states, and it does not therefore “extend to
insistence by one sector o f the population...on its own form o f self-
determination.”51
70 Chapter 2
Since non-self-goveming territories are generally taken by international

jurists to be the paradigmatic cases of legitimate claims to self-determina
tion, the extent to which the notion of dependence or lack o f self-rule can
be used to cover cases other than colonies has become a major issue in the
postcolonial era. There are three instances in which the notion o f non-self-
governance might be extended: (1) nominally independent states that are
effectively under the full or partial control of foreign powers; (2) states that
suppress political participation or representation; and (3) sections o f the
population o f a state that are excluded from political self-rule.
The idea that self-determination may apply to independent states as well
as to colonies is based on the view that international law is basically
concerned with interstate relations. Above all, as Hans Kelsen has noted,
the idea of equal rights applies in particular to states: “the term ‘peo
ples’...in connection with ‘equal rights’—means probably states, since only
states have ‘equal rights’ according to general international law.”52
Concretely, the idea that independent states would have a right o f self-
determination—distinct from the general rights o f territorial integrity and
freedom from aggression found in international law—has been construed
as a claim for control over a state’s own natural resources. Thus, non-self-
governance has sometimes been understood to be a justification for claims
to economic self-determination. This is evident in a number o f U.N.
General Assembly resolutions from the 1960s and 1970s such as the
resolution on sovereignty over natural resources in 1962 and the declaration
on a “new international economic order” in 1974.53
A second case o f the extension o f non-self-governance beyond the
category of formal colonies and possessions is that of peoples denied self-
rule. In this case, the issue of self-determination concerns the relation of the
population of a territory to its government. A people may “have collective
rights against their state.”54 What these rights are has become a matter of
considerable controversy in recent years. Whether or not there is an
emerging right o f democratic government (understood as a system of
legislative representation) has been a source o f debate at least since the
1990 Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation
in Europe adopted a document affirming such a “right to democracy.”55
While this might seem to be a justifiable extension o f the right o f external
self-determination (a right invoked against the subjugation of a people,
usually by a colonial power), a number o f complicated issues are raised by
asserting that representative democracy is the only legitimate form o f self-
government.
Above all, there is considerable potential for conflict with the right of
internal self-determination, since violation of a “right to democracy” could
be construed as grounds for intervention into a state by other states, alone
or in concert. This type of response occurred in the case o f South Africa,
where the apartheid system was understood to violate the right of a people
to self-government. Apartheid was, however, understood within interna
tional legal organizations as an exceptional situation mandating an
extraordinary response, rather than an example o f a new “right to democ
racy.”56
Another example o f this type of definition of a non-self-goveming
people was the state of Southern Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe), which was
nominally self-governing from the early 1960s, but in fact disenfranchised
the majority o f its population. In 1962, the U.N. passed a resolution
designating Southern Rhodesia as a non-self-goveming territory, despite its
formal provisions for home rule.57 The operative principle was that the
majority population in Southern Rhodesia was not allowed any participa
tion in self-government.
Finally, the case of a part of a country being non-self-goveming has
only very occasionally been recognized in international law. Again, when
this is the case, the determining factor has been effective lack of self-rule,
not simply the existence o f ethnic or cultural differences, or the assertion
of a desire for autonomy or separation from the state.58
This can be illustrated by the contrasting cases o f Bangladesh on the one
hand and Katanga and Biafra on the other. While the latter two cases are
examples o f the general tendency in international law to withhold
recognition from separatist movements, the former case shows that there
can be acceptance o f a subgroup o f the population of a country as a distinct
people under some conditions. Though the principal condition must be the
denial o f effective self-rule to a part of the country’s population, it is
probably also true that—as in the case of East Pakistan—other special
circumstances must obtain for a large number o f states to recognize this
denial.59 In the case of East Pakistan, the most important special circum
stance seems to have been the de facto “denial o f human rights in the
territory,” regardless o f its de jure status as part of a self-governing
country.60
The crucial question, however, is determining whether a group within
a state—e.g., a nation—can be understood to be a people entitled to a right
o f self-determination when conditions o f political oppression do not
necessarily obtain. There is one case in which jurists often concede this
72 Chapter 2
right: the case o f nationalities within explicitly multinational states (such

as the former U.S.S.R. or Yugoslavia). The key to the acceptance o f a claim
o f self-determination for nations regardless o f state boundaries in this case
is that the legitimacy o f such a claim has already been recognized
constitutionally within the (multinational) state. On this view, such
constitutional recognition accords the separate nations some standing in
international law that they would not otherwise have. This differentiates
them from the case o f minority nationalities that do not have any particular
constitutional status within a state.61
This latter case, however, is central to the nationalist view that the
equality of nations irrespective of state boundaries permits claims to self-
determination. There have been some jurists who have thought that this
case is covered by international doctrines of self-determination under
certain circumstances. Most important is the fulfillment o f criteria that the
minority group be a people. Two criteria were cited by the International
Commission o f Jurists investigating the situation in East Pakistan: that the
group or community in question share certain historical, cultural, ethnic,
economic, religious, or geographical attributes in common, and that it
“becomes conscious o f its own identity and asserts its will to exist.”62
What is most importantly at stake here is whether minority populations
in a state might be considered to be a people, and thus able to claim
equality with other “nations” that may have states o f their own. One
commentator maintains that, provided self-determination is “unrestrictively
interpreted,” minorities could be considered to be peoples.63 However, this
begs the crucial question: should “self-determination” be given this
“unrestrictive” interpretation? Another jurist maintains that, on the basis o f
the International Covenants on Rights, “minorities as such do not have a
right o f self-determination (and secession) generally.”64
This view is supported by another study that concludes that no rights
follow from the claim o f communities—as homogeneous groups rather than
as legally recognized entities—to create homogeneous states o f their own.
Evidence for this is that virtually all peoples that have been recognized
internationally as legitimately claiming self-determination have been
“ethnically and culturally heterogeneous.”65
The nature of peoples in international law therefore seems, on balance,
to be different from that o f nations as culturally distinct entities. Legal
doctrines o f the right of peoples to self-determination seem not to apply
directly to nations inasmuch as they claim rights in their capacity as
national groups; and to apply to them at all only when other criteria—such
as prior constitutional recognition or a history o f systematic political

oppression—also apply. In particular, it seems clear that, at present, there
is no legal consensus on recognizing a right o f self-determination either for
noncolonial peoples or for minority peoples in existing states.66Neverthe
less, a group o f eminent international jurists has concluded that the
question o f whether or not self-determination applies only to clear cases of
colonies and other non-self-goveming entities will continue to be contro
versial because it “depends on political value-judgments o f a complex
character.”67
While the issue o f whether nations have a legal right to self-determina-
tion may ultimately remain unresolved, it is worth recalling the two basic
conditions o f a legitimate claim to self-determination in current interna
tional legal doctrine. In order to make a claim for self-determination,
nations would have to satisfy these conditions. They are: (1) that a people
constitutes an entity—in other words, that it has “political coherence,” and
(2) that it also exists under an oppressive regime and accordingly has
“subject status.”68
The first condition is a requirement that a group must have the political
wherewithal to make a claim to self-determination and to carry it out if
accorded recognition. Nationalists might argue that all nations at least
potentially possess the ‘‘political coherence” necessary to claim a right o f
self-determination. Nevertheless, international practice suggests that such
a criterion refers to existing states, rather than to nations that could become
states.
The second condition is important in that only in actual conditions of
oppression may a people make a justifiable claim to self-determination,
since die purpose o f the idea o f self-determination is to redefine a
relationship between a dominant and a subjugated population so that self-
government can be extended or strengthened. The basis of self-determina
tion in the value o f self-government means that claims by groups who do
not lack self-rule to self-determination could be seen to be “meaningless.”69
Should Nations Be Regarded as Peoples?

Though nations do not presently have a clear claim to self-determination in
international law, some contend that international law should be changed
to incorporate such a claim. But to extend international legal doctrine to
include the rights-claims o f nations, such claims must be compatible with
the principles governing relations between already existing states that are
74 Chapter 2
at the core o f international law. What is often regarded as the most basic
principle o f international law, and perhaps the very foundation o f any
system of interstate relations, is the prohibition of the use or threat o f force
between states. This prohibition, found, for instance, in Article 2, Section
4 o f the U.N. Charter, has been called the “principal norm o f international
law of our time.”70
In terms o f the concrete rights and duties o f states pursuant to this norm,
there are two that define the limits within which debate about self-
determination as a legal right has generally occurred. These rights (of
states) are territorial integrity and political sovereignty.7I The first right is
one that states possess to ensure that their internationally recognized
boundaries are respected by other states. The second right is that by which
states can condemn interference or intervention by other states in their
internal political affairs.
When peoples are considered to be equivalent to the populations of
already existing states, the possibility for conflict between claims to self-
determination and these principles of integrity and sovereignty are
relatively slight. The self-determination o f peoples would be a matter of
ensuring the internal self-government and external independence of
countries within existing borders. But when self-determination is consid
ered applicable to nations, the possibility o f conflict with international
norms increases. In terms of political sovereignty, nations that are defined
across international frontiers may provide occasions for intervention into
certain states by others seeking a unified national territory. When nations
are considered to reside in parts o f existing states, the territorial integrity
o f those states may be threatened, and the danger o f internal conflicts (civil
wars) increases accordingly.
On the nationalist view, since nations are defined ethnically and not
territorially, the correct boundaries o f nation-states (as based on their
hereditary national homelands) may bear little resemblance to the borders
of presently existing states. To realize the self-determination o f their
nations, nationalists may try to rearrange boundaries or even to dissolve
entire countries. It is not surprising that jurists have usually viewed this
possibility as an indication that national self-determination, as a general
justification for secession or other forms o f territorial reorganization, is
incompatible with central tenets of international law.72
Nationalists view the matter differently. They argue that particular
tenets o f international law should be subordinate to the more fundamental
principles—such as that of national self-determination—upon which they
are based. Whether or not such a principle is more fundamental depends on

one’s view o f the relation between the self-determination o f nations and the
territorial integrity o f states. The standard view is that territorial integrity
takes priority over claims to self-determination. A reason that has been
given for this is that, while self-determination may be a goal set forth by
documents such as the U.N. Charter, sovereignty is a principle designed to
be acted upon by states and other organizations: ‘“ self-determination, in
contrast to sovereignty and all that flows from it, was not originally
perceived as an operative principle o f the [U.N.] Charter...it was one of the
desiderata of the Charter rather than a legal right that could be invoked as
such.’”73 So, even if self-determination were to apply to nations, it would
still not be able to override considerations of the territorial integrity of
already existing states.
From a nationalist perspective, however, self-determination is what
legitimizes rights-claims, while territorial integrity is a subordinate means
of ratifying a system of states that is already legitimate: “compliance with
the principle o f self-determination is the essence, the real legitimacy o f a
status quo, while territorial stability stands for formal, institutionalized
legitimacy.”74
This fundamental disagreement in interpretation concerning the relative
priority of norms in international law indicates the depth o f the problem
with invoking legal precedent to settle conflicts about the legitimacy o f a
principle of self-determination. Though it seems clear that the weight o f
precedent is on the side of those arguing for the priority o f territorial
integrity over national self-determination, this does not mean that an
argument could not still be made that a principle of national self-determina
tion should override the weight of precedent.
Such an argument is possible because law is an essentially interpretive
enterprise. The crucial question is whether there are any limits on legal
interpretation.75 This is a particularly acute problem in international law,
given the lack o f written constitutions, binding agreements, and enforce
ment mechanisms.76 It is almost always possible to construe legal docu
ments in such a way as to make a new interpretation seem a reasonable
one.77 International law has few resources with which to adjudicate this
kind o f dispute. Some jurists have noted that this conflict between the
prerogatives o f states and those o f nationalist movements is “too great to
be solved by international consensual procedures.”78
Nationalists who argue for the equivalence o f nations with other
internationally recognized peoples as the basis for claims to self-determina
76 Chapter 2
tion seek to change the prevailing climate o f international legal doctrine in

favor of such an as yet unrecognized norm. The increasing recognition of
nonstate actors in international legal disputes provides an opening for this
attempt. Nevertheless, given the nature o f international law as a whole it
will be hard to decisively change the current consensus against the rights
o f nations. Claims for national rights are often based on a particular
interpretation o f international documents such as U.N. resolutions and
declarations. Yet, such documents have no definite standing in international
law. They are only accorded recognition to the extent that the practice of
states ratifies the principles invoked in the documents.79
The emphasis on state practices is probably inherent in a legal system
in which states have (at least until recently) constituted both the primary
litigants and adjudicators. International law, even when it acknowledges
nonstate actors, continues to be defined by the ways in which states (and
particularly dominant states) seek to set the limits o f acceptable actions. It
is generally only in reviewing state practices that a sense o f current norms
can be reliably ascertained in the international arena.80
Two conclusions follow from this assessment of international legal
practice. First, it is fairly clear that, with the exception of some dissident
jurists, the weight o f current legal doctrine does not recognize a principle
of national self-determination as a legitimate extension of the principle of
political self-determination. While self-determination for peoples has
increasingly been recognized in international law, it has not generally been
applied to nations (when understood as ethnocultural groups); even an
“unrestrictive interpretation” o f crucial documents concerning self-
determination would probably not result in legitimizing self-determination
for all national groups.
But the second conclusion to be drawn is that international law is a
notoriously indeterminate enterprise and leaves room for just such
unrestrictive interpretations to be advocated by jurists and put into practice
by particular states. Nationalists can take advantage o f the indeterminacy
o f international law to argue for new concepts of national rights, even when
they are not taken to be implicit in current doctrine by most commentators.
One jurist has called such attempts to reinterpret and extend international
law “enthusiastic legal literature,” because it is based not on the “actual
expectations and commitments of governments” but on the “incantations
of secular or religious morality.”81
Nevertheless, such arguments will probably continue to be made. But
it should at least be clear that the law as presently interpreted does not
warrant such an interpretation. Whether a reinterpretation is justified must

in the end be a question, not simply o f generalization from state practices,
but also o f “some consensus concerning what ought to happen” in
international relations.82If the notion o f national self-determination cannot
be found within international law as it currently exists, this does not mean
that it might not be accepted as such in the future. But for this to happen,
national self-determination must be legitimated in the same manner as other
political norms. This, it has been argued, is characteristic o f law in general
in any case, since “every branch of [legal] doctrine must rely tacitly if not
explicitly upon some picture o f the forms o f human association that are
right and realistic in the areas of social life with which it deals.”83
But just as reference to legal doctrine cannot provide any definitive
means for justifying a conception of national self-determination, it cannot
definitively exclude such a conception either. The nature o f legal disputa
tion is not in any essential way distinct from debate in political philosophy.
Any argument for a reconceptualization of rights or goods involves an
attempt to redefine the boundaries o f permissible discourse and action. To
evaluate the direction and necessity o f change in legal doctrine, we must go
beyond reference to precedent and interpretation. This may result in an
attempt to change the law in ways that accommodate new demands and
requirements; or it may reinvigorate the defense o f prevailing legal norms.84
The view that self-determination is a fundamental basis for other
international norms does not, by itself, justify the view that nations in
particular are entitled to that right and therefore to recognition as legitimate
actors in international law. The understanding o f self-determination that is
required is one that views the principle, not as a right o f political associa
tion, but as a “right of a community which has a distinct character to have
this character reflected in the institutions of government under which it
lives.” From this perspective, the rights o f peoples and nations both
“involve essentially the same idea.... The external participation o f culturally
distinct groups in the political process is essentially the same as that of
individual States in respect of the Law of Nations.”85
But to argue that nations and peoples ought to be regarded as essen
tially similar requires that they be recognized as being subject to the same
kind o f political oppression and that they are both capable o f possessing the
type o f political agency that can be recognized as consistent with other
tenets o f international law. To try and show why this cannot be the case, we
need to return to the two cases discussed earlier in this chapter.
78 Chapter 2
The Two Cases Reconsidered
First, consider what I regard as a legitimate case o f “national liberation” in

the postcolonial era—the Palestinian movement. O f course, as noted above,
the Palestinians have been accorded rights by the international community
—indeed, were the first “liberation movement” to have achieved this. But
this does not settle the matter, of course. One view of the relation between
historical struggles and international law is that the latter can only give a
“seal of approval” to historical struggles after they have succeeded—but
can in no case prescribe or condemn political solutions (especially after the
fact).86 However, as previously noted, international law has an indetermi
nacy that permits, indeed demands, that normative considerations take
primacy. This is because the interpretation o f international legal doctrine
requires principles to constrain or direct it in some way.
So, in answering the question about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
particular claim to self-determination, normative considerations must be
brought into play—in particular, as suggested above: (1) whether there is
a good case to be made for regarding a nation as oppressed or subjugated
in some way; and (2) whether this nation has achieved a political agency
that enables it to take actions to realize its putative claim to self-determina
tion.
Taking the first consideration, one might ask whether oppression means
simply the lack o f a state—as nationalists would argue—or the lack of
opportunity for political participation of any kind. To adopt the first
definition is to uncritically accept the nationalist program by simply
defining oppression as lack o f a nation-state. So the second definition
seems more appropriate, as well as in line with international legal doctrine.
Understood in this way, Palestinians can be viewed as an oppressed people
due to two factors: (1) the lack o f ability to participate in a political system
within the occupied territories and (2) the lack o f recognition of a “right of
return” for Palestinians outside o f the occupied territories by the Israeli
government. The first is clearly the case in light of the ongoing Israeli
military occupation o f the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and other areas (and has
not been fundamentally altered by the recent substitution o f a Palestinian
quasigovemmental “authority”); the second—a right o f return which has
been recognized in many international legal documents87—is clearly denied
by Israeli restrictions on travel and immigration by Palestinians.
In terms o f the second consideration—whether Palestinians have
political agency sufficient to make a claim of self-determination—the
ongoing recognition o f the Palestine Liberation Organization in interna

tional bodies, as well as the considerable attention devoted to the issue of
Palestinian self-determination throughout the international community in
the last fifty years, indicates the existence of a Palestinian political
identity.88 In addition, while the historical existence o f such an identity is
more controversial, there is increasing evidence that, at least in the early
years o f this century, it had coalesced—just in time for (or perhaps in
reaction to) the beginnings o f Zionist colonization o f Palestine.89
The case against Palestinian self-determination generally rests on two
points: (1) that self-determination is not an established principle in
international law and (2) that the Palestinians are not a people with a
distinct identity (i.e., that they are indistinguishable from Arabs in
surrounding countries). While the first point is true i f self-determination is
regarded as a principle applicable to nations in the ethnically defined sense,
it is not true o f political self-determination applied to peoples in the sense
discussed above. This is because, in this sense, self-determination is not
only compatible with international law, but is actually an extension o f its
central doctrines—in particular, that of political sovereignty.
The crucial question is whether the Palestinians then qualify as a people
that lacks sovereignty. While according to ethnic criteria they may lack
distinction from neighboring Arab populations, this is irrelevant, since the
defining characteristic o f peoples in international law is a distinctive
political (not ethnonational) identity. The disenfranchisement of the
Palestinian population (regardless o f whether a historical identity predates
this disenfranchisement) is sufficient to distinguish them from Egyptian,
Syrian, Jordanian, or Lebanese Arabs.
Nevertheless, it is fair to ask whether Palestinian self-determination
would be satisfied by a “Jordanian option”—that is, by the integration of
Palestinian populations within neighboring Arab states, principally Jordan.
Wouldn’t this achieve the goal o f political participation for Palestinians,
though not within a distinctive state? O f course, this option has already
been tried to a very limited extent, including within Israel, which has a
small number o f Arab Palestinian citizens (including representatives in the
Israeli parliament). But the question is whether this option constitutes a just
solution to the Palestinian question as a whole.
It must be admitted that, in theory, it would constitute a partial solution.
But in practice, such a solution requires the willingness of both states and
peoples to absorb the Palestinian population—a willingness o f which there
is no evidence. It is only a partial solution for the reason that, once a people
80 Chapter 2
attains political agency, its self-determination must generally be understood

in terms o f its political expression as a whole. This does not necessarily
mean that a separate state is required. But it probably means that the people
cannot be dispersed between five or more states, as would happen if this
option were exercised. Furthermore, the partiality of this solution is
evidenced by the fact that the Palestinian people is divided, not only
between several states, but also within disputed (“occupied”) territories,
refugee camps, and substantial, intact emigrant communities. In the face of
this dispersion, Palestinians have continued to assert a distinctive identity.
In fact, as some commentators have noted, a Palestinian identity is
above all else characterized by this simple survival o f a distinctive
presence.90 This presence is a result of the continued existence and
nomntegration o f the occupied territories into Israel and o f the refugee
camps into neighboring countries. Without a political consensus within
Israel to absorb the West Bank and Gaza Strip with its present population
and without the willing efforts of neighboring countries to resettle the
camps’ population within their borders— and without the acquiescence of
the Palestinians in these absorptions and resettlements—such a solution
becomes impossible.91
Now consider a second case—that of Lithuania—which is often
regarded as just as legitimate a case of self-determination as that of the
Palestinians. In this instance, we must first distinguish the legal from the
ethical justification for self-determination. Clearly, there is legal precedent
for the Lithuanian secession from the U.S.S.R. since, as a republic of the
Soviet Union, Lithuania had a right to secede according to the Soviet
constitution itself. But did it have a just case independent o f this legal
sanction (which the Soviet regime under Gorbachev still tried to deny)? I
would argue that it did not for the following two reasons: (1) it did not
suffer oppression or subjugation as a nation within the Soviet Union and (2)
it did not qualify as a people (i.e., as having political agency) as that is
understood in international law.92
Was Lithuania (and, by extension, the other Baltic republics o f Latvia
and Estonia—and perhaps other former Soviet republics as well) an
oppressed nation within the Soviet Union? Oppression here might mean
three things: (1) lack o f political rights compared to other Soviet (and in
particular, Russian) citizens, (2) subjection to cultural policies of
Russification, or (3) lack (or loss) of an independent Lithuanian state. In the
first case, there was no distinction between Lithuanians and other Soviet
citizens to be made. They might all be regarded as lacking certain political
rights under a Soviet dictatorship; or they might all be considered to have

had at least nominal rights of political participation, though perhaps not on
the model of multiparty representative democracy. But in either case, there
was no difference between Lithuanians and Russians or other ethnic groups
within the U.S.S.R.
Was Lithuania subject to Russification in terms of cultural, educational,
and/or demographic policies? This is unlikely in terms of Russian cultural
and educational policy, since such policy for the most part encouraged and
even subsidized non-Russian ethnic groups. On the other hand, Russian
resettlement from the Russian to the Lithuanian (and other Baltic) republics
was encouraged and has led some to argue that the Baltics were being
forcibly Russified. But even if this had been the case, would this be
sufficient warrant for a claim o f self-determination? It would be cause for
Lithuanians to claim violation of their cultural rights, as guaranteed in
international human rights documents. But it would not constitute political
oppression or subjugation, since Lithuanians were not further deprived of
political rights than other nationalities within the Soviet Union. This has
led one commentator to conclude that
The acts aimed at assimilation of the Baltic ethnic groups into the Soviet
Union and their sovietization justified their claims for cultural and ethnic
protection. These facts, however, did not justify their right of self-
determination to the extent of restoring their statehood93
Nevertheless, this does not mean that there might not be a point at which
the impact o f cultural and demographic change effected by the state would
constitute a reason for claiming self-determination, including secession.
Where would that point be? I would argue that two criteria would have to
obtain in order for this point to be reached: (1) the ability of the native
culture to continue to flourish would have to be endangered by the numbers
and impact o f new settlers and/or (2) the pattern o f settlement would
involve the forceful suppression of the existing culture in order to “make
room” for new settlements. Two examples of where such conditions might
obtain are the one just discussed—Palestine—and one to be discussed in
the next chapter—Tibet. But there is no evidence that these criteria were
met in Lithuania (or the other Baltic Soviet republics).
This then means that, unless Lithuanians were oppressed because they
did not have a state, they were not oppressed by the standards of interna
tional law and could not justifiably claim self-determination. As indicated
above, political oppression cannot be defined as the lack of a state, since
82 Chapter 2
this is inconsistent with international legal doctrine in various ways. But in

the Lithuanian case, there is an additional factor—the loss o f a formerly
independent state, specifically in 1940, when the Soviet Union formally
annexed Lithuania. Is this sufficient warrant for a claim o f self-determina
tion?
This is a complicated issue and relates also to the second consideration
in evaluating a claim o f self-determination—namely, does the group in
question have political agency sufficient to make such a claim? The loss of
a state by the Lithuanians might be—and has been—viewed as a historical
injustice. But is it such an injustice? Determining whether a country has
been illegitimately deprived of a state is a problem because, as Lea
Brilmayer has put it, there is no beginning point, no originally just state of
affairs, with which to compare present injustices.94 So the Lithuanians are
sometimes thought to have had just cause as a result o f the Soviet
annexation o f the country in 1940. Yet, this annexation was itself an
attempt to recover territory lost when the U.S.S.R. sued for peace with
Germany in 1918. Does Lithuania’s twenty years o f independence
legitimate its claim? Or does Russia’s wartime loss of a territory it had
ruled since 1796 justify its attempt to reassert its territorial integrity?
The latter case is perhaps strengthened by the extremely brief period in
which Lithuania was independent. Before Russia’s previous annexation o f
Lithuania in 1796, the country had been more or less ruled (sometimes as
a result of a political confederation) by Poland since 1385.95 Why, in light
o f this history, take 1920—and not 1796 or 1385—as the historical baseline
with which to judge what is the legitimate political authority in the
country? For instance, couldn’t Poland be said to have had as much “right”
as Russia or Lithuania itself to rule the territory—after all, the Lithuanians
(or their nobility, at any rate) voluntarily entered into federation with the
Poles (albeit in the fourteenth century).
This is where what Igor Grazin has called the “expiration o f aggression”
becomes important: at what point does an act o f political aggression cease
to be illegitimate—since history is full of such acts and international law
(and presumably political philosophy) must accommodate itself to them in
some fashion? At this point, the issue o f political agency becomes
important. If the act o f aggression is one that is o f continuing international
concern and one to which political resistance continues to be offered, then
it remains illegitimate.96 So if Lithuanians had offered continual resistance
to the Soviet Union and the international community had (throughout the
lifespan of the Soviet Union) regarded Lithuania as an occupied territory,
then the Lithuanians might be said to have had a just claim to self-
determination, at least on this basis.
But o f course that was not the case. All one need do is to compare the
Lithuanians to the Palestinians—whose claim to self-determination has
been recognized twenty-nine times by the U.N. alone in the last fifty
years—to realize that Lithuania was generally regarded (both by the
international community and by the inhabitants of the republics themselves)
as a part of the U.S.S.R., not as an occupied country.97 Undoubtedly the
reason for this was the fact that the population o f Lithuania was not
accorded any sort o f extraterritorial status—as are the inhabitants o f the
Palestinian “occupied territories”—but were incorporated fully within the
Soviet state. The Lithuanian example, in other words, is one in which the
inconsistency of nationalist claims to self-determination with other tenets
o f international law is apparent. Absent a clear case o f political oppression
(as well as ongoing resistance to it), any claim o f self-determination will be
disruptive of international practice and inconsistent with accepted standards
of determining when a legitimate case of “national liberation” exists.
A Consistency Problem
The idea o f justifying national self-determination on the basis o f the

equivalence o f nations and peoples to consideration by the international
community founders on the problem o f consistency between a right of
national self-determination and other major principles o f international law.
In order to preserve a modicum o f international stability and the basic
integrity of states (as the principal international actors), nations cannot be
considered on an equal footing with existing states. Were they to be
considered equivalent entities, few states would be able to argue for their
sovereignty over divergent national groups. Nationalities could claim the
right to disrupt or rearrange international boundaries in accordance with
their own definition o f national homelands. Self-determination can be
consistent with the fundamental norms o f political sovereignty and
territorial integrity only if it does not apply to nations as distinct from
peoples.
The essential traits and capacities of nations cannot be the foundation
o f a principle of self-determination that is congruent with widely agreed
upon principles o f international law. If there is to be a justification of
national self-determination, it must be one that is based on ethical, rather
84 Chapter 2
than legal, grounds. In particular, it must either be one that is broadly

consequentialist, in the sense that it is necessary in order to ensure goods
beneficial to the members of national groups, or one that is based on
specifically political norms such as democracy or community. The first
approach will be discussed in the next chapter, the second in chapters 4 and
5.
Notes
1. Charter o f the United Nations and Statute o f the International Court o f

Justice (New York: United Nations, 1989), Article 1, Section 2,3.
2. Charter o f the United Nations, Art. 55,30.
3. Heather Wilson, International Law and the Use o f Force by National
Liberation Movements (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 74. Two U.N. General
Assembly Resolutions in 1969 and 1973 (U.N.G.A. Res. 2535B [XXIV] and
3089D [XXVIII] marked this recognition of the Palestinians. For documentation
of the rationales for these resolutions and for the general U.N. approach to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, see Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights
of the Palestinian People, The Right o f Self-Determination o f the Palestinian
People (New York: United Nations, 1979), and W. Thomas Mallison and Sally V.
Mallison, An International Law Analysis ofthe Major United Nations Resolutions
Concerning the Palestine Question (New York: United Nations, 1979).
4. See Malvina Halberstam, “Nationalism and the Right to Self-
Determination: The Arab-Israeli Conflict,” New York University Journal o f
International Law and Politics 26, no. 1 (Fall 1993): 573-83.
5. W. Wentworth Ofuatey-Kodjoe, The Principle o f Self-Determination
in International Law (New York: Nellen Publishing Co., 1977), 157.
6. Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality o f Political Divorce from
Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991),
158-59. It might be more accurate, as some commentators have noted, to say that
Lithuania has a clear legal case, but not such a clear ethical case, for self-
determination (as a result of the recognition of the right of Soviet republics to
secede in the Soviet constitution).
7. Lung-chu Chen, “Self-Determination as a Human Right,'* in Michael
Reisman and Bums H. Weston (eds.), Toward World Order and Human Dignity:
Essays in Honor o f Myres S. McDougal (New York: Free Press, 1976), 242; see
also 210.
8. For Wilson, see his statement, quoted by Alfred Cobban, that, “The
equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it is to last must be an
equality of rights...” in Cobban, The Nation State andNational Self-Determination,
rev. ed. (New York: Crowell, 1970), 76.
9. For a general summary of the status of rights in international law, as

well as relevant human rights documents, see James W. Nickel, Making Sense o f
Human Rights: Philosophical Reflections on the “UniversalDeclaration o f Human
Rights ” (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
10. For a discussion of the distinction between justification in legal and
in political theory, see Virginia Held, “Justification: Legal and Political,” Ethics 86,
no. 1(Oct. 1975), mdRights and Goods: Justifying SocialAction (New York: Free
Press, 1984), esp. chs. 3,7, and 9.
11. Louis Henkin et al., International Law: Cases and Materials (Saint
Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1980), 211-12.
12. U.N.G.A. Res. 1514 (XV) (“Declaration on die granting of
independence to colonial countries and peoples”), Dec. 14,1960; U.N.G.A. Res.
1541 (XV) (“Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or
not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73e of
the Charter”), Dec. 15,1960.
13. United Nations, Resolutions adopted by the GeneralAssembly during
its Fifteenth Session, Vol. I (20 Sept.-20 Dec. 1960), Suppl. No. 16 (A/4684) (New
York, 1961), 66-67. For a comparison of the “revolutionary” resolution 1514with
the “evolutionary” 1541 (that is, in relation to the U.N. Charter's statements about
self-determination), see Michla Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and
Practice: The New Doctrine in the United Nations (Hague, Netherlands: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1982), 10-11.
14. See Wilson, Use o f Force by National Liberation Movements, 70, for
a list of subsequent U.N. General Assembly resolutions affirming self-
determination.
15. U.N.G.A. Res. 1573 (XV) and 1724 (XVI). See Wilson, Use o f Force
by National Liberation Movements, 65-67.
16. Wilson, Use o f Force by National Liberation Movements, 84. The
Katangan case will be discussed further below, in chap. 5.
17. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
and on Civil and Political Rights, are reprinted in Ian Brownlie (ed.), Basic
Documents in International Law, 2nded. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 150-86.
18. Wilson, Use o f Force by National Liberation Movements, 86.
19. Resolutions adopted by the GeneralAssembly during its Twenty-Fifth
Session (15 Sept.-17 Dec. 1970), Suppl. No. 28 (A/8028) (New York: United
Nations, 1971), 122-24.
20. “Namibia Advisory Opinion,” International Court o f Justice Reports
(1971), 31; “Western Sahara Advisory Opinion,” International Court o f Justice
Reports (1975), 32. For a discussion of these opinions, see Wilson, Use o f Force
by National Liberation Movements, 76-77.
21. See Wilson, Use o f Force by National Liberation Movements, 82-83,
for a discussion of the East Pakistan case.
22. For a discussion of the Algiers Declaration, see Richard N. Kiwanuka,
“The Meaning o f‘People* in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,”
86 Chapter 2
American Journal o f International Law 82 (1988), esp. 83.

23. On the Banjul Charter, see Kiwanuka, “Meaning of ‘People* in the
African Charter,” passim.
24. Harry Beran, “Who Should Be Entitled to Vote in Self-Determination
Referenda?” in M. Warner and R. Crisp (eds.), Terrorism, Protest, and Power
(London: Edward Elgar, 1990), 152.
25. Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1958), 56.
26. Rupert Emerson, “Self-Determination,” American Journal o f
International Law 65 (1971), 463.
27. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Self-Determination in International Law, 25.
28. Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy o f Self-Determination
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978), 16.
29. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Self-Determination in International Law, 30-31.
30. Though perhaps this has changed somewhat; see, for instance, the
discussion of uses of the concept of “ethnic cleansing” in the former Yugoslavia
in Henry Kamm, “Yugoslav Refugee Crisis Europe’s Worst since 40’s,” New York
Times, July 24, 1992.
31. See especially Chen, “Self-Determination as a Human Right,” 244; as
well as Lung-chu Chen, “Self-Determination: An Important Dimension of the
Demand for Freedom,” American Societyfor International Law Proceedings 75
(1981); Istvan Bibo, The Paralysis o f International Institutions and the Remedies:
A Study o f Self-Determination, Concord among the Major Powers, and Political
Arbitration (New York: Wiley, 1976); Ian Brownlie, “The Rights of Peoples in
Modem International Law,” in James Crawford (ed.), The Rights o f Peoples
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Kiwanuka, “Meaning o f‘People’ in the African
Charter”; Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Self-Determination in International Law, and Gebre
Hiwet Tesfagiorgis, “Self-Determination: Its Evolution and Practice by the United
Nations and Its Application to the Case of Eritrea,” Wisconsin International Law
Journal 6 (1987). It must be emphasized, however, that these scholars are
uniformly cautious in suggesting that the right of self-determination may be
extended to nationalities, and that virtually all the other legal sources and scholars
mentioned in this chapter concur in noting that nations as such do not have a right
of self-determination. This idea is much more commonly formulated as an ethical
imperative (which would mandate the extension of current interpretations of the
international law of self-determination to nations) by various philosophers cited in
this and subsequent chapters.
33. Gerald Fitzmaurice, quoted in Henkin, International Law, 211.
34. Leo Gross, “The Right of Self-Determination in International Law,”
in M. Kilson (ed.), New States in the Modem World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
35. U. O. Umozurike, Self-Determination in International Law (Hamden,
Conn.: Archon Books, 1972), 271.
36. Chen, “Self-Determination as a Human Right,” 225.

37. Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice, 12.
38. Tesfagiorgis, “Self-Determination,” 88.
39. See Patricia Carley, Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial
Integrity, and the Right to Secession, report from a Roundtable held in conjunction
with the U.S. Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff (Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace, 1996), 4; and Allen Buchanan, “Self-
Determination, Secession, and the Rule of Law,” in Robert McKim and Jeff
McMahan (eds.), The Morality o f Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997), 308.
40. Antonio Cassese, “The Self-Determination of Peoples,” in Louis
Henkin (ed.), The International Bill o f Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 97-98.
41. Emerson, “Self-Determination,” 466.
42. Cassese, “Self-Determination of Peoples,” 98-100.
43. Cassese, “Self-Determination of Peoples,” 101.
44. Brownlie, “Rights of Peoples,” 5; Wilson, Use o f Force by National
Liberation Movements, 80; Tesfagiorgis, “Self-Determination,” 80.
45. Tesfagiorgis, “Self-Determination,” 79 (italics added).
48. Malcolm Shaw, “The International Status of National Liberation
Movements,” Liverpool Law Review 5 (1983): 21.
51. Kiwanuka, “Meaning of‘People* in the African Charter,” 88-89. This
stipulation is presumably given because the issue of self-government would be the
same for all parts of a non-self-governing territory. In addition, it ensures
compatibility with the basic international legal principle of the territorial integrity
of states—including potential new states.
52. Hans Kelsen, quoted in Buchheit, Secession, 131; see also Brownlie,
“Rights of Peoples,” 11.
53. U.N.G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII) and 3201 (S-VI).
54. Kiwanuka, “Meaning of ‘People’ in the African Charter,” 99.
55. Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Document o f the
Copenhagen Meeting o f the Conference on the Human Dimension, June 29,1990
(reproduced by the U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C.). For an influential
argument that a “right to democracy” has been recognized in international law, see
Thomas Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Self-Governance in
International Law,” American Journal o f International Law 86 (Jan. 1992): 46-91.
57. U.N.G.A. Res. 1747 (XVI); see Wilson, Use o f Force by National
Liberation Movements, 8 If., for a discussion of the Southern Rhodesian case.
58. Wilson, Use o f Force by National Liberation Movements, 82-84.
88 Chapter 2
59. Kiwanuka, “Meaning o f‘People’ in the African Charter,” 90.

61. Cassese, “Self-Determination of Peoples,” 94,101. Whether a state
recognizes its nationalities or not seems to be a matter of historical
contingency—particularly of whether a federal state system organized along
ethnonational lines was adopted at some point—rather than principle. But this does
not mean that any general justification for national rights can be derived from the
fact that some states have, for contingent reasons, recognized such rights in the
past.
62. International Commission of Jurists, The Events o f East Pakistan
(1972): 70 (cited in Tesfagiorgis, “Self-Determination,” 88).
63. Kiwanuka, “Meaning o f‘People* in the African Charter,” 94.
64. Cassese, “Self-Determination of Peoples,” 96.
65. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Self-Determination in International Law, 159. The
recognition of Israel by the international community in the late 1940s would seem
to be an exception to this rule.
66. Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The
Accommodation o f Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1990), 48-49.
67. Henkin, International Law, 211-12.
68. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Self-Determination in International Law, 157-58.
70. Louis Henkin, “The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly
Exaggerated,” American Journal o f International Law 65 (1971), 544.
Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 53.
72. Stanley French and Andres Gutman, “The Principle of National Self-
Determination,” in Virginia Held, Sidney Morgenbesser, and Thomas Nagel (eds.),
Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1974), 147; Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Self-Determination in International Law, 189.
73. Yehuda Z. Blum, “Reflections on the Changing Concept of Self-
Determination,” Israel Law Review 10 (1975): 511 (quoted in Pomerance, Self-
Determination in Law and Practice, 9).
74. Bibo, Paralysis o f International Institutions, 75.
75. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1986), 90. As to the question of limits, Dworkin writes that “Law
cannot flourish as an interpretive enterprise in any community unless there is
enough initial agreement about what practices are legal practices” (90-91). Such
agreement is possible, he believes, because “In fact we have no difficulty
identifying collectivcly the practices that count as legal practices in our own
culture” (91, italics added). The limits on interpretation more generally are to be
found in the principles underlying a particular legal system—principles that are
basic to the nature of the political community of which that legal system is a part.
76. This lack of international legal institutions has been taken by
international “realists” as evidence that international law is an impossibility (or at

least, an irrelevance); see, e.g., David Fromkin, TheIndependence o f Nations (New
York: Praeger, 1981), 77. However, international law can also be viewed more
positively as constituting a form of “normative initiative” through which the
uninhibited actions of states can be limited; see Richard Falk, The Promise o f
World Order: Essays in Normative International Relations (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1987), esp. 202. It should be noted that Dworkin, who is
optimistic about the possibility of consensual legal interpretation (see note 75,
above) does not mention international law in Law’s Empire.
77. Andrea Hanneman, in “Independence and Group Rights in the Baltics:
A Double Minority Problem,” Virginia Journal o f International Law 35 (1995),
writes that
Because [of] positive law’s uncertainty regarding the group right of

autonomy, a more normative theory may identify the circumstances and the
extent to which the right should be given effect. Examining moral
arguments is particularly helpful because [the] legal theory of group rights
is so controversial. (502)
78. Henkin, International Law, 212.

79. Wilson, Use o f Force by National Liberation Movements, 10-11.
80. Judge Tanaka (International Court of Justice), quoted in Self-
Determination o f Palestinian People, 9; Wilson, Use o f Force by National
Liberation Movements, 9.
81. Brownlie, “Rights of Peoples,” 14-15.
82. Buchheit, Secession, 32.
83. Robert M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 8.
84. In this connection, see the concept of “enlarged doctrine” in Unger,
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 16; also, for a defense of the adequacy of current
international law in enunciating principles limiting the range of state power, see
Jeremy Brecher, “‘The National Question’ Reconsidered from an Ecological
Perspective,” New Politics 1 (New Series/Summer 1987): 95-112.
85. Brownlie, “Rights of Peoples,” 5-6.
86. Buchheit, for instance, writes the following: ‘The international jurist
can act only as historian, chronicling instances of valid claims to self-determination
after they succeed but unable to offer an opinion concerning their legitimacy before
they reach, or fail to reach, fruition” (Secession, 45).
87. Edward W. Said, The Question o f Palestine (1979; reprint, New York:
Vintage Books, 1992), 48.
88. As Said writes in The Question o f Palestine,
there is ample evidence to show that taken altogether as members of a

community whose common experience is dispossession, exile, and the
90 Chapter 2
absence of any territorial homeland, the Palestinian people has not

acquiesced in its present lot. Rather the Palestinians have repeatedly
insisted on their right of return, their desire for the exercise of self-
determination, and their stubborn opposition to Zionism as it has affected
them. (47)
89. See Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction o f Modem

National Consciousness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).
90. Said, Question o f Palestine, 47; Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, ch. 8.
91. For consideration of other options, see Tomis Kapitan (ed.),
Philosophical Perspectives on thelsraeli-Palestinian Conflict (Armonk, N. Y.: M.
E. Sharpe, 1997).
92. One scholar who agrees with this critique, though on different grounds
(primarily of the deleterious consequences of secessions and partitions generally),
is Robert Schaeffer, in his book Warpaths: The Politics o f Partition (New York:
Hill & Wang, 1990).
93. Igor Grazin, ‘The International Recognition of National Rights: The
Baltic States’ Case,” Notre Dame Law Review 66 (1991): 1398.
94. Lea Brilmayer, “Groups, Histories, and International Law,” Cornell
International Law Journal 25, no. 3 (1992 symposium): 559.
95. Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran, “The Legitimacy of Lithuania’s Claim
for Secession,” Boston University International Law Journal 10 (1992): 36.
96. Grazin writes that
Though I am unable to determine what the exact term of expiration is, there
may be more or less distinct temporal instances when this actual expiration
starts. For practical reasons, it may be admitted that this term starts after
considerable resistance to the occupation ceases to exist or...when the fact
of an occupation of territory in question ceases to be of international
political interest or concern. (“International Recognition of National
Rights,” 1404)
It should be noted that Grazin comes to the opposite conclusion from the one here
with regard to Lithuania.
97. William T. Webb, “The International Legal Aspects of the Lithuanian
Secession,” Journal o f Legislation 17 (1991): 316.
Chapter 3
Cultural Rights and the Ethics of

Self-Determination
Beneath all the ideological clothes of the nation, however, the most
physical reality is the state. One is almost tempted to say: it is the body of
the nation; but of course it is more; it is, unfortunately, virtually the soul
of the nation as well.
— Robert Musil, “‘Nation’ as Ideal and Reality”
An Ethical Justification for National Self-Determination
While self-determination cannot be justified as a formal (or legal) right of

nations, this does not exhaust the possibilities for providing an ethical
argument for it. It is conceivable that an instrumental or co n seq u en tial
argument could be made and in fact one has recently been put forward,
most notably by the philosopher Joseph Raz, along with other figures such
as Avishai Margalit and Yael Tamir.1This chapter will examine in detail
the ways in which they attempt to argue first, that nationality is morally
significant because o f its instrumental value for the realization o f certain
social goods and second, that nations may accordingly claim a right o f self-
determination on consequentialist grounds.2
In the last chapter, the idea that nations might legitimately claim rights
on the basis of their formal equivalence to peoples in international law was
shown to be false. This was largely the result o f an inconsistency between
the claims that nations put forward with the standing body o f international
legal doctrine, especially that concerned with peaceful relations between
states. I concluded that there could be no formal justification of national
self-determination based on an extension o f the existing rights of peoples,
properly understood.
91
92 Chapter 3
Yet, it may still be the case that nations could legitimately claim a right
o f self-determination—not on the basis o f the formal character o f such a
right, but because such a right contributes to human well-being. This type
o f justification is, broadly speaking, consequentialist in that it is based on
a general assessment o f the value o f membership in groups for human well
being and the necessity o f a right of self-determination in order to ensure
the well-being o f these groups. What needs to be demonstrated for this to
be the case is that the political independence o f nations materially
contributes to human freedom and well-being. This issue is most often dealt
with in terms of arguments that the good o f a nation contributes to the good
of its members as individuals. The connection between the good of
(individual) persons and the rights o f nations begins with the assertion that
one aspect of individuals’ freedom is their need to identify themselves with
distinct groups of persons.3
This purported need for group identification as an aspect o f individual
freedom entails a further need for the recognition o f these identities.
Recognition in this sense has two aspects. First, the members of a group
must be able to recognize each other in order to assert their common
identity. Without a right to engage in this process o f recognition, individu
als cannot freely form their identities. But a second dimension of the need
for the recognition o f identity is that groups must themselves be recognized
by other groups for their members to be able to live their lives in accor
dance with their perceived identities.4
The need of individuals to be recognized as members o f groups is
therefore seen as essential to the realization o f the very humanity of
individuals. R ecognition o f groups— specifically, national
groups— accordingly becomes a necessary feature o f what it means for
persons to be free.5 The political aspect o f this individual need for
recognition is a corresponding need o f groups to determine what their
political status as groups will be (that is, with which state they will be
affiliated).6
One way in which national self-determination is justified in this way is
to base it, not on the moral agency o f national groups, but on their right to
a culture and life o f their own. One contemporary exponent of this idea,
Yael Tamir, expresses the idea o f national self-determination as a cultural
right in terms of the need for a culture to have a “public sphere” of its own:
A right to culture...entails the right to a public sphere in which individuals

can share a language, memorise the past, cherish their heroes, live a
fulfilling national life.... This demand for a public sphere in which the
Cultural Rights and the Ethics of Self-Determination 93
cultural aspects of national life come to the fore constitutes the essence of
the right to national self-determination.7
Contemporary movements for cultural rights are often found among

nationalities that have at various times been denied the right to practice
their culture openly—the Kurds in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, the
Basques in Spain, die Tibetans in China, and so forth. Yet, though such
nationalities sometimes also contain nationalist political movements
advocating statehood and self-determination, this does not mean that
national self-determination is itself a cultural right.
In international law, cultural rights have been recognized as pre
eminently the rights of cultural minorities in relation to majority cultures
in multicultural countries. As such, minorities are entitled to the same
rights o f expression, organization, and association as the majority culture.
This means that claims of cultural rights are addressed to existing states,
rather than being expressed as claims to new states.8
The rights o f cultural minorities are therefore not in principle or in
international practice the rights o f nations to states. They are, rather, the
rights o f minorities—which may be nationalities9—to freedom o f cultural
expression. It is symptomatic of this that nationalist movements exist in the
minority cultures of a number of countries regardless of the fact that these
countries already grant full cultural rights to their minorities (for instance,
India or Canada).
But the nationalist argument for self-determination distinguishes the
attainment of minority rights from that of nation-states. On this view, self-
determination is necessary because the possession by nations o f their own
states is the best way that national groups can protect a culture and life of
their own. An influential statement of this view is given by Avishai
Margalit and Joseph Raz in their article, “National Self-Determination”
(1990), and their ideas will be examined in detail below. But it might be
worthwhile first to briefly consider two cases of what a “right to culture”
might amount to, if it is considered as something more than an individual’s
right to express their cultural identity. It will be important to keep in mind
two goods that are supposedly served by this right to culture: what I will
call those of “cultural survival” and “cultural enjoyment.” In the first case,
the continued existence of a set o f cultural practices is what is at issue. In
the second case, it is the ability of a culture to exhibit their identity
politically (through state practices of various kinds) that is at stake.
94 Chapter 3
Two Cases: Tibet and Quebec
Perhaps the paramount case in which cultural survival has become an issue
in the contemporary period is that o f Tibet. This supposedly autonomous
region o f China, which had been nominally independent prior to 1950, was
militarily occupied by China in that year and, thereafter, subjected to
policies designed to integrate Tibet into China more fully, including the
attempted eradication o f Tibetan Buddhist religious practices (which were
also political practices, given the theocratic state existent prior to that time).
The politicoreligious authority in Tibet, the Dalai Lama, at first
attempted accommodation with the Chinese state (through the 1950s); but
he ultimately opted for a govemment-in-exile. This government has
advocated various solutions based on a claim o f self-determination, ranging
from regional autonomy to a separate state. The crucial question is whether
their claims need be framed in terms o f a principle o f national self-
determination or whether they could be justified conditionally, based on a
pattern of discrimination or oppression by the Chinese government.
The question o f cultural survival has sometimes also been applied to the
case o f the French population in the Canadian province o f Quebec, which
has sporadically supported a policy o f secession from Canada.10However,
in this case, I would argue that cultural survival in the sense in which it is
discussed with reference to Tibet is not applicable to Quebec. Rather, a
conception o f cultural enjoyment, in which the claim o f a group to be able
to practice its culture within a space (or territory) in which no other cultural
practices are allowed is what is at stake."
In Quebec, nationalist demands for a separate state have not been the
result of the oppression o f a French minority. In fact, the Canadian
government has instituted policies designed to ensure that French and
English cultures and languages have equal standing throughout the country
(and not just in Quebec). But a multicultural policy o f supporting cultural
diversity within the country has not been deemed sufficient by nationalists
to ensure the full flourishing o f Quebe9ois culture.
The basic question raised by these and other cases is whether a right to
culture provides an ethical warrant for a distinctive principle of national
self-determination. This requires first distinguishing different types of
rights (including cultural rights), and then determining what if anything is
to be gained by adding a right o f national self-determination to already
existing principles o f human rights, including rights to nationality and to
cultural expression.
A Moral Right of Nations?
Before moving directly to the question o f how a right o f national self-

determination could be justified consequentially, it is worth considering
what kind o f right self-determination would be when it is claimed by
nations. The most important considerations in terms o f the type o f right
national self-determination could be are: (1) whether it is a positive or
negative right; (2) in what sense it is a collective or group right; and (3) the
way(s) in which cultural rights are distinct from political rights.
Positive rights are rights in which definite actions by others are required
for the right o f a claimant to be realized. Negative rights are rights in which
the simple forbearance of others is sufficient to allow a claimant their
rights.12 Is national self-determination then a negative or positive right?
Some nationalists write as if their claim to self-determination were a
negative right—one to be exercised without interference. David Copp
makes this view explicit:
The right of self-determination would be the right of a nation not to be

interfered with in forming or maintaining an independent national state if
it should choose to do so.... [I]t would be an active negative claim right.
If any nation has this right and chooses to form or maintain a state, then
other existing states and individuals have a duty not to interfere.13
Yet, this does not settle the matter. To evaluate the claim that national self-
determination is a negative right, the assumption that it is equivalent to a
right o f noninterference must also be evaluated. And this does not seem to
be the case.
In the related instance of minority rights, it seems clearer that the rights
claimed are positive rights. The reason is that action must be taken by a
state for the right to be exercised. Rita Hauser writes o f this case that
Group demands for recognition and sustenance...[by] their nature...are

demands for protection or elevation of the whole group as determined by
extrinsic characteristics: race, language, ethnicity, or religion. They look
toward positive action by the state, rather than non-interference in the life
of the individual.14
While the case o f minority rights is not the same as that o f national rights,
there are important similarities, deriving to some extent from their both
being cases o f group rights. The similarities turn out to be, upon reflection,
more important than the differences in determining whether national rights
96 Chapter 3
are negative or positive.

Is national self-determination primarily a right o f noninterference (a
negative right) or one o f recognition (a positive right)? The answer to this
question is itself a contested matter between those sympathetic to and those
hostile to nationalist claims. For the former, self-determination tends to be
seen as a matter o f allowing certain national groups to “go their own way”
or decide for themselves whether they want a state.15 But for critics o f
nationalism, such a view o f the matter is not accurate.
It is the role o f the international community, and particularly o f the
diplomatic recognition (or the withholding o f such recognition) o f new
states, that seems to be missing from the nationalist view o f self-determina
tion as a negative right. Such recognition has usually been essential for the
viability o f new states. In the case o f self-determination, international
recognition has often made the difference between successful and
unsuccessful attempts.16
A right can only be one premised on the noninterference of others if it
is possible to exercise one’s right without interfering with others.17 Thus,
an individual may claim the right to perform an action without interference
from others because its performance will not affect other persons.
This is not, and cannot be, the case with nations and states. In fact, if
anything, it is the reverse: too many nations have conflicting claims over
territoiy and resources that, if realized, would entail interference with other
nations or states. The realization o f any rights-claim the purpose o f which
is to establish independent nation-states must do so through a disruption o f
existing political and territorial arrangements.
Thus, a justification for such a rearrangement must be a justification for
a duty of existing states to adjust their boundaries and sovereignties so as
to enable the creation o f these new nation-states. That is to say, it must be
the justification o f a positive general right that is to be facilitated by the
relevant parties and that is acknowledged as legitimate by all others.
As a positive right, national self-determination is regarded, e.g., by Raz,
as being essentially a collective or group right. The basic idea is that
collective rights exist because collective goods exist: “If collective goods
such as membership in a society are intrinsically valuable, then it is to be
expected that they provide the source both o f personal goals and of
obligations to others.”18
Groups have the right to appropriate the conditions necessary for their
existence as a group because collective goods have an intrinsic value that
is independent o f their role in implementing individual goals: ‘T he notion
o f collective rights...[i]n pointing to aspects o f the personal sense of
identity which are inextricably bound up with the existence of communities

and their common culture. ..recognizes die intrinsic value o f some collective
goods.’*19 The significance of conceiving o f collective rights as rights of
appropriation is that a model of private property rights is used to justify
collective social rights. The problems with this approach will be discussed
below.
Finally, considering national self-determination as a cultural rather than
a political right requires some clarification. Ostensibly, self-determination
is a political right inasmuch as it concerns the claims of various groups to
self-rule or self-government But, when claims for self-determination are
made by nations, which are themselves groups that are defined culturally
and not politically, the matter gets more complicated. In addition, there is
the possibility that, since self-determination is a means of realizing a right
o f individuals to inclusion in a political decision-making process, already
existent (in the sense of internationally recognized) rights o f self-rule and
citizenship can secure such an end without reference to specifically national
rights.
But the idea o f self-government actually includes two very different
concepts—on the one hand, that of the self-rule o f a people without
external interference, and on the other hand, the self-rule of a nation
independent of other peoples or national groups. Thus, self-determination
has been said to have two versions corresponding to these two meanings of
self-government—a “democratic” version and a “cultural” version.20These
two versions are “distinct concepts...representing two distinct human goods
and deriving their value from different human interests.”21
In fact, Yael Tamir maintains that the crucial claim in self-determination
is not that of self-rule but that of the protection of distinct groups and their
ways o f life:
at the core of the right of national self-determination, lies a cultural rather

than a political claim. The right to national self-determination is the right
of a nation to preserve its existence as a unique social group. This right
is distinct from the right of individuals to govern their lives and to
participate in a free and domestic political process.22
National groups would preserve their existence by securing a “public

space” in which one “can live in accordance with the customs and the
traditions o f [a] people.” 23
This “cultural” sense o f self-determination needs to be distinguished
from the idea o f cultural rights prevalent in international law. In the legal
98 Chapter 3
doctrines o f international human rights, the idea o f “cultural rights” does

not include a right o f statehood for nations. Cultural rights, as Jack
Donnelly maintains, refer to claims by minority communities—against an
existing government—“to preserve their distinctive culture” and to protect
aspects of personal dignity that are based on membership in a cultural
community.”24
But the principle o f national self-determination, when it is understood
to be a right of cultural groups, is quite different. It becomes a right o f those
groups to states, rather than to protection from or consideration by existing
states. Why is the state deemed to be important in this way? It is because
of what Tamir calls the “cultural essence of the state”:25
When one can identify one’s own culture in the political framework, when
political institutions reflect familiar norms of behavior, traditions, and
historical interpretations, one’s conception of oneself as a creator, or at
least a carrier, of a valuable set of beliefs, is reinforced.26
“Encompassing Groups” and Well-Being
When national self-determination is justified instrumentally as a right o f

cultural groups, the justification derives from establishing connections
between human well-being and particular facts or states o f affairs. These
facts or states are to be regarded as goals, from which rights may be
derived. One such fact or state o f affairs is the existence o f groups with
distinctive cultures.
Margalit and Raz refer to such entities as “encompassing groups.” They
state that
The right to self-determination derives from the value of membership in

encompassing groups.... It rests on an appreciation of the great importance
that membership in and identification with encompassing groups has in
the life of individuals, and the importance of the prosperity and self-
respect of such groups to the well-being of their members.27
So self-determination is based on the idea that encompassing groups are

vitally important for the well-being o f their members. In fact, an even
stronger contention is made: that without membership in encompassing
groups, it may be hard for individuals to live satisfying lives. Certainly, it
is claimed, such membership will generally make it easier to do so. This
contention derives from the point referred to above that the world is in fact
made up largely o f encompassing groups: “It may be no more than a brute

fact that our world is organized in a large measure around groups with
pervasive cultures. But it is a fact with far-reaching consequences.”28
What then are encompassing groups? Margalit and Raz suggest six
characteristics that distinguish these groups from other collective entities.
First, such groups have a common character as defined by their cultural
mores, aesthetic styles, distinct languages or dialects, and patterns of
everyday life. These features o f what, for example, might be a “national
character” tend to coalesce into a “cultural tradition” that embodies these
features.29 Second, this common character of encompassing groups tends
to “encompass” individuals through a process o f socialization into the
dominant cultural tradition o f the group. While this process o f socialization
is not always successful, it by and large exercises its influence on
individuals who grow up within the scope o f influence o f the group.
Without this process o f socialization, people cannot realize their capacities
as successfully. This is the result o f the fact that since “[m]ost people live
in groups o f these kinds...those who belong to none are denied full access
to the opportunities that are shaped in part by the group’s culture.”30
The third feature o f encompassing groups is their capacity to identify
those individuals deemed members through a process o f “mutual recogni
tion.” While encompassing groups are not formal organizations, an
individual’s conformity with prevailing cultural norms is usually a
sufficient ground for recognition as a member o f the group.31 The fourth
feature of encompassing groups is that membership in these groups is an
important sign ofpersonal identity. This means that the process o f mutual
recognition becomes a process o f se//-recognition as well.32 Membership
in encompassing groups therefore serves as an important indicator “for
people generally in interpreting the conduct of others,” since membership
is a principal way in which people identify themselves to themselves.
It is also important, fifth, to note that encompassing groups are not
defined by measures o f achievement or excellence, but by a more intangible
process of belonging to a group with common habits, tastes, and inclina
tions. Similarly, the marks o f social class do not serve to distinguish any
particular encompassing group, since despite a commonality in occupation
and income, collectivities identified by achievement or occupation cannot
engender a common culture o f “belonging.”33 Finally, the size o f a group
is important, since an encompassing group is inevitably larger than any
group defined by personal acquaintance or actual encounters. Groups based
on familiarity identify their members through particular relationships, while
encompassing groups are able to do so through more anonymous indicators
100 Chapter 3
of identity—and through the ascription of these qualifying indicators to

strangers.34
There are two ways to regard Margalit and Raz’s general claims
concerning encompassing groups. On the one hand, the idea that individu
als need to live in groups, and that there is a need for these groups to be
respected in order for their members to live satisfying lives, is relatively
uncontroversial. On the other hand, the very obviousness o f the description
o f this type o f group and its relation to individuals begs some important
questions. Above all, there is little demonstration that specifically
encompassing groups play any essential role in the lives o f individuals.
Margalit and Raz admit both that some individuals live outside o f such
groups and that there are other types o f groups within which individuals
live. For instance, why couldn’t some people live a satisfying life in a
small-scale community, without having, or even wanting, membership in
a larger encompassing group? Or why couldn’t someone identify with their
social class, occupational role, or some other type o f affiliation without
feeling at a loss in the absence of ties to an encompassing group?
In Margalit and Raz’s account, the purported necessity o f encompassing
groups for individual well-being depends to a great extent on the idea that
encompassing groups play a central role in the socialization of the young.
Now there is undoubtedly much truth to this claim, understood in a general
way. Certainly, the inculcation of cultural traditions in the young is a large
part of how they are socialized to live in a wider world.
Margalit and Raz’s specific claim, however, is that most people are
socialized through the absorption o f the mores o f a dominant encompassing
group—even if they are not members o f that group. But this cannot
possibly be true in general, since numerous multicultural societies exist
where processes o f socialization nevertheless do occur. In such societies,
significant portions o f the population are not socialized within the dominant
culture, nor is there sometimes even a dominant group whose culture serves
as the basis for socialization.35 The point is that in societies where a
polyglot culture is the norm, socialization through secular educational
systems and/or syncretic patterns o f child-rearing and cultural expression
are also the norm. What necessity can we then attribute to the idea that
encompassing groups constitute any kind o f prerequisite for the well-being
of individuals?
There is also a converse problem: if, in fact, an encompassing group
does dominate the child-rearing and educational systems o f a given country
and is able to propagate its culture in a variety o f ways, then why are claims
for national self-determination necessary for this purpose? If invoking a
right of self-determination is supposed to protect encompassing groups, yet

such groups are often able to propagate their distinctive cultures, what need
is there for such a right?
By focusing on the ways in which encompassing groups socialize the
young as a constitutive element in defining such groups, Margalit and Raz
place themselves in a quandary. On the one hand, if such groups exist and
are able to protect their cultures sufficiently to socialize the young, then
they would seemingly have no need for a special right o f self-determina
tion. On the other hand, if they are unable to propagate their cultural
traditions through socialization, they would therefore also be unable to
maintain that they are in feet an encompassing group and, consequently,
could not claim any right to self-determination.
A standard response to this dilemma would be to argue that groups have
such a right when they are persecuted, discriminated against, or op
pressed—when particular conditions obtain that disrupt or destroy a
group’s capacity for cultural expression. But, as we will see below,
Margalit and Raz maintain that a group’s legitimate claim to self-determi
nation both is and is not a function o f the group’s persecution by others.36
Persecution cannot, in and o f itself, constitute a basis for a claim to self-
determination. Such a claim must have a stronger foundation than that in
order to be a general or universal right. The suppression o f the socializing
institutions of an encompassing group thus would not seem to be reason
enough to warrant a claim of self-determination (for such claims must apply
even where the institutions o f groups have not been suppressed).
Aside from the necessity o f encompassing groups and the generality of
their claims, there is the issue o f whether the argument for the claims of
encompassing groups implies a definition o f these groups that is necessarily
“ethnonational.” Certainly Margalit and Raz deny that their argument
applies exclusively to ethnonational groups; but is this disingenuous? They
contend that the following types o f groups can (but may not always) qualify
as encompassing groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious groups, social
classes, racial groups.37 But note that any o f these groups must, in order to
be encompassing groups, be capable o f “nationhood.” So we are back to
the question o f whether, in order for a claim o f self-determination to be
justified, nations can be defined as any o f these groups listed above—or
more strictly as ethnonational groups only.
Note that we cannot remain on the nominalistic ground o f allowing any
definition o f nationality that is asserted— i f a claim o f self-determination
is also to be asserted. Politicizing national identity forces a choice: which
groups are national and which are not (and therefore also not entitled to
102 Chapter 3
states o f their own)? O f course, this politicizing element is intrinsic to

Margalit and Raz’s theory: the theory is one of self-determination, not
merely o f defining a sociological entity called “encompassing groups.”
Do the five examples of encompassing groups listed above all clearly
qualify as such, as well as being able to make a claim o f self-determina
tion? Encompassing groups are not “small face-to-face groups,” where most
members of the group are known to one another.38 Tribes, however, are
such face-to-face groups; therefore, they must be excluded from the
category. Social classes, Margalit and Raz note on the following page,
cannot claim self-determination, for reasons that they do not specify there.39
The reason could be that classes do not share a character or culture in the
way that encompassing groups must; or that classes cannot legitimately
claim territory—a necessary aspect o f the principle o f self-
determination40—since they could never have a right to any particular
region or country, exclusive of other classes that inhabit it.
What about racial or religious groups? Note that the issue is not whether
races or religions are encompassing groups—only “racial groups” or
“religious groups.” What’s the difference? Just as social classes cannot
claim self-determination, races or religions cannot do so: they invariably
include multiple characters and cultures (namely, as “racial minorities” or
“religious sects” within different societies); and, they exist unattached to
a particular place (but rather to racial traits or religious doctrines). To the
extent that races or religions take on a particularistic—cultural and/or
territorial—aspect, they become groups. But then they are no longer
distinct from ethnic groups, since the racial or religious marks of identity
serve simply to delineate a particular relation of consanguinity.41 Encom
passing groups, therefore, must be ethnonational groups.
The Right to Decide
Now, given this specification of “really existing” encompassing groups,

how do Margalit and Raz argue that they have the capacity to make moral
claims, in particular, to self-determination? What gives these groups such
a capacity? It is here that Margalit and Raz assert that the essence of a
claim o f self-determination concerns not the substance of well-being in a
material sense but the “right to decide” about the conditions of well-being
for a group.42
If there is a core to the idea that self-determination is a moral right, it is
that the well-being of persons includes the capacity of an encompassing
group to decide about crucial issues concerning their own well-being. This
means that the conception o f a moral claim or right is equated with a
certain idea of self-government. Ultimately, we will need to consider the
relation between encompassing groups and their capacity for, and right to,
self-government before further aspects o f the notion o f a moral claim to
self-determination can be taken up. But, initially, it is worth considering in
some more detail the idea that encompassing groups have a “right to
decide” about matters concerning their own governance.
This idea o f the “right to decide” should not be construed to be an
extension of the political value o f democratic legitimacy. It is rather a right
stemming directly from the purported need o f groups to maintain their own
cultural traditions and lifeworlds. In this regard, Margalit and Raz separate
political action from the more general public life that sustains people’s
identities: ‘T o the extent that a person’s well-being is bound up with his
identity as a member o f an encompassing group it has an important public
dimension. But that dimension is not necessarily political in the conven
tional narrow sense o f the term.” 43
Political expression in the form o f a right to self-government is justified
in terms o f the protection of the cultural life o f groups—but this is not to
give it a basis in political values. Neither the value o f political participation
as a particular form o f experience, nor the idea o f democratic rule as a
universal entitlement, can constitute a justification for national self-
determination. The justification is rather that statehood must remain an
option for groups in order for them to have the means o f enhancing or
protecting their cultural identities.
The “right to decide” that Margalit and Raz defend as necessary for the
“culture and self-respect” of encompassing groups is therefore the right to
decide about the legitimacy o f boundaries and sovereignties, not the
“narrow” political right to decide on substantive matters o f governance. It
is precisely the need o f individuals to live in encompassing groups that
justifies expanding the standard notion o f political legitimacy to include the
matters o f territory and citizenship: “[The] importance [of encompassing
groups] makes it reasonable to let the encompassing group that forms a
substantial majority in a territory have the right to determine whether that
territory shall form an independent state in order to protect the culture and
self-respect o f the group.”44
104 Chapter 3
Does A Right to Culture Entail a Right to a State?
If encompassing groups do have a right to self-determination, what does

this right entail? While Margalit and Raz believe that self-determination is
essentially a right to “cultural” goods, this does entail on their view a
legitimate claim to determine political authority in a certain way. This
consists o f the right to make decisions about whether a given territory
should be self-governing.
There is an additional aspect to the argument, however. Why, it may be
asked, should a right to the well-being o f a group necessarily imply that the
group needs to be self-governing? A crucial part o f the co n seq u en tial
argument for self-determination is the claim that there are no other reliable
means of obtaining the goods that encompassing groups provide. In
particular, there is no international agency capable of enforcing compliance
with a principle of group autonomy:
given the absence of effective enforcement machinery in the international

arena, the interest in group prosperity justifies entrusting the decision
concerning self-government to the hands of an encompassing group that
constitutes the vast majority of the population in the relevant territory,
provided other vital interests are protected.45
The obvious question to ask about such a statement is: what is the
“relevant territory”? This gets to the heart of the matter—self-government
for Margalit and Raz concerns who is to decide about the boundaries and
citizenship o f territories: “A group’s right to self-determination is its right
to determine that a territory be self-governing.... [I]f [a group] has the right
to decide, its decision is binding even if it is wrong, even if the case for
self-government is not made.”46 This statement makes it clear that what is
at stake in a claim of self-determination is who has political authority, not
whether self-determination contributes to the well-being of the group per
se. It is the ability o f an encompassing group to decide about the nature and
future of the group’s territory and conditions of membership that is most
important here. Thus, even if a group does not appear to need self-
determination in order to solve problems of poverty or discrimination, it
still may be the case that the group will choose—and should have the right
to choose—to exist in an independent state.47
Several conditions are imposed on legitimate acts of self-determination:
respect for minorities within the redrawn boundaries, prevention o f damage
to the interests of other countries, and, above all, the assertion of self
determination for the “right reasons.”48 But it is ultimately the essential or

intrinsic connection between culture and territory that is assumed to exist
that legitimizes the idea that nations have claims to their own states.
Margalit and Raz make this clear when they distinguish between
possession o f and title to territory.49 Possession o f territory resides with
whomever occupies it at present, so long as they did not (recently) seize it
by force. The determination o f possession o f a given country or region is
“based largely on public-order considerations.” By this they mean that a
“possessory right” is obtained through a correct procedure for obtaining
possession—inheritance, purchase, or invitation, for instance. If possession
is obtained by means o f conquest, blackmail, or other acts o f force, it is
generally not considered to yield a possessory right, and measures may
legitimately be taken to restore the prior rulers.
How is title to a territory different from this? It is a right to have
possession of a particular territory. That is to say, title is conferred, not just
on those who have legitimate possession o f a territory, but also on those
who have legitimate claim to possession, even if they choose not to
presently exercise their claim. Thus, a nation may “choose” to exist within
a multinational state, living within its “national territory” as a component
of a larger state. That nation may not therefore presently have possession
of that territory independent of its membership in the larger entity. Yet, for
all that, the nation still has title to the territory and can choose to exercise
it at any point in the future.50
Yet, how does a group come to have such a right o f title? Since neither
Margalit and Raz nor other theorists of national rights have offered an
explicit theory o f title to territory, it must be inferred that a claim of title
exists because o f the particularly close and essential connection between
cultures and lands.51 But this is not a relationship o f a group to a means of
achieving its well-being; acquisition o f the territory may or may not be
instrumental in improving the group’s welfare.
The relationship o f national groups to national territories is deeper than
that—something much more like a kind o f identity between groups and
territories. The trouble with this view is that there is nothing inherent in any
particular connection between groups and territories. In fact, the same
group may come to view itself very differently—in relation to different
conceptions of a “homeland”—depending on who has possession of these
territories and what is done with them.
Historically, many nationalists have asserted rights to title over territory
when they feel they have been discriminated against—usually by way of
the redistribution of wealth or property within a multinational state. Yet,
106 Chapter 3
this very problem o f decline in the well-being o f a group— and its

consequent assertion o f a right to self-determination—might be viewed
very differently if the group (and its territory) is simply defined differently.
This is the classic problem o f defining a people, which assertions of
groups’ right to title does nothing to solve. Grievances, and the correspond
ing conflicts over possession o f lands and resources that sometimes occur
between national groups, have no inherent meaning. They can be viewed
as conflicts between peoples or groups or conflicts within a people or
group. Allen Buchanan makes this point when he argues that
whether a group views itself as a victim of discriminatory redistribution

will depend in part upon how it conceives of the boundaries of its own
identity—whether it regards those to whom some of its resources are
being transferred by government redistribution policies as its own people
or as an alien group.12
It is a constant o f nationalist thought that this definition o f a nation,

people, or group is not an arbitrary or even constructed one, but rests on
some essential characteristics of a group’s existence. Yet, for an instrumen
tal justification o f national rights, this view is particularly inappropriate.
The legitimation o f moral claims must, from this perspective, be a result o f
an estimation o f consequences, not o f intrinsic or essentialist definitions of
agency.
When a distinction is made between title and possession, a crucial
assumption is made—that groups can lay claim to territory as their property
and that such claims can override considerations o f public good. But this
overlooks the limited nature o f property rights: most contemporary theories
o f property regard rights to ownership as limited in various ways by
considerations o f general welfare or distributive justice. As Buchanan
argues, “Any theory o f justice that allows for any redistribution whatso-
ever...must concede...that the individual right to private property is a
limited right, not a right against all interference or a right of unlimited
accumulation.”53
Raz does concede concerning property rights that it is not the case that
“they are either inalienable or o f absolute or near absolute weight.”54 Yet,
if this is the case, the distinction between title and possession collapses. If
title can be modified or ended for reasons of general welfare or justifiable
redistribution, then it is not fundamentally different from possessory rights
that are maintained in accordance with “public-order considerations.” If
both are instrumentally justified in relation to certain conceptions o f public
well-being, then the distinction loses its importance. The whole idea o f
title, as invoked by Margalit and Raz to justify self-determination as a right
distinct from conditional rights o f possession, rests on an essentialist notion
o f the rightful ownership o f territory, in which ownership is a function of
some intrinsic connection between the possession and the owner. Yet, this
is an idea that is insupportable by most theories o f property rights
(including Raz’s theory).55
But even if the distinction between title and possession that seems
necessary for self-determination to have any distinct meaning were
established, how would title be justified? How, indeed, are property rights
in general justified? The move to justify self-determination on grounds of
a title to territory seems to be exactly backward: it is not political arrange
ments that need justification on the grounds o f title to property, but
property arrangements that need justification on the grounds of political
norms.56
No direct connection, in short, can be made between the existence o f
encompassing groups and the legitimate title to rule over territory. The
intermediate step o f instrumentally justifying such title must be taken. Raz
elsewhere argues just this point about rights in general:
rights...rest on the importance of the interest of the right-holder which

they serve.... [T]he importance we attribute to the protection of those
interests results from their service to the promotion and protection of a
certain public culture. That culture is in turn valued for its contribution to
the well-being of members of the community generally, and not only of
the right-holders. The importance of liberal rights is in their service to the
public good.17
“Public-order considerations” are a necessary part o f justifying rights o f all

kinds—including property rights—and this applies to self-determination
just as much as to supposedly conditional rights o f possession.
Individual Identities and Cultural Enjoyment
The fundamental value that nationalists give to the recognition of

national identity has already been mentioned. The protection o f a national
identity is then taken to be the justification for nationalist claims to self-
determination.5’ But the connection o f national identity (and correspond
ingly, o f self-determination on this account) with individual well-being is
108 Chapter 3
less easily established.

It should be remembered that claims for the importance o f national
identity are different from the right of individuals to a cultural identity that
is already a part of international human rights law. The difference is that
national self-determination needs a justification as a right o f groups, since
it cannot be justified as a right o f individuals. It is also not equivalent to a
right of individuals, such as that found in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which recognizes the “right of
everyone...[t]o take part in cultural life.”59
TTiejustification of national self-determination must proceed by way of
a number of intermediate premises between the espousal o f the value of
cultural identity for individuals and the necessity of a nation-state for the
realization o f this value. These premises are the following: (1) the cultural
identities of persons are essentially equivalent to their national identities;
(2) the secure possession o f national identities requires a process o f the
mutual recognition of individuals within national groups; and (3) this
process of mutual recognition can best occur within a nation-state.
Consider the last premise first. Why should the nation-state be essential
to the protection of national identities? The basic idea seems to be that
national identities require a “public space” in which to exist and flourish.60
It is not enough for persons to see themselves as members o f a cultural
nationality and as embodying particular practices, customs, languages, and
so on, as they choose. A more “heroic” form of cultural identification in
which individuals identify themselves vicariously with a nation through its
embodiment in a state is the only means of ensuring one’s own sense of
national identification.61
This view o f what is entailed in national identities actually involves a
choice as to what form such identities should take. Historically, and at
present, most national cultures have never had states—yet they existed, and
often flourished, sometimes for centuries.62What is actually assumed is the
value, not of a national culture, but of a nation-state as the most perfect
manifestation of such a culture. But this is an argument not for the
preservation of national identities but for the virtues of identification with
a state.
Now, consider the second premise: that a process of recognition is
essential for the establishment and maintenance of national identities. This
idea seems to follow from the structure of national identities—that a person
is a member of one nation or another, but never both: “A nation is a distinct
group o f individuals recognizable to each other as well as to
nonmembers.”63
The assumption o f this view is that there is such a thing as “national

character,” and that, even if it does not subsume all of what we know to be
culture, it is nevertheless a very important part of it:
recognition is often based on the belief that it is possible to identify other

members of one’s nation, since all members of a nation share norms,
beliefs, and patterns ofbehavior that are constitutive of their personalities,
hence generating a “national character.” This concept is much disliked
nowadays, yet it is useful in turning our attention to the importance of
cultural influences in identity formation.64
But the idea that persons have one (and only one) national identity, that this
identity is readily recognizable, and that it will not change, all imply an
essentialist conception o f culture and personal identity that contradicts the
more nuanced understandings in contemporary social theory o f how culture
and personality are constituted.
This is why, if the idea o f national character is “much disliked nowa
days,” it is not only because o f its association with the cliches of national
stereotypes but also because of its incompatibility with what we know
about the variable nature o f human cultures and identities. Conceptions of
national character are more than shorthand designations for important
cultural differences—though they may sometimes be that. They also distort
the very processes by which cultures are constituted by presupposing the
static and necessary character o f cultural differences. As Iris Young has
pointed out, the traditional view o f cultural difference “assumes an
essentialist meaning o f difference; it defines groups as having different
natures.” This view would certainly include the nationalist subsumption of
cultural differences within those o f “national character.” But another—and
more accurate—view o f cultural identities “defines difference more fluidly
and relationally as the product o f social processes.” 65
What this means is that, while national identities are undoubtedly a part
of the cultural experiences o f many individuals, they are not equivalent to
cultures in general.66They are therefore also not the stable reference points
for individual identities that nationalists assume them to be.67Nations, like
many other types o f social groups—tribes, classes, genders, families—are,
especially within increasingly “modernized” societies, temporary entities
within which individuals live a part or an aspect o f their lives. This does
not mean that such entities are unimportant. But it does mean that any
particular collective cultural identity is the result o f “the activation o f one
or more potential individual identities.”68
110 Chapter 3
Cultural identity cannot therefore be equivalent to national identity; the

importance of the former does not imply the necessity of the latter. But
there is a further consequence of keeping this distinction in mind when we
return to the question of whether self-determination is required for
individual well-being. For, if cultural identity and national identity are not
equivalent, it may be the case that the protection of national identities will
prevent, rather than further, the cultural identities o f individuals.
There are ways in which giving nations the right to states may actually
serve to restrict and undermine individual self-determination. This is
because any particular cultural identity that individuals embody or adopt
may only further their own life-plans for a period of their lives or in certain
ways. It cannot be assumed that particular national identities will necessar
ily always serve people’s ends, especially if they are viewed in ways that
exclude syncretic or transformational changes in identities.69
The ability o f persons to lead fulfilling lives seems to be best served
when individuals have the maximum opportunity to change their group
affiliations and cultural identities in relation to changing needs and
interests:
The quest for individual self-determination implies...aspiration to absolute

freedom to interact with others. It implies the right to change group
membership. It does not deny that we are social animals, but seeks
liberation from the present institutionalization of social needs into rigid
groupings.70
Besides minimizing the importance o f individual choice in the

construction o f cultural identities, nationalists also trivialize human culture
in valorizing its politically symbolic manifestations. This is why, even if
nationalists were correct about the “need” for individuals to affiliate
exclusively with national groups in order to have a cultural identity, they
would be incorrect about the nature of the cultural enjoyment this
affiliation provides. This is what theorists such as Tamir cannot explain
when they argue that nationalism is appealing because it enables “ordinary”
people to identify symbolically with “their” states through its sports teams,
beauty pageants, and so forth.71
What, after all, is there to enjoy about official national cultures? Even
if military parades and international sports competitions are exciting to
some, they cannot be taken as representative (or exemplary) o f human
culture in general. Nation-states actually enhance just those aspects o f
culture (and only those aspects) that ratify the power of nation-states. And,
of course, we should not forget that the instrumental value o f such

“cultural” expressions is to solidify the attachment o f peoples to their states
in the event o f war.
The consequentialist justification of self-determination simply assumes
the equivalence o f national and cultural identities; it fails to show that the
former is essential for the well-being o f individual persons; and it
minimizes the ways in which pursuit o f the recognition of national
identities through self-determination may actually hinder the rights of
individuals to a distinctive cultural life.
Group Persecution and Cultural Survival
Nevertheless, there may be instances in which nations might truly need

states to ensure their well-being. This is what Margalit and Raz refer to as
national self-determination “being exercised for the right reasons.”72 But
what would be the wrong reasons? The example given in this passage is
that o f the Katangan secession from the Congo in the 1960s, which
Margalit and Raz characterize as originating from the desire for “exclusive
control” o f the uranium mines in Katanga. Yet, it is entirely possible that
the secessionists could have argued that their attempt at such control was
based on the desire to ensure the “prosperity and self-respect”—in short,
well-being—of Katanga. In this connection, it is important to recall that
Margalit and Raz maintain that the right o f self-determination is to be
characterized as the “right to decide,” even if the decision is shown to be
wrong. What is essential is only that the “ reasons that motivate the group’s
decision are of the right kind.”73
Yet, if rightness is a function of motivation rather than judgment, then
virtually any claim by a group that something is essential for its well-being
could constitute sufficient reason for a group to make a rights-claim. What
is then crucial is not the actual consequences o f such a claim—its
instrumental value—but the belief by a group that such a rights-claim is
essential to its well-being. Once this is established—once the motivation
o f the claimants is accepted as genuine—assessments o f “what is to be
decided” rather than “who is to decide” are beside the point.
But Raz himself has made an effective criticism o f just such a type of
justification. In terms o f the legitimacy of authority, he maintains that a
form o f authority cannot be justified simply on the basis o f a belief by a
group that the authority is trustworthy. This is because, on consequentialist
grounds, authority can only be sanctioned if it in fa ct yields good conse
112 Chapter 3
quences:
trust in the authority is trust that the authority is likely to discharge its
duties properly.... Accepting the authority as a way of identifying with a
group will be justified only if the trust is not altogether misplaced.
Otherwise the odd situation may result that a person will quite properly
express his identification with a group by supporting an institution which
grossly betrays its duties to its group.74
Similarly, with regard to rights, a claim cannot be justified simply on the

basis o f a group’s belief, conviction, or trust that the right will lead to an
increase in the group’s well-being.
Characterizing self-determination as an aspect o f “who is to decide”
rather than “what is to be decided” means that, for self-determination to be
justified on this basis, it may require, not an instrumental justification that
assesses the effects or consequences o f claims, but an assertion of the “right
to decide” without regard for consequences. The consequences, after all, as
Margalit and Raz acknowledge, may not be good—the wrong decision may
be made.
This now gets us back to the whole issue o f the persecution o f (or
discrimination against, or domination over) groups and what relation, if
any, they have to the legitimate rights-claims o f the groups. Margalit and
Raz are o f two minds about this. On the one hand, the whole underlying
rationale for the idea o f self-determination is that the well-being o f groups
cannot be ensured unless they have the right to protect their own interests:
In our world, encompassing groups that do not enjoy self-government are

not infrequently persecuted, despised, or neglected. Given the importance
of their prosperity and self-respect to the well-being of their members, it
seems reasonable to entrust their members with the right to determine
whether the groups should be self-governing.75
Yet, the fact that self-determination is justified as a “right to decide” is

important here. For, if self-determination were dependent for its legitimacy
on the actual persecution of encompassing (specifically, national) groups,
then there could be no general moral claim to self-determination on this
basis. This is the reason that Margalit and Raz maintain that the persecution
of groups cannot serve as grounds for a right of self-determination:
a history of persecution is neither a necessary or a sufficient condition for

the instrumental case for self-government. It is not a necessary condition,
because persecution is not the only reason why the groups may suffer
without independence.... Persecution is not a sufficient condition, for
there may be other ways to fight and overcome persecution and because
whatever the advantages of independence it may...only make their
members worse off.76
But if the case for the self-government of encompassing groups cannot

be based on the lack of well-being of those groups, then on what can it be
based? The case must fall back again on the idea o f a “right to decide.” But
what can this right be, if not an instrumental response to at least the
possibility o f group persecution? Such an argument could be appropriate
for justifying the intrinsic value of the self-determination o f encompassing
groups. It could also be an instrumental argument justifying self-govem-
ment on nonmoral grounds—for instance, as an essential component of
legitimate political authority. While Margalit and Raz attempt to put
forward a case for an instrumental moral principle of national self-
determination, such a case falters once the connection between the well
being o f groups and their claims to a state are made independent of any
particular condition of persecution, domination, or oppression. Only an
intrinsic claim to self-determination can be justified if considerations of the
consequences o f such claims cannot be considered as validating or
invalidating the claims themselves.
O f course, this also undercuts any connection between a right of
national self-determination and the considerations of cultural survival
which some think provide a principal reason for asserting the right. If
cultural survival is genuinely at issue, then persecution or oppression must
be occurring in some fashion. But in that case, a special or remedial claim
to self-determination under conditions o f discrimination, for instance, will
suffice. Conversely, absent such a condition, the dispersal or disappearance
o f certain (national) cultures could probably only be prevented given the
type o f interference with individual choices that is objectionable on
grounds of moral autonomy (the same grounds supposedly being used to
justify a principle o f self-determination!).
Cultural Rights in Quebec and Tibet
Finally, what conclusions can we draw with respect to the two cases of self-
determination claims mentioned earlier in this chapter? In the case of
Quebec, it is not at all apparent how statehood necessarily would produce
114 Chapter 3
beneficial consequences for the Quebesois. Only if the benefit, or increase

in well-being, is defined as the acquisition o f statehood would such a result
be assured. But the important point is that it is not apparent that most, or
even many, people (in Quebec or elsewhere) would care about such an
outcome or do believe that it would benefit them in any real way. What is
assured is that the identities o f Quebecers, just as much as other Cana
dians—indeed, other people—are very often multiply defined, including
identifications with their locale, their region (province, in this case), their
country, and so on.77
While most arguments for Quebec’s independence do not proceed from
the assumption that Quebecers would simply enjoy such independence, I
would argue that that is what such arguments come to in the end (and it is
a trivial end). Some argue the case as if there were not significant potential
disadvantages to independence, including for Quebecers themselves.78Yet,
if there are such disadvantages, a positive argument for the good of
secession on nationalist grounds is then needed, not simply the assuaging
o f doubts concerning the illiberal character o f future regimes (which is
what Kai Nielsen and other advocates have offered).
Another argument, as cited above, is Charles Taylor’s view that
Quebecers face the problem o f cultural survival, not simply o f enjoyment.
But if this were true (which I doubt), it would be the result o f choices made
by individuals concerning their own identities, not the result o f discrimina
tion, oppression, or prejudice on the part o f other Canadians (or of the
Canadian state). As I have argued above, mandating the “survival” of a
national culture—if that is even possible—requires coercion o f those
individuals who have chosen otherwise (culturally speaking). On what basis
would this coercion be justified? None other than the argument, criticized
above, that state cultures are the most perfect manifestation o f human
cultures—and that people ought to recognize this and act accordingly.
Now turn to a real case o f cultural oppression—Tibet. Does the Chinese
treatment o f Tibet warrant a claim o f national self-determination on the
grounds of cultural survival? No, if this claim is interpreted to mean that
the Tibetans have a general right in this regard. But if this claim is
considered conditional—and is based on an assessment o f the actual
policies of the Chinese government with regard to Tibetans—then such a
claim is legitimate. Any appropriate claim for self-determination in such a
case, however, would have to be conditional on the actual existence of
cultural oppression. And, as we saw above, conditional claims are not
sufficient to generate a principle o f national self-determination, if such a
principle is properly understood to be a general right o f nations—that is,
not a principle invoked only to remedy particular injustices.

At this point, it may be helpful to recall the two criteria that I posited in
the last chapter for when a pattern o f cultural and/or demographic change
violates existing cultures. First, there is the ability o f the culture to continue
to flourish despite, e.g., substantial immigration from other groups; and,
second, there is the question o f whether actual government policies of
cultural suppression and/or expropriation (especially o f property, including
that of cultural institutions) are used to displace an existing culture. In the
case of Lithuania, I argued that these were not present; in the case o f Tibet,
there is ample evidence that they are.
This, however, was not always the case. In the early years of the
Chinese republic, when Tibet was under Chinese suzerainty (as a result of
international agreements), the Chinese recognized Tibetans as one o f five
peoples accorded rights within China (along with the Chinese, Mongolians,
Manchus, and Muslims). China, along with Tibet, seemed to be moving
toward a Canadian model of a multicultural, federal system. But after 1927,
with the ascendancy o f more nationalistic elements in the Chinese state,
this model was repudiated.79 Had China retained the earlier approach to its
nationalities and had it not later conducted a military campaign to subdue
and “ reform” Tibet, the Tibetans would have no justifiable claim to self-
determination.
Nevertheless, they do today legitimately have such a claim. But this
claim cannot be justified merely by invoking a general (and perennial)
national right to self-determination. It is a conditional claim based on
particular injustices; and absent these injustices, the claim would not
exist.80 What is important to remember about the Tibetan case when it is
compared with that o f Quebec is that it is the explicit oppressive actions of
the Chinese government that generate a legitimate claim o f self-determina-
tion; in the case o f states such as Canada, which accord cultural rights to
national minorities, no such claim is warranted.
The Real Ethical Consequences of National Self-Determination
The idea that national self-determination can be justified by its conse

quences for encompassing groups fails for the reasons outlined above. But
it is questionable whether there can even be a coherent argument for
national self-determination on instrumental grounds. This doubt is
provoked by the ways in which Margalit and Raz, quite consistently,
exclude many of the conditions to which such a right is often thought to
116 Chapter 3
apply. Is there any distinctive right or claim left to be made after these
conditions have been invoked?
Before reviewing the major aspects of a legitimate claim of self-
determination, mention needs to be made of the subsidiary conditions that
must be respected once the claim is made. For instance, the interests of all
inhabitants in the new state must be considered and the interests of other
countries treated similarly.81 But how often would this be possible, while
still creating a new nation-state? After all, the creation of new states means
the disruption o f old ones, as well as the disruption o f individual lives. If
the right is made conditional on the absence o f such disruption, how could
it ever be invoked? Conversely, if it is invoked without regard for these
other interests, then it will need a different justification altogether than the
one given here.82
Furthermore, self-determination cannot be claimed as a result of the
persecution within a country o f one group by another. While such
persecutions may be the reason that some groups look to self-determination
in the first place, persecution in and of itself cannot justify a right to self-
determination, since such a right could not be claimed absent such a
condition.
But then, when could it be invoked? If a group is not oppressed or
persecuted, what is the instrumentalist warrant for the right? And if it is
being persecuted, then general principles of individual human rights might
already warrant recourse to the separation or secession of a group from its
persecutors. Once again, self-determination must either be regarded as an
intrinsic right of nations, deriving from their nature as groups o f a certain
kind, or it must be a political right based on the character o f political
legitimacy, rather than on specifically moral considerations.
In addition, when national groups lay claim to a specific territory on
which to create a state, the problem of possession arises. Self-determination
cannot be regarded as justifying possession of territory, since this can only
be done on the prudential grounds o f prior possession, international
stability, and so forth. There is accordingly no distinctive right of self-
determination that can be justified on the instrumental grounds o f ensuring
the well-being of national groups. If national self-determination can be
justified at all, it can only be by directly connecting nations to states on
political grounds—that is, on the basis of the nature o f political legitimacy.
There are two ways this has generally been done: either by showing how
self-determination is necessary in order for individuals to truly consent to
political authority or by showing that nation-states are the necessary form
of an ethical community, whatever governmental form such communities
ultimately take. These justifications, which may be designated as the

consensual and the communitarian justifications, will be examined in the
next two chapters.
Notes
1.1 refer here primarily to Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, “National
Self-Determination,” Journal o f Philosophy 87, no. 9 (Sept 1990): 439-61. The
philosophical foundations of their argument can be found principally in Joseph
Raz, The Morality o f Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). In addition, see
Avishai Margalit, TheDecent Society, trans. Naomi Goldblum (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1996), and the work of Raz’s student, Yael Tamir,
particularly ‘The Right to National Self-Determination,” Social Research 58, no.
3 (Fall 1991), and Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1993). Recently, Raz’s view of the nation-state seems to have changed
slightly; see his article, “Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective,” Dissent 41, no.
1 (Winter 1994): 67-79.
2. It should be noted here, as will be discussed in more detail below, that
reference to a right of self-determination is not equivalent to advocating a “rights-
based morality”; the basis for a right may be broadly consequentialist in the sense
that the right is not antecedent to goods but is derived from its utility in realizing
particular goods. For an argument that rights can be justified consequentially, see
Raz, Morality o f Freedom, especially chaps. 7 and 8, as well as the discussion later
in this chapter.
3. Lung-chu Chen, “Self-Determination: An Important Dimension of the
Demand for Freedom,” American Societyfor International Law Proceedings 75
(1981), 88-89.
4. Tamir, “Right to National Self-Determination,” 487.
5. Chen, “Self-Determination,” 94.
6. J. Herman Burgers, “The Function of Human Rights as Individual and
Collective Rights,” in Jan Berting et al. (ed.), Human Rights in a Pluralist World:
Individuals and Collectivities (Westport, Conn.: Meckler, 1990), 73.
7. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 8-9.
8. See, for example, Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (1966): “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall be not denied the right,
in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to
profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.” Interestingly,
in the accompanying Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, there is
no mention of the rights of nations; “cultural” rights are the rights of individuals
to practice a culture of their choice. See also Jack Donnelly, Universal Human
Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), 156.
118 Chapter 3
9. Of course, minorities may also not be nationalities as conventionally

understood—usually because they do not inhabit a contiguous territory, or perhaps
because they are not defined by ethnonational characteristics. Examples of the first
would be Jews or African Americans, of the second would be members of religious
sects or sexually deviant groups.
10. See, e.g., Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Amy
Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism and the “Politics o f Recognition " (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 58-61.
11. See Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 74,84-85.
12. Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1973), 59.
13. David Copp, “Do Nations Have the Right of Self-Determination?” in
Stanley G. French (ed.), Philosophers Look at Canadian Confederation (Montreal:
Canadian Philosophical Association, 1979), 79 (italics added).
14. Rita Hauser, “International Protection of Minorities and the Right of
Self-Determination,” Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 1 (1971): 93.
15. For instance, see Walzer’s statement that “I would be inclined to
support separation whenever separation is demanded by a political movement that,
so far as we can tell, represents the popular will. Let the people go who want to
go,” in “The New Tribalism,” Dissent (Spring 1992): 169 (italics added).
16. For instance, the recent German recognition of Croatia and Slovenia
(fqllowed by recognition by the European Community and the United States) has
been seen to be crucial to the success of their secession from Yugoslavia (as well
as to causing the subsequent civil war in Bosnia); see Misha Glenny, “Yugoslavia:
The Revenger’s Tragedy,” New York Review o f Books, Aug. 13, 1992. Biafra is
frequently cited as a case of national self-determination that failed due to the lack
of international recognition; see Heather Wilson, International Law and the Use
o f Force by National Liberation Movements (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 84-
85, and W. Wentworth Ofuatey-Kodjoe, The Principle o f Self-Determination in
International Law (New York: Nellen Publishing Co., 1977), 162.
17. Here, as at a number of other points, the parallels between a right of
national self-determination and a right to private property become apparent: just as
in the “noninterference” version of the former, so the “original acquisition”
(Lockean) version of the latter presupposes a “free” or empty space that can be
occupied, acquired, and worked on. This idea is of course dependent on underlying
assumptions of a “state of nature” and of an original “grant” of untrammeled nature
from God to humanity. Objections to the “original acquisition” theory of private
property often begin by rightly questioning the speciousness of these assumptions;
see, e.g., Alan Ryan, Property and Political Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1984), 18ff.
18. Raz, Morality o f Freedom, 216.
20. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 69.
22. Tamir, “Right to National Self-Determination,” 565-66.

24. Donnelly, Universal Human Rights, 156.
27. Margalit and Raz, “National Self-Determination,” 456-57.
28. Margalit and Raz, “National Self-Determination,” 449.
35. For example, India, the second-most populous country in the world,
has no dominant cultural tradition—at least not one institutionalized within an
educational system (though, of course, there are “Hindu” nationalists who are
trying to change this). Other obvious examples might be Switzerland, Canada, and
the United States; there are many less obvious ones.
36. See both Margalit and Raz, “National Self-Determination,” 457,450-
51. These passages are further discussed below.
37. Margalit and Raz, ‘‘National Self-Determination,” 447.
41. Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1986), 26-27 and 34-37; Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest
fo r Understanding (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 44-46.
47. It should be emphasized here that Margalit and Raz do not use the
term “self-government” to mean a democratic form of rule for all the inhabitants
of a given territory, but rather a condition under which a “self’ (an encompassing
group—that is, a nation) has its own government.
48. Margalit and Raz, “National Self-Determination,” 457,459.
50. One inference from this theory of title is that residency is not a
necessary condition for claiming a title to territory. Since a group requires a
particular territory not for its livelihood but for its self-respect, it is conceivable that
the territory could presently be occupied by someone else. Yet, the group still may
have title to that territory, should they so assert it. One example that comes to mind
120 Chapter 3
is the claim of Jewish title to Palestine. Of course, such a claim will inevitably
clash with those groups—e.g., the Arab population living in the region—who
currently have possession and may also be expected to assert a claim to the area.
51 .Michael Walzer has argued this point most extensively; see his Spheres
o f Justice: A Defense o f Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983),
42-44, and the discussion of his theory in chapter 5, below.
52. Allen E. Buchanan, Secession: TheMorality o f Political Divorcefrom
Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 51.
53. Buchanan, Secession, 42.
55. Of course, an exception is the libertarian theory of property advocated
by philosophers such as Robert Nozick, who see any form of redistribution as
illegitimate; see, e.g., Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic
Books, 1974), esp. 150-82. While Nozick does not differentiate terminologically
between title and possession, he does argue, following Locke, for a right of
ownership based on the “original acquisition” of property. This original acquisition
is the basis of a right to ownership that cannot be abrogated by other
considerations. Criticisms of Nozick’s view may be found in Anthony Kronman,
“Contract Law and Distributive Justice,” Yale Law Journal 89 (1980), reprinted in
Feinberg and Gross, Philosophy o f Law, 441-55; in various articles from Jeffrey
Paul (ed.), Reading Nozick: Essays on "Anarchy, State, and Utopia " (Totowa,
N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1981), particularly Onora O’Neill, “Nozick’s
Entitlements”; and in Richard Norman, Free and Equal: A Philosophical
Examination o f Political Values (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), esp.
144-53.
56. C. B. MacPherson has most emphatically asserted the political
character of property relations—and their consequent need for justification in
political terms. For instance, in his essay ‘The Meaning of Property,” MacPherson
defines property as a “political relation between persons,” and writes that
Property is not thought to be a right because it is an enforceable claim: it

is an enforceable claim because it is thought to be a human right. This is
simply another way of saying that any institution of property requires a
justifying theory.... Property has always to bejustified by something more
basic; if it is not so justified, it does not for long remain an enforceable
claim. (In MacPherson [ed.], Property: Mainstream and Critical
Positions [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978], 4,11-12)
Also, cf. MacPherson, “A Political Theory of Property,” Democratic Theory:

Essays in Retrieval (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 120-40.
58. Chen, “Self-Determination,” 91.
59. Article 15, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural

Rights (Annex to U.N.G.A. Res., 16 Dec. 1966); reprinted in Ian Brownlie (ed.),
Basic Documents in International Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972),
157.
62. This point is made very tellingly in William McNeill, Polyethnicity
and National Unity in WorldHistory (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986),
passim.
63. Tamir, “Right to National Self-Determination,” 577 (italics added).
64.Tamir, “Right to National Self-Determination,” 577. National identities
could perhaps be distinguished, not on the basis of a complex conception of
national character, but on the basis of simple traits. One example is the different
forms of prayer, such as the hand signals by which the “sign of the cross” is made,
that are used by Serbs (usually Orthodox) and Croats (usually Catholic) to
distinguish themselves from each other (and, in some cases, as a pretext for
imprisonment and even murder). But, in these instances, the traits are usually
assumed to signify more thoroughgoing cultural and characterological differences.
65. Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), 157.
66. And as Ross Poole points out, it is only one form that cultures have
taken, often by obliterating other local or transnational forms; see his book,
Morality and Modernity (London: Routledge, 1991), 98-99.
67. It is important to note that nationalists do usually assume, rather than
argue for, such a view of identity. For instance, Tamir writes that
National rights can only be consistently justified on universal grounds by

referring to the value individuals find in the existence of nations, and by
assuming that human beings care as much about the national environment
in which they implement their life-plans as about the specific content of
these plans. (Liberal Nationalism, 83 [italics added])
But this is exactly what needs to be demonstrated, not just assumed (and, in fact,
there is much evidence to the contrary).
68. Dov Ronen, The Questfor Self-Determination (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1979), 53.
69. Ronen, Questfor Self-Determination, 52.
70. Ronen, Questfor Self-Determination, 61 (italics added).
71. See Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 84-85, 96, and 148 for examples
drawn from the Israeli experience.
72. Margalit and Raz, “National Self-Determination,” 459 (italics added).
73. Margalit and Raz, “National Self-Determination,” 459. As for
Katanga, the reason given for secession in the “Proclamation of Independence of
Katanga” (July 11, 1960) was that the Congolese government was instituting a
122 Chapter 3
“regime of tenor” in Katanga in order to effect the “disintegration of the whole

military and administrative apparatus" of the province. The proclamation ends with
this phrase: ‘To all the inhabitants of Katanga, without distinction of race or color,
we ask that you gather around us to lead our country and all its inhabitants forward
to political, social, and economic progress, to the betterment of all.” If this is not
talk about well-being, what is? See Jules Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, trans.
Rebecca Young (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), 328-29, for this
document.
77.Alan Caims, “The Fragmentation ofCanadian Citizenship,” in William
Kaplan (ed.), Belonging: The Meaning and Future o f Canadian Citizenship
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993), 193. For further discussion
of this, see Joseph H. Carens, “Dimensions of Citizenship and National Identity in
Canada,” in Omar Dahbour (ed.), “Philosophical Perspectives on National
Identity,” a special issue of the Philosophical Forum 28, nos. 1-2 (Fall-Winter
1996-1997): 122-23.
78. See, e.g., Kai Nielsen, “Cultural Nationalism, neither Ethnic or Civic,”
in Dahbour, “Philosophical Perspectives on National Identity,” 42-52, as well as
his earlier article, “Secession: The Case ofQuebec,” Journal o f Applied Philosophy
10, no. 1 (1993): 29-43.
79. Alfred Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination,
rev. ed. (New York: Crowell, 1970), 222.
80. There may also be other grounds (besides invoking self-determination)
for claiming that the rights ofTibetans have been violated. For instance, there is the
possibility of using a “right to development” to guarantee the cultural survival of
oppressed minorities; see Michele L. Radin, “The Right to Development as a
Mechanism for Group Autonomy: Protection of Tibetan Cultural Rights,”
Washington Law Review 68 (1993): 695-714. Also see my advocacy of an
ecoregional principle of self-determination in the conclusion.
81. Margalit and Raz, “National Self-Determination," 457.
82. This indicates the extent to which the justification of national self-
determination given by Margalit and Raz is only superficially a consequentialist
one. Such considerations as those just enumerated might be seen to be an occasion
for balancing the gains and losses of invoking a right such as national self-
determination. But, in that case, such a right would become conditional upon the
satisfaction of other goods—a conclusion that Margalit and Raz want to avoid.
Chapter 4
Consent Theory and Democratic

Self-Determination
[T]he doctrine of self-determination [on] the surface...seemed reasonable:

let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot
decide until somebody decides who are the people.
— Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government
From Democracy to Self-Determination
A commonplace o f nationalist doctrine is the idea that nations have a right

to self-determination because they ought to be able to choose the states
within which they live. This idea indicates that, for many, national self-
determination is preeminently a political, and indeed a democratic, idea.
Yet, much o f the discussion o f this principle has concerned its moral
legitimacy, usually based on some idea o f the moral agency o f groups or the
desirability o f group well-being. The first part of this study was designed
to show that such ideas cannot provide a satisfactory justification for a
principle of national self-determination. If such a justification is possible,
it must therefore be specifically political in the sense that national self-
determination would be warranted by the very nature o f legitimate political
authority. Political justifications of national self-determination are o f two
types: a consensual (or libertarian) justification and a communitarian (or
more purely nationalist) justification. The latter will be examined in the
next chapter; the former in this.
Since John Locke’s initial formulation o f a consent theory o f political
legitimacy, consent has been perhaps the most common idea to be used as
the basis for justifying a democratic political system. Consent theory
generally emphasizes a decision procedure by which individuals come to
be obligated to a state. A state lacking this therefore also lacks true political
authority. Such a decision procedure is a means o f linking individual
123
124 Chapter 4
persons to a government through the legitimation o f political authority or

the acceptance o f political obligation(s) on the part o f those individuals. By
focusing on the unmediated relation of individuals to the state, consent
theory can be seen to be a form of liberal individualism'—a theory often
considered to be antithetical to nationalism. Nevertheless, there are strong
individualistic, libertarian, and majoritarian strains in nationalism—and
these come to the fore when national self-determination is given a
consensual justification.
But consent theory has not only been used to formulate a theory of
democratic political obligation. It has also been applied, particularly by the
Australian philosopher, Harry Beran, to the question o f whether states
legitimately have sovereignty over their citizens. This ultimately means that
consent theory may be used to justify national self-determination, since, as
Michael Walzer has claimed, that principle is the “expression o f democracy
in international politics.” In this context, democracy means that national
groups “ought to be allowed to govern themselves.”2
To a certain extent, John Stuart Mill’s argument for national rights that
was briefly discussed in chapter 1 can be considered a forerunner o f a
democratic justification. Mill is concerned about “free institutions” and
whether they can exist in countries inhabited by diverse populations. He
regards this as virtually impossible, since it is “reasonable” to assume that
where the “sentiment o f nationality” exists, national groups will want to
govern themselves separately from others. This is, in Mill’s view, “merely
saying that the question o f government ought to be decided by the gov
erned.”3
The key point in Mill’s view is that nation-states can be justified on the
basis of a simple right o f individual association; this is, for him, the true
meaning of democratic government. No “communitarian” assumptions
(concerning, e.g., the value o f cultural membership in groups or the
foundation of the state on national identities) are necessary in order to
connect the entitlement o f individuals to self-government to their entitle
ment to national self-government (i.e., self-determination).
This connection is the basis for all justifications o f nation-states that
have a democratic, voluntarist, majoritarian, or individualist bent. For
instance, in considering the justifiability of nationalities seceding from
existing states, Christopher Wellman writes that “liberalism’s presumption
upon individual liberty...provides a prima facie case against the govern
ment’s coercion and fo r the permissibility o f secession.”4 The crucial
connection implied here, in Mill’s writings, and in others we will examine
below, is the concept of consent. Assuming that individual (voluntary)
Consent Theory and Democratic Self-Determination 125
consent is the primary determinant of political legitimacy implies a

justification o f nation-states. This justification is a libertarian one: the
political liberty o f individuals entails the liberty for nations.
This latent libertarianism is built into consent theory. The liberty that is
supposedly sought by nations, on this account, is not contingent on
satisfying obligations to other groups, since such obligations would assume
nonconsensual limits on the groups’ decisions—and thereby contradict
consent theory. Consent, in short, must be unconstrained. The only
obligation that is entailed by consent is to a minimal state—one designed
to ensure only that the groups (perhaps temporarily) resident within it have
the greatest possible autonomy.5
Harry Beran, for one, denies that a democratic theory of self-determina-
tion is equivalent to “nationalism.” If national self-determination means
that nationalities are entitled to their own states, Beran maintains that it is
“fatally flawed as a general theory of rightful political boundaries.”6
Nevertheless, “the democratically based right of self-determination grants
nations all that they deserve: if the members o f a nation are united in their
wish for a state of their own then they are entitled to it.”7
But while the democratic theory is not designed to justify the idea that
only national groups have a right to self-determination, it does provide a
justification for the idea that nationalities have such a right, provided that
their members do in fact desire a state of their own. Ultimately, the
attractiveness of a democratic conception of self-determination lies in
avoiding the implication that it justifies the claims o f communities to seek
states by ethnically exclusivist (i.e., nationalistic) means. But it turns out
that the democratic argument cannot avoid this implication; paradoxically,
it even requires, for its proper application, the use of undemocratic
procedures to define and realize claims o f self-determination. National self-
determination cannot therefore, in the end, be a democratic principle.
Before turning to the consensual argument in some detail, it is worth
considering the general claim that a principle of national self-determination
is a necessary corollary o f an elementary commitment to democratic
political processes. This idea is expressed, for example, by David Copp,
when he argues that the notion that people have a legitimate claim to
govern themselves in a state implies that they have the right to choose
within which state they will do so.8 Jean-Jacques Rousseau and other
majoritarian theorists o f democratic self-government anticipated this idea.
For Rousseau, at least, any set o f individuals has the natural right to form
themselves as a people—or to dissolve themselves as a people should
changes in condition or sentiment warrant it.9
126 Chapter 4
Self-government as a basic democratic ideal is meant to be coextensive

with the idea o f majority rule. If a majority can rightfully choose a
particular government for itself, why, Copp (and others) ask, cannot that
majority also rightfully choose which state that government will rightfully
rule over?10The first question that arises about such a view concerns where
a majority that claims such a right is a majority. If it is a majority o f
citizens o f a state, then “choosing” a state is an irrelevancy. This is not so
if the choice is whether or not to dissolve the state; a majority of members
of a given state may o f course decide to split up the entity. But this requires
no special apparatus o f principles or rights—it is simply the expression o f
the majority o f an existing political community.
National self-determination is different from this because it is concerned
with what democratic rights are available to groups that are not at present
(or perhaps have ever been) distinct and self-governing political communi
ties. Only if this further extension o f majority rule is warranted can it be
said that democratic principles entail a right o f self-determination for
nations. This is exactly the claim that Copp makes:
the [democratic] principle must also extend to groups which could

feasibly be states.... [N]ations are groups of this kind.... The result is
that...any state, nation, or nation-like group has the right to form or
maintain a separate self-determining state if a majority of its members
chooses that it do so."
The important aspect o f this claim is that democracy is progressively

redefined from the majority rule of a political community to the choice o f
a majority o f any group within a political community (or even distributed
across different political communities). But what justifies this redefinition
of majority rule?
The answer to this question is the subject o f much o f the rest o f this
chapter. But one preliminary aspect o f this redefinition needs some
consideration. Is it the case that any group whatsoever can claim self-
determination as a right on the basis o f democratic legitimacy? Copp argues
that this “ unrestricted” interpretation o f the principle is unwarranted. The
reason is that it would lead to the attempted construction o f nonviable
states, in terms o f size, shape, or membership. Copp writes that, “In the
case of many groups, it would be completely unfeasible to form a separate
state, even if no person or collective interfered in any way, and I assume
this to show these groups do not have this right.” He further admits that
such an unrestricted principle o f self-determination would undermine the
ability o f any political community to maintain majority rule—a point to

which we will return below.12
Nevertheless, most nationalists— and most voluntarists or consent
theorists, such as Beran—would maintain that self-determination (consent)
should necessarily be unrestricted. This is because only a thoroughgoing
application of the principle of self-determination can guarantee consistency
o f rights for all nations. In addition, according to Beran, self-determination
is essential for an adequate consent-based system o f political authority.
Consent, in his view, must above all concern the choice o f membership in
states by individuals. Without this choice—and by extension, without a
right o f (national) groups to choose their political affiliation—no state
could legitimately claim authority over its citizens.
Does this perspective necessarily justify the nation-state as a form of
government? While democratic consent theory is not explicitly “national
ist,” in the sense o f espousing national identity as an absolutely necessary
prerequisite for legitimate government, it is certainly compatible with and
contributory to justifying a principle o f national self-determination. For
instance, Beran admits the centrality of ethnonational groups for a theory
o f self-determination: “My theory is consistent with the more plausible of
the range of claims in the nationalist spectrum. The presumption in favour
o f permitting secession, which I ascribe to democratic liberalism, applies
as much to ethnically distinctive groups as it does to others.”13 Similarly,
when Daniel Philpott comes to discuss self-determination “in practice,” he
admits that “Sharing some sort o f cultural trait, desiring to govern itself
more directly, the group is almost always a ‘nation.’”14
Two Examples of “Captive Nations”
But what kind of nations? One answer is to refer to what are sometimes
called “captive nations.” Michael Walzer has defined these as those
national groups which ought to have had independent states in the sense of
being the equal of other nations that do have states of their own.15They are
distinct both from nations subject to colonial or imperial domination (and
that consequently generate national liberation movements of one sort or
another) and from national minorities which may be subject to some form
of cultural oppression or discrimination.
One might think that, in terms of considerations of democracy, a
captive, or unfree, nation was one that was denied rights of political
participation—voting, representation, and so forth. So, for instance, the
128 Chapter 4
Palestinians, who lack any self-government—or perhaps, the Tibetans,

whose government was driven into exile—might be viewed from a standard
democratic perspective as “captive.” But this is not the case in the view o f
those such as Walzer, who regard nations in terms o f whether or not they
have states o f their own. The crucial question in determining whether
nations are free is not therefore, on this view, whether they have democratic
rights at all, but whether they exercise them within a separate state.
Furthermore, captive nations are distinct from ‘‘potential nations,” a
term which Ernest Gellner used to designate all those ethnonational groups
that lack states currently (as well as historically).16 O f course, from
Gellner’s perspective, there are many more potential nations than possible
viable states. In addition, the certainty o f conflict and violence is implied
in the idea that these nations could all become states. But the notion of
captive nations relies on the idea that only some national groups have
expressed the political will to seek statehood and it is only these nations
that are entitled to it.
The question is whether the existence o f political will alone is sufficient
reason to accord nations a right of self-determination. Two cases o f what
might be called captive nations are those o f the Kurds, who inhabit adjacent
regions o f Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and the various peoples o f the
former Yugoslavia, including Slovenians, Croatians, and Bosnians.
The Kurds seem to be a classic case o f a national group that has not had
a state o f its own, yet appears to have generated a political movement for
one. But, in light o f the history and diverse present conditions o f the
Kurdish population, can it be said that it “ought to have (had) a state”?
From a consensual point o f view, this is a matter o f whether, if Kurdish
nationalists were able to obtain (and win) a referendum within areas o f the
above-mentioned states inhabited by Kurds, this would be a sufficient
reason to assert a legitimate claim o f self-determination.
In the case o f Yugoslavia, the withdrawal of, first, the Slovenians,
second, the Croatians, and later, the Bosnians and other groups from the
Yugoslav federation has been viewed as a matter o f these national groups
fleeing the captivity o f a Serbian-dominated state for political independ
ence. Yet, it is clear that the Yugoslav political system had in actuality been
designed to minimize the influence o f the Serbians through a federal system
based on collaboration between the various republics.17It was the unilateral
withdrawal of the Slovenians in particular that led to the collapse o f this
collaborative structure. Was the Slovenian (and later, Croatian and
Bosnian) secession justified solely on the basis o f political sentiment within
the Slovenian republic for an independent state?
In both cases, what is at issue is the extent to which a political choice,

independent of particular conditions of oppression or domination (such as
the absence o f political rights), warrants a claim o f self-determination.
Democratic Principles and Consent
The basic idea is that desire for self-determination on the part of a

(national) group indicates lack o f consent to an existing political associa
tion and that this is sufficient reason for self-determination to be warranted.
While some democratic theorists o f self-determination do not want to use
the concept of consent in defining democracy, it turns out to be hard to
avoid.
For instance, David Copp justifies a principle of self-determination
democratically from the notion o f the “choice of the governed.”18 This
notion is based on the idea of “equal respect” for citizens of democratic
states. In the latter case, if citizens are “disenfranchised...on the issue of
political sovereignty,” then this constitutes an unjustifiable limitation on
their democratic rights.19But, as Allen Buchanan has noted, Copp does not
provide any argument for why lack of a principle of self-determination
actually constitutes disenfranchisement. Such a notion makes sense “only
if no meaningful distinctions could be drawn between political decisions
made within a state and decisions to set the boundaries o f states.”20 It is
with the purpose o f drawing such a distinction that Beran elaborates his
distinctive concept o f consent (in particular, the idea o f consent to
membership). In any case, such terms as “choice o f the governed” indicate
Copp’s implicit indebtedness to consent theory.
Daniel Philpott bases his argument for self-determination on the idea
that individuals require democratic institutions in order to protect their
autonomy. Self-determination is a means o f ensuring that individuals’
“pure, essential, unalloyed right to govern themselves” is not denied by
states that attempt to limit the right of persons to exit from the state.21
Philpott admits that this idea is close to the consent theory version of liberal
democracy advocated by Beran. But he insists that the democratic principle
o f self-determination need not refer to consent, but may be based on other
grounds—of which he names only the “intrinsically binding nature of
liberal principles.”22Whatever force liberal principles may have, however,
would seem to come from their particular justifications o f political
institutions—for which none is given by Philpott other than from consent.
Christopher Wellman explicitly denies the applicability o f consent
130 Chapter 4
theory to justifying self-determination;23 however, the denial finally

amounts to a quibble rather than an alternative justification. Wellman’s
theory is the most explicitly libertarian in being based on an assumption of
individual liberty as generating a prima facie case for self-determination.24
However, when Wellman comes to formulate his “hybrid model” o f self-
determination, it turns out to be based on a qualified argument from
consent. While consent as the basis o f political institutions is implied by the
principle o f liberty, its unqualified use is impermissible because o f its
destabilizing effects.25 While Wellman acknowledges that Beran attempts
to restrict his own version o f consent theory to deal with this problem, he
notes that “these restrictions are inexplicable in a pure consent model.”26
Hence, the hybrid model—consent modified by a “teleological” principle
that restricts liberty when harmful consequences result.27
The problem, o f course, is that this same criticism can be applied to
Wellman’s hybrid model— once consent is justified on libertarian grounds,
invoking the harmful consequences o f the principle is not a (principled)
reason for limiting consent—even if it is dressed up as an alternative
“model.” Wellman may well have pointed to an inherent failing of consent
theory—that it does not easily admit o f qualification, even in the face of
adverse consequences. But this does not mean that it can be dispensed with
when justifying a democratic principle o f self-determination.
The democratic principle thus needs to be understood as based upon a
general commitment to consensual political obligation. Self-determination
is to be defined as the application of consent to the problem o f determining
membership (i.e., citizenship) in states. The means o f gauging consent is
the referendum, which can be administered to national, or perhaps other,
substate groups. This idea of consent to membership, and the use of
referenda to achieve it, will be examined in turn. Then, three problems with
this idea—concerning obligation, coercion, and territory—will be outlined.
A Consent Theory of Membership
Beran’s explication and defense o f a consent theory o f authority and

obligation constitutes an attempt to revitalize the notion o f consent by
meeting various objections that have arisen to it since Locke’s initial
formulation. There are two special features o f Beran’s consent theory that
make it a departure from past theories. First, it is a theory o f actual, rather
than tacit, consent to authority; that is, only actual consent is viewed as a
legitimate means o f authorizing a state’s monopoly of political power.28
Consent Theoiy and Democratic Self-Determination 131
Second, consent applies, not to every decision made by government, but to

an initial procedure for the choice by individuals o f membership in a state;
consent theory is a theory o f membership as the basis for all other
authority.29
The basic meaning o f consent used by Beran, and indeed within the
general tradition o f consent theory, is that o f a voluntary act by which
individuals accord a state authority or assume obligations to a state.30 The
standard problem with traditional versions o f consent is that, for the theory
to legitimate the authority of actual states, it must incorporate some kind o f
tacit consent. This is because it is generally thought to be the case that
every citizen cannot continually consent to every act o f a government.
Some mechanism must be devised for consent to be ongoing in the absence
o f express consent by all citizens.31
There are at least two major problems with the idea o f tacit con
sent—and, to some extent, with consent as a general principle. First, tacitly
consenting to something is similar to being regarded as having accepted
that thing, without necessarily having wanted to accept it. In other words,
when a relationship between an individual and another entity (e.g., a
government) already exists, consent becomes a means o f legitimating that
relationship. Yet, that legitimation is not a matter o f the individual having
established the relationship voluntarily, but rather o f their having accepted
what already exists. Whether such individuals would, in the absence o f the
relationship, have wanted to establish it (e.g., citizenship in a state) cannot
be determined by imputing consent to them.
This is a problem not only with tacit consent but with consent in
general; it is simply made more acute when no express consent can be said
to have been given. The lack o f voluntarism in consent, tacit or express, is
seen clearly when consent is contrasted with acts o f promising, in which
new relationships are established voluntarily between persons. Carole
Pateman distinguishes between promising and consent in the following
way:
A promise is an example of self-assumed obligation as the creation of a

relationship of obligation. The social practice of promising enables
individuals to create a new relationship where none existed before....
Consent, however, must be to something. In the case of obligation it is
consent to an already existing relationship of obligation.32
Beran does not distinguish between promising and consenting because

he maintains that, in his own version of consent theory, both relationships
132 Chapter 4
are subsumed within a general category o f agreeing to membership in a

state.33 Whether Beran’s version o f consent is able to incorporate more
voluntaristic relationships such as that of promising remains to be seen. But
it is the case that his membership version of consent is able, to some extent,
to avoid this classic problem of tacit consent.
This is because Beran defines consent to membership as a form o f
express consent. In general terms, consent to membership in a state
transforms that state into a “voluntary association.”34The means by which
this occurs is that of a decision procedure which ensures that “actual
personal consent must be the basis o f political obligation and authority.”35
The purpose of the decision procedure is to make membership in a state
contingent on the express agreement of the individuals concerned.
In doing this, Beran seeks to avoid the second major problem with tacit
consent—what A. John Simmons calls the “problem o f ‘tacit consent
through residence.’”36 Locke and other consent theorists have maintained
that residence within a state constituted tacit consent to the authority o f that
state. Yet, as Simmons and others have noted, without a clear and explicit
choice as to whether residence in the state is acceptable to individuals,
those individuals cannot be said to have consented—in the sense of
agreed—to the authority of the state.
It is only when a decision procedure is instituted that allows persons to
actually choose membership in a state that consent can be said to exist
(whether it therefore legitimates the state’s authority is another matter,
however). But even under these conditions, is consent through residence a
realizable means o f legitimizing authority? A decision procedure that made
this a real possibility would usually be understood to allow for emigration
in cases where individuals did not consent to a government.
But if emigration were allowed, or even provided for, consent would
still be, in Pateman’s terms, the acceptance or rejection of a prior existing
relationship, rather than the postulation of a new—and purely volun
tary—relationship. For emigration is often not an acceptable option for
persons if the losses involved in acting upon it are considered. As Simmons
notes,
The problem is that it is precisely the most valuable “possessions” a man

has that are often tied necessarily to his country of residence and cannot
be taken from it.... In that case, we would be justified in concluding that
no such procedure could ever allow us to take continued residence as a
sign of tacit consent to the government’s authority.37
The solution that Beran offers to this problem is that secession as well
as emigration must be an option in any decision procedure designed to
ensure the consent o f individuals to governmental authority. Residence is
therefore considered to constitute consent only when the persons concerned
have chosen to reside in a state—to become members of it—given the
option that they could have either emigrated or seceded from it. The reason
that secession is important here is that emigration, as Simmons and others
have noted, has great costs and consequently is often not an option that
groups will voluntarily exercise.38
Consent then, according to Beran, is properly considered to be the
acceptance of membership in a state, rather than actual or virtual agreement
with a particular government ruling over the state. A formal decision
procedure through which this acceptance is explicitly stated is apart o f the
theory. Three conditions must be present for this procedure to be fully
legitimate: (1) there is a right to emigrate; (2) secession must be permitted;
and (3) a “dissenters’ territory” should be created.39 The last condition
means that a geographical area should be set aside for individuals who
reject membership in any state.
Two additional features o f Beran’s “membership version” of consent
theory should be noted. For one thing, the idea that every individual must
consent to a government for that government to be legitimate is not implied.
Beran seeks to leave room for democratic majoritarianism in deciding the
legitimacy of authority. Nevertheless, Beran maintains that a minority is not
bound by an obligation to a state that the majority has accepted—if it can
viably exercise the options of emigration or secession.40
Furthermore, individuals or groups cannot be bound by the choices
made by prior generations to constitute a state o f which the subsequent
generations are to be considered members. This is because “in so freezing
the status quo one generation, which exercised its freedom of choice,
attempts to deprive later generations of the same freedom.”41 Means must
accordingly be found with which to register the choice o f membership of
subsequent generations, so that consent to the authority o f some state can
be given—or a new state created.
In this way, Beran seeks to fulfill the requirements that Pateman (and
before her, Rousseau) suggested a truly voluntarist conception of authority
must have: the ability to create new relationships o f voluntary agreement,
rather than being bound by consent or dissent to old relationships of
obligation. The chief means by which Beran sees this as being achieved is
that o f referenda to decide the membership o f groups within a state.
The question of self-determination is therefore necessarily raised by the
134 Chapter 4
membership version of consent theory. Only if groups can determine for

themselves their membership within states can these states become
legitimate authorities. But this in turn requires that groups have the ability
to opt out of a state, setting up a new state of their choice. Some right of
self-determination is then required for consent to operate as the basis of
membership (and consequently, state authority in general). It, however,
remains to be seen whether the very mechanism of determining legitimate
authority serves to undermine the democratic and voluntaristic norms that
are supposedly fulfilled by a consent theory o f authority in the first place.
Referenda and Self-Determination
Within a consent-based theory of political authority derived from individu

alist premises, the chief institutional means of determining the legitimacy
of a state is through a referendum. The questions o f what kind of referenda
are permissible, who is to vote, and what changes are allowable based on
the results are all questions of importance for a theory of national self-
determination. Beran has emphasized a particular conception o f referenda
because it enables him to specify the kind o f consent that would make a
state legitimate.
According to Beran, referenda should be conducted by the “reiterated
use o f the majority principle.” This idea is designed to avoid a simple
referendum of a majority of citizens within a political entity, since such a
referendum may simply ratify the already existing boundaries and
memberships. In order to get the desired result—acceptance of the
separation from a state by any group of its citizens—majority rule must be
modified. Reiteration enables such separations to take place, since a
referendum would only be given within the boundaries specified by
separatists themselves: “If there is a separatist group within a state, this
group may specify a territory in which a separatist referendum is to be
held.... In each case only the people o f the territory specified by the
separatists should be entitled to vote in the referendum.”42
The idea behind allowing separatists in a given situation to determine
the extent o f voting in a referendum is that, without this stipulation,
separatists might be out-voted and the unity of the state would not be
voluntary. While Beran rejects the idea that the consent of citizens to
authority need be universal—that every citizen need consent—he argues
that only small minorities of citizens that reject the state would not
invalidate its authority. In order to ensure this outcome, significant groups
o f individuals wishing to exit from the state ought to be allowed to hold

referenda to legitimize their wishes.
But how are the nature and extent of these groups determined? Beran
argues that the only legitimate way to do so is “[b]y making groups which
wish to live together as separate political communities self-defining.”43
This idea, o f course, is designed to yield a particular result: by being
allowed to define exactly who may vote in a referendum, the separatists can
virtually determine the outcome. The point o f this, Beran maintains, is to
ensure the voluntariness o f every political association.
How voluntary (or democratic) such a scheme is will be considered
below. But it is worth noting that Beran believes that reiteration sets limits
on the ability o f separatist groups to dictate the results in their own favor.
The reiterative use o f referenda means that, even in new states, the eventual
possibility o f further referenda specified by other groups o f separatists must
be entertained. So if the original group o f secessionists sets boundaries
without regard for this, they may undercut their own ability to set up a
legitimate state o f their own: “the separatists have to be cautious in
specifying the territory in which the referendum is to be held to minimise
the risk of counter-secession.”44
Nevertheless, this limitation on the ability o f separatist groups can be
overcome under certain conditions if additional stipulations for the conduct
o f referenda are made. The goal o f purely voluntary consent to a state
suggests that all those living in a certain area would have rights to
participate in a referendum deciding whether to secede from that state. But,
in fact, Beran suggests that no such presumption is warranted.
The purpose o f “self-determination referenda” is not to determine
whether all individuals living in an area consent to a particular state, but
whether individuals who have a right to live in that area so consent: “[A]
criterion of entitlement to vote in a self-determination plebiscite is being in
a territory by moral right."*5Neither birth nor residence decisively define
rights o f occupancy; rather it is “being a member o f a group which
traditionally occupies a territory” that is the crucial factor.
Individuals not residing by right in a certain territory would also not
necessarily have the right to call a counter-referendum to determine their
own political membership. On the contrary, individuals who reside by right
in a territory also have the right to “control” immigration into that territory.
This is required by the need to maintain an identifiable area within which
the group may live. Otherwise, an area may be occupied by people who
have no traditional right to occupancy, and who furthermore might not vote
for separation in a referendum o f the territory. Consequently, such
136 Chapter 4
immigrants, who may have occupied a territory by conquest or forceable

entry of another kind “are there without the right of being there and...do not
belong even if they have spent their whole lives there and feel they
belong.”46
Finally, this implies that such people not only “may legitimately be
excluded from separatist referenda,” but their continued immigration and
residence may also be subject to controls exercised by the rightful
inhabitants o f the territory. Once a group establishes a separate state as the
basis of a referendum, it has the right to control future immigration into the
territory in accordance with the group’s need to preserve their traditional
rights. But, in addition, it has the right, not only to exclude certain people
in the future, but also to expel such people in the present: “if the immi
grants do not depart voluntarily, then their expulsion may be morally
permissible.”47 This right is based on the idea that those who have voted in
a referendum for a separate state have the right to take appropriate
measures to maintain the integrity and independence o f that state. If
immigration is not controlled, and prior immigrants not expelled, the state
may not be able to maintain both its unity (and hold over the territory) and
its consensual form o f government.
Self-determination for nations thus means that those nations can set
the nature of the decision procedure establishing the initial conditions of
membership (via a separate state), control the inclusion and exclusion of
individuals into the state once established, and forcibly expel others who
are not members o f the state by right.
Is There a Right to “Opt Out” of a State?
It is worth recalling the problem that Beran faces in developing his

membership version o f consent theory. By replacing a consent theory of
authority with one o f membership, he hopes to avoid the problems
associated with the concept of tacit consent—namely, the ways in which
individuals supposedly consent indirectly to state authority. Whether
through residence in a country or through other indications of consent
attributed to them, persons said to tacitly consent to a government can in
fact be shown to have done no such thing.
By replacing the attribution o f tacit consent to individuals with a
procedure by which those individuals directly choose their membership in
a political community, Beran hopes to make consent a more direct
process—and one less prone to doubt concerning people’s actual accep
tance o f authority. The key to this shift from consent to authority to consent
to membership is the possibility o f rejecting membership in a state—of
emigration or secession. But even if membership in a state is made
consensual, can that state then be regarded as fully democratic?
The idea of consent to membership relies on the right o f groups to “opt
out” of a state voluntarily. Whether democratic principles allow such a
right of opting out is what is at issue. Lea Brilmayer, for one, argues that
there is no such right:
Separatists cannot base their arguments upon a right to opt out because no
such right exists in democratic theory.... Government by the consent of the
governed does not necessarily encompass a right to opt out. It only
requires that within the existing political unit a right to participate
through electoral processes be available.4*
Beran argues that allowing consent to membership is a way to avoid

appealing to tacit consent. But the idea o f participatory democracy also
constitutes a means o f answering the question o f how people can enter into
voluntary political relations. How then are we to determine whether consent
is better understood as the right to secession from an existing state (as a
consent theory of membership) or as a right to participation in that state (as
a theory of participatory democracy)?
The idea that a group can invoke self-determination as a means of
ensuring a voluntary relationship with a state implies that the act of
founding new states is an ever present possibility. Groups within states are
viewed as existing autonomously without any particular obligations to other
groups or individuals with which they may coexist.49 This conception o f a
state o f nature is similar to Locke’s idea that individuals have the right to
possess parts of nature that they work upon without the consent o f any
other persons (who may previously have held it in common).50 Groups
wishing to opt out o f a state correspondingly have the right to do so without
the consent of any other persons or groups, including the other citizens of
that political community.
The Violation of Obligations
Maintaining that there is a right to opt out—and that the means to do this
is through self-determination referenda—is one way to construe a
consensual form o f democratic government. But it also results in a number
138 Chapter 4
of problems that ultimately yield either significant adverse consequences

or that contradict the original purpose o f consent theory. First, the right to
opt out suggests that national groups may exit from a state unilaterally
without incurring or causing negative consequences that would counterbal
ance whatever positive benefits there are to secession. But this implies that
there are no significant obligations within states—what Carol Pateman calls
horizontal obligations (i.e., of citizens to one another).
The idea of a horizontal obligation of citizens to one another directly
contradicts the assumption that there exists a state of nature out o f which
separate (or separable) groups may carve their own territories at will. The
horizontal relation between members of a political community relies on a
distinction between political obligation that is based on consent and one
that is based on acts o f promising. Promising creates new relationships of
mutual responsibility between the individuals directly concerned; similarly,
participatory democratic relations also create direct ties of mutuality
between citizens. Political life, when conceived of in this way, becomes
“the area of social existence in which citizens voluntarily cooperate
together and sustain their common life and common undertaking.”51 From
the viewpoint o f participatory democratic theory, the notion of consent to
membership still suffers from the problem of all “vertical” political
relations of obligation: it is a means by which persons alienate “their right
to make political decisions.”52
An answer to the question of whether consent theory can justify self-
determination as a right o f national groups depends on determining the
extent to which there could be binding obligations within existing
communities that would preclude unilateral exit. Only if groups have no
obligations to other citizens within the political community can they be said
to be merely acting voluntarily when they assert a claim to self-determina-
tion.
The crucial point here is how groups come to be able to assert that they
alone have the right to determine whether they will remain in or opt out of
a political association. Brilmayer refers to this problem when she writes
that
[One] line of reasoning linking consent to secession proposes that denying

a right of secession is directly contrary to the wishes of the separatist
group, and thus a violation of the principle of popular sovereignty.... The
fallacy of this argument is obvious; it assumes that the relevant individu
als to consult are the members of the secessionist group. In consulting the
population of the entire state, one might find that a majority overall
wished to remain a single country. What has not been explained is why
only the separatists need be consulted.*3
Beran’s answer is that only if separatists can make such decisions

themselves will the political community retain its voluntaristic character.54
But this implies that the only group that really counts in such decisions is
the group that asserts a claim to separate.
From the viewpoint o f participatory democratic theory, however, the
primary, or even only, relation of obligation is between the members o f a
political association. Relations between a group and the state are not at
issue because there is no relation of obligation that holds; it is rather the
relations between members o f the political community that are important.
Thus, the primary question in determining whether a claim o f secession is
valid is in terms o f its effect on the obligations that have been formed (that
is, political “promises” that have been made) between citizens o f a country.
This does not mean that political associations, once created, can never
be dissolved. But a participatory democratic theory would make such a
dissolution conditional on the satisfaction o f obligations between citizens
or on the mutual renunciation o f those obligations—not on the unilateral
withdrawal o f a group or nation from a political community. This is the real
issue at stake in Beran’s insistence that voluntarism is a principle that
should, at times, override majoritarian democratic decision-making. What
he calls voluntarism is really a product o f the assumption that intergroup
relations are a “state o f nature” in which there are no relations o f obligation
between different groups and nations (even within states).
In answering the second question o f whether the costs o f changes in
boundaries and citizenship necessitated by invoking self-determination are
acceptable, Beran insists that there are conditions under which secession
might not be recommended or possible. For instance, this may be the case
when the seceding group occupies a major part o f the existing state, when
it possesses the wealthiest area o f the state, or when it refuses to recognize
its own subgroups’ demands for self-determination. But “none o f these
conditions is an insuperable barrier to secession.”55 It is also unclear why
such prudential considerations should trump a principled claim to self-
determination. In the end, self-determination is the defining principle of
political authority, obligation, and legitimacy, taking precedence over other
desiderata.
Beran consistently ignores the consequences this might have for the
maintenance of even rudimentaiy political community or cooperation; his
underestimation of the dangers of legitimizing virtually any claim of
140 Chapter 4
secession or self-determination is striking. For one thing, he minimizes the

possibility that some secessions will lead to many more—what he calls the
“domino theory o f secession.”56 For another, he suggests that secessionist
claims will not lead to “many unviably-sized political entities.” This is
because “people do not disrupt the unity o f an existing state lightly....
Moreover, political separation at one level can go hand in hand with
economic (and political) integration at another.... [T]he fear of
balkanization may be largely illusory.”57
In a 1998 article, Beran does admit that, if his theory were to be
adopted, “the number o f states would increase considerably.”58 But this
would be limited by two factors: the lack o f viability o f very small states
and the probable calculation o f very small communities that remaining
affiliated with larger states would give them “greater control over their
internal affairs or a more prominent place among the communities o f the
world.”59 Needless to say, this is extremely speculative; it also contradicts
the recent history o f instances o f states’ fragmentation. But the primary
problem with this view is that these considerations are either vague (in the
case of the viability criterion) or prudential (in the case o f the concern for
real independence). Neither places any definite or principled limit on the
purported right o f nations and other communities to be self-determining as
it suits them.
Take the case o f Yugoslavia. Are the new states o f Slovenia, Macedo
nia, or Bosnia (to mention the smaller ones) viable? They are neither
economically self-sufficient nor militarily defensible (indeed, adoption of
foreign currencies and/or occupation by foreign troops are either under
consideration or have already occurred). Similarly, the momentum
generated by claims o f national self-determination was not slowed in any
discernible way by the very real possibility that these newly “sovereign”
states would be-anything but truly sovereign.
In considering the Yugoslav case, Beran writes that, if his theory (in
particular, reiterative referenda) had been applied, “[t]he result would have
been a rump Yugoslavia and independent states o f Slovenia, Croatia,
Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, but with borders considerably
changed by peaceful means to reflect the wishes o f those living in these
lands.”60 But the most authoritative commentaries on the disintegration of
Yugoslavia have generally concluded that once the principle of breaching
international borders was accepted, an escalation of violence became
almost inevitable.61 Beran thinks that by instigating an (initially) orderly
process of dissolution, this could have been prevented. Yet, his theory
provides a rationale for dissolution of even internal borders, including those
of brand new states, which would not (yet) have the means to ensure their
own integrity. How realistic is it to assume that legitimating the already
bloody process o f nation-statebuilding—by, for example, holding referenda
on independence in the Krajina, western Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro,
Vojvodina, and probably every village in Bosnia—could result in a
resolution o f any kind, just or unjust, “by peaceful means”?
In any case, the assertion o f self-determination as a democratic
entitlement o f national and other groups is potentially fatal to any
democratic polity that seeks to establish ties o f voluntaristic obligation and
cooperation among its members. As Robert Dahl has put it, granting groups
unconditional rights to political autonomy “would make a state, or any
coercive organization, impossible (or at any rate illegitimate), since any
group facing coercion on any matter could demand and through secession
gain autonomy.”62
The Necessity of Coercion
Supposedly, self-determination referenda provide a means o f ensuring that

states are democratically constituted. Furthermore, the reiterative use of
referenda preserves the voluntariness o f political authority by limiting the
referendum to the area o f people specified by the group desiring self-
determination. In addition, by providing the means for legitimately
establishing the boundaries of, and membership in, the (new) state,
referenda legitimize whatever changes in residence and possession are
required. Restrictions on immigration or forcible resettlement or expulsion
are justifiable if they are required to enforce changes in boundaries and
citizenship that have been legitimized by a referendum.
Ordinarily, referenda are conducted according to majoritarian principles.
But a special feature o f Beran’s formulation o f self-determination referenda
is that majorities o f existing political associations do not necessarily vote
to determine whether the association is continued or dissolved. This is
justified by the idea that democracy is based on an underlying principle of
voluntary political association that may, in certain cases, be served by
restricting majoritarian voting. The reiterative use o f referenda is designed
to ensure that voluntariness is preserved even in the definition o f who is to
be included in the political community in the first place. This requires that,
to allow for the possibility o f a minority group opting out, a separatist-
specified referendum must override a referendum o f the majority o f citizens
in an existing state. The reason is that, “if all citizens of the existing state
142 Chapter 4
could vote in the referendum they could outvote the separatists and the
unity of the state would then not be voluntary.”63
But does this attempt to restrict the scope of referenda actually extend,
rather than circumscribe, democratic principles o f voluntary association?
In other words, do self-determination referenda provide express consent to
membership for all the individuals involved? Certainly, for those able to
participate in the referendum, they do. But what about the majority o f
members in a state who cannot, on Beran’s model, vote in the referendum?
As Lea Brilmayer points out, the majority, in abiding with the results o f a
referendum in which they did not vote, must tacitly consent to the
rearrangements in boundaries and citizenship that follow. While the
(secessionist) minority exercises their will to form a new state, the
(possibly antisecessionist) majority is not even able to vote in a referendum
that might dissolve the political community o f which they are members. As
a result, ‘tacit consent can be attributed to members o f the dominant ethnic
group in the state, but not to members o f the secessionist group. As to the
latter, only actual consent will suffice.”64
Majority voting cannot, according to the consent theory o f membership,
legitimately apply to determining the extent and membership o f states.
Minorities must have the right to directly consent in a state of their own
choosing. But this results in the denial o f express, or actual, consent to a
much larger body o f individuals whenever a referendum to determine an
issue o f self-determination comes up. This applies as well to inhabitants o f
an area undergoing a self-determination referendum who are deemed not
to be occupants “by right,” but, e.g., recent (or even not so recent)
immigrants. Self-determination referenda deny the majority a vote in the
possible reconstitution o f their political community and thereby actually
contravene the idea that communities ought to be self-governing.
When we turn to the results of self-determination referenda, which may
be expressed either in the exclusion o f immigrants who might change the
present composition o f a newly independent state or in the forcible
expulsion o f inhabitants who are deemed not to be traditional occupants,
a similar problem occurs. Clearly in cases where such people either seek to
enter a new country or seek to remain there, their exclusion or expulsion
will violate their own express desires to be members o f that state. This is
justified because they presumably have no “moral right” to residence in a
territory (based on the traditional occupancy o f that territory).65
A central question for any consent theory that, through the means o f
referenda, seeks to justify forcible exclusions or expulsions (of resident
populations) is how such methods could be compatible with the basic value
of the voluntary acceptance o f political authority. What becomes apparent

here is how consent theory works to set up divisions between those who are
entitled to give (or withhold) their consent and those who are not. For the
latter, consent theory is a means to compel involuntary obedience rather
than voluntary agreement.66 In the case o f people actually excluded or
expelled, even obedience is deemed insufficient for their continued
membership in a state; they must be separated from any residence or
connection with the territory—one in which they may have lived their
entire lives (and in which they may even have been bom).
The use of referenda to decide self-determination for nations within
existing states—when such referenda are limited to the territories claimed
by secessionists—therefore violates both the letter and the spirit o f a
voluntarist conception o f political authority. No method o f political choice
that excludes most affected individuals from participation in the procedure
itself, and then justifies the permanent exclusion or expulsion of some of
them from a new state, can preserve even the appearance o f voluntarism.
The use of referenda when they are restricted in such a way that majority
populations are effectively disenfranchised requires coercing the majority
to accept outcomes which they were barred from deciding upon in the first
place.
The Seizure of Territory
A final problem with the consensual justification o f national self-determi-

nation is that of how consent can be used to ground claims to rightful
possession of territory. Consent is usually applied to people’s acceptance
or lack of acceptance o f the authority o f a government. But when consent
is applied to membership in the state itself—and accordingly includes the
right of secession—it must additionally justify a group’s right to “take out”
territory as it exits from the state’s authority and jurisdiction.
Brilmayer has suggested that the very idea o f self-determination is
misleading for this reason; it implies that proposed solutions to claims for
self-determination such as secession are fundamentally about the rights of
people, while they are actually about their rights over territory: “The phrase
self-determination frames the separatist question in a misleading way; it
obscures the territorial aspects o f the dispute. At issue is not a relationship
between peoples and states, but a relationship between people, states, and
territory.”67 The connection between popular consent to authority and the
legitimate possession of territory is obscured by the consent theory of
144 Chapter 4
membership.
The lack of an explicit justification of possession o f territory makes
consent theory at best an incomplete justification of self-determination. As
Allen Buchanan maintains, consent theory cannotjustify self-determination
since
even if various objections to the consent argument could be successfully

met, the most that argument would establish is that those who do not
consent are not obligated. It would not show that they may appropriate
territory, and hence it would not show that secession is justified.68
For a claim o f secession to be legitimate, there must be an additional

argument presented for why the secessionists can occupy some of the
territory of the existing state. Consent theory, by itself, cannot do this.
While consent theory can indicate the extent to which certain individu
als or groups no longer wish to be associated with a particular state, this at
most indicates that there is a legitimate reason for those individuals or
groups to emigrate. But rights to emigration do not need a claim of self-
determination for their justification. Conversely, if self-determination is
understood to include more than a right o f emigration, then an additional
reason is needed to justify the additional claim to particular territories. This
additional reason must establish a ‘Valid claim to territory.... It must be
shown that the secessionists have a right to the territory.”69
One feature o f Beran’s argument for self-determination is that, while it
is explicitly a theory of consent, there is an assumption that a right to
territory exists. Moreover, this right plays a crucial role in the theory in at
least two ways. First, the idea that self-determination includes a right to
secession rather than simply a right to emigration depends on the claim that
a group has rights to a territory—not just rights to exit from a state if the
group does not consent to its authority. Second, in the establishment of self-
determination referenda, ascertaining who has a right to vote is a function
o f who has a right to occupy and/or possess the territory in dispute.
In both o f these cases, the claim is made of a right to territory founded
not on consent but on a historical lineage that establishes a right prior to
consent or dissent. Beran’s claim is that “a group o f people who have
traditionally occupied an area have a right to continue to occupy it.”70What
this means is that before invoking the rights of consent, a legitimate claim
to the self-determination of a nation must invoke the rights o f tradition. But
this is to move the whole justification o f national self-determination onto
very different grounds.
This is because, while a self-determination referendum may indicate

present interest in invoking a claim to territory, it does not justify that
claim. What justifies it is the historical, communitarian, or ethical
specification o f the territory that must exist in order to identify it in the first
place. Once the territory has been identified, and the claim o f a group to
self-determination in it asserted, a referendum can do no more than indicate
whether the nation or group wishes to act on the claim at that time.
The actual justification o f a claim to territory must therefore refer back
to the historical traditions and communal attachments that exist before
consent theory can be used. But this is simply to indicate the impossibility
o f providing a justification for a principle o f national self-determination on
strictly democratic grounds.
Beran would undoubtedly reply, as he indicates in his 1998 article, that
while democratic theory does not provide a full theory o f just claims to
territory, it does provide a theory o f “rightful borders, i.e., borders
consistent with human rights.”71A claim o f (moral or human) rights, on this
account, trumps the consideration of good institutional arrangements—e.g.,
borders consistent with a just distribution o f land and resources. But why
accord self-determination the status o f a right, rather than a desideratum
given an unjust distribution o f territory?
The idea is that self-determination is a prima facie moral right o f human
beings because it is something that is intimately related to their ability to
be at liberty. Just institutions, on the contrary, enable persons to utilize their
liberty for their own good. But this distinction does not mean that the
distribution of territory and the determination o f boundaries are themselves
prima facie rights. Indeed, why accord self-determination the status o f a
moral right before weighing other considerations as to whether it is
justified? As Ronald Beiner puts it,
Why start off with the presumption of legitimacy, which is what the
“right” [to self-determination] announces, and then worry about how to
limit and qualify exercise of the right...rather than, as seems more prudent,
put the onus on nationalists and secessionists to make their case for the
reasonableness, in their own situation, of sovereignty or self-determina
tion?72
At this point, it seems that it is the “rhetoric o f rights” that is justifying the
prima facie character o f self-determination, rather than a theory of rights to
territory—which is what is needed.
When the democratic theorists regard claims to self-determination “in
146 Chapter 4
practice/’ they are often forced to admit, as Beran does, that “[voluntary
association, the criterion of rightful borders, can come in conflict with the
criteria of good borders.” At this point, “[t]hose committed to democracy
must assume that...the two sets o f criteria give outcomes that are not too
disparate.”73
Are There Any “Captive Nations”?
It is now appropriate to ask whether the examples o f so-called captive

nations given above are best regarded in this way or not: in short, whether
there are any legitimate cases o f national groups claiming self-determina
tion solely on the basis o f democratic choice. The classic problem of
consent enunciated by Ivor Jennings and others remains a primary
consideration in determining whether a legitimate principle of self-
determination can be derived from a theory o f consent.
In cases discussed in previous chapters, such as Quebec or Lithuania,
one dimension o f the debate about self-determination concerns whether
such entities are entitled to decide by themselves whether they ought to
establish independent states. Aside from constitutional considerations
(which may in some instances— such as in the former Soviet Union—allow
parts of a country to have such an option), the question is how to decide
which unit of population to consider in setting up referenda or other choice
procedures. As argued above, there is no way to “democratically” decide
this issue—it must be mandated originally in a state constitution. So
Quebec, Lithuania, and other similar regions do not have any better a case
on consensual grounds than on the ones previously discussed.
In terms o f the examples o f the Kurds and the Slovenians mentioned
earlier in this chapter, the question is whether either would have a
legitimate claim to self-determination solely on the basis o f a political
sentiment for independence. For instance, in the case o f the Kurds, //there
is warrant for an independent state, it would be because the Kurds have
been so subject to discrimination or oppression in one or more countries
where they live that there is little possibility of achieving redress without
an independent state. A desire for a separate state would not be sufficient
warrant absent such oppression, since there would be no way to distinguish
who would be allowed to participate in deciding the issue and who would
not.
Beran actually uses the Kurdish nationalist movement as an illustration
of the idea that self-determination need not depend on some prior condition
o f oppression. Even if the Kurds in their different countries of residence

were not subject to mistreatment or oppression, they would still have a
justifiable claim to self-determination. This is because their lack o f a
nation-state constitutes a disadvantage under which they are “unable to
maintain, develop and express their distinctive culture adequately. A people
can be severely...disadvantaged by arrangements which do not involve any
intentional discrimination, oppression or injustice.”74
But this view of the Kurdish question seems to be wrong about the
Kurds’ ability to develop or maintain their cultural identity. It is the case
that the Kurds have developed as a distinctive cultural (if not political)
presence in the region over the last six hundred years without having a state
of their own.75 If they are now unable to continue in this way, it must be
because of some special or new conditions which are inhibiting them from
doing so. But in that case, it would be a matter of “discrimination,
oppression, or injustice” mandating a claim o f self-determination, not the
simple existence of the Kurdish people—or even their professed desire for
a state. Without the existence of such a condition, it would be impossible,
as I argued above, to distinguish between who would and would not
legitimately have a say in deciding (through a referendum or by other
means) whether a new state was warranted.
Similarly, in the Slovenian (or Croatian or Bosnian) case, if a situation
existed in which particular Yugoslavian republics were subject to
discriminatory policies or practices by the federal government, grounds
would clearly exist for claims to independence, once redress appeared to be
foreclosed. But this is quite different from the claim that the nationalities
had a legitimate claim to secession from Yugoslavia solely on the basis of
the choice o f some part of the population of the country.
O f course, there were contingent reasons that led to the secessions. But
these reasons, which have been amply documented, have more to do with
the destabilization of the currency and the resultant economic depression
into which the country was plunged in the late 1980s than with any
systematic attempt to discriminate against particular nationalities by the
state.76Once the economic situation had deteriorated, the possibility of civil
war became real. But it was not antecedent to the Slovenian secession. In
fact, the Slovenian secession—which triggered the secession of the much
larger Croatian republic—precipitated the civil conflict that the mainte
nance o f the federation might have prevented.
In both cases, it is not the consent or lack o f consent to membership in
a state that is at issue, but whether or not some prejudicial condition exists
that provides a means of distinguishing a national group from other
148 Chapter 4
inhabitants of a state. Otherwise, there can be no warrant for determin

ing—on the basis o f ethnonational criteria, for example—that some persons
have the right to exercise their consent to a political arrangement, while
others do not So the concept o f captive nation obfuscates the issue o f self-
determination and democratic rights: it is not the lack o f a state (the
“captivity”) that generates a right to self-determination on democratic
grounds, but the lack o f ability to participate in a political system within an
existing country—and the oppression and injustice that are the result
Self-Determination, Nationalistic not Democratic
Regarding the self-determination o f nations as a democratic principle relies

on the plausibility o f the view that determining the membership and
boundaries of one’s political community is a basic entailment o f self-
government. But this is the case only if it is assumed that no great
differences separate these issues o f membership and boundaries from the
standard concerns o f democratic theory with the authority o f government
and the rights o f citizens.
What distinguishes Beran’s effort from others advocating self-determi
nation as a democratic principle is his willingness not to flinch from the
task of stipulating the conditions necessary to fully apply consent theory to
determining state boundaries and political membership. Unfortunately, in
so doing, the internal contradictions of a democratic theory o f self-
determination become manifest. As Buchanan notes, many democratic
theorists acknowledge that democratic consent has limits as a justification
for political institutions.77 But the democratic theorists o f self-determina-
tion seek to push back these limits by deriving a theory o f membership in
states from democratic principles. Paradoxically, doing this requires that
even more limits be put on democratic decision-making (i.e., self-determi-
nation referenda) than is the case when democracy is limited to participa
tion in existing political institutions.
Beran seems to concede as much in his more recent article when he
writes that “before a referendum can be held to determine whether a region
is to change its political borders, it has to be determined who is entitled to
vote in the referendum.”78But Beran thinks that this can be done democrati
cally and that the quandary mentioned by Jennings in the quotation at the
beginning of this article—that a people must be defined before they can
decide anything—can be avoided. This is because “[t]he reiterated use o f
the majority principle to settle disputes about political borders always
yields a determinate result.”79 O f course, this is true only if it has been

previously stipulated who may—and who may not—participate in such a
referendum. It is misleading not to mention, as Beran does not in his 1998
article, that the scope of such referenda are defined by the nationalists (or
other groups) seeking self-determination and that they are to be restricted
to members of those nationalities—i.e., the residents o f particular territories
who are there “by right.” In his earlier work, Beran stipulates this—and it
is these provisions alone that make it possible for referenda to “yield a
determinate result.”
Meanwhile, though a democratic theory cannot be used without
contradiction to justify self-determination directly, the attempt to do so may
nevertheless add fuel to the fire of nationalistic aspirations for partition and
revanchism. Beran asserts that, if claims to self-determination give rise to
conflict and war, it is because of the resistance of existing states to such
claims. “It is confused thinking,” he writes, ‘to reject the right of secession
because its exercise may unjustifiably be opposed by some states with
force.”80
But this is true only if it were the case that other people (not just states)
were never interested in rejecting claims to self-determination, including
secession. Since no one but members o f potentially seceding nationalities
would have any say in a self-determination referendum, it is not hard to
conceive o f situations in which the denial o f a voice in the dissolution of
a country would provoke people—-justifiably, on consensual grounds—to
resist such secessions. This is, of course, in addition to the ways in which
other nationalist groups seeking self-determination could be expected to
contest the attempt to claim territory that has historically been disputed by
different nationalities. Just as the essentially nationalistic character of a
democratic theory of self-determination is assumed when defined—then
overlooked when it is justified—so its nonconsensual character must be
stipulated in order to get an outcome, while it must be forgotten in order to
regard this outcome as “democratic.”
In justifying self-determination referenda, or the principle more
generally, recourse must be made to predemocratic determinations of group
(i.e., national) membership in order for claims to self-determination to get
going. Furthermore, once going, the claims can be used to justify political
disenfranchisements, demographic expulsions, and territorial seizures—all
in the name o f “democracy.” One needs little imagination to realize, as
Copp and Philpott, for instance, acknowledge, that nationalists will be the
ones most likely to avail themselves of these justifications.
But since the actual justification of a claim to national self-determina
150 Chapter 4
tion must inevitably refer back to the historical traditions and territorial
identifications o f a national group prior to any determination o f current
political sentiments, some advocates o f the principle jettison the attempt to
give it a basis in democratic consent and go on to justify it on the basis o f
the value o f the kind o f community that nation-states supposedly are. This
“communitarian” justification is the subject o f the next chapter.
Notes
1. Carole Pateman, in her book 7%e Problem o f Political Obligation: A
Critique ofLiberal Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), states
that: ‘The idea of self-assumed obligation and the theoretical perspective of
abstract individualism share a common historical origin. This means that they tend
to be seen as if they are integrally associated with each other” (24).
2. Michael Walzer, “The New Tribalism,” Dissent (Spring 1992), 165.
3. John Stuart Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government,” in
“On Liberty " and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 230.
4. Christopher H. Wellman, “A Defense of Secession and Political Self-
Determination,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 24, no. 2 (Spring 1995), 161.
5.The latent libertarianism of this brand of nationalism has been
emphasized particularly by John Feffer in “Self-Determination as a Contingency
Principle,” New Politics 4, no. 3 (1993): 137-43, especially 141.
6. Harry Beran, “A Democratic Theory of Political Self-Determination for
a New World Order,” in Percy B. Lehning (ed.), Theories o f Secession (London:
Routledge, 1998), 32 (italics added).
7. Beran, “Democratic Theory of Political Self-Determination,” 42.
8. David Copp, “Do Nations Have the Right of Self-Determination?” in
Stanley G. French (ed.), Philosophers Look at Canadian Confederation (Montreal:
Canadian Philosophical Association, 1979), 84. Copp concludes: “given that the
members of a nation desire that they be governed by a separate national state, there
is a prima facie case for their being governed by such a state.” Cf. Copp’s more
recent article, “Democracy and Communal Self-Determination,” in Robert McKim
and Jeff McMahan (eds.), The Morality ofNationalism (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1997), in which he attempts to make a distinction between a narrowly
nationalist and a more “statist” principle of self-determination in which
‘“territorial-political’ societies” have such a right (278). The argument of this
chapter, in part, is that such a distinction cannot hold up on democratic-consensual
grounds, since there needs to be some prior specification of what constitutes a
society, territory, or people before that entity can be said to consent or not consent
to anything.
9. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, trans. Judith R.
Masters (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1978), bk. 1, ch. 5, and 3, ch. 16.
10. Copp, “Do Nations Have the Right of Self-Determination?” 87-88.

11. Copp, “Do Nations Have the Right of Self-Determination?” 86-87
(italics added).
12. Copp, “Do Nations Have the Right of Self-Determination?” 86.
13. Harry Beran, “More Theory of Secession: A Response to Birch,”
Political Studies 36 (1988): 317. Birch’s article, “Another Liberal Theory of
Secession,” can be found in Political Studies 32 (1984): 596-602.
14. Daniel Philpott, “Self-Determination in Practice,” in Margaret Moore
(ed.), National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998), 82 (italics added).
15. See Walzer, “New Tribalism,” 166.
16. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
17. See Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution
after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995), esp. chap. 2,
for a history and analysis of this system and its collapse.
18. Copp, “Do Nations Have the Right of Self-Determination?” 84.
19. Copp, “Democracy and Communal Self-Determination,” 285.
20. Allen Buchanan, “Democracy and Secession,” in Margaret Moore
(ed.), National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998), 20.
21. Daniel Philpott, “In Defense of Self-Determination,” Ethics 105
(1995): 362.
22. Philpott, “In Defense of Self-Determination,” 368 (italics added).
23. Wellman, “Defense of Secession,” 150.
25. Wellman, “Defense of Secession,” 160-61.
28. Harry Beran, The Consent Theory o f Political Obligation (London:
Croom Helm, 1987), 31.
29. Beran, Consent Theory o f Political Obligation, 28-29.
30. A. John Simmons defines consent theory generally as “any theory of
political obligation which maintains that the political obligations of citizens are
grounded in their personal performance of a voluntary act which is the deliberate
undertaking of an obligation” (Moral Principles and Political Obligations
[Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979], 57-58). In this general
formulation, it includes promises, contracts, and various types of express and tacit
consent.
31. For instance, Simmons writes that while “express consent is a ground
of political obligation...the real battleground for consent theory is generally
admitted to be the notion of tacit consent. It is on this leg that consent theory must
lean most heavily if it is to succeed” (Moral Principles and Political Obligations,
79).
152 Chapter 4
32. Pateman, Problem o f Political Obligation, 21.

34. Harry Beran, “Self-Determination: A Philosophical Perspective,” in
W. J. Allan Macartney (ed.), Self-Determination in the Commonwealth (Aberdeen,
England: Aberdeen University Press, 1988), 27.
35. Beran, Consent Theory o f Political Obligation, 23 (italics added).
36. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 95.
37. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 99-100. In
addition, it should be noted that, even when individuals are willing to emigrate as
a way of rejecting the authority of a state, the frequent unwillingness of other states
to admit such persons severely limits the use of that option. Recent examples ofthis
can be found in the United States’ attitude toward Haitian immigrants, Germany’s
restriction of Turkish immigration, and so forth.
39. Beran, Consent Theory o f Political Obligation, 125.
40. Beran, Consent Theory o f Political Obligation, 99.
41. Harry Beran, “A Liberal Theoiy of Secession,” Political Studies 32
(1984): 25.
(London: Edward Elgar, 1990), 154.
43. Beran, “Self-Determination,” 28.
44. Harry Beran, “Border Disputes and the Right of National Self-
Determination,” History o f European Ideas 16, nos. 4-6 (Jan. 1993): 485.
45. Beran, “Self-Determination Referenda,” 158.
48. Lea Brilmayer, “Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial
Interpretation,” Yale Journal o f International Law 16 (1991): 185 (italics added).
49. The concept of the state of nature is used here in the sense of a
condition that allows for the unilateral actions of groups (nations) by right, such
that these actions need not be limited either by responsibilities of the groups to
others or by the rights of other groups. Such an assumption, while not explicit in
Beran, cannot fail to play a role in his theory, since—despite his disavowals—the
legitimacy of secession implies a lack of conflict over specific territories. Such
conflict is inevitable in a world populated with various states, groups, territories,
countries, and peoples—many with overlapping claims. His idea of self-
determination makes more sense if it is assumed that groups operate in a relative
vacuum, unpopulated by other groups with rival claims or already existing
rights—or that groups do not have responsibilities to others (what Pateman calls
“horizontal” obligations).
While Beran explicitly rejects the idea of an “original contract” found in
Locke, among others (Consent Theory o f Political Obligation, 45), he nevertheless
assumes a type of continuing state of nature in which nations and states do not owe
one another anything and in which they can furthermore legitimately act without
consideration of rival claims (to territory or to mutual responsibilities). This idea
of a state of nature connects Beran more with contemporary international “realists”
than with the traditional contractarians. Such thinkers as Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans
Morgenthau, and George Kennan maintain this idea of realism as the absence of
reciprocal obligations (other than the minimal one of keeping international peace,
where possible). Beran seems to accept this idea, at least by implication. For a
critique of the “realist” approach to international relations, see Marshall Cohen,
“Moral Skepticism and International Relations,” in Charles R. Beitz et al. (eds.),
International Ethics: A “Philosophy and Public Affairs " Reader (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1985), 3-52.
50. “[I]t is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of
the state nature leaves it in, which begins theproperty; without which the common
is of no use. And the taking of this or that part, does not depend on the express
consent of all the commoners” (John Locke, Second Treatise o f Government
[Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1980], 19).
53. Brilmayer, “Secession and Self-Determination,” 185 (italics added).
54. Beran, “Liberal Theory of Succession,” 27.
56. Beran, “Liberal Theory of Secession,” 29.
57. Beran, “Liberal Theory of Secession,” 30. Needless to say, the
foregoing must be read in light of the disintegration of the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, as well as the possibly imminent fragmentation
of some of the largest, and most democratic, states in the world, such as India,
Italy, and Canada.
60. Beran, “Democratic Theory of Political Self-Determination,” 51
(italics added).
61. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, and Catharine Samary, Yugoslavia
Dismembered, trans. Peter Drucker (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1995).
62. Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
63. Beran, “Liberal Theory of Secession,” 27.
64. Brilmayer, “Secession and Self-Determination,” 186.
66. Pateman has emphasized the underlying current of submission to be
found in liberal consent theory: “The basic liberal argument about the relationship
of citizens to the state is that there are good reasons for obedience. Yet, the
argument must be given a voluntarist appearance” (Problem o f Political
Obligation, 168 [italics added]).
67. Brilmayer, “Secession and Self-Determination,” 179; see also 192-93.
154 Chapter 4

69. Buchanan, Secession, 72; cf. Brilmayer, “Secession and Self-
Determination,” 189.
70. Beran, Consent Theory o f Political Obligation, 38-39 (italics added);
see also Beran, “Self-Determination Referenda,” 158.
72. Ronald S. Beiner, “National Self-Determination: Some Cautionary
Remarks Concerning the Rhetoric of Rights,” in Margaret Moore (ed.), National
Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 174.
73. Beran, “Democratic Theory of Political Self-Determination,” 45
(italics added).
75. See Nader Entessar, Kurdish Ethnonationalism (Boulder, Colo.:
Lynne Rienner, 1992), esp. 3-6.
76. See Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, esp. chap. 3, as well as Samary,
Yugoslavia Dismembered, esp. 62-65, for the history of this process.
77. Buchanan, “Democracy and Secession,” 20-21.
Chapter 5
The Nation-State as an Ethical

Community
In the state...man is the imaginary member of an imaginary sovereignty,
divested of his real, individual life, and infused with an unreal
universality.
—Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question”
Solidarity, not Consent
The principle of national self-determination means, not only that nationali

ties have a right to cultural expression and political participation, but also
that they may claim a country or territory of their own. Yet, a justification
o f national self-determination that relies on a notion of individual political
consent cannot yield adequate reasons for honoring claims to national
territories or homelands. Only a theory that can demonstrate that there is
necessarily a connection between particular nationalities and specific
territories may also be able to provide this justification.
A distinction must therefore be made between what David Miller has
recently called the “principle of nationality” and the idea o f individual
consent to a government.1 Miller characterizes the difference in the
following way:
The principle of nationality...holds that people who form a national

community in a particular territory have a good claim to political self-
determination. This principle should not be confused with a certain liberal
view of the state which makes individual consent a necessary and
sufficient condition of a state’s authority.2
Miller asserts that a consequence of the consensual justification of self-

determination which disqualifies it from serving as a viable theory of self-
determination is the anarchic and unstable outcomes which presumably
155
156 Chapters
would follow from implementation of a thoroughgoing consent-based system

of nation-states. There would be no way of ensuring stable and secure
boundaries when changes in the way individuals view their political loyalties
could lead to continual rearrangements of state sovereignties and territories.
But there is another difference between the consent-based and the
nationality-based theories of self-determination: the former relies on an
essentially individualist view o f political legitimacy, while the latter
substitutes a “communitarian” conception in which nationalities are
distinguished, not on the basis o f individual loyalties, but as solidaristic
communities which generate rights to particular territories. The communi
tarian view does not completely discount the role o f individual affinities in
identifying national groups; but it suggests that what is most important is not
the will of individuals but their identities. Thus, it turns out, on this view,
that the right question to ask, according to Miller, “is not ‘Does this group
now want to secede from the existing state?’ but ‘Does the group have a
collective identity which is or has become incompatible with the national
identity of the majority in the state?’”3
While the distinction between consensual and communitarian theories of
political legitimacy could perhaps be characterized as a distinction between
democratic and nondemocratic theories, this is not really accurate. A type of
consent might very well have a place within a communitarian theory, but it
would not be one of actual individual consent to political authority. Rather,
consent would be seen to be more a matter of congruence between a
community and its way o f life and the state which is sovereign over it. This
is made clear by Michael Walzer when, in writing of a right of states to be
secure from intervention by others, he connects such a right with the
community that it is to protect:
The rights of states rest on the consent of their members. But this is
consent of a special sort... The moral standing of any particular state
depends upon the reality of die common life it protects and die extent to
which the sacrifices required by that protection are willingly accepted and
thought worthwhile. If no common life exists, or if the state doesn’t defend
the common life that does exist, its own defense may have no moral
justification.4
Nevertheless, the main concern o f communitarian thinkers such as

Walzer is not the rights of individuals as such, but the needs of a community
to maintain itself in the face of other, potentially hostile, communities. Every
The Nation-State as an Ethical Community 157
community must, on this view, confront the problem of how to mobilize its
members to fulfill duties to other members or to protect the community as
a whole. This problem is one o f defining the basis for solidarity within
communities, and it is a major concern o f communitarians. Nationalism, or
what Miller calls the principle of nationality, is a central means o f addressing
this problem in contemporary politics:
[Njationality answers one of the most pressing needs of the modem world,
namely how to maintain solidarity among the populations of states that are
large and anonymous.... [Many] problems can be avoided only where there
exists large-scale solidarity, such that people feel themselves to be
members of an overarching community, and to have social duties to act for
the common good of that community.... Nationality is de facto the main
source of such solidarity.5
Such a view o f the importance and role of nationality in ensuring the

solidarity of people with a state can be termed communitarian inasmuch as
it focuses on the connection between a nationality as a prepolitical
community and the state as a means of expressing the identity and interests
o f that community. Some communitarians, however, have been puzzlingly
vague concerning the political and institutional outcomes to be expected
from their affirmation o f certain views o f personality and morality. In fact,
some are quite skeptical about a purported affinity between
communitarianism and nationalism.
For instance, Will Kymlicka argues that the nation-state is incompatible
with communitarianism, since the latter emphasizes the need for shared
moral values, which can only be found within ra/mational communities, not
entire nations.6 While this may be true, it does not necessarily contradict the
communitarian idea that in order to constitute a political community a
particular national character is required. National identities, Kymlicka
admits, “must be taken as givens”; yet, if this is so, these identities are
equivalent to “national characters” that do embody common political or
public virtues, values, or goods which can serve as the basis for political
institutions. The theory of political communitarianism and the institution of
the nation-state do therefore seem to be closely connected.
In contrast, Michael Walzer explicitly connects a communitarian
definition o f justice with the legitimation of the nation-state and o f the
rights of nationalities without states to obtain them.8 In particular, he has
used a conception o f “communal autonomy” to argue for the validity o f
158 Chapter 5
national claims to separate states.9 I f the communitarian definition of a

nation is accepted, the idea o f self-determination for nations follows
inexorably. For instance, Walzer defines a nation as “a historic community,
connected to a meaningful place, enacting and revising a way o f life,
aiming at political or cultural self-determination.”10By defining nations in
this way, the need for a distinct argument for a right o f self-determination
is avoided; the work has already been done in the act o f definition. As
David Miller writes, “the thesis that a nation should want its own state is
at one level tautological, since the ambition to be politically self-determin
ing is built in to the very idea o f nationhood.”11
The central conclusion to be drawn from communitarian theories such
as Walzer and Miller’s is that, since bounded communities are a political
necessity in the world as it is, and since nation-states are the best form such
communities can take, these nation-states are the primary form of “ethical
community”—that is, the primary (political) embodiment of the good
life—in the modem era.12What kind o f a community a nation-state is, and
in what way it is “ethical,” o f course remains to be seen.
Two Cases
Before considering the nature o f communal autonomy and why nations

should have it, we might bring to mind a couple o f cases in which the issue
of self-determination as a claim to communal autonomy is especially clear.
The question o f political autonomy, when not considered in relation to legal
rights, moral goods, or consensual government, tends to come up as a
demand in two types o f cases. First, it is frequently equivalent to a claim of
regional autonomy; second, it is a demand o f indigenous peoples. These
two types o f cases are not necessarily distinct in all instances; but it might
be useful as a preliminary to separate them and consider an example o f
each.
In the first case, we might consider the regional autonomy movements
that have arisen in the last generation in the United Kingdom, particularly
in Scotland and Wales (Northern Ireland is a distinct case).13The national
ist demands for self-determination in this instance have generally relied on
a perception that Britain is a country dominated in various ways by the
English and that preserving a measure of regional diversity requires
political independence for Scotland and Wales. So the underlying reasoning
seems to rely on the good o f decentralization as a means to autonomy for
regional communities within the British state. But o f course the nationalists
go the extra step o f insisting on the dissolution of the British state into its
component parts as a means of ensuring this autonomy.
A second type of case involves demands for self-determination by
indigenous peoples in various parts of the globe. One important example
o f these demands is the assertion o f American Indian peoples in the United
States and Canada (and, to some extent, in Mexico and Central and South
America, as well) that they form distinct communities which are worthy of
some form o f political autonomy.
One problem with this assertion is the definition of “indigenous”
peoples. While this term has come to be distinguished from primitive,
undeveloped, or tribal peoples in current international legal usage, it still
designates a kind o f community that is distinct in some important ways
from those dominant within certain countries.14 In terms of American
Indians specifically, some acknowledgment of their special status has of
course been given in the United States and particularly in Canada. But the
question is whether this constitutes just recognition o f legitimate claims of
national self-determination, o f some other principle o f self-determination,
or o f strictly domestic problems o f underdevelopment or discrimination.
The answer must await further specification of the nature o f communal
autonomy and o f its application to nations.
The Nature of Communal Autonomy
Michael Walzer maintains that national self-determination is a principle of

“communal autonomy” in the sense that communities ought to have a right
of freedom from interference or domination by other communities. O f
course, the question that arises is to which communities this principle ought
to be applied. Walzer understands communal autonomy to be equivalent to
the principle o f nonintervention in international law: “the nonintervention
principle [means] always act so as to recognize and uphold communal
autonomy.... We need to establish a kind of a priori respect for state
boundaries; they are...the only boundaries communities ever have.”15
What is interesting about this interpretation of the nonintervention
principle is that it is justified, not in terms of the rights o f people to
participation in a political community, but in terms of the rights of another,
prior and as yet unspecified, community to protection from other states.
This view is made clearer when Walzer’s views on the right o f communi
ties to include and exclude people are examined. It turns out that such a
right is designed to protect, not the ability of a political community to
160 Chapter 5
function, but the character o f a prepolitical community to flourish:
Admission and exclusion are at the core of communal independence. They

suggest die deepest meaning of self-determination. Without them, there
could not be communities o f character, historically stable, ongoing
associations of men and women with some special commitment to one
another and some special sense of their common life.16
Communal autonomy for political communities serves the purpose o f

protecting cultural communities; in other words, states are meant to ensure
the existence and well-being o f nations.
While this view will not perhaps give as strong a justification for a list
o f individual rights as a contractarian or utilitarian view, it can potentially
provide a much stronger justification for the rights o f groups such as
nations, since the existence and health o f such groups is exactly what
generates the need for states, rights, and other political institutions in the
first place. What remains to be seen is whether such a communitarian
conception of self-determination can solve the problem that plagued the
consensual justification—that o f territorial settlement.
To do this, Walzer needs to show, first, that political communities must
be founded on the identities o f particular nations, second, that such
identities rightly set limits on membership in those communities, and third,
that states must protect these identities in order to maintain their own
cohesion. National self-determination would therefore be justified as a
primary means o f securing the communal autonomy necessary for the
existence and flourishing o f political communities. In addition, the problem
o f territory would be solved in the sense that there would be no alternative
to according nations their own territories on which to exist, inasmuch as
they asserted a claim to them.
I will argue that just as national self-determination cannot be based on
a right o f individuals to democratic consent, so it cannot be based on the
claim o f national communities to political autonomy. Not the least o f the
reasons for this will turn out to be the inability o f a principle o f communal
autonomy—when it is interpreted nationalistically—to resolve the very
disputes over territory and boundaries that it is designed to settle.
Identity, not Will
In arguing for self-determination by using a concept o f communal

autonomy, Walzer must initially establish a distinction between political

communities and cultural identities. This difference is, o f course, suggested
by the tradition o f distinguishing political from cultural nations
(iStaatsnation and Kultumation), a tradition initiated by Friedrich
Meinecke, and particularly embodied in German scholarship on national
identity.17
To some extent, such a distinction is the product o f twentieth-century
political experience, since many commentators in the nineteenth century
did not make it. When, for instance, Renan called the nation a product of
a “daily plebiscite,” he was suggesting that there is no fixity to nations, but
that they are products o f an essentially political process o f definition and
redefinition.18And, when Acton maintained that “The great importance of
nationality in the State consists in the fact that it is the basis o f political
capacity,” he in fact meant by nationality, “[c]ertain political habits and
ideas [that] belong to particular nations.”19
While such statements seem consistent with Walzer and other contem
porary nationalists’ claims for the importance o f national communities, they
are actually quite different. When Renan (or Acton) argued for the variable
nature o f national feelings, he meant that these feelings depend to a
considerable extent, not on any determinate identity which the people o f a
given country might have, but on an act o f will to affirm or deny particular
affinities with others in that country, region, or group. Cultural nations have
sometimes been thought to have definite, stable, and objectively determina
ble characteristics that would fix their identity and location. But contempo
rary nationalists such as Walzer often do not claim that nations are
invariant in this way.
Nevertheless, there must be some limits to our ability to define and
redefine the character and extent o f nations, or they could not be used to
order and, if necessary, rearrange political sovereignties and boundaries. In
discussing what type o f identity is found within national groups, Walzer
states that they “are likely to share a wide range of cultural
artifacts—language, religion, historical memory, the calendar and its
holidays, the sense o f place, a specific experience o f art and music—and as
a result o f some or all o f these, what we call ‘nationality.’”20 The result of
this common identity made up of different “cultural artifacts” is that an
“emergent nation-state...can be viewed by its members as an appropriate
and already familiar framework for the exercise o f autonomy and the
formation o f attachments.”
If the nation has a cultural identity that is distinct from acts o f political
“will-formation,” how is that identity to be characterized? What gives a
162 Chapter 5
community its “character”? Above all, it would seem that history and
geography give form to those cultural communities commonly called
nations. On the one hand, a sense of memory and, on the other hand, a
sense of place seem to be the most important determinants o f national
identities.21
Is this an ethnonational conception of nations? Walzer is not especially
concerned to answer this question; but David Miller is. He argues that
nations need not be ethnically defined in order for them to be communities
in something like the sense outlined above: “Even nations that originally
had an exclusively ethnic character may come, over time, to embrace a
multitude of different ethnicities.”22 But this misses the point made earlier
about ethnonationalism; it is not the reality of consanguinity but the belief
that there are ethnic commonalities that defines nations. Neither Walzer nor
Miller deny this explicitly—and their conceptions o f national identity
actually provide evidence that this is the case.
In the case o f Walzer, historical memory and geographical rootedness
allegedly define nationality. But what is the content of memory or
rootedness, if not a belief in common ancestry or a mutual homeland (in the
sense of place of origin)? While it is possible to speak loosely about such
things, this does not mean that the content of the beliefs is not still
fundamentally ethnonational. Put somewhat differently, the language of
memory and homeland just is the language o f ethnicity.
While Miller admits that nationality begins in ethnicity, he does not
want to concede that it ends there as well. National identities are character
ized as having five features: (1) common beliefs, (2) a history, (3) group
activity, (4) geographical specificity, and (5) a “common public culture.”23
Miller regards history and geography in much the same way that Walzer
does. Group activities and a common culture require that persons identify
with the group or the culture—they require prior ascriptions o f identity,
either by individuals themselves or by others of them. What are these
ascriptions based upon? Sometimes they are based upon physical or other
characteristics of personhood (e.g., physical features or language); but there
are counterexamples in which ascriptions of nationality have been applied
to people with diverse characteristics. We come back to the first feature,
beliefs.
What sort of beliefs? Miller states that, “nations exist when their
members recognize one another as compatriots, and believe that they share
characteristics o f the relevant kind.”24 But he immediately seems to retract
the second part o f this thought—that it is particular characteristics that
define national identities. Only “mutual recognition” is sufficient. But on
what is such recognition founded? It can be nothing other than the belief
that we share a common ancestry with certain others; were we to share
something else with them—interests, skills, dogmas—we would identify
them as members of similar classes, occupations, movements, but not of
nations. Miller’s five-fold definition of national identity (as well as
Walzer’s two-fold characterization) therefore reduces to one aspect, which
implicitly utilizes an ethnic conception of nationality, while explicitly being
a refutation of it.
In any case, while both Walzer and Miller would argue that nations are
defined prepolitically (if not ethnically), it is also a necessary feature of
them that they will seek to “affirm” their identity by becoming self
determining. Cultural nationality therefore inevitably generates political
action. This act of affirming one’s national community is what Walzer
refers to as “tribalism”—“the commitment of individuals and groups to
their own history, culture, and identity.”25 It is a type of commitment that
ratifies the only transcultural universal that there is—namely, the ineradica
ble differences between groups: “our common humanity will never make
us members o f a single universal tribe. The crucial commonality of the
human race is particularism.”
This particularism is reflected in the more or less close ties that
nationalities have to regions, lands, or territories. Fundamentally, nations
are defined as those communities that already have countries o f their own:
national communities...came into existence, and were sustained over the

centuries, on the basis of geographical coexistence.... Nations look for
countries because in some deep sense they already have countries: the
link between people and land is a crucial feature of national identity.26
O f course, the sense in which nations already have countries is cultural; the
political problem still to be settled is the means by which a nation will
come to govern their own country.
Self-determination is a means by which nations assert their right to
determine this. The political result of this close link between nations and
lands is that a major reorganization of boundaries and territories may be
warranted. This is because it is only nations that can provide a basis for the
legitimacy of a particular boundary or state: “It is the coming together of
a people that establishes the integrity of a territory.”27Absent this “coming
together,” boundaries and territories are apportioned out to states and rulers
by accidents o f history, without any rights necessarily following from them:
“It hardly matters if the territory belongs to someone else, unless that
164 Chapter 5
ownership is expressed in residence and common use.”28

The implications of this view of national identity are considerable.
When combined with a communitarian view o f duties and rights, it yields
a moral as well as political particularism that limits the scope of any claims
to moral consideration to specific, territorially bounded communities. This
is because, since communities constitute the material foundations for any
possible moral life, they also set the boundaries o f applicability for moral
claims about what constitutes proper conduct:
In practice...we show equal respect and concern only when our roles
require it and then only over the population relevant to the roles.... Neither
the same fellowship nor the same idea [of citizens] will be universally
shared—and then what demands respect is only indirectly the individual
himself; it is more immediately the way of life, the culture of respect and
concern, that he shares with his fellows.29
The significance o f this view is that it suggests how important it is for

nations to protect their communal integrity by whatever means are
necessary—including establishing independent states of their own. Only
then can nations erect an edifice of mores, norms, and values by which to
live some kind o f a good life.
Furthermore, it is only by maintaining control over the entry and exit of
people into a community that such a life may be cultivated. Social justice
requires the ability to set limits to the scope of mutual obligations, limits
beyond which communities cannot be expected to have responsibilities.30
This is what Walzer means by the primacy of “membership”—the fact that,
in the world of nation-states, claims for justice have a necessarily limited
scope. Political wisdom consists in accepting this and making the best of
it.
Social justice therefore inevitably applies only within the restricted
limits of a particular national territory or country:
The idea of distributive justice presupposes a bounded world within

which distributions take place.... That world...is the political community,
whose members distribute power to one another and avoid, if they
possibly can, sharing it with anyone else.31
The ability o f nations to control their membership—who is and who is

not a member o f the nation— thus has direct impact on who can lay claim
to consideration on the part o f the national community. In determining what
are goods and how they ought to be distributed, therefore, the first good to
be considered is that of membership in a community itself:
The primary good that we distribute to one another is membership in some

human community. And what we do with regard to membership structures
all our other distributive choices: it determines with whom we make those
choices, from whom we require obedience and collect taxes, to whom we
allocate goods and services.32
Once membership in a nation is settled, individuals may lay claim to the

other goods available to and appropriate for them. But the first issue is
whether such individuals are, and can plausibly claim to be, members of the
nation itself.
The primary means o f controlling membership is the state in its capacity
as the institution that sets conditions for citizenship and guards territory.
Walzer thus moves from an assertion of the integrity of cultural-national
communities based on land and memory to claims for sovereignty on the
part o f such communities. Cultural nations must become political nations
in order to safeguard their integrity, territory, resources, and ways of life.
Political self-determination becomes a justifiable and even essential
demand for nations to make in a world of sovereign states.
From Communal Autonomy to Self-Determination
While other nationalists have argued that nation-states can have good
consequences for individual well-being, the communitarian justification of
nation-states given by Walzer is different. The good is not one that
necessarily accrues to individuals as such, but is a good for communities as
a whole. There is, o f course, a connection between the welfare o f national
groups and that of their members on this account. It is the connection that
obtains between individuals that experience themselves as members of a
group and the fate o f that group as a whole—obviously they will be closely
intertwined. But it is most especially the political life o f nations that is at
stake when the question o f sovereignty arises. This is not subject to
consequentialist calculations; without the state, there is no possibility for
persons to act politically.33
Aside from the value of political life for individuals, it is also the case
(according to the communitarians) that, if society is to be in any sense a just
community, it must have the protection of a nation-state. This is because,
as Miller (who has argued this point most extensively) puts it, nation-states
166 Chapter 5
“are the only possible form in which overall community can be realized in
modem societies.”34 It is only when states obtain a national identity that
they can embody “trust” across society (and particularly, among different
social classes).33
The reason for this is that nations are ethical communities in a way that
multinational entities are not. It is an inevitable feature of modem politics
that we feel that we have duties to members o f our national group that we
do not have to others. This feeling is rooted to a substantial degree in “prior
obligations of nationality”—obligations that obtain prior to those that may
arise between citizens o f states.36
But the basis o f political trust, Miller claims, must be the faith that there
are potential grounds for agreement among citizens. In modem states, it is
only a common nationality that makes this “sense o f solidarity” possible.37
Furthermore, when the state is used to ensure a measure o f social justice,
particularly through redistributive taxation or welfare policies, it is only
when such measures are thought of as national—that is, designed to better
a national community within which some sense o f obligation already
obtains—that they have a possibility of acceptance and success.38
The proper fit between nations and states—something that the principle
o f national self-determination is designed to ensure—is thus essential in
strengthening sentiments and institutions o f democratic legitimation and
redistributive justice without which modem societies are increasingly
vulnerable to domination by political elites and exploitation by the global
market.39 Nations seek self-determination because states “with strong
national identities and without internal communal divisions” are more
successful in achieving social justice within their borders.40
The importance o f territory and the sovereignty o f nation-states is
therefore that only within them can nations develop their own internal
political life—something which, in turn, is supposed to protect the integrity
of a nation’s identity (that is, its cultural life). What is at stake is fundamen
tally a matter o f freedom—not o f individuals, but o f the nation in its desire
for “self’-expression. Only the sovereignty o f a territorial state is able to
guarantee the possibility o f such self-expression.41
National self-determination is therefore justified by the need that
communities have for autonomy.42 This autonomy must, in one way or
another, be achieved through the exercise o f state sovereignty. But what
does such sovereignty involve? Two aspects o f sovereignty are essential for
nations in order to secure their autonomy, according to Walzer. First, there
is the establishment o f boundaries within which nations can protect their
autonomy from others. Second, there is the determination o f membership
(that is, citizenship) by which nations can preserve their integrity.

A right o f nations to the territory that constitutes their homelands
implies that state boundaries are an important means for protecting the
autonomy that nations require. Sovereignty is constituted principally by
secure state boundaries. But how are the boundaries determined? Walzer
admits that, while some boundaries are necessary for a nation’s self-
determination to be assured, where the boundaries are is not a matter easily
settled or always correctly determined. In fact, the very idea o f correctness
is not necessarily ascertainable: “When we think o f the nation we are led
to think of boundaries...[but there] is no sure way, given the circumstances
of national life, to get them right.”43 What is, therefore, to be done in
settling accounts between different national(ist) claims to territory?
Walzer seems to argue for a presumption in favor of separatism and
partition, other things being equal.44 Yet, he maintains that there is no
definite assumption that political independence is always the best outcome
for national groups.43 It depends on the political relations between
nationalities within a country. Nevertheless, whenever separatism is
popularly supported by a national group, it is prima facie warranted.
Though this might seem as if Walzer is reverting to a will-based theory of
self-determination, it ought to be remembered that identities determine the
initial attribution of nationhood to a group; what is later determined is
whether that group seeks self-determination by way o f complete political
independence or not.
Once a boundary is set, the question o f citizenship arises. It is axiomatic
on the nationalist view that such a question can only be answered within a
framework o f sovereign nation-states; in Walzer’s words, “There is no easy
way to avoid the country (and the proliferation of countries) as we currently
know it.”46But this framework already suggests an answer. Without a right
of “admission and refusal,” no country could maintain its identity in the
face o f the movements of population across the globe. This yields the
significant result that only countries can themselves determine the
conditions of membership, including the circumstances warranting
exclusion or expulsion of nonnationals. As Walzer puts it,
The distribution of membership is not pervasively subject to the con

straints of justice.... [S]tates are simply free to take in strangers (or not)....
[T]he right to choose an admissions policy is...not merely a matter of
acting in the world, exercising sovereignty, and pursuing national
interests. At stake here is the shape o f the community that acts in the
world, exercises sovereignty, and so on.47
168 Chapter 5
In order to retain its autonomy, a (national) community must insist on its

rights to determine membership; otherwise, the very purpose of sover
eignty, self-determination, and the nation-state as such would be under
mined.
Are there limits or restraints on the rights of nations to determine the
boundaries of their territory and the characteristics of their members?
Certainly there are no limits severe enough to override the right of self-
determination itself. The rights o f nations are not abrogated because a
nation might abuse such a right by claiming too much territory or excluding
too many people.48 In settling national disputes over territory or people,
there is not only a presumption o f the justifiability of separation—that is,
the separation of nations from one another into nation-states wherever
possible. There is also a ready means—that of (further) partition of
land—for the settlement of disputes that still may arise.49 In both cases, the
communitarian view is that it is better that nations separate from one
another, or that they partition disputed lands into separable entities. Only
in this way can national communities maintain their autonomy.
One other question about the limits of the use of a concept of communal
autonomy concerns which nations may legitimately claim autonomy. After
all, many nations have never had states, and others might still be deemed
by some to be too small, weak, fragmented, or dependent to warrant a claim
to sovereignty. Walzer, however, argues for the maximum possible
extension of the principle of autonomy, not only to nations that once had
states, but to others which could potentially have them.50
However, while nations may claim a right o f self-determination,
acknowledgment of such a right by others is contingent on the ability of the
claimants to maintain their community as a distinct nation. It is crucial that
a nation exhibit the characteristics of a definite and unique identity which
can become the basis of a viable nation-state. In the world o f already
existing nation-states, new or aspiring nations that seek to exit from states
must show their ability to do so through a process of political and
sometimes violent struggle. There is no other way to be sure that a nation
has an identity that can be sustained in the future:
The problem with a secessionist movement is that one cannot be sure that
it in fact represents a distinct community until it has rallied its own people
and made some headway in the “arduous struggle” for freedom. The mere
appeal to the principle of self-determination isn’t enough; evidence must
be provided that a community actually exists whose members are
committed to independence and ready and able to determine the condi
tions of their own existence. Hence the need for political or military
struggle maintained over time.31
If a nation demonstrates its identity as a distinct community—and shows

its capacity to act politically to mobilize its members in the fight for the
recognition of its identity—a nation may justifiably claim that it has a right
of self-determination. But, for the communitarian case to be made
successfully, it must be shown that the conception of nations as ethical
communities outlined above provides a basis for the legitimate authority of
states, as well as a criterion for determining boundaries between different
national communities. Both of these claims will be contested in the
following sections.
Destroying Political Communities
The idea that a community must be based on some underlying conceptions

or ideas that are shared in common by its members is a commonplace of
political philosophy. It has been espoused by philosophers such as John
Rawls, who speaks of “certain fundamental intuitive ideas,”52 as well as
Charles Taylor, who writes of “common meanings” as the basis of
communities.53But what is at issue is to what extent a political community
must be rooted in /to/spolitical ideas or meanings that are held in common
by members of the community. The idea that the nation-state is an ethical
community, which is held by Walzer, Miller, and others, contains the
assumption that political communities must also be, in some sense, cultural
communities—nations—in order for there to be enough agreement to
ensure that a commonality of purpose obtains. Individualists (such as
consent theorists), on the other hand, have generally argued that only the
most minimal agreement on specifically political matters is needed for a
political community to maintain itself.
Walzer considers political identity to be, to a great extent, dependent on
a prior national identity. Nations are constituted historically, through
“autonomous processes of cultural creativity” and “pattem[s] o f mutual
attachment.”54 The question is whether these processes and patterns are
necessary for the constitution of political identities and communities—and
whether they provide criteria for distinguishing between legitimate and
illegitimate forms o f political authority.
Political identities are distinct from cultural identities in that they must
be, at least in part, chosen, affirmed, or at least accepted by the participants
170 Chapter 5
concerned. Political communities are not like cultural communities as such,

inasmuch as they are not derived exclusively from the long-term, relatively
anonymous growth o f folkways, customs, and relations. Political identities
are formed through political acts; this is in part what the whole concept of
self-determination aims at—whether applied to individuals, peoples, or
nations. Whether self-determination is a right derived from preexisting
identities, or is itself constitutive o f particular political identities, is what
is at issue.
While antecedent prepolitical forms of life may contribute to the
formation o f political communities, such communities cannot be only the
expressions of those forms o f life, for the reason that this would rid them
o f exactly that feature that makes them “political”—their formation through
acts of choosing, deciding, acting, and so on. As Adrian Oldfield writes,
political identity is at least partly about a commitment or choice to affirm
some features of what we want a community to be or become:
When we describe ourselves as American, Canadian or British...we do not

necessarily identify ourselves politically. We may be expressing some
thing about our roots [but] we do not thereby say anything about the
commitment which a political identity involves as it is self-consciously
recognized, acknowledged and taken on. It is this choosing of a political
identity that gives rise to the solidarity and cohesion of a political
community.55
Political identities may be formed in some cases by explicit choice (e.g.,

revolutions). They may also be created in order to engage in common
activities (e.g., agriculture, industry, or trade); or they may result from
espousing certain beliefs (e.g., religious doctrines or specifically political
ideologies).
But, however we characterize the act or fact o f political association, a
national identity cannot be a sufficient basis for a political community—a
national identity is not enough to give a community an ethical character, in
other words. But what is? Something that gives legitimacy to the choice or
commitment that constitutes such communities. While it is certainly the
case that political communities have often been formed by war, conquest,
or the domination of elites,56 what is at issue in the case o f the nationalist
argument for self-determination is whether a political community can
legitimately be formed on the basis of preexisting cultural identities,
without some further ties obtaining between its members.
Here, thought should be given to how a specifically political association
is formed. Given the problems with consent theory, as well as the theoreti
cal commitments of communitarianism, legitimate political associations

must be understood as those that embody standards which are susceptible
to rational evaluation. This evaluation need not be (indeed, cannot be)
presuppositionless. But prior normative commitments must not exclude the
possibility of a rational revision of the norms governing a community. It is
this that, I argue below, is to some extent just what is excluded by
communities based on national identities. In such cases, such communities
could not, therefore, be ethical communities.
One concept of the standards necessary for legitimate association is
what Ronald Dworkin has called the integrity o f a political community.
Dworkin does concede that political communities may be formed through
the organization and incorporation o f persons possessing particular cultural
characteristics (e.g., a national identity); he calls this a “bare” community.
But to form a “true” community—that is, one in which the community
constitutes a true associative relation—some means o f determining the
integrity o f the relations within the community must be found.57Only what
Dworkin calls a “community o f principle” can fulfill the conditions of a
community with integrity—with truly associative relations. Communities
may be said to have integrity only when they are organized on the basis of
principles that have gained common acceptance, The idea o f a community
of principle “insists that people are members o f a genuine political
community only when they accept that their fates are linked in the
following strong way: they accept that they are governed by common
principles, not just by rules hammered out in political compromise.”58
Dworkin is more concerned to contrast communities o f principle, not
only with those based on preexisting or historically derived ties (e.g.,
national communities), but also from communities constituted by adherence
to a set o f rules designed to produce political compromises between
competing groups. His idea is that the concept of integrity captures what is
essential about how political communities can be seen as legitimate: only
in conformity to a set o f principles can a community be evaluated as
legitimate or illegitimate.59 If a community is based simply on a nonpoliti
cal set of identifying characteristics, there is no way of deciding whether
and when the community might rightfully embody the ideas contained in
the original commitment to form that community.
Nevertheless, this view of legitimacy as based on principles does not
specify what principles might go to make up the foundations of a commu
nity. Why, for instance, could the principles not be those supposedly
embodied in a “national character”—some set o f virtues attributed to a
particular national group and held up as a foundation for a “true” (national)
172 Chapter 5
community? Clearly, the nature o f a political community cannot simply be

defined by reference to the idea o f principles.
The history o f political philosophy gives us a number of theories of
what such principles might be. But for present purposes, we might briefly
consider three, before asking whether they are compatible with the
communitarian conception o f national autonomy. The principled legitimacy
o f a political community might be characterized as that of: (1) discursive
agreements, (2) constitutive beliefs, or (3) cooperative activities.
The basic idea o f an association defined by discursive agreement is, as
Jtirgen Habermas has maintained, that o f a political community defined by
a process of communication within which a normative ideal o f mutual
understanding is embedded. Political communities are examples o f social
interactions that can be characterized as communicative; and in communi
cative action, “participants are not primarily oriented to their own
individual successes; they pursue their individual goals under the condition
that they can harmonize their plans o f action on the basis o f common
situation definitions.”60
Social actions are inevitably communicative actions inasmuch as “the
negotiation of definitions o f the situation is an essential element o f the
interpretive accomplishments required” to a c t61 This is certainly a
characteristic o f political communities, in which some kind of agreement
about goals is essential for effective actions to occur.62
Political legitimacy can therefore be generally defined as a sort of
consensual agreement, achieved through a process o f intersubjective
communication aimed at reaching mutual understanding of particular
political principles that can serve as a basis for action. The implication of
this idea of legitimacy for the definition o f political identity is that such
identity cannot be a function primarily o f a pre-given cultural identity but
should be determined through a process o f communication and mutual
agreement.
This is not to say, however, that the communicative features o f political
life can provide us with a sufficient definition of political community. For
how are specific communities that engage in rational communicative
practices or that endorse a similar set o f principles to be differentiated from
one another? Actual political communities cannot be defined only by a set
of philosophical or constitutional principles, however legitimate.63 But the
main point is that the idea o f a nation as a community o f character cannot
do this either, since its reliance on a notion o f ascribed national identity in
order to differentiate communities from one another precludes princi
pled—and thus legitimate—discursive agreement about rights or goods.
Nevertheless, further specification of the basis of legitimate association

is necessary. One possibility is that there are deep or background beliefs
that provide the foundation upon which discursive agreements about goals
are possible. Such beliefs might be said to be “constitutive” o f a community
inasmuch as they comprise the fundamental commitments that all members
of the community are understood to share.64 It is important to note that it is
beliefs, not “values” as such, that are constitutive of community. As John
O’Neill notes, “shared values as such do not constitute a community—a
group of individuals who, unknown to each other, share a set o f values
would not constitute a community.”65
There must be a belief on the part of members of a community that its
other members share certain values, interests, or concerns; otherwise, there
simply exists an aggregate of discrete (though similar) individuals—not an
association, a community. But where does legitimacy come into the
picture? It is in the fact that constitutive beliefs can be either true or false;
for a community to be legitimate, the belief that its members share certain
values must be true.66 If it is not true, there will be no possibility o f a
discursive or consensual agreement about goals: either the persons actually
associating on the basis o f allegedly shared commonalities are in fact
associating for other reasons (perhaps exploitative or oppressive ones), or
an associative relation is imputed to persons who are not in fact associating
with one another. What looks like a community may really be something
else—a society, perhaps, but a divided and probably hierarchical one, or a
fictitious community, one in name only.67
David Archard criticizes this view in stating that “[a] community can be
genuine in the sense that its members really do think o f themselves as
members of a community, even if they are mistaken in their beliefs as to
why they think o f themselves in this way.”68 This is of course true if
“community” is rid of any particular content; here again the quasi
nominalist view criticized in earlier chapters (as expressed by Gilbert,
Wellman, and others) reasserts itself. But communitarians presumably
regard community as having a determinate content (even if they disagree
about what this content may be). From that perspective, it becomes possible
to argue that someone has gotten the description o f that content
wrong—and this is the basis for the claim that nationalists posit a false
sense o f community if they assert that national identities imply a common
ality o f values, interests, and so on.
But beyond this idea o f legitimate association as a product o f (true)
constitutive beliefs, there is the question of what such beliefs are about. If
someone believes that they share something with others sufficiently to
174 Chapter 5
constitute a community, what could it be that they share? It is not sufficient

to say that it is values, interests, or concerns, as suggested above. These
must be embodied in activities that might exemplify, accomplish, or
express these things—and the activities must be cooperative.
The idea o f cooperation in general has often been seen to be intrinsic to
the idea of community.69 But cooperation is best understood as a criterion
for legitimate action—in this way it can become a standard o f legitimacy.
Haskell Fain has made this point in writing that “Political communities...are
constituted out o f communal tasks or activities.... It is the common task that
provides the origins o f the moral bridge between ‘perfect strangers’ and
that sanctions any ‘moral power* relationship between them.”70 What is
important to note about this idea of legitimacy as the product o f cooperative
activity is that, if communities are defined by such activities, their extent
and membership cannot be determined in advance according to prepolitical
criteria (such as national identities).
A people’s choice to associate should be the result o f their agreement
about certain principles, their true belief that these principles are shared by
others in their group, and their willingness to act upon these principles
jointly. Communities, in short, cannot be groups that are already constituted
in accordance with ascribed identities, but which are otherwise devoid of
mutual agreement, belief, or activity.
To what extent can the communitarian concept o f political community,
which is based on national identities, fulfill any o f the versions of
legitimate association just outlined? Certainly, to the extent that political
communities are understood to be based upon “cultural nations,” there is
a problem. As Habermas has put it, “The nation o f citizens does not derive
its identity from some common ethnic and cultural properties, but rather
from the praxis o f citizens who actively exercise their civil rights.”71 But
Miller might counter that “identifying with a nation, feeling yourself
inextricably part o f it, is a legitimate way o f understanding your place in
the world.”72 From this conception o f identity, Miller, Walzer, and others
go on to posit self-determination as a norm. The claim about personal
identity is uncontroversial. But does it lead to the conclusion that a political
community is legitimately based on such identities?
First, consider the concept o f legitimacy as discursive agreement Can
a nation-state result from such agreements? This is really a question about
the limits o f defining nations, since defining membership in a state on the
basis o f agreement between persons risks diluting the definition o f national
identity that such a state supposedly expresses. If, as I argued in chapter 1,
the nationalist project is incoherent absent a strict definition o f nationality,
then legitimacy must be based on a strict (and prior) definition of the

nation—and one that is not susceptible to change on the basis o f discourse
among concerned parties.
Second, consider the matter of constitutive beliefs as defining legiti
macy. Why could not a belief in the reality o f a national community be the
basis for a legitimate state? One reason is that the belief that certain persons
share an identity is stipulative: if the observer decides that they do, then
they do. Community is not therefore constituted by a belief that members
share certain values or concerns, but simply that they are who they are (or
are not). There is nothing here that could be either true or false: ascriptions
o f identities are not falsifiable. So there is no standard by which legitimacy
could be determined one way or another. For example, there is no way to
argue whether someone is German or not, other than in terms o f a stipulated
(ascribed) definition o f Germanness. This is different from determining
whether someone values a certain way o f life (agrarian, maritime) or certain
ideas of how to live (Islamic, humanistic); this may or may not be the case,
independently o f how we may wish to view them.
Third, consider legitimacy as based on cooperative activity. Can a
nation be regarded as engaged in such activity? O f course, it might be so
engaged—but not in its capacity as a nation. All a nation can do is to be
(itself). This includes the activity o f acquiring a state: the purpose o f such
activity for the nation is to more perfectly realize its own identity—not to
achieve any other goals. Here we have a distinction between being and
doing: nations exist, while political communities act (and in so acting,
become legitimate). If nations engage in political activity, it is to achieve
self-determination and, therefore, to protect their identities as nations.
States or social movements, in contrast, act to achieve certain goals (e.g.,
well-being). They are legitimate to the extent that such goals are the
product of cooperative (that is, free) activity. In short, nations do not form
the basis o f communities organized around principles (understood as
discursively, constitutively, or cooperatively legitimated), but only of
communities derived from ascribed identities.
Communitarian nationalists might maintain that a conception o f political
community based solely on principles is not a realistic one. Walzer, for
instance, would see it as a case of attempting to provide a neutral or
universalistic framework from which particular communities can be
evaluated as to their suitability for political nationhood. Yet, Walzer argues
that the idea o f a political community that maintains a neutrality o f interest
between distinct national groups is largely a fiction, though perhaps one
that might work well “in immigrant societies where everyone has been
176 Chapter 5
similarly and in most cases voluntarily transplanted, cut off from homeland
and history.”73Short o f this, a nonculturally based nationality is impossible,
and in cases o f mixed identities within the same states, recourse should be
made to partition or secession.
Underlying Walzer’s rejection o f the idea o f a state without cultural
affiliations o f one kind or another is the communitarian conviction that
norms and values themselves are formed and can only be fully legitimated
within the lifeworld o f a national group. While Walzer does not insist that
nations alone are the foundations o f norms, they are examples o f the
“collectivities within which moral ideas and ways o f life have been
elaborated.”74 Some such collectivity, whether tribes, cities, religions, or
some other group, must comprise the entities within which moral norms
and political communities find their origin.
Part of what is at issue in these divergent definitions o f political
community is the basis on which identity itself—or at least group
identity—is to be understood. Habermas argues for rejecting the view that
the identity o f communities, collectivities, or groups in general can be
understood by analogy with that o f individuals—that group identities are
“ego identities on a large scale.”75To conceive o f nations, and by extension
political communities, as entities that are capable o f a kind o f identity—and
therefore, of a kind o f autonomy—similar to that o f an individual con
sciousness (or ego) is to overlook the ways in which identities in general
are constituted.
Walzer denies that he considers nations to be “egos.” But he claims that
they are something similar: “[Some] understand nationalism as a form of
collective egoism. It is better understood, however, as a form o f collective
individualism.”76 The distinction between the nation as an ego and as an
individual is meant to evoke the possibility that nations may behave better
or worse toward others—“egoism” is not an inevitable outcome of
nationalism. But this seems to be little more than a wish or hope that
nationalities will learn to tolerate other “individuals” (nations).77
What reason is there to believe this if nation-states devoid o f principled
discursive agreements, true constitutive beliefs, or cooperative activities
toward agreed upon goals are nevertheless regarded as legitimate—simply
because they express the identity o f a nationality? Since the communitarian
principles o f nationalists such as Walzer and Miller do not ultimately
require other standards for legitimacy—the self-assertion of national groups
being sufficient—what reasons for restraint and toleration could be given
to overly assertive nationalist movements or nation-states?
Ultimately, the lack of a standard o f political legitimacy other than
national identity gives tacit validation to any nationalist political actors who
can seize power in the name o f a national group. Such capitulation in the
face of disputes over the legitimacy o f one group or another can only
encourage the most ruthless political actors, not to become more tolerant
o f others, but to further ruthlessness in the pursuit o f their “national” goals.
In any case, even if Walzer were able to show how national identity
could legitimate a political community, he would still have to argue that the
autonomy of those communities, guaranteed by rights o f self-determination,
could adequately address the problems of defining citizenship and
territorial boundaries in a way that other justifications for national self-
determination have not been able to do.
Exacerbating Territorial Disputes
Walzer makes two claims based on the idea that communities ought to be
autonomous—and consequently that they may claim a right to self-
determination as a means o f achieving this autonomy. First, when a
community achieves autonomy, it is entitled to admit or exclude people as
it sees fit: setting the terms o f membership in a community is a crucial part
of ensuring the community’s autonomy. Second, the connection between
a community and a historical and geographical setting means that granting
communities autonomy will provide a means o f settling territorial disputes.
Self-determination for nations is justified because it is the only
legitimate way in which to determine membership in communities and to
set boundaries and limits on the territorial extent o f those communities. But
does the principle o f communal autonomy—which is for Walzer the idea
that underlies national self-determination—actually provide a means of
legitimating citizenship rights and territorial settlements?
The importance o f citizenship rights, or what Walzer calls “member
ship,” is not just a view common among communitarians. The determina
tion of who is and who is not a member o f a political community is, along
with the settlement o f its physical boundaries, also a determination o f who
stands to participate in and benefit from the activities o f that community.
Bruce Ackerman, in other particulars opposed to communitarian views,
writes that “citizenship is not just another question open for resolution by
the political community. It is conceptually prior to all other particular
power struggles.”78 This is why Walzer emphasizes membership as the
most basic issue for a political community to settle.
The notion o f communities as based on identities that require autonomy
178 Chapter 5
for their development leads to a particular conception o f membership. The

communal autonomy that is a goal, and is sought by claims to self-
determination, must be maintained and ensured through the determination
by the community itself o f the conditions for membership. A community is
regarded as an enclosure within which a nation or culture can flourish, and
without which this would be impossible: “The distinctiveness of cultures
and groups depends upon closure and, without it, cannot be conceived as
a stable feature o f human life.”79
The upshot o f this view o f membership is that citizenship rights must be
set by the community itself according to its own standards. The implication
is that the standards will depend upon prior membership in the nation or
cultural group that maintains a state, since this is the primary purpose for
which the state was established in the first place. Thus, membership
ultimately depends on nationality.
But nationality is o f course a term with different meanings, and Walzer
vacillates in his discussion o f this issue between different conceptions o f
national membership. On the one hand, the whole weight o f his theory
leads to the conclusion that citizenship in a state should depend on prior
membership in the nation that “rules” the state. Yet, Walzer also entertains
the other meaning o f nationality whereby all those resident within a country
have rights o f citizenship there. This, he maintains, is the “principle o f
political justice”: “the processes o f self-determination through which a
democratic state shapes its internal life, must be open, and equally open, to
all those men and women who live within its territory, work in the local
economy, and are subject to local law.”80
Walzer apparently does not attempt to resolve this contradiction in his
views. The reason for including nonnationals as citizens o f a country is
“political justice.” Yet, it is a prerequisite of “political justice”—that is, a
condition for the very existence o f political communities—to accord
autonomy to nations in order that they may act to preserve and protect their
distinctive cultural identity. One or the other o f these principles must yield,
and it is clearly the idea o f political justice that is the afterthought, given
Walzer’s other communitarian views.
Thus, the idea of communal autonomy ends up providing reasons for
violating the very localism and sense of place which it is supposedly
designed to serve:81 it actually provides a justification, not for protecting
distinctive local cultures and environments, but for protecting the idea of
a culturally distinct and ethnically pure nation in the face o f demographic,
economic, and cultural change.82
The even more intractable problem o f justifying the acquisition of
territory by national groups is equally poorly served by the idea o f

communal autonomy. The problem does not lie with connecting a general
justification o f national self-determination with a general claim by nations
to sovereignty over territory, as it did for the consensual theory o f self-
determination. Communitarianism establishes a clear link between nations
and lands—nations are in fact, on this view, defined in part by their
connection to particular territories. A nation is not understood to be simply
a collection o f individuals (as in consent theory) but a conglomeration of
people, land, and even time (in the sense of historical memories that must
be cherished and preserved—sometimes in conjunction with the possession
o f sacred places, monuments, relics, or documents83). In this sense, a
general link between nations and territories is clearly established. And if
nations have a right to their autonomy and self-determination, then that
would seem to imply that they have a right to the possession of their
national lands and territories.
But the problem is not with a general linkage that can be established
between nations and countries—but with specifying a manner by which one
could determine which nations have rights to which territories. The concept
o f communal autonomy turns out to offer little help in resolving this
dilemma. In fact, it may even complicate its resolution, since it would seem
to accord rights to territory to any nation that claims them. At the very least,
if there is a way o f disqualifying nations from making certain claims, it is
not readily apparent given a communitarian framework that accords nations
autonomy to make such decisions about sovereignty and boundaries.
Walzer attempts to deal with the problem o f territorial disputes and
sovereignty in three ways: (1) by maintaining that the exercise o f popular
choice is a presumption that trumps other claims; (2) by arguing in favor of
partition, other things being equal; and (3) by establishing a principle of
“reiterative universalism” to mitigate the worst offenses o f nationalist
aggrandizement.
In the first case, Walzer states that “I would be inclined to support
separation whenever separation is demanded by a political movement that,
so far as we can tell, represents the popular will. Let the people go who
want to go.”84 Does this settle the issue? Not if it means that peoples who
simply assert their desire for, or right to, self-determination are entitled to
it.85 As we have seen, self-determination, in international law at least, is
only applicable to peoples “under the subjugation o f another community.”86
Now Walzer might reply that “[in some societies] the only way to avoid
domination is to multiply political units and jurisdictions, permitting a
series of separations.”87 While this may be true, it does not, however,
180 Chapter 5
constitute either a justification o f a general right o f self-determination for

all nations or a principle by which to determine the territorial sovereignties
of nations that simply seek their “autonomy,” however that is construed (by
them). Claims by nations to autonomy cannot, in and o f itself, yield any
particular set o f sovereignties or boundaries, not to speak o f legitimate
ones. There is (for Walzer, as for Beran) the problem o f determining the
appropriate unit within which to determine the “will o f the people.” By
referring the resolution o f disputes over sovereignty to mechanisms such
as plebiscites for determining the “popular will,” the dispute is simply
pushed back one step to a dispute over the appropriate territory in which to
conduct such a referendum.88
Walzer takes another tack in arguing that partition, in and o f itself,
constitutes an adequate solution to most disputes over territory: “Partition
is almost always an available (though rarely a neat) solution in territorial
disputes.”89 Unfortunately, this view must seek to counteract the more
fundamental principle established previously—that o f communal auton
omy. The latter idea would seem to provide clear justifications for different
nations precisely not to settle for partition of their countries or homelands.
And if they do so, it may often be only a calculated retreat in a long-term
campaign to recover the territory lost and the sovereignty compromised.
In any case, as Walzer himself acknowledges, there are few cases in
which such a solution would really “solve” the dispute. This is because
partition does not resolve national disputes so much as stimulate nations to
adopt a belated revanchism. As Anthony Giddens notes,
only in those instances where boundaries fairly closely coincide with

existing language-communities is the convergence between the nation
state and nationalism a relatively frictionless one. In all other cases—by
far the majority in the modem world—the advent of the nation-state
stimulates divergent and oppositional nationalisms as much as it fosters
the coincidence of nationalist sentiments and existing state boundaries.90
Partitions cannot be presumed to solve territorial disputes, since there is no

particular principle on which they would be based that could override or
counteract the justification nations would feel in continuing to pursue the
(re)unification o f their presumptively divided territories or homelands.91
Finally, it might be maintained that some such principle o f the mutual
consideration o f nations for one another could be added to the fundamental
value of communal autonomy—or at least this is what Walzer contends in
offering a revision o f his earlier position. In his 1989 Tanner Lectures, he
advocates a principle o f “reiterative universalism” that presumably would

accord respect to all acts o f groups or nations seeking autonomy: “We act
immorally whenever we deny to other people the warrant for or what I will
now call the rights o f reiteration, that is, the right to act autonomously and
the right to form attachments in accordance with a particular understanding
o f the good life.”92
Walzer refers to the idea o f reiterative universalism as the “best account
o f nationalism in general and the most adequate constraint on its various
immoralities.”93 Presumably the latter characterization refers to the
problems o f sorting out boundary and territorial disputes as nations come
to have states and to act on their understanding o f their own rights. It is
central to the communitarian view that communities cannot be judged by
standards external to them. To do so would be to advocate what Walzer
calls a “covering-law universalism” which “would require us to disregard
or repress processes o f cultural creativity and patterns o f mutual attachment
that we ought to value.”94 A covering-law universalism would assess all
regimes according to the same standard, with the aim o f eventual confor
mity to one idea o f a legitimate state.
By contrast, reiterative universalism only seeks a “universal model for
the behavior o f one nation toward the others.”95 In seeking to resolve the
conflicts that he admits plague the search for autonomy and self-determina-
tion by nations, the idea that each nation’s attempts at autonomy might
justifiably be “reiterated” by other nations seems a pleasing possibility.
Unfortunately, it is only that; for while the idea o f reiterative universal
ism is unobjectionable when stated so broadly, it is also less than useful in
providing reasons for why nations starting from the aggressive and
righteous pursuit o f their own autonomy and self-determination must
suddenly pause to consider the autonomy and self-determination o f others.
This seems particularly implausible as a way to deal with conflicts in which
each nation seeks sovereignty over their homeland or country and in which
these are substantially the same territory. Yet, this is the hard case that is
also a frequent case in international relations; and it is this case that Walzer
is concerned to address.
What is missing from this attempt to find a means o f determining
legitimate sovereignties is some rationale for why nations might come to
renounce or modify their claims o f sovereignty over specific territories.
Why indeed would a nation seeking to further its autonomy accept the
qualification or frustration o f such a goal once it had regarded its autonomy
and self-determination as rooted in the deepest values and norms o f
political life?
182 Chapter 5
Any political philosophy that begins with a commitment to the

autonomy and integrity o f national cultures is going to be unable to provide
much guidance in developing the means to determine legitimate sovereign
ties and settle territorial disputes between rival nationalities. This is again
a result of the identity- or consciousness-based conception o f community
discussed earlier. A commitment to communal autonomy does not entail
any further principle (nor can it allow for any such principle) that can
provide the means for limiting communal autonomies when they conflict
or overlap.
This may help to account for the nature o f the justification of national
self-determination that is given by communitarians. In a sense, the
justification is provided by the entire philosophy o f communitarianism.
When community is valorized and regarded as something with an integrity
and distinctiveness that cannot legitimately be compromised by general
principles of any kind, the idea o f national rights, in general, and rights to
the self-determination o f nations, in particular, follow logically. Unlike
individualist justifications o f national rights (such as those based on
consequentialist or consensual theories), where the transition from a set of
norms designed primarily to determine rightful individual conduct or
legitimate individual rights must be carefully extended to nations, the
communitarian justification starts from premises in which the very idea o f
self-determination is at least implicit.
But what this also suggests is that the deficits o f communitarianism in
general fatally undermine the case for national self-determination. From a
theory in which the general rights of communities are accepted as bedrock
principle, it becomes very hard to derive a means o f restricting and limiting
such rights in order to reconcile nation-states within a world of mutually
conflicting claims to national homelands and territories. Yet, that is exactly
what is required in order for such a set o f rights to have any viability as
principles of political legitimacy. While the communitarian case for
national self-determination is undoubtedly the strongest one that can be
made, it is no stronger than the political theory o f communitarianism itself.
Does Communal Autonomy Require Nation-States?
Given the inability of communitarian nationalism to define a standard o f

political legitimacy or to solve the territorial problem, it is appropriate to
wonder whether the very idea o f communal autonomy—rather than the
more specific concept of national self-determination—is irremediably
compromised. Another way o f putting this is to question whether there can

be any legitimate claims to autonomy on the part o f communities, national
or otherwise. It is worth reconsidering for a moment the two cases o f the
British and American Indian peoples, cited earlier as examples o f commu
nities claiming autonomy from the larger states within which they reside.
The first case o f autonomy claims for Scotland and Wales relies on the
idea that there is a cultural divergence between the region and the larger
country, and that this gives the region a claim to self-determination. But, as
we have argued above, the brute fact o f cultural divergence cannot ground
any particular political rights, since a political community is a very
different entity from culturally defined groups. Furthermore, even if a
culturally defined nation did exist in Scotland, for instance (not an
unreasonable supposition), and even if this were to give the Scottish people
a claim to some form of political self-determination, this would not give
them a definite claim to Scottish land and territory.
This is because there is no principle for determining whether the region
o f Scotland is essentially a part o f Great Britain or a separate country. O f
course, this is a relatively easy case compared to certain regions in, e.g.,
central Europe or the Middle East, where overlapping territorial claims to
the same land make any assertion o f political autonomy an inducement to
conflict and war. But the same territorial problem applies: short o f a
mutually agreed upon dissolution o f the United Kingdom, what better
grounds do Scottish nationalists have for claiming that Scotland ought to
be independent than British unionists have for claiming that Scotland is
inextricably a part o f Great Britain?96
If there are grounds for such a claim, they would rely on the argument
that the connection o f a people to a land makes possible a different form of
life—and that this connection is being destroyed by the regions’ subsump
tion within a larger state. Generally, such an argument would include the
claim that the British state, e.g., either makes possible or actively abets the
exploitation o f non-English regions so that such regions cannot maintain a
distinctive way o f life. Two things make such an argument a nonnationalist
one. First, it is not based on the national identity of Scots or Welsh—but on
a claim to a distinctive economy or ecology, a claim that may or may not
be demonstrable. Second, a claim to self-determination would not
necessarily be equivalent to a claim to statehood, since maintaining a
distinctive regional economy or ecology only requires a separate state under
conditions o f massive discrimination or exploitation, not as a matter of
course.
This type o f argument has in fact been given for the self-determination
184 Chapter 5
claims o f indigenous peoples. While there are many difficulties in defining

what is distinct about indigenous peoples such as American Indians, there
is nevertheless the basis for a legitimate claim to self-determination in the
idea of a distinctive way of life, tied to a particular territory. In various
discussions within international organizations over the last generation, a
number of criteria for defining indigenous peoples have been developed. As
is usual with international documents, an all-inclusive list will yield too
imprecise a definition to be useful in distinguishing one case from
another.97 However, most definitions rely on some idea of a way o f life,
economic institutions, or social practices that are tied to a particular region.
This was at first (for instance in an International Labor Organization
Convention from 1957) put in terms of tribal populations at a “less
advanced” level o f “social and economic conditions” than others in the
same country.98 But more recently, a World Bank document mentions one
o f several characteristics of indigenous peoples as “having an economic
lifestyle largely dependent on the specific natural environment.”99
In such a definition, which has been applied to some extent to American
Indian peoples such as the Mikmaq in Canada, the beginnings o f a concept
of regional autonomy, based on differential relations to a natural environ
ment and natural resources, can be found. This seems to be a way to
develop a legitimate concept o f self-determination that can solve the
territorial problem that the communitarian perspective cannot. But it should
be clear that what is crucial in determining the legitimacy o f a claim o f
political autonomy is not the ethnonational identity of particular peoples
but their relation to specific characteristics o f a particular region within a
larger country.
In addition, as Barsh indicates, what is distinctive about indigenous
peoples’ claims is that they do not—unlike separatist nationalisms such as
the Scottish—necessarily involve claims to statehood:
Because the aims of most indigenous peoples can be achieved by means

less disruptive than secession, such as the constitutional restructuring of
existing states, most indigenous peoples need not insist on the option of
independence. An interpretation of the right of self-determination that
encourages democratic development and discourages territorial disruption
might obtain the support of a majority of states and meet the practical
objectives of most indigenous peoples.100
What is potentially legitimate about claims to (regional) autonomy and self-

determination made by Indian peoples in various American states is that,
first, they are based on ways of life related to specific territories rather than
national identities, and second, their objectives do not necessarily involve

statehood (except perhaps in cases o f severe political repression or
economic exploitation by the dominant groups in die country). This latter
feature—that is, the refusal to focus exclusively on absolute sovereignty as
a desideratum—means that the intractible problems o f boundaries and
territorial integrity that nationalists have been unable to solve can be
largely avoided without giving up the idea o f self-determination as such.
Nationalism and the Temptation of Statehood
The communitarian argument for national self-determination is the one that

most clearly exemplifies the nationalist obsession with the attainment of
statehood, to the exclusion o f other possible solutions to conflicts over
identities, resources, and political power. The fact that the justification of
nation-states does not solve the theoretical problems o f political legitimacy
and territorial rights has not so far diminished the temptation to regard
statehood as a panacea.
But if nation-states are the only effective forms o f political community
that can ensure some measure o f social solidarity, then the cost in potential
international conflicts may be one that will simply have to be accepted, as
Walzer suggests. Nation-states are, however, neither necessary for social
solidarity nor even particularly conducive to it. This is so for several
reasons, but most especially because there is simply no general connection
to be made between nations—when they are defined by reference to
ethnicity or kinship—and what underlies solidarity, that is, the satisfaction
of people’s needs or interests.101
Walzer and Miller contend that completely abandoning national identity
as a basis for a political system will result in a constitutionalism (of the
kind that Dworkin and Habermas espouse) that is unlikely to produce
sentiments o f communal solidarity. But if the ethnonational identity o f the
state is not completely abandoned, justice is, to that degree, undermined
since, as Walzer maintains, the specification of membership cannot itself
be subject to such considerations. This limitation will easily lend itself to
“offloading” social problems from the community, as has happened in
many states that exclude noncitizens, resident aliens, and guest workers
from full citizenship and thus from the social benefits o f membership.
What then is the exact connection between redistributive justice and the
nation-state, in the communitarian view? It turns out to be a conditional
one; as Miller puts it, “Provided...that we endorse ideals of social justice,
186 Chapter 5
and recognise that these take hold mainly within national communities, we
have good reason for wanting the political systems that can realize these
ideals to coincide with national boundaries.”102 But there is nothing in the
principle of national self-determination that mandates a commitment to
social justice in the first place—and there are reasons to think that such a
principle tends to preclude it.
While communitarians maintain that the nation-state is the best vehicle
for social equity based on a concern about the power o f international
capital, they fail to note three problems with this view. First, nation-states
frequently act in concert with transnational economic interests rather than
opposing or limiting them in various ways. This is the result o f the too little
noted fact that nation-states can only exist within an international system
o f political sovereignties that affords them recognition. This system, which
has been called that o f “intemationality,” 103 is not necessarily at odds with
that of the global market, especially to the extent that nation-states seek full
recognition in the international arena. The real conflict exists between
nations and various supemational corporations or agencies, on the one
hand, and social movements, cities, and regions seeking development or
autonomy, on the other. It is one result o f advocacy o f national self-
determination that the legitimacy o f non-state-oriented political actors is
put in question. Yet, it is these actors that historically have provided the
impetus for achieving more egalitarian social institutions.104
Second, while the relation between nation-states and social justice is
surely at most an elective one, it is important to realize the role that the
nation-state actually plays in relation both to other states and to subnational
communities. In the first case, nation-states function primarily not as
welfare states but as “warfare states.” The reason for this is the need to
position the (new) nation-state within the international system so as to
demand due recognition from other states. This fact was more generally
recognized in the last great period of nationalist resurgence, the 1930s, than
it is today.105 Today, movements for national self-determination continue
to seek state power modeled on that of already existing states. This leads
these movements—when they attain statehood—to establish national
armies, patrolled borders, and immigration controls, as well as to adopt the
model of an industrial economy that can produce or buy the weaponry and
other technologies needed for these features o f modem statehood.106There
is, consequently, an intrinsic connection between nationalist movements for
self-determination and the construction o f a militarized state.107
In the second case, nation-states play a parasitic role in relation to
subnational regions and cities. It is here that the importance of regions
becomes manifest—for these are an alternative locus o f community that

does not eventuate in the drive for states and is not based on ethnic or
kinship relations or beliefs. As Mumford pointed out, the realities of
regional economic and cultural development are obscured by adopting the
“mythology o f the national state.”108Nationalism inevitably colonizes local
life on the basis o f the dominance, enforced by the state, o f one region over
others: “‘nationalism’ is an attempt to make the laws and customs and
beliefs of a single region or city do duty for the varied expressions o f a
multitude of other regions.”109
A concern for social justice cannot be served via the policies o f the
nation-state, as communitarians suggest, because nation-states exploit and
even destroy the means o f sustainable and self-reliant development found
in regional and urban life. It may even be the case that an inverse relation
ship exists between the ability of regions to support their populations and
the creation o f national identities—only when the first is destroyed does the
second become attractive. This is because oppressed peoples must then
“struggle to compete for a place in the only social space that remains—the
social space defined by the modem state.”110
The close relation between nationalism and the state has led to some of
the strange formulations found in communitarian justifications o f self-
determination—namely, that the nation needs the state to safeguard its
existence, while at the same time the nation already exists prior to
statehood and in fact must continue to exist in order for it to legitimately
claim rights to autonomy. One might naturally ask o f such views: why then
do nations need states? The “answer,” only implicit in communitarian
theory, is that, in some sense, states “need” nations. Warren Magnusson has
referred to this conception o f the relationship between nations and states as
the “circularity o f nationalist ideology”: “the nation needs the state as its
political embodiment, so the state has to create the nation to legitimate its
own existence. Hence, nation-building is the most glorious o f state
activities.”111
Not only is the nationalist theory o f the state circular in this way, it is
also paradoxical in its coupling o f a valorization o f statehood with a
delegitimation o f (most) existing states. There is an implicit contradiction
between nationalists’ avowed interest in state sovereignty (for their own
nations) and the disruptive effects on actual state sovereignties and the
interstate system as a whole that the doctrine o f national self-determination
has had. By advocating statehood for national groups, nationalists are
weakening the very system o f state sovereignty that they ostensibly seek to
join.
188 Chapter 5
The communitarian justification of self-determination for nations thus

lacks a convincing rationale for why national groups need sovereign states,
since such states will not necessarily provide a better context within which
such groups can flourish. Though communitarian theorists are certainly
able to pose the problem o f national autonomy more clearly than others, the
communitarian justification o f self-determination raises still more sharply
the prospect that even if nations obtain states, take control o f territories,
and adopt exclusionary citizenship policies, the “nationalities problem” will
be no closer to a solution—and will perhaps even be worsened by its
absorption into the dubious politics of nation building.
Self-determination cannot be justified any more convincingly by
referring to nations as first-order entities that deserve control over territory
and membership than it can by arguing that nations need states in order to
further the well-being or political rights o f individuals. The attainment o f
nation-states will simply force many national groups to confront even more
starkly a world o f other hostile nationalities, great powers, giant transna
tional businesses, and global economic inequalities that can only exacerbate
the inability of such groups to attain a modicum of autonomy and self-
sufficiency.
Communitarian nationalists fail in their efforts to justify self-determina-
tion for nationalities in part because, despite their greater political
sophistication, they also indulge in the dangerous illusion o f a tolerant,
beneficent, liberal (or socialist) nationalism that is somehow immune to the
violence and oppression that have characterized most really existing
nationalist movements. Suggesting that nationalism, if properly understood,
could be a basis for social justice, political autonomy, and cultural
toleration constitutes a massive failure o f political imagination. David
Miller’s need to disavow any connection of his own theory with the
historical legacy o f an actually existing “national socialism” is only one
example of the costs o f this failure o f imagination."2 How can this
persistent illusion in recent political theory be explained? The last chapter
will attempt an answer to this question.
Notes
1. David Miller, “In Defence of Nationality,” Journal o f Applied

Philosophy 10, no. 1 (1993): 3-16.
2. Miller, “Defence of Nationality,” 12.

Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 54-55.
6. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f Minority
Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 92-93.
7. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 184-85.
8. For a selection of readings from the communitarians, as well as some
responses from liberal thinkers, see Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit (eds.),
Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992);
for some additional assessments ofthe “communitarian debate” (the first somewhat
favorable to the communitarians, the second less so), see Chantal Mouffe,
“American Liberalism and Its Critics: Rawls, Taylor, Sandel, and Walzer,” Praxis
International 8 (1988): 193-206, and Allen E. Buchanan, “Assessing the
Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,” Ethics 99 (July 1989): 852-82; and for a
recent comprehensive survey of the major thinkers involved in the debate, see
Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1992).
9. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 90.
10. Michael Walzer, Nation and Universe: Tanner Lectures on Human
Values (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 554 (italics added).
12. Miller actually uses the term “ethical community” {On Nationality
[Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995], 11). It is loosely drawn from Hegel’s concept of
Sittlichkeit, usually translated as “ethical life” (though Miller does not cite Hegel
explicitly); however, on Hegel’s complex relationship to nationalism, see the
discussion in chap. 1. The use of the term also seemed appropriate considering the
work of Poole and Gilbert on national identity; see, e.g., Poole, Morality and
Modernity, chap. 5, and Gilbert, Philosophy o f Nationalism, passim, as well as their
articles on “Freedom, Citizenship, and National Identity” (Poole) and “The
Concept of a National Community” (Gilbert) in Omar Dahbour (ed.),
“Philosophical Perspectives on National Identity,” a special issue of the
Philosophical Forum 28, nos. 1-2 (Fall-Winter 1996-1997).
13. For a useful survey of these movements, see Tom Naim, The Break-
Up o f Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism, 2d ed. (1977; reprint, London: Verso,
1981), esp. chaps. 2-3 on Scotland. In chap. 3, esp. 127-28, Naim argues, though
not with perfect clarity, that contemporary Scottish nationalism is a “neo
nationalism,” distinct from the old (i.e., central European) variety.
14. On the definition of indigenous peoples, see Russel Lawrence Barsh,
“Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of International Law?”
Harvard Human Rights Journal 7 (1994): 33-86, and Benedict Kingsbury,
“‘Indigenous Peoples’ as an International Legal Concept,” in R. H. Barnes,
Andrew Barnes, and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), Indigenous Peoples o f Asia (Ann
Arbor, Mich.: Association for Asian Studies, 1995), 13-34.
190 Chapter 5
16. Michael Walzer, Spheres o f Justice: A Defense o f Pluralism and

Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 62.
17. See Friedrich Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the National State,
trans. Robert B. Kimber (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970); and
the discussion of these concepts in Peter Alter, Nationalism, trans. Stuart
McKinnon-Evans (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), 14-18.
18. Ernest Renan, “What Is a Nation?” in Alfred Zimmem (ed.), Modem
Political Doctrines (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), 203.
19. Lord Acton, “Nationality,” in History o f Freedom and Other Essays
(London: Macmillan, 1907), 207.
20. Walzer, Nation and Universe, 538.
22. Miller, On Nationality, 20.
23. Miller, On Nationality, 22-25.
25. Michael Walzer, “The New Tribalism,” Dissent (Spring 1992): 171.
26. Walzer, Spheres o f Justice, 44.
29. Walzer, Nation and Universe, 530-31.
30. This is what Miller calls the “universalist case for nationality”—the
need for national communities within which redistributions of goods in favor of
greater equality can be mandated. See David Miller, “The Ethical Significance of
Nationality,” Ethics 98 (July 1988): 661.
33. Walzer states, in Spheres o f Justice, that “to give up the state is to give
up any effective self-determination” (44).
34.David Miller, Market, State, and Community: TheoreticalFoundations
o f Market Socialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 245.
44. Walzer, “New Tribalism,” 169.
47. Walzer, Spheres o f Justice, 61-62 (italics added).

51. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 93-94.
52.John Rawls, ‘The Domain of the Political and Overlapping
Consensus,” New York University Law Review 64, no. 2 (1989): 235.
53.Charles Taylor, “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man,” in
Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge:
55. Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism
and the Modem World (London: Routledge, 1990), 7.
56. Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin Books, 1963), 19-
20; Oldfield, Citizenship and Community, 8.
57.Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
58. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 211.
59. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 216.
60. Jtlrgen Habermas, The Theory o f Communicative Action, vol. 1,
Reason and the Rationalization o f Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1984), 285-86.
61. Habermas, Theory o f Communicative Action, 286.
62. Habermas, Theory o f Communicative Action, 190.
63 .The root of the problem with theories of “constitutional
patriotism”—to use Habermas’ phrase (for his own theory, among others)—is that
they fail to posit substantive values that can serve as a basis for deciding upon
particular principles. On the idea of constitutional patriotism, see Jtlrgen Habermas,
“Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe,”
Praxis International 12 (Apr. 1992): 7; on how this problem affects the
foundations of Habermas’ theory of procedural legitimacy, see Agnes Heller,
Beyond Justice (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 236-40.
64.Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice, 2d ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 150.
65. John O’Neill, “Should Communitarians Be Nationalists?” Journal o f
Applied Philosophy vol. 11, no. 2 (1994), 139.
66. O’Neill, “Should Communitarians Be Nationalists?” 140.
67. O’Neill, “Should Communitarians Be Nationalists?” 139.
68. David Archard, “Should Nationalists Be Communitarians?” Journal
o f Applied Philosophy vol. 13, no. 2 (1996): 218.
69. Charles Taylor, “The Nature and Scope of Distributive Justice,” in
Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge:
70. Haskell Fain, Normative Politics and the Community o f Nations
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 102.
71. Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity,” 3.
192 Chapter 5

73. Walzer, “New Tribalism,” 166. This is Walzer’s view of the United
States as a political community, which, however, he regards as virtually unique in
this respect; see his article, “What Does It Mean to Be an ‘American’?” Social
Research vol. 57, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 591-614.
75. Jflrgen Habermas, “Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional
Identity: The Federal Republic’s Orientation to the West,” in The New
Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians ’Debate (Cambridge, Mass.:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1989), 261.
77. See Michael Walzer, “Justice and Tribalism: Minimal Morality in
International Politics,” in Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 63-83.
78. Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), 92.
81. Walzer’s core claim, again, is that communities depend on their right
of “closure” (i.e., the ability to admit or exclude potential members): “The
distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon closure and, without it, cannot
be conceived as a stable feature of human life” (Spheres o f Justice, 39). He here
compares nations with neighborhoods, clubs, and families in this respect. But
notice that he writes that “Neighborhoods can be open only if countries are at least
potentially closed” (38).
While the free play of capitalist market forces, including the role of a global
labor market that produces large demographic shifts, is undoubtedly inimical to the
cultivation of sustainable local economies and cultures, it is the nature of
closure—whether it will take place along lines of nationality and to what extent the
nation-state need be the primary vehicle for forcibly creating closed
communities—that is at issue. As I will maintain further below, the use of cultural
nationality and state power as determinants of the proper limitations of community
and locality is actually at odds with the values of communal self-sufficiency and
sustainability that are advocated, for example, in the contemporary ecology
movement. On this point, see Andrew Dobson, Green Political Thought: An
Introduction (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 84.
82.For a discussion of how rare ethnically pure and self-enclosed
communities have been, see William McNeill, Polyethnicity and National Unity in
World History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986).
83. See Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1986), esp. chap. 8, for a discussion of the creation of “imaginary
histories” and “imaginary geographies” out of these types of materials.
85. W. Wentworth Ofuatey-Kodjoe, The Principle o f Self-Determination

in International Law (New York: Nellen Publishing Co., 1977), 164.
88. This, of course, is the problem that Beran expends much effort in
trying to solve—though unsuccessfully in my view. See the discussion of
reiterative referenda in chapter 4. Walzer, as far as I can tell, does not acknowledge
the difficulties involved in determining the popular will—perhaps because he
believes that there can be no general solution to the problem other than to rely on
particular nations’ determinations of their own “wills.”
90. Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique o f Historical
Materialism, vol. 2, The Nation-State and Violence (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1987), 219-20.
91. Walzer seems to think that nationalist revanchism is not a fundamental
problem for his view of self-determination but simply something to be peacefully
resolved through international forums. But he seriously neglects the political
motivation given to revanchist movements by the very concept of communal
autonomy that he espouses.
96. Naim, in his thorough history of Scottish nationalism, never seems to
consider this basic question, assuming instead that the contest is between a Scottish
and an English nationalism. But this would only be the case if the British state was
actively engaged in the process of anglicizing Scotland, something of which there
is no evidence. Rather, Naim convolutedly writes that “it is not alarmism to suggest
that the persistence of the British regime fosters the most regressive possible side
of an eventual English nationalism” (Break-Up o f Britain, 80 [italics added]).
97. For instance, Barsh refers to a World Bank document that, in seeking
to define indigenous peoples, refers to ‘“a close attachment to ancestral territories
and to the natural resources in these areas,’” as well as “heavy reliance on
subsistence-level production, distinct languages, and characteristic ‘customary
social and political institutions’” (Barsh, “Indigenous Peoples in 1990s,” 81). Barsh
comments, not completely accurately in my view, that such a definition could refer
to national minorities as well.
98. Quoted in Kingsbury, “‘Indigenous Peoples’ as International Legal
Concept,” 20.
99. Quoted in Kingsbury, “‘Indigenous Peoples’ as International Legal
Concept,” 22.
100. Barsh, “Indigenous Peoples in 1990s,” 36.
194 Chapter 5
101. Brian Barry, “Self-Government Revisited,” in David Miller and Larry

Siedentop (eds.), The Nature o f Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983),
135.
102. Miller, On Nationality, 85 (italics added).
103. Jonathan R6e, “Intemationality,” Radical Philosophy 60 (Spring
1992): esp. 10-11.
104. See Warren Magnusson, “The Reification of Political Community,”
in R. B. J. Walker and Saul B. Mendlovitz (eds.), Contending Sovereignties:
Redefining Political Community (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990).
105. Lewis Mumford, The Culture o f Cities (1938; reprint, Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), 349. See also Rudolph Rocker, Nationalism and
Culture, trans. Ray E. Chase (Los Angeles: Rocker Publications Committee, 1937).
106. Giddens, Contemporary Critique o f Historical Materialism, 254.
107.Maria Mies, in Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva, Ecofeminism
(Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Zed Books, 1993), 128.
108. Mumford, Culture o f Cities, 354.
109. Mumford, Culture o f Cities, 349.
110. Vandana Shiva, in Mies and Shiva, Ecofeminism, 112.
111. Magnusson, “Reification of Political Community,” 49.
112. Miller, Market, State, and Community, 238.
Chapter 6
The Contradictions of Liberal

Nationalism
[T]he national society is a parody of the human society.
— Max Horkheimer/Theodor Adorno, Dialectic o f Enlightenment
Self-Determination and Liberal Nationalism
Philosophical arguments for the legitimacy o f a principle o f national self-

determination generally assume some background commitment to a scheme
or paradigm o f how core ethical values are given political form—including
what institutions are necessary to embody these values. Institutionally, the
primary commitment o f exponents o f national self-determination is to the
legitimacy—even the necessity—of the nation-state, at least as a normative
ideal. Theoretically, however, virtually all o f the philosophers discussed in
this book have also been committed to one or another version o f the liberal
state as a guarantor o f individual liberties and social equality (and, less
explicitly, to private property and economic growth). The major question
about such commitments is how one can advocate both restrictions on
government intervention and rights to nation-states as basic goods. The
answer to this question has generally been that such principles can be
reconciled through developing a philosophy of what has come to be called
liberal nationalism. Yet, I will argue here that such a theory is inherently
contradictory—that attempting to combine liberal and nationalist principles
cannot succeed.
The idea o f liberal nationalism arises both out o f the inadequacies of
traditional liberal theory and from the hope that there can be a pacific and
tolerant form o f national identity. Philosophically, liberal nationalism
constitutes the claim that there are good reasons derived from liberal
principles why nations have rights to their own independent states. But why
are liberal thinkers now incorporating advocacy o f national rights into their
195
196 Chapter 6
theories? The basic reason is that nationalism provides—or seems to some

to provide—an antidote to the inadequacies o f liberal doctrine. The
fundamental problem with liberalism is that in placing primary value on
individual liberties it cannot provide a definition o f community that can
give individuals reasons for feeling solidarity with others. This problem
manifests itself in three ways.
First, liberalism provides no theory o f whom we need feel responsibility
for and whom we can ignore.1In political terms, this means that liberalism
lacks a theory o f citizenship; liberal philosophers simply take for granted
that a territorial state with a limited citizenry is the context within which
liberties may be secured.2 Second, liberalism lacks an account of social
goods—those goods that can be attained only through the cooperative
activity of many individuals.3Politically, this means that liberal theory can
give reasons for asserting rights, but rarely and with difficulty reasons for
individuals to assume duties.4Third, liberalism provides no reasons to limit
the effects o f private property rights and a market economy on classes,
communities, or regions.3 With its historical emphasis on the importance
o f freedom o f ownership and trade as measures o f individual liberty, liberal
theory is handicapped in providing a critique o f the effects o f capital
accumulation, economic growth, and free trade.6
This lack o f a place for community in liberalism is a concern especially
because of the dependence of liberal theories of justice and obligation upon
largely unacknowledged quasi-nationalist ideas o f community and
citizenship. As Tamir has written,
liberals have no choice but to presuppose the existence of [communal] ties

and “treat community as prior to justice and fairness in the sense that
questions of justice and fairness are regarded as questions of what would
be fair or just within a particular political community.”7
The (often unacknowledged) dependence of liberalism upon nationalism

has (at least) two components: (1) the assumption o f membership in a
nation-state that generates a culture o f “belonging,” and therefore o f
individuals’ obligation to the state, and (2) the limitation o f principles o f
distributive justice to application within a nation-state, without consider
ation of whether such principles could or should be applied beyond the
boundaries o f that state.
So the nation-state provides the larger context o f a political community
and o f a limited citizenry within which liberal ideas might have applicabil
ity: “By absorbing national concepts, liberalism has been able to take for
The Contradictions of Liberal Nationalism 197
granted the existence of states inhabited by specific populations, and

[thereby] circumvent such thorny issues as membership and immigration.”8
The result is that liberalism must assume the desirability o f a closed
community o f homogeneous citizens, however much this may violate its
principles. Thus,
the fact that the liberal welfare state is necessarily predicated on certain
“national beliefs” is often overlooked. Its conception of distributive
justice is only meaningful in states that do not see themselves as voluntary
associations but as ongoing and relatively closed communities whose
members share a common fate.9
This means that a limited liberal version o f nationalism (including a

principle o f national self-determination) cannot provide an alternative to a
robustly assertive nationalism unencumbered by liberal principles, since it
does not have an alternative conception o f community and citizenship to
counterpose to the nationalist one.
Liberalism, when applied to the issues of citizenship and community,
therefore, is caught in a paradox: while it must assume the existence of
nation-states in order to have communities within which principles of
individual liberty and value neutrality can hold sway, it must at the same
time studiously ignore the normative basis of such communities, since to
do otherwise would be to admit that nonliberal principles o f exclusion and
intolerance are fundamental to a liberal state. The result is “the political
weakness o f liberalism in times o f crisis/’ since the theory cannot generate
a basis for social cohesion other than that o f the nation-state.10
As has often been remarked, the nation-state is (at least in theory) the
most prevalent and successful form o f political community in the modem
era. It is thus unsurprising in one sense that, since liberal theory has
assumed the existence o f this fundamental political institution, some might
now seek to show that its existence is in fact compatible with—and even
necessary for—a liberal society. Yet, the close linkage between liberalism
and the nation-state remains unacknowledged by most liberal political
philosophers. This is because the linkage is established via principles such
as self-determination, which are only ambiguously liberal.
Liberal nationalists attempt to combine an adherence to a standard list
of liberal rights and institutions with an advocacy o f claims to national
autonomy and self-determination. However difficult this turns out to be, it
is clearly o f the first importance for both liberals and nationalists to try to
reconcile two central aspects o f the ideology o f the nation-state—its role
198 Chapter 6
as the supposed guarantor of entitlements often won by democratic

struggles against the state and its role in mobilizing patriotic sentiments in
defense of the state.
There are several ways that liberals have tried to combine liberal and
nationalist doctrines. One way is to treat nations as loosely defined entities,
based on loyalties or affinities that are not inconsistent with a liberal notion
of the person. But, as argued in chapter 1, this loose view o f the nation
cannot support nationalist political principles, such as self-determination,
without surreptitiously introducing a strict definition o f nations at some
point—a strict definition that precludes liberal ideas o f tolerance and
individuality. Another way is to try to expand international law, which
institutionalizes some liberal ideas, to include nationalist principles. As was
shown in chapter 2, this attempt has the consequence of rendering
international law incoherent. Finally, liberal nationalist philosophers have
tried to take certain aspects o f liberal theory and use them directly as the
basis for the legitimacy o f nation-states. In particular, three aspects o f
liberalism—the value of individuality, the democratic theory o f legitimacy,
and a quasi-republican conception of political community—have been used
to try to formulate a coherent liberal nationalism.
Three Versions of Liberal Nationalism
The first version o f liberal nationalism is a concomitant o f the ethical case

for national self-determination. The basic idea is that the desire of
individuals for the greatest possible liberty is thought to entail a right to
culture. The ability to express one’s cultural preferences is regarded as an
important aspect o f the liberties o f persons; but crucially, this is not thought
to be something that individuals can do by themselves, but only within
encompassing groups, particularly nations. Cultural life, while valuable to
individuals, cannot be produced by them alone, but only collectively.
Finally, national groups, in order to engage in cultural expression, need the
state in order to be able to have, for example, national holidays, languages,
symbols, or myths.11
Given this connection of states to cultures, individuals are said to have
an interest in being members of a nation-state, and this interest is regarded
as consistent with having liberal rights as individuals within the state. But
the crucial problem is how to reconcile the seeming interest persons have
in being within a nation-state with liberal treatment o f others. One way to
resolve this problem would be to argue that nation-states can have a liberal
political culture which respects individual rights (at least o f its citizens).12
But there are two problems with this view. First, even if possible, this
respect for liberal rights would extend only to the national boundaries, not
beyond. It would therefore not be equivalent to the respect liberal theory
supposedly accords all persons, regardless of nationality. This would
obviously be a problem in two cases: one of conflict between nation-states,
particularly military conflict, and the other o f immigration between states,
where individuals find themselves in situations in which they may have no
citizenship rights. Second, the idea o f a liberal national-political culture is,
at best, a possibility, not an inevitability, even theoretically. And it goes
against the antiliberal tendencies inherent in nationalism and the nation
state. Above all, the notion o f “national interest” has been shown to be
inimical to attempts to construct liberal or egalitarian societies, since it is
more easily invoked in pursuit o f authoritarian, hierarchical, and militaristic
goals.13
Liberal nationalists tend to argue that, ontologically, there is no
necessary contradiction between a particularistic-nationalistic view of
personal identity and a universalistic view, since persons may all be
regarded as requiring a particular (i.e., national) context for flourishing.14
But this is different from arguing that, politically, creating and strengthen
ing nation-states is compatible with equal respect for the liberty o f all
persons.
Furthermore, liberal nationalists such as Tamir have put emphasis on
arguing that the nation-state is implied by liberal theory—and in this
respect, they are undoubtedly correct.15 But what they have not done is to
show how nationalism implies a commitment to a liberal state. Absent such
a demonstration, liberal nationalism becomes a desideratum, nothing more.
Tamir writes that liberal nationalism is characterized by how it “fosters
national ideals without losing sight of other human values against which
national ideals ought to be weighed.”16 The liberal nation-state that
supposedly achieves this combination o f liberal and national values would:
(1) have a right o f exclusion in terms of citizenship—but only on the
condition that all other nationalities had at least the right to states of their
own; and (2) accord all persons already present in the nation-state equal
rights, including national minorities.17
These conditions, however, would seem to be either impractical or
inimical to the very idea o f a nation-state. What nation-state would attempt
to justify to its own citizens not excluding nonnationals because they lacked
nation-states o f their own? And what reason would a nation-state created
to embody a particular national culture have to accord equal rights to
200 Chapter 6
minorities within its borders, minorities who would “dilute” the national
culture? Tamir claims that ‘T he integration o f liberal and national values
inherent in the morality o f community...precludes the possibility o f granting
ultimate value to national goals.”18 The reason she gives for this is that
there is a difference between pursuing one’s own goals and not caring
about or inhibiting the pursuit o f others’. But the fact that there is this
difference does not say why persons would necessarily act in one way or
another. That one form of action is liberal and the other is not does not
mean that it is not possible (or even unlikely) that the illiberal course o f
action will be chosen.
A second type o f liberal nationalism results from the idea o f democratic
government. The specific idea of democratically determining membership
in states is that democracy is incomplete if it does not include the right o f
individuals to be ruled by a government that they choose—and that this
right is best expressed through a right o f national groups to statehood.
If liberal democratic theory is voluntarist and individualist, how can it
be used to derive a justification for the rights of groups such as nations?
Beran argues that, while some forms of nationalism may be incompatible
with democratic consent theory, not all forms are:
are not nationalism and consent theory incompatible, the former being a
collectivist doctrine, the latter an individualist one? There are of course
versions of nationalism which are incompatible with consent theory, but
the assertion of a right to national self-determination is not.19
The reason that consent theory and nationalism are not absolutely
incompatible, on Beran’s view, is that rights o f nations can be derived from
rights o f individuals (to their own self-determination). This is different,
however, from according rights to nations that take precedence over
individual rights.
For this reason, what Beran calls the “core doctrine” o f nationalism is
incompatible with consent theory. This core doctrine is the idea that “the
individual citizen [is] a captive o f birth and history”—that is, individuals
are formed primarily and exclusively within a particular nation, to which
they owe primary allegiance.20 Such a view yields a very different
justification for national rights, in Beran’s view. The adoption o f the
nationalist view means that the voluntary choices of individuals may be
justifiably overridden by the claims o f national allegiances ascribed to
those individuals by others.
But Beran maintains that, if nationalist demands for nation-states
conflict with liberal voluntarist demands for separate states, the voluntarist
demands should take precedence. Conflicts may occur when nationalists
attempt to maintain the unity o f new nation-states in spite of further
demands for separation by regions or minority groups. In such cases, the
separatist demands have greater prima facie validity than the nationalist
ones.
Nevertheless, “a right of national self-determination follows from the
liberal democratic theory o f group self-determination.”21 It may be asked,
however, whether a voluntarist theory of self-determination is substantively
different from a nationalist theory that does not make reference to consent
theory or democratic rights.
The consensual-voluntarist version o f liberal nationalism is supposedly
liberal because it emphasizes the democratic choice of membership in a
state over the communitarian attribution o f membership on the basis of
ascribed national characters. But since claims of self-determination by
national groups are viewed as a possible extension o f this theory of choice,
the liberal (or more properly, libertarian) character o f the principle is
questionable. This is because, if national groups can (as collections of
individuals) reiteratively decide to claim their own state (that is, by each
individual making the same choice), this means that the choices o f other
individuals may have to be overriden. Otherwise, the principle could never
be enacted—since nonnationals could veto the choices o f a national group.
So the libertarian element in self-determination—while an attribute of an
initial choice situation—seems to inevitably fall out so that a choice (to
have a state) can be acted upon.
Finally, a third version o f liberal nationalism is allied with the commu
nitarian argument for national self-determination. In this version, the
nation-state is the ideal form that a community must take in order to create
the kind of moral responsibility between its members that would result in
a more egalitarian society. This is because it is only the shared sense of
national identity that creates an ethical imperative to sacrifice for
others—whether that sacrifice is military service or redistributive
taxation.22 Without the affective ties that are created by belonging to the
same national group, individuals will not feel obligations to the larger
society within which they live or to the state to whose authority they
consent. But with a close fit between nation and state, people will be
willing to concern themselves with the safety and welfare o f other persons
of the same nationality.23
This close fit between nation and state is different from an authoritarian
subsumption of individuals within an “organic” state. It is also distinct from
202 Chapter 6
a “moral” communitarianism that emphasizes the essential role o f

communities in the determination of proper moral roles and conduct for
individuals.24 The political communitarians have instead been concerned
with the question o f the relation o f the state to communal norms and
cultures. Walzer, for instance, maintains that, for political philosophy, the
problem o f the psychological bases o f morality (with which much o f the
debate between liberals and communitarians has been concerned) is not the
primary issue. Rather, what is most importantly in dispute is whether
political communities can be constituted solely on the basis o f a liberal
conception o f voluntary association, or whether something more is required
for communities to cohere in an ethically satisfactory way.25
This additional element was first theorized by the “civic republicans,”
to which certain communitarian ideas can be traced.26 Civic republicanism
is classically distinguished from later—more individualistic—philosophies
by its de-emphasis on the rights o f individuals except when paired with
corresponding notions o f duties to the community in general and other
citizens in particular. Thus: “Individuals do not only conceive o f them
selves as bearing rights, nor is their posture to forms o f collective life solely
instrumental.”27 Civic republicans accordingly emphasize the role of
citizenship much more strongly than do individualistic political philoso
phies. This is the result o f conceiving o f citizenship as not only a role that
individuals may passively assume, but as something involving active
participation by those individuals. According to Oldfield, “Within civic
republicanism, citizenship is an activity or a practice, and not simply a
status, so that not to engage in the practice is, in important senses, not to be
a citizen.”28
The relation o f civic republicanism to contemporary communitarian
ideas is not always easy to trace. Nevertheless, it provides a means of
understanding why even liberal nationalists such as Walzer often reject a
pure consensualist theory o f authority: that theory does not seem to be able
to account for the ways in which communities need to cohere through the
attribution o f duties and responsibilities to individuals. From a communi
tarian standpoint, a libertarian consent theory—even if it is used to justify
communal goals such as the self-determination o f nations—seems to point
to anarchy; such a view might just as easily legitimate the dissolution of
communities as the formation o f new ones.
Thus, recourse is often made to republican ideas that seem to be able to
more fully account for the needs o f solidarity and cohesion that political
communities are thought to have. In another sense, however, contemporary
communitarians depart from civic republican theory. It may be that there
is just no ready embodiment for republican ideas in modem societies ruled

through representative democratic institutions that are circumscribed by
legal guarantees o f individual rights and entitlements.29
Instead, Walzer argues that communitarianism constitutes a “corrective”
within a liberal state, compensating for those aspects of liberal authority
that lead to the weakening o f communal bonds:
Liberalism is best understood as a theory of relationship, which has

voluntary association at its center and which understands voluntariness as
the right of rupture or withdrawal.... [I]nsofar as liberalism tends toward
instability and dissociation, it requires periodic communitarian
correction.30
While within a stable and democratic state, such correction might be

embodied in civic associations existing outside both the state and the
market, for states that are new, unstable, or diverse, a communitarian
corrective might involve reconstituting the very nature o f the state through
revolution, civil war, or secession. This is where national self-determina
tion might find its place—as a means o f putting a community on a sounder
footing so that liberal institutions have a chance to take root.
Walzer thus seeks to combine adherence to liberal norms o f individual
rights with a view o f communities as providing the basis for these rights
through the cultivation o f their own distinct characters separately from
those of others. While, within a community, liberal rights may be legiti
mate, between communities, such rights cannot directly apply. It is the
pursuit of an international community of separate but equal nation-states
that constitutes the only means o f eventually ensuring the fullest possible
adherence to liberal rights.
Since the end in mind here seems to be some sort o f a liberal state,
certain philosophers have doubted whether there is any affinity between
communitarianism and the idea o f a nation-state. Perhaps the nation-state
can be viewed simply as an instrumental good that contributes to the
perpetuation of a liberal society without attributing any added weight or
value to the national community underlying the state.
The limitations o f this approach can be seen, for example, in Andrew
Mason’s claim that, “[although it is perhaps plausible to regard mutual
concern as partially constitutive o f the good life for everyone...[it] is
difficult to see how the view that community membership is an essential
ingredient of the good life can be defended.”31 On this individualist
account, community can therefore be seen as a good, but not as the
204 Chapter 6
fundamental good with which other political norms must be reconciled. So,
while individualism might be able to generate a justification for community
as an elective virtue, it does not seem to be able to justify a conception of
community in the strong sense that would yield, for instance, a principle of
national self-determination.
A different view o f the relation of nationalism to communitarianism is
held by Will Kymlicka, who argues that the nation-state is incompatible
with communitarianism, since the latter emphasizes the need for shared
moral values, which can only be found within subnational communities, not
entire nations.32 While this may be true, it does not necessarily contradict
the communitarian idea that, in order to constitute a political community
(a nation-state), a particular national character is required. National
identities, as Kymlicka admits, “must be taken as givens”;33yet, if this is so,
these identities are equivalent to “national characters” that do embody
common virtues, values, or goods which serve as the basis for political
institutions. So there seems to be an ineradicably communitarian element
in all justifications—even liberal ones—of the nation-state.
The Contradictions of Liberal Nationalism
The problem with all these versions o f liberal nationalism is that the
nationalism ultimately overwhelms the liberalism when a choice has to be
made—as it does at the historically crucial junctures of economic
depression or civil war. The paradigmatic case o f this is the dissolution of
Yugoslavia in 1989-1990. It was the nationalist program of Slobodan
Milosevic, newly elected president o f the Serbian republic, not the liberal
program o f Ante Markovic, the last prime minister o f the Yugoslav
federation, that prevailed. There were various reasons for this (including
Markovic’s acceptance o f the International Monetary Fund’s austerity
program for Yugoslavia); but the crucial point is that nationalism has
ideological resources for confronting the impact o f deprivation and conflict
that liberalism does not.34
A liberal nationalist state will default to a nationalist politics in
moments where its survival is in question. The reason for this is that the
liberal justifications for the nation-state just discussed cannot fundamen
tally change the characteristics o f such states. And nation-states possess
features that contradict liberal values in at least three ways.
First, liberal nationalism attempts to combine a traditional libertarian
emphasis on the rights of individuals to personal choice with an authoritar
ian notion o f the importance o f the state in the creation o f national cultures.
This is apparent in, for example, the connection that is sometimes made
between national pride and cultural belonging. This national pride,
moreover, is not an allegiance to political principles, but patriotic attach
ments to the symbols and rituals of a “national character.”35
The idea that individuals form their identities primarily through
membership in social groups such as nations contradicts the liberal idea
that individual choice is a fundamental necessity in the process of creating
selfhood.36 What if individuals—in the course o f forming their own
identities—do not wish to adhere to the supposed features o f their national
character? Or what if, at some stage, persons who might once have
conformed now decide to change their identity by joining other cultural
groups or engaging in other cultural practices? On the nationalist view, they
either cannot do so—since individuals* very identity is inextricably
connected to a particular nationality, or, if they can do so, they stand to lose
the political entitlements which follow from these group attachments—to
be deprived o f citizenship, for example. By making cultures into state
cultures, in other words, the libertarian view o f individual choice as
intrinsic to the making o f personal identities is compromised.
Second, there is a contradiction between the value placed by liberals on
consensual relations and the communalist nature o f nationalist movements
and states. A cardinal tenet o f liberalism is that individuals are ontologi-
cally prior to collectivities and that these collectivities must be evaluated
in terms of the extent to which they are compatible with a principle of
individual consent. Yet, nationalism is fundamentally communalist in the
sense that nations are groups that must be taken, at some point, as givens.37
Most importantly, nations are seen as the primary political actors—not
individuals, states, regions, parties, or movements.38
The view that an expanded notion o f consent implies a prima facie right
of secession and self-determination must override individual consent at
some point since the boundaries of nations cannot be consensually
determined—some individuals will be included in nations against their will
and others excluded despite their protests. O f course, in any political
arrangement, there are some limitations on consent, since power is always
coercive to some degree. But for nationalists, power flows from a particular
definition of the nation—of who its members are and o f where its
boundaries lie—and this cannot be determined consensually because
individuals will inevitably make conflicting claims about these matters.
The notion that nations ought to be able to consent to their rule by
particular states (and to secede from them if they wish)—a seemingly
206 Chapter 6
consensual idea—ends up as a justification for the exclusion o f individuals

o f the “wrong” nationality from citizenship without their consent, if it is
necessary for the readjustment o f boundaries and populations in order to
create new nation-states.39 Thus, if consent is applied to nations as a
principle justifying secession, then the right o f individuals to political
consent can be compromised.
Finally, a third contradiction within liberal nationalism arises in the
conflicting tendencies toward an egalitarian conception o f justice and
toward an elitist notion o f national independence and greatness. While
liberalism in the late twentieth century has come increasingly, in the work
o f such philosophers as Dworkin, Rawls, and Habermas, to incorporate an
emphasis on equality, nationalism subordinates the value o f equality to the
interests of a particular nation.40 O f course, some liberal nationalists argue
that only national sentiments can provide the ideological support necessary
for a state to be capable o f curbing market economies and redistributing
wealth in an egalitarian manner.41
But, other nationalists more consistently emphasize the importance of
achieving a strong nation-state that can maintain its independence from
others. The definition o f the “national interest” as an equal society is often
subordinated to the ostensibly national interests o f ruling elites who are
able to secure the state’s continued power in the interstate system only at
the cost o f domestic social reform.42
Furthermore, liberal egalitarianism is undercut by a nationalism that
refuses to concern itself with injustices that occur outside the nation’s
boundaries.43 It is also frequently die case that national sentiments, far from
creating a sense o f moral obligation, as liberal nationalists contend, can
create a callousness and indifference to injustices, provided they occur to
members of other nationalities. Thus, the “national interest” might be used
to justify restrictions on immigration, denial o f citizenship or benefits to
“guest workers,” refusal to make compensation for the colonial exploitation
of other countries, or even foreign military intervention to secure scarce
goods for the national community. Overall, the liberal concern for universal
justice and equality exists at odds with the nationalist concern for exclusion
of aliens and protection o f the national homeland.
The communalism, statism, and elitism of nationalist ideology is
politically more powerful than a liberalism committed to libertarian,
consensual, and egalitarian principles because liberalism must, in the end,
rely on the nation-state as the only context within which these principles
might be enacted.44This is true whether liberal thinkers acknowledge it or
not, because liberalism as such has no means of specifying the boundaries
of a political community, who should be members o f it, and why they

should feel obligations toward one another. Nationalism does have the
means to settle these matters, although, as I have argued, they are incompat
ible with the core values that liberals have traditionally espoused. Liberal
theory is thus at an impasse: while the nationalist version shows awareness
that liberalism lacks solutions to the problems o f determining territorial
boundaries, citizenship criteria, and communal obligations, traditional
liberal internationalism is aware of the fundamental incoherence o f trying
to combine nationalist solutions to these problems with liberal principles.
Zionism as a Case of Liberal Nationalism
A case that shows how liberal nationalists might attempt to reconcile

seemingly irreconcilable principles is that o f Zionism and the philosophical
legitimation o f the Israeli state. It is perhaps coincidental that so many
philosophical advocates o f national self-determination on liberal grounds
have been advocates o f a liberal Zionism or Jewish nationalism.45 But it is
not coincidental that the case for a Jewish state has so frequently been
made in liberal nationalist terms—it is the paradigmatic example o f the
attempted liberal pacification of a militaristic nationalism imposed on a
hostile people and land.
The liberal case for Zionism is conceptually independent of attitudes
toward the Palestinian liberation movement; liberal Zionists may accept the
idea of a Palestinian state, for instance. But what is never accepted is the
original program o f the Palestinian movement—a binational or multina
tional state. The liberal case for Israel therefore concerns more the
justification for a Jewish state itself, rather than any particular approach to
peace with the Palestinians.46
The liberal argument for a Jewish state does, o f course, view the Israeli
and Palestinian situations as comparable and similar: ‘T he Israeli and
Palestinian claims are both grounded in their past suffering.”47 But beyond
this, the key point is that a Jewish state would not, as early Jewish critics
argued, necessarily be an authoritarian or warlike state—it could be a
liberal and tolerant entity. Nevertheless, it was necessary for Jews to have
a state (in Palestine), either to ensure their survival, or because Jewish
culture needed a state context in which to flourish.
But is a liberal Israel possible? Consider two points. First, such a state
must exclude enough Palestinians to ensure that the few who do remain are
a tiny minority. The right of exclusion—and expulsion—must remain intact
208 Chapter 6
so as to ensure that the Jewish state remains Jewish. Second, Israel must be
(and remain) a warfare state, since in order for it to maintain itself it must
control enough territory (and exclude enough Palestinians from this
territory) to ensure its continuation as a distinctively Jewish state.
These features o f Israel, notwithstanding the good intentions o f various
liberal Zionists, negate the possibility that—if it is to continue to exist as
a Jewish state—Israel could become a tolerant and pacific (and above all,
multicultural) community. As Yitzhak Shamir has stated, ‘T he Jewish state
cannot exist without a special ideological content.... We cannot exist for
long like any other state whose main interest is to insure the welfare o f its
citizens.”48
Nationalism, Globalization, and Autonomy
Liberal nationalists have two last points to make in defense o f the nation
state: (1) nation-states are the only effective vehicles for realizing a
modicum of social justice, and (2) nation-states are the first and last line o f
defense against the power o f global capital and hegemonic states. If these
points were valid, they might compensate for the theoretical contradictions
embedded in liberal nationalist ideas. But are they valid?
If nation-states were the primary means o f achieving distributive justice,
they would indeed have a strong claim to our loyalties. This is exactly how
David Miller seems to view them: nation-states generate the trust required
in order for redistributive schemes to win support.49 But notice that the
claim is not made for states as such—a less controversial point, to be sure.
It is mjtion-states specifically that are required for social justice schemes
to be effectively enacted. Only if Miller can elide the difference between
political communities o f any kind and national communities can he make
his point.
This is because, as John Breuilly has argued, nationalist movements are
usually at odds with the substate forces that are most active in agitating for
social justice and economic redistribution—e.g., socialist and democratic
movements and political parties. It is only where class-based politics is
weak that nationalist movements flourish.50But where they are both strong,
rivalry and antagonism between them is usually the case.
In other words, nationalism is not primarily a form o f social justice-
centered politics so much as it embodies a state-centered politics focused
on the values o f political independence, homogeneous citizenship, and
often militaristic patriotism. The effects of this type o f state-centered
politics are twofold. First, as Warren Magnusson has pointed out, such
politics effectively exclude two important sources o f reformist and
redistributive politics—the local community and the social movement.51 In
each case, political life is not experienced solely as a function o f the
citizens’ relation to the state, but rather as a part o f their experience of
problems or possibilities within everyday life. Nationalism narrows the
meaning o f politics to a relationship to state institutions.
Second, when localities or movements seek greater social justice, they
find it harder to use the rhetoric of nation building—often expressed in
terms of the “national interest”—to influence the state to undertake
reforms. As Anthony Giddens puts it,
the discourse of national solidarity helps block off other possible

discursive articulations of interest The discursive arena of the modem
polity treats what “politics” is as inherently to do with the bounded sphere
of the state. Thus if programmes of reform on the part of subordinate
classes (or other groupings) are to succeed, they have normally to be made
to appear in “the national interest.” But dominant classes have much less
difficulty representing their own policies as in “the national interest” than
do oppositional groups.32
The politics o f national self-determination is not therefore a politics of

social justice so much as a politics o f state building.
If (his were a necessity, however, in order to resist the transnational
forces that might undermine national autonomy—and therefore whatever
social justice could be constituted within states—it might seem a worth
while goal. This is certainly what Walzer seems to think; as he writes with
reference to the North American Free Trade Agreement and other
international protocols benefiting capital, it is only the state that can resist
such threats to welfare and other redistributive schemes that have amelio
rated the effects o f capital on workers in the past.53
One might also mention (as Walzer, interestingly, does not) the power
of hegemonic states such as the United States to influence and/or punish
weaker states or peoples with which it has antagonistic relations. It would
seem that maintaining independent states would be the only way to resist
such influence or retribution. But again the real question that Walzer, like
Miller, evades is whether nation-states specifically are effective in this
regard.
I would argue that they are not, for two reasons. First, there is no
necessary antagonism between nationalist movements and nation-states and
either transnational corporations or hegemonic powers. Nationalist
210 Chapter 6
movements are often happy to ally themselves with large corporations if the
alliance will aid them in destabilizing existing states (the Katangan
secessionist movement was an example o f this). In any case, the accession
to power of nationalists does not mean that foreign corporations will
necessarily get a hostile reception. In fact, new nation-states are often
anxious to make the agreements with international business that will give
them the currency to reconstruct state institutions and gain diplomatic
credibility. Similarly, with hegemonic states, nationalist movements will
often ally themselves with dominant powers in order to secure their status
regionally. Examples abound, from the U.S. client states o f Israel and
Pakistan to the recent tacit alliances o f breakaway Soviet and Yugoslav
republics with Germany and the United States.
Second, it is often the case that nationalist movements, if they succeed
in attaining state power, often inherit weakened, divided, or shrunken states
that provide much less resistance to global capital and imperial powers than
their predecessor states did or could have done. Can anyone maintain that
the new successor states to Austria in interwar Eastern Europe were better
able to resist German expansionism—or that today the even smaller
statelets of the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, or Czechoslovakia could
offer much resistance to U.S. or German hegemony?
The fact that such states may be more nationally homogeneous is at best
irrelevant (and at worst, perhaps, disabling) in the global contest for
resources and influence. O f course, given the the transnational migrations
engendered by the increasing internationalization o f labor and capital, it is
quite reasonable to expect that such nation-states would fail even at their
primary goal— achievement o f a fully homogeneous political community,
coextensive with a national group. What could be achieved, however, is a
further increase in tensions and conflicts as more and more national groups
attempt to secede, further fragmenting already weakened “nation
states”—that is, states that are “national” largely in name only.
Though liberal nationalism fails in one of its primary tasks—the
justification o f a tolerant and egalitarian (yet still solidaristic) commu
nity—it does point to the theoretical lacunae in liberalism concerning the
need for a conception o f community that provides a context for solidarity,
citizenship, and civic responsibility. While the nation-state cannot be such
a community, this does not mean that there is not still a need to theorize
what this community might be.
Furthermore, while national self-determination cannot be justified
philosophically, some form o f autonomy would seem to be a necessity if
particular ethical communities are to survive and flourish. Thus, self
determination is a justifiable demand as long as it is not understood in

nationalistic terms. But is it possible to advocate self-determination without
nationalism?
Notes
1. See Ross Poole, Morality and Modernity (London: Routledge, 1991).

2. Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1993), 117-18; see also Ronald Beiner, What‘s the Matter with Liberalism?
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 114.
3. See Charles Taylor, Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, Philosophy and the
Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
4. The classic statement of this problem with liberalism was made by
Giuseppe Mazzini in his Duties o f Man (London: Dent, 1907).
5.See C. B. MacPherson, The Political Theory o f Possessive
Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), and
Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).
6. See Immanuel Wallerstein, After Liberalism (New York: New Press,
1995).
7.Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 118. Tamir is quoting Ronald Dworkin in
this passage. Obviously, when stated this generally, such a claim for the priority of
community could encompass nonnationalist as well as nationalist views. The
intermediate premise in Tamir and others’ advocacy of nation-states is that
communities are most essentially and desirably national communities (see chapter
3 above for discussion of this point). As I suggest in the conclusion, another
conception of community that more adequately captures the realities of social life
and communal interdependence is urgently needed in order to show the nationalist
conception as the distorted image of public life that it is.
10. Poole, Morality and Modernity, 105.
12.0ne example of this sort of argument is Kai Nielsen, “Cultural
Nationalism, neither Ethnic nor Civic,” in Omar Dahbour (ed.), “Philosophical
Perspectives on National Identity,” a special issue of the Philosophical Forum 28,
nos. 1-2 (Fall-Winter 1996-1997): 42-52.
13.See Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique o f Historical
Materialism, vol. 2, The Nation-State and Violence (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1987), 220-21.
15. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 139, 141.
16. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 79 (italics added).
212 Chapter 6

19. Harry Beran, The Consent Theory o f Political Obligation (London:
CroomHelm, 1987), 138.
20. Harry Beran, “Self-Determination: A Philosophical Perspective,” W.
J. Allan Macartney (ed.), Self-Determination in the Commonwealth (Aberdeen,
England: Aberdeen University Press, 1988), 31; see also 25.
23.Michael Walzer, Spheres o f Justice: A Defense o f Pluralism and
24. See particularly Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral
Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), Michael
Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982), and Charles Taylor, Sources o f the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989).
25. In his article ‘The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,” Political
Theory 18, no. 1 (Feb. 1990), Walzer states that, “The central issue for political
theory is not the constitution ofthe selfbut the connection of constituted selves, the
pattern of social relations” (21).
26. On the connection between contemporary communitarianism and civic
republicanism, see Chantal Mouffe, “American Liberalism and Its Critics: Rawls,
Taylor, Sandel, and Walzer,” Praxis International 8 (1988): 193-206, and
especially, Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and
the Modem World (London: Routledge, 1990). Oldfield cites Machiavelli,
Rousseau, Hegel, and Tocqueville as primary exponents of some version of civic
republicanism. Mouffe also mentions Hannah Arendt as a twentieth-century
exponent of certain civic republican themes. There are a few historians who have
argued for the influence of some aspects of civic republicanism on modem political
philosophy in general—including individualistic theories such as
contractarianism—and on American Revolutionary thought in particular; see, for
instance, J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political
Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1975). For a more recent (and philosophical rather than historical)
treatment, see Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory o f Freedom and Government
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
27. Oldfield, Citizenship and Community, 4.
28. Oldfield, Citizenship and Community, 5.
29. Walzer makes this point when he writes that
A revival of neoclassical republicanism provides much of the substance

of contemporary communitarian politics. The revival, I have to say, is
largely academic...it has no external reference...there are virtually no
examples of republican association and no movement or party aimed at
promoting such association. (“Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,”

19)
The recent work of Stephen Macedo seems designed to answer—at least in the
realm of theory—Walzer’s charge against civic republicanism by arguing that
“liberal constitutionalism” does in fact embody substantive civic values. As
Macedo writes, “Communitarian values are implicit in the idea of a pluralistic
community governed properly by liberal justice” (Liberal Virtues: Citizenship,
Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism [Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1990], 203). I cannot here deal further with this controversy other than to say that
Macedo does not seem to separate the problem of how to define the conditions of
membership in a community—whether on grounds of national identity or in some
other way—from the question of the values that underlie the constitution of a state.
And see also Pettit, Republicanism.
30. Walzer, “Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,” 21.
31. Andrew Mason, “Liberalism and the Value of Community,” Canadian
Journal o f Philosophy 22 (June 1993): 232.
32.Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f
Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 92-93.
34. Catherine Samary, Yugoslavia Dismembered, trans. Peter Drucker
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1995), 63-64; see also Susan Woodward,
Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1995), chaps. 3-5.
35. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 96,148.
36. See Dov Ronen, The Quest for Self-Determination (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979).
38. See Warren Magnuson, “The Reification of Political Community,” in
R. B. J. Walker and Saul B. Mendlovitz (eds.), Contending Sovereignties:
Redefining Political Community (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990).
(London: Edward Elgar, 1990), and James Nickel, “What’s Wrong with Ethnic
Cleansing? Philosophical Perspectives on Forced Relocation” (unpublished paper,
1993).
40. On the liberal concept of equality, see especially Ronald Dworkin,
“Liberalism,” in Stuart Hampshire (ed.), Public and Private Morality (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1978).
42. Giddens, Contemporary Critique o f Historical Materialism, 220-21.
43. Walzer, Spheres o f Justice, 61-62.
44. Poole, Morality and Modernity, 91.
214 Chapter 6
45. This includes, most self-consciously, Yael Tamir, in her book Liberal
Nationalism, as well as Avishai Margalit, Joseph Raz, and Michael Walzer (though
not Harry Beran or David Miller, as far as I know).
46. For a variety of approaches to this issue, see Tomis Kapitan (ed.),
Philosophical Perspectives on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Armonk, N.Y.: M.
E. Sharpe, 1997).
48. Quoted in the New York Times, July 14,1992.
49. Miller, On Nationality, 90,93.
51. Magnusson, “Reification of Political Community,” 46, 52.
52. Giddens, Contemporary Critique o f Historical Materialism, 221. The
use of a rhetorical anticommunism during the Cold War to articulate a nascent
nationalism in the United States—and thereby to defeat proposals for
demilitarization and domestic social reform—might be considered an example of
this phenomenon; see H. W. Brands, The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold
War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
53. Michael Walzer, “Response to Veit Bader,” Political Theory 23, no.
2 (May 1995): 248.
I
Conclusion
Self-Determination without
Nationalism
[I]t is highly important to recognize the basic regional and economic
realities that have been ignored by the mythology of the national state,
with its egoistic schemes of conquest, dominion, and belligerent assertion.
— Lewis Mumford, The Culture o f Cities
Against National Self-Determination
If self-determination is to be understood as a principle capable of address

ing the real problems of oppression and domination in the international
realm, it must be clearly separated from the nationalist view that such
problems are a result of nations lacking states of their own. The critique of
justifications for national self-determination has, I hope, made clear that
this particular solution is not only inadequate, but will exacerbate such
problems in many instances.
For example, the attempt to extend provisions within international law
for a right of self-determination to national groups generally results in what
I have called a “consistency problem.” The granting of a right of self-
determination to nations is inconsistent with other norms in international
law, particularly those respecting the integrity of already existing states and
the right of peoples to self-rule. The effort to create new states would, I
have argued, end up denying political rights already recognized to other
affected groups and peoples.
But if nations are seen to have a right of self-determination as a result
of their individual members’ need for cultural expression, an “identity
problem” results. This is because, in establishing a state—and thereafter,
an official state culture—individuals’ identities will end up being made to
conform to some preexisting standard that may be inimical to their own
changing sense o f self-identity. For instance, such matters as language use,
religious practice, sexual orientation, dietaiy choice, and educational
215
216 Conclusion
curricula may be changed, standardized, or determined in ways that

adversely affect the ability o f individuals to make choices about their own
lives. So there is no gain in the ability of individuals to express themselves
culturally with the acquisition o f nation-states—unless of course cultures
are viewed as essentially state cultures which require a governmental
apparatus to enforce their “enjoyment.”
The attempt to make national self-determination a matter o f political
choice—a democratic right—fails as well, largely because it leads to a
“coercion problem.” When the idea o f democratic consent is extended
beyond consent to particular policies or regimes to consent to membership
in a state, the limits o f democratic government have been exceeded.
Coercion must be used to regulate who has a choice o f membership, since
a completely democratic decision procedure in this matter is impossible.
But if it is impossible to determine who will choose democratically, then,
in particular situations, some must be prevented from exercising their
consent—and the outcome o f a choice situation (a referendum, for instance)
may involve the coercion (e.g., expulsion or subordination) of those
excluded from choosing in the first place. National self-determination, in
other words, is essentially undemocratic, since it accords a right of consent
only to some (national) groups in particular cases, not to all.
Finally, the attempt to justify a principle of self-determination for nations
out of the very meaning o f community generates a “territory problem.” This
is the result of such a principle being unable, on the one hand, to show how
peoples’ right to a community produces a similar right to a land. But it is
even more the case that the principle results in disputes over territory, since
a claim of self-determination would be an unconditional claim to particular
lands that others might also claim or, perhaps, that they presently occupy.
Nothing in the principle would provide the means to adjudicate such
disputes. In fact, the principle would lead to making such disputes even
more intractable, since it would give just cause to all national groups who
invoked it.
What then is left of the principle o f national self-determination? It is the
basic concept o f self-determination, shorn of its nationalist connotations.
The conclusion that the very idea o f self-determination is flawed—a
conclusion to which Elie Kedourie came in his 1960 book on national
ism—is unwarranted. This is because the fundamental idea o f political
autonomy that underlies the principle o f self-determination, while generally
inapplicable to national groups, is still a desideratum for many peoples and
groups in the world. The real questions are how legitimate demands for
self-determination can be embodied in political institutions other than the
i
Self-Determination without Nationalism 217
nation-state and what principles should govern relations between political

communities that are self-determining.
This conclusion was anticipated in a somewhat forgotten book by Alfred
Cobban on national self-determination, published in 1947. While Cobban
was overly sanguine about certain forces or institutions in the postwar
world (e.g., the spread of global markets and the use of plebiscites to
determine citizenship), he was remarkably prescient about the flaws in the
theory of the nation-state. In particular, he made three points in the
conclusion to his book: (1) the idea of national identity is not a stable or
reliable guide to peoples’ cultures or loyalties; (2) the idea of the nation
state cannot solve the problem of sovereignty—that is, it cannot determine
when a state is legitimate; and (3) there is no historical necessity to the
nation-state—on the contrary, it is historically exceptional.
The idea of national identity, according to Cobban, implies that
individuals' identities are unitary and separable along national lines, when,
in actuality, “[n]ationality...is never stationary; it is constantly being built
up or broken down.”1This fluid situation means that the idea implicit in the
concept of national self-determination—that all states should be nation
states—is an impossibility: “The attempt to make the culturally united
nation state the one and only basis of legitimate political organisation has
proved untenable in practice. It was never tenable in theory.”2
The goal of achieving nation-states, however unrealizable, can
nevertheless prove politically potent. This means that as nationalities enter
into conflicts with one another or with states over claims to sovereignty, the
destruction of one or the other group or country becomes virtually
inevitable. The nation-state cannot be the solution to such conflicts:
“National sovereignty...is irreconcilable with any solution of the fundamen
tal political problems of the modem world.”3 Nevertheless, nationalities
sometimes have legitimate demands requiring redress; the fact that nation
states are not the form this redress should take does not negate the real
existence o f problems of national oppression and discrimination.4
The solution lies in finding a new form of limited state sovereignty that
respects individual liberties while maintaining the necessary cohesion for
“organized social life.”5 Developing this new form o f sovereignty is a
realistic possibility because, Cobban insists, it is the nation-state that has
been historically exceptional:
To limit the rights of national sovereignty and self-determination is in

effect to reverse the process by which cultural and political nationality
became allied, and to separate them once again. This may be condemned
218 Conclusion
as flying in the face of history, but in fact what we are doing is calling on
a thousand years of history to redress the balance of a century and a half.
Nationality developed and national cultures flourished for century after
century in the absence of any idea of national sovereignty.6
What does “political nationality” (i.e., community) mean as a norm

separated from “cultural nationality”? What is a principle o f self-determina
tion that is neither synonymous with the existing rights o f states nor
subservient to nationalist imperatives? What claims do individuals have to
citizenship when not based on their putative nationalities? What does a
reconstituted conception of sovereignty mean for relations between peoples
and states? These are the questions that will be briefly entertained in the
remaining pages o f this conclusion.
Political Community without the Nation-State
One implication o f the arguments against national self-determination in this

book is that political communities need definition without reference to the
ethnonational identities o f their members. This means that the contiguity
of a people in a country does not (and should not) imply their consanguin
ity—their relatedness. This also means that a communitarian account o f
political legitimacy is not equivalent to a nationalist account that relates
citizenship to ethnic nationality. Of course, various philosophers criticized
in this book would deny that that is what they are claiming; nations,
according to them, are bound together by simple political will—by a
process o f mutual self-recognition, and nothing more. It is one o f the
central claims in this work that this is disingenuous—that nationalists
implicitly rely on an ethnically based definition o f nationality in order to
distinguish their political claims from those o f others, while denying that
they are engaged in advocating a form o f ethnonational exclusivism.
But nationalists, whether admitting to their ethnonational biases or not,
are seemingly on strong ground if it is conceded that universalist and/or
liberal ideas cannot provide the means of determining the legitimacy of
particular communities. Since I did in fact concede this in chapters 5 and
6, what basis for community is left, if not an ethnonational one? Can, in
other words, contiguity itself provide the basis for community? One way in
which this issue has been discussed is to ask whether communitarian
assumptions inexorably lead to nationalist conclusions. John O’Neill has
argued that they do not, because “nation building” has itself been destruc
tive o f older, premodem forms o f communitarian association.7 If the

communitarian critique o f liberal universalism is applicable, it will not
justify nation-states, for nationalism itself is in certain respects a universal-
ist project leading to the suppression or privatization o f “older allegiances.”
But, as O’Neill himself concludes, these older allegiances are, in any case,
often oppressive in ways that most contemporary communitarians would
not endorse. Upon what, then, can a political community be based, if not on
premodem local affinities or on modem national identities?
From the perspective o f international law, it is enough to recognize the
sovereignty o f existing states without considering the theoretical basis of
this sovereignty. But this is a merely provisional option—and one that, in
any case, provides no guidelines for reconstituting sovereignty in the cases
in which existing states have disintegrated (cases o f which the 1990s has
offered us a couple o f spectacular examples). The upshot o f the critique of
national self-determination in these pages is not simply the reaffirmation
of existing international legal arrangements, including state sovereignties.
As was pointed out in chapter 5, there are instances in which legitimate
claims to self-determination may not be recognized in international
law—though these cases cannot be described in nationalistic terms.
It is true, however, that, as I argued in chapter 1, the present doctrine of
external sovereignty provides a powerful corrective to the imperial
pretensions o f hegemonic states—one that ought not to be discarded. So
any revisionist conception o f political community ought to be one that does
not occasion massive changes in existing sovereignties—as does the
nationalist conception.
A theory o f political community that is based on the rejection of both
national identity and simple legal sovereignty as the bases for community
seems to leave little room for alternatives. What is required, however, for
this alternative conception of political community (and ultimately o f self-
determination, as well) is a normative theory o f contiguity that can provide
the basis for the determination o f boundaries and citizenship in cases of
political upheaval. There is, of course, at present no such theory. But there
are some interesting possibilities for future development.
One option is to revitalize the civic republicanism o f some early modem
political philosophy by focusing on the legitimacy o f certain kinds of
constitutional regimes.8 In a world in which such republican systems are
exceptional, what would establish the legitimacy o f particular states is
adherence to such systems. But there is a theoretical problem with this
approach: if all states adhered to republican principles, what would
differentiate one from another? This is the same sort o f problem encoun
220 Conclusion
tered in theories o f “constitutional patriotism”:9 constitutions seem not to

be particularistic enough to give any criteria for differentiating one state
from another, should both (or many) states adhere to the same principles.
O f course, this may rarely be a problem in practice—or it may be one that
republican theory is yet able to solve.
A second possibility is to try to define contiguity nonpolitically, but also
non-nationally. This approach, I think, comes closer to the heart of the
matter than the republican one. States, on this account, would be rendered
legitimate to the extent that they corresponded to countries, defined as
places, regions, or localities united by certain features or characteristics.
Some examples might be: places inhabited by indigenous peoples leading
distinctive ways o f life; regions united by roughly self-sufficient econo
mies; ecosystems clearly distinguishable from surrounding areas
(“bioregions”).
In these examples, a connection inheres between a people and a locale,
determined not by a special ethnonational identity, but by distinctive
lifeworlds, economies, or ecologies. In the anthropological literature, this
is what defines a people as “indigenous”—its unique connection to a way
of life (a lifeworld) rooted in a particular place.10In the literature of urban
and regional planning, this is what defines a region—a unique concatena
tion of the natural and the human." Finally, in environmentalist writing,
this is what distinguishes sustainable from unsustainable ecologies—a
rootedness in the inherent possibilities and limitations o f particular places,
rather than to a model o f development that results in attempts at achieving
perpetual economic growth.12
While it goes without saying that these are but intimations o f a seriously
under-theorized connection between peoples and lands, this does not mean
that this connection is unreal. In fact, I would argue that, even within
nationalist writings, these conceptions o f place or contiguity are surrepti
tiously evoked in order to disguise (or more charitably, supplement) the
relative poverty o f the ethnonational conception o f community. But, despite
nationalist claims to the contrary, there is no necessary relation between
ties o f national identity and those o f place, economy, or ecology.
This is the importance, finally, o f insisting on a strict (ethnically based)
definition o f national identity: it enables an analytical distinction to be
made between ascriptive and substantive concepts of, e.g., community,
place, region, or people. In nationalist rhetoric, it is the evocation of
national homelands as those places within which distinctive ways o f life,
economies, and ecosystems can be maintained that gives such rhetoric its
intermittent persuasiveness. Yet, the paucity of support for nationalist
movements when those movements cannot claim any deleterious effects of

the lack o f nation-states on peoples’ customs, livelihoods, or environments
illustrates how important it is for nationalists to associate national identity
with a conception o f place in the more substantive sense(s) just
mentioned.13
Of course, the connection of this sense o f place to a definition of
political community remains to be theorized. Above all, it need not mean
that each such locality, region, or ecosystem must have its own state.14But
it might mean that, i/there is a justifiable reason for a people to disassoci
ate itself from existing states in some way, that reason will lie in the
inability o f that people to maintain its lifeworld, economy, or ecology—not
in the militant assertion o f a national identity. This brings us to a consider
ation o f how to conceptualize a revised principle o f self-determination that
addresses these real (potential) problems, rather than contributing to the
illusions o f nation building.
Self-Determination without Nationalism
One way to begin is to return to the four types o f political struggles and
movements that have invoked the term and ask whether the principle need
be applied in a new way to the issues about which they are concerned.
These political struggles aim at: (1) national liberation, in the sense of
independence from colonial and neocolonial domination; (2) the cultural
rights o f minorities within multicultural countries; (3) democratic self-rule,
particularly as applied to countries under authoritarian governments; and
(4) the autonomy o f distinct regions or indigenous peoples within existing
states.
(1) From a nationalist perspective, national liberation means nations
claiming states o f their own. But in terms o f international law, national
liberation is simply equivalent to a claim o f self-rule for colonized peoples.
In other words, it is simply the extension o f a principle of political
sovereignty to territorially distinct parts o f colonial empires. Among
prominent historical advocates of national liberation (i.e., those involved
in the anticolonial struggles of the early to mid-twentieth century,
especially in Africa and Asia), no legitimacy was generally granted to the
idea that separate nations, ethnicities, tribes, or cultures have the right to
states.15
Today, few colonial situations remain to which a principle o f self-
determination would legitimately apply. But there are some neocolonial
222 Conclusion
situations in which the principle might properly be invoked. The clearest

case of this, as discussed in chapter 2, is that o f the Palestinians. But the
recognition o f this case in international law is clearly established and does
not require any special or new principle in order to justify it. Similarly, in
future struggles against neocolonialism, if the denial o f political rights is
involved, recognizing a claim o f self-determination would not require a
new legal principle.
(2) In the case o f cultural rights, these have been recognized in
international law primarily as being equivalent to the rights o f minorities
to cultural expression. Since minorities are regarded as being entitled to the
same rights as the majority culture, this does not entail claims to
statehood.16The rights o f cultural minorities are therefore not in principle
or in international practice the rights o f nations to states. This is not to deny
that the nation, as David Archard puts it, “may nevertheless be worthy o f
some institutional recognition and protection insofar as it provides a source
o f good for citizens.”17 But this means no more than that the claims o f
nationalities are equivalent to the rights o f minorities to freedom o f cultural
expression.
But even in cases where these rights are so systematically violated that
statehood for the oppressed national minority is the only way in which their
cultural rights can be protected, this does not entail a general principle of
national self-determination. The reason is that only an argument for a
remedial, not a general, principle is necessary; that is, in the case o f the
suppression o f a national minority’s cultural rights, that minority may have
a right to a state—but only in that case and only as a remedial measure. So
in cases such as Tibet, where the suppression o f a culture may be ongoing,
statehood would be a remedial option o f last resort, but not a right absent
this suppression.
(3) Self-determination has also been invoked when the democratic self-
rule of peoples has been denied. Nationalists have worked up such cases
into a category o f “captive nations.” But no such term need be applied to
instances of peoples who are systematically denied any political participa
tion by authoritarian governments. O f course, such instances are not ones
of specifically national self-determination, but simply o f political self-
determination within existing states. This is equally true o f cases in which
the denial o f self-rule is discriminatory—i.e., applied only to a minority
within a state. The legitimate claims o f that minority to political
participation—or absent the granting o f such claims, to independ
ence—require no principle o f national self-determination distinct from the
general claim that all peoples ought to be self-governing.
There is, as I argued especially in chapter 4, no reason why national

groups should have a right to rule themselves alone, so long as self-rule is
available to them within an existing country. Given the insuperable barriers
to having a completely democratic choice concerning which states
individuals affiliate with, it is only in those instances o f the actual denial
of political participation that invoking self-determination would be
warranted.
(4) Finally, national self-determination has sometimes been used as a
way of claiming greater autonomy for indigenous peoples or distinctive
regions within existing countries. In cases in which indigenous peo
ples—for instance, American Indians—have real claims to a distinctive
way of life and to a long-standing tie to a land, self-determination may be
legitimately at issue; but this is not because such claims are national in
character. This is also the case in regions that may be suffering some
discrimination on the part o f central governments, regions that may or may
not be ethnically distinct from the rest of the country. It is the inability to
pursue a way o f life suitable to a particular environment that determines
whether a claim o f self-determination is legitimate, not the existence o f a
“national community” o f one sort or another.
But if such regions or peoples have a legitimate claim, is it captured by
existing principles in international law? In my view, this is the clearest case
in which there is a need for an enhanced principle o f self-determination. It
is precisely the needs o f peoples and localities to live distinctively that is
not served by current arrangements or doctrines, either nationalist or
internationalist.
While there are legitimate needs and concerns in certain instances
concerning political sovereignty, democratic self-rule, cultural rights, and
regional autonomy, the principle of national self-determination cannot
provide a philosophical foundation for meeting these needs. On the one
hand, the sovereignty o f non-self-governing peoples is a legitimate concern
in the few places where it may still be at issue; but it is met by existing
international law, which now recognizes self-government as a basic
entitlement. On the other hand, while the cultural rights o f peoples are an
important consideration, they do not require a national principle in addition
to currently accepted human rights law, which recognizes culture as an
individual right. Furthermore, democratic self-rule cannot be applied to the
question o f membership without contradiction. As long as peoples are
provided with the opportunity for participation in some political system,
membership should not be an issue, since it is irresolvable by democratic
means. Finally, regional autonomy, while a need unmet in current
224 Conclusion
international law, is also unserved by a principle o f national self-determina

tion, since such a principle misconstrues problems o f “internal colonialism”
as ones of ethnonational identity, rather than economic exploitation or
ecological destruction.
In addition, since the principle o f national self-determination, as I
argued in chapter 2, implicitly violates certain doctrines in international
law, it is a desideratum o f any reconstructed principle o f self-determination
that it be compatible with such doctrines. This is not, as some nationalists
might claim, because o f a bias in favor o f already existing states; but
because the maintenance o f international peace is generally furthered by
respecting the autonomy o f states.
The way in which self-determination can be made compatible with other
legal principles is to construe self-determination as a remedial right.18The
idea of a remedial right is that the right can only be invoked when certain
conditions are present; absent these conditions, there is no such right. Allen
Buchanan has advocated a remedial right o f self-determination (or more
specifically, in his case, secession), which could be invoked only when one
o f the following three conditions are present: (1) when massive and
continuing human rights violations are perpetrated upon one group by
another or by a state under which they reside; (2) when a pattern o f
“discriminatory redistribution” (DR) o f wealth and resources from one
group to another occurs within a state; or (3) when a group’s cultural
survival is at issue.19
These conditions require some comment. The first is already virtually
present in existing international law, since the violation o f human rights has
been used as justification for a variety o f actions, including economic
sanctions and even military intervention. The third condition, while too
unlimited in my view (on account o f the critique o f the idea given in
chapter 3), nevertheless is appropriate i f the threat to survival is direct
government action to suppress a group’s culture (e.g., as in Tibet).
It is the second condition—that o f DR—that, I would argue, is the most
important and also the least acknowledged within current international law.
Buchanan defines DR as “implementing taxation schemes or regulatory
policies or economic programs that systematically work to the disadvantage
of some groups, while benefiting others, in morally arbitrary ways.”20
Another way o f putting this would be as the forcible reallocation of
resources and productive capacities from one region to another within a
state or the forcible imposition o f an inappropriate mode o f development
upon a region or people by a central government.
But this is to give DR a more specific meaning than Buchanan does. It
seems to me that, rather than applying the principle to all groups, it is best
applied to two categories—those o f indigenous peoples and ecological
regions, for whom claims o f regional autonomy have particular importance.
This is because if DR is applied to other groups—for instance, minori
ties—existing international human rights law would seem to be an
appropriate venue for criticizing such conditions. When applied to
indigenous groups and ecoregions, eliminating DR will facilitate the
maintenance o f regional and local cultures and ways o f life and the ability
o f regions to sustain these cultures.
A non-nationalistic principle o f self-determination should therefore be
designed to highlight the problem o f what has been called “regional
exploitation” or “internal colonialism”—the differential status and power
o f regions within existing states. Obviously, there are a number o f problems
to be worked out in formulating such a principle—chief among them the
standard (of justice) to be used in determining whether a particular
redistribution o f resources is fair or unfair (i.e., discriminatory). As
Buchanan notes, using the concept o f DR as a means o f distinguishing
legitimate from illegitimate claims to self-determination seems to require
prior agreement about what constitutes a just distribution o f resources.
Without this, no consensus, philosophical, legal, or political, could be
expected about when DR is occurring. But, it may not be necessary to reach
agreement about a philosophical concept o f justice before agreement could
obtain concerning cases. What is required is a mid-range, or substantive,
conception that would indicate when DR is occurring. There is a historical
example of this—namely, colonialism—that did provide a basis for both
philosophical and legal agreement concerning the necessity o f redress (and
this occurred without consensus on how to characterize the conception of
justice or rights underlying condemnations o f colonialism).21
A similar mid-range concept (but this time as a positive goal)—that o f
sustainability—has come to play an important role today in gauging when
development policies are appropriate for regions and ecosystems and when
they are n o t22 If development policies are unsustainable in terms o f a
region’s natural resources and social structures, then they can be deemed
unjust. DR can be considered to be occurring when unsustainable develop
ment policies, including schemes o f land tenure and resource allocation, are
imposed by central states on particular regions. Understanding the basis for
legitimate claims to self-determination in this way should allow us, as
Cobban has advocated, “to restate the issue [of self-determination] in
different and less irreconcilable terms."23
226 Conclusion
A World of Peoples, not Nations
In what ways would the differences between this conception of self-

determination and the nationalist one manifest themselves? Alternatively,
how would advocacy o f a remedial principle o f self-determination (based
on the elimination o f DR) differ from current international legal doctrine?
Two issues are worth consideration in this regard: the role o f states in
defining citizenship and limitations on the sovereignty o f states in relation
to one another.
The principle o f national self-determination functions in part as a
criterion o f citizenship that leads logically to a restrictive immigration
policy, in accordance with the nationalities o f the persons involved. The
reason is, as Michael Walzer writes, that “closure must be permitted
somewhere”; so “something like the sovereign state must take shape and
claim the authority to make its own admissions policy, to control and
sometimes restrain the flow o f immigrants.”24
But once the self-determination of political communities is separated
from the national identities o f their members, it becomes apparent that all
those living and working in a locality would be considered members, and
everyone with a stake in the country (not just those who can claim to be
members of a national group) would have a claim to citizenship.25
Consequently, as Jttrgen Habermas has argued, “[t]he criteria o f ethnic
origin, language, and education—or an ‘acknowledgment o f belonging to
the cultural community’ of the land o f migration...could not establish
privileges in the process o f immigration and naturalization.”26
This is not to deny that, in order for persons to establish membership in
a political community, they must adhere to the political and economic
culture of that community; but this does not mean that they need have a
particular identity, other than the identity that comes from accepting certain
political principles or from living and working in a particular place.27From
the perspective of a regional or ecological concept o f self-determination,
the only justifiable reason to restrict membership would be to protect
distinctive ways o f life against the “enormity o f claims, social conflicts, and
burdens that might seriously endanger the public order or the economic
reproduction o f society.”28
There is a problem with this view, however. Could not such a principle
of self-determination end up justifying the protection o f powerful and
wealthy societies, those which have benefited from the exploitation o f
weaker and poorer ones, while excluding their members from the benefits
o f such exploitation? This possibility suggests that the right o f communities
to determine membership should be further limited by some normative

criterion that establishes responsibility on their part for the effects o f their
actions (including economic and environmental effects) on other societies.
It is certainly unjust for communities grown wealthy on the exploitation of
other societies to exclude from entry persons fleeing the impoverishment
of such societies. In any case, this issue is clearly irresolvable given the
nationalist criterion for membership: a criterion based solely on the
ascribed characteristics o f a national identity.
Alternatively, another approach might be to reconstitute a conception
of sovereignty so that the exploitation (or environmental despoliation) of
other communities would itself be regarded as violating their autonomy.29
This suggests another implication of a non-nationalist conception of self-
determination: the implicit reconstruction o f the concept o f political
autonomy (and o f state sovereignty) as well. In particular, as was argued
above, since nationalism employs a paradoxical view o f autonomy—at once
valorizing its importance while undermining it in practice—rejecting
nationalism will lead to reevaluating yet again the meaning o f political
autonomy.
A conception o f self-determination designed to protect regional and
local lifeworlds provides a reason, under certain conditions, to limit the
internal sovereignty o f states, in relation to their component peoples and
areas. At the same time, it replaces and delegitimizes a different sort of
reason—that o f national identity—from providing grounds for dissolving
and fragmenting political communities.
What of external sovereignty? As I argued in chapter 1, nationalism
often provides a reason to violate the territorial integrity, and consequently
the sovereignty, o f states in the course o f attempting to establish new
nation-states. A regional and ecological understanding of self-determination
would not do this, since statehood would not generally be at issue.30 Such
a conception of self-determination would therefore be more compatible
with a traditional understanding o f external sovereignty—one that accords
states a fundamental equality in relation to one another.31
In the end, a non-nationalist conception o f self-determination would
provide a firmer foundation for the political autonomy o f communities
precisely because its purpose would be to secure the real bases of
autonomy—ones that are found, not in the supposed national identities of
peoples, but in their economic interdependencies and in their relations to
their particular environments.
228 Conclusion
Hopes, not Illusions
It is the particular tragedy o f dominated and oppressed peoples in the last

two centuries that they have been so often prey to the nationalist illusion.
The history o f this tragedy remains to be written. What I have tried to do
here is to suggest the faulty philosophical basis o f this illusion.
The nation-state is not a rational, much less the best, understanding o f
political community. The self-determination o f peoples is not served by
defining it in terms o f those peoples’ national identities. The suffering o f
persons fleeing the horrors o f war, depression, and ecocide are not
ameliorated by limiting the membership o f communities to nationalities.
The world of peoples is not made more peaceful and prosperous by de-
legitimating the sovereignty o f existing states on the basis o f an impossible
criterion o f ethnonational homogeneity—quite the reverse.
These conclusions derive, not only from the horrific record o f national
ist movements in the last two hundred years, but also from the incoherent
nature of the claims made for the panacea o f the nation-state. It is perhaps
not yet possible to fully consider the ambiguous legacy o f the most
fundamental concepts o f modem political philosophy—self-determination
certainly being among them. But it is high time to realize that the dream o f
liberation that such a concept implies when used to oppose authoritarianism
or colonialism has become a nightmare when employed to realize national
ist political ambitions.
Self-determination can, if properly understood, be a political goal that,
rather than justifying the fragmentation o f countries in an elusive search for
national grandeur, instead legitimates limits on powerful states and
organizations and aids in the protection of distinctive and environmentally
sustainable ways o f life. That these ends are increasingly being recognized
as vital for the flourishing o f all societies is a hopeful sign. It is now
equally imperative to admit that the nationalist illusion does nothing to
contribute to their realization.
Notes
1. Alfred Cobban, The Nation-State and National Self-Determination, rev.
ed. (New York: Crowell, 1970), 125.
2. Cobban, National Self-Determination, 129.
3. Cobban, National Self-Determination, 141-42.
4. Cobban, National Self-Determination, 148-49.

7. John O’Neill, “Should Communitarians Be Nationalists?” Journal o f
Applied Philosophy 11, no. 2 (1994), 141.
8. See, e.g., Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory o f Freedom and
Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
9. See, e.g., JQrgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions
to a Discourse Theory o f Law and Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge,
Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1996).
10. John H. Bodley, Victims o f Progress, 3rd ed. (Mountain View, Calif.:
Mayfield Publishing Co., 1982), 153-55.
11. Lewis Mumford, in The Culture o f Cities (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1938), writes that “Not found as a finished product in nature, not
solely the creation of human will and fantasy, the region, like its corresponding
artifact, the city, is a collective work of art” (367). See also, Mark Luccarelli, Lewis
Mumford and the Ecological Region: The Politics o f Planning (New York:
Guilford Press, 1995).
12. Morris Berman, in The Reenchantment o f the World (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1981), writes that there is a great difference in thinking
of communities in a “biotic, not merely ethnic” sense (297). See, also, Kirkpatrick
Sale, Dwellers in the Land: The Bioregional Vision (Philadelphia: New Society
Publishers, 1991).
14.Paul Gilbert, The Philosophy o f Nationalism (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1998), 114.
15. See, e.g., Frantz Fanon’s rejection of “tribalism,” in The Wretched o f
the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 113-14.
16. See, for example, Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (1966): “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right,
in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to
profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language” (in Ian
Brownlie [ed.], Basic Documents in International Law, 2d ed. [Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1972], 171). Interestingly, in the accompanying Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, there is no mention of the rights of nations; “cultural”
rights are the rights of individuals to practice a culture of their choice. See also
Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1989), 156.
17. David Archard, “Should Nationalists Be Communitarians?” Journal
o f Applied Philosophy 13, no. 2 (1996), 219.
18.0n the concept of a remedial right, see Allen Buchanan, “Self-
Determination, Secession, and the Rule of Law,” in Robert McKim and Jeff
McMahan (eds.), The Morality o f Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
230 Conclusion
1997), 310.
19. Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality o f Political Divorcefrom
Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991),
152-53.
21. For some thoughts on this problem, see Buchanan, “Self-
Determination, Secession, & Rule of Law,” 312-13, as well as my article, “Self-
Determination without Nationalism,” in Fred Dallmayr and Jos6 Maria Rosales
(eds.), BeyondNationalism ? Sovereignty and Citizenship (Lanham, Md.: Lexington
Books, 2001), 57-71.
22. For the original statement of a concept of sustainability, see the
“Brundtland report”—World Commission on Environment and Development, Our
Common Future (Oxford, 1987), especially chapter 2, ‘Towards Sustainable
Development”; for discussion of the concept, see Michael Redclift, Sustainable
Development: Exploring the Contradictions (London: Methuen, 1987), and
Vandana Shiva, “Recovering the Real Meaning of Sustainability,” in David E.
Cooper and Joy A. Palmer (eds.), The Environment in Question: Ethics and Global
Issues (London: Routledge, 1998), 187-93.
24. Michael Walzer, Spheres o f Justice: A Defense o f Pluralism and
25. Jtlrgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity: Some
Reflections on the Future of Europe,” Praxis International 12 (April 1992): 5.
28. Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity,” 16; note Bruce
Ackerman’s agreement on this point in Social Justice in the Liberal State (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), 95: “The only reason for restricting
immigration is to protect the ongoing process of liberal conversation itself." It
should be noted that Habermas and Ackerman understand this limitation solely in
terms of constitutional principles, rather than in the economic-ecological terms I
am presenting it.
29. While Henry Shue, in his article “Eroding Sovereignty: The Advance
of Principle,” in Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (eds.), The Morality o f
Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), regards sovereignty as an
impediment to solving environmental problems, he argues that pollution across
borders violates sovereignty just as much as military actions do
(350)—paradoxically showing how sovereignty can provide a criterion for
condemning environmental destruction.
30. This is not to say, however, that statehood could never be at issue: in
cases of severe DR, ecological-regional self-determination might yield a legitimate
demand for a separate state.
31. Ian Brownlie, Principles o f Public International Law, 4th ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1980), 287.
Bibliography
Ackerman, Bruce. SocialJustice in the Liberal State. New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1980.
Acton, John. “Nationality.” In History o f Freedom and Other Essays. London:
Macmillan, 1907.
Alter, Peter. Nationalism. Translated by Stuart McKinnon-Evans. London:
Edward Arnold, 1989.
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. Rev. ed. London: Verso, 1991.
Archard, David. “Should Nationalists Be Communitarians?” Journal o f Applied
Philosophy 13, no. 2 (1996): 215-20.
Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. London: Penguin Books, 1963.
Armstrong, John. Nations Before Nationalism. Chapel Hill: University ofNorth
Carolina Press, 1982.
Avineri, Shlomo, and Avnerde-Shalit, eds. Commmitarianism and Individual
ism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Barker, Ernest. National Character and the Factors in Its Formation. London:
Methuen, 1927.
Barry, Brian. “Self-Government Revisited.” In The Nature o f Political Theory
edited by David Miller and Larry Siedentop. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.
Barsh, Russel Lawrence. “Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to
Subject of International Law.” Harvard Hitman Rights Journal 7 (1994): 33-86.
Bauer, Otto. Die NationalitQtenfragen und die Sozialdemokratle. Vienna:
Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1907. Excerpted in Austro-Marxism, edited and
translated by Tom Bottomore and Patrick Goode. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.
Beiner, Ronald S. “National Self-Determination: Some Cautionary Remarks
Concerning the Rhetoric of Rights.” In National Self-Determination and Secession,
edited by Margaret Moore. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
----- . What's the Matter with Liberalism? Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1992.
Beitz, Charles R. Political Theory and InternationalRelations. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1979.
Beran, Harry. “Border Disputes and the Right ofNational Self-Determination.”
History o f European Ideas 16, nos. 4-6 (January 1993).
231
232 Bibliography
----- . The Consent Theory o f Political Obligation. London: Croom Helm, 1987.
----- . “A Democratic Theory of Political Self-Determination for a New World
Order.” In Theories o f Secession, edited by Percy Lehning. London: Routledge,
1998.
----- . “A Liberal Theory of Secession.” Political Studies 32 (1984).
----- . “More Theory of Secession: A Response to Birch.” Political Studies 36
(1988).
----- . “Self-Determination: A Philosophical Perspective.” In Self-Determina
tion in the Commonwealth, edited by W. J. Allan Macartney. Aberdeen, Britain:
Aberdeen University Press, 1988.
----- . “Who Should be Entitled to Vote in Self-Determination Referenda?” In
Terrorism, Protest, and Power, edited by M. Warner and R. Crisp. London:
Edward Elgar, 1990.
Berlin, Isaiah. “The Counter-Enlightenment.” In Against the Current: Essays
in the History o f Ideas. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1979.
Berman, Morris. The Reenchantment o f the World. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
Bibo, Istvan. The Paralysis o f International Institutions and the Remedies: A
Study o f Self Determination, Concord among the Major Powers, and Political
Arbitration. New York: Wiley, 1976.
Birch, Anthony. “Another Liberal Theory of Secession.” Political Studies 32
(1984): 596-602.
Blaustein, Albert. “The New Nationalism.” American Journal o f Comparative
Law, Supplement (1982).
Blum, Yehuda Z. “Reflections on the Changing Concept of Self-Determina
tion.” Israel Law Review 10 (1975).
Bodley, John H. Victims o f Progress. 3rd ed. Mountain View, Calif.: Mayfield
Publishing Co., 1982.
Brands, H. W. The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993.
Brecher, Jeremy. “‘The National Question* Reconsidered from an Ecological
Perspective.” New Politics 1 (New Series/Summer 1987): 95-112.
Brecher, Jeremy, and Tim Costello. Global Village or Global Pillage:
Economic Reconstruction from the Bottom Up. Boston: South End Press, 1994.
Breuilly, John. Nationalism and the State. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1982.
----- . “Nationalism and the State.” In Nationality, Patriotism, and Nationalism
in Liberal Democratic Societies, edited by Roger Michener. Saint Paul, Minn.:
Professors World Peace Academy, 1993.
Brilmayer, Lea. “Groups, Histories, and International Law.” Cornell Interna
tional Law Journal 25, no. 3 (1992 symposium).
----- . “Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation.” Yale
Journal o f International Law 16 (1991): 177-201.
Brownlie, Ian, ed. Basic Documents in International Law. 2d ed. Oxford:
Bibliography 233
Clarendon Press, 1972.

----- . Principles o f Public International Law. 4th ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1980.
----- . “The Rights of Peoples in Modem International Law.” In The Rights o f
Peoples, edited by Janies Crawford. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.
Buchanan, Allen E. “Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism.”
Ethics 99 (July 1989): 852-82.
. “Democracy and Secession.” In National Self-Determination and
Secession, edited by Margaret Moore. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
. Secession: The Morality o f Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to
Lithuania and Quebec. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991.
----- . “Self-Determination, Secession, and the Rule of Law.” In The Morality
o f Nationalism, edited by Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan. Oxford: Oxford
Buchheit, Lee C. Secession: The Legitimacy o f Self-Determination. New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978.
Burgers, J. Herman. ‘The Function of Human Rights as Individual and
Collective Rights.” In Human Rights in a Pluralist World: Individuals and
Collectivities, edited by Jan Berting et al. Westport, Conn.: Meckler, 1990.
Cairns, Alan. “The Fragmentation of Canadian Citizenship.” In Belonging: The
Meaning and Future ofCanadian Citizenship, edited by William Kaplan. Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993.
Carens, Joseph H. “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders.” Review
o f Politics 49 (Spring 1987).
----- . “Dimensions of Citizenship and National Identity in Canada.” In
“Philosophical Perspectives on National Identity,” edited by Omar Dahbour.
Special issue of the Philosophical Forum 28, nos. 1-2 (Fall-Winter 1996-97).
Carley, Patricia. Self-Determination: Sovereignty, TerritorialIntegrity, and the
Right to Secession. Report from a roundtable held in conjunction with the U.S.
Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff. Washington, D.C.: United States
Institute of Peace, 1996.
Cassese, Antonio. “The Self-Determination of Peoples.” In The International
Bill ofRights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, edited by Louis Henkin.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1981.
Chen, Lung-chu. “Self-Determination: An Important Dimension of the Demand
for Freedom.” American Societyfor International Law Proceedings 75 (1981).
----- . “Self-Determination as a Human Right.” In Toward World Order and
Human Dignity: Essays in Honor o f Myres S. McDougal, edited by Michael
Reisman and Bums H. Weston. New York: Free Press, 1976.
Cobban, Alfred. The Nation State and National Self-Determination. Rev. ed.
New York: Crowell, 1970.
Cohen, Marshall. “Moral Skepticism and International Relations.” In
International Ethics: A “Philosophy and Public Affairs " Reader, edited by Charles
R. Beitz et al. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985.
234 Bibliography
Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.

The Right o f Self-Determination o f the Palestinian People. New York: United
Nations, 1979.
Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe. Document o f the
Copenhagen Meeting o f the Conference on the Human Dimension. 29 June 1990.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State.
Connolly, William E. Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations o f Political
Paradox. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991.
Connor, Walker. Ethnonationalism: The Questfor Understanding. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994.
----- . “A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a...”; excerpted
in Nationalism, edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith. Oxford: Oxford
Copp, David. “Democracy and Communal Self-Determination.” In The
Morality o f Nationalism, edited by Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan. Oxford:
----- . “Do Nations Have the Right of Self-Determination?” In Philosophers
Look at Canadian Confederation, edited by Stanley G. French. Montreal: Canadian
Philosophical Association, 1979.
Couture, Jocelyne, Kai Nielsen, and Michel Seymour, eds. “Rethinking
Nationalism.” Supplementary volume 22 of the Canadian Journal o f Philosophy
(1998).
Crawford, James, ed. The Rights o f Peoples. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.
Dahbour, Omar. “The Ethics of Self-Determination: Democratic, National,
Regional.” In Cultural Identity and the Nation-State, edited by Carol C. Gould and
Pasquale Pasquino. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.
----- . “The Incoherence of Liberal Nationalism.” In Memory, History, and
Critique: European Identity at the Millenium, edited by Frank Brinkhuis and
Sascha Talmor. Utrecht, Netherlands: ISSEI, 1998.
----- . “The Nation-State as a Political Community: A Critique of the
Communitarian Argument for National Self-Determination.” In “Rethinking
Nationalism,” edited by Jocelyne Couture, Kai Nielsen, and Michel Seymour.
Supplementary volume 22 of the Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy (1998): 311-43.
----- . “National Identity: An Argument for the Strict Definition.” Public Affairs
Quarterly 16, no. 1 (Jan. 2002): 17-37.
----- . “Self-Determination in Political Philosophy and International Law.”
History of European Ideas 16, nos. 4-6 (Jan. 1993): 879-84.
----- . “Self-Determination without Nationalism.” In Beyond Nationalism?
Sovereignty and Citizenship, edited by Fred Dallmayr and Jos6 Rosales. Lanham,
Md.: Lexington Books, 2001.
----- , ed. “Philosophical Perspectives on National Identity.” Special issue of
the Philosophical Forum 28, nos. 1-2 (Fall-Winter 1996-97).
Dahbour, Omar, and Micheline R. Ishay, eds. The Nationalism Reader. Atlantic
Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 199S.
Bibliography 235
Dahl, Robert A. Democracy and Its Critics, New Haven, Conn.: Yale
Dallmayr, Fred, and Jos6 Rosales, eds. Beyond Nationalism? Sovereignty and
Citizenship. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001.
Davis, Horace B. Toward a Marxist Theory o f Nationalism. New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1978.
Dobson, Andrew. Green Political Thought: An Introduction. London: Unwin
Hyman, 1990.
Donaldson, Thomas. Corporations and Morality. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1982.
Donnelly, Jack. The Concept o f Human Rights. New York: Saint Martin’s
Press, 1985.
----- . Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
Dunn, John. Western Political Theory in the Face o f the Future. Canto edition.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Dworkin, Ronald. Law‘s Empire. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1986.
----- . “Liberalism.” In Public and Private Morality, edited by Stuart Hamp
shire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
----- . Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1977.
Emerson, Rupert. From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion o f Asian
and African Peoples. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960.
----- . “Self-Determination.” American Journal oflntemationalLaw65 (1971).
Entessar, Nader. Kurdish Ethnonationalism. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,
1992.
Fain, Haskell. Normative Politics and the Community o f Nations. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1987.
Falk, Richard. The Promise o f World Order: Essays in Normative International
Relations. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987.
Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched o f the Earth. Translated by Constance Farrington.
New York: Grove Press, 1968.
Feffer, John. “Self-Determination as a Contingency Principle.” NewPolitics 4,
no. 3 (1993).
Feinberg, Joel. “The Nature and Value of Rights.” Rights, Justice, and the
Bounds o f Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
----- . Social Philosophy. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973.
Feinberg, Joel, and Hyman Gross, eds. Philosophy o f Law. 4th ed. Belmont,
Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1991.
Fichte, J. G. Addresses to the German Nation. Translated by R. F. Jones and
G. H. Turnbull. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.
----- . “The Closed Commercial State.” In The Political Thought o f the German
236 Bibliography
Romantics, 1793-1815, edited by H. S. Reiss. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985.

Franck, Thomas. “The Emerging Right to Democratic Self-Governance in
International Law."American Journal o f International Law 86 (Jan. 1992): 46-91.
French, Stanley, and Andres Gutman. “The Principle of National Self-
Determination.” In Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs, edited by
Virginia Held, Sidney Morgenbesser, and Thomas Nagel. Oxford: Oxford
Fromkin, David. The Independence o f Nations. New York: Praeger, 1981.
Garreau, Joel. The Nine Nations o f North America. Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1981.
Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1983.
Gerard-Libois, Jules. The Katanga Secession. Translated by Rebecca Young.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966.
Giddens, Anthony. A Contemporary Critique o f Historical Materialism, vol.
2, The Nation-State and Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
Gilbert, Paul. “The Concept of a National Community.” In “Philosophical
Perspectives on National Identity,” edited by Omar Dahbour. Special issue of the
Philosophical Forum 28, nos. 1-2 (Fall-Winter 1996-97).
----- . The Philosophy o f Nationalism. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998.
Glenny, Misha. “Yugoslavia: The Revenger’s Tragedy.” New York Review o f
Books, 13 August 1992.
Gould, Carol C. Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in
Politics, Economy, and Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Gould, Carol C., and Pasquale Pasquino, eds. Cultural Identity and the Nation-
State. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.
Grazin, Igor. “The International Recognition of National Rights: The Baltic
States’ Case,” Notre Dame Law Review 66 (1991).
Greenfeld, Liah. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1992.
Gross, Leo. “The Right of Self-Determination in International Law.” In New
States in the Modem World, edited by M. Kilson. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Gutmann, Amy. “Communitarian Critics of Liberalism.” Philosophy and Public
Affairs 14 (1985): 308-22.
Habermas, Jttrgen. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse
Theory o f Law and Democracy. Translated by William Rehg. Cambridge, Mass.:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1996.
----- . “Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of
Europe." Praxis International 12 (April 1992).
----- . “Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Identity: The Federal
Republic’s Orientation to the West.” In The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism
and the Historians ’ Debate, edited and translated by Shierry Weber Nicholsen.
Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1989.
Bibliography 237
----- . “Interview: Ethics, Politics, and History.” Philosophy and Social

Criticism 14 (1988): 433-39.
----- . The Theory o f Communicative Action, vol. 1, Reason and the Rational
ization o f Society. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1984.
----- . ‘Towards a Communication-Concept of Rational Collective Will-
Formation: A Thought Experiment.” Ratio Juris 2 (July 1989).
Halberstam, Malvina. “Nationalism and the Right to Self-Determination: The
Arab-Israeli Conflict.” New York University Journal o f International Law and
Politics 26, no. 1 (Fall 1993): 573-83.
Hanneman, Andrea. “Independence and Group Rights in the Baltics: A Double
Minority Problem.” Virginia Journal o f International Law 35 (1995).
Hannum, Hurst Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The
Accommodation o f Conflicting Rights. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1990.
Hauser, Rita. “International Protection of Minorities and the Right to Self-
Determination.” Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 1 (1971).
Havel, Vaclav. “Post-Communist Nightmare.” New York Review o f Books 41,
no. 10 (27 May 1993).
Hayes, Carlton J. H. Essays on Nationalism. New York: Macmillan, 1926.
Hegel, G. W. F. Lectures on the Philosophy o f World History, Introduction:
Reason in History. Translated by H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1975.
----- . Philosophy o f Mind. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford
----- . Philosophy o f Right. Translated by T. M. Knox. Oxford: Oxford
Held, Virginia. “Justification: Legal and Political.” Ethics 86, no. 1 (October
1975).
----- . Rights and Goods: Justifying SocialAction. New York: Free Press, 1984.
Heller, Agnes. Beyond Justice. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987.
Henkin, Louis, et al. International Law: Cases and Materials. Saint Paul,
Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1980.
----- . “The Reports of the Death of Article 2 (4) Are Greatly Exaggerated.”
American Journal o f International Law 65 (1971).
Herder, J. G. Reflections on the Philosophy o f History o f Mankind. Translated
by T. O. Churchill. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968.
Hinsley, F. H. Sovereignty. 2d ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986.
Hobsbawm, E. J. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth,
Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Honor6, Tony. “The Right to Rebel.” Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies (1988).
Horkheimer, Max. ‘Traditional and Critical Theory.” In Critical Theory:
Selected Essays. Translated by Matthew O’Connell et al. New York: Continuum,
1982.
238 Bibliography
Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1985.
----- . “Self-Determination: Politics, Philosophy, and Law.” In National Self-
Determination and Secession, edited by Margaret Moore. Oxford: Oxford
Hudson, James L. “The Philosophy of Immigration.” Journal o f Libertarian
Studies 8 (Winter 1986).
Jacobs, Jane. The Question o f Separatism: Quebec and the Struggle over
Sovereignty. New York: Random House, 1980.
Jayal, Niraja Gopal. “Ethnic Diversity and the Nation State.” Journal o f
Applied Philosophy 10, no. 2 (1993).
Jennings, Ivor. The Approach to Self-Government. Cambridge: Cambridge
Kamm, Henry. “Yugoslav Refugee Crisis Europe’s Worst since 40’s.” New
York Times, July 24,1992.
Kann, Robert A. A History o f the Hapsburg Empire, 1526-1918. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1974.
Kapitan, Tomis, ed. Philosophical Perspectives on the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997.
Kedourie, Elie. Nationalism. 4th ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
Kelly, Christopher. “Rousseau on the Foundation of National Cultures.”
History o f European Ideas 16, nos. 4-6 (Jan. 1993).
Khalidi, Rashid. Palestinian Identity: The Construction o f Modem National
Consciousness. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
Kingsbury, Benedict. “‘Indigenous Peoples’ as an International Legal
Concept.” In Indigenous Peoples o f Asia, edited by R. H. Barnes, Andrew Barnes,
and Benedict Kingsbury. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Association for Asian Studies, 1995:
13-34.
Kiwanuka, Richard N. “The Meaning of ‘People’ in the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights.” American Journal o f International Law 82 (1988).
Kohn, Hans. The Idea o f Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background.
New York: Macmillan, 1944.
Kronman, Anthony. “Contract Law and Distributive Justice.” Yale LawJournal
89(1980).
Kymlicka, Will. Liberalism, Community, and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1989.
----- . Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f Minority Rights. Oxford:
----- , ed. The Rights o f Minority Cultures. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995.
Lansing, Robert. “Self Determination: A Discussion of the Phrase,” Saturday
Evening Post, May 1921.
Lehning, Percy, ed. Theories o f Secession. London: Routledge, 1998.
Lenin, V. I. “On the National Pride of the Great Russians.” In On the National
Bibliography 239
Question and Proletarian Internationalism. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency

Publishing House, 1970.
----- . “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination.” In On the National
Question and Proletarian Internationalism. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency
Locke, John. Second Treatise o f Government. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Co., 1980.
Luccarelli, Mark. Lewis Mumford and the Ecological Region: Hie Politics o f
Planning. New York: Guilford Press, 1995.
Luxemburg, Rosa. “The National Question and Autonomy.” In The National
Question: Selected Writings by Rosa Luxemburg, edited by Horace B. Davis. New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1976.
Macedo, Stephen. Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in
Liberal Constitutionalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame, Ind.:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1981.
MacPherson, C. B. The Political Theory o f Possessive Individualism: Hobbes
to Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.
----- . “A Political Theory of Property.” In Democratic Theory: Essays in
Retrieval. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.
----- , ed. Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1978.
Magnusson, Warren. “The Reification of Political Community.” In Contending
Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community, edited by R. B. J. Walker and Saul
B. Mendlovitz. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990.
----- . The Search for Political Space: Globalization, Social Movements, and
the Urban Political Experience. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996.
Mallison, Thomas, and Sally V. Mallison. An International Law Analysis ofthe
Major UnitedNations Resolutions Concerning the Palestine Question. New York:
United Nations, 1979.
Margalit, Avishai. The Decent Society. Translated by Naomi Goldblum.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996.
Margalit, Avishai, and Joseph Raz. “National Self-Determination.” Journal o f
Philosophy 87 (September 1990): 439-61.
Marx, Karl. “On the Jewish Question.” In The Marx-Engels Reader, edited by
Robert C. Tucker. 2d ed. New York: W. W. Norton, 1978.
----- , and Friedrich Engels. “The German Ideology: Part I.” In The Marx-
Engels Reader, edited by Robert C. Tucker. 2d ed. New York: W. W. Norton,
1978.
Mason, Andrew. “Liberalism and the Value of Community.” Canadian Journal
o f Philosophy 22 (June 1993): 215-40.
May, Larry. The Morality o f Groups: Collective Responsibility, Group-Based
Harm, and Corporate Rights. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press,
1987.
240 Bibliography
Mazzini, Joseph. “The Duties o f Man ’’and Other Essays. London: D. M. Dent
&Co., 1907.
McKim, Robert, and JefFMcMahan, eds. The Morality ofNationalism. Oxford:
McNeill, William. Polyethnicity and National Unity in WorldHistory. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1986.
Meinecke, Friedrich. Cosmopolitanism and the National State. Translated by
Robert B. Kimber. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970.
Michnik, Adam. “Nationalism.” Social Research 58, no. 4 (Winter 1991): 757-
63.
Mies, Maria, and Vandana Shiva. Ecofeminism. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Zed
Books, 1993.
Mill, John Stuart. “Considerations on Representative Government.” In “On
Liberty" and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Miller, David. “The Ethical Significance ofNationality.” Ethics 98 (July 1988).
----- . “In Defence ofNationality.” Journal o f Applied Philosophy 10 (1993):3-
16.
----- . Market, State, and Community: Theoretical Foundations o f Market
Socialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
----- . On Nationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
Mitchell, Robert D., and Paul A. Groves, eds. North America: The Historical
Geography o f a Changing Continent. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987.
Moore, Margaret, ed. National Self-Determination and Secession. Oxford:
Morgan, Edward M. ‘The Meaning and Imagery of Self-Determination.” New
York University Journal o f International Law and Politics 20 (Winter 1988).
Morris, Christopher W. An Essay on the Modem State. Cambridge: Cambridge
MoufTe, Chantal. “American Liberalism and Its Critics: Rawls, Taylor, Sandel,
and Walzer.” Praxis International 8 (1988): 193-206.
Mulhall, Stephen, and Adam Swift. Liberals and Communitarians. Oxford:
Blackwell, 1992.
Mumford, Lewis. The Culture o f Cities. 1938. Reprint, Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1981.
Munck, Ronaldo. The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism. London:
Zed Books, 1986.
Musil, Robert. “‘Nation’ as Ideal and as Reality.” In Precision and Soul:
Essays and Addresses, translated by Burton Pike and David S. Luft. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1990.
Nairn, Tom. The Break-Up o f Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism. 2d ed.
London: Verso, 1981.
Nickel, James W. Making Sense o f Human Rights: Philosophical Reflections
on the "Universal Declaration o f Human Rights.” Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1987.
Bibliography 241
----- . “What’s Wrong with Ethnic Cleansing? Philosophical Perspectives on

Forced Relocation” (unpublished paper, 1993).
Nielsen, Kai. “Cultural Nationalism, neither Ethnic nor Civic.” In “Philosophi
cal Perspectives on National Identity,” edited by Omar Dahbour. Special issue of
the Philosophical Forum 28, nos. 1-2 (Fall-Winter 1996-97): 42-52.
----- . “Secession: The Case of Quebec.” Journal o f Applied Philosophy, Vol.
10, No. 1 (1993): 29-43.
Norman, Richard. Free and Equal: A Philosophical Examination o f Political
Values. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
Nozick, Robert Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, 1974.
Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W. Wentworth. The Principle o f Self-Determination in
International Law. New York: Nellen Publishing Co., 1977.
Oldfield, Adrian. Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the
Modem World. London: Routledge, 1990.
O’Neill, John. “Should Communitarians Be Nationalists?” Journal o f Applied
Philosophy 11, no. 2 (1994): 135-42.
O’Neill, Onora. “Nozick’s Entitlements.” In Reading Nozick: Essays on
“Anarchy, State, and Utopia, ” edited by Jeffrey Paul. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1981.
Pateman, Carole. The Problem o f Political Obligation: A Critique o f Liberal
Theory. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.
Paul, Jeffrey, ed. Reading Nozick: Essays on “Anarchy, State, and Utopia.”
Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1981.
Pettit, Philip. Republicanism: A Theory o f Freedom and Government. Oxford:
Philpott, Daniel. “In Defense of Self-Determination,” Ethics 105 (1995): 352-
85.
----- . “Self-Determination in Practice.” In National Self-Determination and
Secession, edited by Margaret Moore. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Pocock, J. G. A. The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and
the Atlantic Republican Tradition. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1975.
Pogge, Thomas. “The Bounds of Nationalism.” In “Rethinking Nationalism,”
edited by Jocelyne Couture, Kai Nielsen, and Michel Seymour. Supplementary
Volume 22 of the Canadian Journal o f Philosophy (1996): 463-504.
----- . Realizing Rawls. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989.
Pomerance, Michla. Self-Determination in Law and Practice: The New
Doctrine in the United Nations. Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.
Poole, Ross. “Freedom, Citizenship, and National Identity.” In “Philosophical
Perspectives on National Identity,” edited by Omar Dahbour. Special issue of the
Philosophical Forum 28, Nos. 1-2 (Fall-Winter 1996-97).
----- . Morality and Modernity. London: Routledge, 1991.
----- . Nation and Identity. London: Routledge, 1999.
Radin, Michele L. ‘The Right to Development as a Mechanism for Group
242 Bibliography
Autonomy: Protection of Tibetan Cultural Rights.” Washington Law Review 68

(1993): 695-714.
Rawls, John. “The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus.” New
York University Law Review 64, no. 2 (1989).
----- . The Law o f Peoples. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999.
Raz, Joseph. The Morality o f Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
----- . “Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective.” 41 (Winter 1994): 67-
79.
Redclift, Michael. Sustainable Development: Exploring the Contradictions.
London: Methuen, 1987.
R6e, Jonathan. “Intemationality.” Radical Philosophy 60 (Spring 1992).
Renan, Ernest. “What Is a Nation?” In Modem Political Doctrines, edited by
Alfred Zimmem. London: Oxford University Press, 1939.
Rocker, Rudolf. Nationalism and Culture. Translated by Ray E. Chase. Los
Angeles: Rocker Publications Committee, 1937.
Ronen, Dov. The Quest for Self-Determination. New Haven, Conn.: Yale
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Government o f Poland, excerpted in The
Nationalism Reader, edited by Omar Dahbour and Micheline R. Ishay (Atlantic
Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1995).
----- . “On the Social Contract.” In Basic Political Writings, edited by Donald
A. Cress. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1987.
Rudrakumaran, Visuvanathan. “The Legitimacy of Lithuania’s Claim for
Secession,” Boston University International Law Journal 10 (1992).
Ruggie, John. ’Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in
International Relations.” International Organization 47 (Winter 1993).
Ryan, Alan. Property and Political Theory. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984.
Said, Edward. The Question o f Palestine. New York: Vintage Books, 1992.
Sale, Kirkpatrick. Dwellers in the Land: The Bioregional Vision. Philadelphia:
New Society Publishers, 1991.
Samary, Catharine. Yugoslavia Dismembered. Translated by Peter Drucker.
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1995.
Sandel, Michael J. Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982.,
Scanlon, Thomas. “Rights, Goals, and Fairness.” In Public and Private
Morality, edited by Stuart Hampshire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1978.
Schaeffer, Robert. Warpaths: The Politics o f Partition. New York: Hill &
Wang, 1990.
Sen, Amartya. “Rights and Agency.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 11, No. 1.
(1981).
Seton-Watson, Hugh. Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins o f
Nations and the Politics o f Nationalism. London: Methuen, 1977.
Shaw, Malcolm. “The International Status ofNational Liberation Movements.”
Bibliography 243
Liverpool Law Review 5 (1983).

Shiva, Vandana. “Recovering the Real Meaning of Sustainability.” In The
Environment in Question: Ethics and Global Issues, edited by David E. Cooper
and Joy A. Palmer. London: Routledge, 1998.
Shue, Henry. “Eroding Sovereignty: The Advance of Principle.” In The
Morality o f Nationalism, edited by Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan. Oxford:
Simmons, A. John. Moral Principles andPolitical Obligations. Princeton, N.J.:
Smith, Anthony D. The Ethnic Origins o f Nations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1986.
Stalin, J. V. Marxism and the National Question. Tirana, Albania: “8 Nentori”
Tamir, Yael. Liberal Nationalism. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1993.
----- . “The Right to National Self-Determination.” Social Research 58, no. 3
(Fall 1991).
Taylor, Bron Raymond, ed. Ecological Resistance Movements: The Global
Emergence o f Radical and Popular Environmentalism. Albany: State University
of New York Press, 1995.
Taylor, Charles. “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man.” In Philosophical
Papers, vol. 2, Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge
----- . “Nationalism and Modernity.” In The Morality ofNationalism, edited by
Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
----- . “Nature and Scope of Distributive Justice.” In Philosophical Papers, vol.
2, Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985.
----- . “The Politics of Recognition.” In Multiculturalism and “The Politics o f
Recognition, ’’ edited by Amy Gutmann. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1992.
----- . Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and
Nationalism. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993.
----- . Sources o f the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Tesfagiorgis, Gebre Hiwet. “Self-Determination: Its Evolution and Practice by
the United Nations and Its Application to the Case of Eritrea.” Wisconsin
International Law Journal 6 (1987).
Tilly, Charles. “National Self-Determination as a Problem for All of Us.”
Daedalus 122 (Summer 1993): 29-36.
Umozurike, U. O. Self-Determination in International Law. Hamden, Conn.:
Archon Books, 1972.
Unger, Robert Mangabeira. The Critical Legal Studies Movement. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983.
United Nations. Charter ofthe United Nations and Statute o f the International
244 Bibliography
Court o f Justice. New York, 1989.

----- . General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV). Declaration on the Granting
o f Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. U.N. Doc. A/4684. New
York, 14 December 1960.
----- . General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV). Principles which Should
Guide Members in Determining whether or not an Obligation Exists to Transmit
the Information Calledfor under Article 73e o f the Charter. U.N. Doc. A/4684.
New York, 15 December 1960.
----- . General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV). Declaration on Principles
o f International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in accordance with the Charter o f the United Nations. U.N. Doc. A/8028.
New York, 24 October 1970.
----- . General Assembly Resolution, Annex. International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. New York, 16 December 1966. Reprinted in Basic Documents
in International Law, edited by Ian Brownlie. 2d ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1972.
----- . General Assembly Resolution, Annex. International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. New York, 16 December 1966. Reprinted
in Basic Documents in International Law, edited by Ian Brownlie. 2d ed. Oxford:
-----. Universal Declaration o f Human Rights. U.N. Doc. A/811. New York,
10 December 1948. Reprinted in Basic Documents in International Law, edited by
Ian Brownlie. 2d ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.
Viroli, Maurizio. For Love o f Country: An Essay on Patriotism and National
ism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. After Liberalism. New York: New Press, 1995.
Walzer, Michael. “The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism.” Political
Theory 18 (Feb. 1990).
----- . Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations.
New York: Basic Books, 1977.
----- . “Justice and Tribalism: Minimal Morality in International Politics.” In
Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. Notre Dame, Ind.:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994.
----- . Nation and Universe: Tanner Lectures on Human Values. Oxford:
----- . “The New Tribalism.” Dissent (Spring 1992).
----- . “Response to Veit Bader.” Political Theory 23, no. 2 (May 1995).
----- . Spheres o f Justice: A Defense o f Pluralism and Equality. New York:
Basic Books, 1983.
----- . “What Does It Mean to Be an ‘American’?” Social Research 57 (Fall
1990): 591-614.
Webb, William T. “The International Legal Aspects of the Lithuanian
Secession.” Journal o f Legislation 17 (1991).
Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An Outline o f Interpretive Sociology. Ed.
Bibliography 245
Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. 2 Vols. Berkeley: University of California Press,
1978.
Wellman, Christopher H. “A Defense of Secession and Political Self-Determina
tion.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 24, no. 2 (Spring 1995).
Wilson, Heather. International Law and the Use o f Force by National
Liberation Movements. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.
Wilson, Woodrow. “An Address to a Joint Session of Congress, 8 January,
1918.” In The Papers o f Woodrow Wilson, edited by Arthur Link. Vol. 45.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966.
----- . “An Address to a Joint Session of Congress, 11 February, 1918.” In The
Papers o f Woodrow Wilson, edited by Arthur Link. Vol. 46. Princeton, N.J.:
Woodward, Susan. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold
War. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995.
World Commission on Environment and Development. Our Common Future.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
Young, Iris Marion. Justice and the Politics o f Difference. Princeton, N.J.:
Index
Aaland Islands, SO Pakistan
Absolutism, 39 Banjul Charter, 65
Ackerman, Bruce, 230 Barsh, Russel L., 184,193
Acton, John, 10,45-46,161 Basques, 11,93
Adomo, Theodor, 195 Bauer, Otto, 24,51
African Americans, 118 The Nationalities Question and
African Charter on Human and Social Democracy, 20
Peoples’ Rights, 65 Beiner, Ronald, 145
Algeria, 63 Beitz, Charles R., 7,9, 14
Algiers Declaration, 65 Belgian Congo, 64
American Indians, 182, 183,223 Belgium, 63
Canada, 12,184 Beran, Harry, 214
Central and South America, 159 consent theory, 129-136 passim,
Mexico, 12, 159 148,200
United States, 12,159,184 core doctrine of nationalism, 200
Anderson, Benedict, 5-8,19,24, democratic self-determinism,
28 125,127
Anthropology, 220 “original contract,” 152-153
Anticolonialism, 11,26 referenda, 141,142,149,180,
Apartheid, 71 193
Arabs, 79. See also secession, 139
Palestine/Palestinians sovereignty, 124
Archard, David, 173,222 territorial claims, 139-141,
Arendt, Hannah, 212 144-146,148
Austria, 46,48,210 Yugoslavia, 140
Authoritarianism, 228 Biafra, 64,71,118
Autonomy. See Communal Bioregions, 220
autonomy Bolshevik Revolution, 49
Bosnia/Bosnians, 118,128,140,
Baltic republics, 12, 81. See also 141,147
Lithuania Bosnia-Hercegovina, 140
Bangladesh, 65,71. See also East Boundaries, 166,167,168,181
247
248 Index
Brazil, 12,31 indigenous peoples, 159, 183,

Breuilly, John 221,223
ethnicity, 33,34 national self-determination, 159,
national identity, 9,17,28 168
nationalism, 30,33,35,208 nation-state, 39,157, 182
Brilmayer, Lea, 137,138, 142, 143 regional, 183,221,225
Britain. See United Kingdom Scotland, 158
Brownlie, Ian, 41 sovereignty, 39
Buchanan, Allen, 106,129,144, Wales, 158,183
148,224,225 Walzer, 157,159,160,168,177
Buchheit, Lee C., 89 Communist International, 49
Communitarianism
Canada, 153 autonomy, 12
Indians, 12,159,184 civic republicanism, 202
multiculturalism, 93,94,114, identity, 12
115,119 Kymlicka, 157,204
See also Quebec Mill, 124
Capitalism, 192. See also Market Miller, 158
economy nationalism, 47, 123, 185, 188,
Captive nations, 12,127-128,146. 204,218
See also names o f nations nation-state, 47,157, 165,169,
Central America, 159 185-186
Chen, Lung-chu, 67 self-determination, 123,179,
China, 11,93,94,114-115 182,185
Citizenship social justice, 186
Beitz, 14 Walzer, 156, 157,158, 178,203
Cobban, 217 Conference on Security and Co-
exclusion, 177,199,206,226 Operation in Europe, 70
liberalism, 196,197 Congo, 111, 122
minorities, 199 Congress of Vienna, 48,56
nationality, 14,167,206 Connor, Walker, 9,19,21,26,28,
rights and duties, 177,196 31,52
Walzer, 177,178,226 Consanguinity, 33
Ciutti, Irenej, 2 Consent/Consent theory
Civic republicanism, 202,212,213, Beran, 124,127,29-136 passim,
219 200
Class struggle, ix Brilmayer, 142,143
Closure, of communities, 192,226 Buchanan, 144
Cobban, Alfred, 217 captive nations, 146
Coercion, 216 democratic, 129,148,216
Cold War, 214 exclusions/expulsions, 142,143
Colonialism, 7,68,225,228 Jennings, 146, 148
Communal autonomy liberal individualism, 124
cultural communities, 12,160 libertarian aspects, 125
Index 249
Locke, 123, 130, 132,152,153 International Law concerning

membership version, 133,136 Friendly Relations and
nationalism, 200 Cooperation among States, 64
Pateman, 131,132,153 Decolonization, 60,63
political legitimacy, 123,170 Demographical movements, 192
promising, 131 Discriminatory redistribution, 224,
referenda, 134,135,140,142 225
right to opt out, 138 Distributive justice, 9-10,14,196
secession, 147,205 Donnelly, Jack, 98
self-determination, 124,127, Dunn, John, 1
129,138, 146,205,216 Dworkin, Ronald, 88,171,185,
Simmons, 151 196,206
sovereignty, 124
territorial claims, 143 East Pakistan, 12,65,71,72. See
Wellman, 129-130 also Bangladesh
Constitutionalism, 185 Economic growth, 195
Constitutional patriotism, 191,220 Ecosystems, 220,221
Contiguity, 33 Ekmecic, Milorad, 2
Contractarianism, 153, 160 Emigration, 132, 133, 137, 144,
Copp, David, 125, 126, 129,149, 152
150 Encompassing groups, 98,99,100,
Covenant on Economic, Social, and 101,102, 104,107,113
Cultural Rights, 229 Engels, Friedrich, 2
Croatia/Croatians, 118,121,128, Environmentalism, 220
147 Equality of groups, 61
Cultural identity/Cultural rights Equality of nations, 46
cultural minorities, 93,94,161, Equal rights, 59,64
169,221, 222. See also Estonia, 80
Quebec; Tibet Ethnicity
cultural nationality, 163,165, common ancestry, xi
218 Connor, 19,29
cultural rights, 93,96-98,147, Miller, 32,162
217,221,222,229 national identity, 26, 27,29, 30,
identity, 109,110,160,169 33,74, 162
international law, 93,117,222, nationality, 19,21,26-30
229 passim, 162
multicultural countries, 221 nation-state, 19
See also Encompassing groups; objectivist view, 32
Separatism Poole, 19,30,32
Czechoslovakia, 153,210 Smith, 26
ethnonation, 36
Dahl, Robert, 141 self-determination, 13,27
Dalai Lama, 94 European Community, 118
Declaration on Principles of Exclusion, 199. See also
250 Index
Citizenship nationalism, 39
Expulsion, 216 political community, 170,172,
174
Fain, Haskell, 174 self-determination, 9
Fichte, J. G., 14,42,44,45,47 Haitians, 152
Filmer, Robert, 42 Havel, Vaclav, 3
First Congress of the Peoples of the Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
East, 49 civic republicanism, 212
Fitzmaurice, Gerald, 66 equality of nations, 44,46
Fourteen Points, 49 nationalism, 46,47,189
France, 63,64 nation-state, 14,39,42,44
French Revolution, 18 Philosophy o f World History, 43
political community, 14,42
Galicia, 48 political legitimacy, 47
Gaza Strip, 78, 80 Sittlichkeit, 189
Gellner, Ernest, 8,23,24,128 Hegemonic states, 219
Germany, 152 Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 14,
Giddens, Anthony, 38,180,209 42,44,45,46,47
Gilbert, Paul Hindu nationalists, 119
nation, 19, 30 Hinsley, F. H., 40
national identity, 25,189 Hobbes, Thomas, 39,40,42
nationalism, 25,28 Hobsbawm, Eric, 19
nominalist approach, 26-27,30, Horizontal obligations, 138
173 Horkheimer, Max, 15,195
The Philosophy o f Nationalism, Horowitz, Donald, 33
8 Human rights, 61,116
Globalization, 192,208,217
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 80 Identity
Grazin, Igor, 82,89 cultural, 109,110,160,169,176
Great Britain. See United group membership, 205
Kingdom. individual/personal, 199,205
Greenfeld, Leah, 18 national. See National identity
Gross, Leo, 66,66 political, 18,169
Grotius, Hugo, 42 self-, 21,22,28
Guest workers, 9,152 Identity politics, 18
Immigration, 9, 152,230
Habermas, Jtlrgen India, 12,31,93,119,153
constitutional patriotism, 185, Indians. See American Indians
191.230 Indigenous peoples, 183,193,220,
group identities, 176,226 221,223
immigration/guest workers, 9, Individual rights/liberties, ix, 9-10,
226.230 48, 59,61,64, 116, 124, 195,
individual rights, 9 196,205, 229
liberal, x, 1,9,26,206 Indonesia, ix
Index 251
Industrial Revolution, 23 Katanga,64,71, 111, 122,210

International Court of Justice. See Kedourie, Elie, 1,4,43,216
World Court Kelsen, Hans, 70
International Covenants on Civil Kennan, George, 153
and Political Rights, 64,65,72, Kinship, 22,32
117,229 Kosovo, 141
International Covenants on Krajina, 141
Economic, Social, and Cultural Kultumation, 161
Rights, 64,65,72,108,117 Kurds, 11,93,128,146,147
International Labor Organization Kymlicka, Will, 157,204
Convention, 184
International law Languages, 22,23
Algerian independence, 63 Lansing, Robert, 49
cultural rights, 93,117,222,229 Latvia, 80
equal rights, 64 League of Nations
indeterminacy of, 76 Aaland Islands, 50
interstate relations, 70 Committee of Jurists, 50
Katanga, 64 national self-determination, 49,
nationalist reinterpretation, 62 50
nations and peoples, 59, 67,68, League of Nations Covenant, 49,
69,72 50
nature and sources, 63,76 Lenin, V. I., 69
non-self-goveming territories, 70 “On the National Pride of the
Palestinians, 64 Great Russians,” 2
peoples, 56,68 “The Right of Nations to Self-
self-determination, xi, 59,61, Determination,” 48,49
63,64,65,67,73,76,83,215, Liberalism
224 citizenship, 196,210
sovereignty, 219 civic responsibility, 196,210
International Monetary Fund, 204 community, 196,210
International recognition, 118 egalitarianism, 206
Iran, 11,93,128 individual rights, ix, 196,205
Iraq, 11,93,128 internationalism, 10
Ireland, ix, 22 nationalism. See Liberal
Israel, 78,207,208,210. See also nationalism
Palestine/Palestinians; Zionism property rights, 196
Italy, 153 Liberal nationalism, 195,196,197,
198,199,204,218
Jennings, Ivor, 123,146 communitarian, 201
Jews, 118,120 consensual, 201
Jordan, 79 contradictions ff, 204
Justification, of legal principles, 62 and cultural rights, 198
democratic government, 200
Kant, Immanuel, x, 14,44 distributive justice, 208
252 Index
egalitarian, 210 Considerations on

elitism, 210 Representative Government, 45
statism, 200 Miller, David, 214
Zionism, 207-208 “ethical community,” 189
Libertarianism, 130,204 communitarian nationalism, 157,
Lithuania, 60,80-83,115,146 158,165,176,185,188
Locke, John, 42, 120,123,130, ethnicity, 32,162
132, 137,152 national identity, 30-31,
Luxemburg, Rosa, 49 162-163,174
nationality vs. consent, 155
Macedo, Stephen, 213 “national socialism,” 188
Macedonia, 140,141 nation-state, 165-166,169,185,
Machiavelli, Niccolo, 212 208
MacPherson, C. B., 120 On Nationality, 30
Magnusson, Warren, 187,209 principle of nationality, 155,
Majoritarianism, 148,149 157,158,190
Manchus, 115 redistributive justice, 185,190,
Margalit, Avishai 208
cultural rights, 104 self-determination, 155,166, 174
encompassing groups, 98-102, sovereignty, 38
103,113,115 U.S. as multinational nation,
“National Self-Determination,” 30-31
93 universalist case, 190
right to decide, 103, 111, 112 Miller, David Hunt, 49
self-determination, 104,107, Milosevic, Slobodan, 204
111, 112 Mongolians, 115
territory, 105,107 Montenegro, 141
See also Raz, Joseph Morgenthau, Hans,, 153
Market economy, 192,196 Morris, Christopher, 39,40
Markovic, Ante, 204 Mouffe, Chantal, 212
Marx, Karl, ix, 2,39 Multiculturalism, 31,93,94,
“On the Jewish Question,” 155 114-115,119,221
Mason, Andrew, 203 Multinational states, 30-31,32,46,
Mazzini, Giuseppe, 14,42,46,47 72,119
The Duties o f Man, 44,45 Mumford, Lewis, 186,215,229
Meinecke, Friedrich, 161 Musil, Robert, 91
Membership, 168,177,178,200, Muslims (in China), 115
216,226. See also
Consent/Consent theory Naim, Tom, 189,193
Mexico, 12,159 Namibia, 65
Michnik, Adam, 3 Nation
Mikmaq, 184 accommodation to modernity, 23
Mill, John Stuart, ix, 10, 14, 42,44, Anderson, 8, 19, 23, 28
46,48, 124 ascriptive rather than associative,
Index 253
33 consent theory, 200

autonomy, 38-39, 170,188 current scholarship, x, 1
Bauer, 20 distributive justice, 14
“community of character,” 20 Dunn, 1
compared to state, 67,68-69, Germany, 11
166 Giddens, 38
Connor, 19,21,28,29 Gilbert, 8,25,28
contingency of, 8 Habermas, 39,206
cultural aspects, 18,66 Hegel, 46,47,189
equivalent to country, 47 historical view, 4
ethnic aspects, xi, 18,21,27,29, ideology of modem society, 6
30,33, 163 Italy, 11
Gellner, 23 Kedourie, 4
Gilbert, 19,25,27,30 liberalism, 10,124,196,197.
group defined nonterritorially, See also Liberal nationalism
69 Mill, 46
“imagined community,” 8,19,23 Miller, 157,158,165, 176, 185,
international law, 59,67,68-69 188
moral/ethical aspects, 24-25,61, nation-state, 6,206. See also
166 Nation-state
multinational, 31 19th cent. Europe, 11
political aspects, 18,27,28 patriotism, 47
Poole, 8,19,23-24,27,28,30 Poole, 33,48
Renan, 19-20,23 political aspects, 3-4,37,47
self-identity, 18-19,21-22,28 political belief vs. philosophical
self-determination, 18-19,61. doctrine, 3-4
See also Self-determination popular sovereignty, 5
Stalin, 20-21 referenda, 149
statehood, 22,25. See also republicanism, 39,48
Nation-state Russia, ix, 49
Taylor, 8,18,169 scholarship on, x, 1
territory, 166 self-determination, x, 1,9,26.
Walzer, 8. See also Walzer, See also Self-determination
Michael Seton-Watson, 5
Weber, 21,28 social justice, 188
See also National identity Soviet Union, 49
Nationalism Stalin, 49
Anderson, 5-6 subordination of equality, 206
Beitz, 7,14 Taylor, 18
Beran, 200 Walzer, x, 193
Breuilly, 30,33,35,208 National identity
colonialism, 7 Acton, 45, 161
communitarianism, 47, 123,185, ancestry and kinship, 9
188,201,204,205,218,219 Anderson, 7
254 Index
ascriptive features, 121,162 Connor, 19

Breuilly, 9,17,28 culture of belonging, 196
Cobban, 217 definitional agnosticism, 19
communitarian nationalism, 201, ethical aspects, 169
219 ethnic aspects, 19
Connor, 9 ethnonation, 185
contingent aspects, 7,8 globalization, 208
cultural aspects, 161 Greenfeld, 18
distinction by traits, 121 Hegel, 14,39,42,44
diverse populations, 32 historically exceptional, 217
ethnic aspects, 26,27,30,33, ignored by philosophers, 6-7
162 imaginary community, 6,7-8
Gellner, 8 individual rights/liberties, 10
Greenfeld, 18 inevitability, 6
Industrial Revolution, 23 justifications, 165,166
language, 22 liberalism, 195,197
membership 164 Mazzini, 46,47
Miller, 30-31, 155, 157, Mill, 10
162-163,174,185 Miller, 165-166,169,185,208
national character, 64,109 national identity, 206,217
need for strict definition, 34 origin, ix, 18-19
people, 61,65-66 political community, 197,228
Pogge, 7 Poole, 8
political aspects, 14,170 219 redistributive justice, 185
Poole, 8,22-23,29,30,189 Rousseau, 46,47
rejection of, 219 self-determination, ix, 1,166
self-determination, 9,26,37,75, social justice, 186,187,208
107,108,156,201,226 social solidarity, 185
social crisis, 33 sovereignty, 217
sovereignty, 38 viability and size, 141
Walzer, 162, 177,178,185 Walzer, 8, 157-158, 165,167,
Weber, 21 169,209,226
Nationality. See National identity Nazism, 13
National liberation movements, ix, Neighborhoods, 192
11,63,78,80,221 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 153
National rights, 66, 94,95,106 Nielsen, Kai, 32,33,34, 114
National self-determination. See Nigeria, 64
Self-determination North American Free Trade
Nation-state Agreement, 209
Anderson, 6 Northern Ireland, 158
autonomy, 39, 157, 182 Nozick, Robert, 120
Cobban, 217
communitarian aspects, 47,157, Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W. Wentworth,
165, 169,182,185-186 59
Index 255
Oldfield, Adrian, 170,202,212 189

O’Neill, John, 173,218-219 peoplehood, 23
Oppressed peoples, 60 personal identity, 23
Oppression, 146 republicanism, 48
Organization of African Unity, 65 Popular sovereignty, 5
Orthodox Christianity, 121 Portugal, 63
Prayer, forms of, 121
Pakistan, 210 Proletarian internationalism, 49
Palestine/Palestinians, x, 60,64, Promising, 131
81,83,120,127,207,222 Property, 106,118,120,195,196
Palestine Authority, 78 Prussia, 48
Palestine Liberation
Organization, 79 Quebec, x, 32, 33, 34,94,
See also Israel 113-114,115,146
Pateman, Carole, 131,132,133,
138,150,153 Racial groups, 102
Patriotism, 47 Rawls, John, 7,169,206
Peoples, 59,61,65-66,68, 220 Raz, Joseph, 91,98-107 passim,
Persecution, 111,112,116 111-115 passim, 214
Pfaff, William, 3 “National Self-Determination,”
Philpott, Daniel, 127,129, 149 93
Plebiscites, 180,217 Realist approach, 153
Pogge, Thomas, 7 Referenda, 140,141,142, 144,
Poland, 48, 56,82 149,216
Political autonomy, xi, 47,216 Regional autonomy, 158,183, 184,
Political community, 169,170, 173, 220,221,223,224
175,218,219,221 Reiterative universalism, 180,181
communitarian concept, 173 Religious groups, 102,118,121
Dworkin, 170 Renan, Ernest, 19-20,24,161
Habermas, 170,175 Republicanism, 47,48. See also
Walzer, 174 Civic republicanism
Political legitimacy Residency, 119-120
Hegel, 47 Right of return, 78
Locke, 123 Roman Catholicism, 121
Rousseau, 47 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 38,44,
Political nation, 165,218 46,133
Pomerance, Michla, 67 civic republicanism, 47,212
Poole, Ross, 121 general will, 42,125
definition of nation, 8-9, 19,24, Social Contract, 42-43
27,28,30 sovereignty, 39,42,43
ethnicity, 29,30 Russia, ix, 2,31,48,49. See also
nationalism, 33,48 Soviet Union
Nation and Identity, 8 Russian Social Democratic Party,
national identity, 8, 22, 23,29, 49
256 Index
Russification, 80,81 passim, 144,146,148,156

consistency problem, 215
Said, Edward W., 89 Copp, 129
Scotland, 158, 183, 189 cultural aspects, 11,92,98,
Secession 215.222
Beran, 132-133, 139 democratic aspects, 123-126
Bosnia, 128, 147 passim, 139,141,148,149,
Brilmayer, 138 216.222
consent theory, 132-133, 137, vs. democratic self-rule, 35
138,143-144,205 dependent peoples, 69
Croatia and Slovenia, 118,128, discriminatory redistribution,
147 230
Katanga, 111 disenfranchisement, 129
Lenin, 49 distinctive regions, 223
Margalit and Raz, 111 distributive justice, 9-10
proletarian internationalism, 49 encompassing groups, 98-104
Walzer, 168 passim
Wellman, 124 ethical/moral aspects, 83,91,95,
Yugoslavia, 118,128 115,198
Self-determination ethnic aspects, 37,127
Aaland Islands, 50 external, 68
Algerians, 63 Fitzmaurice, 66
autonomy, 46,216 goals of, 18
Bangladesh, 71 Gross, 66
Beitz, 7,9-10 Habermas, 9
Beran, 125,127,129,136,144, Havel, 3
148 human right, 9,10,61,92,145,
Biafra, 71 216
Buchanan, 144,224,225 independence movements, ix
Chen, 67 indigenous peoples, 12,183,223
“choice of governed,” 129 internal, 67-68,71
claim-right, 36 international law, xi, 59,61,63,
Cobban, 217,225 64,65,73,76,215
colonies/colonialism, 11,26, justifications for, 215
69-70,73 Katanga, 64,71
communal autonomy, 159,166, Kedourie, 4,216
177 League of Nations, 49,50
communitarian aspects, 123, Lenin, 48,49
156,185, 187 libertarian aspects, 123,130,
component concepts, 17 155,201
Congress of Vienna, 48 Lithuania, 60
consensual aspects, 123, 126, Margalit and Raz, 91, 93,
127, 143, 155 98-104 passim
consent theory, 124, 130-138 Marx and Engels, 2
Index 257
Michnik, 3 United Nations, 50,59,64

Mill, 124 universalistic aspects, 9
Miller, 155 Walzer, 159,177,226
minorities, 11,73 Wellman, 130
multinational states, 72 Wilson, 2,49,56,57
national autonomy, 11,48,72, World War 1,48
73,95,96 Self-govemment/Self-rule, 35,68,
national identity, 17,107,108, 97,125,126,215,221-222
156,228 Separatism, 135,137, 139,167,
nationalism, 1,9,16,26,37,75, 179,184
95,96, 123, 156,185, 187, Seibians, 121,128
226 Seton-Watson, Hugh, 5
non-nationalist principle, 225, Sexually deviant groups, 118
227 Shamir, Yitzhak, 208
Northern Ireland, 11 Shue, Henry, 230
of peoples, 59,66,70,71,72,76 Simmons, A. John, 132,133, 151,
oppression, 146 152
Palestinians, 11,60,64 Sittlichkeit, 189
Pfaff, 3 Slovenia/ Slovenians, 118,128,
philosophical aspects, 195 140,146,147
Philpott, 129 Smith, Anthony, 26-27
political aspects, 83,123,216 Social contract, 42, 54. See also
Pomerance, 67 Consent/Consent theory
populations of states, 69 Social equality, ix, 195
positive or negative right?, Socialism, ix, 40
95-96 Social justice, ix, 186, 187,208,
postcommunist Eastern Europe, 209
2-3 South Africa, 71
referenda, 134,135,137,140, South America, 159
141,143,144 Southern Rhodesia, 71
regional/ecological, 12,226, Sovereignty
227,230 Beran, 124
remedial right, 224,226 Cobban, 217
right to opt out, 136,137 communal autonomy, 39
self-government/self rule, 97, consent theory, 124. See also
222 Consent/Consent theory
socialism, 49 environmental problems, 230
sovereignty, x, 75, 83 equality of states, 64
state, 12,70 external, 227
Tamir, 36,91, 92 Giddens, 38
territorial aspects, 83,155,216 Hegel, 39
Tesfagiorgis, 67 Hinsley, 40
Tilly, 2 Hobbes, 39,40
Umozurike, 67 individual liberties, 217
258 Index
international law, 219 determinant of peoplehood, 69,

Marx, 39 220
Miller, 38 disputes over, 177,181
minimalist view, 40 Margalit and Raz, 104,105,107
Morris, 40 national identity, 105,166
national identity, 5,38, 166 partition/secession, 144,180,
national rights, 37 216
nation-state, 217 peoples, 69,220
natural resources, 77 self-determination, 83, 116,177,
non-self-governing peoples, 223 216
populist/socialist view, 40 sovereignty, 166,179
reiterative universalism, 181 title to, 105,106,119-120,179
Rousseau, 39,42,43 Walzer, 177-180 passim
secure boundaries, 167 Tesfagiorgis, G. H., 67, 68
self-determination, x, 39,75, 83 Tibet/Tibetans, ix, 11,81,93,94,
Shue, 230 114-115,122,128,224
territorial disputes, 166,179 Tilly, Charles, 2
United Nations Charter, 75 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 212
Walzer, 179 Tribalism, 101,229
Soviet Union Turkey/Tuiks, 11,93,128, 152
Baltic republics, 81
disintegration of, 153,210 Umozurike, U. O., 67
Lithuania, 60, 80-81,83 United Kingdom, 12,63,158, 183
nationalities policy, 49, 72, 81, United Nations
146 Biafra, 64
Spain, 11,31,93 civil and political rights, 64,117,
Staatsnation, 161 229
Stalin, Joseph, 20-21,49 decolonization, 69
Subjugated peoples, 60,63 East Pakistan (Bangladesh), 65
Switzerland, 22,119 economic, social, and cultural
Syria, 11,93,128 rights, 64,108,117
equal rights, 59
Tamir, Yael, 91 General Assembly Resolutions,
community, 196,211 63,64,65, 70,71
cultural rights, 92-93,97,98 Namibia, 65
liberal nationalism, 196,199, new economic order, 70
200 Palestinians, 60
national identity, 36 self-determination, 64
Taylor, Charles, 8,18,114,169 Southern Rhodesia, 71
Territory sovereignty over natural
acquisition/possession, 116,178 resources, 70
Beran, 145 Western Sahara, 65
claims to, 144-145 United Nations Charter, 4, 50, 59,
communal autonomy, 178-179 69, 74, 75
Index 259
United States Tanner Lectures, 180

Balkan involvements, 118,210 tribalism, 163
Haitian immigrants, 152 U.S. as political community, 192
Indians, 12,159,184 Weber, Max, 21,28,31
and Israel, 210 Wellman, Christopher, 124,
multinational nation, 31-32,119 129-130,173
political community, 192 West Bank, 78,80. See also
South as captive nation, 12 Palestine/Palestinians
Universal Declaration on the Western Sahara, 65
Rights of Peoples, 65 Wilson, Woodrow, 2,49, 50,56,
Universalism, 199,218 57,61,69
Urban and regional planning, 220 World Bank, 184,193
World Court, 63,65
Versailles Conference, 49 World War 1,48,61,66,69, 82
Vojvodina, 141
Voluntary associations, 202 Young, Iris, 6,33,109
Yugoslavia, ix, 72, 118,128,140,
Wales, 158, 183 147, 153,204,210
Walzer, Michael, 214
captive nations, 127-128 Zimbabwe, 71
citizenship, 167,226 Zionism, 207,208. See also Israel;
civic republicanism, 213 Palestine/Palestinians
communal autonomy, 157-158,
159-160,165, 168, 178
communitarianism, 156-157,
202,203
community of character, 51
consent theory, 124,156
cultural identity, 160,176
immigration policy, 226
liberal constitutionalism, 213
national identity, 162,177,185
nationalist revanchism, 193
nation-states, 8,157-158, 165,
167,169,209,226
North American Free Trade
Agreement, 209
political communities, 160,161,
174,175,177
popular will, 118,193
reiterative universalism,
180-181
rights of states, 156
separatism, 118,167,179
About the Author
Omar Dahbour is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College and

Associate Director of the Center for Place, Culture, and Politics at the
Graduate Center, City University of New York. He is coeditor of The
Nationalism Reader (Humanities Press, 1995), editor of “Philosophical
Perspectives on National Identity” (a special issue of the Philosophical
Forum , 1996-1997), and author of articles and reviews in various books and
journals, including Canadian Journal o f Philosophy, Constellations,
German Politics and Society, History o f European Ideas, Journal o f the
History o f Philosophy, Public Affairs Quarterly, Radical Philosophy
Review , and Theory and Society. Besides teaching at C.U.N.Y., he has also
held appointments at Colorado College, Ohio University, and other
institutions. He is a member of several scholarly associations, most notably
the Radical Philosophy Association, as well as being a founding member
of its Anti-Intervention Group and coauthor of the pamphlet, Against
N.A.T.O. ’s War in Yugoslavia.
261

Illusion of The Peoples

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Illusion of The Peoples

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Illusion of the Peoples

Series Editor: James P. Sterba, University of Notre Dame

This series encourages work that is centrally concerned with the

Illusion o f the Peoples: A Critique of National Self-Determination, by Omar

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

JC311 .D33 2003

It would be unseemly o f us...to forget the immense significance of the

Introduction: Nationalism as Belief and as Doctrine 1

1 National Identity and Political Autonomy 17

2 Peoples and Nations in International Law 59

3 Cultural Rights and the Ethics of Self-Determination 91

4 Consent Theory and Democratic Self-Determination 123

5 The Nation-State as an Ethical Community 155

6 The Contradictions o f Liberal Nationalism 195

Conclusion: Self-Determination without Nationalism 215

About the Author 261

denial o f the principle itself—the lack of self-determination—that is the

3. For surveys of some of this historical scholarship, see Peter Alter,

at Hunter College, both in the Philosophy Department and the Honors

Nationalism as Belief and as Doctrine

Nationalism [is] largely a doctrine of national self-determination.

— Elie Kedourie, Nationalism

Illusion of the Peoples

The current state o f discussion on nationalism is best characterized as

least as it is commonly understood today.

for almost two centuries [national self-determination] has had extraordi­

The historical trajectories of nationalist movements that have used this

But the idea o f national self-determination also has considerable

Not only those involved in immediate political struggles hold such

Behind what Serbia is doing is the superficially reasonable, but in practice

What is most interesting about this statement is the assumption that

is itself now recognized as a fundamental good? Because it is ultimately

Ideology and Philosophy of Nationalism

I...see little point in trying to analyse nationalism itself as an ideology. It

But in the last generation, a number of historians have turned their

Yet, there is a tendency within the new historiography o f nationalism as

state as an entity requiring legitimation. It may appear strange in a book

Traditional and Critical Theories of National Identity

Among those contemporary scholars, historians or philosophers, who have

in Ernest Gellner’s similar argument that national identities are the

attachments formed by historical struggles or current needs.28This illusion

Self-Determination without Nationalism (or Liberalism)?

violation of principles o f international distributive justice.31 In both cases,

determination have been made by a variety of political movements and

nationalist conception of self-determination is concerned with the ways in

1. W. Wentworth Ofuatey-Kodjoe, in The Principle o f Self-Determination

25. Paul Gilbert, The Philosophy o f Nationalism (Boulder, Colo.:

thoroughly differentiated from the nationalist principle in chapters 2-5,

National Identity and

— John Breuilly, “Nationalism and the State”

The Identity of the “Self” In National Self-Determination

Historically, the concept of self-determination came into political usage in

features o f collectivities designated as nations. This is, philosophically

Greenfeld, locate the origins o f modem nation-states as early as the

Renan emphasized the ways in which nations were continually reconsti­

A nation implies a past; while, as regards the present, it is all contained in

But Renan’s insight into the fluctuating character o f nations destabilizes

too psychologistic and implicitly nationalist.16 There is some truth to this

relations or “felt kinship ties”;23 otherwise, the group identity would be of

what constitutes political community, and a certain type of moral commit­

which are inconsistent with the demands o f formal consistency or

This is a deceptively simple solution to the problem o f definition. It has the

claim to political independence (whatever the reasons) is sufficient to make

for almost two centuries [national self-determination] has had extraordi

Renan emphasized the ways in which nations were continually reconsti

what constitutes political community, and a certain type of moral commit

1. Only twelve states (9.1 percent) can justifiably be described as nation

This distinction between peoples and nations seems to be one o f consider

ongoing recognition o f the Palestine Liberation Organization in interna