ETHICS

LEARNER'S GUIDE
AY 2020 - 2021

WEST VISAYAS STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
SOCIAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT

SS 112
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 HOW TO USE THIS
GUIDE
Welcome to Ethics!
This Learning Guide on Ethics consists of nine Units. It provides comprehensive
notes and activities to easily help you define, analyze, understand and synthesize
about ethics and morality. It also includes an introduction to peace education.

This is designed to equip you with the basic skills required to:

1. Know the definitions and major concepts in ethics

2. Understand the ethical approach to decision making,
3. Follow the assessment criteria steps when making a decision
4. Understand the different moral and ethical theories
5. Explain the implication of ethics to the contextualized reality of life.
6. Communicate effectively, when explaining and describing the concept of ethics
and its application.

As a student, you will have the opportunity to discuss and debate values
and ethical standards through the series of learning activities on each
lesson, and thereby understand and be better equipped to address
problems and issues relating to ethics and morality.

- SOCIAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT

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 SS 112 - ETHICS
COURSE DESCRIPTION

Ethics deals with principles of ethical behavior in modern society at the level of the person,
society, and in interaction with the environment and other shared resources (CMO 20 s 2013).

Morality pertains to the standards of right and wrong that an individual originally picks up from the
community. The course discusses the context and principles of ethical behavior in modern society
at the level of individual, society, and in interaction with the environment and other shared
resources. The course also teaches students to make moral decisions by using dominant moral
frameworks and by applying a seven-step moral reasoning model to analyze and solve moral
dilemmas.

The course is organized according to the three (3) main elements of the moral experience: (a)
agent, including context – cultural, communal, and environmental; (b) the act, and (c) reason or
framework (for the act).

COURSE CREDIT : 3 Units (3 lecture hours/week)

COURSE OUTCOMES

At the end of the course the student must have:

1. Differentiated between moral and non-moral problems

2. Described what a moral experience is as it happens in different levels of
human existence
3. Explained the influence of Filipino culture on the way students look at moral
experiences and solve moral dilemmas
4. Described the elements of moral development and moral experience
5. Used ethical frameworks or principles to analyze moral experiences
6. Advanced sound ethical judgments based on principles, facts, and the
stakeholders affected
7. Developed sensitivity to the common good
8. Understood and internalize the principles of ethical
behavior in modern society at the level of the person,
society, and in interaction with the environment and
other shared resources

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 I. HOW TO USE THIS GUIDE 2
II. COURSE DESCRIPTION & OUTCOMES 3
III. UNIT ONE: PEACE EDUCATION 5
Lesson 1. A Holistic Understanding of Peace and Violence 6
Lesson 2. Types of Violence and Promotion of Peace Culture 10
CO N TE N TS

IV. UNIT TWO: INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 16

Lesson 3. What is Ethics? 17
Lesson 4. Scope of Ethics 22
Lesson 5. Why be Moral? 28
Lesson 6. Ethics and Other Sciences 30
Lesson 7. Moral Commitments and the Discipline of Ethics 32
Lesson 8. Principles of Ethics 34
Lesson 9: Moral Standards and Non-moral Standards 39
V. UNIT THREE: ETHICAL ISSUE, JUDGMENT,
ARGUMENT, DILEMMA 43
Lesson 10. Ethical Issue 44
Lesson 11. Ethical Judgment 46
Lesson 12. Ethical Argument 47
TABLE OF

Lesson 13. Ethical Dilemma 48

VI. UNIT FOUR: THE NATURE OF MORALITY
& MORAL THEORIES 51
Lesson 14. Metaethics 52
Lesson 15. Normative Ethics 56
Lesson 16. Applied Ethics 65
VII. UNIT FIVE: MORAL REASONING 70
Lesson 17. The Philosophical Importance of Moral Reasoning 74
Lesson 18. Forms of Moral Reasoning 74
VIII. UNIT SIX: THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTS 79
Lesson 19. Understanding of Human Act 80
Lesson 20. Forms of Moral Reasoning 84
Lesson 21. Factors Determining the Morality of Human Acts 87
IX. UNIT SEVEN: MORAL MATURITY 90
Lesson 22. Elements of Moral Maturity 91
X. UNIT EIGHT: ETHICS IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIETY:
ETHICS, SOCIETY AND THE LAW 96
Lesson 23. Right or Wrong in Context 97
Lesson 24. Morality and the Law of the Land 101
XI. UNIT NINE. LOOB AND KAPWA:
AN INTRODUCTION TO FILIPINO VALUES 103
Lesson 25. Glossary of Terms 104
Lesson 26. A Brief of Filipino History 107
Lesson 27. Loob 110
Lesson 28. Kapwa 113
Lesson 29. The Filipino Values 116

XII. COURSE REFERENCES 129

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Unit One: Peace Education
Introduction

“Humankind needs to take lessons from its past in order to build a new and better
tomorrow. One lesson learned is that, to prevent our violence-ridden history repeating
itself, the values of peace, non-violence, tolerance, human rights and democracy will
have to be inculcated in every woman and man — young and old, children and adults
alike. Peace education does not simply mean learning about conflicts and how to
resolve them peacefully. It should also involve participation of young people in
expressing their own ideas and cooperating with each other in order to eliminate
violence in our individual lives, in our communities and in our societies.”
Ambassador Anwarul K. Chowdhury, Former Under-Secretary-General and
High Representative of the UN. “The world cannot afford war. People cannot stand by
while the numbers of war and environmental refugees soar, while poverty spreads like
an epidemic, and money for education, health, job training and other needed
services are stolen to pay for weapons. Only when ministries of education realize
that their responsibility includes preparing future generations to not only know how to
read and write, but also to be thoughtful, responsible members of their communities,
who will graduate not to make money but to make a difference, will we rest knowing
that we have contributed to creating a Culture of Peace.” Cora Weiss, President,
Hague Appeal for Peace Former President, International Peace Bureau.

Learning Outcomes:

At the end of the unit, the student must have:

1.Defined Peace from his/her own view and from the authors;
2.Valued the importance of peace in daily living;
3.Created an acrostic that show the concept of Peace.
4.Defined violence from personal and varied perspectives:
5.Contextualized acts of forgiveness for people who were perpetrators of
violence;
6.Made creative output to express for victims of violence
based on the Philippine culture of peace framework

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Lesson 1. A Holistic Understanding of
Peace and Violence
Contents

Activity
PEACE be with you?

Fill in the circles of the terms related to the word PEACE. Using the words listed,
create your definition of PEACE.

PEACE

My own definition

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Analysis

• Why do we need peace?

• Is there a reason to fear when there is no
peace?
• How do you find your own place right now?

Abstraction

A new way of thinking about peace is so important today. The power of our own
understanding and views of peace both as a condition and as a value cannot be
underestimated. It is because our ideas shape our feelings and our actions, as well
as how we live and how we relate with others.

Secular Views/Concepts of Peace and Violence

Early secular writings on the subject of peace indicate that peace was defined as
merely the absence of war or direct violence.

As late as 1966 the noted French thinker, Raymond Aron defined peace narrowly as
a condition of “more or less lasting suspension of violent modes of rivalry between
political units” (Barash, 1999).

However, an alternative view started to emerge, beginning with the late 1960s.
Attention started to shift from direct to indirect or structural violence, i.e., ways in
which people suffer from violence built into a society via its social, political and
economic systems (Hicks, 1987).

It was realized that it was not only war and direct violence that caused death and
disfigurement. Structural violence also led to death and suffering because of the
conditions that resulted from it: extreme poverty, starvation, avoidable diseases,
discrimination against minority groups and denial of human rights. It was further
realized that a world marked by said conditions is a world devoid of peace and
human security; it breeds anger and generates tension leading to armed conflict
and war.

In this connection, Johan Galtung, a renowned peace theorist and researcher,

argues that structural violence occurs when the wealth of affluent nations, groups
or individuals is based on the labor and the essential resources drawn from nations,
groups and individuals who, as a consequence, are required to live diminished lives
of deprivation (Monez, 1973).

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Toward a Holistic Concept of Peace and Violence

Over the past many years, peace workers have increasingly challenged this
conventional view of peace and have declared that “peace is not simply a lack of war
or nonviolence; peace means the eradication of all facets of injustice” (Cheng and
Kurtz, 1998). There is a consensus that we need to have a comprehensive view of
peace if we are to move toward a genuine peace culture.

Johan Galtung explains that peace is the absence of violence, not only personal or
direct but also structural or indirect. The manifestations of structural violence are
the highly uneven distribution of wealth and resources as well as the uneven
distribution of power to decide over the distribution of said resources.

Indeed, peace researchers and educators now seem satisfied to split the concept of
peace in two, stating that the meaning of peace can be captured by the idea of a
negative peace and the idea of a positive peace. Negative peace refers to the
absence of war or physical/direct violence, while positive peace refers to the
presence of just and non-exploitative relationships, as well as human and
ecological well-being, such that the root causes of conflict are diminished.

The non-exploitative relationships mentioned above refer not only to

relationships between humans but also to those between humans and nature.
Peace with nature is considered the foundation for “positive peace” (Mische,
1987).

The diagram below summarizes the foregoing discussion on a comprehensive

concept of peace and also indicates the types of violence that correspond with the
ideas of negative peace and positive peace.

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 PEACE

VIOLENCE

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Our understanding of peace should also include the various levels of
relationships, beginning with personal peace and expanding to wider circles.

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Application

Make an acrostic of the word PEACE based on what you’ve learned in the lesson.

P___________________

E___________________

A___________________

C___________________

E___________________

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Assessment

Reflect on the quote. Answer the questions below.

“We must bring love and compassion to the world today. We

don’t need guns and bombs to do this.” –
Mother Theresa

Choose 2 words that are important to you from the quote. Explain
why?

How does the quote affect your daily life?

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Lesson 2. Types of Violence and
Promotion of Peace
Activity

• Draw the violence tree.

• On the roots and trunk, write the causes of violence. On the leaves, write
the effects of violence.
• What is violence for you?
• Why is it continuing despite the efforts

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Analysis

How can you counter it as an individual or group?

Abstraction

Types of Violence

Betty Reardon, a peace educator who has made significant contributions to the
field, defines violence as “humanly inflicted harm” (Reardon, n.d.). It is a succinct
description of what constitutes violence in contrast to other types of harms that
result from natural causes.

A Culture of Peace

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The UNESCO preamble tells us that “Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is
in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed.” In
keeping with its mission, UNESCO began the Culture of Peace Program and it
saw the potential of the program to become a global movement. The Declaration
on a Culture of Peace was eventually adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1999
What is a culture of peace? The Declaration (UN, 1998) states that “a culture of
peace is a set of values, attitudes, traditions, modes of behavior and ways of life
that reflect and inspire:

• respect for life and for all human rights;

• rejection of violence in all its forms and commitment to the
• prevention of violent conflict by tackling their root causes through
dialogue and negotiation;
• commitment to full participation in the process of equitably meeting
the needs of present and future generations;
• promotion of the equal rights and opportunities of women and men;
• recognition of the right of everyone to freedom of expression,
• opinion and information;
• devotion to principles of freedom, justice, democracy, tolerance,
solidarity, cooperation, pluralism, cultural diversity, dialogue and
understanding between nations, between ethnic, religious, cultural
and other groups, and between individuals.

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Keeping the self and the family whole, in view of the various forms of brokenness
that surround them, is a foundation of a peace culture. Respect for human dignity,
fundamental freedoms, democratic participation, the fulfillment of basic needs and
economic equity are also major concerns in this framework because the
aforementioned are roots of peace. Likewise, intercultural understanding or the
acceptance and respect for the “different other” as well as caring for the
environment contribute to peace. In view of the continuing threat of armed
conflicts in the country, the cessation of armed hostilities is a major concern as
well as the re-allocation of scarce resources from “arms to farms” or from
buying/stockpiling weapons to undertaking activities that would redound to
people’s benefit.

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Application

Write a prayer for children and women who are victims of violence based on the
peace culture framework.

Assessment

How do you feel about people who are ex-convict or having been imprisoned
because of violence. Choose two situations and explain your answer.

1. They should be treated as normal people.

2. They should be guided in doing some things.

3. They should not be allowed to earn their livelihood.

4. They should be laughed at and their potentials should be ignored.

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5. They should be encouraged to join community activities.

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Unit Two: Introduction to
Ethics
Introduction

This unit provides a concise introduction to the study of ethics. It introduces

some key terms and concepts that further explains the ideas, principles and
frameworks of ethics all throughout the course. Therefore, it is important to study
and understand this unit before going through the other units, as it provides the
foundation to better appreciate the subject matter.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this unit, students must have:

• defined key terms and concepts relating to the study of ethics
• outlined key ethical ideas, principles and frameworks
• explained the importance of ethics

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Lesson 3: What is ‘ethics’?
Etymologically the term “ethics” is derived from the Greek word “ethos” which
means character, habit, customs, ways of behavior, etc. Ethics is also called
“moral philosophy”. The word “moral” comes from Latin word “mores” which
signifies customs, character, behavior.

Ethics can have an overarching standpoint in dealing with diverse issues, problems,
debates, etc., such as:

• Personal life: e.g. questions about one’s basic values and morals in life
• Work and professional life: principles and practices as ethical standards or
standards of behaviors that direct all actions in an institution.
• Social and political life: issues of social justice, political rights

Therefore, ethics, as a science, may be defined as the systematic study of the

morality human actions from the point of view of their rightfulness or wrongfulness,
as means for the attainment of the ultimate good or happiness.

At its simplest, ethics is a system of moral principles which may affect or influence
how a person or group directs his/her life from decision making to ultimately living
life. It is concerned with what is good for individuals and society, which can also be
described as moral philosophy.

In essence, ethics addresses fundamental questions of life such as: How should I
live my life? What is the meaning of life? What moral standards should I live by?
What is the right or moral thing to do? Whose standards or principles are right or
wrong?

However, it is difficult to judge what may be right or wrong in a particular situation

without some frame of reference. Therefore, ethics also involves the process of
questioning, discovering, contextualizing and defending our values, principles and
purpose. It’s about finding out the basis, foundations and reasons of what we
believe and live by which can define who we are and how we face life’s challenges
and uncertainties.

Ethics vs Morality

The terms ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ are commonly used based on contexts and
realities. They are not used interchangeably to mean the same but their meanings
correspond to a particular situation or position.

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Ethics is often used in the context of an organization and institution that follows set
of standards, rules, regulations, guidelines and systems aimed to protect, maintain,
secure and ensure the welfare of its management, employees and even customers
for that matter.

Fundamentally, it refers to a code of conduct or ethical standards, which are often

formalized in terms of comprehensive sets of rules to guide the actions of individuals
in a workplace. Such as in respect of confidentiality of patients’ personal information
in a healthcare facility or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees which they are ought to live by.

Morality, on the other hand, is more often used in the context of personal life,
often in relation to how a person conduct himself personally and socially.
Sometimes, it is a set of rules or standard of behaviors concerning matters of
greater importance which is usually guided by the church teachings and the wisdom
of the elders. However, violations of such can bring disturbance to individual
conscience and social disapproval or disagreement.

In principle, both ethics and morality are based on accepted standards of behavior
personally and socially. These standards have developed over time and come from a
variety of sources including:

• The influence of religious writing and interpretations.

• The influence of philosophical thought.
• The influence of community (societal) values.

The difference between a moral issue and a non-moral one.

One of the first tasks of moral philosophy is to be clear on what makes an action
moral and differentiate between moral and non-moral judgments. Clearly, telling a
friend that she should buy the red coat I have just seen in a shop is not a moral
judgment, whereas telling her that she shouldn’t buy a red coat made by child slaves
in India is. But how can we explain the difference between the two?

Do you think the following examples are moral issues?

a) We shouldn’t litter the street.

b) You should not tell white lies.
c) We should watch tv
d) We should not experiment on animals
e) I should get 3 a-levels.

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Most people would argue that telling white lies and experimenting on animals are
moral issues whereas getting good grades or watching tv aren’t. However, the same
key term, which has some moral dimension “should” is used in all cases. “Should”
has a prudential use, which means that it is based on careful consideration,
something that has been thought about, but also a moral use, in so far as it makes
implicit reference to some kind of guideline of behavior or principle. A non-moral
action doesn’t involve the consideration of principles.

The main difference thus, between moral and non-moral issues is that moral issues
are based on values. A fact is a descriptive statement about the world, but could
also be what the law says, what religions say or what takes place in nature: for
example, it is illegal to have abortions in Ireland, or people are banned from
smoking in public places in England. A value, however, is never intended to be
descriptive: it is a judgment about the world and implies the acceptance or rejection
of norms of behavior, and the understanding of terms such as right or wrong.
Philosophers investigate the relationship between facts and values, which means
how we view the world and the moral principles we adopt.

This has led philosophers to make a distinction between moral, immoral and amoral
actions.

- an immoral action is that is considered morally wrong.

- a moral action is an action which is considered morally right or good.
- A morally neutral action is one that is independent from moral judgment; for
example the prudential use of the verb should when we say you should eat
more fruits.
- An amoral action is one performed by someone who is not morally aware,
that is doesn’t have any concepts or understanding of right and wrong.

Are the following actions moral, immoral, amoral

a) a lion killing a zebra.

b) A toddler hitting a baby.
c) A 19 year old man stealing from a shop
d) A child accidently firing a gun and injuring a relative.
e) A 40 year old woman hitting her child.

We would probably consider the action of the lion and of the baby as amoral; in the
case of a lion, we would argue that it is not capable of thinking morally, whereas a
baby, a toddler and even a child do not yet under the moral implications of their
actions. What we need to think about, therefore, is the criteria for moral
responsibility.

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Philosophers recognize certain requirements as essential to be able to have moral
choice and make moral decisions: thus a moral agent is a being who is capable of
moral decisions; with this capacity comes responsibility for the moral or immoral
behavior chosen. The main criteria for moral agency would be the following:

- We need to be free to make choices (moral philosophers presume free will)

- we need to be rational (that means being able to look at the pros and cons of
decisions, and weigh up consequences, for example);
- we need to be self-aware and conscious (in so far as we understand that we
are the ones performing the action)
- The act must be intentional.
- The act has an effect on others, in so far as it can benefit them or harm
them. The core problem in ethics is however who we define by others. Are
the beings in our moral sphere moral agents like us, or could they be beings
incapable of moral choice, such as animals, people in a coma or newborn
babies?

Philosophers are aware of the problem and make a distinction between moral agents
and moral patients. While a moral agent is one who is capable of moral choice, a
moral patient, however, is not capable of making a moral decision but still partakes
in the moral realm. Thus, most of us would not give a second thought to killing a
wasp buzzing by a window, but we wouldn’t hurt a newborn baby. A baby is part of
the moral world, in so far as we have moral responsibilities towards it. This
distinction will be particularly important when you look at practical ethics and the
issues of abortion and euthanasia.

Suggested Reading

Instruction: Read the suggested reading below (or accessed the video at
https://www.mindtools.com/pages/videos/values-transcript.htm) and develop a list
of your own personal values and prioritize your top ten values with a brief
explanation.

Your values are the standards of behavior and ways of doing things that
you think are correct in the way you live and work.

When your actions and decisions align with your values, then you show
others that you have integrity. You become a good role model. And, you
experience peace of mind, because you're confident you're doing the right
thing.

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When you act in a way that goes against your values, you can feel
unhappy and bad about yourself, you can make mistakes, and you may
find yourself behaving unethically.

You'll have noticed different people have different values, and these often
determine the things they do in life. For example, a life-saving surgeon
will have different values from a respected musician, who will have
different values from an award-winning designer.

So, do you know what your values are?

To identify them, start by thinking of times when you were happiest.

What were you doing? Why were you so happy?

Next, remember times when you were really proud of yourself. Why did
you feel proud?

Then think about times when you felt really fulfilled and satisfied with
what you were doing. What need or desire did you meet in these
situations?

Once you've thought about why these situations are so memorable, make
a list of the values that led to these outcomes. These can be values like
honesty, openness, success, creativity, or self-reliance. Or they could be
any of hundreds of other equally worthwhile values.

You might end up with a long list. That's fine, but you need to focus on
the values that best define you. So your next step is to prioritize these
values, and identify the four or five you think are most important to you.

This can be a challenging step, so give yourself time to really think about
which of these are most meaningful. By doing this, you'll take an
important step towards living a happier, more authentic and less stressed
life.

Now, read the article that accompanies this video to find out more about
identifying – and living by – your values. The article also includes a list of
more than 100 values to help you decide which ones are most important
to you.

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Lesson 4: Scope of Ethics
Ethics deals with voluntary actions. We can distinguish between human actions and
actions of human: human actions are those actions that are done by human
consciously, deliberately and in view of an end. Actions of human may not be
wilfully, voluntarily, consciously and deliberately done but all the same they are done
by human (e.g. sleeping, walking, etc.). It is the intention which makes the
difference between human action and action of human. In ethics we deal only with
human actions.

History of Ethics

Ethics is as old as humanity. The first ethical precepts were certainly passed down
by word of mouth by parents and elders, but as societies learned to use the written
word, they began to set down their ethical beliefs. These records constitute the first
historical evidence of the origins of ethics.

In as much as it is the study of human behavior, we cannot really trace the history
of ethics. However, as a systematic study of human behavior, we can point out how
ethics evolved as a discipline. It is not that we have first a straightforward history of
moral concepts and then a separate and secondary history of philosophical
comment. To set out to write the history of moral philosophy involves a careful
selection from the past of what falls under the heading of moral philosophy as we
now conceive it. We have to strike a balance between the danger of a dead
antiquarianism, which enjoys the illusion that we can approach the past without
preconceptions, and the other of believing that the whole point of the past was that
it should culminate with us. However, we can observe a gradual development in the
ethical thought from the beginning to our day.

In the Western Philosophy, the history of ethics can be traced back to the fifth
century B.C with the appearance of Socrates. As a philosopher among the Greeks his
mission was to awaken his fellow humans to the need for rational criticism of their
beliefs and practices. It was the time when the philosophers began to search for
reasons for established modes of conduct. Socrates, in demanding rational grounds
for ethical judgments, brought attention to the problem of tracing the logical
relationship between values and facts and thereby created ethical philosophy. Plato’s
theory of forms could be seen as the first attempt at defending moral realism and
offering an objective ground for moral truths. From the Republic on through the later
dialogues and epistles, Plato constructed a systematic view of nature, God, and
human from which one derived one’s ethical principles. His main goal in his ethical
philosophy was to lead the way toward a vision of the Good. Aristotle differed from
Plato in his method of inquiry and his conception of the role of ethical principles in

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human affairs. While Plato was the fountainhead of religious and idealistic ethics,
Aristotle engendered the naturalistic tradition. Aristotle’s ethical writings (i.e.
Eudemian Ethics, the Nicomachean Ethics, and the Politics) constitute the first
systematic investigation into the foundations of ethics. Aristotle’s account of the
virtues could be seen as one of the first sustained inquiries in normative ethics. It
was a clear mixture of Greco-Roman thought with Judaism and elements of other
Middle Eastern religions.

The medieval period was dominated by the thoughts of Christian philosophers and
theologians like Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. The influence of Christianity
dominated the ethical scenario. So much so that during this period philosophy and
religion were nearly indistinguishable. The rise of Christian philosophy produced a
new era of history of ethics. In St. Augustine, the most prominent philosopher of the
early medieval period, ethics became a blend of the pursuit of earthly well-being
with preparation of the soul for eternal salvation. The next towering figure of
medieval philosophy is Thomas Aquinas. He brought about a true reconciliation
between Aristotelian science and philosophy with Augustinian theology. Aquinas
greatly succeeded in proving the compatibility of Aristotelian naturalism with
Christian dogma and constructing a unified view of nature, human, and God.

The social and political changes that characterized the end of medieval period and
the rise of modern age of industrial democracy gave rise to a new wave of thinking
in the ethical field. The development of commerce and industry, the discovery of
new regions of the world, the Reformation, the Copernican and Galilean revolutions
in science, and the rise of strong secular governments demanded new principles of
individual conduct and social organization. Some of the modern philosophers who
contributed to the great changes in ethical thinking were Francis Bacon, René
Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Benedict de Spinoza, John
Locke, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill and Friedrich Nietzsche.
Further developments in ethical thinking in the west came with Karl Marx and
Sigmund Freud. Here we are not intending to give a detailed analysis of their
contribution to ethics. However, the most influential ethical thought during this
period were the Utilitarianism, dominated by British and French Philosophy (e.g.
Locke, Hume, Bentham, Stuart Mill) and Idealistic ethics in Germany and Italy (e.g.
Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche).

The contemporary ethical scenario is a further complex area of study. The

contemporary European ethics in the broadest sense attempts to cover a generous
range of philosophies running from phenomenology to theories of communicative
action. The conditions of contemporary civilization forced philosophers to seek for a
genuine ground for ethics and moral life. In much of the English speaking world G.E.
Moore’s Principia Ethica (1903) is taken to be the starting point of contemporary

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ethical theory. Others like Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel, Emmanuel Levinas, Max
Scheler, Franz Brentano and John Dewey too have made significant contributions to
the ethical thinking in other parts of the world.

Method of Ethics

Ethics, as a philosophical discipline makes use of the methods used in philosophy.

Thus in ethics, both the inductive method and deductive methods are used.
Deduction is a process of gaining knowledge independently of experience through
pure logical reasoning. Deductive reasoning begins with a universal or general truth
and leads to knowledge of a particular instance of it. The classical form of deductive
reasoning is the syllogism in which a necessary conclusion is derived from two
accepted premises: e.g All men are mortal, Ram is a man, and therefore, Ram is
mortal. Induction is a process of arriving at knowledge through experience.
Induction begins with the particular and moves to the universal, a generalization
that accounts for other examples of the same category or class. For instance, if a
number of ravens have been observed, all of which are black, and if no raven has
been encountered that is not back, the inferences to the conclusion that the next
observed raven will be black or to the general conclusion that all ravens are black,
are inductive inferences.

However, in ethics the inductive method (particular to the universal) is generally

preferred to the deductive (universal to the particular).

Division of Ethics

The whole study of ethics can be divided into General Ethics (nature of moral
activity, norm of morality, foundation of morality, end of morality, etc) and Special
Ethics (applies the principles of general ethics to the various actions of human
activity). However, when we consider the ethical theories, philosophers today usually
divide them into three general subject areas: metaethics, normative ethics and
applied ethics. Metaethics investigates the origin and meaning of ethical concepts. It
studies where our ethical principles come from and what they mean. It tries to
analyse the underlying principles of ethical values; Normative ethics tries to arrive at
moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. It is a more practical task. It
is a search for an ideal litmus test of proper behaviour; Applied ethics involves
examining specific controversial issues, such as abortion, infanticide, animal rights,
environmental concerns, homosexuality, and so on. In applied ethics, using the
conceptual tools of metaethics and normative ethics, one tries to resolve these
controversial issues.

PAGE 24
Often the lines of distinction between metaethics, normative ethics, and applied
ethics are often blurry. For instance, the issue of abortion is an applied ethical topic
in as much as it involves a specific type of controversial behavior. But it is also an
issue involving normative principles such as the right of self-rule and the right to life
and an issue having metaethical issues such as, “where do rights come from?” and
“what kind of beings have rights?”.

Where does ethics/morality come from?

Philosophers and thinkers have several answers to this question:

• Religion
• Culture
• Laws

a. Religion

It is one of the oldest foundations of ethical standards and greatly influences human
actions, decisions and will. Religion is believed to carry the good news as a
manifestation of the divine which determines the good and the bad, the holy and
unholy and the righteous and sinful. There are numerous religions followed by
people and each religion talk about the nature of right and wrong. Religion is the
basis of an individual that he follows from his childhood and is deeply rooted in his
behaviors. He understands about the fair and unfair, badness and goodness of
actions and the consequences of these actions.

Activity

Instruction: Read the Suggested Reading: Philosophy of Religion (Chapter 9:

Religion, Morality and Ethics – Section 3: Religion and Morality as Identical) by Philip
A. Pecorino (2001).
https://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialsciences/ppecorino/phil_of_religion_text/CHAPTER_
9_MORALITY_VALUES/Religion_Morality_Identical.htm

Guide Questions:

1. Does Morality depend upon religion?

2. Are religious ethics and secular ethics similar or essentially different?
3. What other foundation is possible for moral codes?
4. Can a Society sustain itself for very long without a religious foundation for its
morality?

PAGE 25
 b. Culture

Culture reflects the moral values and ethical norms governing how people should
behave and interact with others.It is a pattern of behaviors and values that are
transferred from one generation to another, those that are considered as ideal or
within the acceptable limits. No wonder therefore that it is the culture that
predominantly determines what is wrong and what is right. It is the culture that
defines certain behavior as acceptable and others as unacceptable. Human
civilization in fact has passed through various cultures; wherein the moral code was
redrafted depending upon the epoch that was. What was immoral or unacceptable in
certain culture became acceptable later on and vice versa. This implies the rules,
standard, values that are transmitted from generations to generations. These are the
standard code of conduct to be followed by an individual that is permissible and
acceptable to the community to which he belongs to from his childhood. The human
civilization is cumulative of cultural experience that an individual passes through
during his lifetime.

Activity

Instruction: Suggested Reading: Morality from Culture by Michael Matteson and

Chris Metivier (2020) - https://philosophia.uncg.edu/phi361-matteson/module-2-
what-is-ethics/morality-from-culture/

Guide Questions for Assessment:

1. Is Culture necessary for a truly moral community?

2. Is Culture necessary for society to flourish?
3. Is Culture necessary for the survival of the humanity?

c. Law

Laws are procedures and code of conduct that are laid down by the legal system of
the state. They are meant to guide human behavior within the social fabric. The
major problem with the law is that the law cannot cover all the ethical expectations
and especially with ever changing outer environment the law keeps on changing but
often fails to keep pace. In business, complying with the rule of law is taken as
ethical behavior, but organizations often break laws by evading taxes, compromising
on quality, service norms etc.

Activity

Insruction: Suggested Reading: Morality from Culture by Michael Matteson and Chris
Metivier (2020) - https://philosophia.uncg.edu/phi361-matteson/module-2-what-is-
ethics/morality-from-rights/

PAGE 26
Guide Questions for Assessment:

1. Can government laws work as the ultimate foundation of morality?

2. What is the relation of law to morality?
3. Is there anything legal but immoral? Cite an example

PAGE 27
Lesson 5: Why be moral?
Consider what the world would be like if there were no traffic rules at all. Would
people be able to travel by automobiles, buses and other vehicles on the roadways if
there were no traffic regulations? The answer should be obvious to all rational
members of the human species. Without basic rules, no matter how much some
would like to avoid them or break them, there would be chaos. The fact that some
people break the rules is quite clearly and obviously not sufficient to do away with
the rules. The rules are needed for transportation to take place.

Why are moral rules needed? For example, why do humans need rules about
keeping promises, telling the truth and private property? This answer should be
fairly obvious. Without such rules people would not be able to live amongst other
humans. People could not make plans, could not leave their belongings behind
them wherever they went. We would not know who to trust and what to expect
from others. Civilized, social life would not be possible.

So, the question is :

Why should humans care about being moral?

Reasons: There are several answers.

• Sociological: Without morality social life is nearly impossible.

• Psychological: People care about what others think of them. Reputation and
social censure. Some people care about doing the right thing.
• Theological: Some people care about what will happen after death, to their
soul or spirit. For many religions, there is an afterlife that involves a person’s
being rewarded or punished for what they have done.

So, that is out of the way. We know that we should be moral and so should others
and without some sense of morality it would be very difficult if not impossible for
large numbers of humans to be living with one another. Now to the questions that
deal with the rules of morality and all the rules which govern human behavior. First,
some terms need to be clarified.

• Mores- customs and rules of conduct

• Etiquette – rules of conduct concerning matters of relatively minor importance
but which do contribute to the quality of life. Violations of such rules may
bring social censure.

PAGE 28
 o Etiquette deals with rules concerning dress and table manners and deal
with politeness. Violations would bring denunciations for being rude or
gross.
o Friendships would not likely break up over violations of these rules as
they would for violating rules of morality, e.g., lies and broken
promises! They are made up by people to encourage a better life. In
each society there are authorities on these matters and there are
collections of such rules.
• Morality- rules of right conduct concerning matters of greater
importance. Violations of such can bring disturbance to individual conscience
and social sanctions.
• Law- rules which are enforced by society. Violations may bring a loss of or
reduction in freedom and possessions.

Activity

Instruction: Describe: Provide detailed account of your personal reflection

What’s most important to me is ______________________________________________________.

In 10 years time I hope to ___________________________________________________________.

Everyone should __________________________________________________________________.

I’m against _______________________________________________________________________.

I’m all for ________________________________________________________________________.

I’m convinced that _________________________________________________________________.

With a gift of 1 million pesos I would ___________________________________________________.

If I could have three wishes I’d like ___________________________________________________.

In summary, Why be moral?

___________________________________________________________________________

PAGE 29
Lesson 6: Ethics and Other Sciences
In our analysis of the definition and nature of ethics, it was presented that
as a science, ethics is concerned with an end or ideal or standard for what is
good and right.

Most sciences, on the other hand, are concerned with certain uniformities of our
experience – with the ways in which certain classes of objects (such as rocks or
plants) are found to exist, or with the ways in which certain classes of
events (such as phenomena of sound or electricity) are found to occur. These
sciences have no direct reference to any end that is to be achieved or to any
ideal by reference to which the facts are judged.

Ethics is distinguished from the natural sciences, inasmuch as it has a direct

reference to an end that human persons desire to attain. Although ethics
is sometimes regarded as a practical science, it is not a ‘practical science’ as
medicine, engineering or architecture in as much as it is not directed towards the
realization of a definite result.

Ethics is often said to be the fruit of all the sciences since it ultimately
perfects human person, by ordering all other sciences and all things else in
respect to an ultimate end that is absolutely supreme.

The table below shows a simple illustration of the focus of other sciences in
comparison with ethics:

Other Focus Ethics

Focus
sciences
How a man behaves How a man MUST behave (a
Psychology
(a descriptive science) normative science)
Nature of human
Anthropology How man’s actions OUGHT to be
beings and its activity
Social and Deals with the How man’s social and political life
political organization of man’s MUST or OUGHT TO BE organized
sciences social and political life in order to be moral
Concerned with
goods, i.e. with those Deals with those ACTS which are
Economics objects which are the the conditions of the attainment
means of satisfying of the highest end of life.
any human want.

PAGE 30
Activity

Instruction: Contrast: Explain the differences of Ethics from other sciences and
provide one example for each area.

1. Psychology

2. Anthropology

3. Social and Political Science

4. Economics

PAGE 31
Lesson 7: Moral Commitments and
the Discipline of Ethics

Ordinarily we make no distinction between the notions of "morality" and "ethics,"

"moral obligations" and "ethical duties," "moral codes" and "codes of ethics." But in
philosophy we may distinguish "morals" from "ethics," according to the level of
analysis intended. "Morality" governs conduct, tells us to follow the rules, and calls
our attention to the fundamental commitments with which we order our lives.
Morality tells us not to steal; one tempted to steal is morally bound not to steal, and
one who habitually succumbs to that temptation is an immoral person. "Ethics" is
primarily an academic discipline; it has to do with forms of reasoning rather than
conduct, it reflects on, compares, and analyzes rules, and it traces the logical
connections between fundamental principles and the moral commitments that guide
us. Ethics derives the principle of respect for the property of others from which we
further derive the rule, that we should not take the property of others without
authorization; ethics describes the conditions under which the principle fails to apply
or can be overridden. We can live moral lives without knowing ethics, but we
cannot discuss the morality of our lives, defend it, put it into historical context,
without the intellectual tools to do so. Ethics provides those tools.

Morality is a precondition for ethics, in two ways. First, morality, as a shorthand way
of referring to all our transactions with each other, is the subject matter of ethics,
just as our transactions with the physical world form the subject matter of science.
Second, ethics is an activity, and any activity requires certain moral commitments of
those who take part in it. We cannot do anything well without moral commitments
to excellence, or anything for any length of time without the moral virtue of
perseverance. The doing of ethics also has moral commitments appropriate to it.
These commitments, to reason and to the moral point of view, can rightly be
demanded of any person who would take ethics seriously.

In any troubling case, we have first of all an obligation to think about it, to examine
all the options available to us. We must not simply act on prejudice, or impulsively,
just because we have the power to do so. We call this obligation the commitment
to reason. The commitment to reason entails a willingness to subject one's moral
judgments to critical scrutiny oneself, and to submit them for public scrutiny by
others; further, to change those judgments, and modify the commitments that led
to them, if they turn out (upon reflection) not to be the best available. This
commitment rules out several approaches to moral decision-making, including
several versions of "intuitionism" (a refusal to engage in reasoning about moral

PAGE 32
judgment at all, on grounds that apprehension of moral truth is a simple perception,
not open to critical analysis), and all varieties of "dogmatism" (an insistence that all
moral disagreements are resolved by some preferred set of rules or doctrines; that
inside that set there is nothing that can be questioned, and that outside that set
there is nothing of any moral worth).

Second, we have an obligation to examine the options from an objective standpoint,

a standpoint that everyone could adopt, without partiality. We want to take
everyone who has a stake in the outcome ("stakeholders," we will call them) into
account. Since this consideration for other persons is the foundation of morality, we
call this perspective universality, or as Kurt Baier called it in a book of that
name, the moral point of view. The commitment to the moral point of
view entails a willingness to give equal consideration to the rights, interests, and
choices of all parties to the situation in question. This commitment to impartial
judgment has one essential role in the study of ethics: once we have decided that
all persons are to count equally in the calculations, that each is to count as one and
as no more than one, we have the unit we need to evaluate the expected benefit
and harm to come from the choices before us, to weigh the burdens placed and the
rights honored. We also know that if anyone's wants, needs, votes or choices are to
be taken seriously and weighed in the final balance, then everyone's wants etc. of
that type must be weighed in equally; that is, if anyone is to be accorded respect
and moral consideration, then all must be. We can derive most of the moral
imperatives that we will be using from this single commitment.

By way of example, the familiar "Golden Rule," that we ought to treat others as we
would have them treat us, is a fine preliminary statement of those commitments.
With regard to anything we plan to do that will affect others, we ought not just to
go ahead without reflection; we ought to ask, how would we like it if someone did
this to us? That consideration is perfectly adequate as a satisfaction of the moral
commitments that precede ethics. In general it may be said, that if we will not
agree to submit our decisions to reason, and to attempt to see the situation from
the point of view of all who are caught up in it, ethics is impossible.

Activity

Instruction: Interpret: Explain in your own words and discuss significance.

• The commitment to the moral point of view entails a willingness to give

equal consideration to the rights, interests, and choices of all parties to the
situation in question.

PAGE 33
Lesson 8: Principles of Ethics
Ethics is about human beings. The values that we have appealed to quite
uncritically in the preceding stories--values of food for the hungry, of fair treatment,
of neighborhood peace and respect for rights--are not arbitrary or merely
conventional. We can discover their foundations in the life of the human being, and
derive them from fundamental aspects of human nature. The human being, and
human nature, are endlessly complex, of course; yet the human being is universally
recognizable to others of the species, and their preferences are very generally
predictable. So if we avoid the complexities of the outer limits of human potentiality,
it should be possible to say enough about the fundamentals of human morality just
from the easily discoverable truths about the human being. In the course of the
discussion, we will make some initial attempts to foreshadow the major ethical
orientations which philosophers have, through our history, adopted, as reflective of
these most basic moral principles.

Then what are human beings about? Given the normative premise, that moral
principles must be appropriate to human life if they are to govern human life, three
basic, simple, readily observable facts about human beings determine the structure
of our moral obligations:

1. People Are Embodied

People are animals. They have bodies. They are matter; they exist in time and
space and are subject to physical laws. These bodies are organic processes,
requiring regular sustenance internally, and suffering all manner of slings and
arrows of violent change externally. They experience pain, deprivation, and danger.
They are prone to periodic failure unpredictably and to ultimate failure inevitably;
they are mortal.

Then people have needs that must be satisfied if they are to survive. They need at
least food, water, and protection from the elements and natural enemies. That
means that they must control the physical environment to make from it the means
to those ends. Failure to do so will lead quickly to pain and suffering. These are
inevitable in any case; in this way we are reminded of our mortality.

The first and immediate implication for ethics is that, if we have any reason to care
about human beings, then the relief of that suffering and the satisfaction of those
needs should be our first concern. In philosophical terms, human need and
vulnerability to harm give rise to duties of compassion (for suffering), non-
maleficence(avoiding harm), and more generally, beneficence: working to satisfy
human need, maximize human happiness, optimize human interests in all respects.

PAGE 34
In general, the moral reasoning that takes help and harm to human beings as the
primary determinant of the rightness of action is called "utilitarianism," following
John Stuart Mill's description of that reasoning. (Mill, Utilitarianism, 1859)

2. People Are Social

Social animals regularly live in large groups of their own kind (i.e., in groups
containing several to many active adult males); individuals raised apart from such
groups exhibit behavior that is, and they are themselves, abnormal for the species.
Whatever problems, therefore, that people have with their physical environment,
they will have to solve in groups. They will soon discover that this necessity
produces a new set of problems; they must cope with a social environment as well
as the physical one. That social environment produces two further needs: for a
social structure to coordinate social efforts, and for a means of communication
adequate to the complex task of such coordination. The need for communication is
fulfilled by the evolution of language.

The implication for ethics is that, given that there are so many of us, we must take
account of each other in all our actions. We come saddled by nature with
obligations, to the group in general and to other members of the group in
particular, that we cannot escape or evade. Normal people (not psychopaths) seem
to know this without being told. By nature human beings try, most of the time, to
do good and avoid evil, in advance of knowing just what counts as good or evil. The
attempt to do good, to others as to oneself, involves the adoption of "the moral
point of view," or a stance of impartiality with regard to the distribution of benefits
and burdens. Fairness, or justice, demands that we subject our actions to rule, and
that the rule be the same for all who are similarly situated. What will make an act
"right," ultimately, is not just that it serves individual happiness but that it serves
the whole community; people are equal, and since equality is itself a value (derived
from "equal dignity") the society must deal with them equally unless good reason is
given for differential treatment.

A philosopher who has made Justice central to his theory of society is John Rawls;
Rawls points out that the duty of justice may require us to favor just those persons
who would not succeed in getting their claims recognized if personal power, or even
majority benefit, were to determine the distribution. (Rawls, A Theory of Justice,
1970)

3. People Are Rational

Normal adult human beings are able to consider abstract concepts, use language,
and think in terms of categories, classes and rules. Since Immanuel Kant, we have
recognized three categories of thought that characterize the way human beings deal

PAGE 35
with the objects and events of the world. These are time (whendid something
happen? in the past, the present, the future; and how long did it take?
duration); space(where is some object? or how far away is it? location, bulk,
distance); and causation (how did something happen? what brought it about?
antecedents, agencies, powers, consequences). "Rationality," of course, in our
ordinary discourse, means a good deal more than the basic ability to think in terms
of when, where and how. Ordinarily we use the word to distinguish calm and
dispassionate decision making from "emotional" or disorganized decision making;
we use it to distinguish people capable of making good decisions from people who
are not. But for our purposes here, we need go no further with the word. The
creature that is "rational" will think, on occasion, in general terms, about classes
and laws, extending over time, space, and possibility, while the creature that is "not
rational" will think, if at all, only about particular (individual) objects or events.

Since people are rational, they can make rational choices. When people think about
action they think in terms of classes of acts as well as individual acts. For instance,
if my neighbor has a particularly attractive knife, and I desire to take it from him,
and am currently making plans to do so, I shall make my plans based on what I
already know about all cases of people taking things from other people. And I can
contemplate not only those past acts of taking, and the present plan to take that
knife, but all cases that will ever be of taking, especially of knives--future acts as
well as past and present acts. But in that case I am thinking of action not yet taken,
of action therefore undetermined, for which real alternatives exist. Since people can
conceive of alternatives, they can choose among them--having thought over the
circumstances, and deliberated on the outcomes, they can decide what to do. Put
another way: I do not have to take that knife, if I have not yet done it. People
are free, as we say, or autonomous moral agents. But then they can also realize
that they could have done differently--I did not have to take the knife, and given
my neighbor's understandable grief and anger at its loss, maybe I should not have.
That is, I can feel guilt and remorse and assume responsibility for having chosen as
I did.

As far as we know, we are alone among the animals in possession of this ability.
And since people can conceive of classes of acts for which alternatives exist, they
can make laws to govern acts in the future, specifying that the citizens (or whoever
may be bound by the law) ought to act one way rather than another: for instance
that no one ought to take things that do not belong to them, and that such takings,
henceforth to be called "theft," shall be collectively punished. General obligations
can be formulated and articulated for a whole society. Collectively (acting in their
groups), people make collective choices, especially choices of rules, rather than
relying on instinct; and they are then collectively responsible for those choices and
individually responsible for abiding by them.

PAGE 36
Rationality's implication for ethics is that, as freedom of choice is the characteristic
that sets humans apart from the other animals, if we have any duty to respect
human beings at all, it is this choice that we must respect. Persons are categorically
different from the things of the physical world: they have dignity, inherent worth,
rather than mere price or dollar value; they are bearers of rights and subjects
of duties rather than mere means to our ends or obstacles to our purposes. Our
duty of respect for persons, or respect for persons as autonomous beings, requires
that we allow others to be free, to make their own choices and live their own lives;
especially, we are required not to do anything to them without their consent.

Just as utilitarianism makes human happiness central to ethics, and the Rawlsian
account of fairness makes justice central, a complete theoretical account of ethics
can follow from the value of human autonomy. The philosopher most identified with
the centrality of autonomy and moral agency to ethical theory is Immanuel Kant
(Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1785)

4. The Human Condition

In summary: By 3, above, humans have minds, or as the philosophers call it, a

rational nature; and by 1, above, humans have an apparently limitless capacity for
physical and psychological suffering. Rationality and suffering are not found
together anywhere else; possibly the angels have the first, and surely all beasts
possess the second, but only human beings appear to be able to reflect upon their
own suffering and contemplate the suffering of others of their kind, and that sets
them apart from all creation. By virtue of rationality, human persons
possess dignity and command respect. Ultimately, that respect entails the
willingness to let other people make their own choices, develop their own moral
nature, and live their lives in freedom. By virtue of that abysmal capacity for
suffering, the human condition cries out for compassion and compels attention to
human well-being and the relief of pain. And by 2, above, this condition is shared;
we are enjoined not only to serve human need and respect human rights, but to
establish justice by constructing a political and legal structure which will distribute
fairly the burdens and benefits of life on this earth in the society of humans. These
most general concepts: human welfare, human justice, and human dignity--are the
source and criteria for evaluation of every moral system authored by human beings.

The same concepts are the source of every moral dilemma. Attention to human
welfare requires us to use the maximization of human happiness (for the greatest
number of individuals) as our criterion of right action; attention to the needs of
groups, and of social living, requires us to set fairness for all above benefit for some
as our criterion; yet duty can require that we set aside both the feelings of the
groups and the happiness of the individual in the name of respect for human

PAGE 37
dignity. To protect the welfare of many it is often necessary to limit the liberty of
the individual (the liberty to operate dangerous or noisy vehicles without a license,
for instance). On the small scale as well as the large, to respect the liberty of
persons is not always to further their best interests, when they choose against
those interests (for instance, by taking addictive drugs or by spending themselves
into debt). To maintain a rough equality among persons, it is often necessary to put
unequal demands on the interests of some of them (by progressive taxation, for
example). To preserve the community, it is sometimes necessary to sacrifice the
interests of the few--but that course seems to discount the worth of the few, and so
to violate justice.

Activity

Instruction: Discuss or Explain: Give reasons, facts, details that show you
understand.

• Moral principles must be appropriate to human life if they are to govern

human life.

PAGE 38
Lesson 9: Moral Standards and Non-
Moral Standards
Morality may refer to the standards that a person or a group has about what is right
and wrong, or good and evil. Accordingly, moral standards are those concerned with
or relating to human behavior, especially the distinction between good and bad (or
right and wrong) behavior.

Moral standards involve the rules people have about the kinds of actions they
believe are morally right and wrong, as well as the values they place on the kinds of
objects they believe are morally good and morally bad. Some ethicists equate moral
standards with moral values and moral principles.

Non-moral standards refer to rules that are

unrelated to moral or ethical considerations. Either these standards are not
necessarily linked to morality or by nature lack ethical sense. Basic examples of non-
moral standards include rules of etiquette, fashion standards, rules in games, and
various house rules.

Technically, religious rules, some traditions, and legal statutes (i.e. laws and
ordinances) are non-moral principles, though they can be ethically relevant
depending on some factors and contexts.

The following six (6) characteristics of moral standards further differentiate them
from non-moral standards:

a. Moral standards involve serious wrongs or significant benefits.

Moral standards deal with matters which can seriously impact, that is, injure or
benefit human beings. It is not the case with many non-moral standards. For
instance, following or violating some basketball rules may matter in basketball
games but does not necessarily affect one’s life or wellbeing.

b. Moral standards ought to be preferred to other values.

Moral standards have overriding character or hegemonic authority. If a moral
standard states that a person has the moral obligation to do something, then he/she
is supposed to do that even if it conflicts with other non-moral standards, and even
with self-interest.

Moral standards are not the only rules or principles in society, but they take
precedence over other considerations, including aesthetic, prudential, and even legal

PAGE 39
ones. A person may be aesthetically justified in leaving behind his family in order to
devote his life to painting, but morally, all things considered, he/she probably was
not justified. It may be prudent to lie to save one’s dignity, but it probably is morally
wrong to do so. When a particular law becomes seriously immoral, it may be
people’s moral duty to exercise civil disobedience.

There is a general moral duty to obey the law, but there may come a time when the
injustice of an evil law is unbearable and thus calls for illegal but moral
noncooperation (such as the antebellum laws calling for citizens to return slaves to
their owners).

c. Moral standards are not established by authority figures.

Moral standards are not invented, formed, or generated by authoritative bodies or
persons such as nations’ legislative bodies. Ideally instead, these values ought to be
considered in the process of making laws. In principle therefore, moral standards
cannot be changed nor nullified by the decisions of particular authoritative body.
One thing about these standards, nonetheless, is that its validity lies on the
soundness or adequacy of the reasons that are considered to support and justify
them.

d. Moral standards have the trait of universalizability.

Simply put, it means that everyone should live up to moral standards. To be more
accurate, however, it entails that moral principles must apply to all who are in the
relevantly similar situation. If one judges that act A is morally right for a certain
person P, then it is morally right for anybody relevantly similar to P.

This characteristic is exemplified in the Gold Rule, “Do unto others what you would
them do unto you (if you were in their shoes)” and in the formal Principle of Justice,
“It cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it would be wrong for B to
treat A, merely on the ground that they are two different individuals, and without
there being any difference between the natures or circumstances of the two which
can be stated as a reasonable ground for difference of treatment.” Universalizability
is an extension of the principle of consistency, that is, one ought to be consistent
about one’s value judgments.

e. Moral standards are based on impartial considerations.

Moral standard does not evaluate standards on the basis of the interests of a certain
person or group, but one that goes beyond personal interests to a universal
standpoint in which each person’s interests are impartially counted as equal.

Impartiality is usually depicted as being free of bias or prejudice. Impartiality in

morality requires that we give equal and/or adequate consideration to the interests

PAGE 40
of all concerned parties.

f. Moral standards are associated with special emotions and vocabulary.

Prescriptivity indicates the practical or action-guiding nature of moral standards.
These moral standards are generally put forth as injunction or imperatives (such as,
‘Do not kill,’ ‘Do no unnecessary harm,’ and ‘Love your neighbor’). These principles
are proposed for use, to advise, and to influence to action. Retroactively, this feature
is used to evaluate behavior, to assign praise and blame, and to produce feelings of
satisfaction or of guilt.

If a person violates a moral standard by telling a lie even to fulfill a special purpose,
it is not surprising if he/she starts feeling guilty or being ashamed of his behavior
afterwards. On the contrary, no much guilt is felt if one goes against the current
fashion trend (e.g. refusing to wear tattered jeans).

Activity

Instruction: Suggested Reading: Why do we need Ethics by Steven Mintz (2017).

https://www.ethicssage.com/2017/03/why-do-we-need-ethics.html and read the
case study below in reference for you to answer the guide questions.

Case study (Baby Theresa): This full case is included in The Elements of Moral
Philosophy (Rachels and Rachels, 2012). The following is the summary of the case:

Summary: Baby Theresa was born in Florida (United States of America) in

1992 with anencephaly, one of the worst genetic disorders. Sometimes
referred to as "babies without brains", infants with this disease are born
without important parts of the brain and the top of the skull is also
missing. Most cases are detected during pregnancy and usually aborted.
About half of those not aborted are stillborn. In the United States, about
350 babies are born alive each year and usually die within days. Baby
Theresa was born alive. Her parents decided to donate her organs for
transplant. Her parents and her physicians agreed that the organs should
be removed while she was alive (thus causing her inevitable death to take
place sooner), but this was not allowed by Florida law. When she died
after nine days the organs had deteriorated too much and could not be
used.

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Guide Question:

1. How do we put value on human life?

2. What should one do when there is a conflict between the law and one's own
moral position about an issue?
3. If you were in a position to make the final decision in this case, what would it
be and why?

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Unit Three: Ethical
Issue, Judgment,
Argument, Dilemma

Introduction

This unit discusses situations in which there is a choice to be made between two
options, neither of which resolves the situation in an ethically acceptable fashion. In
such cases, societal and personal ethical guidelines can provide no satisfactory
outcome for the chooser.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this unit, students must have:

• Understood and defined the concepts of Ethical Issue, Judgment, Argument

and Dilemma
• Analyzed the implications of Ethical Issue, Judgment, Argument and Dilemma
• Articulated and defended a preferred position on the relationship between
ethics and society while appreciating its limitations

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Lesson 10: Ethical Issue
Ethical issues abound in contemporary society. Ethical issues involve questions of the
ethical rightness or wrongness of public policy or personal behavior. Actions or
policies that affect other people always have an ethical dimension, but while some
people restrict ethical issues to actions that can help or harm others (social ethics)
others include personal and self-regarding conduct (personal ethics).

Many of today’s most pressing issues of social ethics are complex and multifaceted
and require clear and careful thought. Some of these issues include:
• Should states allow physician-assisted suicide?
• Is the death penalty an ethically acceptable type of punishment?
• Should animals have rights?
• Is society ever justified in regulating so-called victimless crimes like drug use,
not wearing a helmet or a seatbelt, etc.?
• What are our responsibilities to future generations?
• Are affluent individuals and countries obligated to try to prevent starvation,
malnutrition, and poverty wherever we find them in the world?
• Is there such a thing as a just war?
• How does business ethics relate to corporate responsibility?

To reach careful conclusions, these public policy issues require people to engage in
complicated ethical reasoning, but the ethical reasoning involving personal issues
can be just as complex and multifaceted:
• What principles do I apply to the way I treat other people?
• What guides my own choices and my own goals in life?
• Should I have the same expectations of others in terms of their behavior and
choices as I have of myself?
• Is living ethically compatible or incompatible with what I call living well or
happily?

An Ethical Issue requires a person or organization to choose between alternatives

that must be evaluated as right (ethical) or wrong (unethical).

People care quite a bit about ethical issues and often voice varied and even sharply
opposed perspectives. So when looking at how we debate ethical issues publicly, it is
not surprising to find debate ranging from formal to informal argumentation, and
from very carefully constructed arguments with well-qualified conclusions, to very
biased positions and quite fallacious forms of persuasion. It’s easy to be dismayed by
the discord we find over volatile issues like gun control, immigration policy, and
equality in marriage or in the workplace, gender and race equality, abortion and

PAGE 44
birth control, jobs versus environment, freedom versus security, free speech and
censorship, and so on. But it is also easy to go the other direction and be drawn into
the often fallacious reasoning we hear all around us.

Critical thinkers want to conduct civil, respectful discourse, and to build bridges in
ways that allow progress to be made on difficult issues of common concern.
Progress and mutual understanding is not possible when name-calling, inflammatory
language, and fallacies are the norm. Some mutual respect, together with the skill of
being able to offer a clearly-structured argument for one’s position, undercuts the
need to resort to such tactics.

So critical thinkers resist trading fallacy for fallacy, and try to introduce common
ground that can help resolve disputes by remaining respectful of differences, even
about issues personally quite important to them. When we support a thesis (such as
a position on one of the above ethical issues) with a clear and well-structured
argument, we allow and invite others to engage with us in more constructive
fashion. We say essentially, “Here is my thesis and here are my reasons for holding
it. If you don’t agree with my claim, then show me what is wrong with my argument,
and I will reconsider my view, as any rational person should.”

When we evaluate (analyze) somebody else’s position on an ethical issue, we are

not free to simply reject out-of-hand a conclusion we don’t initially agree with. To be
reasonable, we must accept the burden of showing where the other person errs in
his facts or reasoning. If we cannot show that there are errors in the person’s facts
or reasoning, to be reasonable we must reconsider whether we should reject the
other person’s conclusion.

By applying the common standards of critical thinking to our reasoning about ethical
issues, our arguments will become less emotionally driven and more rational. Our
reasoning will become less dependent upon unquestioned beliefs or assumptions
that the other people in the conversation may not accept. We become better able to
contribute to progressive public debate and conflict resolution through a well-
developed ability to articulate a well-reasoned position on an ethical issue.

Activity 7

Instruction: Illustrate: Explain by using examples

• Present three important ethical issues that our society is facing today.

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Lesson 11: Ethical Judgment

Ethical judgments are a subclass of value judgments. A value judgment involves an

argument as to what is correct, superior, or preferable. In the case of ethics, the
value judgment involves making a judgment, claim, or statement about whether an
action is morally right or wrong or whether a person’s motives are morally good or
bad. Ethical judgments often prescribe as well as evaluate actions, so that to state
that someone (or perhaps everyone) ethically “should” or “ought to” do something is
also to make an ethical judgment.

If ethical judgments are a subclass of value judgments, how do we distinguish

them? Ethical judgments typically state that some action is good or bad, or right or
wrong, in a specifically ethical sense. It is usually not difficult to distinguish non-
ethical judgments of goodness and badness from ethical ones. When someone says
“That was a good action, because it was caring,” or “That was bad action, because it
was cruel” they are clearly intending goodness or badness in a distinctly ethical
sense.

By contrast, non-moral value judgments typically say that something is good (or
bad) simply for the kind of thing it is; or that some action is right or wrong, given
the practical goal or purpose that one has in mind. “That’s a good car” or “That’s a
bad bike” would not be considered to moral judgments about those objects.
Goodness and badness here are still value judgments, but value judgments that
likely track features like comfort, styling, reliability, safety and mileage ratings, etc.

The use of “should” or “ought to” for non-moral value judgments is also easy to
recognize. “You ought to enroll early” or “You made the right decision to go to
Radford” are value-judgments, but no one would say they are ethical judgments.
They reflect a concern with wholly practical aims rather than ethical ones and with
the best way to attain those practical aim.

Activity

Instruction: Interpret: Explain in your own words and discuss significance.

• “Ethical judgments typically state that some action is good or bad, or right or
wrong”

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Lesson 12: Ethical Argument

Ethical arguments are arguments whose conclusion makes an ethical judgment.

Ethical arguments are most typically arguments that try to show a certain policy or
behavior to be either ethical or unethical. Suppose you want to argue that “The
death penalty is unjust (or just) punishment” for a certain range of violent crimes.
Here we have an ethical judgment, and one that with a bit more detail could serve
as the thesis of a position paper on the death penalty debate.

An ethical judgment rises above mere opinion and becomes the conclusion of an
ethical argument when you support it with ethical reasoning. You must say why you
hold the death penalty to be ethically right or wrong, just or unjust. For instance,
you might argue that it is unjust because of one or more of the reasons below:

• It is cruel, and cruel actions are wrong.

• Two wrongs don’t make a right.

• It disrespects human life.

• In some states the penalty falls unevenly on members of a racial group.

• The penalty sometimes results in the execution of innocent people.

Of course you could also give reasons to support the view that the death penalty is a
just punishment for certain crimes. The point is that whichever side of the debate
you take, your ethical argument should develop ethical reasons and principles rather
than economic or other practical but non-moral concerns. To argue merely that the
death penalty be abolished because that would save us all money is a possible
policy-position, but it is essentially an economic argument rather than an ethical
argument.

Activity

Instruction: Discuss or explain: Give reasons, facts, details that show you
understand.

• Present one ethical argument that concerns the government and its people.

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Lesson 13: Ethical Dilemma

An ethical dilemma is a term for a situation in which a person faces an ethically

problematic situation and is not sure of what she ought to do. Those who experience
ethical dilemmas feel themselves being pulled by competing ethical demands or
values and perhaps feel that they will be blameworthy or experience guilt no matter
what course of action they take. The philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre gives the example
of a young Frenchman of military age during the wartime Nazi occupation who finds
himself faced, through no fault of his own, with the choice of staying home and
caring for his ailing mother or going off to join the resistance to fight for his
country’s future:

He fully realized that this woman lived only for him and that his disappearance – or
perhaps his death – would plunge her into despair…. Consequently, he found himself
confronted by two very different modes of action; the one concrete, immediate, but
directed towards only one individual; and the other an action addressed to an end
infinitely greater, a national collectivity, but for that very reason ambiguous – and it
might be frustrated on the way. (Sartre, 1977)

What is the role of values in ethical dilemmas?

Frequently, ethical dilemmas are fundamentally a clash of values. We may

experience a sense of frustration trying to figure out what the ‘right’ thing to do is
because any available course of action violates some value that we are dedicated to.
For example, let’s say you are taking a class with a good friend and sitting next to
him one day during a quiz you discover him copying answers from a third student.
Now you are forced into an ethical decision embodied by two important values
common to your society. Those values are honesty and loyalty. Do you act
dishonestly and preserve your friend’s secret or do you act disloyal and turn them in
for academic fraud?

Awareness of the underlying values at play in an ethical conflict can act as a

powerful method to clarify the issues involved. We should also be aware of the use
of value as a verb in the ethical sense. Certainly what we choose to value more or
less will play a very significant role in the process of differentiating between
outcomes and actions thereby determining what exactly we should do.

Literature and film are full of ethical dilemmas, as they allow us to reflect on the
human struggle as well as presenting tests of individual character. For example
in World War Z, Gerry Lane (played by Brad Pitt in the movie version) has to make a

PAGE 48
similar choice as Sartre’s Frenchman: between serving the world-community of
humans in their just war against Zombies, and serving his own immediate family. It
adds depth and substance to the character to see him struggling with this choice
over the right thing to do.

What ethical dilemmas are more common in real life?

Rarely are we called on to fight zombies or Nazis, but that doesn’t mean we live in
an ethically easy world. If you’ve ever felt yourself pulled between two moral
choices, you’ve faced an ethical dilemma. Often we make our choice based on which
value we prize more highly. Some examples:

You are offered a scholarship to attend a far-away college, but that would mean
leaving your family, to whom you are very close. Values: success/future
achievements/excitement vs. family/love/safety

You are friends with Jane, who is dating Bill. Jane confides in you that she’d been
seeing Joe on the side but begs you not to tell Bill. Bill then asks you if Jane has
ever cheated on him. Values: Friendship/loyalty vs. Truth

You are the official supervisor for Tony. You find out that Tony has been leaving
work early and asking his co-workers to clock him out on time. You intend to fire
Tony, but then you find out that he’s been leaving early because he needs to pick up
his child from daycare. Values: Justice vs. Mercy. You could probably make a
compelling argument for either side for each of the above. That’s what makes ethical
dilemmas so difficult (or interesting, if you’re not directly involved!).

Activity

Instruction: Justify or prove: Construct an argument for or against and support with
evidence based on the presented situations below.

PAGE 49
PAGE 50
Unit Four: The Nature of
Morality and Moral Theories

Introduction

This unit provides a comprehensive reading and analysis into the field of ethics (or
moral philosophy) focused on ethical theories, which involves systematizing,
defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong behavior based on the
work of James Fieser’s Ethics. Philosophers today usually divide ethical theories into
three general subject areas: metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics.
Metaethics investigates where our ethical principles come from, and what they
mean. Are they merely social inventions? Do they involve more than expressions of
our individual emotions? Metaethical answers to these questions focus on the issues
of universal truths, the will of God, the role of reason in ethical judgments, and the
meaning of ethical terms themselves. Normative ethics takes on a more practical
task, which is to arrive at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct.
This may involve articulating the good habits that we should acquire, the duties that
we should follow, or the consequences of our behavior on others. Finally, applied
ethics involves examining specific controversial issues, such as abortion,
infanticide, animal rights, environmental concerns, homosexuality, capital
punishment, or nuclear war.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this unit, students must have:

• Described an ethical theory and its rationale;

• Explained the meaning of key ethical issues, concepts or principles; and
• Compared or evaluated different ethical theories.

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Lesson 14: Metaethics
The term “meta” means after or beyond, and, consequently, the notion of
metaethics involves a removed, or bird’s eye view of the entire project of ethics. We
may define metaethics as the study of the origin and meaning of ethical concepts.
When compared to normative ethics and applied ethics, the field of metaethics is the
least precisely defined area of moral philosophy. It covers issues from moral
semantics to moral epistemology. Two issues, though, are prominent:
(1) metaphysical issues concerning whether morality exists independently of
humans, and (2) psychological issues concerning the underlying mental basis of our
moral judgments and conduct.

Metaphysical Issues: Objectivism and Relativism

Metaphysics is the study of the kinds of things that exist in the universe. Some
things in the universe are made of physical stuff, such as rocks; and perhaps other
things are nonphysical in nature, such as thoughts, spirits, and gods. The
metaphysical component of metaethics involves discovering specifically whether
moral values are eternal truths that exist in a spirit-like realm, or simply human
conventions.

There are two general directions that discussions of this topic take, one other-
worldly and one this-worldly. Proponents of the other-worldly view typically hold that
moral values are objective in the sense that they exist in a spirit-like realm beyond
subjective human conventions. They also hold that they are absolute, or eternal, in
that they never change, and also that they are universal insofar as they apply to all
rational creatures around the world and throughout time. The most dramatic
example of this view is Plato, who was inspired by the field of mathematics. When
we look at numbers and mathematical relations, such as 1+1=2, they seem to be
timeless concepts that never change, and apply everywhere in the universe.

Humans do not invent numbers, and humans cannot alter them. Plato explained the
eternal character of mathematics by stating that they are abstract entities that exist
in a spirit-like realm. He noted that moral values also are absolute truths and thus
are also abstract, spirit-like entities. In this sense, for Plato, moral values are
spiritual objects. Medieval philosophers commonly grouped all moral principles
together under the heading of “eternal law” which were also frequently seen as
spirit-like objects. 17th century British philosopher Samuel Clarke described them as
spirit-like relationships rather than spirit-like objects. In either case, though, they
exist in a spirit-like realm. A different other-worldly approach to the metaphysical

PAGE 52
status of morality is divine commands issuing from God’s will.

Sometimes called voluntarism (or divine command theory), this view was inspired by
the notion of an all-powerful God who is in control of everything. God simply wills
things, and they become reality. He wills the physical world into existence, he wills
human life into existence and, similarly, he wills all moral values into existence.
Proponents of this view, such as medieval philosopher William of Ockham, believe
that God wills moral principles, such as “murder is wrong,” and these exist in God’s
mind as commands. God informs humans of these commands by implanting us with
moral intuitions or revealing these commands in scripture.

The second and more this-worldly approach to the metaphysical status of morality
follows in the skeptical philosophical tradition, such as that articulated by Greek
philosopher Sextus Empiricus, and denies the objective status of moral values.
Technically, skeptics did not reject moral values themselves, but only denied that
values exist as spirit-like objects, or as divine commands in the mind of God. Moral
values, they argued, are strictly human inventions, a position that has since been
called moral relativism.

There are two distinct forms of moral relativism. The first is individual relativism,
which holds that individual people create their own moral standards. Friedrich
Nietzsche, for example, argued that the superhuman creates his or her morality
distinct from and in reaction to the slave-like value system of the masses. The
second is cultural relativism which maintains that morality is grounded in the
approval of one’s society – and not simply in the preferences of individual people.
This view was advocated by Sextus, and in more recent centuries by Michel
Montaigne and William Graham Sumner.

In addition to espousing skepticism and relativism, this-worldly approaches to the

metaphysical status of morality deny the absolute and universal nature of morality
and hold instead that moral values in fact change from society to society throughout
time and throughout the world. They frequently attempt to defend their position by
citing examples of values that differ dramatically from one culture to another, such
as attitudes about polygamy, homosexuality and human sacrifice.

Psychological Issues in Metaethics

A second area of metaethics involves the psychological basis of our moral judgments
and conduct, particularly understanding what motivates us to be moral. We might
explore this subject by asking the simple question, “Why be moral?” Even if I am
aware of basic moral standards, such as don’t kill and don’t steal, this does not
necessarily mean that I will be psychologically compelled to act on them. Some

PAGE 53
answers to the question “Why be moral?” are to avoid punishment, to gain praise, to
attain happiness, to be dignified, or to fit in with society.

a. Egoism and Altruism

One important area of moral psychology concerns the inherent selfishness of

humans. 17th century British philosopher Thomas Hobbes held that many, if not all,
of our actions are prompted by selfish desires. Even if an action seems selfless, such
as donating to charity, there are still selfish causes for this, such as experiencing
power over other people. This view is called psychological egoism and maintains that
self-oriented interests ultimately motivate all human actions. Closely related to
psychological egoism is a view called psychological hedonism which is the view
that pleasure is the specific driving force behind all of our actions. 18th century
British philosopher Joseph Butler agreed that instinctive selfishness and pleasure
prompt much of our conduct. However, Butler argued that we also have an inherent
psychological capacity to show benevolence to others. This view is
called psychological altruism and maintains that at least some of our actions are
motivated by instinctive benevolence.

b. Emotion and Reason

A second area of moral psychology involves a dispute concerning the role of reason
in motivating moral actions. If, for example, I make the statement “abortion is
morally wrong,” am I making a rational assessment or only expressing my feelings?
On the one side of the dispute, 18th century British philosopher David Hume argued
that moral assessments involve our emotions, and not our reason. We can amass all
the reasons we want, but that alone will not constitute a moral assessment. We
need a distinctly emotional reaction in order to make a moral pronouncement.
Reason might be of service in giving us the relevant data, but, in Hume’s words,
“reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions.” Inspired by Hume’s anti-
rationalist views, some 20th century philosophers, most notably A.J. Ayer, similarly
denied that moral assessments are factual descriptions. For example, although the
statement “it is good to donate to charity” may on the surface look as though it is a
factual description about charity, it is not. Instead, a moral utterance like this
involves two things. First, I (the speaker) I am expressing my personal feelings of
approval about charitable donations and I am in essence saying “Hooray for charity!”
This is called the emotiveelement insofar as I am expressing my emotions about
some specific behavior. Second, I (the speaker) am trying to get you to donate to
charity and am essentially giving the command, “Donate to charity!” This is called
the prescriptive element in the sense that I am prescribing some specific behavior.

From Hume’s day forward, more rationally-minded philosophers have opposed these

PAGE 54
emotive theories of ethics and instead argued that moral assessments are indeed
acts of reason. 18th century German philosopher Immanuel Kant is a case in point.
Although emotional factors often do influence our conduct, he argued, we should
nevertheless resist that kind of sway. Instead, true moral action is motivated only by
reason when it is free from emotions and desires. A recent rationalist approach,
offered by Kurt Baier (1958), was proposed in direct opposition to the emotivist and
prescriptivist theories of Ayer and others. Baier focuses more broadly on the
reasoning and argumentation process that takes place when making moral choices.
All of our moral choices are, or at least can be, backed by some reason or
justification. If I claim that it is wrong to steal someone’s car, then I should be able
to justify my claim with some kind of argument. For example, I could argue that
stealing Smith’s car is wrong since this would upset her, violate her ownership rights,
or put the thief at risk of getting caught. According to Baier, then, proper moral
decision making involves giving the best reasons in support of one course of action
versus another.

c. Male and Female Morality

A third area of moral psychology focuses on whether there is a distinctly female

approach to ethics that is grounded in the psychological differences between men
and women. Discussions of this issue focus on two claims: (1) traditional morality is
male-centered, and (2) there is a unique female perspective of the world which can
be shaped into a value theory. According to many feminist philosophers, traditional
morality is male-centered since it is modeled after practices that have been
traditionally male-dominated, such as acquiring property, engaging in business
contracts, and governing societies. The rigid systems of rules required for trade and
government were then taken as models for the creation of equally rigid systems of
moral rules, such as lists of rights and duties.

Women, by contrast, have traditionally had a nurturing role by raising children and
overseeing domestic life. These tasks require less rule following, and more
spontaneous and creative action. Using the woman’s experience as a model for
moral theory, then, the basis of morality would be spontaneously caring for others
as would be appropriate in each unique circumstance. On this model, the agent
becomes part of the situation and acts caringly within that context. This stands in
contrast with male-modeled morality where the agent is a mechanical actor who
performs his required duty, but can remain distanced from and unaffected by the
situation. A care-based approach to morality, as it is sometimes called, is offered by
feminist ethicists as either a replacement for or a supplement to traditional male-

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Lesson 15: Normative Ethics
Normative ethics involves arriving at moral standards that regulate right and wrong
conduct. In a sense, it is a search for an ideal litmus test of proper behavior. The
Golden Rule is a classic example of a normative principle: We should do to others
what we would want others to do to us. Since I do not want my neighbor to steal
my car, then it is wrong for me to steal her car. Since I would want people to feed
me if I was starving, then I should help feed starving people. Using this same
reasoning, I can theoretically determine whether any possible action is right or
wrong. So, based on the Golden Rule, it would also be wrong for me to lie to,
harass, victimize, assault, or kill others. The Golden Rule is an example of a
normative theory that establishes a single principle against which we judge all
actions. Other normative theories focus on a set of foundational principles, or a set
of good character traits.
The key assumption in normative ethics is that there is only one ultimate criterion of
moral conduct, whether it is a single rule or a set of principles. Three strategies will
be noted here: (1) virtue theories, (2) duty theories, and (3) consequentialist
theories.

1. Virtue Theories

Many philosophers believe that morality consists of following precisely defined rules
of conduct, such as “don’t kill,” or “don’t steal.” Presumably, I must learn these
rules, and then make sure each of my actions live up to the rules. Virtue ethics,
however, places less emphasis on learning rules, and instead stresses the
importance of developing good habits of character, such as benevolence (see moral
character). Once I’ve acquired benevolence, for example, I will then habitually act in
a benevolent manner. Historically, virtue theory is one of the oldest normative
traditions in Western philosophy, having its roots in ancient Greek civilization. Plato
emphasized four virtues in particular, which were later called cardinal virtues:
wisdom, courage, temperance and justice. Other important virtues are fortitude,
generosity, self-respect, good temper, and sincerity. In addition to advocating good
habits of character, virtue theorists hold that we should avoid acquiring bad
character traits, or vices, such as cowardice, insensibility, injustice, and vanity. Virtue
theory emphasizes moral education since virtuous character traits are developed in
one’s youth. Adults, therefore, are responsible for instilling virtues in the young.

Aristotle argued that virtues are good habits that we acquire, which regulate our
emotions. For example, in response to my natural feelings of fear, I should develop
the virtue of courage which allows me to be firm when facing danger. Analyzing 11
specific virtues, Aristotle argued that most virtues fall at a mean between more

PAGE 56
extreme character traits. With courage, for example, if I do not have enough
courage, I develop the disposition of cowardice, which is a vice. If I have too much
courage I develop the disposition of rashness which is also a vice. According to
Aristotle, it is not an easy task to find the perfect mean between extreme character
traits. In fact, we need assistance from our reason to do this. After Aristotle,
medieval theologians supplemented Greek lists of virtues with three Christian ones,
or theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity. Interest in virtue theory continued
through the middle ages and declined in the 19th century with the rise of alternative
moral theories below. In the mid 20th century virtue theory received special attention
from philosophers who believed that more recent ethical theories were misguided for
focusing too heavily on rules and actions, rather than on virtuous character traits.
Alasdaire MacIntyre (1984) defended the central role of virtues in moral theory and
argued that virtues are grounded in and emerge from within social traditions.

2. Duty Theories

Many of us feel that there are clear obligations we have as human beings, such as to
care for our children, and to not commit murder. Duty theories base morality on
specific, foundational principles of obligation. These theories are sometimes
called deontological, from the Greek word deon, or duty, in view of the foundational
nature of our duty or obligation. They are also sometimes
called nonconsequentialist since these principles are obligatory, irrespective of the
consequences that might follow from our actions. For example, it is wrong to not
care for our children even if it results in some great benefit, such as financial
savings. There are four central duty theories.

The first is that championed by 17th century German philosopher Samuel Pufendorf,
who classified dozens of duties under three headings: duties to God, duties to
oneself, and duties to others. Concerning our duties towards God, he argued that
there are two kinds:

1. a theoretical duty to know the existence and nature of God, and

2. a practical duty to both inwardly and outwardly worship God.

Concerning our duties towards oneself, these are also of two sorts:

1. duties of the soul, which involve developing one’s skills and talents, and
2. duties of the body, which involve not harming our bodies, as we might
through gluttony or drunkenness, and not killing oneself.

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Concerning our duties towards others, Pufendorf divides these between absolute
duties, which are universally binding on people, and conditional duties, which are the
result of contracts between people. Absolute duties are of three sorts:

1. avoid wronging others,

2. treat people as equals, and
3. promote the good of others.

Conditional duties involve various types of agreements, the principal one of which is
the duty is to keep one’s promises.

A second duty-based approach to ethics is rights theory. Most generally, a “right” is

a justified claim against another person’s behavior – such as my right to not be
harmed by you (see also human rights). Rights and duties are related in such a way
that the rights of one person implies the duties of another person. For example, if I
have a right to payment of $10 by Smith, then Smith has a duty to pay me $10. This
is called the correlativity of rights and duties. The most influential early account of
rights theory is that of 17th century British philosopher John Locke, who argued that
the laws of nature mandate that we should not harm anyone’s life, health, liberty or
possessions.

For Locke, these are our natural rights, given to us by God. Following Locke, the
United States Declaration of Independence authored by Thomas Jefferson
recognizes three foundational rights: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
Jefferson and others rights theorists maintained that we deduce other more specific
rights from these, including the rights of property, movement, speech, and religious
expression. There are four features traditionally associated with moral rights. First,
rights are natural insofar as they are not invented or created by governments.
Second, they are universal insofar as they do not change from country to country.
Third, they are equal in the sense that rights are the same for all people, irrespective
of gender, race, or handicap. Fourth, they are inalienablewhich means that I cannot
hand over my rights to another person, such as by selling myself into slavery.

A third duty-based theory is that by Kant, which emphasizes a single principle of

duty. Influenced by Pufendorf, Kant agreed that we have moral duties to oneself and
others, such as developing one’s talents, and keeping our promises to others.
However, Kant argued that there is a more foundational principle of duty that
encompasses our particular duties. It is a single, self-evident principle of reason that
he calls the “categorical imperative.” A categorical imperative, he argued, is
fundamentally different from hypothetical imperatives that hinge on some personal
desire that we have, for example, “If you want to get a good job, then you ought to

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go to college.” By contrast, a categorical imperative simply mandates an action,
irrespective of one’s personal desires, such as “You ought to do X.” Kant gives at
least four versions of the categorical imperative, but one is especially direct: Treat
people as an end, and never as a means to an end. That is, we should always treat
people with dignity, and never use them as mere instruments.

For Kant, we treat people as an end whenever our actions toward someone reflect
the inherent value of that person. Donating to charity, for example, is morally
correct since this acknowledges the inherent value of the recipient. By contrast, we
treat someone as a means to an end whenever we treat that person as a tool to
achieve something else. It is wrong, for example, to steal my neighbor’s car since I
would be treating her as a means to my own happiness. The categorical imperative
also regulates the morality of actions that affect us individually. Suicide, for example,
would be wrong since I would be treating my life as a means to the alleviation of my
misery. Kant believes that the morality of all actions can be determined by appealing
to this single principle of duty.

A fourth and more recent duty-based theory is that by British philosopher W.D. Ross,
which emphasizes prima facie duties. Like his 17th and 18th century counterparts,
Ross argues that our duties are “part of the fundamental nature of the universe.”
However, Ross’s list of duties is much shorter, which he believes reflects our actual
moral convictions:

• Fidelity: the duty to keep promises

• Reparation: the duty to compensate others when we harm them
• Gratitude: the duty to thank those who help us
• Justice: the duty to recognize merit
• Beneficence: the duty to improve the conditions of others
• Self-improvement: the duty to improve our virtue and intelligence
• Nonmaleficence: the duty to not injure others

Ross recognizes that situations will arise when we must choose between two
conflicting duties. In a classic example, suppose I borrow my neighbor’s gun and
promise to return it when he asks for it. One day, in a fit of rage, my neighbor
pounds on my door and asks for the gun so that he can take vengeance on
someone. On the one hand, the duty of fidelity obligates me to return the gun; on
the other hand, the duty of nonmaleficence obligates me to avoid injuring others
and thus not return the gun. According to Ross, I will intuitively know which of these
duties is my actual duty, and which is my apparent or prima facie duty. In this case,
my duty of nonmaleficence emerges as my actual duty and I should not return the
gun.

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 3. Consequentialist Theories

It is common for us to determine our moral responsibility by weighing the

consequences of our actions. According to consequentialism, correct moral conduct
is determined solely by a cost-benefit analysis of an action’s consequences:

Consequentialism: An action is morally right if the consequences of that action are

more favorable than unfavorable.

Consequentialist normative principles require that we first tally both the good and
bad consequences of an action. Second, we then determine whether the total good
consequences outweigh the total bad consequences. If the good consequences are
greater, then the action is morally proper. If the bad consequences are greater, then
the action is morally improper. Consequentialist theories are sometimes
called teleological theories, from the Greek word telos, or end, since the end result
of the action is the sole determining factor of its morality.

Consequentialist theories became popular in the 18th century by philosophers who

wanted a quick way to morally assess an action by appealing to experience, rather
than by appealing to gut intuitions or long lists of questionable duties. In fact, the
most attractive feature of consequentialism is that it appeals to publicly observable
consequences of actions. Most versions of consequentialism are more precisely
formulated than the general principle above. In particular, competing
consequentialist theories specify which consequences for affected groups of people
are relevant. Three subdivisions of consequentialism emerge:

• Ethical Egoism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action

are more favorable than unfavorable only to the agent performing the action.
• Ethical Altruism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action
are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone except the agent.
• Utilitarianism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are
more favorable than unfavorable to everyone.

All three of these theories focus on the consequences of actions for different groups
of people. But, like all normative theories, the above three theories are rivals of each
other. They also yield different conclusions. Consider the following example. A
woman was traveling through a developing country when she witnessed a car in
front of her run off the road and roll over several times. She asked the hired driver
to pull over to assist, but, to her surprise, the driver accelerated nervously past the
scene. A few miles down the road the driver explained that in his country if someone
assists an accident victim, then the police often hold the assisting person responsible
for the accident itself. If the victim dies, then the assisting person could be held

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responsible for the death. The driver continued explaining that road accident victims
are therefore usually left unattended and often die from exposure to the country’s
harsh desert conditions.

On the principle of ethical egoism, the woman in this illustration would only be
concerned with the consequences of her attempted assistance as she would be
affected. Clearly, the decision to drive on would be the morally proper choice. On the
principle of ethical altruism, she would be concerned only with the consequences of
her action as others are affected, particularly the accident victim. Tallying only those
consequences reveals that assisting the victim would be the morally correct choice,
irrespective of the negative consequences that result for her. On the principle of
utilitarianism, she must consider the consequences for both herself and the victim.
The outcome here is less clear, and the woman would need to precisely calculate the
overall benefit versus disbenefit of her action.

• Types of Utilitarianism

Jeremy Bentham presented one of the earliest fully developed systems of

utilitarianism. Two features of his theory are noteworty. First, Bentham proposed
that we tally the consequences of each action we perform and thereby determine on
a case by case basis whether an action is morally right or wrong. This aspect of
Bentham’s theory is known as act-utilitiarianism. Second, Bentham also proposed
that we tally the pleasure and pain which results from our actions. For Bentham,
pleasure and pain are the only consequences that matter in determining whether our
conduct is moral. This aspect of Bentham’s theory is known as hedonistic
utilitarianism. Critics point out limitations in both of these aspects.

First, according to act-utilitarianism, it would be morally wrong to waste time on

leisure activities such as watching television, since our time could be spent in ways
that produced a greater social benefit, such as charity work. But prohibiting leisure
activities doesn’t seem reasonable. More significantly, according to act-utilitarianism,
specific acts of torture or slavery would be morally permissible if the social benefit of
these actions outweighed the disbenefit. A revised version of utilitarianism
called rule-utilitarianism addresses these problems. According to rule-utilitarianism, a
behavioral code or rule is morally right if the consequences of adopting that rule are
more favorable than unfavorable to everyone. Unlike act utilitarianism, which weighs
the consequences of each particular action, rule-utilitarianism offers a litmus test
only for the morality of moral rules, such as “stealing is wrong.” Adopting a rule
against theft clearly has more favorable consequences than unfavorable
consequences for everyone. The same is true for moral rules against lying or
murdering. Rule-utilitarianism, then, offers a three-tiered method for judging
conduct. A particular action, such as stealing my neighbor’s car, is judged wrong

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since it violates a moral rule against theft. In turn, the rule against theft is morally
binding because adopting this rule produces favorable consequences for everyone.
John Stuart Mill’s version of utilitarianism is rule-oriented.

Second, according to hedonistic utilitarianism, pleasurable consequences are the

only factors that matter, morally speaking. This, though, seems too restrictive since
it ignores other morally significant consequences that are not necessarily pleasing or
painful. For example, acts which foster loyalty and friendship are valued, yet they
are not always pleasing. In response to this problem, G.E. Moore proposed ideal
utilitarianism, which involves tallying any consequence that we intuitively recognize
as good or bad (and not simply as pleasurable or painful). Also, R.M. Hare
proposed preference utilitarianism, which involves tallying any consequence that
fulfills our preferences.

• Ethical Egoism and Social Contract Theory

We have seen that Hobbes was an advocate of the methaethical theory of

psychological egoism—the view that all of our actions are selfishly motivated. Upon
that foundation, Hobbes developed a normative theory known as social contract
theory, which is a type of rule-ethical-egoism. According to Hobbes, for purely selfish
reasons, the agent is better off living in a world with moral rules than one without
moral rules. For without moral rules, we are subject to the whims of other people’s
selfish interests. Our property, our families, and even our lives are at continual risk.

Selfishness alone will therefore motivate each agent to adopt a basic set of rules
which will allow for a civilized community. Not surprisingly, these rules would include
prohibitions against lying, stealing and killing. However, these rules will ensure
safety for each agent only if the rules are enforced. As selfish creatures, each of us
would plunder our neighbors’ property once their guards were down. Each agent
would then be at risk from his neighbor. Therefore, for selfish reasons alone, we
devise a means of enforcing these rules: we create a policing agency which punishes
us if we violate these rules.

Normative Areas and Assessment

a. Ethics

• Assessment: Right/wrong, good/bad, virtue/vice

• Basis: Varies-conscience, reason, self-interest, social agreement,
nature, etc.
• Punishments: Guilt, blame, bad reputation, non-legal
punishment, suffering etc.

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 • Rewards: Peace of mind, praise, good reputation, well-being
etc.

b. Religion

• Assessment: Righteous/sinful, holy/unholy, blasphemy.

• Basis: religious authorities (such as priests) or divine being.
• Punishment: Guilt, social punishment, punishment by divine
agents (such as hell).
• Rewards: Social rewards, divine reward (such as heaven).
• Religion and ethics
• Religion has often been used as the basis of morality.
• Religion has often been assessed by moral standards.
• Religion typical includes a moral aspect.
• There is extensive overlap: religion raises many moral
issues and morality raises many religious issues.

c. Laws/Rules

• Assessment: Legal/illegal
• Basis: The authority of the lawmakers.
• Punishment: Fines, prison terms, exile, death, torture, etc.
inflicted by the enforcers of the law.
• Rewards: Typically none.
• Law and ethics
• Laws can be immoral.
• Something that is moral can be illegal.
• There is a tradition of basing many laws on morality.
• Some immoral things are not illegal.
• There is extensive overlap: law raises many moral issues
and morality raise many legal issues.

d. Etiquette

• Assessment: Polite/impolite, proper/improper, rude.

• Basis: Social agreement, custom, etiquette authorities.
• Punishment: Social disapproval.
• Rewards: Social approval.
• Etiquette & Ethics
• It can be immoral to ignore etiquette.
• Things required by etiquette might be immoral.
• There is a slight overlap.

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e. Aesthetics

• Assessment: art/non-art, good/bad, beautiful/ugly

• Basis: Varies-reason, emotions, social agreement, etc.
• Punishment: Rejection, being ignored
• Reward: Acceptance, attention, possibly lucrative contracts and
sales.
• Aesthetics & ethics
• Things of beauty can be immoral.
• There is some overlap: aesthetics raises some moral
issues and morality sometimes involves aesthetic issues.

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Lesson 16: Applied Ethics
Applied ethics is the branch of ethics which consists of the analysis of specific,
controversial moral issues such as abortion, animal rights, or euthanasia. In recent
years applied ethical issues have been subdivided into convenient groups such as
medical ethics, business ethics, environmental ethics, and sexual ethics. Generally
speaking, two features are necessary for an issue to be considered an “applied
ethical issue.” First, the issue needs to be controversial in the sense that there are
significant groups of people both for and against the issue at hand.

The issue of drive-by shooting, for example, is not an applied ethical issue, since
everyone agrees that this practice is grossly immoral. By contrast, the issue of gun
control would be an applied ethical issue since there are significant groups of people
both for and against gun control.

The second requirement for an issue to be an applied ethical issue is that it must be
a distinctly moral issue. On any given day, the media presents us with an array of
sensitive issues such as affirmative action policies, gays in the military, involuntary
commitment of the mentally impaired, capitalistic versus socialistic business
practices, public versus private health care systems, or energy conservation.
Although all of these issues are controversial and have an important impact on
society, they are not all moral issues. Some are only issues of social policy.

The aim of social policy is to help make a given society run efficiently by devising
conventions, such as traffic laws, tax laws, and zoning codes. Moral issues, by
contrast, concern more universally obligatory practices, such as our duty to avoid
lying, and are not confined to individual societies. Frequently, issues of social policy
and morality overlap, as with murder which is both socially prohibited and immoral.
However, the two groups of issues are often distinct.

For example, many people would argue that sexual promiscuity is immoral, but may
not feel that there should be social policies regulating sexual conduct, or laws
punishing us for promiscuity. Similarly, some social policies forbid residents in certain
neighborhoods from having yard sales. But, so long as the neighbors are not
offended, there is nothing immoral in itself about a resident having a yard sale in
one of these neighborhoods. Thus, to qualify as an applied ethical issue, the issue
must be more than one of mere social policy: it must be morally relevant as well.

In theory, resolving particular applied ethical issues should be easy. With the issue

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of abortion, for example, we would simply determine its morality by consulting our
normative principle of choice, such as act-utilitarianism. If a given abortion produces
greater benefit than disbenefit, then, according to act-utilitarianism, it would be
morally acceptable to have the abortion. Unfortunately, there are perhaps hundreds
of rival normative principles from which to choose, many of which yield opposite
conclusions. Thus, the stalemate in normative ethics between conflicting theories
prevents us from using a single decisive procedure for determining the morality of a
specific issue. The usual solution today to this stalemate is to consult several
representative normative principles on a given issue and see where the weight of the
evidence lies.

Normative Principles in Applied Ethics

Arriving at a short list of representative normative principles is itself a challenging

task. The principles selected must not be too narrowly focused, such as a version of
act-egoism that might focus only on an action’s short-term benefit. The principles
must also be seen as having merit by people on both sides of an applied ethical
issue. For this reason, principles that appeal to duty to God are not usually cited
since this would have no impact on a nonbeliever engaged in the debate. The
following principles are the ones most commonly appealed to in applied ethical
discussions:

• Personal benefit: acknowledge the extent to which an action produces

beneficial consequences for the individual in question.
• Social benefit: acknowledge the extent to which an action produces beneficial
consequences for society.
• Principle of benevolence: help those in need.
• Principle of paternalism: assist others in pursuing their best interests when
they cannot do so themselves.
• Principle of harm: do not harm others.
• Principle of honesty: do not deceive others.
• Principle of lawfulness: do not violate the law.
• Principle of autonomy: acknowledge a person’s freedom over his/her actions
or physical body.
• Principle of justice: acknowledge a person’s right to due process, fair
compensation for harm done, and fair distribution of benefits.
• Rights: acknowledge a person’s rights to life, information, privacy, free
expression, and safety.

The above principles represent a spectrum of traditional normative principles and are
derived from both consequentialist and duty-based approaches. The first two

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principles, personal benefit and social benefit, are consequentialist since they appeal
to the consequences of an action as it affects the individual or society. The
remaining principles are duty-based. The principles of benevolence, paternalism,
harm, honesty, and lawfulness are based on duties we have toward others. The
principles of autonomy, justice, and the various rights are based on moral rights.

An example will help illustrate the function of these principles in an applied ethical
discussion. In 1982, a couple from Bloomington, Indiana gave birth to a baby with
severe mental and physical disabilities. Among other complications, the infant,
known as Baby Doe, had its stomach disconnected from its throat and was thus
unable to receive nourishment. Although this stomach deformity was correctable
through surgery, the couple did not want to raise a severely disabled child and
therefore chose to deny surgery, food, and water for the infant. Local courts
supported the parents’ decision, and six days later Baby Doe died. Should corrective
surgery have been performed for Baby Doe?

Arguments in favor of corrective surgery derive from the infant’s right to life and the
principle of paternalism which stipulates that we should pursue the best interests of
others when they are incapable of doing so themselves. Arguments against
corrective surgery derive from the personal and social disbenefit which would result
from such surgery. If Baby Doe survived, its quality of life would have been poor and
in any case it probably would have died at an early age. Also, from the parent’s
perspective, Baby Doe’s survival would have been a significant emotional and
financial burden. When examining both sides of the issue, the parents and the courts
concluded that the arguments against surgery were stronger than the arguments for
surgery. First, foregoing surgery appeared to be in the best interests of the infant,
given the poor quality of life it would endure. Second, the status of Baby Doe’s right
to life was not clear given the severity of the infant’s mental impairment. For, to
possess moral rights, it takes more than merely having a human body: certain
cognitive functions must also be present. The issue here involves what is often
referred to as moral personhood, and is central to many applied ethical discussions.

Issues in Applied Ethics

As noted, there are many controversial issues discussed by ethicists today, some of
which will be briefly mentioned here.

Biomedical ethics focuses on a range of issues which arise in clinical settings. Health
care workers are in an unusual position of continually dealing with life and death
situations. It is not surprising, then, that medical ethics issues are more extreme and

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diverse than other areas of applied ethics. Prenatal issues arise about the morality of
surrogate mothering, genetic manipulation of fetuses, the status of unused frozen
embryos, and abortion. Other issues arise about patient rights and physician’s
responsibilities, such as the confidentiality of the patient’s records and the
physician’s responsibility to tell the truth to dying patients. The AIDS crisis has raised
the specific issues of the mandatory screening of all patients for AIDS, and whether
physicians can refuse to treat AIDS patients. Additional issues concern medical
experimentation on humans, the morality of involuntary commitment, and the rights
of the mentally disabled. Finally, end of life issues arise about the morality of suicide,
the justifiability of suicide intervention, physician assisted suicide, and euthanasia.

The field of business ethics examines moral controversies relating to the social
responsibilities of capitalist business practices, the moral status of corporate entities,
deceptive advertising, insider trading, basic employee rights, job discrimination,
affirmative action, drug testing, and whistle blowing.
Issues in environmental ethics often overlaps with business and medical issues.
These include the rights of animals, the morality of animal experimentation,
preserving endangered species, pollution control, management of environmental
resources, whether eco-systems are entitled to direct moral consideration, and our
obligation to future generations.

Controversial issues of sexual morality include monogamy versus polygamy, sexual

relations without love, homosexual relations, and extramarital affairs.

Finally, there are issues of social morality which examine capital punishment, nuclear
war, gun control, the recreational use of drugs, welfare rights, and racism.

Activity

a. Instruction: Look for three ethical/moral problems in our society today that can be
specifically answered by the following:

1. Metaethics
2. Normative Ethics
3. Applied Ethics

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b. Instruction: Discuss or Explain: Give reasons, facts, details that show you
understand.

1. Metaethics
a. Is there any such thing as right and wrong actions?
b. What makes an action right or wrong (metaphysically)?
2. Normative Ethics
a. What, in particular, determines that an action is moral?
b. What, in particular, determines that an individual is moral?
c. How do human beings acquire moral knowledge?

3. Applied Ethics
a. Is it moral/ethical to terminate a pregnancy for health reason of both
the mother and the baby?

Provide answers from the following perspectives (you can do further

research):
i. Legal views
ii. Rights of a mother
iii. Religious views
iv. Medical views

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Unit Five: Moral Reasoning

Introduction

While moral reasoning can be undertaken on another’s behalf, it is paradigmatically

an agent’s first-personal (individual or collective) practical reasoning about what,
morally, they ought to do. Philosophical examination of moral reasoning faces both
distinctive puzzles – about how we recognize moral considerations and cope with
conflicts among them and about how they move us to act – and distinctive
opportunities for gleaning insight about what we ought to do from how we reason
about what we ought to do.

This unit characterizes moral reasoning more fully, situates it in relation both to first-
order accounts of what morality requires of us and to philosophical accounts of the
metaphysics of morality, and explains the interest of the topic. It also takes up a
series of philosophical questions about moral reasoning, so understood and so
situated.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this unit, students must have:

• Identified the nature of moral reasoning

• Explained the implication of moral reasoning to different situations.
• Critiqued moral problems based on the nature of moral reasoning.

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Lesson 17: The Philosophical
Importance of Moral Reasoning

Defining Moral Reasoning

Moral reasoning applies critical analysis to specific events to determine what is right
or wrong, and what people ought to do in a particular situation. Both philosophers
and psychologists study moral reasoning.

How we make day-to-day decisions like “What should I wear?” is similar to how we
make moral decisions like “Should I lie or tell the truth?” The brain processes both in
generally the same way.

Moral reasoning typically applies logic and moral theories, such as deontology or
utilitarianism, to specific situations or dilemmas. However, people are not especially
good at moral reasoning. Indeed, the term moral dumbfounding describes the fact
that people often reach strong moral conclusions that they cannot logically defend.

In fact, evidence shows that the moral principle or theory a person chooses to apply
is often, ironically, based on their emotions, not on logic. Their choice is usually
influenced by internal biases or outside pressures, such as the self-serving bias or
the desire to conform.

So, while we likely believe we approach ethical dilemmas logically and rationally, the
truth is our moral reasoning is usually influenced by intuitive, emotional reactions.

Moral reasoning is a study in psychology that overlaps with moral philosophy.

Starting from a young age, people can make moral decisions about what is right and
wrong; this makes morality fundamental to the human condition. Moral reasoning,
however, is a part of morality that occurs both within and between individuals.
Prominent contributors to this theory include Lawrence Kohlberg and Elliot Turiel.
The term is sometimes used in a different sense: reasoning under conditions of
uncertainty, such as those commonly obtained in a court of law. It is this sense that
gave rise to the phrase, "To a moral certainty;" however, this idea is now seldom
used outside of charges to juries.
Moral reasoning can be defined as the process through which individuals try to
determine the difference between what is right and wrong by using logic.[3] This is
an important and often daily process that people use when trying to do the right
thing. For instance, every day people are faced with the dilemma of whether to lie in
a given situation or not. People make this decision by reasoning the morality of their

PAGE 71
potential actions, and through weighing their actions against potential
consequences.
A moral choice can be a personal, economic, or ethical one; as described by some
ethical code, or regulated by ethical relationships with others. This branch of
psychology is concerned with how these issues are perceived by ordinary people,
and so is the foundation of descriptive ethics. There are many different forms of
moral reasoning which often are dictated by culture. Cultural differences in the high-
levels of cognitive function associated with moral reasoning can be observed through
the association of brain networks from various cultures and their moral decision-
making. These cultural differences demonstrate the neural basis that cultural
influences can have on an individual’s moral reasoning and decision-making.
In 1983, James Rest developed the four components Model of Morality, which
addresses the ways that moral motivation and behavior occurs. The first of these is
moral sensitivity, which is "the ability to see an ethical dilemma, including how our
actions will affect others". The second is moral judgment, which is "the ability to
reason correctly about what 'ought' to be done in a specific situation”. The third is
moral motivation, which is "a personal commitment to moral action, accepting
responsibility for the outcome". The fourth and final component of moral behavior is
moral character, which is a "courageous persistence in spite of fatigue or
temptations to take the easy way out".
Distinctions between theories of moral reasoning can be accounted for by evaluating
inferences (which tend to be either deductive or inductive) based on a given set of
premises. Deductive inference reaches a conclusion that is true based on whether a
given set of premises preceding the conclusion are also true, whereas, inductive
inference goes beyond information given in a set of premises to base the conclusion
on provoked reflection.
This branch of psychology is concerned with how these issues are perceived by
ordinary people, and so is the foundation of descriptive ethics. There are many
different moral reasoning. Moral reasoning is culturally defined, and thus is difficult
to apply; yet human relationships define our existence and thus defy cultural
boundaries.
Philosopher David Hume claims that morality is based more on perceptions than on
logical reasoning. This means that people's morality is based more on their emotions
and feelings than on a logical analysis of any given situation. Hume regards morals
as linked to passion, love, happiness, and other emotions and therefore not based
on reason. Jonathan Haidt agrees, arguing that reasoning concerning a moral
situation or idea follows an initial intuition. Haidt's fundamental stance on moral
reasoning is that "moral intuitions (including moral emotions) come first and directly
cause moral judgments"; he characterizes moral intuition as "the sudden appearance
in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence (good-bad, like-

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dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of
searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion".
Immanuel Kant had a radically different view of morality. In his view, there are
universal laws of morality that one should never break regardless of emotions. He
proposes a four-step system to determine whether or not a given action was moral
based on logic and reason. The first step of this method involves formulating "a
maxim capturing your reason for an action". In the second step, one "frame[s] it as
a universal principle for all rational agents". The third step is assessing "whether a
world based on this universal principle is conceivable". If it is, then the fourth step is
asking oneself "whether [one] would will the maxim to be a principle in this world".
In essence, an action is moral if the maxim by which it is justified is one which could
be universalized. For instance, when deciding whether or not to lie to someone for
one's own advantage, one is meant to imagine what the world would be like if
everyone always lied, and successfully so. In such a world, there would be no
purpose in lying, for everybody would expect deceit, rendering the universal maxim
of lying whenever it is to your advantage absurd. Thus, Kant argues that one should
not lie under any circumstance. Another example would be if trying to decide
whether suicide is moral or immoral; imagine if everyone committed suicide. Since
mass international suicide would not be a good thing, the act of suicide is immoral.
Kant's moral framework, however, operates under the overarching maxim that you
should treat each person as an end in themselves, not as a means to an end. This
overarching maxim must be considered when applying the four aforementioned
steps.
Reasoning based on analogy is one form of moral reasoning. When using this form
of moral reasoning the morality of one situation can be applied to another based on
whether this situation is relevantly similar: similar enough that the same moral
reasoning applies. A similar type of reasoning is used in common law when arguing
based upon legal precedent.
In consequentialism (often distinguished from deontology) actions are based as right
on wrong based upon the consequences of action as opposed to a property intrinsic
to the action itself.

Activity

Instruction: Research: Name at least two developmental psychologists and

philosophers that studied moral reasoning and briefly describe their contributions.

1. ________________________________
2. ________________________________

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Lesson 18: Forms of Moral Reasoning

Contrasting forms of moral reasoning, or reasoning to conclusions on the problems

of ethics, were mentioned in passing in the expositions of our decision procedures,
above, and may be derived from the discussion so far.

The first we may call consequentialist (or utilitarian or teleological) reasoning, in

which ends are identified as good and means are selected that will lead to those
ends.

The second is generally called nonconsequentialist (or deontological) reasoning, in

which rules are accepted as good and acts are judged right or otherwise according
to their conformity to those rules.

A third, complementary to those two but not yet included in the decision processes,
is called virtue-based (or ontological) reasoning, in which the type of person one is,
and the type of moral community one belongs to, determines the obligations to act.
In consequentialism, the rightness of an act is linked with the goodness of the state
of affairs that it brings about; in non-consequentialism, it is linked with its
derivability from a rule; in virtue ethics, it is linked with the character of the agent.

1. Reasoning from Rule: Deontological Reasoning

We suggested above that moral principles usually take the form of an imperative,
setting a duty sufficient in itself to justify action. An imperative serves as the major
premise for a line of deontological, or nonconsequentialist, reasoning. Deontological
reasoning states a duty, observes that the present instance, real or hypothetical,
falls under that duty, and proceeds to derive the obligation to carry out that duty in
this instance. For example, presented with a particularly nice necklace left
unguarded on a patient's bedside table or on the jewelry counter at the department
store, I might be very tempted to snatch it and run. But my duty not to do that is
very clear:

• (major premise) Thou shalt not steal.

• (minor premise) To take this necklace would be stealing.
• (conclusion) Thou (in this case, I) may not take the necklace.

Or if I take it anyway, and am confronted at the door by my supervisor asking if the

removal were authorized, or by the store owner asking if I paid for that necklace,

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and I want very much to say "Oh, this is my necklace--I wore it in but the clasp
broke which is why it's in my hand," again my duty is clear:

• (major premise) Lying is wrong.

• (minor premise) To say it's my necklace would be lying.
• (conclusion) I may not say it's mine.

Connoisseurs of logical form will note a certain falling short of the strict subject-
predicate form demanded by Aristotelean logic, but the point should be clear
enough. In deontological reasoning (literally, reasoning from duty), we assume that
we are obligated to do what is right, that there are moral laws which correctly
demarcate what is right and what is wrong, and that we can deduce the moral
status of a contemplated action by finding what moral laws apply to it. (By those
laws, an act may have one of three moral statuses: it may
be prescribed (obligatory), proscribed (forbidden), or permitted (neither prescribed
nor proscribed).

There are problems with this approach. What, for instance, is the grounding of the
major premises? Deontological reasoning starts with the assertion of duties, but
those duties must be justified externally. In this case, we can go back to our basic
principles and derive the prohibitions of stealing and lying without too much
difficulty. Occasionally, however, in order to justify a premise, we are forced to fall
back on consequentialist reasoning--the reason why we mustn't trade shares of
stock on the basis of inside information cannot be traced directly from the original
principles, but involves quite some understanding of the stock market and,
ultimately, the assertion that (a very small minority of economists dissenting)
insider trading is harmful to the market and thus to the free enterprise system.
(Insider trading is usually represented as a violation of "justice." But of course it
would not be "unjust" to deal as an insider if the rules permitted it. It would just be
conducive to bad consequences, or so the general belief goes.)

2. Reasoning from Consequences: Teleological Reasoning

Note, however, that we could often just as easily couch the same moral argument
in goal-oriented or consequentialist terms. In such an argument we treat the
principles as values rather than as imperatives, and as ends to be achieved in
society, rather than laws governing action directly. Moral argument then becomes
an exercise in evaluating the means to the end of the best possible society.
The good, as opposed to the right of right action, becomes the benchmark of moral
prescription; that good is generally understood as the greatest happiness of the
greatest number of persons in the society in the long run. Action is right insofar as

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it brings about good results. The most familiar form of consequentialist reasoning is
the "cost-benefit" analysis familiar from the business world: To find the right thing
to do, you add up the benefits of each of the options, divide the benefits of each
course of action by its costs, and select that option with the highest ratio of benefits
to costs.

Can we deduce the same conclusions as above using consequentialist reasoning?

Yes, somewhat more elaborately:

• (major premise) If everyone took objects that don't belong to them, all trust
in institutions would break down and the economy would collapse; therefore
the practice of unauthorized taking objects is contrary to the greatest good
of the society;
• (minor premise) Taking this necklace in these circumstances would therefore
be contrary to the greatest good of the society;
• (conclusion) This act is not right and I should not do it.

We don't have to go through this procedure every time we find a necklace lying
around within reach, of course. The experience of the whole human race is that
respect for property, however property may be defined in different cultures, is
essential for the stability of society, and therefore, on those grounds, such taking of
property without payment or authorization is appropriately forbidden everywhere
(as is lying on matters of personal, social or commercial interest). Once the act is
prohibited, the reasoning proceeds exactly as it did in the nonconsequentialist
framework. Most of us find rule utilitarianism (consequentialism that establishes
rules and then reasons from them) easier to work with on a day-to-day basis
than act utilitarianism(consequentialism that evaluates every individual act on the
basis of its consequences). But any consequentialist will insist on the point
that every legitimate major premise for such a moral syllogism is based on
consequentialist reasoning; we need no divine commands, unverifiable intuitions, or
arbitrary pronouncements to give us the principles from which we derive the moral
status of the act in question.

3. Reasoning from Virtue: Ontological Reasoning

A third form of reasoning is customarily couched in the terms of virtue or character.

In such argument we appeal to the principles as character traits rather than as
goals or as rules, as virtues inherent in the moral agent rather than as
characteristics of the act. Every time we act we simultaneously define ourselves (as
the type of person who acts that way) and change ourselves (toward that type of
person), whether for better or for worse. Our objective in moral action, by this

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reasoning, is not only to adhere to rule (a minimal prescription), and achieve good
ends (chancy at best), but also, and primarily, to become a good person, especially
the kind of person who performs right actions by habit and by desire. We go
beyond cost/benefit and rule-adherence to aim at ideals of conduct and
personhood.

Virtue ethics does not define, initially, just what virtues are worth pursuing most
and by whom. In this lack of specificity it is no worse off than utilitarianism, which
wavers among definitions of "happiness" (welfare objectively determined? felt
pleasure? preference as expressed in the market?) or deontology, which is
indifferent among several sources of "rules" (natural law? human law? the form of
moral reasoning itself?) By tradition, humans should seek to become temperate,
courageous, wise (prudent), and just; additionally, in our religious traditions, they
should try to acquire faith, hope, and charity--not to mention honesty, kindness,
patience, equanimity, magnanimity, modesty and a sense of humor. For moral
action, it is essential to acquire just those virtues, i.e. become just the sorts of
person, that will make immoral conduct impossible; for professional ethical conduct,
it is essential to acquire the virtues appropriate to the profession. These should
differ depending on the function of the profession in the community. Presumably,
the physician will seek to acquire compassion (professional beneficence) before
justice; the judge will seek justice first. The businessman will value prudence
(professional wisdom) most highly, the military officer will cultivate courage. The
Greeks always linked virtue to function--you are the right person for what you do
when you have the character traits that permit you to do it well--and that link
continues to make sense.

Can we put the same examples in virtue ethics? Yes, even more easily:

• (major premise) I aspire to be an honest person, I hate the idea of being a

thief.
• (minor premise) Taking this necklace makes me a thief.
• (conclusion) Therefore I may not take this necklace.

Whatever its theoretical merits, it is worth observing that virtue ethics is as

practically effective as we are likely to get. It is close to its subject and highly
motivational; most of us in fact abstain from crime because we hold ideals (images)
for ourselves that are incompatible with petty crime, not to mention its
punishments.

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 Activity

Instruction: Illustrate: Explain by using examples and identify what form of moral
reasoning will you apply to justify your answer.

Situation:

You are a very skilled doctor with five dying patients, each of whom needs a
different organ in order to live. Unfortunately, there are no organs available to
perform any of the transplants. It just so happens that you have a sixth dying
patient, suffering from a fatal illness, who will die sooner than the other five if
not treated. If this sixth patient dies, you will be able to use his organs to
save the five other patients. However, you have a medicine you can give to
this sixth patient that will cure his illness and he won’t die. Would you:

a: Wait for the patient to die and then harvest his organs or
b: Save the patient even though the other patients won’t get organs.

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Unit Six: The Morality of Human
Acts

Introduction

Humans are said to be evaluative in nature. Whenever a person does something

we find others analyzing his/her behavior and commenting that it was good, bad
or at times indifferent. Ethics is said to be a philosophical treatise which studies
human behavior and tries to determine whether the act performed was morally
right or wrong. It cannot content itself with simply registering facts; it attempts to
reflect on the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of such facts, establish or reject
them on a rational basis, understand their implications, draw relevant
consequences and, above all, intuit their ultimate cause. There is a continuous
effort made for studying our own moral beliefs and our moral conduct and striving
to ensure that we, and the institutions we help to shape, live up to standards that
are reasonable and morally based. This contributes towards establishing sound
moral foundation on which people build their lives. Hence one can reasonably
aver that Ethics represents a broad framework for determining a core value system
one uses for our day to day existential situation.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this unit, students must have:

• defined the concept of human acts and acts of man

• understood the theories of determinism and indeterminism with the analysis
of human action
• analyzed the factors that generally influence the morality of human action

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Lesson 19: Understanding of Human Act
Scholastic philosophy outlines a distinction between Actus Hominis and Actus
Humanus i.e. ‘Acts of Man/Human’ and ‘Human Acts’ respectively. Not every act
that a human being does is a typically human act. Human activities, like the
circulation of blood, heart beat, over which normal people in general have no
control are not classified as human acts. Such acts which are beyond the control
of humans and those which they share in common with animals are called as
‘Acts of humans’. Acts of humans, then, are involuntary and therefore, not
morally responsible for them.

On the other hand a ‘Human Act’ is one which proceeds from knowledge and
from consent of free will. Or in other words it is an act which emanates from
the will with a knowledge of the end or goal to which the act leads. The
Human act is to be distinguished from acts of humans which are performed
without intervention of intellect and free will. An act is termed as distinctively a
human act which is voluntary in character, that is, the human person under
consideration could have done it differently if s/he had so willed or chosen. It is
an act which is in some way under the control or direction of the will, which is
proper to humans. Such an act is performed by a person deliberately and
intentionally in order to realize some foreseen end/s. Thus one can rightly
assert that a voluntary act proceeds from the will with the apprehension of the
end sought, or, in other words, is put forth by the will solicited by the goodness
of the object as presented to it by the intellect. Such acts, moreover, proceed
from the will's own determination, without necessitation, intrinsic or extrinsic.

The Constituent Elements of Human Act

Constituent elements of the human act refer to the inner causes or the
constituting elements which generate a human person to undertake a certain
act. The understanding of the human act indicates that there are two essential
elements which constitute a human act: The Intellectual Element and The
Volitive Element.

1. The Intellectual Element

Knowledge is one of the important qualities which distinguish humans from

other sentient beings. Absolute truth in all situations and matters might be
beyond human capabilities. But we humans can attain truth and that not all
truths are relative are undeniable facts, as Epistemology will have established.
The denial of such assertions only results in re-asserting them, by the very act

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 itself. Universal scepticism and absolute relativism are found to be self-
contradictory and as such are philosophically untenable doctrines.

The faculty of willing can make a choice for something and seek it only when it is
first known. This act of knowing is undertaken by the faculty of the intellect. The
human act is voluntary when its different elements and its implications are
sufficiently known by the agent or the doer prior to the operation of the will. This
process of knowing entails certain important conditions:

(i) adequate knowledge of the aspired object,

(ii) attention to the action by which the particular object is to be
pursued and
(iii) judgment on the value of the act.

The fulfillment of the above elements is found to be essential, for, human person
cannot consciously and freely will something without having proper knowledge about
what the object one is concerned with and therefore conscious of the act one is to
perform in order to achieve the desired aim. It is also required that one evaluates
the action undertaken in its concrete nature as a desirable good or an undesirable
evil. Such an appraisal includes judgment on the moral or ethical value of the act.

Furthermore, the goodness or the badness of a particular human act is judged only
under those of its aspects which are sufficiently known. For instance a person who
robs and kills a person not knowing him to be his brother, he is guilty of criminal
injury but not culpable of offence of fratricide.

However, from the above discussion one should not presuppose that we have full
knowledge of the act and its implications every time we undertake a human act.
There is still room left for mistakes. What we affirm here is that with right effort the
person can have sufficient knowledge of the object and its other considerations
which are essential for the making of a human act.

2. The Volitive Element

Another important characteristic which sets apart the human person from
animals is that of voluntariness or what we commonly designate as free will. It is
the task of the intellect to conceptualize the good, to propose it to the will as
something desirable, and to judge the suitability of the means in its attainment.
This awareness which is based on certain amount of reflection is very important
in the analysis of the human act. It can occur in varying degrees depending on
which, they can affect the morality of the act. However, just this awareness is

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 insufficient for the production of the human act. It is required that the presented
good is willed freely by the person. The volitive dimension points that the will
can freely make a choice of the concrete object in which the good is sought.
Thus when we hold a person morally responsible for his/her action, we assume
that the act was done freely, knowing and willingly. The idea of responsibility
would seem then to connote and presuppose that of free will.

If a human person for some valid reason is not free to choose what he/she
would like according to his/her insight and will, but has to act against one’s
will, his/her action is not free and consequently such an act cannot be
designated as a human act. For instance a mentally disturbed person feels
compelled to do something again and again but he/she is conscious of the
object one is concerned with and also the end of the action with which the
object is pursued, yet such an act will not be voluntary because its execution is
done with psychic compulsion and not with free will.

So an act to be a free act and consequently a human act, it is to be done without

any internal or external compulsion. The degree of compulsion determines to a
large extent the voluntariness of the action and consequently the culpability of the
person. For instance a high degree of compulsion may almost render the act
involuntary and subsequently reduce the degree of culpability One must note that
anything that is an object of the will, we call the thing willed.

But not everything that is willed is necessarily an effect of the will; for e.g. the
setting of a house on fire which is not caused, but desired by someone, is
something willed but is not the effect of the will. Thus when what is willed is both
the object and the effect of the will, we call it voluntary. One can conclude the
discussion on the two constitutive elements of the human act: intellectual and
volitive, by affirming the essential union of the knowledge and will in the
generation of the human act.

Process involved in a Voluntary Act

Very often a voluntary act, performed by an agent knowingly and freely in order to
realize some foreseen end, is not a spontaneous reaction. It involves a dynamic
process. Voluntary action has its advent in the mind. It begins with a feeling of
want or a craving or a desire which is either real or ideal. Such an impulse, though
to a certain extent painful, is mixed with pleasure which arises from the
anticipation of satisfaction of this craving by the attainment of the desired object.

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The person also has awareness of the means that are required to attain the proper
object. In a simple action, where there is no conflict of motives, the choice is
easily made and the desired action is performed. However, in our daily course of
living many of our actions are of a complex nature which often involves a conflict
of motives thereby causing difficulty in the matter of choice that eventually delays
decision and the performance of the act. Hence, when the self is confronted with
divergent and competing motives the mind experiences a challenge generated by
conflict of motives.

In order to tackle this, the mind deliberates on the merits and demerits of the
different courses of action that are available. After weighing the advantages and
disadvantages the mind chooses a particular motive and a particular action to
achieve the end. This act of selection of one motive to the exclusion of others
results in decision. The decided motive is subjectively evaluated as the strongest
motive among the others. The decision phase is often converted immediately into
action and the decision is actualized. However at times the decision might be
postponed for a future fulfillment in which case there is scope for resolution.
Resolution refers to the capacity of remaining committed to the decided motive.
The state of decision or resolution gives way to the actual performance of a bodily
action which is technically designated as a human act. The undertaking of the
external bodily action produces changes in the external world, certain of these are
foreseen consequences whereas many others are unforeseen consequences.

Activity

Instruction: Interpret: View an episode of a popular soap story or film depicting

concrete situations and answer the questions below in your own words.

1. What is good about the person (the moral agent in the story) and his / her
actions?
2. What might motivate the person to act in this way (e.g. concern for those in
need etc.)?
3. Why was the person willing to make personal sacrifices (i.e. comfort, safety)
to help others?
4. Why did the person act morally?

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Lesson 20: Impediments for Human
Acts
In the process of performing a human act the individual might encounter certain
obstacles which though may not nullify the human act and make it involuntary but
they may reduce the imputability or culpability of the individual, thereby making
him less responsible for the particular act. In this section, we shall elaborate some
of the main impediments which might affect either the intellectual or the volitive
constituent (or both together) of the human action.

6.3.1 Ignorance

This to a great extent affects the intellectual dimension of the human act. It is
elucidated as lack of adequate knowledge in an individual with regard to the
nature or moral quality of an act one is performing or proposes to perform.
Ignorance is mainly of two categories: Invincible ignorance and Vincible
ignorance. The former is explained as that ignorance which cannot be dispelled by
reasonable diligence a prudent individual would be expected to exercise in a given
situation. Such ignorance almost renders the act performed as involuntary and
consequently the individual may not be imputable for the act for what is
unknown cannot be the object of volition. On the other hand, Vincible ignorance is
that which could be eliminated by the application of reasonable diligence. Here the
agent has not put in enough effort to gain the required knowledge and as such the
concerned person is culpable or imputable for the act performed under such type
of ignorance. However the degree of imputability depends on the extent of the
individual’s cupable negligence.

6.3.2 Passion

It is often connoted as a powerful or compelling emotion or feeling for instance an

experience of strong hate or sexual desire. Passion is said to be a strong tendency
towards the possession of something good or towards the avoidance of something
evil. The more the intensity of the emotions, the less the capability for making
balanced and objective deliberation. Thus passion is considered as an obstacle to
human act. One can enumerate two main kinds of passions: Antecedent and
Consequent. The former refers to passion elicited without the consent of the will.
Here the person might not be fully responsible for the passion and as such the
culpability is much less if not fully absent. Consequent passion is passion which is
within the control of the will, therefore the agent is responsible for the arousal of
the passion and as such imputable for the act.

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 6.3.3 Habit

Habit is an acquired tendency for doing something as a result of repeated practice.

It may be voluntary or involuntary, depending on whether it was imbibed with
consent of a person or without. Habits usually do not render an act non-human,
because though they exert certain coercion they can be overcome by a committed
effort. As such imputability of acts from habit increases or decreases depending
upon the effort exerted.

6.3.4 Fear

It is defined as the shrinking back of the mind on account of an impending evil

considered to be difficult to avoid or even impossible at times. Fear may be grave
or mild according to whether it is caused by a grave evil whose avoidance is rather
difficult if not impossible, or only by a mild evil which can be easily avoided. Fear is
characterized as highly grave when it exercises great deterrence on an average
person for e.g. fear of killing. Fear is relatively grave when the threatened evil is
generally considered as objectively slight but it scares a particular person
subjectively depending on the person’s emotional disposition. Fear hampers the
use of reason and as such destroys voluntariness. Fear in general does not fully
destroy the voluntariness of action but merely reduces its gradation and as such
usually lessens its culpability. Only in extreme cases when the highly grave fear
totally impairs the two constitutive elements the act done out of fear may be
regarded as involuntary.

Activity

Instruction: Justify or prove: construct an argument for or against and support with
evidence while you identify what impediments of human acts might affect your
decision-making.

1. Your best friend is about to get married. The ceremony will be performed in one
hour, but you have seen, just before coming to the wedding, that your friend’s
fiancee has been having an affair. If your friend marries this woman, she is
unlikely to be faithful, but on the other hand, if you tell your friend about the
affair, you will ruin his wedding.

Question: Would you, or would you not, tell your friend of the affair?

2. There is a train that, much to your horror, is about to run over your grown up

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son, who has been tied to its track. It just so happens that you have just enough
time to flip a switch that will send the train down a different track, saving your son.
However, tied to the other track, is your granddaughter, the daughter of the very
son in danger of being run over. Your son is begging and pleading with you not to
flip the switch, not to kill his daughter.

Question: What would you do?

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Lesson 21: Factors Determining the
Morality of Human Acts
Analyzing the morality of the human act is said to be a complex enterprise since it
is affected by so many conditions which are within and without. Most of the
moralists agree that to judge the goodness or badness of any particular human
act, three elements must be weighed from which every act derives its morality.
They are: the Object of the act, the Circumstances surrounding the act, and the
End or Intention that the one performing the act has in mind.

1. The Object of the Human Act

It is that which the action of its very nature tends to produce. Or in other words it
refers to the effect which an action primarily and directly causes. It is necessarily
the result of the act without taking into account the circumstances or the end. For
example the object of setting fire to hut of a slum-dweller is to burn whereas the
end might be revenge. The object is usually regarded as the primary factor for
moral judgement of a human act. From the viewpoint of object an act is generally
classified as morally good, bad or indifferent. For a morally good act, the object of
it must be good.
2. The Circumstances contextualizing the Human Act

These include all the particulars of the concrete human action which are capable of
affecting its morality. They are such things as the person involved, the time, the
place, the occasion, which are distinct from the object, but can change or at
times even completely alter its moral tone. Circumstances can make an otherwise
good action better for e.g. giving food to a person who is almost dying of
starvation. They can make good an act which is otherwise indifferent, for e.g.
sitting with a person who is feeling lonely. But they can also make worse an act
which is evil in its object for e.g. robbing a beggar from his/her only meal of the
day. Since all human actions occur in a particular context i.e. at a certain time and
at a certain place, the circumstances must always be considered in evaluating the
moral quality of any human act.

3. The End or the Intention of the Agent in performing a Human Act

The end or intention of a human act is the purpose that prompts one to perform
such an act. Every human act, no matter how trivial, is done with some
intention. It is the reason for which the agent performs a particular act. It is the
effect that the agent subjectively wills in his/her action. At times it can so happen

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that the intention of the agent coincides with the object of the human act, for e.g.
offering a glass of water to a thirsty person to quench thirst. However at other
times both of them might be different. For e.g. a captured spy may commit suicide
in order to safeguard the secrets of the country. A human act to be morally good
the agent or doer must have a good intention—he must want to accomplish
something that is good in one way or another.

The end too can affect the morality of the human act just as circumstances do. A
good intention can make better an act which is good in its object, for e.g. helping
a poor person to start a small business with the intention of making him
independent. Also the end can worsen a act which is already evil in its object, for
e.g. killing the father, who is the only breadwinner in the family, so that his
children might be on the street. To a great extent many of the actions that we do
which otherwise might be indifferent morally in themselves, but they receive their
moral quality from the intention behind them.

According to the moralists a human act is said to be morally good when it is good
in its object, circumstances and also in the intention, for it is believed that an
action is good when each of these three factors is conformed to order (Bonum ex
integra causa). If even one of these determinants is contrary to order, the action
will be bad, at least in part (Malum ex quocumque defectu).

Activity

Instruction: Describe: provide a detailed account while you determine the different
Factors Determining the Morality of Human Acts based on the situation below.

Situation: Lea is a sophomore in high school and a member of a local

theater group in a nearby city. She likes school, but her passion for singing
and acting is huge.

Lately there has been talk going around that some members have been
exempt from auditions for the last few productions. Leah knew in the “real
world” that can happen sometimes. Some productions have such huge
numbers of applicants and so little time that the more experienced, well known
actors and singers sometimes get bumped up into the cast without having to
try out. But, this wasn’t Broadway, this was a local teen theater group and the
whole idea was to give everyone a chance to prove him or herself. She and her
friends talked about the rumor and how, if it was true, how unfair it was.

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It’s one thing to know someone probably deserves to be cast in the
production, but another to just put that person in without letting others
compete for the same role. They felt close enough to their choir director to
talk to him about it. He said he couldn’t imagine that applicants were being
exempt. Lea’s friends talked about going to the director, but didn’t want to
jeopardize their relationship with him. He was intimidating and, after all, what
if he took offense or got mad? Their future chances for good roles could be
compromised.

The first week of tryouts for the next musical production Lea was called into
the director’s office. He told her she was in for one of the main singing parts.
She was ecstatic at first. It was the role she had wanted more than any other.
It was a starring spot and would set her up for amazing roles in the future.
Then, she realized the director meant she didn’t have to audition. He
explained that they simply didn’t have enough time to see every performer’s
audition. They knew her work and knew she was right for the role.

Lea was conflicted. What would she say to her friends? How would she
explain this to them? What’s more, the choir director agreed with her and her
friends that everyone should audition. What would she tell him ? She decided
she would raise the question to the head director before she left his office.
She asked, “ What do I tell my choir director or the rest of the cast?” He
replied, “ They don’t need to know. This is often done with the strongest
performers. Just skip the audition and we’ll take care of the rest.”

Questions:
a. What should Lea do? What would you do?
b. What position did the director put Lea in? Do you think it was fair of
him?
c. Do you think she should tell her choir director about all this? What
about her friends?
d. What do you think are the possible outcomes if Lea were to tell her
choir director? What if she were to tell her friends?
e. Would you talk to your parents about this if you were in Lea’s place?
What do you think they would do? Would you agree?

PAGE 89
Unit Seven: Elements of Moral
Maturity

Introduction

This unit offers an image of moral maturity that consists of seven elements: moral
agency, harnessing cognitive ability, harnessing emotional resources, using social
skill, using principles, respecting others, and developing a sense of meaning.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this unit, students must have:

• outlined the elements of moral maturity

• described the ability of oneself to make decisions and choices
• explained the importance of moral maturity

PAGE 90
Lesson 22: Elements of Moral Maturity

1. Moral Agency and Sense of Self

Moral agency means that people see themselves as having the right and the ability
to make decisions, and to act on them. Developing a sense of self and the authority
of one's voice is central to Belenky, Clinchy, Goldeberger, and Tarule's (1986)
developmental model. People whose identity is suppressed, such as women in
authoritarian cultures, or the emotionally or sexually abused (Hunter, 1990), may
not think they have a right to choose their own opinions.

A morally mature person is not only a moral agent, but is also aware that he or she
is a moral agent. Kegan (1994) refers to peoples' increasing ability to consider their
own cognitive processes as they develop. Their own thinking becomes an object of
thought, something to be understood, evaluated, and improved.

Accepting moral agency helps people appreciate their responsibility to act for the
good. This naturally leads to the question of what "the good" is, a search involving
other aspects of moral maturity. However, recognition that there is a self, the self
chooses behaviors, and behaviors affect the self and others, is fundamental to moral
maturity.

2. Harnessing Cognitive Ability

Cognitive ability is the cornerstone of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976). For

instance, to resolve a moral dilemma, one needs to identify stakeholders, evaluate
their interests in a situation, appreciate conflicts between principles, and often make
tradeoffs. All of these steps involve abstract reasoning.

Cognitive skill also helps people identify situations that have a moral component
(Rest, 1986). A well-developed mind can better imagine the impact of various
courses of action. Further, mindfulness, where someone pays attention to otherwise
automatic activities (Langer, 1989), is a cognitively intentional act. Suppose a parent
realizes he or she habitually demeans a child who makes the normal mistakes of
childhood. Breaking the habit requires the parent to consciously monitor his or her
automatic behavior. This takes persistent cognitive vigilance.

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More mature individuals also make better use of evidence (Perry, 1970). They move
from radical relativism - the notion that all opinions are equally valid - to the idea
that some beliefs are better supported by evidence than others. Using evidence
requires more cognitive effort than refusing to judge, or simply relying on intuitions.
However, the morally mature person will use evidence as circumstances - and his or
her own principles - demand.

Finally, developmental models like Belenky et al. (1986), King and Kitchener (1994),
and Perry (1970) hold that cognitive development is triggered by "crises" in Erikson's
(1968) sense. That is, information that conflicts with current beliefs leads people to
revise their thinking. Cognitive skill enables this process, helping people recognize
conflicts and create new systems of meaning.

3. Harnessing Emotional Resources

Emotions drive much of our behavior. Emotions supply goals for rational thought,
and rational thought redirects and sometimes vetoes emotions (Plutchik, 2001).
Morally mature

people understand this complex interplay. They take their own and other peoples'
emotions into account when interpreting events. They know, for example, that initial
emotional reactions do not always reflect someone's deeper values.

Emotions are important in initiating and sustaining action. Resisting impulses - the
virtue of self-discipline - is critical to goal achievement (Lickona, 2000). Moral anger
can arouse someone to oppose injustice (Smith, 1759). To paraphrase Aristotle, the
morally mature person knows how to be angry with the right person at the right
time for the right reasons. Moral trespasses can also invoke disgust (Haidt, Rozin,
McCauley, and Imada, 1997). Empathy, where someone feels the emotions of others
(Hoffman, 2000), helps someone understand how events affect other people.
Elevation is another interesting emotion. It occurs when someone observes a moral
exemplar in action (Haidt, 2000). Elevation can prompt the observer to action.

4. Using Social Skill

Morally mature people have the skills to participate in the social world. They can
understand others, make themselves understood, and sometimes persuade others to
adopt their own point of view. Social skill is particularly important for connected

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knowers, those who seek to better understand the world by integrating their views
with other peoples' (Belenky, et al., 1986).

Morally mature people know that group norms affect behavior, and that social
pressure is used to encourage obedience. They can detect untoward social pressure
applied to themselves and others. They can maintain their commitment to their
principles in the face of group pressure. Some even build their own opposition
groups, creating social support for opinions that are out of the mainstream.

5. Using Principles

The ultimate sign of moral development in Kohlberg's (1976) model is principle-

based reasoning. A principle is an abstract moral idea applied across situations.
Influenced by Rawls (1967), Kohlberg thought that justice was the most important
principle. Other writers emphasize different principles. Gilligan's (1982) work on the
principle of care is perhaps the best-known modern example.

Morally mature people do not slavishly obey one principle, however. They are aware
of the conflicts between principles that underlie moral dilemmas. They understand
community standards and the relationships that bind communities together. This
sensitivity is the cornerstone of Aristotle's practical wisdom (Liszka, 2002).

6. Respecting Others

The morally mature person's respect for others shows itself in several ways. First,
other people are valued. Enlightenment philosophies, such as that enshrined in the
American Declaration of Independence, recognize the value of people simply
because they are people. Moral principles like justice and caring reflect the inherent
worth of people.

Second, morally mature people know they are part of an interdependent social
network (Love and Guthrie, 1999). People move from dependence, where they
define themselves by others' opinions, to independence, where they become their
own authority, to interdependence. In the last stage, people recognize the complex
web of relationships that tie us to each other. We are both supported by and
constrained by this network.

Third, a morally mature person recognizes that knowing is dependent to some

extent on the knower (King and Kitchener, 1994). Most people have more-or-less the

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same experiences with things like gravity. However, social "facts" vary widely across
cultures. What sexual relationships are permitted? What gender roles have been
established? How are children best cared for? How is civil justice best administered?

Acknowledging the effect of culture on knowledge does not mean accepting radical
relativism. An Australian might believe that bribery is wrong, while knowing it is
customary in many places. However, someone who recognizes that knowledge is in
part socially defined can better deal with the realities of interpersonal exchange.

Finally, a morally mature person can interact with others without feeling that his or
her own worldview is threatened. Belenky et al. (1986) write about "real talk:"
listening carefully, encouraging, exploring ideas, posing questions, arguing,
speculating, and sharing. In real talk, listening does not diminish one's capability to
hear one's own moral voice.

The metaphors people use for conversation shapes their expectations (Johnson,
1993). For instance, "discussion as war" means that one "defends a position" and
"shoots down the enemy's arguments." The goal is victory, not truth or
understanding. Morally mature people can use different metaphors as appropriate,
like "discussion as exploration," where participants cooperate to uncover new
intellectual territory. Other options are "discussion as play," and even "discussion as
dance." However, such openness requires a stronger sense of agency (or self) than
some people have.

7. Developing a Sense of Purpose

The final element of moral maturity is a sense of life purpose. Chickering (1969),
Frankl (1984), Maslow (1968), and other writers emphasize its importance. Purpose
can be a superordinate achievement goal, although it need not be (Ogilvy, 1995). It
might be a way of living life, a dedication to certain processes rather than specific
outcomes.

Service to others is one of the more common life missions among moral exemplars.
Some peoples' commitment to others is an integral part of their identity (Colby and
Damon, 1995). Service to a higher power is another recognizable life purpose, which
may or may not entail service to others.

A theme from various authors is that a sense of purpose makes life worth living, and
death easier to bear. Kushner (2001, p. 146) writes:

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Over the course of my thirty years as a congregational rabbi, I have seen many
people come to the end of their lives... Most people are not afraid of dying; they are
afraid of not having lived... People can accept the inescapable fact of mortality.
What frightens them more is the dread of insignificance, the notion that they will be
born and live and one day die and none of it will matter.

Finding life's purpose is a difficult philosophical task. It's easy to chant someone
else's slogans, of course. However, to choose one's own goals - and to respect
others while pursuing them, to use one's cognitive, emotional, and social skills well,
to keep fast to one's own principles – is not so easy.

Activity

Instruction: Discuss and Explain: Give reasons, facts, details that show you
understand the question presented below.

1. What is the most important element of moral maturity does our society need?

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Unit Eight: Elements of Moral
Maturity

Introduction

This unit discusses the importance of ethics in society. Its societal context presents
that the actions of humans can be analyzed by having ethical decision-making on
what is the right thing to do, and what the moral agent should do, since the ethical
values and principles response to the actual practices of life and to the needs of
humans in the society.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this unit, students must have:

• distinguished ethical issues from social issues

• reflected on the requirements for the smooth running of society
• considered the nature of social decision-making
• explained the principles that govern just societies
• analyzed the nature of political authority

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Lesson 23: Right or Wrong in Context
In thinking ethically we are trying to decide which actions are right and wrong,
which actions we should or shouldn’t perform. But no man is an island, and the
decisions we make about how to act must be made in the context of the laws of the
land in which we live. Some of the most important ethical decisions, therefore, are
not primarily decisions about how individuals should or shouldn’t act, but rather
decisions about whether a given action:

• should or shouldn’t be illegal

Nearly every country in the world has made it illegal to clone a human being for
reproductive purposes. Even if an individual believes that human cloning is morally
acceptable, therefore, he cannot rationally clone a human being without taking into
account the fact it is illegal and that the state will punish him if it discovers what he
is doing. (We shall be considering reproductive cloning in Chapter 8.)

• should or shouldn’t be regulated by law

In Britain and in some US states (e.g. Rhode Island, California and New Jersey) it is
legal to clone a human being as far as the blastocyst stage of embryo development
for the purposes of research (so-called ‘therapeutic’ cloning). Anyone wanting to
clone a human being for such purposes, however, must jump through the myriad
hoops by which such activities are regulated by the law. They will, for example, in
the UK, need a license from the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority
(HFEA), whose job it is to subject requests for licenses to close examination, then
they will need to obey the various regulations governing the activity itself, then
finally they will have to destroy the clone by the 14th day.

• should or shouldn’t be funded by the public purse

In the United States, under President Bush, therapeutic cloning, though legal, could
not be carried out by anybody needing public funding. It was forbidden to use
money from the public purse for such activities. Only private organizations able to
fund their own research were therefore able to take advantage of the legality of
therapeutic cloning in the United States.

Such decisions cannot be made by ordinary individuals, they must be made by the
nation-states to which individuals belong as citizens or as subjects, or by the parts of
those nation-states to which the nation-state has delegated decision-making power.

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Philosophical background: The state of nature

In deciding the principles by which the state should be governed political

philosophers talk about the ‘state of nature’. This is the condition human beings
were in before governments came into existence. The questions asked about the
state of nature include: how did humans act? Were there any rules all human beings
followed? Why did humans bring states into existence?

There are different views about what life was like in the state of nature. Some, for
example British Philosopher John Locke (who was instrumental in writing the US
constitution), believed that in the state of nature human beings would be naturally
sympathetic and co-operative. He also believed there’d be a natural morality which
he called the ‘law of nature’. This law gave us, in Locke’s opinion, the right to self-
defense and to own those goods with which we ‘mixed our labor’ (for example, if we
plough some land, we become the owner of that land). Locke believed the state
would come into existence because we would soon see that this would be a better
way of making sure the law of nature is imposed fairly and in accordance with
majority rule.

Another British philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, rejected Locke’s benign view of human
nature. He believed that in the state of nature we would be constantly at war with
each other and that life would be ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’. Hobbes
believed our motivation for introducing the state would be our need to protect
ourselves from each other: we would want a single leader, one strong enough to put
down the insurrections, dis- agreements and infighting that would inevitably arise
without the rule of such a leader.

In making these decisions the state sometimes has a very difficult task. In every
society there are issues, often moral, that cause huge controversy. On such issues
most citizens believe themselves to be right, but they disagree with each other on
exactly what is right. Sometimes these disagreements can become very bitter. Those
who believe that experimentation on animals, or abortion, is wrong, for example,
have resorted to extreme violence to make their case

Most people who believe such things are wrong do not act so unreasonably. But
when reasonable people disagree the state cannot adjudicate. All it can do is to take
account of that controversy in making its decisions.

The decisions made by the state or its agents all involve the allocation of important
social resources such as freedom, power and public money. It is the state that
decides what its citizens are free to do and not to do, who should have the authority
to act on behalf of the state, and how state-sponsored activities should be funded.

Different nation-states have different decision-making processes. Some states are

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dictatorships. In Zimbabwe, until recently, decisions have largely been made by one
man, Robert Mugabe, and by those he has appointed. The same is true in North
Korea. Other states, including most of those in the west, are democracies in which
decisions are made by those who have been elected by the people to represent
them. Different democracies go about the process of decision-making in different
ways. The decisions they make are sometimes very different.

In a democracy individuals are able to participate in the process of deciding what

their government should or shouldn’t do. Some participate only to the extent of
voting for a representative, others don’t even do this. Some do far more than this. It
is clear that the more concerned one is about the decisions that the state makes
(and about the laws that one will therefore have to obey) the more one should
engage actively in the process of making these decisions.

In order to participate effectively in such decision-making, individuals must be

informed about the decisions to be made, must have reflected on the decisions they
think should be made and, ideally, will have put their reflections to the test by
engaging in debate with those whose views differ. Such debates provide an
opportun- ity for those involved to attempt to achieve a ‘reflective equilibrium’
between their different beliefs. This can be achieved by listening to others’
arguments and taking good arguments into account in their own thinking.

Democracies, ideally, will try to provide forums to help citizens participate in such
activities, expect schools to prepare citizens for participation, and perhaps provide
incentives for citizens to participate.

As biotechnology advances and makes it possible for us to engage in many activities

that have previously been impossible, it is not just individuals who must decide for
themselves whether or not the activities made possible are morally permissible,
required or forbidden: states must also make such decisions. The decisions made by
states will, of course, interact importantly with the decisions of individuals.

Activity

Instruction: Criticize and evaluate: Make a judgment about strengths and

weaknesses, positive or negative aspects. You can use the theories of the
abovementioned philosophers to contextualize your answers.

Situation: You should imagine that they are in the state of nature and must
therefore look out for themselves and their family group. There is no law and
therefore no protection from the law for individuals.

PAGE 99
1. Try to identify the advantages and disadvantages of their situation;

2. Decide whether they would like to continue to live without benefit of the law
or whether they’d prefer to agree to live together according to the rule of
law.

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Lesson 24: Morality and the Law of the
Land
That the law of the land is quite different from what many have called the ‘moral
law’ can be seen in the fact that there are actions that are immoral but not illegal
and vice versa.

Lying, for example, is not illegal, though most people would agree that lying is –
usually – morally wrong. There are types of lie, of course, that are illegal (fraud is
usually against the law and fraud is a type of lying), but no state would pass a law
forbidding you from falsely telling your friend you think she looks nice.

There are also actions that are illegal but not obviously immoral. In Britain it is illegal
to drive on the right, for example, in the United States it is illegal to drive on the left.
Morality, however, says nothing about the side of the road on which one should
drive. At least it doesn’t until a law is passed, then it might be argued that as
morality would say ‘obey the law’, then morality also says ‘drive on the left when in
Britain and on the right when in the United States’. Nevertheless it is easy to see
that here there is an arbitrary element to the law: this law is needed to co-ordinate
behaviour not to enforce morality.

Other laws, for example ‘do not kill’, seem to have a clear moral element. If human
beings have the right to life then morality would say ‘you must not kill’, and the law
of the land merely gives state expression to the moral requirement. In doing so the
state gives itself (or its agents) the power to punish anyone who kills another human
being. In deciding whether or not to kill someone, an individual who is not dissuaded
by the immorality of doing so, might be dissuaded by the illegality of it. If not, and
he is caught, he will be punished.

Another indication that the law of the land is not the same as the moral law is given
in the fact that morality can seem to require the making of, or the abolition of, a
law. Many people in the United States, for example, believe that the death penalty is
immoral. How could a law be immoral if there was no more to morality than the law
of the land? In Britain many people believe that morality demands that a law should
be passed permitting assisted dying. How could morality demand a law that doesn’t
exist if there was no more to morality than the law?

The making of the law, as an activity, is itself governed by morality. There are three
important moral considerations that must be taken into account in every decision the
state makes:

• public welfare;

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 • individual rights;

• justice between individuals.

As we work through this book we will see that it can be hugely difficult to balance
these considerations against each other: just as the values that guide the conduct of
individuals conflict, so the values that guide the decision-making of states conflict:
hard decisions cannot be avoided.

Activity

Instruction: Personal Reflection

Reflect on the different ways we punish those who have broken the law and those
who have acted immorally. Why should there be such different sorts of
punishment?

PAGE 102
Unit Nine: Loób and Kapwa:
An Introduction to a
Filipino Virtue Ethics by
Jeremiah Reyes

Introduction

This is an introduction to a Filipino virtue ethics which is a relationship-oriented

virtue ethics. The concepts to be discussed are the result of the unique history of the
Philippines, namely a Southeast Asian tribal and animist tradition mixed with a
Spanish Catholic tradition for over three-hundred years. Filipino virtue ethics is based
on two foundational concepts in Filipino culture. The first is loób, which can easily be
misunderstood when literally translated into English as “inside” but which is better
translated as “relational will,” and the second is kapwa, which is literally translated
as “other person” but is better understood as “together with the person.” These
serve as pillars for a special collection of virtues (kagandahang-loób, utang-na- loób,
pakikiramdam, hiya, lakas-ng-loób/bahala na) which are not individualistic virtues in
the same way as most of the cardinal virtues of the Western tradition (i.e.,
prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude) but are all directed towards the
preservation and strengthening of human relationships. This introduction to a Filipino
virtue ethics is articulated and organized through a dialogue with Aristotelian-
Thomistic virtue ethics.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this unit, students must have:

• reflected the Filipino Virtue Ethics

• explained the foundational concepts in Filipino culture and virtues
• evaluated the Filipino culture and ethics

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Lesson 25: Glossary of Terms
Since one can easily get overwhelmed by the foreign vocabulary when encountering
ideas from another country or culture for the first time, perhaps it is best to begin
with a short glossary of concepts so that one can survey the landscape. Later on we
will discuss each concept in detail.

1. Loób – (Pronounced as two syllables with short o’s, lo-ob.) This word is
literally translated into English as “inside”. It is used to describe the inside of
physical objects such as a house or a jar. However, when it talks about a
person, it talks about the person’s “relational will”, i.e. his will towards his
kapwa. This concept is fundamental because the Filipino virtues are mostly
compound words which say something about the kind of loób that a person
has.

2. Kapwa – This word is literally translated as “other” or “other person” but it is

in a way untranslatable into English. This is because it is embedded in an
entirely different worldview and web of meanings unique to Philippine culture
and history—namely, a Southeast Asian tribal and animist culture mixed with
Spanish Catholicism. It is tribal and Christian at the same time. Kapwa has
therefore been translated by local scholars as “shared self”, “shared identity”,
or “self-in-the-other.” I use “together with the person.”

3. Kagandahang-Loób – This word is literally translated as “beauty-of-will.” The

beauty of the will in this context is determined by one’s relationship towards
the kapwa. Someone who has an affective concern for others and the
willingness to help them in times of need is a person with kagandahang-loób.
It is best understood through the paradigmatic example of a mother’s love
and concern for her child, most especially during the child’s weakness in
infancy.

4. Utang-na-Loób – This word is literally translated as “debt-of-will.” It is the

natural response to kagandahang-loób. It is the self-imposed obligation to
give back the same kind of kagandahang-loób to the person who has shown it
to you. When utang-na-loób is returned “with interest”, i.e. more than what is
due, it can bring about a circular dynamic between two persons where the

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 one who previously showed kagandahang-loób is now the one with utang-na-
loób, and then vice versa; it continues to alternate and strengthen the
relationship in the process. This is where kapwa naturally develops into
mutually sacrificial friendships.

5. Pakikiramdam – The closest translation might be “relational sensitivity” or

“empathy.” It is about being skilled in reading the other person’s feelings and
correctly guessing his inner state. It requires receptivity to many non-verbal
cues, such as subtle facial expressions, tones of voice, and bodily gestures.
This indirect communication, though it might seem tedious or frustrating to
the foreigner, is a way of practicing a kind of “emotional intelligence”, a way
of evaluating and deepening the relationship with the other person.

6. Hiya – Hiya has been variously translated as “embarrassment” or “shame.” It

has often been negatively criticized when studied in isolation, especially for
the Filipino tendency to be roundabout and not direct to the point. But it is a
virtue when it controls and restrains selfish desires for the welfare of the
other (kapwa). One of the most common manifestations is withholding a
direct verbal confrontation that could embarrass the other, especially in
public.

7. Lakas-ng-Loób/Bahala na – Lakas-ng-loób is literally translated as “courage”,

bahala na is sometimes translated as “fatalism” or “resignation”, but it is
translated more positively as “courage to face uncertainty.” Like hiya, these
two can degenerate into negative concepts if separated from the principle of
kapwa. The unique history of the Philippines must also be taken into account
in order to see that this is not just any kind of courage, but a courage for self-
sacrifice for the kinship group. As we will see later, the Tagalog Pasyon
(Passion of Christ) play is the key to understanding this virtue and the ideal
Philippine hero (bayani).

This glossary is a survey of Filipino virtue ethics. Note that it is a Filipino virtue
ethics, and not the Filipino virtue ethics, since the words introduced here are derived
from Tagalog language and culture, primarily in the Northern island of Luzon and
dominant in the capital of the country, Manila. But if any investigation of Filipino
virtue ethics is to be undertaken, this would be the logical first step, not only
because the national Filipino language is almost completely based on the Tagalog

PAGE 105
language, but also because the Tagalog culture has been the most thoroughly
Hispanicized during the three-hundred years of Spanish occupation and therefore
shows the most thorough synthesis of the two worlds.

After a primary study of Tagalog virtue ethics, one can investigate the similarities
with other regional groups in the Philippines. For example, Mercado has identified
the counterparts of the Tagalog loób in other language in the Philippines, specifically
the Ilokano nakem and the Bisayan buot (Mercado, 1976, p. 54).

It is only now that these concepts are being presented as a virtue ethics. Since the
1970’s local scholars have only been presenting these as “values.” This is because
many of the pioneering anthropologists and psychologists embraced the value
orientation theory of Clyde Kluckholn and were completely unfamiliar with virtue
ethics as an interpretative option. For example, the American anthropologist Frank
Lynch famously coined the term “smooth interpersonal relationships” to describe the
greatest value of Filipino culture (Lynch, 1962, p. 89). The international revival of
virtue ethics had to wait for Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue published in 1981. The
problem with “values” is that the concept is too broad, and is often simply conflated
with the notion of something “good” or “important.” It also carries with it a very
subjective understanding of what constitutes a “good.” To say that something like
utang-na- loób is a Filipino value is to merely say that it is something that Filipinos
find “good” or “important”, which is not really to say much, since Filipinos find a host
of other things important, such as family or a college education. It does not give a
clear definition of what something like utang-na-loób in fact is; it just says how we
feel towards it.

But with the concept “virtue” derived from the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, one
has recourse to something much more defined than “values.” For Aquinas, a virtue is
the quality of a power (potentia) of the soul, (ex. the will). A virtue is also a habit
(habitus) that makes the person disposed towards the performance of good works.
As we shall see, Filipino virtues are similar in that they describe the quality of one’s
relational will (loób) which acts towards others (kapwa). The Thomistic scheme
provides a stable foundation for these concepts which were blurry when talked
about as values. What has often been called a “value system” is better understood
as a “virtue ethics.”

Now another thing needed before going into our discussion is a brief intellectual
history of the Philippines. This is necessary in order to show the significant
difference between the Filipino worldview and the Western worldview, and also, the
difference between the Philippines and its closest Southeast Asian neighbors. This is
due mainly to its unique mix of East and West.

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Lesson 26: A Brief Philippine History
Before the explorer Ferdinand Magellan arrived in the islands in 1521, and was killed
by the tribal warrior Lapu-Lapu, the Philippines was composed of many different
tribes and chiefdoms scattered across the archipelago. Based on the artifact called
the Laguna Copperplate Inscription we know that Indian influences were already
present in the islands since 900 A.D. and this is verified by the many Sanskrit based
words found in the Tagalog language (Francisco, 1964). Manila was also at the heart
of the trade network in the region, and had extensive trade dealings with the
Chinese. In the 14th century Arab traders arrived in the Southern islands of the
Philippines and spread Islam (Majul, 1999). One can imagine that if the Spanish had
not arrived, the Philippines would have become like its Islamic neighbours Malaysia
and Indonesia. However, in 1565 Miguel Lopez de Legazpi arrived following
Magellan’s Pacific route. Miguel Lopez de Legazpi was appointed by King Philip II as
the first governer-general of the Philippines (the islands were previously named Las
Islas Filipinas by Ruy Lopez de Villalobos, in honor of Philip II). This began three-
hundred thirty three years of Spanish colonization only to end in 1898 when the
Philippine revolutionaries declared independence and when the Americans acquired
the Philippines through the Treaty of Paris. After attempts at modernization and
democratization, the Americans finally granted the Philippines its national
independence in 1946.

A significant fact for us is that the words we are going to discuss (ex. loób and
kapwa) were present in the Tagalog language before the Spanish arrived and were
words used in a tribal and animist context. The basic structure of society was the
barangay, a group of people ruled by one datu or chief (Scott, 1994), and the
animist religion was led by a priestess class called babaylan who served as bridges
to the spirit world and also as the prime culture bearers (Salazar, 1999). The word
kapwa in this older context would have naturally referred to someone from the tribe.
Someone outside the tribe would not have been considered kapwa. The idea of loób
meanwhile was woven into a spiritual animist worldview. Benedict Anderson has
described the concept of power in Javanese culture as an “intangible, mysterious,
and divine energy which animates the universe” (Anderson, 1972, p. 7). Reynaldo
Ileto has drawn parallels with this and the notion of loób (Ileto, 1979, p. 32).

But when the Spanish missionaries arrived, the concept kapwa was impregnated and
enlarged by the Christian precept to “love your fellow man just like your own body.”
Tribal boundaries were stretched outward towards humanity in general. Vicente
Rafael describes how the Spanish chose to adopt a different strategy from what they
implemented in South America (Rafael, 1993). Instead of forcing the native
population to learn Spanish, they retained the native language and translated the

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Christian doctrine into those languages. Rafael contends that many Filipino words
and concepts (ex. utang-na-loób) were exploited as mechanisms for control, and
other meanings were simply lost in translation. This may be true to a certain degree;
but on the other hand, it was advantageous for the concepts per se because they
were preserved rather than discarded, and then they were conceptually enlarged.

The two traditions, Southeast Asian and Spanish, interacted, warred and mixed in
various ways for more than three hundred years. And even until today one can still
feel the impact and influence of these traditions in Philippine culture and society.
The tribal datu was transformed into the principales or landed class during the
Spanish occupation, and they have kept their status as powerful family dynasties in
Philippine politics (McCoy, 1994). Roman Catholicism was heavily syncretized with
native beliefs and practices producing in a distinct brand of folk

Catholicism (Bulatao, 1992). Filipino virtue ethics must also be seen as a synthesis of
these two traditions as far as its matter and content goes. However, when it comes
to theory and explanation, a third tradition, the American tradition, plays a
significant role.

In order to achieve what President McKinley called the “benevolent assimilation” of

the Philippines, the Americans taught Filipinos the English language and established
the public school system including the University of the Philippines. Renato
Constantino lamented this as the “mis-education” of the Filipino (Constantino 1970),
but a distinction must be made between the Western values that the Americans tried
to inculcate, and the educational system and resources that they set in place.
Though values such as liberal individualism were inimical to older family values and
the concept of kapwa, the educational training the Americans provided allowed
Filipinos to eventually criticize certain Western ideas as being incongruent with
Filipino culture. Frank Lynch, the first pioneer in Filipino values, was an American
Jesuit. The Sikolohiyang Pilipino (Filipino Psychology) movement was born in the
American-founded University of the Philippines, and leading Filipino scholars such as
Virgilio Enriquez and F. Landa Jocano obtained their doctorates in the United States.
Despite the prominent anti-colonial rhetoric, there is still a significant debt (utang-
na-loób) to the American tradition. And so, though the matter of Filipino virtue ethics
comes from the two older traditions, the capacity for theorization comes from the
American tradition.

Before the Americans arrived however, the Philippines was largely insulated from the
modern developments in the West. The ideas of Protestantism, Cartesian philosophy
and the French Revolution reached the Philippines only towards the end of the 19th
century. It entered in trickles through the ilustrado class (wealthy Filipinos who
studied in Europe) and then in a flood through the American public school system.

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For the longest time, the only Western philosophical system in the Philippines was
Thomism. The University of Santo Tomas was founded by the Dominicans in 1611
and is the oldest existing university in Asia. It was patterned after the University of
Salamanca in Spain. The curriculum was pure scholasticism (i.e., Aristotle, Aquinas,
Peter of Lombard), and most of the priests and clergy in the country were trained
there (Villarroel 2012). One can make a case for a pure scholastic age in the
Philippines lasting from the 17th century to the 19th century.

There is justification in the use of Thomism in the exploration of Filipino virtue ethics
because it is a historical “insider” so to speak. Thomism is a part of the Catholic
tradition in the Philippines, and is not wholly incompatible with the earlier animist
one (for example, both share an adherence to spiritual realities which are dismissed
by modern materialism and secularism). As I will explain, grave errors can arise
when loób is interpreted through modern post-Cartesian philosophy. There is a kind
of anachronism in using the values orientation theory of Kluckholn or the
phenomenology of Max Scheler—both of which subscribe to a subjective-objective
dichotomy which is not present in the two earlier traditions. As one Filipino
philosopher claims, such a dichotomy did not exist in the Filipino worldview
(Mercado, 1994, p. 53). The advantage of using the virtue ethics of Aristotle or
Aquinas as a main dialogue partner is that they have more similarities with Filipino
concepts from a historical and intellectual point of view. And now that we have
provided all the preliminaries for understanding Filipino virtue ethics, we can discuss
each concept one by one.

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Lesson 27: Loób
The literal translation of the word loób is “inside.” The word loób can mean the
inside of physical objects like houses or pots. But the literal translation can easily
confuse when we talk about the loób of persons. It certainly does not mean the
physical insides of persons, such as their bodily organs which are called lamang-
loób, but the “will” of the person. The confusion starts when people latch on to this
literal translation of loób as “inside” and use all sorts of 20th century Western
philosophical and psychological theories to explain loób, with the subjective-objective
dichotomy of Descartes or Kant looming in the background. This leads to a serious
distortion of loób because as we have mentioned above, the concept of loób was
born and developed in traditions which were basically pre-modern, insulated from
the Western subjective turn in philosophy. In fact the discrepancy can be even more
glaring when we realize that the tribal and animist tradition in the Philippines is not
just pre-modern, it is in fact “pre-rational”, that is, more similar to the time of the
Homeric epics before the birth of philosophy than any other period of Western
history. Using modern theories to explain loób can therefore easily result in a gross
caricature of it.

One of the dangerous tendencies is to introduce a “bifurcation” or “dichotomy” on

loób, between the inner person and the outside world, between subjectivity and
objectivity, a trap that several Filipino scholars have fallen into. Regarding this
“dichotomizing” tendency, one of the pioneers of Filipino philosophy, Leonardo
Mercado, comments:

But the Filipino does not think in either-or categories. His is both/and in his spirit of
harmony. We said that since loob (and buot, as well as nakem) has a holistic
concept of the body, there is no dichotomy between the inside and the outside of
the person. (Mercado, 1994, p. 37)

Loób is not a disembodied, subjective view of the self such as in Descartes, but it is
a will always directed towards something, especially towards other people. It not
only presupposes an objectively real world (based on the two traditions it can only
be classified as “realist”), it even presupposes a world dense with spiritual entities
and spiritual connections. Loób is what it is only insofar as it is completely embedded
and integrated inside this web of connectivity. Jose de Mesa recognized this
relational nature of loób when he said: “Loób apart from referring to the core of
personhood, also states what kind of core that is in relationship. Loób, one may say,
is a relational understanding of the person in the lowland Filipino context” (De Mesa,
1987, p. 46). And Dionisio Miranda agrees when he says: “Loob needs kapwa even
to be loob: its continued responding to kapwa is the condition for its own existence

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and authenticity as loob” (Miranda, 1992, p. 84). The term loób should therefore not
be investigated in isolation. An isolated and separated loób—something like a
monad—is vacuous and has no meaning. Rather, loób must be understood in
tandem with the concept of kapwa and the Filipino virtues that move in between
them.

Leonardo de Castro has previously translated loób as “will” (De Castro, 1998). The
older Vocabulario de la Lengua Tagala also translated it as voluntad or will (De
Noceda & De Sanlucar, 1860, p. 193). This is accurate, but I would prefer to nuance
the translation as “relational will” if only to emphasize its thoroughly relational
character and to differentiate it from something like the autonomous will of Kant.
This will is always in relationship to something, either to the world, to spiritual
entities, or most of all to other people called kapwa.

We can account for how loób is connected to the word “inside” and yet is not the
“inside” of modern subjectivity by resorting to the concept of potentia from
Arisotelian-Thomistic philosophy. A seed has the potency (potentia) to become a
tree. When it finally becomes a tree this potency is actualized. A block of stone has
the potency to become a statue of David, but it requires a sculptor to turn this into
an actual statue. In a sense one can say that a tree is “inside” the seed, or a statue
of David is “inside” the block of stone, but it has yet to be actualized. When it is
finally actualized, this serves as conclusive proof that it was its hidden potentia all
along. Potency manifests itself through act.

The will too, according to Aquinas, is a potentia of the soul (Summa Theologiae I, Q.
77). It is a “power” that operates in act. It is the same power as free choice (liberum
arbitrium), the power to choose (Summa Theologiae I, Q. 83, A. 4). When we
choose we bring this potency into act. The potency is always there, but it needs to
manifest itself through choices and the concrete actions brought about by those
choices. Aquinas also indicates that the virtues of this power of the will are the ones
directed towards others (Disputed Questions on Virtue, Q.1, A. 5). Similarly we can
also consider loób as a potentia or power rather than think of it in terms of spatial or
subjective interiority. The virtues of the loób are also directed towards others
(kapwa). For Aquinas there are several powers of the soul, such as reason, the will,
and the sensitive powers, but for Filipino virtue ethics there is only one, the loób,
because this is what concerns relationships and relationships are the most important
thing in this ethics.

Loób as a potency that manifests itself through action makes sense in ordinary life.
Loób is not so much known through reflection more than by living in relationship
with others. How I treat others reveals who I am and what my loób is. And
conversely, I know the other person most when I am on the receiving end of his

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own actions. As Wojtyla says: “Action reveals the person... Action gives us the best
insight into the inherent essence of the person and allows us to understand the
person most fully” (Wojtyla, 1979, p. 11). De Castro basically says the same thing
about loób when he says:

It is part of the meaning of loob—of what lies within—that it

must be ventilated. The kalooban lies inside but it must not be
kept inside. In a way, it is “what-lies-within-that-lives-without.” It
can only be manifested and perceived externally. (De Castro,
2000, p. 52)

In other words, the loób is known only through relationship and interaction. Even
your own loób cannot be determined by yourself in isolation, instead it is determined
by how you relate and act towards your kapwa.

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Lesson 28: Kapwa
We mentioned earlier that Frank Lynch proposed “smooth interpersonal relationship”
as the highest value of Filipinos in the 1960’s. This inaugurated scholarly interest in
Filipino “values” and provoked intense debate amongst Filipino scholars because of
the apparent superficiality of SIR. Was the greatest Filipino value just about
preserving harmony and getting along well? Surely, there must be something deeper
involved. Eventually Virgilio Enriquez, the founder of the Sikolohiyang Pilipino
(Filipino Psychology) movement, challenged SIR by identifying kapwa as the core
value of Filipinos and describing it in this way:

When asked for the closest English equivalent of kapwa, one word
that comes to mind is the English word “others.” However, the
Filipino word kapwa is very different from the English word “others.”
In Filipino, kapwa is the unity of the “self” and “others.” The English
“others” is actually used in opposition to the “self,” and implies the
recognition of the self as a separate identity. In contrast, kapwa is a
recognition of shared identity, an inner self shared with others.
(Enriquez, 1992, p. 52)

And later Enriquez also says:

The ako (ego) and the iba-sa-akin (others) are one and the same in
kapwa psychology: Hindi ako iba sa aking kapwa (I am no different
from others). Once ako starts thinking of himself as separate from
kapwa, the Filipino “self” gets to be individuated in the Western
sense and, in effect, denies the status of kapwa to the other. By
the same token, the status of kapwa is also denied to the self.
(Enriquez, 1992, p. 54) Katrin de Guia, a prominent student of
Enriquez, also writes:

The core of Filipino personhood is kapwa. This notion of a “shared

Self” extends the I to include the Other. It bridges the deepest
individual recess of a person with anyone outside him or herself,
even total strangers. (De Guia, 2005, p. 28)

The very title of de Guia’s book, Kapwa: The Self in the Other, also seems to be a
succinct definition the concept. But what does “self in the other” mean? Is it a mere
sentiment? Is it figurative imagination? As I have said, it translates to action within
the a relationship. To say that one is your kapwa means to interact with him or her
in a particular way, defined by the virtues which we will expound below.

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My preferred translation of kapwa is “together with the person.” I prefer this over
the definitions of Enriquez and De Guia which mention a “self.” They have the right
idea, but their starting point is one where the self and other has already been
opposed, it is the “modern” starting point so to speak, and they wish to retrieve
kapwa from such conditions. The English word “self” is loaded; it has been sculpted
by a long and complex history of ideas and upheavals in modern times as Charles
Taylor has shown (Taylor 1989). It is closely bound to concepts such as subjectivity,
autonomy and independence. But if you want to define kapwa on its own, there is
no “self.” There is loób to be sure, but loób as we have already pointed out is a
relational will. The starting point of kapwa is “together.” In fact if we could use only
the word “together” as the translation that would be better, were there no need to
indicate its specifically human context. It comes first before you break it apart into
separate “selves.” The animist tradition hangs in the background, which is why De
Guia is able to say that kapwa endorses “the deeper experiences of mankind, akin to
an ancient animist connectedness of feeling one with all creation” (De Guia, 2005, p.
173). On the other hand the Christian tradition moves it towards a communio
personarum, a communion of persons, which Filipinos call oneness or pagkakaisa—
“the highest level of interpersonal interaction possible” and “the full realization” of a
relationship with the kapwa (Enriquez, 1992, p. 64).

Of course, the translation is not as important as being aware of the traditions where
kapwa was born, and how at variance those traditions are with the Western modern
tradition. If one keeps this in mind one can just import the word kapwa into English
without a translation.

At first glance one may see similarities between the concept of kapwa and the Other
(L’autre) of Levinas, or the I and Thou (Ich und Du) of Martin Buber. An interesting
trend in 20th century was that philosophers tried to bring back the relational aspect
to an intellectual climate which has forgotten it. This was after the complete
negation of the other experienced in the Holocaust of World War II (Levinas and
Buber were both Jews). However for Levinas the

Other is completely different from the Self, like the concept of infinity (Levinas,
1961). And for Levinas there is no hope for anything like oneness in the same sense
as the Filipino pagkakaisa. Jaime Guevara has made a preliminary comparison
between kapwa and the philosophy of Levinas:

For Levinas, the other is infinitely irreducible. This is why the

relationship between the two is not about a unity of similarities.
Rather, Levinas describes the relationship as one of
asymmetry. Since, there is no essential similarity, but only an
essential difference between the self and the other, the other

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 cannot be said to be like the self and vice versa. The other is
merely different... For Levinas, there is nothing “shared”
between the self and the other. The notion of “shared identity”
does not fit in his philosophy. Yet, Filipinos do experience
“shared identity.” (Guevara, 2005, p. 13)

There is here an insurmountable gulf between the self and the other. The same is
the case, in a milder way, for Martin Buber. This can be explained by the
philosophical traditions that they inhabited. But for kapwa, relationship is the given,
it is taken for granted. It is the starting point, not something to be retrieved.

More similar is the Thomist Personalism of Norris Clarke and Karol Wojtyla, which at
least talks about the communio personarum. A philosophical basis is provided by
Norris Clarke’s explanation of Thomistic philosophy as substance-in-relation. Unlike
the “self-enclosed substance of Descartes” or the “inert, unknowable substance of
Locke”, to be a substance in the universe is to be ipso facto in relation with a host of
other things through the act of being and through secondary acts (Clarke, 1994).
Everything is caught up in this dynamic web of activity, with God as its source, both
as pure act (actus purus) and pure existence (ipsum esse subsistens). This has clear
affinities with the animist world view, which sees the world dense and alive with
spiritual connections. But Clarke goes a step further and applies this concept
specifically to the sphere of persons:

To be an authentic person, in a word, is to be a lover, to live a

life of inter-personal self-giving and receiving. Person is
essentially a “we” term. Person exists in its fullness only in the
plural. (Clarke, 1993, p. 218)

This orientation is congruent with kapwa. Karol Wojtyla also comes close when he
talks about “participation” (Wojtyla, 1993) and Norris Clarke acknowledges his debt
to Wojtyla (Clarke, 2009). However, Wojtyla has a stronger emphasis on the
subjective “I” than what would be naturally found in kapwa, and it is not surprising
because he acknowledges his debt to the phenomenology of Max Scheler and to the
ethics of Immanuel Kant (Wojtyla, 1979, p. 302). But the end goal for him is still the
same, that is, a unity and oneness between acting persons.

Now that we have explained both loób and kapwa, it is time to take a look at the
virtues which bring this whole dynamic to life, the virtues which must be practiced
within a relationship. Otherwise everything would only remain as mere theory.

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Lesson 29: The Filipino Virtues
What we aim to do—beside expounding the Filipino virtues themselves—is to roughly
compare the Filipino virtues with the Western cardinal virtues (prudence, justice,
temperance, and fortitude) and at least one theological virtue (charity). This
immediately provides us a structure and order for the virtues which offers
improvements over the arbitrary schemes proposed by some Filipino scholars.

Aquinas mentions only two virtues in his system which are properly in the will:
charity and justice (Disputed Questions on Virtue, Q.1, A. 5). These virtues are
properly directed towards another, either towards God or towards other people. He
conceives of the other virtues as being properly individual. These are prudence in
the reason, and temperance and fortitude in the sensitive appetites. Now when it
comes to the Filipino virtues, they are all in the will, in the loób, because that is the
only part of the soul that Filipino virtue ethics is concerned with. Perhaps one can
say that the Filipino idea of the soul is still compact and holistic, in that the faculty of
reason has not yet been extracted or separated. It is in this sense “pre-rational”.

However, there is a compatibility because insofar as all the Filipino virtues are found
in the loób, they are also all relational and directed towards others (kapwa), which
Aquinas would hold for virtues whose subject is the will. In addition, Aquinas
introduces the idea of potential virtues, that is, virtues which are somehow
connected to the cardinal virtues but directed to “secondary” matters, and which fall
short of the whole power of the cardinal virtue (Summa Theologiae II-II, Q. 48 & Q.
80; Disputed Questions on Virtue, Q. 5, A. 1, ad. 12). There is therefore room to
annex these Filipino virtues to the cardinal virtues of Aquinas while fully respecting
their difference.

We now begin with the Filipino virtues which are counterparts to those two virtues
properly in the will according to Aquinas (charity and justice): kagandahang-loób
and utang-na- loób. The dynamic of these two virtues presents us with the “beating
heart” of the Filipino system.

1. Kagandahang-loób

Kagandahang-loób is literally translated as “beauty-of-will” and is synonymous with

another term kabutihang-loób or “goodness-of-will”. According to Virgilio Enriquez:

The concept [kagandahang-loób] is manifested through an act of

generosity or kabutihan. Thus, one sees kagandahang-loób in the act

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 of lending utensils to neighbors or graciously accommodating a guest.
But to qualify as kagandahang-loób, such acts of generosity must
spring spontaneously from the person’s goodness of heart or
kabaitan. A display of kagandahang-loób must have no motive save
that of kindness and inherent graciousness. (Enriquez, 1992, p. 57)

Consider the act of giving money to someone because her father is in the hospital
and they can’t pay the bills. The act of buying a take-out meal and giving it to a
beggar sleeping on a sidewalk. The act of taking an extra effort to help an
unemployed friend find a job in the company you’re working in. These are all
examples of kagandahang-loób, but it is not only the act that counts, but also the
motivation. The act of kindness must not be guided by an ulterior motive to be paid
back. As De Castro explains:

An act can be considered to convey kagandahang loób only if it is

done out of kusang loób (roughly, free will); and can only be
considered to have been done out of kusang loób if the agent (1) is
not acting under external compulsion, (2) is motivated by positive
feelings (e.g. charity, love or sympathy) towards the beneficiary, and
(3) is not motivated by the anticipation of reward.

These conditions entail debt-of-good-will relationships where the benefactor has no

right to demand reciprocity but the beneficiary has a “self-imposed” obligation to
repay kagandahang loób with kagandahang loób. (De Castro, 1998)

Kagandahang-loób might seem just like any act of kindness or altruism. But this is
where the importance of the two background traditions comes into play. There is a
tribal and familial element involved. We help members of the tribe or clan for the
sake of the survival of the tribe or clan. When it comes to family we hardly question
at all why we need to help someone in the family—you do it simply because he or
she is a blood-relation, that is enough reason in itself. Kagandahang-loób towards
the kapwa is about treating him or her as part of your “primal group”, that is, your
family, clan or tribe. It is urgently manifested when the kapwa is weak or in need.
The greatest paradigm is the mother’s love for her weak and needy child. The
mother loves, protects and nourishes her child without asking for anything in return.
It is, especially in the earliest stages, a unilateral giving. As Dionisio Miranda says:

Maternal love is unconditional, or gratuitous. The mother loves

her child as her creature. It has not done anything to merit this
love; in fact, there is nothing that the child can do to obtain this
love. All that it can “do” is to be, to be her child. (Miranda, 1987,
p. 72)

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The new-born infant needs his mother simply to survive. Likewise, the purest form
of kagandahang-loób is shown when the kapwa is in desperate weakness and need.
Disasters, illness, and extreme poverty provoke the need and the occasion for
showing kagandahang-loób. Of course, even when the child is already grown up and
is less dependent on his mother, he is still the recipient of generous acts of love and
kindness, though it is no longer a matter of life and death. And so kagandahang-loób
manifests itself in various other minor gifts and services, like those mentioned by
Enriquez.

Presumably you are able to show kagandahang-loób to someone because you

already experienced kagandahang-loób yourself. The natural place to learn
kagandahang-loób is within the family—from the parents, especially the mother, and
then practiced towards siblings, and then towards cousins and relatives. As Miranda
says: “Maternal love means to insure that the child’s love also becomes
“maternal.”... It means to develop the love of the child so that it becomes itself a
source of life” (Miranda, 1987, p. 72). One common practice of kagandahang- loób
within the family is for the eldest sibling to postpone marriage and starting his or her
own family in order to financially support the younger siblings until they have
finished college. Another contemporary manifestation is the Overseas Filipino Worker
(OFW), usually a parent, but sometimes one of the children, who faces uncertain
prospects to get a job abroad in order to support the family back home.

In the past generations Filipino families usually had more than seven children, with a
wide circle of cousins and relatives, plus ritual kinship relations as well (ex.
godfathers and godmothers) (Jocano, 1998). This would certainly have provided a
lot of practice, forging one’s behaviour before he or she interacts with the society at
large. As Guthrie says: “The family pattern becomes, in many ways, the prototype of
interpersonal patterns... The tranquility and unanimity cherished within the nuclear
family is also cherished and idealized in nonfamily contacts” (Guthrie & Jacobs,
1966, p. 194).

Like we said, the Christian tradition is what was supposed to widen this exclusive
family instinct towards those who are not blood-related, and so religion obviously
plays an important role. As Modesto de Castro (1938) says in Urbana at Feliza: “the
love for the kapwa is the fruit of a love for God, so those who love God know how to
be kapwa” (De Castro, 1938, p. 3). But nevertheless the natural starting point is the
devotion and loyalty given towards family, clan, or tribe.

Because of the “maternal” element, it is not surprising that Leonardo de Castro has
called kagandahang-loób a “feminine” concept and identified similarities with the
feminist ethics of care of Nel Noddings (De Castro, 2000). But he also warns that
one should not reduce kagandahang-loób to a mere subclass of feminist thought,

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and this is important because as we have stressed, this ethics was born in a unique
cultural and historical context and is properly understood only through that context.

Is kagandahang-loób the same as the theological virtue of charitas? Charitas

according to Aquinas is foremost towards God and then loving the neighbor for
God’s sake (Summa Theologiae II-II, Q. 25, A. 1). And as we have said,
kagandahang-loób certainly has a Christian element. However, kagandahang-loób is
usually shown to someone in need. God is to be loved by us but not with
kagandahang-loób. Rather, God shows kagandahang-loób to us. Kagandahang-loób
comes from someone in better condition to help someone who is in an inferior
condition. In this sense it is more like a certain aspect of charity called benevolence
(benevolentia) and its exterior act of beneficence (beneficentia) since it involves a
movement from the superior to the inferior, like in the giving of gifts (Summa
Theologiae II-II, Q. 31, A. 1). However, Aquinas adds that among men, he who is
superior in one respect may be inferior in another, and so two people may still end
up showing kagandahang-loób to each other. Since a human being can be better off
compared to other human beings (but not to God), then kagandahang-loób can be
seen as a very human virtue in terms of its application.

2. Utang-na-loób

Kagandahang-loób inspires the reverse current of this dynamic which is called utang-
na-loób. Utang means “debt”, and so utang-na-loób means a “debt of will (loób).” It
can be understood once more by the parent-child relationship, most especially the
relationship with the mother. The mother has given the child his very existence,
carried him in her womb for nine months, and nourished and protected him into
adulthood. The child should acknowledge this and be grateful, and must strive to
repay her back somehow.

Children are expected to be everlastingly grateful to their parents not only for all the
latter have done for them in the process of raising them but more fundamentally for
giving them life itself. The children should recognize, in particular, that their mother
risked her life to enable each child to exist. Thus, a child’s utang na loób to its
parents is immeasurable and eternal. Nothing he can do during his lifetime can make
up for what they have done for him. (Holnsteiner, 1973, pp. 75- 76)

Therefore in Filipino society it is common for children to take care of their parents

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when they are old and infirm. To send them to a “home for the elderly” is
considered a kind of negligence, and besides it is financially costly and not an option
for many households.

As an example of utang-na-loób outside the family context, say I lack money to pay
my tuition for a semester in college. A friend hears about my situation and insists
that he lend me money rather than I postpone my studies. I gratefully accept his
offer. After the semester I save enough money to repay him back. However I do not
consider my utang-na-loób finished, but I am still open to help him should the
opportunity arise. Years later, as professionals, it does come. He loses his job and
has difficulties finding another one to support his large family. Being a manager in
my own company, I go the extra mile to secure him a good position, pulling some
strings along the way. He ends up with a better job than the one he lost. My utang-
na-loób has translated into a significant kagandahang-loób for him, such that now—
given the gravity of his situation—he is the one with an utang-na-loób towards me.

This example is one where there is a cyclical or alternating dynamic between

kagandahang-loób and utang-na-loób. It is a kind of repayment with interest, a kind
of “one- upmanship”, as Holnsteiner would say (1973, p. 73). Our exchange could
continue even further, and I could end up once more having a greater utang-na-loób
to my friend.

Since they constitute one dynamic, utang-na-loób is expected to possess many of

the same characteristics as kagandahang-loób, namely 1) its personal and
sympathetic character and 2) its being free from external compulsion. As De Castro
says “the obligation to pay the debt is a self-imposed one” (1998) and Miranda also
concurs that it is “self-binding” (1987, p. 37). One does not have utang-na-loób
because it is required by the other person (though they could hope for it), but rather
it should come from one’s self. To have utang-na-loób means that one values kapwa
relationships and seeks to prolong and strengthen these relationships. For Filipino
virtue ethics, the existence of healthy kapwa relationships are ends in themselves
and sources of happiness.

As scholars have pointed out, utang-na-loób should not be equated with mere
commercial transaction (Kaut, 1961, p. 260). It can perhaps involve some kind of
monetary contract (in the above example I knew just how much I needed to pay
back to my friend for the tuition), but the situation of need makes it much more than
that (Holnsteiner, 1973, p. 79). My friend is not an official “money lender”, but he is
just someone who saw my need and offered to help me. And therefore it is not the
money but rather the person behind the money—and my relationship with him—that
is the primary focus. In this way it is different from the commutative justice that
Aquinas speaks of. For Aquinas, commutative justice is only about the “arithmetical

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mean” between individuals (Summa Theologiae II-II, Q. 61, A. 2). If two people
have 5, and one of them gives 1 to the other so that the other now has 6 and the
other 4, justice will be done if the one who has 6 gives 1 to the one who has 4, so
that the mean is restored. In terms of goods and services it is a bit like “I scratch
your back and you scratch mine.” Utang-na-loób may also involve a “mean”, but
ideally it is not only about restoring the mean but also cycling the debt, in order to
strengthen the relationship and inter-dependence.

Some scholars have compared utang-na-loób with Marcel Mauss’ thoughts on gift-
exchange in tribal societies, where gift-giving serves as a kind of cohesive process
for relationships within the tribe. This is probably true, but one should not conclude
that the utang- na-loób now is exactly the same as its tribal version, given the three-
hundred year influence of Christianity. The tribal gift-giving, as Mauss describes it,
requires a return. But the dynamic of kagandahang-loób and utang-na-loób has
something “altruistic” about it, in that the return is hoped for, but cannot be and
should not be demanded.

Finally, one of the worst things to be called in Filipino society is to be called “walang
utang-na-loób”, that is, having no utang-na-loób. This is when someone has been
shown significant kagandahang-loób but does not acknowledge or repay it. A child
who has been brought up in comfortable circumstances by his parents but who ends
up neglecting them in their old age is walang utang-na-loób. Someone who has been
given a job when he needed it, but who ends up stealing from their company is
walang utang-na-loób. It is related to another derogative expression called walang
hiya (without hiya) which we will mention later.

3. Pakikiramdam

Pakikiramdam is the closest counterpart to “prudence” in Filipino virtue ethics. In the

Aristotelian-Thomistic system, prudence is the virtue that enables one to find the
“mean” or “middle way” according to right reason (Summa Theologiae II-II, Q. 46,
A. 7). The prudent person should be able to find “a mean between two vices, one of
excess and one of deficiency” (Nicomachean Ethics II.7, 1107a). Pakikiramdam also
looks for a kind of “mean”, but it is a mean within the relationship. The most literal
translation would be simply “feeling”, but perhaps it is better to call it “relational
sensitivity” or “empathy” towards the kapwa. Prudence in Aristotle and Aquinas is
based on the faculty of reason, but since reason is not a segregated faculty from the

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loób, then it makes sense that “pakikiramdam is not so much cognitive but affective”
(Mataragnon, 1987, p. 479). Nevertheless it seems to require the most “cognition”
(still tied with feeling) than the other Filipino virtues. Rita Mataragnon was the first
to do a pioneering study of the concept:

In Filipino social interaction, a concern for feelings and preference for indirect
expression gives rise to the phenomenon of pakikiramdam, a covert individual
process by which a person tries to feel and understand the feelings and intentions of
another. (Mataragnon, 1987, p. 479)

For example, in the dynamic between kagandahang-loób and utang-na-loób, what

should I do or how much should I give back in order to fulfill my utang-na-loób?
Sometimes there is no way of quantifying or calculating my utang-na-loób. I need to
feel or guess if I have repaid my debt to the other person, and this is accomplished
by knowing him and being sensitive to his behavior and to the wider context. This
“feeling” or “groping” around is part of pakikiramdam.

As Masunkhani says, “pakikiramdam is good training for emotional intelligence”

(Mansukhani, 2005, p. 200). Or perhaps it itself constitutes emotional intelligence.
Another related concept for it is “empathy”. Edith Stein would define empathy as
“how human beings comprehend the psychic life of their fellows” (Stein, 1989, p.
11). It is the capacity of decentering yourself and being able to replace it with the
inner state of another, in this case, the kapwa.

Pakikiramdam [is] a way of reconstructing another person’s feeling state or state of

being. Apart from being a mere sensitivity to nonverbal cues, pakikiramdam is also
the active attempt to reconstruct the speaker’s internal state. The sensitivity to cues,
therefore, has as its goal the appreciation for, and the understanding of, the other
person’s state of being. It is an act akin to empathy. What is constructed in
pakikiramdam, however, cannot be put into words. (Mansukhani, 2005, pp. 187-
188).

Someone tries to read the other person’s inner state without the help of words or
direct communication. Perhaps one of the easiest ways to understand pakikiramdam
is through jokes. Not all jokes are funny to all people. The same joke may be funny
for some, dull or obscure for others, and even offensive for some. It depends on a
lot of things. I could deliver a joke about former Philippine President Erap Estrada,
the action star who became president and who is described as being dull, but I
should know a little bit about my audience—do they know about Erap? Are they
willing to have fun at his expense? Would they consider such jokes too “cheap”?

The person telling a joke must know enough about his audience or else the joke
could fail. As Ted Cohen says, executing a joke requires a certain “intimacy”

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between speaker and audience—a knowledge of the audiences’ backgrounds and
inner states—to make them laugh (Cohen, 1999). And when the joke is successful, it
strengthens that intimacy because it confirms a shared background. They
understand each other beyond the level of indicative statements to a level that
allows them to manifest humor and laugh together. The more obscure the joke, the
greater the intimacy involved. But you know that something has gone awry when
the speaker ends up having to “explain” the joke to his audience.

Jokes are filled with other communication cues: tones of voice, facial expressions,
gestures, and the perfect timing to deliver the punchline. Some jokes, as good as
they are, will flop when delivered in monotone or in an uncertain voice. This whole
experience of jokes is a good introduction to pakikiramdam. Jokes, laughing and
teasing are a huge part of Filipino culture, especially around the dining table or
during feasts and celebrations.

We mention jokes because it is something that is universal, but there are other
forms of behaviour that are more unique to Filipino culture. Lambing is showing
exaggerated forms of affection (which to an outsider might look nauseous) to either
test or reconfirm the relationship. Tampo is the reverse of that, it is a show of
sulkiness when someone close has disappointed your expectations. However, one
usually does not tell the other directly, but expects him to discover and understand it
on his own (because figuring it out shows that he’s sensitive and aware to your inner
own state). Both forms are often reserved for very close relationships such as family
and romantic relationships. But for both forms to work requires a culture that is
familiar with, and maybe even encourages, both lambing and tampo. The
phenomenon of pakikiramdam thrives because of certain inarticulate elements in the
culture itself. As Maggay says:

The meaning of our movements and actions are imbedded in the culture and are not
indicated in an orderly, succinct, and written explanation. Its definition and grammar
is learned through unconscious observation as we grow and are shaped by the
culture. (Maggay, 2002, p. 135)

Pakikiramdam, like the other Filipino virtues, is supposed to be learned within the
family through the years. It is a virtue in a culture that values sensitivity that goes
beyond direct and spoken communication. Perhaps one can trace this to the native
tradition which also thrived on metaphors (talinhaga) and riddles (bugtong)
(Lumbera 2001). As Ted Cohen proposed, metaphors too, just like jokes, can be
thought of in terms of a “cultivation of intimacy” (Cohen, 1978). Under Spanish
colonization, where Filipinos where not encouraged to voice out their sentiments and
opinions, this tradition of receptivity to indirect communication could have continued.
In any case, pakikiramdam also features prominently in our next virtue called hiya

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which involves, among other things, making sure you do not hurt the feelings of
others.

4. Hiya

Hiya is often translated as “shame” or “embarrassment”, but this translation does

not make a distinction between the hiya that is suffered (let’s call this the “passion”
of hiya, from the Latin pati, to have something done unto you), and the hiya that is
a virtue. The virtue of hiya is a kind of “self-control” that prevents someone from
making another person suffer the passion of hiya. Let’s use one of the more extreme
examples of Bulatao:

Two men are drinking tuba in a sari-sari store. One of them jokingly pulls up the
back of other one’s undershirt and rubs the back with his palm. The other pulls out a
knife and kills him. Later, the lawyer in court justifies the killing by saying,
“Napahahiyâ siya e [He suffered hiya].” (Bulatao, 1964, pp. 424-425)

The first person wanted to have a laugh at the second person’s expense. This led to
the other person suffering hiya (embarrassment) in public. But if the first person
only had the virtue of hiya it would have kept him in check, and he would not have
made the other person suffer the passion of hiya. It would have also saved his life.
The passion of hiya is negative. Bulatao identifies this when he says that “hiyâ is a
painful emotion. It is something like fear or a sense of inadequacy and anxiety in an
uncontrolled and threatening situation” (Bulatao, 1964, p. 426). This corresponds to
what Aquinas would call verecundia (shame), which is not a virtue but a passion.
According to him it is a species of “fear” (Summa Theologiae II-II, Q. 144, A. 1). But
the virtue of hiya is something like temperance. For Aquinas temperance enables
one to control the natural desires (especially food, drink and sex) and make it
subject to the rule of reason. The virtue of hiya also involves a certain restraint, only
that it restrains the person from selfish impulses that would embarrass others or
make them feel uncomfortable. As Francis Senden, a Belgian priest, comments:

You have the hiya, which is again very beautiful. The hiya means sensitivity. Every
human being is sensitive, but there are degrees of sensitivity. And my experience is
that the Filipinos are very sensitive. But this is not a defect – it is a virtue... You
don’t insult people in public and you expect that nobody will insult you in public. If
you call a Filipino to your office and you are alone with him, you may tell him
everything; he will not resent it. But if you do it in public he cuts off relations with
you. If you call somebody in public loko, he severs relations with you. But because
he himself is so sensitive, he will avoid insulting others. He will, as a rule, not insult
people in public. (Senden, 1974, p. 50)

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Certain complications arise when the Filipino is “overly” cautious or tactful, which
can confuse the Western foreigner who values direct communication and being
straight to the point;. Jocano recounts the frustration of one foreign executive who
told him: “Sometimes they (Filipinos) say ‘yes’ to whatever you say. Oftentimes, they
do not tell you exactly what they think or how they feel. They just remain silent, and
you have to read their true feelings in the way they smile” (Jocano, 1997, p. 73). In
general saying “no” directly is avoided as it might offend another, and it causes the
Filipino to “beat around the bush.”

Hiya goes beyond verbal situations. In general the virtue of hiya is a quality of one’s
loób that makes him control or sacrifice an individual desire for the sake of the
kapwa’s welfare. Consider another very common expression of hiya. Imagine a
dinner gathering where a last piece of fried chicken is left on the serving plate on
the table. Even though one wants to eat that last piece of chicken, hiya dictates that
you should leave that for others. Someone else might want it. To get that last piece
of chicken reveals to the people around you that you are thinking primarily of
yourself. Of course if everyone had hiya then the last piece of chicken might remain
there for good. The standstill is usually resolved when the host insists that a
particular guest take the last piece and finish the food—“huwag ka nang mahiya
(come on don’t be shy).”

To be called walang hiya (without hiya) means that you are only thinking of yourself,
of how to satisfy your impulses and desires, even at the cost of your kapwa. It can
be when you don’t control your tongue and bluntly say what you feel, or when you
try to always squeeze in order to be first in line. You are willing to ignore others, or
worse, take advantage of them when it suits you. It is a violation of the spirit of
kapwa. A person without hiya is “one who has flagrantly violated socially approved
norms of conduct” (Lynch, 1962, p. 97) through an action that “involves a crassness
and insensibility to the feelings of others” (Bulatao, 1964, p. 429). But the one who
has hiya sacrifices himself for others, and this is also the same spirit that informs the
next virtue.

5. Lakas-ng-loób / Bahala na

A debate began when Lynn Bostrom equated the Filipino phrase bahala na with
American fatalism (1968). Her initial article was countered to by Alfred Lagmay who
argued that bahala na was instead “a functionally positive response to uncertainty”
(1993, p. 35). Michael Tan agrees with Lagmay when he says that: “[Bahala na] isn’t
automatic resignation but a way to embolden oneself, almost like ‘I’m going to do
what I can’” (2013). Miranda also says something similar:

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When the Filipino says “Bahala na”, several things are implied: (a) he does not know
at that point how things will turn out, (b) he assumes responsibility nonetheless to
try and do something to influence events, (c) he assumes such responsibility
knowing well that the case looks hopeless, (d) he hopes that luck will help when
other things fail. (Miranda, 1992, p. 218)

Bahala na, taken in its own right, is quite simply a positive confrontation of
uncertainty. But it has been given a negative reputation because it can also be said
in cases of indifference or irresponsibility. It can become similar to the English
expressions “whatever” or “who cares.” But its virtuous element is revealed when it
is not taken in isolation but is put in its proper place within Filipino virtue ethics. It
plays a very strong role in the virtue of lakas-ng-loób.

Lakas-ng-loób is literally “strength of will” and corresponds to the cardinal virtue of

courage or fortitude. But to say that it is simply “courage” might be misleading.
Again, a knowledge of the older traditions helps here. The tribal tradition considered
courage primarily in the form of the tribal warrior hero, such as those found in the
epics. The epics depict a heroic age similar to the time of Homer, and as MacIntyre
says, in this heroic age “courage is important, not simply as a quality of individuals,
but as the quality necessary to sustain a household and a community” (MacIntyre,
1999, p. 122). In other words courage was about the survival of the tribe, or about
those exploits which would benefit the tribe and the community as a whole.

This tribal form of courage was eventually transformed by the Pasyon (Passion of
Christ) play. The first Tagalog Pasyon play was written in 1703 by Gaspar Aquino de
Belen. A newer version in 1814, called the Pasyon Pilapil, became the most popular
version of the play. In a population with very low literacy this play was a tremendous
influence, and in fact, as Reynaldo Ileto has pointed out, the Pasyon is was what
shaped the sentiments of the masses who joined the Philippine revolution (in
contrast with the ilustrado or “enlightened” class who studied in Europe) (Ileto,
1979). The suffering Christ became the new tribal hero. But instead of killing and
pillaging he won through suffering and self-sacrifice. Nevertheless it was a sacrifice
for the collective, this time represented by Mother Country (Inang Bayan).

In the pantheon of Filipino national heroes Jose Rizal and Ninoy Aquino are given a
privileged place because they both closely fulfill the criteria for a Christ-like hero;
they both possessed a bahala na attitude which led to their martyrdom. They both
knew that their return to the Philippines could cost them their lives, but their
courage (lakas-ng-loób) was for the sake of nation. Both were killed, Rizal by the
Spanish authorities in 1896, and Aquino by the orders of the dictator Marcos in
1983. But their deaths were not in vain. Rizal’s death provoked the Philippine
Revolution and Aquino’s death led to the famous EDSA People Power of 1986.

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Similarly, the Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW) are often hailed as Filipino “heroes”
because they also possess this bahala na for others, many of them leaving for
abroad with uncertain prospects in order to provide for their family back home. It is
the same pattern, though on a smaller scale.

Lakas-ng-loób and bahala na should therefore be understood in the context of a

complete Filipino virtue ethics which values the sacrifice of self for the kapwa. Lakas-
ng-loób is not merely courage and bahala na is not merely fatalism. Their ideal
manifestations are kapwa- oriented. As De Mesa says: “Bahala na without active
concern for others is a superficial kind of risk-taking, but with malasakit [concern for
the other] it becomes a Christian risk-taking after the example of Jesus himself. We
find this in Jesus when he dares to risk his person out of concern for another” (De
Mesa, 1987, p. 168).

Conclusion

We have now finished an introductory overview of a Filipino virtue ethics based on

loób and kapwa. To summarize, the defining feature of this virtue ethics is that it
seeks to preserve and strengthen human relationships. It is a unique blend of East
and West, the result of two different traditions which have mixed together for more
than three hundred years. The use of Aristotelian- Thomistic philosophy (which is an
“insider” in one of the traditions) helps us to more properly understand these
concepts. First, it provides us the resources to explain loób as a potentia of the soul,
namely the “will”, and then the virtues as qualities of this loób. Second, it allows us
to organize the Filipino virtues in rough comparison with the cardinal virtues of the
West so that we can note their similarities and differences. This approach is a
significant improvement over the previous interpretation of “values” which was
philosophically vague. The dialogue with Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy provides a
good starting point from where other philosophical approaches—which we certainly
do not discourage—can build upon.

One can identify the goal or telos of this virtue ethics as “oneness” or in Filipino,
pagkakaisa. As Enriquez says, “Pagkakaisa is also the highest level of interpersonal
interaction possible. It can be said that being one with another is a full realization of
pakikipagkapwa” (Enriquez, 1992, p. 64) Such a oneness is not theoretical but
practical, played out in daily life from within the most intimate setting of the family,
outward towards the kapwa—and then towards the greater body called the bayan
(country). One of the ideal manifestations of this pagkakaisa is what happened
during the events of the 1986 EDSA Revolution, when millions of Filipino People
came together to peacefully overthrow the dictator Marcos.

How is this Filipino virtue ethics relevant for the global ethical conversation? In a

PAGE 127
world that is becoming increasingly individualist, where people are still looking for
ethical options that emphasize human relationships, Filipino virtue ethics presents a
unique and interesting viewpoint. And though this viewpoint is one which was
fashioned by a specific culture and particular historical and geographical
circumstances, there are elements here which can go beyond those confines and
speak to what is universally human. Just as Enriquez envisioned

Filipino psychology contributing to a universal psychology (Pe-Pua & Protacio-

Marcelino, 2000, p. 50), we also envision Filipino virtue ethics contributing to the
wider conversation on ethics.

Activity

Instruction: Criticize and evaluate: Make a judgment about strengths and

weaknesses, positive or negative aspects of the Filipino Virtues. Provide specific
situation/example on each virtue.

1. Kagandahang-loob

2. Utang-na-loob

3. Pakikiramdam

4. Hiya

5. Lakas-loob/ bahala na

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