Neo skepticism as a philosophy of life

“Skeptic (n.) member of an ancient Greek school that doubted the possibility of real
knowledge, noun use of adjective meaning ‘inquiring, reflective,’ related to skeptesthai ‘to reflect,
look, view.’” (Online etymology dictionary)
As philosopher Miguel de Unamuno explained:

“Skeptic does not mean him who doubts, but him who investigates or researches as opposed to
him who asserts and thinks that he has found.” (Essays and Soliloquies, 1924)

But “skepticism” also has a (apparently, as we shall see) very different meaning, in the context of
Hellenistic philosophy. It refers to two distinct schools of thought that were interested in the same
goal of all practical philosophers of the time: to figure out how to live a eudaimonic life, a
flourishing life for a human being. The two schools in question are Pyrrhonism and Academic
Skepticism, the latter also known as the New Academy. I will refer to this latter type
interchangeably as “ethical” or Socratic skepticism, or as New Skepticism (or Neo skepticism).

The major difference between Pyrrhonian and New Skeptics is that the first group suspended
judgment about all “non-evident matters,” on the grounds that are sensorial perception and beliefs
are unreliable. The New Skeptics, by contrast, thought that absolute, or certain knowledge is not
possible for human beings, but that we nevertheless can hold (lightly) to a number of opinions, in
proportion to how likely we judge them to be useful or “true.” This judgment, in turn, is justified
by argument and evidence.

The second century Roman historian Aulus Gellius describes the difference between the two
schools in the following fashion: “The Academics apprehend (in some sense) the very fact that
nothing can be apprehended, and they determine (in some sense) that nothing can be determined,
whereas the Pyrrhonists assert that not even that seems to be true, since nothing seems to be true.”
Seen this way, the Pyrrhonists were more radical skeptics than the New Academics.

The explicit goal of the Pyrrhonians was to achieve ataraxia, a word variously translated as
equanimity or lack of (emotional) disturbance. This was the key to a good life, and it can be
arrived at if we manage epoché, suspension of all judgment. The Academic Skeptics (so-called
because they took over Plato’s Academy between 266 and 90 BCE) did not explicitly pursue
ataraxia, nor did they think it practical for people to suspend all judgment, because this would
lead to inaction. Their goal was more broadly eudaimonic, and it was to be achieved by practicing
virtuous behavior and an open mind about any particular notion one may entertain, on the ground
that one may turn out to be wrong.

The major exponent of Pyrrhonism was, of course, Pyrrho of Elis (360–270 BCE), who was
inspired by the Presocratic philosopher Democritus and actually traveled to India with Alexander
the Great, coming into contact with the early Buddhists. (See this book about the possibility of
cross-cultural fertilization occasioned by that trip.) We know about Pyrrho’s philosophy thanks to
the writings of his student, Timon of Phlius. Pyrrhonism later on experienced a revival, referred to
as Neo pyrrhonism, thanks to the works and teachings of Aenesidemus (first century BCE) and
Sextus Empiricus (160–210 CE).

My focus here is mostly on the New Academy. Major figures in this group include Arcesilaus,
who took over the Academy in 266 BCE and gave it its skeptical spin; Carneades (214–129
BCE), arguably the major force behind the Greek phase of Neo skepticism; and Philo of Larissa
(159–84 BCE). But by far the most influential of the New Academics was none other than Cicero,
who is at the same time our major source about the movement as well as one of the writers who
have contributed the most to our understanding (and criticism) of Stoicism.

You might wonder, incidentally, how is it that Plato’s Academy was taken over by (moderate)
Skeptics. The answer is that — like every other Hellenistic school — the Skeptics were defining
themselves in relation to Socrates. In particular, they thought of their approach as going back to a
more genuine Socratic philosophy, since Socrates had devoted his life to ask the big questions
(what is justice? How do we become good human beings?) while at the same time professing that
he didn’t really know the answers. It was for this reason that he was famously declared to be the
wisest man in Athens by the Oracle at Delphi.

But it is with Cicero that things have recently come full circle for me, unexpectedly (although I
should, in fact, have expected it!) uniting scientific and ethical Skepticism. For the past few
weeks, I have been publishing episodes of my Stoic Meditations podcast focused on Cicero De
Divinatione (On Divination). This is a work in which Cicero discourses with his brother Quintus
about the ancient practice of divination, the ability to predict the future by looking at animals’
entrails or by studying the flight path of birds.

Quintus defends the Stoic position, which takes divination to be real, in book I of the treatise,
while Cicero criticizes the notion, and therefore the Stoics, in book II. It’s a good example of the
approach advocated by the New Skeptics: put forth the best argument of your opponent, then
criticize it in the most reasonable and charitable way possible.

While I was going through the book and preparing the text for my podcast episodes it struck me
that I was reading one of the first attempts to address what modern philosophers of science call
the demarcation problem, i.e., the distinction between science and pseudoscience. My activity as a
professional philosopher has largely focused on the issue of demarcation. Correspondingly, a
large part of my activity as a public science advocate has been centered on the perils of
pseudoscience. It was curiously interesting, then, that Cicero — whom I had read so far as a moral
philosopher — was directly addressing an epistemological issue I have cared so much about
throughout my life!
And it gets better. Simultaneously with my preparation of the podcast series I have been working
on an article on science and pseudoscience for the peer reviewed Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (here is the one I wrote for the same outlet about Stoicism). As part of my research for
the article I stumbled on a paper by Damian Fernandez Beanato entitled “Cicero’s demarcation of
science: A report of shared criteria.” Beanato’s paper begins with an apt quote from Cicero, from
De Divinatione:

“As I fear to hastily give my assent to something false or insufficiently substantiated, it seems that
I should make a careful comparison of arguments […]. For to hasten to give assent to something
erroneous is shameful in all things.” (De Divinatione, I.7)

Beanato goes on to demonstrate that Cicero had anticipated a good number of the criteria for
demarcating science from pseudoscience that are accepted by contemporary philosophers of
science. So now we have the same philosophy, the New Skepticism of Carneades, Cicero, and the
others, that concerns itself with the two things that have been at the center of my own interests
and efforts for many years: epistemic virtue and moral virtue. Indeed, had I paid attention I should
have seen this coming long ago. Back in 2006, that is, a whopping 15 years ago (and, entirely
coincidentally, the same year I moved to New York) I wrote an essay on, of all people, Carneades
and his anticipation of the modern scientific skepticism movement.

In that essay I wrote: “Carneades reckoned that we don’t actually need certain knowledge in order
to function and conduct inquiry, all we need is an estimate of how probable a given conclusion is.
Indeed, the word ‘probability’ comes from the Latin probabilis, Cicero’s translation of the Greek
word used by Carneades, ‘pithanos’ — which means persuasive.” And I continued: “Carneades
suggested that a given conclusion can be more or less persuasive (probable) depending on two
factors: how well if fits with other components of our knowledge of the world, and how much
time and resources we are willing to devote to further consolidate the conclusion itself by
additional inquiries. The more we wish to be confident of our assessment (because it is more
important for us for whatever reason), the more effort we need to be willing to invest in the
pursuit. The reasonable skeptic, then, is justified in holding opinions about things in direct
proportion with the persuasiveness of the evidence, as well as in being more demanding of
evidence in proportion to the importance of the matter at hand.”

So, after all of the above, here is a quick first stab at the foundational tenets of Neo skepticism:

Attitude: Keep an open mind on things, including notions you think you have good reasons to
reject. However, as modern scientific skeptic Carl Sagan put it, let your mind not be so open that
your brain falls off!

Epistemology: Certain knowledge is not achievable by human beings, but we can reasonably

assess the likelihood of any statement to be true (or not) on the basis of argument and evidence.
Consequently, we should (lightly) hold beliefs that are proportionate to the evidence.
Ethics: We should strive toward eudaimonia, a flourishing life human being. It consists in
pursuing virtue, in the sense of excellence, both in the ethical and the epistemological realms. In
other words, act with wisdom, courage, justice, and temperance (the four Socratic virtues) while
at the same time pursuing the truth on all matters, so much as it is humanly possible.