Sutherland - Kant On Fundamental Geometrical Relations 4-18-23

Kant on Fundamental Geometrical Relations 117
Kant on Fundamental Geometrical Relations

by Daniel Sutherland (Chicago)
Abstract: Equality, similarity and congruence are essential elements of Kant’s the-
ory of geometrical cognition; nevertheless, Kant’s account of them is not well
understood. This paper provides historical context for treatments of these geo-
metrical relations, presents Kant’s views on their mathematical definitions, and
explains Kant’s theory of their cognition. It also places Kant’s theory within the
larger context of his understanding of the quality-quantity distinction. Most im-
portantly, it argues that the relation of equality, in conjunction with the categories
of quantity, plays a pivotal and wide-ranging role in Kant’s account of mathemat-
ical cognition.
Kant’s philosophy of mathematics is of interest both in its own right
and for its influence on subsequent philosophy of mathematics. It also
strongly influenced Kant’s critical philosophy, which was shaped by the
conviction that mathematics and mathematical physics contain syn-
thetic a priori knowledge. The connection to Kant’s critical philosophy
runs much deeper, however, since he also held that the synthesis that
makes mathematics possible is the very same that makes the cognition
of an object possible (B 202f., A 163/B 204).1 As a consequence, the way
in which we cognize the fundamental geometrical relations of equality,
similarity, and congruence will be important for Kant’s account of both
mathematical cognition and cognition more generally.
1 I will refer to the Critique of Pure Reason using A for the first edition pagination
and B for the second. Other references will be to Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften by
volume, part number (for volumes with multiple parts) and page number; a ref-
erence to lecture notes will be followed by the best estimate of the date the lecture
was given based on the analysis of Erich Adickes (14: 34f.). All translations from
the German are my own, although I have closely consulted the translations of the
Critique of Pure Reason by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Kant 1998) and the
translations of Kant’s lectures on metaphysics by Karl Ameriks and Steve Nara-
gon (Kant 1997b).
The passages cited are from the Axioms of Intuition, which concern not only the
application of mathematics to experience but pure mathematics itself, as I argue
in Sutherland forthcoming a.
Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philosophie 87. Bd., S. 117–158

© Walter de Gruyter 2005
ISSN 0003-9101
118 D a n i e l S u t h e rl a n d
Kant, like most of his contemporaries, largely accepted Euclidean geometry,

whose axioms include five postulates concerning spatial representation. Kant’s
account of how we cognize Euclid’s postulates will be crucial to his account of
geometry, so the postulates are a natural starting place for an investigation of Kant’s
views. Euclidean demonstrations do not just rely on the five postulates, however;
they also rely heavily on equality, similarity, and congruence. When Kant’s views on
these relations have been discussed, it has usually been in connection with incon-
gruent counterparts rather than Kant’s theory of mathematical cognition as a whole.
Many of these investigations assume that the notions of equality, similarity and con-
gruence that Kant employed are fairly straightforward, or at least that they do not
require or warrant an examination on their own.2 I think this is mistaken. My paper
will be unusual in setting aside Kant’s account of Euclid’s five postulates and his ar-
guments from incongruent counterparts; what is needed, I think, is a closer examin-
ation of Kant’s views on the relations among equality, similarity, and congruence and
his views on how we cognize each of them. In addition, Kant’s views cannot be
understood apart from the Leibnizian-Wolffian account of quality and quantity and
Kant’s reaction to it; examining his views of quality and quantity provides important
insights into Kant’s theory of mathematical cognition.3
Euclid and Kant both endorsed forms of foundationalism; Euclid grounded
geometry in postulates and common notions, while Kant grounded human cognition
in pure a priori concepts and a priori forms of intuition. These two foundational
approaches converge in Kant’s account of mathematical cognition, which raises
questions about the relations among similarity, equality, and congruence, and
whether one is more fundamental than another. I will argue that equality is the most
fundamental and that equality and the categories of quantity are the cornerstone of
Kant’s theory of mathematical cognition. This conclusion raises a further question
addressed at the close of the paper: if the importance of the concept of equality par-
allels that of the categories of quantity, where does the concept of equality fit into
Kant’s account of human cognition? I argue that the concept of equality may find its
home in the Concept of Freflection.
The first part of the paper provides some essential background concerning the his-
tory of geometry. Section 1 surveys Euclid’s views on the three fundamental relations
and the theory of proportions, while section 2 describes the Leibnizian and Wolffian
attempts to give geometry a new foundation. The second part of the paper focuses on
Kant’s response to this tradition: section 3 reviews Kant’s mathematical understand-
2 There are exceptions. For example, Paul Rusnock and Rolf George provide an es-
pecially helpful examination of Kant’s views on quality and quantity in relation
to Leibniz and Wolff (Rusnock/George 1995). Their general line of inquiry is
similar to my own, although their focus is on the arguments from incongruent
counterparts.
3 It would be surprising if a clearer understanding of equality, similarity, con-
gruence, quality, and quantity did not also provide new insights into Kant’s ar-
guments from incongruent counterparts. I think it does, but I will postpone a
treatment of incongruent counterparts to another occasion.
ing of the three relations, and section 4 examines his theory of how we cognize them.
The third part of the paper extends and completes the analysis by placing Kant’s
theory in the larger context of the distinction between qualitative and quantitative
properties. Section 5 traces the quality-quantity distinction from Leibniz to Kant,
and section 6 relates Kant’s views on this distinction to equality, similarity, and con-
gruence. Section 7 briefly addresses how Kant might fit the concept of equality into
the account of human cognition described in the Critique.
§ 1: Equality, similarity, and congruence in Euclid and his critics
Euclid introduces equality, similarity and congruence in different ways.

He explicitly defines similarity: similar rectilinear figures as those
whose angles are equal and whose sides around the equal angles
are proportional. The definition does not appear until Book VI, be-
cause it presupposes the Eudoxian theory of proportions introduced in
Book V; I will return to similarity after introducing the theory of pro-
portions.
In contrast, Euclid does not explicitly define equality, so we have to
rely on how he employs it and on the common notions which govern it.
Euclid applies the relation of equality to straight lines, angles, and fig-
ures. In Book I Proposition 35 (I.35), he shows that figures that meet
a particular condition are equal, and it is clear from the context that
the notion of figures being equal corresponds to what we would de-
scribe as having the same area. In XI.28, Euclid extends equality of fig-
ures to solids, which corresponds to what we would describe as having
the same volume. I say “corresponds”, for Euclid identifies an area
or volume with a particular figure; he thinks of area and volume as
(relatively) concrete and geometrical equality as a relation between par-
ticular figures.4
In Book V, Euclid broadens the application of equality to include
magnitudes in general. Euclid does not define the notion of magnitude,
but he introduces the Eudoxian theory of proportions, and his defini-
4 Today, in contrast, we abstract from particular areas to the feature they have in
common and think of different figures as sharing one and the same area. The dif-
ference is reflected in the way area is described: Euclid would say that a particular
rectangle and a particular triangle are equal, while we would say that they have
the same area. See Stein 1990 for a discussion of this point.
Euclid introduces the notion of equality between triangles in I.4, but only applies
it there to congruent triangles. (I will discuss congruence presently.) Euclid does
not include the equality of differently shaped triangles until I.37.
tions of ratio and having a ratio show that he thinks that magnitudes of
the same kind (such as lines, or areas, or volumes) are capable of being
multiplied and can stand in comparative size relations (V. Def. 3 & 4).
In particular, all magnitudes can stand in the relation of equality.
It is not entirely clear what kinds of things the Greeks counted as magnitudes.
Aristotle, who followed Eudoxus and preceded Euclid, does not use the term “mag-
nitude” when discussing ratios and proportions, and he may have wished to reserve
the term for geometrical magnitudes.5 For Euclid, magnitudes included lines, areas,
and volumes. If the definitions of the Eudoxian theory of proportions are used as a
guide, then other sorts of things, such as angles and weights, might also be counted as
magnitudes. Since numbers can stand in ratios, numbers would also be considered a
kind of magnitude. Book V extends the application of equality to anything that
counts as a magnitude, whatever the precise scope of the latter term. I will return to
the Eudoxian theory of proportions shortly.
Although Euclid does not define equality, he gives three axioms,

called common notions, concerning it:
Common Notion 1: Things equal to the same thing are also equal to each other.
Common Notion 2: If equals are added to equals, the wholes are equal.
Common Notion 3: If equals are subtracted from equals, the remainders are
equal.6
Euclid saw no need to state explicitly that a thing is equal to itself, that
is, that equality is reflexive. If we assume reflexivity, then Common No-
tion 1 will entail both symmetry and transitivity, and hence that equal-
ity is an equivalence relation.7 In keeping with his concrete conception
of geometrical quantities, however, Euclid does not abstract from
equivalence classes to an abstract quantity shared by different geo-
metrical elements of that class.
Common Notions 2 and 3 correspond to the substitutivity of equal-
ity in addition and subtraction, but two features of Euclid’s formu-
lation should be noted. First, Euclid has in mind a general notion of ad-
dition and subtraction that includes composition and division of any
sort of magnitude. It includes the composition of equal volumes,
for example. Second, it should not be assumed that Euclid has in
5 Mueller 1970, 1.
6 Mueller 1981, 317f.
7 One need not assume reflexivity for Common Notion 1 to entail that equality is
an equivalence relation; it is sufficient to assume that for every magnitude, there
is some magnitude (not necessarily itself) to which it is equal. It seems highly
likely, however, that Euclid would have taken reflexivity for granted.
mind that one concrete quantity can actually be substituted for an-
other, that is, moved and put in place of another. As stated, the com-
mon notions merely assert that equals added or subtracted from equals
are equal.8
Euclid is even less explicit about congruence than equality; he neither
defines congruence nor provides common notions governing it, so our
understanding is entirely dependent upon how he uses it. Euclid refers
to applying one rectilinear figure to another to superimpose them, and
he refers to the coincidence of applied rectilinear figures. Euclid’s lan-
guage strongly suggests that congruence requires movement of figures
in order to superimpose them, which is how he has traditionally been
understood. In order for any congruent plane figures to be superimpos-
able, the motion must include both translation and rotation, and the
motion must not alter any geometrical properties of the figures other
than their outer relations to each other. In other words, the possibility
of superposition presupposes the possibility of “rigid” motion: the lines
must remain straight and equal during the motion.
Euclid assumes that plane figures that are reflections of each other
are congruent.9 In order to superimpose plane figures that are reflec-
tions of each other, one triangle must either be reflected through an
axis, or it must be translated and rotated in three-dimensional space
in order to be flipped it over (see Figure 1). Euclid does not mention
reflection. Moreover, the inversion required in reflecting a figure is
inconsistent with keeping it rigid. It is therefore most likely that
Euclid was thinking of translation and rotation in three-dimensional
space.
Euclid’s views about the relations among equality, similarity and
congruence are problematic in several ways. First, Euclid thought that
the similarity and equality of figures implied their congruence. While
this is true for plane figures if one allows motion in three-dimensional
space, it is not the case for three-dimensional figures that are incon-
gruent counterparts, such as a hand and its mirror image: two such fig-
ures are completely similar and equal according to Euclid’s conception
8 In the modern approach, to assert the equality of two concrete magnitudes is

to say that they share one and the same abstract quantity, for example, 2 inches or
a square mile. This makes it more natural to think of Common Notions 2 and 3
as expressing the substitutivity of equals in the operations of addition and sub-
traction.
9 I give the evidence for this in the discussion of the side-angle-side theorem below;
see footnote 11 below.
Fig. 1
of these notions, and yet they cannot be superimposed. Leibniz and

Wolff also thought that similarity and equality entailed congruence;
as is well known, Kant seized upon this oversight in his 1768 essay On
the First Grounds of the Distinction of Directions in Space [Henceforth
Directions].
Even setting this problem aside, Euclid’s use of congruence and the
relation between congruence and equality raises serious questions
about his demonstrations. Euclid makes a controversial use of con-
gruence very early in the Elements, in Propositions I.4 and I.8. His use
of it is crucial to the Elements, since many of the subsequent proposi-
tions depend on I.4 and I.8. In Proposition I.4, Euclid appeals to con-
gruence to prove the side-angle-side theorem: two triangles that have
two sides equal and the angle enclosed by those sides equal will be equal
in their remaining side, equal in their remaining corresponding angles,
and the triangles themselves will be equal (i.e., they will have the same
area).10 The demonstration is worth examining in some detail, because

it raised important issues concerning the relation between congruence
and equality.
Fig. 2
It is helpful to divide Euclid’s proof into three parts. In the first part Euclid argues
from equalities to congruencies. Consider two triangles such that AB is equal to DE,
AC is equal to DF, and the angle BAC is equal to the angle EDF, as in figure 2. Eu-
clid argues that if the first triangle is superimposed on the second with point A on
point D and AB along DE, then the equality of AB and DE ensures that point B will
coincide with point E, whereas the equality of angles BAC and EDF and the equality
of AC and DF ensures that point C will coincide with point F.11
In the second part Euclid argues from congruencies to congruencies. Since point B
coincides with point E and point C with point F, and since both BC and EF are
straight lines, Euclid infers that the lines BC and EF coincide. Using these results to-
gether with the results of the first part, he then infers that the triangles and the re-
maining corresponding angles coincide.
In the third part Euclid argues from these congruencies to equalities. Euclid infers
from the full congruency of the two triangles that BC is equal to EF, angle ABC is
equal to angle DEF, angle ACB is equal to angle DFE, and that the triangles them-
selves are equal, that is, that they have the same area.
Each part of the above proof contains a crucial assumption. In the
first part of the proof, Euclid assumes that equal lines and angles are
superimposable. In the second part he assumes that two straight lines
whose endpoints coincide will fully coincide. In the third part he as-
sumes that superimposed lines, angles, and triangles are equal.12
10 All references to Euclid will be to the Elements by book number followed by defi-
nition, postulate, common notion, or proposition number. For the translation of
the definitions, postulates, and common notions themselves I follow Mueller
1970. For all other translations, I follow Heath 1956.
11 Since triangles that are reflections of each other can have two sides and an en-
closing angle that are equal, the proposition will not be true unless reflections
can also be superimposed.
12 Hilbert 1947, 15f. avoids these problems by taking a congruence version of the
side-angle-side theorem as an axiom. His version of it asserts the congruence of the
corresponding remaining angles; he proves the congruence of the remaining side.
We do not have an original version of the Elements and cannot be

certain of its contents; nevertheless, there is some agreement today that
Euclid included only the three common notions listed above. These fall
short of articulating all of the assumptions needed for his demonstra-
tion, including the three assumptions he makes in Proposition I.4.
Despite the revolutionary rigor of the Elements, it seems unlikely that
Euclid wished to make every assumption explicit.13 In contrast, many
of Euclid’s commentators thought that all assumptions needed to be
made explicit, and they interpolated additional common notions, some
of which became difficult to distinguish from Euclid’s own. Proclus,
commenting on the Elements in the fifth century, thought that Euclid
was responsible for five common notions – the above three and the fol-
lowing:
Common Notion 4: Things which coincide with one another are equal to one
another.
Common Notion 5: The whole is greater than the part.14
Common Notion 4 was included to justify the inferences in the third
part of I.4 from congruencies to equalities. There is, however, no com-
mon notion to justify the inferences in the first part from equalities to
congruencies.15 Proclus showed relative restraint in limiting the com-
mon notions to these five. Although they did not all appear together in
one edition, there are more than sixteen common notions that various
commentators thought were necessary to shore up Euclid’s foun-
dations.16 One interpolated common notion states that two straight
lines do not enclose a space, which justifies the inference in the second
part of I.4, that is, Euclid’s inference from the coincidence of the end-
points of straight lines to the coincidence of the entire lines.
Euclid was criticized not only for his assumptions concerning the re-
lation between congruence and equality, but also for using congruence
at all. Jacques Peletier published a Latin edition of Euclid in 1557 that
included a well-known attack on Euclid’s introduction of motion into
geometry; he argued that motion introduced a mechanical element into
geometry that was inappropriate for the science and beneath its dig-
13 For agreement on the number of genuine common notions, see Euclid 21956,
I 221 f., and Mueller 1981, 33f. Mueller argues persuasively that Euclid did not
intend to make every assumption explicit.
14 Mueller 1981, 319. Proclus 1970, 151f.
15 As Heath points out; see Euclid 21956, I 250.
16 Euclid 21956, I 221f.
nity.17 More interesting is his argument that once motion was intro-
duced into the Elements, it offered shortcuts to various proofs and even
made one of Euclid’s postulates provable.18
Despite these serious worries, most commentators accepted con-
gruence and the rigid motion in three-dimensional space upon which it
relied. This was in no small part because giving up congruence would
have undermined much of Euclidean geometry, a fact they viewed as a
powerful argument in favor of congruence. Even if most geometers
were willing to accept the rigid motion of geometrical figures, however,
concerns about the legitimacy of congruence and its relation to equality
formed part of the Euclidean tradition, and it is likely that Kant was
familiar with them.
Kant was also familiar with another aspect of Euclidean geometry:
the Eudoxian theory of proportions presented in Book V of the
Elements. The Eudoxian theory of proportions strongly influenced
Kant’ understanding of mathematics and mathematical cognition.
That theory was a direct response to the Greek conception of number
and the problem of incommensurables. In Book VII Euclid defines
number as a collection of composed units (Book VII, Def. 2). In this
view, only whole numbers are numbers. The Pythagoreans developed
the first theory of ratios, and in their approach, ratios between magni-
tudes, such as between two lines or between two areas, were expressed
as ratios between numbers. This numerical treatment of ratios ran into
trouble, however, since it was limited to ratios between whole numbers.
If a square has sides of length 1, then a diagonal of the square has a
17 See Euclid 21956, I 247, and Mancosu 1996, 29f.

18 Some propositions prove the possibility of certain geometrical constructions and
are called “problems” rather than “theorems.” Propositions I.2 and I.3 are prob-
lems that can be radically simplified by introducing the rigid motion of geometri-
cal figures. Furthermore, the fourth postulate, which states that all right angles
are equal to one another, can be proven rather than taken as a postulate if rigid
motion in three-dimensional space is allowed. Some subsequent commentators
agreed that motion should not be used for establishing problems but thought that
superposition was permissible in the proofs of theorems. Euclid does not, how-
ever, use superposition in the proof of the theorem of I.26, where it would be
relatively easy and straightforward to do so. Euclid’s choice not to use superposi-
tion for this theorem undercuts the distinction between the permissibility of its
use in proving theorems and its impermissibility for proving problems. At the
same time, his choice not to use superposition in I. 26 has been taken as evidence
that Euclid himself was uneasy about the motion of congruence. Heath, for
example, thinks that Euclid wishes to avoid it where possible (Heath in Euclid
21956, 225 and 249). I agree, however, with Mueller’s assessment that the evidence
that Euclid avoided superposition is weak (Mueller 1970, 25f.).

length of ö2. Today, the latter is called an “irrational” precisely because

it cannot be expressed as the ratio of two whole numbers; these two
magnitudes are also said to be “incommensurable” because there is no
unit that will measure both. In other words, if some multiple of a unit
measures one magnitude, no multiple of that unit will measure the
other magnitude, and this is true no matter how small one takes the unit
to be. Thus, there were ratios between magnitudes that could not be
expressed by the ratio between two whole numbers. Pythagoreans
eventually recognized that their theory of ratios was severely limited.
Eudoxus responded to this problem by developing an ingenious
method for treating ratios in a way that does not make use of numbers.
His approach turns on defining a proportion, that is, the sameness of
two ratios, as an invariance of comparative size relations19:
Magnitudes are said to be in the same ratio, the first to the second and the third to
the fourth, when, if any equimultiples whatever be taken of the first and the third,
and any equimultiples whatever of the second and the fourth, the former equi-
multiples alike exceed, are alike equal to, or alike fall short of, the latter equi-
multiples respectively taken in corresponding order (Book V, Def. 5).
This definition is more readily understood if anachronistically formu-

lated in modern algebraic notation. For any four magnitudes a, b, c,
and d and any two positive natural numbers m and n
a : b = c : d iff for all m, n:
ma > nb f mc > nd
ma = nb f mc = nd
ma < nb f mc < nd.
In other words, one pair of magnitudes stands in the same ratio as an-
other if the comparative size of the first pair is the same as the com-
parative size of the second pair under all equimultiple transformations.20
19 For a clear and concise discussion of this theory, see Stein 1990.
20 Numbers count as magnitudes, and in particular, discrete magnitudes. Neverthe-
less, numbers cannot stand in many of the ratios that continuous magnitudes can
stand in, such as the side and diagonal of a square. Thus, numbers appear to be
just a special, limited case of magnitudes more generally. The Elements reflects
this difference; the theory of magnitudes is developed twice: once for continuous
magnitudes and once again for number magnitudes. Because numbers appear to
be just a special and limited case of magnitudes, the Euclidean tradition focused
on continuous magnitudes and geometry in particular rather than on arithmetic,
and it developed mathematics as far as possible without appeal to numbers. The
primacy of geometry over arithmetic was a legacy of the Greek mathematical
tradition found in Euclid.
The theory of proportions presupposes that magnitudes can be

“multiplied” and that magnitudes of the same kind stand in com-
parative size relations. The multiplication of a magnitude takes the
magnitude as a unit and composes a larger magnitude out of instances
of the unit. The notion of a unit itself rests on the equality of the units
composed. In addition, the comparative size relations between magni-
tudes presuppose the relation of equality. Thus, the Eudoxian theory of
proportions presupposes and relies heavily on the relation of equality,
which has an importance not shared by similarity and congruence. The
theory of proportions also gives equality a much broader scope, since
all magnitudes can stand in the relations of equality with other magni-
tudes of the same kind, while only spatial magnitudes can be similar or
congruent. This will be of considerable importance to understanding
Kant’s view of equality.
We can say a bit more about the presuppositions of the Eudoxian theory of pro-
portions. As noted above, the Euclidean tradition interpolated into the Elements
Common Notion 5, which states that a whole is greater than a part. This allows a
straightforward definition of greater than: one magnitude is greater than another if
the other is equal to a part of it. Similarly, one magnitude is less than another if it is
equal to a part of the other. These definitions permit the reduction of greater than
and less than to equality and part-whole relations. Thus the equality relation, the
part-whole relation, and composition provide a sufficient foundation for the Eudox-
ian theory of proportions.
We are now in a position to revisit Euclid’s definition of similarity. As mentioned
above, Euclid appeals to proportions in his definition of similarity: similar rectilinear
figures are those whose angles are equal and whose sides around the equal angles are
proportional (VI. Def. 1). In other words, corresponding angles of the figures are
equal, and the ratios among the sides of one figure are the same as the ratios among
the corresponding sides of the other. Hence, the Euclidean notion of similarity of fig-
ures can be reduced to the equality of angles between figures and the equality, part-
whole relations, and composition of lengths.
Euclid’s understanding of the fundamental geometrical relations was

the starting point for all serious geometry for almost two millennia;
nevertheless, concerns about the role of motion, the relation between
congruence and equality, and other hidden assumptions stimulated de-
bate about the foundations of geometry during the Renaissance. Other
pressures also came into play in the early modern period; advances in
algebra and Descartes’ development of analytic geometry stimulated
more aggressive reassessments of Euclid’s Elements. Despite attempts
to rethink or overthrow Euclidean geometry, its pre-eminence persisted
well into the 18th century, and Kant was not unusual in holding the El-
ements in high regard. Nevertheless, early modern reactions to Euclid,

including those of Leibniz and Wolff, helped shape Kant’s views on
fundamental geometrical relations. Let us therefore turn to the views of
Leibniz and Wolff.
§ 2: Leibniz and Wolff on the Foundations of Geometry
Euclid’s Data, advances in algebra, and Hobbes’s work on geometry in-

spired Leibniz to rethink the foundations of geometry for himself.21
Leibniz worked carefully through Book I of the Elements before at-
tempting to put geometry on an entirely new footing; he then pursued
both a mathematical and a philosophical approach. The mathematical
was inspired by both the success and the limitations of the application
of algebra to geometrical problems. On the one hand, Descartes’ ana-
lytical geometry proved extremely powerful; on the other, algebra was
incapable of symbolizing qualitative features of the forms of geometri-
cal objects, such as their shape, which Leibniz called their “situation”.
Leibniz based his new approach, which he called analysis situs, on a sys-
tem of notation that made a geometrical calculus possible. We know
what Leibniz had in mind through essays and fragmentary works that
were not published until well after Leibniz’s lifetime. They reveal an in-
genious method of symbolizing geometrical relations and an entirely
novel ordering of geometrical proofs.22 Leibniz’s approach is founded
on defining loci using congruence relations. The most important fea-
tures for our present purposes are that the method was thoroughly
mathematical, that is was based on the congruence relation, and that
Leibniz accepted the rigid motion of geometrical figures. Equality had
21 Euclid’s Data examined the relationship between various given quantities and the
further quantities that are determined by them. For example, if two straight lines
contain a given area in a given angle, and if the difference or sum of them is also
given, then each of the lines is given. It was thought that the Data was part
of the Greek method of analysis, that is, the method for finding solutions,
in contrast to synthetically and systematically proving them as is done in the
Elements. See Heath 1963, 255f. Leibniz mentions it as a step in the right direc-
tion towards his views; see Leibniz 1971, V 178f., translated in Leibniz 21956,
I 391. Leibniz’s reaction to Hobbes is discussed in Laird 1967, 264f.
22 Unfortunately, explaining Leibniz’s approach would take us too far afield. See
Leibniz 1971, II 20f., translated in Leibniz 21956, I 384f. See also Leibniz 1995
for more recently published fragments.
a secondary importance, and in his notes he states that his new ap-
proach will reduce equality to congruence.23
Leibniz corresponded with Christian Wolff concerning the analysis
situs, but Wolff did not incorporate the geometrical calculus into
his own mathematics, nor did he communicate it to others. Very little
was known about Leibniz’s theory in the 18th century besides the
name “analysis situs” and its unfulfilled promise to revolutionize ge-
ometry. Kant remarks on it in Directions, wondering whether Leibniz
had a method at all or whether it was merely a figment of his imagin-
ation.24
Leibniz’s second approach to reforming geometry was philosophical.
It aimed to fit geometrical concepts into a general, abstract treatment
of concepts. Leibniz attempted to develop a “universal characteristic”
for all thought that would make possible a logical calculus of all truths.
Leibniz hoped to assimilate the geometrical calculus of the analysis
situs into this logical calculus. The assimilation was based on a meta-
physical definition of similarity that included geometrical similarity as
a special case. Leibniz believed that it was philosophy’s task to provide
this definition, and that it would greatly improve geometry.25 His meta-
physical definition of similarity rested on a metaphysical distinction be-
tween quality and quantity, a detailed analysis of which I will postpone
until section 5. For now, it is sufficient to note that the key to Leibniz’s
assimilation of geometry into metaphysics was a philosophical defini-
tion of the quality-quantity distinction.
Wolff did not grasp the mathematical interest of the geometrical cal-
culus, but he did put great store in the abstract definitions of similarity,
quality, and quantity. Wolff used the Leibnizian conception of simi-
larity in his own account of geometry and developed it along the lines
he thought Leibniz intended.26 I will also examine Wolff ’s views and
his influence on Kant in section 5. In short, Wolff sought to assimilate
geometry into metaphysics using Leibniz’s philosophical definition of
similarity.
23 Leibniz 1961, 152. Referred to by Loemker in Leibniz 21956, I 577 fn. 250.
24 Kant 1992, 365.
25 Leibniz 21956, I 392: “The true reason why geometricians have not made enough
use of a theory of similarity is, I think, this. They did not have any general con-
cept of it which was sufficiently distinct or adapted to mathematical investi-
gation; this is a fault of philosophers, who usually are content, especially in meta-
physics, with vague definitions which are fully as obscure as the thing defined.”
26 Wolff 1968 [1742], 119f. Translated in Kant 1992, 443 fn. 11.
§ 3: Kant on the Mathematical Definitions of Equality,

Similarity, and Congruence
Kant was a philosopher first and a mathematician second – his focus

was on explaining the nature of mathematical cognition. He neverthe-
less maintained a strong interest in mathematics for its own sake and
possessed a good working knowledge of geometry and algebra. Unlike
Descartes or Leibniz, Kant generally accepted the state of mathematics
in his day. His understanding of geometry was guided by tradition, and
for that Euclid was his touchstone.
Kant draws a sharp distinction between mathematics and philosophy that in-
fluences his treatment of fundamental geometrical relations. According to Kant,
mathematics and philosophy are properly distinguished by their methods. The most
important difference is that mathematics proceeds by the construction of concepts,
while philosophy does not.27 There are further important differences, however, in-
cluding their uses of definitions. Kant holds that mathematics employs definitions
whose content is stipulated by the mathematician. A triangle, for example, might be
defined as a three-sided rectilinear figure or as a three-angled rectilinear figure. The
acceptability of stipulative definitions in mathematics is at least in part due to the
fact that the mathematician can construct an object corresponding to the concept.
The mathematician begins reasoning with construction based on such definitions,
and their stipulative character guarantees that she has not forgotten to consider any
characteristics that follow from it.
Philosophy, in contrast, treats given concepts, such as the concept of justice. Be-
cause they are given, the philosopher cannot be sure that all of the marks of a con-
cept have been taken into account. For this reason, Kant states that given concepts
are not capable of definition properly-so-called, only exposition. This limitation does
not prevent philosophical inquiry, since we can still draw worthwhile inferences from
incompletely grasped concepts. When it does so, however, the exposition of a concept
is a result of philosophical inquiry, not its starting point (A 728f./B 756f.).28
27 See Carson 1999 for a helpful discussion of the contrast between philosophical
and mathematical method.
28 It is relatively easy to see the way in which the definition of triangle can be viewed
as stipulative, but it is not as easy to see where to draw the line between math-
ematical and philosophical definitions of a concept that is arguably given in
mathematical practice itself. If a mathematician were to attempt to define equal-
ity, for example, would that count as a definition of a given concept, or is the
mathematician free to stipulate a new meaning in this case? Kant’s point is that,
whether or not the mathematician attempts to capture a previously given notion
such as equality, a mathematical definition of equality will make a clean start of
things; those and only those consequences that follow from the definition will be
considered in subsequent mathematical proofs.
Kant’s distinction between the two sorts of definition supports his

view that mathematicians should not employ philosophical definitions,
which will only hinder mathematical practice. His proscription is re-
flected in a criticism leveled against Wolff in his Inquiry into the Distinct-
ness of the Principles of Theology and Morals.29 As noted in section 2,
Wolff introduced Leibniz’s philosophical conception of similarity into
his mathematics. Kant objects:
It was in this way that Wolff considered similarity in geometry: he looked at it with
a philosophical eye, with a view to subsuming the geometrical concept of simi-
larity under the general concept. But he could have spared himself the trouble. If
I think of figures in which the angles enclosed by the lines of the perimeter are
equal to each other and in which the sides enclosing those angles stand in identical
ratios to each other – this can always be regarded as the definition of similarity
between figures […]. The general definition of similarity is of no concern whatever
to the geometer (2: 277).
Kant bans the Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysical definition of simi-

larity from mathematics. Nevertheless, it is important to note that he
does not exclude philosophical definitions of geometrical relations
from philosophy. By the time of the Critique, as we will see in section 5
below, Kant appeals to the Leibnizian-Wolffian definition of similarity
in his account of our cognition of mathematics.
Kant also does not exclude mathematical definitions or results from
philosophy. In fact, the mathematical definitions of equality, similarity
and congruence describe relations whose cognition Kant wishes to ex-
plain; they provide the starting point for his philosophical reflections.
Taking mathematics as a starting point for philosophical investigation
is nicely demonstrated in Kant’s 1768 essay On the First Grounds of the
Distinction of Directions in Space. Kant begins the essay with a descrip-
tion of the geometrical relations relevant to the topic. He then states:
This may be sufficient to understand the possibility of fully similar and equal and
yet incongruent spaces. Now we will proceed to the philosophical application of
these concepts (2: 382).
Because Kant bases his account of mathematical cognition on mathematical prac-
tice, I will first examine Kant’s understanding of the mathematical definitions of
equality, similarity, and congruence. I will then consider how these relations might be
mathematically defined in terms of each other, which would reduce the number of re-
lations whose cognition would have to be explained.
29 Although the Inquiry appeared in 1764 and hence before the critical period, Kant’s
views on definitions are strikingly similar to those expressed in the Critique.
I begin with Kant’s understanding of congruence. In his Directions

essay Kant shares the widely accepted notion of congruence as super-
position or coincidence, the German for which is “covering” [decken]30.
Kant does not actually define congruence. He instead defines incon-
gruent counterparts and spaces, and he states that an incongruent
counterpart of an incongruent counterpart of a figure is congruent
to the figure (2: 382).31 Kant’s notion of congruence presupposes that
one can rigidly translate and rotate geometrical figures in order to
superimpose them – Kant refers, for example, to twisting and turning
the surface of one body in an attempt to make it coincide with another
(2: 383). Kant expresses no qualms about such motion; he sides with
Euclid and the prevailing Euclidean tradition against critics such as
Peletier.
In addition to the rigid translation and rotation of figures, Kant ad-
mitted another sort of motion into geometry. Kant emphasizes in sev-
eral places in the Critique that we can only represent a line by drawing
or describing it in thought (B 154, B 203). Kant states that this drawing
of a line is a pure act of successive synthesis through productive im-
agination and that this motion “belongs to both geometry and tran-
scendental philosophy” (B 155n). Kant’s reasons for this are rooted in
his Newtonian understanding of the calculus. One interpretation of the
calculus found in the Newtonian tradition construed magnitudes as
flowing, which guarantees the existence of derivatives and is intended
to circumvent reliance on infinitesimals.32 Kant incorporates this kine-
matical conception by regarding motion as an essential component of
the generation of lines and figures in pure intuition; although it may
have been primarily motivated by his understanding of the calculus,
Kant can appeal to such motion in his account of Euclid’s construction
postulates – drawing a straight line between points, continuing a
straight line, and drawing a circle.33 Kant’s conviction that motion of a
30 In contrast to the changes in Kant’s views on mathematical cognition, Kant’s

understanding of mathematical relations is relatively stable over the course of his
career. I will draw rather freely from early and late texts to piece together Kant’s
views.
31 Kant also describes incongruence as an inability of the boundary of one figure to
enclose another. This does not alter his basic conception or its presuppositions,
however, since it amounts to a failure of the coincidence of the boundaries.
32 See Kitcher 1975, and Friedman 1992, 74f.
33 See Friedman 1992, 55f.
point is essential to geometry eases the way for allowing the motion of
entire figures.34
Kant holds that similarity and equality are sufficient to guarantee
the congruence of plane figures. In this he is in agreement with Euclid.
As noted above, however, Kant parts company with Euclid, Leibniz,
and Wolff in insisting that similarity and equality are not sufficient for
the congruence of three-dimensional figures. This is shown in his defi-
nition of incongruent spaces (and incongruent counterparts) as those
which are equal and similar but which nevertheless fail to cover each
other.35
Since Kant holds that similarity and equality are sufficient for the con-
gruence of plane figures, like Euclid, he must either allow reflection of
plane figures or the translation and rotation of plane figures in three-di-
mensions. Kant allows reflection in geometry. He describes the construc-
tion of an incongruent counterpart of a hand by means of reflection:
From all the points on its surface let perpendicular lines be extended to a plane
surface set up opposite it; and let these lines be extended the same distance behind
the plane surface, as the points on the surface of the hand are in front of it; the
ends of the lines, thus extended, constitute, when connected together, the surface
of a corporeal form […]. (2: 382)
Although Kant allows reflection in the construction of an incongruent

counterpart, reflection is not one of the transformations allowed to test
whether two figures can be made to coincide. If it were allowed, then
there would be no incongruent counterparts at all. We can infer that for
testing the conditions of congruence of all figures, including plane fig-
ures, Kant, like Euclid, allows, and only allows, rigid motion in three-
dimensional space.36
34 In addition, Kant may also have thought that translation and rotation of the sub-
ject of perception (that is, the subject’s point of view) is also possible. See Fried-
man 2000.
35 In the modern terms, Kant’s assertion that there are incongruent counterparts
requires a tacit assumption that three-dimensional space has constant curvature
and is orientable. If space were of constant curvature but non-orientable, then
similarity and equality would be sufficient to guarantee congruence.
In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant states that “[…] full
similarity and equality, in so far as it can only be cognized in intuition, is con-
gruence” (4: 493). He is either thinking only of plane figures, or intends to in-
clude handedness in a notion of “full” similarity that includes all that can be cog-
nized in intuition, including handedness.
36 Kant and Euclid differ from modern treatments in this way, where one is free to
specify whether translation and rotation are restricted to a surface or not. If they
In contrast to congruence, Kant provides neither an explicit nor

implicit mathematical definition of equality. He is like Euclid in this
respect. He is also like Euclid in asserting Common Notions 2 and 3.
On the other hand, Kant never discusses either Common Notion 1 or
the symmetry and transitivity of equality. It is likely, however, that he
also accepted Common Notion 1 or at any rate assumed the symmetry
and transitivity of equality. Because Kant’s discussion of Common No-
tions 2 and 3 appear in a philosophical context, I will postpone further
discussion of them to the next section.
Kant offers a definition of similarity in his attack on Wolff quoted
above:
[…] figures in which the angles enclosed by the lines of the perimeter are equal to
each other and in which the sides enclosing those angles stand in identical ratios
to each other are similar […]. (2: 277)
This is simply the traditional definition found in Euclid and requires no
further comment.
These mathematical conceptions of congruence, equality and simi-
larity were the starting point of Kant’s inquiry into our cognition of
them. If Kant’s understanding of these relations allows one or more of
them to be reduced to another, there would be fewer truly fundamental
relations.
The first relation to consider is similarity. As discussed in section 1,
the foundation of Euclid’s theory of proportions and ratios can be
grounded in equality and part-whole relations.37 Thus, one figure is
similar to another if and only if their angles are equal and the equality
and part-whole relations among the sides of one figure are the same as
those of the other. Similarity can therefore be reduced to equality of
angles, equality of lines, and the part-whole relations of lines.
Similarity can be further reduced to eliminate the dependence on
equality of angles. For figures of more than three sides, equal angular-
ity is not sufficient for similarity (as a square and a rectangle show); nor
is proportionality of corresponding sides (as a square and a rhombus
show). Thus, equality of angles and proportionality of sides are both
required for the similarity of rectilinear figures in general. If we restrict
are restricted to a plane, for example, similarity and equality are not sufficient for
the congruence of plane figures. In contrast, if the motion is restricted to a non-
orientable surface, such as a Möbius strip, or is allowed in three-dimensional
space, similarity and equality are sufficient for congruence.
37 See page 13 above.
ourselves to triangles, however, equality of angles is not required; same-

ness of proportions among the sides is sufficient to guarantee similarity.
Furthermore, any rectilinear plane figure can be divided into triangles.
One starts by drawing a line between any two vertices separated by
a vertex where the line remains entirely within the figure; this “cuts off ”
a triangle from it. By repeating this operation on the remaining portion
of the figure, one can reduce any rectilinear figure to a number of con-
tiguous triangles.38 This makes it possible to reduce the similarity of
two rectilinear plane figures to the similarity of corresponding compo-
nent triangles, and hence to proportionalities.39 Thus, in a rather
straightforward way, similarity between rectilinear figures can be re-
duced to equality and part-whole relations among lines.
Might congruence be reduced to equality? Since Euclid’s and Kant’s
conception of congruence rests on motion, a full reduction of con-
gruence to equality will not be possible. Might equality be reduced to
congruence? The reduction seems straightforward in this direction: the
equality of straight lines could simply be defined by their superimpos-
ability. Alternatively, the equality of straight lines could be defined by
superimposability of their endpoints. In like fashion, the equality of
angles could be defined as angles whose enclosing sides can be super-
imposed.
It looks, however, as if circularity threatens any attempt to reduce
equality to congruence. Congruence rests not merely on motion but
rigid motion, which requires that the lines of a moved figure remain
straight and that their lengths remain equal while being moved.40 The
objection turns on distinguishing the figure at two different positions
at two different times and taking rigidity to require equality between
them.
38 I would like to thank Bill Hart for clarifying how this can be done. There is
another approach to reducing equiangularity to proportionality. Take any point
on a line enclosing an angle and another point equidistant from the vertex on the
other enclosing line, and draw a line connecting them. Then draw such a con-
struction on another angle. The ratio between the connecting line and a side of
the first angle will be the same, greater, or less than the ratio between those of the
second if and only if the first angle is equal, greater, or less than the second. (The
limiting cases of 0 and 180 degrees do not require a construction.)
39 In order to use this method to establish the similarity of two figures, one must
make sure that each figure is decomposed in the same way – for example, by in-
suring that lines are drawn between their corresponding vertices.
40 Giuseppe Veronese raised this objection in 1891 in his Fondamenti di geometria;
see Heath’s discussion in Euclid 21956, I 226f. and 249.
As mentioned in the previous section, Leibniz proposed reducing equality to con-

gruence in his analysis situs. His discussions of the method of the analysis situs make
it clear that he thought he could assume rigid motion, and he is explicit about the
definition of equality in terms of congruence.
Unfortunately, the writings available do not reveal whether Leibniz overlooked the
fact that rigid motion presupposes equality, or whether he had a different under-
standing of rigidity. One might, however, define rigid motion by appealing to the
identity conditions of geometrical figures rather than to the equality of figures dis-
tinguished by their location at different times. Imagine, for example, an unmoved
pentagon. If it changed in either its size or its shape, it is at least plausible to claim
that it has changed into a different figure, and hence that rigidity is a consequence of
identity. If the notion of congruence rests on the mobility of one and the same figure,
it could be argued that the continued identity of the figure requires that it retain all its
inner properties of size and shape. While I doubt that the identity conditions of geo-
metrical figures is well defined enough to carry the weight, this approach has some
intuitive appeal. In effect, both equality and congruence would rest upon the notion
of identity preserved during motion.
Leibniz’s analysis situs was not available to Kant, so there is no possi-

bility that Leibniz influenced him on this point. Kant need not have
known of Leibniz’s views in order to have considered a reduction of
equality to congruence, however. Once one admits motion of geometri-
cal figures into geometry, the reduction is a natural enough thought.
Alternatively, congruence could be partially reduced to equality: con-
gruence presupposes motion and rigidity, and hence congruence could
be reduced to equality and motion.
One or other of the reductions would have been appealing: defining
equality in terms of congruence would solve the difficulties concerning
the relation between congruence and equality exemplified in proposi-
tion I.4. It would follow by definition that straight lines are equal if and
only if they are congruent, so that no common notions concerning the
equality of congruent lines or the congruence of equal straight lines
would be required. On the other hand, if equality is not defined in terms
of congruence and an independent account is given of each, then a con-
cern with rigor would require common notions or other axioms to infer
equality from congruence and vice versa. The reduction of equality to
congruence or the partial reduction of congruence to equality would
also be appealing for another reason: it would reduce the number of fun-
damental geometrical relations whose cognition needs to be explained.
Kant discusses neither the rigidity of moved figures nor their identity
conditions. His acceptance of rigid motion for congruence and his lack
of comment on it might be taken as evidence that he would accept a
definition of equality based on congruence, but his discussion of math-
ematical definitions is inconclusive. An examination of Kant’s views on

how we cognize equality, similarity, and congruence will resolve this
issue; more importantly, it will explain their role in Kant’s theory of
human cognition.
§ 4: Kant on the Cognition of Fundamental Geometrical Relations
In an analysis of the cognition of fundamental geometrical relations, it

is important to distinguish between the direct cognition that two figures
stand in a relation and the role of the relation in mathematical demon-
strations. We need to distinguish, for example, between directly visually
cognizing that two lines are equal and the role of equality in a geometri-
cal proof such as the side-angle-side theorem of Proposition I.4. Our
cognitive abilities in general include an ability to judge that two lengths
or angles that are presented to us are very nearly equal. On the other
hand, no proof in the Elements relies upon our judging by means of di-
rect visual comparison that one line segment is equal to another. This is
as it should be, for how would we judge that one line segment is exactly
equal to another and not ever so slightly larger? The limits of our per-
ceptual abilities preclude it.41 In geometrical proofs, equality is either
stipulated or demonstrated through mathematical inference. In Euclid’s
proof of the side-angle-side theorem, for example, we begin with the
stipulation that corresponding sides of two figures and the angle they
enclose are equal. Euclid relies on this stipulation in his proof that the
base and the remaining angles are also equal.42
Judgments of congruence in mathematical proofs involve the same sort of stipu-
lation or demonstration. In order to judge that two figures are congruent, we trans-
late and rotate one figure in imagination and judge whether they can be made to co-
41 This is a generalization of the problem of appealing to direct observation of geo-

metrical figures to determine the curvature of space: how are we to judge that the
three angles of a triangle sum exactly to two right angles and that space is not
ever so slightly curved? See Kitcher 1975. This problem seems to me to be distinct
in an important way from the problem raised by Parsons about our knowledge
that a line can be extended or divided ad infinitum; see Parsons 1983, 95f. The
latter concerns our knowledge about a purported constructive ability and not
merely an observation of a property of space.
42 I am not claiming that the spatial representation of figures can be eliminated
from Euclidean geometry. On the contrary, I think that spatial representations
play both a heuristic and a justifying role in Euclidean demonstrations. My pres-
ent point is only that judgments of equality, similarity, and congruence in Euclid-
ean geometry do not rely on direct visual inspection.
incide. We are never asked, however, to judge whether the two figures exactly
coincide. Judgments of congruence stipulate or demonstrate that certain sides are
proportional and angles are equal, and the judgment depends on the orientation that
two figures can take relative to each other.
This marks an important difference between mathematical cognition and ordinary
empirical cognition. The latter typically requires that we estimate whether two mag-
nitudes whose size relations have not been stipulated or mathematically demon-
strated are equal, similar, or congruent to some degree determined by practical con-
text; for example, whether the cloth I am purchasing is equal to three yards. The
concepts of equality, similarity, and congruence in such cases are used in a different
way from geometry, for no stipulation takes place.43
Kant holds that our judgments of congruence depend upon intu-

ition; more particularly, he holds that the translation and rotation of
figures is an operation that we carry out in pure intuition. Kant shows
surprising consistency on this point. As is well known, Kant employs
incongruent counterparts to argue for at least three different con-
clusions: that space is absolute (1768), that the concept of space is a
pure intuition (1770), and that space is ideal (1783). The diversity in his
conclusions is explained in part by the changes in Kant’s views over this
period; Kant nevertheless consistently maintains that our judgments
concerning incongruence are based upon intuition.44
Kant’s appeal to intuition might lead one to think he held that our
judgments of congruence are direct and immediate, i.e., that we directly
intuit the property of congruence shared by two figures. Kant does not
state this, however, and the definition of congruence in terms of coinci-
dence implies that what we intuit are the possible translations and ro-
tations of figures and the resulting coincidence.
Judgments of incongruence go beyond judgments of congruence in
an important way. Such judgments affirm that for some equal and simi-
43 To the extent that we take empirically perceived magnitudes to be equal and rea-
son from that assumption, one might reasonably claim that we are applying
mathematics in an empirical context.
44 In Directions, Kant argues that incongruent counterparts demonstrate the reality
of absolute space. In the course of the argument he states that we “directly intuit”
the difference between bodies that only differ from each other in their relation
to absolute space. In the Inaugural Dissertation, the role of intuition becomes
the focus and the conclusion. He argues that incongruence is apprehended by
pure intuition, or, as he also puts it, incongruence “is apprehended concretely in
space itself and falls under the gaze of the mind” (2: 402f.). In the Prolegomena,
Kant uses incongruent counterparts to establish the ideality of space; his argu-
ment states that the judgment of incongruence is based on immediate intuition
(4: 286).
lar figures no amount of translation and rotation will allow them to be

brought into coincidence. Hence, these judgments presuppose that we
can know in general that translation and rotation exhaust the full range
of possible rigid permutations; there is no other method of rigidly mov-
ing figures to change their relative situation. They also assume that we
can know in a particular case that we have considered enough trans-
lations and rotations to be confident that we have exhausted the permu-
tations they can bring about.45
Kant has more to say concerning our cognition of equality. In the in-
troduction of the Critique, Kant contrasts synthetic and analytic math-
ematical propositions. As examples of the latter, Kant states:
A few principles that geometers presuppose are indeed actually analytic and rest
on the principle of contradiction; but they only serve as identical propositions for
the chain of method and not as principles; e.g., a = a, the whole is equal to itself,
or (a + b) > a, i.e. the whole is greater than its part. And indeed these themselves,
even if they are valid according to mere concepts, are only admitted to mathemat-
ics because they can be represented in intuition. (B 17–17)
The first of these principles concerning part-whole relations asserts the reflexivity of
equality. We saw that Euclid simply assumes the reflexivity of equality. Kant holds
that it is analytic, and thus thinks that it is either part of the meaning of equality or
follows from it by the principle of contradiction. If Kant held Common Notion 1,
and it is likely that he did, then the symmetry and transitivity of equality would fol-
low from its reflexivity.
The second principle asserts that a whole is greater than its part. We saw in sec-
tion 1 above that this principle appears in the Elements as Common Notion 5. Al-
though it is prima facie plausible, we would no longer accept it today; infinite collec-
tions can have the same cardinality, and in that sense the same size, as their proper
parts. Kant does not directly address this issue, but he follows the Aristotelian tradi-
tion of restricting the infinite to the merely potentially infinite, at least with respect to
determinate magnitudes, such as those represented in geometry. For determinate
magnitudes, he claims that an infinite collection cannot constitute a determinate
whole.46 His views on the infinite make it plausible to think that the second principle
follows from the meanings of “whole” and “proper part.”
45 We now know that Kant was wrong about the first presupposition. In a non-
orientable space, translating one figure through a looped path of sufficient size
can lead to a change in its orientation relative to another.
46 “[T]he concept of number (which belongs to the category of allness) is not always
possible wherever the concepts of multitude and unity are (e.g., in the represen-
tation of the infinite) […]” (B 111). See also Kant’s discussion of the impossibility
of a determinate representation of an infinite world or a world with an infinite
number of parts (A 517f./B 545f.).
Kant’s understanding of the second principle has more to do with the relation of
equality than is immediately apparent. As I noted in section 1, greater than and less
than can be defined in terms of equality and the part-whole relation. Leibniz defines
greater than and less than in this way as does Wolff and Baumgarten.47 In his lectures
on metaphysics, Kant states that “something is larger than the other if the latter is
equal to only a part of the former” (28: 561). As a consequence, Kant can reduce
comparative size relations to equality and part-whole relations. Kant can in turn re-
gard the theory of proportions as founded on composition, equality, and part-whole
relations, as was explained in section 1.
This is, in fact, Kant’s approach. As I have argued elsewhere,
Kant’s philosophy of mathematics is based on a theory of magnitudes.
Furthermore, Kant’s theory of magnitudes is intended to reflect the
Eudoxian theory of proportions. In Kant’s view, the categories of quan-
tity – unity, plurality, and totality – allow us to cognize the part-whole
relations of intuitions.48 Since the theory of proportions also presup-
poses equality, Kant’s account of equality will be particularly import-
ant for his theory of mathematical cognition.
The Axioms of Intuition of the Critique contains another revealing
analytic proposition concerning equality. Kant claims that axioms
must be both general and synthetic a priori. He argues on this basis that
various propositions cannot be axioms. As we saw above, Euclid’s com-
mon notions are axioms, and his Common Notions 2 and 3 state that
“equals added to equals are equal” and “equals subtracted from equals
are equal.”49 Kant claims that these propositions are analytic, and
hence not axioms50:
Kant’s restriction to the potential infinite may only hold for determinate magni-
tudes, and hence may not apply to the indeterminate representations of space and
time as infinite given magnitudes. If space and time as infinite given magnitudes
are represented as actual infinities, however, Kant will face the paradox of infin-
ity after all, for the space outside of the building I am now in is as infinite as all of
space. (I’d like to thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.)
47 See “Primary Truths”, Leibniz 31995, 87; Wolff 1965, 859; Wolff 1968, 24;
Kant 17: 60.
48 For a defense of these claims, see Sutherland 2004, forthcoming a, forthcoming b,
and forthcoming c.
49 It is thought that they were later interpolations to the text, but in Kant’s day they
were accepted as axioms.
50 Kant’s denial that they are axioms runs counter to the claims of mathematicians,
but does not count as an intrusion of philosophy into mathematics. Philosophy
is concerned with how the claim is known rather than whether or how it is used;
it does not affect the practice of mathematics.
That equal composed with equal or subtracted from it yields an equal, are ana-
lytic propositions, insofar as I am immediately conscious of the identity of the one
magnitude production with the other (A 164/B 204).51
For example, if lines A and B are equal and so are C and D, then the result of
composing A and C is equal to the result of composing B and D (figure 3).
Fig. 3
Kant’s versions of these propositions refer not to addition and sub-

traction but to putting together [hintun] and taking away [abziehen],
making it clear that he has a more general principle in mind that would
include the composition and decomposition of any sort of magnitude.
Kant is making the scope of the principle explicit, something that is
only implicit in Euclid’s common notions.52
The immediacy of the consciousness of identity cannot be based on a
direct cognition that A happens to equal B and C happens to equal D. If
such judgments were sufficient, then my estimation that two segments
51 “Denn daß Gleiches, zu Gleichem hinzugethan oder von diesem abgezogen, ein
Gleiches gebe, sind analytische Sätze, indem ich mir der Identität der einen
Größenerzeugung mit der andern unmittelbar bewußt bin; Axiomen aber sollen
synthetische Sätze a priori sein” (A 164/B 204f.).
52 I believe that Kant primarily has in mind continuous magnitudes, such as lines,
and the application of common notions in Euclid’s geometry. It is less clear how
Kant thinks this principle is to be applied to numerical formulae. In fact, puzzles
arise when one attempts to apply this principle directly to numbers. I think
Kant’s understanding of numbers is based on his account of discrete magnitudes,
but I will not be able to defend this claim here. See Sutherland forthcoming c for
more on this issue.
happen to be of the same length would be analytic rather than syn-

thetic, a result quite contrary to Kant’s views.53 Moreover, as discussed
above, we are incapable of any such judgment except as an approxi-
mation, which would be insufficient for mathematical demonstration.
If mathematical judgments concerning equality were based on direct
judgments, then equality would lose its transitivity. I might judge that
G and H are equal and that H and I are equal and yet be able to see that
G and I are not equal if the differences between G and H and between
H and I are just below the threshold of differences that I can notice.
Kant would have to give up on one of the fundamental properties of
equality, a property entailed by Euclid’s Common Notion 1. What is at
issue in Kant’s claim is the identity of the two magnitude productions
given the stipulation that A is equal to B and C is equal to D; I am im-
mediately conscious of the fact that if A equals B and C equals D, then
E and F must be equal. The fact that Kant thinks that this principle is
analytic demonstrates his sensitivity to the distinction between the geo-
metrical and empirical use of equality described at the beginning of this
section.
The principle also sheds light on the relation between equality and
congruence. If Kant had endorsed a mathematical definition of equal-
ity in terms of congruence, one would expect it to emerge in these ana-
lytic claims concerning equality, yet both the Introduction and Axioms
passages lack any reference to congruence. We can infer that Kant did
not define equality in terms of congruence.
There is a very good reason for Kant to eschew the reduction of equality of con-
gruence, however. We saw in section 1 that Euclid defines similarity and congruence
for spatial figures, but that he applies the notion of equality not only to lines, areas,
and volumes, but to magnitudes more generally. If equality were defined by con-
gruence, then equality would be restricted to spatial magnitudes in particular and the
generality of the theory of proportions would be lost. This would be too great a cost
for Kant. Kant’s philosophy of mathematics rests on a theory of magnitudes, as will
become increasingly clear. Furthermore, as I have argued elsewhere, Kant’s theory of
magnitudes reflects the Eudoxian theory of proportions.54
Kant’s explanation of Common Notions 2 and 3 shows that equality

is to be understood as a relation between magnitudes. He states that
these principles are analytic because they rest on an identity; I will re-
53 I would like to thank Michael Friedman for prompting me to make this point ex-
plicit.
54 See Sutherland forthcoming b, and forthcoming c.
turn to this point below.55 What is relevant for our present purposes is
that he thinks that the proper philosophical account of equality appeals
to the identity of the production of magnitudes. I noted above that
Kant held that the generation of a line requires drawing a line in
thought; Kant describes it as a “successive synthesis of the manifold
in outer intuition in general through productive imagination” (B 155n).
It is this generation of lines in pure intuition that Kant has in mind,
the same synthesis that generates determinate spaces and times for
geometry and makes the apprehension of every outer appearance pos-
sible (B 203, A 165/B 206).
Kant’s discussion of Common Notions 2 and 3 shows that his con-
ception of equality is rooted in his theory of magnitudes. To see how
equality fits into Kant’s theory of mathematical cognition, one must
understand the Leibnizian-Wolffian view of quality and quantity and
Kant’s reaction to it.
§ 5: Identity, Quantity, and Quality from Leibniz to Kant
As mentioned in section 2, Leibniz at one time proposed reducing

equality to congruence and ratio to similarity. Leibniz focused during
this period on developing a new method for geometry; at the same
time, however, Leibniz hoped to assimilate his work in geometry into
metaphysics by means of a metaphysical account of equality and simi-
larity.
Leibniz began with traditional definitions of equality as identity of
quantity and of similarity as identity of quality.56 As is well known,
Leibniz laid particular emphasis on the substitutivity of identity, that
is, that (terms for) identical things can be substituted for each other (in
55 I will not be able to give a full account of Kant’s views on these principles, in par-
ticular how they apply to numbers (see footnote 52). My aim here is to merely es-
tablish a few points: 1) The principles presuppose that the equality of parts
composed are stipulated, not directly judged, to be equal; 2) The principles give
no indication that equality is defined in terms of congruence; 3) equality is in
some way grounded in an identity; and 4) equality is in some way grounded in the
production of magnitudes.
56 See, for example, “On Analysis Situs”, Leibniz 1971, V 179, translated in Leibniz
21956, 392. The tradition of defining equality and similarity in this way appears
in Aristotle; see Aristotle 1984, Met. V, 1021a10.

propositions) without change of truth-value.57 In at least one fragment,

Leibniz used a restricted version of substitutivity to define equality:
(terms for) equal things could be substituted for each other (in proposi-
tions) without change of the truths concerning quantity.58 A complete
account of equality and similarity therefore requires the definition of
quantity and quality. Leibniz claimed to have uncovered the proper
metaphysical characterization of quantity and quality:
Quantity can be grasped only when the things are actually present together or
when some intervening thing can be applied to both. Quality represents some-
thing to the mind which can be known in a thing separately and can then be ap-
plied to the comparison of two things without actually bringing the two together
either immediately or through the mediation of a third object as measure.59
This way of distinguishing quality and quantity appeals to the fact that
two completely similar objects cannot be distinguished from each other
by their size unless they are compared with each other or are each com-
pared to some other object taken as a common measure.
Leibniz assumes that his epistemological distinction between quality
and quantity reflects a metaphysical distinction: if a property of an ob-
ject can only be grasped or known in relation to other objects, then the
property is a relation to other objects. In this view, quantity is not an in-
trinsic property or an inner determination of an object, but rather a
property of an object in relation to others. This conception of quantity
appeals to measurement.60
Since similarity is sameness of quality, Leibniz states that things are
similar that cannot be distinguished when observed in isolation from
each other.61 This general metaphysical definition of similarity captures
57 There is some ambiguity in Leibniz’s use of the word “term” to stand for the con-
cept of things or the things themselves, and whether the substitution is of con-
cepts in propositions or things in situations. See Ishiguro 1990, 17f. Our investi-
gation does not require resolving these issues.
58 Leibniz 1961, 546.
59 Leibniz 1971, V 180. Translated in Leibniz 21956, I 392.
60 If the object or a part of the object is itself taken as the measure, such as the meter
bar in Paris, then in this Leibnizian conception, size would count as a quality
rather than a quantity. It may seem odd to count the length of the meter bar as a
quality; on the other hand, stipulating that the size of the meter bar is 1 meter
long is arguably not a case of cognizing a quantitative property; it may tell us how
we plan to use the meter bar, but does not determine its size relative to anything
else until it is used.
61 Furthermore, similarity and equality can be interpreted as restricted versions of
the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Two objects are similar if the prop-
erties that can be known of one object in isolation and the corresponding prop-
the notion of geometrical similarity. For example, two triangles that are
similar are so in virtue of properties that can be known of each triangle
separately; it excludes the relative sizes of the figures.
It is important to note that whether a property is quantitative or
qualitative is relative to what one is taking as an object. In particular,
quantitative properties of the parts of an object might be qualitative
properties of an object as a whole. To return to our geometrical
example, suppose a triangle has a side twice the length of another. This
is a quantitative property of each of the two sides since it can only be
known with reference to something outside of each, i.e., with reference
to each other or some measure common to both. On the other hand, it
is a qualitative property of the triangle as a whole since it can be known
without reference to anything outside the triangle.
The relativity of the quantity-quality distinction is particularly im-
portant, because it allows Leibniz to assimilate geometrical similarity
into his philosophical notion of similarity. Geometrical similarity
requires that the ratios among the sides of a triangle be quantitative
properties of the sides. Nevertheless, these ratios can be known without
reference to something outside the triangle, and hence count as
qualities of the triangle as a whole. Hence, Leibniz can state that two
triangles are similar if they have the same qualities, which conforms to
his metaphysical definition of similarity.
As discussed in section 2, Leibniz communicated his metaphysical
conception of similarity and equality to Wolff, who accepted Leibniz’s
basic approach. Wolff defines identity in terms of substitutivity and de-
fines equal as those things which can be substituted for each other with-
out affecting their quantity.62 His own definition of similarity follows
Leibniz’s definition fairly closely.63
Wolff nevertheless found Leibniz’s distinction between quality and
quantity difficult to clarify – in particular, he was troubled by the sense
in which two things must be co-present for comparison.64 Wolff may
have been concerned that if knowing quantitative properties requires
co-presence of two objects or an object and a measure, and our knowl-
erties of another object (i.e. their qualities) are indiscernible (and hence ident-
ical). Two objects are equal if the properties of one object that can only be known
through comparison to the other object or some common measure (i.e. their
quantities) are indiscernible (and hence identical). This is suggested for the case
of similarity by Loemker; see Leibniz 21956, 393 fn. 262.
62 Wolff 1962, 148, 274.
63 Wolff 1973, 118f.
64 Wolff 1965, 1280.
edge reflects the nature of the quantitative property, then all quanti-
tative properties will be mere outer relations, rather than an inner de-
termination of an object apart from other objects. That is, the
quantitative properties of an object will be much like relative position,
and will not in any way be a property of the object taken on its own. It is
one thing, however, to require comparison to other objects in order to
determine its size relative to other things; it is quite another to deny that
an object has any of its own intrinsic quantitative properties.
There is indirect evidence that this was Wolff ’s worry, since Alexander Baum-
garten, a prominent Wolffian, adjusted his metaphysical definitions in his Meta-
physica to sidestep the problem. He does so by introducing a distinction between rep-
resenting a property and distinctly cognizing it. Whether a property is an inner
determination depends on whether it can be represented in an object; whether a
property is a quality or a quantity depends on whether it can be distinctly cognized in
an object. Baumgarten defines an inner determination of a thing as that which can be
represented in a thing when it is regarded on its own and independently of other ob-
jects, while an outer determination cannot be so represented. Both qualities and
quantities of a thing count as inner determinations since they can be represented in
it.65 Qualities can be distinctly cognized in a thing without reference to any other
things, while quantitative properties cannot be distinctly cognized when regarding just
the thing.
Baumgarten contrasts the inner and outer determination distinction with the
quality and quantity distinction when he defines the later in § 69:
All inner determinations of a thing can be represented in the thing viewed in and
for itself (§ 67, § 37) […] we can distinctly recognize an inner determination of a
thing either without viewing the determination in its relation […] to something
else, or we cannot do this. If the first, then such an inner determination of a thing
is a property [Beschaffenheit] (qualitas) of the thing; if the second, it is a magni-
tude [Größe] (quantitas) (17: 41).
In the immediately following § 70 Baumgarten defines similar things as those having
the same quality and equal things as those having the same quantity (17: 42).
In Baumgarten’s view, I can represent an object as having quantitative properties,
but I won’t be able to distinctly cognize how big it is until I relate it to other objects.
This allows Baumgarten to ascribe quantitative properties to a thing as inner deter-
minations, while maintaining the thrust of the Leibnizian distinction between quality
and quantity. The important difference from Leibniz’s view is that the quantitative
properties of a thing are inner determinations, despite the fact that they require a re-
lation to something outside of the thing for their distinct cognition.
65 Kant 17: 35. (Metaphysica Alexandri Gottlieb Baumgarten, 21757, Magdeburg,

is reprinted in Kant 1902, vol. 17.)
Significantly, Wolff and Baumgarten’s understanding of distinct cog-

nition closely ties quantity to sensible cognition. In their view, a con-
cept is any representation in the understanding that represents a
thing.66 Any representation of a thing that is not distinct is confused,
and all confused representations are sensible. Since quantitative prop-
erties of an object viewed on their own cannot be distinctly cognized, it
follows that when an object is viewed on its own, the quantitative prop-
erties can only be represented sensibly. In contrast, qualitative proper-
ties are capable of being intellectually represented when an object is
viewed on its own. This explains Wolff ’s claim that similarity is the
agreement of those properties that are distinguished from one another
through the intellect.67
Kant used Baumgarten’s Metaphysica in his lectures on metaphysics,
and in the early years his views are difficult to discern from those of
Wolff and Baumgarten. As his own views developed, his lectures and
notes increasingly pointed out differences. He eventually abandoned
Baumgarten’s Metaphysica as his teaching text and based his meta-
physics lectures on the Critique of Pure Reason, but the shift did not
happen until the 1790s, so that Kant’s lectures and his notes in his copy
of Baumgarten provides a great resource on Kant’s reaction to Leibni-
zian-Wolffian metaphysics.
There are important similarities between Kant’s mature views and
the Leibnizian-Wolffian view of equality and similarity. Kant agreed
with the traditional analysis of equality as identity of quantity and
similarity as identity of quality. At several points in the Amphiboly of
the Critique, Kant indicates that identity of the qualitative and quanti-
tative inner determinations of two objects entails their similarity and
equality, respectively (A 263f./B 319f., A 272/B 328). Kant reaffirms
this connection in a first draft of What Real Progress has Metaphysics
Made In Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff? (20: 282). Fur-
thermore, as we saw in the previous section, Kant states in the Critique
that the principle that equals added to equals are equal rests on the
identity of the two magnitude productions, implying a dependence of
equality on identity (A 164/B 204f).
On the other hand, there are also important differences between
Kant’s mature views and the Leibnizian-Wolffian view, for his under-
standing of quality and quantity changed dramatically. Rather than
66 Wolff 1973, 6.
67 Wolff 1973, 118.
appealing to distinct cognition to distinguish them, Kant held that

qualities are properties of an object that are specifically different, i.e.
heterogeneous, from each other:
[…] quality differs from quantity in that, and to the extent that, the [former]68 in-
dicates something in the same object which is inhomogeneous [ungleichartiges]
with regard to other determinations found in it. Therefore quality is that determi-
nation of a thing according to which whatever is specifically different finds itself
under the same genus, and can be distinguished from them [i.e., other specifically
different determinations under the same genus]. This is heterogeneous [heterogen]
in contrast to that which is not specifically different, or to the homogeneous
[homogen]. (29: 992 I 2, 1794/5)
Qualities are specific differences and are heterogeneous. In contrast,

quantities lack specific difference, and are for that reason homogene-
ous.69
Kant’s notion of quantity here does not correspond to the Leibni-
zian-Wolffian notion, and Kant calls quantities in this new sense
quanta. In the Critique Kant distinguishes between a relatively concrete
and a more abstract sense of magnitude: quanta and quantitas. Quanta
are magnitudes “as such” (A 163/B 204), which he defines as a homo-
geneous manifold in intuition in general (B 202f.). In contrast, quanti-
tas answers the question of how big something is, that is, what its size is,
and corresponds to the Leibnizian-Wolffian notion of quantity (A 163/
B 204). Thus, Kant makes room for a notion of quantity more concrete
and more basic than the determination of size.70
Kant’s marginal notes in his copy of Baumgarten’s Metaphysica bring out the simi-
larities and differences between Baumgarten’s and Kant’s views. As noted above,
Baumgarten distinguishes between quality [qualitas] and quantity [quantitas] in § 69,
and defines equality and similarity in § 70. Between these paragraphs Kant jotted
“quantum und quantitas” and next to Baumgarten’s definition of quantitas he wrote:
better quanta; that which is a quantum can be cognized absolutely, but how big
(quantitas) only relative. (3541, 17: 42, probably after 1790. See also 28.1: 506,
probably 1780s)
68 I follow the editors and translators of Kant’s lectures on metaphysics, Ameriks

and Naragon, in thinking that “former” was mistakenly replaced by “latter.” See
Kant 1997b note b.
69 In other lectures, Kant states that difference or diversity without specific differ-
ence is numerical difference (28: 561, 1790–1?, 28: 504, late 1780s), linking quan-
tity to bare numerical difference.
70 For more on the distinction between quanta and quantitas, see Sutherland 2004.
In a later lecture on metaphysics, Kant returned to this distinction:

Through the comparison of a thing with itself and its parts one can clearly cognize
that there is a quantum, but one can never determine, without comparison of a
thing with other things, what it would actually have for a magnitude or – how large
it is. (29: 922, 1794/5)71
Kant holds that one can cognize that something is a magnitude [quanta] without ref-
erence to anything else; cognizing quantitas, on the other hand, still requires relation
to something else.72
Since simply being a quantum can be distinctly cognized through comparison of a
thing with itself, it should count as a quality, and this is what Kant says:
[…] that something is a quantum merely expresses something that determines the
quality of the thing […]. (29: 993, 1794/5)
Being a quantum is a qualitative property of a thing, which marks an important dif-
ference between the Leibnizian-Wolffian understanding of quantity and Kant’s
understanding of quanta and quantitas.
Significantly, Kant follows Baumgarten in allowing that quantitas
can be an inner determination of a thing despite requiring comparison
to other objects for its complete determination. In the Amphiboly of
the Critique and in a draft of What Progress?, Kant refers to differences
of quality and quantity as inner differences and to qualitas and quanti-
tas as inner determinations (A 263f./B 319 f., A 272/B 328, 20: 282). Just
as in Baumgarten, the relation to something outside the object does not
make the quantitas a mere outer relation; it is still an inner determi-
nation.
Crucially unlike Baumgarten, however, Kant does not hold that
quantitas is an inner determination merely because it can be repre-
sented in the object. It is also because quantitas is a determination of
71 This is the same contrast between quantitas and quantum to which Kant appeals
in the Axioms of Intuition of the Critique in his argument that axioms belong to
quanta but not quantitas: “[…] between two points only one straight line is pos-
sible; two straight lines do not enclose a space, etc. These are the axioms that
properly concern only magnitudes (quanta) as such. But concerning magnitude
(quantitas), i.e., the answer to the question ‘how big is something?’ […] there are
nevertheless no axioms in the proper sense” (A 163f./B 204).
Since my focus in this paper is not on the axioms, I simply note that Kant thinks
that the distinction between quanta and quantitas distinguishes magnitudes “as
such” and the determinate quantity of a magnitude.
72 The Amphiboly of the Critique also provides evidence that the notion of quanti-
tas he has in mind is size and that it requires reference to an object or measure
outside of it, for he uses as an example the similarity and equality of two [distinct]
cubic feet of space (A 282/B 338).
the size of the quanta of an object. The quantum – the homogeneous

manifold in the object – is the (comparatively) concrete feature of the
object to which the size belongs; the quantitas is a determination of a
quantum, as the Schematism of the Critique indicates:
The pure image of all magnitudes (quantorum) for outer sense is space; for all ob-
jects of the senses in general, it is time. The pure schema of magnitude (quantitatis),
however, as a concept of the understanding, is number, which is a representation
that summarizes the successive addition of one to one (homogeneous). Thus
number is nothing other than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homo-
geneous intuition in general, in so far as I generate time itself in the apprehension
of the intuition. (A 142f./B 182)73
In Kant’s view, quantitas is determination of the size of a quantum ex-
pressed by the number of units contained in the quantum.
This passage also indicates another crucial difference between Kant’s
view of quantity and that of Wolff and Baumgarten: the representation
of a quantum requires intuition. The homogeneous manifold that
makes up the quanta finds its pure image in space and time and hence
requires intuition for its representation. The reason for this can be
found in Kant’s understanding of the difference between qualitas and
quanta.74 As we saw above, Kant defines the homogeneity of quanta as a
lack of specific difference, and in Kant’s view concepts can only repre-
sent specific differences. Since a quanta is also a manifold, its represen-
tation as a magnitude requires the representation of a diversity without
specific difference, that is, a numerical diversity that cannot be concep-
tually represented. Hence, a quantum can only be represented as a mag-
nitude in intuition, for space and time are what allow us to represent the
parts of a homogeneous manifold as outside (and so numerically dis-
tinct from) each other.75
Kant’s views of quantity are therefore fundamentally different from
the Wolffian view. Wolff and Baumgarten’s distinction between intellec-
tual and sensible representation turns on the logical distinction be-
tween distinct and confused representations. In their account, a quan-
tity is sensible in so far as it is a confused representation, and it is a
confused representation when an object is regarded alone and not in re-
73 For more on Kant’s understanding of the relation between quanta and quantitas,
see Sutherland 2004.
74 I can detect no important distinction between Kant’s use of “quality” [Qualität]
and of “qualitas”, and I use them interchangeably.
75 I discuss the relation between quanta, homogeneity and intuition in greater detail
in Sutherland forthcoming b.
lation to other objects. In sharp contrast, Kant holds that a quantity

is sensible because a quantum can only be represented as a magnitude at
all by representing it in intuition. Kant’s distinction between concepts
and intuitions thoroughly transforms his understanding of quantity.
§ 6 The Fundamental Geometrical Relations as Qualities and Quantities
Our investigation of quality and quantity in Leibniz, the Wolffians, and

Kant allows us to explain Kant’s views concerning the fundamental
geometrical relations. Kant differs from the Leibnizian-Wolffians be-
cause he introduces the notion of a quantum, i.e., a homogeneous mani-
fold in intuition, and holds that quantitas is a determination of the size
of a quantum. Nevertheless, he still shares the traditional view of simi-
larity as identity of quality and equality as identity of quantity. He also
retains the Leibnizian-Wolffian conception of quantitas as a determi-
nation of size and shares Baumgarten’s view that both quality and
quantity are inner determinations of an object. Moreover, he still dis-
tinguishes between the quality and quantity (quantitas) of an object by
whether or not determination of the property requires comparison to
something outside the object.
Because Kant shares these views, he also shares the view that whether
a property is a quality or a quantity depends on what one takes as the
object. Kant, like Leibniz, will hold that qualitative properties of an ob-
ject may be quantitative properties of the object’s parts. Kant will agree
with the Leibnizian-Wolffian view that a triangle with one side twice
the length of another describes a quality of the triangle, since it can be
determined without reference to anything outside of it. He will also
agree that one side being twice as long as another is a quantitative prop-
erty of each of the sides.
As mentioned in the previous section, the relativity of the quality-quantity distinc-

tion allowed Leibniz to assimilate his geometrical notion of similarity, which involves
proportions between sides, to his metaphysical conception of similarity as identity of
quality. The relativity of the quality-quantity distinction also allows Kant to define
similarity in terms of proportions. Moreover, as we saw in section 4, defining simi-
larity in terms of proportions allows him to explain similarity as qualitative identity
and at the same time reduce similarity to equality and part-whole relations.
In sum, then, Kant can account for our cognition of the fundamental
geometrical relations of equality, similarity and congruence in terms of
our cognition of equality, part-whole relations, and rigid motion.
§ 7: The Origin of the Concept of Equality
The results of this investigation raise an important further question

about Kant’s foundational account of human cognition. The founda-
tional character of the concepts of part and whole is reflected in the fact
that the categories of quantity – unity, plurality, and totality – are used
to cognize part-whole relations. How does the concept of equality fit
into Kant’s account of human cognition?
Kant does not directly address this question. His silence raises a general concern
about the thoroughness of his foundational account of human cognition. Never-
theless, the Amphiboly doctrine of the concepts of reflection suggests an answer.
Although a full account of the concepts of reflection is beyond the scope of this
paper, I would like to show that it provides the resources to account for the concept
of equality.
Kant holds that there are four pairs of concepts we use to make com-
parisons: identity and diversity, agreement and opposition, inner and
outer, and form and matter. Kant was in agreement with other early
modern philosophers as diverse as Hume and Baumgarten on the need
for concepts of comparison.76 The concepts of reflection are distin-
guished from the categories because they are not employed to cognize a
corresponding object; they are instead used to compare representations
with each other. Kant nevertheless thinks that these concepts are cru-
cial to human cognition, because such comparison “precedes the con-
cepts of things” (A 269/B 325).77 That is, the concepts of reflection
allow us to acquire concepts through comparison. It is therefore poss-
ible that the concept of equality arises from a comparison rooted in the
concepts of reflection.
In Kant’s view, there are two very different ways in which the con-
cepts of reflection can be employed. The first uses them in the compari-
son of concepts alone while the second uses them for the comparison of
the content of concepts, that is, the things to which the concepts refer
76 See Hume 21978, 14 and Baumgarten in Kant 17: 83. Identity, for example, was
thought to be fundamental. Hume counts identity as one of the seven philosophi-
cal relations which arise from the comparison of objects (Hume 21978, 14), while
Baumgarten devotes the first section on the fundamental relations of things to
identity and diversity (17: 83f.).
77 Béatrice Longuenesse, in particular, has emphasized the importance of the con-
cepts of reflection in Kant’s theory of cognition (Longuenesse1998, especially
Chapter 6). A full account of these matters would need to carefully address the
relation between fundamental geometrical relations and the general role Kant as-
signs to the concepts of reflection in human cognition.
(A 262/B 318, A 269/B 325).78 Kant maintains that cognition of a thing

represented by a concept requires intuition, so that a thing can only be
cognized if it is an object of sensibility. As a consequence, the compari-
son that results in cognition must take into account the sensible condi-
tions of space and time. The application of the concept of equality in
the comparison of magnitudes will be a comparison of this latter type.
As we have seen, Kant endorses the traditional view of similarity as identity of
quality and equality as identity of quantity. Hence, the concepts of similarity and
equality would derive from the first pair of concepts of reflection, identity and diver-
sity. Objective judgments of similarity and equality are judgments that objects are
identical with respect to qualitas and quantitas, respectively. We saw in the previous
section that quantitas is a determination of quanta; equality is therefore an identity of
the quantitative determinations of quanta.
As we saw in section 4, Kant claims that Common Notions 2 and 3

are analytic and that they are grounded in consciousness of the identity
of the production of magnitudes. Kant’s appeal to identity confirms
that the concept of equality is based on the concepts of reflection, while
our analysis helps explain these common notions.79 Common Notions 2
and 3 presuppose that the magnitudes to be composed or decomposed
are equal. Since equality is identity of quantity, this stipulation requires
the identity of their quantity, that is, a consciousness of the identity of
the quantitative determination (quantitas) of distinct magnitudes
(quanta). In Kant’s view, the determination of quantitas is only possible
by means of a synthesis that produces our representation of magni-
tudes. It is this determination through the production of a represen-
tation of magnitude to which Kant refers in his discussion of the com-
mon notions.
If Kant accounts for the concepts of similarity and equality by defin-
ing them as identity of qualitas and quantitas, it will be natural to ask
after the source of the concepts of qualitas and quantitas themselves.
Kant, like Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten, thinks that qualitas is a de-
termination that can be cognized through the thing itself, while quanti-
78 The point of the Amphiboly is to diagnose where the Leibnizian theory of cog-
nition (and implicitly the Wolffian theory of cognition) has gone wrong, and
Kant locates Leibniz’s error in a failure to distinguish these two ways of employ-
ing the concepts of reflection. Since he primarily explains his doctrine of the con-
cepts of reflection for the purpose of attacking Leibniz, his account is incomplete
and some reconstruction is required. I will set aside Kant’s criticisms of Leibniz
and will focus on Kant’s own views.
79 At least for continuous magnitudes; see footnote 52 above.
tas (how large it is) is a determination that can only be determinately

cognized through comparison of the thing with other things. Thus,
qualitas and quantitas are distinguished by whether the grounds of their
determinate cognition are inner or outer relative to the object cognized.
The concepts of inner and outer are the third pair of concepts of reflec-
tion, and Kant could appeal to them in defining qualitas and quantitas.
Whether Kant does so is a matter I will not pursue further here; my
present purpose is merely to show that Kant has the resources to find a
place for the concept of equality in his theory of cognition.
Conclusion
Our investigation allows us to place Kant’s views in the context of foun-

dational issues in Euclidean geometry. Euclid defined geometrical simi-
larity as equality of corresponding angles and identity of the propor-
tions among corresponding sides, so that his notion of similarity
presupposes the Eudoxian theory of proportions. We have seen that
equality of angles can also be reduced to proportions between sides,
and that the theory of proportions itself rests on the equality and part-
whole relations of magnitudes. Similarity can therefore be reduced to
the equality and part-whole relations of magnitudes. Euclid thought of
congruence in terms of superposition and coincidence, and he assumed
the possibility of rigid motion in three-dimensional space. Euclid did
not explicitly define equality or congruence, nor did he clarify the re-
lation between them, despite the fact that the Elements crucially depend
on them and that his failure to clarify the relation between them leaves
apparent gaps in his demonstrations. Some geometers rejected Euclid’s
appeal to rigid motion altogether, but most accepted the need for con-
gruence and rigid motion in spite of worries about Euclid’s foun-
dations.
Given this background, it is unsurprising that Leibniz focused on
equality, similarity and congruence when he attempted to give ge-
ometry new foundations. Leibniz’s approach in the analysis situs took
congruence and hence rigid motion as primitive and defined equality in
terms of it. This definition raises questions about the nature of rigid
motion, but would appeal to a Euclidean geometer who takes rigid mo-
tion for granted, and it would close the deductive gaps in Euclid’s
proofs. On the other hand, defining equality in terms of congruence
would limit equality to spatial magnitudes. Hence, it would severely re-
strict the Eudoxian theory of proportions, which presupposes equality
and is meant to apply to any sort of magnitude. A definition of equality

in terms of congruence is therefore not an option for someone inter-
ested in preserving the full theory of proportions.
Leibniz also attempted to assimilate his analysis situs into a logical
calculus and metaphysics by defining equality as identity of quantity
and similarity as identity of quality. Leibniz was able to do this while
preserving the quantitative character of geometrical similarity by rela-
tivizing the quality-quantity distinction: qualities of a geometrical fig-
ure as a whole are quantitative properties among its sides. Thus, geo-
metrical similarity can be described, on the one hand, as the identity of
qualities of two figures and, on the other, as the identity of the propor-
tions among the parts of each of the figures.
Unlike Leibniz, Kant did not attempt to reform mathematics and ar-
gued against introducing philosophical definitions into geometry. Kant
focused on explaining the possibility and limits of human cognition,
including mathematical cognition. Any explanation of the cognition
underlying Euclidean geometry will have to include an explanation of
equality, similarity, and congruence. We have seen that much more can
be said about Kant’s views of these relations than one might at first
suspect. First, Kant was sensitive to the difference between employing
equality and congruence in geometry and in empirical judgments; the
former proceeds by stipulating or demonstrating equalities, never by
relying on a direct judgment that two segments happen to be equal. Sec-
ond, Kant followed the mainstream Euclidean tradition by accepting
rigid motion, and he attributed to us the cognitive ability to represent
rigid motions and draw inferences from them. He expresses no misgiv-
ings about the nature of rigid motion, but he does not define equality in
terms of congruence. I have argued that he had a strong reason not to,
since he bases his general theory of mathematical cognition on the Eud-
oxian theory of magnitudes, which requires a broader conception of
equality than such a definition would allow. In fact, because the theory
of proportions rests on equality and part-whole relations and similarity
can be reduced to proportions, equality played a particularly important
role in Kant’s theory of mathematical cognition.
Kant incorporates the concept of equality into his broader theory of
human cognition by appealing to the traditional philosophical defini-
tion of equality as identity of quantitative properties. His understand-
ing of quality and quantity was strongly influenced by the Leibnizian-
Wolffian definitions of quality and quantity, although he modified the
conception of quantity in important ways by distinguishing between
quanta and quantitas. Despite these changes, he preserves Leibniz’s
relativized conception of quality and quantity. The distinction allows

him to define similarity and equality as special cases of identity and at
the same time to reduce similarity to equality and part-whole relations.
The reduction of similarity preserves the Eudoxian theory of propor-
tions at the basis of his theory of mathematical cognition and allows
him to ground our cognition of the fundamental geometrical relations
of equality, similarity, and congruence in our cognition of equality,
part-whole relations, and rigid motion.
In addition, the concept of equality can be defined as identity of
quantity, notions which in turn find a home in the concepts of reflec-
tion. In this view, the part-whole and equality relations required for the
theory of proportions derive from the categories of quantity and the
concepts of reflection, respectively.
We have seen that Kant’s attacks on Leibniz’s philosophical ap-
proach did not prevent him from borrowing it. Kant only objected to
Leibniz’s attempt to use philosophical definitions to transform mathe-
matics; he did not have qualms about using the Leibnizian distinction
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Kant on Fundamental Geometrical Relations 117

Kant on Fundamental Geometrical Relations

Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philosophie 87. Bd., S. 117–158

Kant, like most of his contemporaries, largely accepted Euclidean geometry,

§ 1: Equality, similarity, and congruence in Euclid and his critics

Euclid introduces equality, similarity and congruence in different ways.

Although Euclid does not define equality, he gives three axioms,

8 In the modern approach, to assert the equality of two concrete magnitudes is

of these notions, and yet they cannot be superimposed. Leibniz and

area).10 The demonstration is worth examining in some detail, because

We do not have an original version of the Elements and cannot be

17 See Euclid 21956, I 247, and Mancosu 1996, 29f.

that Euclid avoided superposition is weak (Mueller 1970, 25f.).

length of ö2. Today, the latter is called an “irrational” precisely because

This definition is more readily understood if anachronistically formu-

The theory of proportions presupposes that magnitudes can be

Euclid’s understanding of the fundamental geometrical relations was

ements in high regard. Nevertheless, early modern reactions to Euclid,

§ 2: Leibniz and Wolff on the Foundations of Geometry

Euclid’s Data, advances in algebra, and Hobbes’s work on geometry in-

§ 3: Kant on the Mathematical Definitions of Equality,

Kant was a philosopher first and a mathematician second – his focus

Kant’s distinction between the two sorts of definition supports his

Kant bans the Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysical definition of simi-

I begin with Kant’s understanding of congruence. In his Directions

30 In contrast to the changes in Kant’s views on mathematical cognition, Kant’s

Although Kant allows reflection in the construction of an incongruent

In contrast to congruence, Kant provides neither an explicit nor

ourselves to triangles, however, equality of angles is not required; same-

As mentioned in the previous section, Leibniz proposed reducing equality to con-

Leibniz’s analysis situs was not available to Kant, so there is no possi-

ematical definitions is inconclusive. An examination of Kant’s views on

§ 4: Kant on the Cognition of Fundamental Geometrical Relations

In an analysis of the cognition of fundamental geometrical relations, it

41 This is a generalization of the problem of appealing to direct observation of geo-

Kant holds that our judgments of congruence depend upon intu-

lar figures no amount of translation and rotation will allow them to be

Kant’s versions of these propositions refer not to addition and sub-

happen to be of the same length would be analytic rather than syn-

Kant’s explanation of Common Notions 2 and 3 shows that equality

§ 5: Identity, Quantity, and Quality from Leibniz to Kant

As mentioned in section 2, Leibniz at one time proposed reducing

in Aristotle; see Aristotle 1984, Met. V, 1021a10.

propositions) without change of truth-value.57 In at least one fragment,

65 Kant 17: 35. (Metaphysica Alexandri Gottlieb Baumgarten, 21757, Magdeburg,

Significantly, Wolff and Baumgarten’s understanding of distinct cog-

appealing to distinct cognition to distinguish them, Kant held that

Qualities are specific differences and are heterogeneous. In contrast,

68 I follow the editors and translators of Kant’s lectures on metaphysics, Ameriks

In a later lecture on metaphysics, Kant returned to this distinction:

the size of the quanta of an object. The quantum – the homogeneous

lation to other objects. In sharp contrast, Kant holds that a quantity

§ 6 The Fundamental Geometrical Relations as Qualities and Quantities

Our investigation of quality and quantity in Leibniz, the Wolffians, and

As mentioned in the previous section, the relativity of the quality-quantity distinc-

§ 7: The Origin of the Concept of Equality

The results of this investigation raise an important further question

(A 262/B 318, A 269/B 325).78 Kant maintains that cognition of a thing

As we saw in section 4, Kant claims that Common Notions 2 and 3

tas (how large it is) is a determination that can only be determinately

Our investigation allows us to place Kant’s views in the context of foun-

and is meant to apply to any sort of magnitude. A definition of equality

relativized conception of quality and quantity. The distinction allows