Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PRELIMINARY COMMENTS: statutory trade mark law and the common law of
passing off
Trade marks – defined in a broad sense, refers to the signs that traders use to
identify the products or services which they want to promote, as originating from a
particular source. These “signs” could include words, logos, sounds, colours, the get-
up of a shop, a smell, a jingle, the shape of a product, and combinations of these.
Statute: The Trade Marks Act of 1993 provides for a registration system so that
signs can be registered as trade marks for particular good or services – a registration
is prima face proof of proprietorship of the trade mark.
Common law: Unlawful competition is delictual route that provides a remedy where
a competitor has competed in a wrongful/unlawful way. Passing off is a form of
unlawful competition where the competitor misrepresents that its products are those
of the plaintiff’s.
Why do you think that it is necessary for us to first think about the purpose/function?
IS it necessary?
Among the possible reasons for trade mark protection are the following.
• Advertising/promotion function
The Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 and the accompanying Regulations are central to
the protection of trade marks. (The Act was amended by the Intellectual Property
Laws Amendment Act 2013 (the TK Act) but since the amendments are not yet in
force, we will not be examining them in the course.)
There are other pieces of legislation that sometimes play an overlapping role in the
protection of trade mark owners’ rights, such as the Counterfeit Goods Act and the
Consumer Protection Act. In addition, the guidelines of the Advertising Regulatory
Board,1 also come into play in some cases – the ARB administers the Code of
Advertising Practice.
At international level there is the TRIPS Agreement 1994, as well as the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883 as revised.
1 www.arb.org.za
Do you have your TMA?2 This is the core of statutory trade mark regulation.
In broad strokes, this is what the TMA does (at least in so far as it is of interest
to us in the course).
The TMA provides for a registration system. A trader can register a trade mark for
the goods or services in which they intend to trade.
In order to secure the registration, the substantive requirements for a valid trade
mark must be met. In other words, the trade mark must be registrable in terms of the
TMA.3 There is also, obviously, a procedure that must be followed.
Unlike patent law, there is an examination of your application to check that the mark
you want to claim as yours, meets the substantive requirements of the TMA. The
TMA also allows for a pre-registration opposition by interested persons. These are
usually competitors who do not want you to get the registration. 4
Let’s say that all goes according to plan and you get the registration. You
cannot chill. Why not? Two reasons:
Firstly, it is possible for your registration to be challenged. The TMA sets out various
grounds for this – for example, where your mark should not have been registered in
the first place because it actually didn’t meet the requirements, where your mark was
good at the time it was registered but has since lost its ability to remain registered or
where you have not used your registered trade mark enough to justify that you
should retain that exclusivity.5
Secondly, your competitors are likely not chillaxing – some may even be using marks
that infringe on your exclusive rights. The TMA sets out the scope of your monopoly
by listing the things that others cannot do in relation to your mark without infringing.6
Have a look the Tastee Cookie table below for an overview of this.
PRE-REGISTRATION POST-REGISTRATION
(X wants to register a trade mark (X has a registered trade mark but cannot chill.)
but has hoops to jump through and
obstacles to dodge.)
X wants to Y does not want X is the proprietor of the Y uses X’s registered trade
register TASTEE X to register registered trade mark, mark TASTEE COOKIE in
COOKIE for TASTEE TASTEE COOKIE, for relation to bread and biscuits.
biscuits. COOKIE for biscuits.
X’s response = infringement
biscuits.
Y wants the trade mark action
removed/expunged from the
Y’s counter response =
Register.
defences
Issue for X: Issue for Y: Issue for Y: Apply for Issue for X: institute
Application for Oppose Rectification of the infringement action s34(1)
Registration Application for Register or Removal of X’s
(s16-20) Registration mark (s24, s26, s27)
(s21) Issue Y:
Y’s grounds are:
INTRODUCTION
Note: Trade marks, like patents, are territorial, so your registration in SA only
extends to SA. In addition, it lasts for 10 years, but it is renewable.7 The scope of
your rights is found in the list of things which others cannot do without infringing.
Many different types of things can act as trade marks, however, not everything will
be recognised by the TMA. There are four types of trade marks in the TMA.
(And we will not explore Traditional terms and expressions as introduced by the
Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 2013 because they are not in force.)
7 Unlike patents and copyright where you cannot renew your rights once the time has run out.
Examples of each?
How would one graphically represent marks which are not “traditional” eg sounds or
even smells?! See: Guidelines on the Lodging of Non-traditional Trade Marks
(CIPRO 2009) (Vula).
Note that wrt olfactory/smell marks, the reference is to the ECJ in Sieckmann v
Deutches Patent-und Markenamt [2003] RPC 38 685 (ECJ ) where it was held that
with regard to olfactory marks that a trademark could consist of a sign that was not
visually perceived, provided that it can be represented graphically and that the
representation is clear, precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable
and objective. This is not satisfied by chemical formulae, by description in words,
deposit of odour sample, or combination of these.10
For the mark to be a trade mark is must either be currently used in relation to goods
or services in the course of trade or you must intend to use it for that purpose. The
trade mark need not have been used prior to the application for registration.
What is the implication of this?
Example: If you wanted to use a smell/odour as a trade mark, how would you “use”
it? How would you use your trade mark if your product is gas?
The use or intended use of the mark, must be use as a trade mark, in other words,
for the purposes of distinguishing. This excludes mere decoration or ornamentation.
For example:
– the word marks serve to distinguish the chocolate of each trade mark owner from
the chocolate of other trade mark owners.
In short,
• a certification mark indicates that the holder of the certification mark registration
(its proprietor) certifies/warrants that the goods or services which bear the
mark, are of a certain standard or quality
• the rules which accompany the registration set out the circumstances in which
the proprietor of the registration will authorise use of the certification mark.
Examples: “Scotch Whisky”, the "Woolmark" and the "SABS mark"
• note that if you are the proprietor of the certification mark, you cannot also be
trading in the goods for which the certification mark is held (Can you give a
reason why this is so?)
In short,
• we are dealing with the registration of a mark which one group/collective or
traders of certain goods and services use to distinguish themselves other
providers of those types of goods and services. Pause of a moment here – can
you see how this differs from certification marks? (Here we are distinguishing
persons, certification marks distinguish products by standard)
• geographical names and other indications of geographical origin may be
registered as collective marks
• although there are rules which govern the use of the collective mark, the focus
here is on who may use it (eg wine producers in a particular area, sheep
farmers in the Karoo), as opposed to the standard of the product that they
produce.
2.1. CHITCHAT
Having a trade mark registration is prima face proof that you are entitled to use the
mark in terms of the exclusivity provided by the TMA. The scope of your rights/what
you can stop other people from doing, is set out in s 34 which makes provision for
what sort of behaviour is regarded as an infringement.
The register must accurately reflect what sign it is that you, as trade mark proprietor,
is entitled to keep for yourself, and by implication – what it is that competitors are not
allowed to use when they trade. If the registration is too broad or vague, others are
at an increased risk of infringing because the boundaries of your exclusive rights are
not clear.
• Submit application. TM office allocates a number and filing date to the application.
• Registrar examines to determine if any of the grounds for refusal apply. In effect
the registrar has to check whether the proposed mark complies with s9 and is not
excluded by s10.13
• Registrar may either accept it absolutely, refuse it, provisionally refuse it or
accept subject to modification, amendment and limitations.
• If there are any objections, these are sent to the applicant who is given three
months to respond; no response within the period will result in the application
deemed to have been abandoned. If correspondence/hearing between the applicant
and Registrar is unsuccessful, the applicant may appeal to the HC.
• If accepted by Registrar but subject to conditions, modifications and/or limitations
and the Applicant objects then the applicant has three months again to submit
arguments in writing, apply for hearing or extension.
11 Under the 1963 Act the register was divided into Part A and Part B. Part A was for distinctive
marks, and Part B for marks which were capable of becoming distinctive through use. There is no
longer this division and the marks existing under the 1963 which were incorporated into the current
Act at its commencement fall into the single Register.
12 And regulation 11 of the 1995 regulations.
13 We will be spending a lot of time on s 9 and 10!
• After the Registrar has accepted the application, the applicant has to
advertise/publish it in the Patent Journal. The application is left open to opposition
by interested parties for period of 3 months from date of advertisement.
• Opposition14
• If no opposition, then registration is granted for a period of 10 years after filing of the
application.
You don’t need to “study” this for the course but bear in mind that there is an
examination process and an opposition opportunity. This means that your application
has to pass the registrar’s eye and not be knocked out by a third party, in order to
succeed.
Example: If I want to use the mark Pumpkin Pie for clothing for people, then I would
register it in Class 25. This would not stop someone else from using the mark
Pumpkin Pie to trade in carpets. Carpets do not fall under the goods for which I have
registered the trade mark, ie clothing in Class 25. Carpets are not clothes (usually
) and they fall under Class 27.17
14 The procedure is set out in reg 52(1) and reg 19. Section 21 provides that any interested person
may oppose the application. The grounds on which a registration may be opposed are any one or
more of the grounds on which a registration may be refused, namely s9 and s10.
15 How does that requirement of graphical representation fit in here, do you think?
16 Schedule 3 of the Regulations provides for 45 classes of goods and services for which trade marks
may be registered
17
A copy of the Nice Classification list of classes is on Vula (Resources/Legislation).
These include:
(b) Associations
This means that they cannot be transferred/assigned separately. For all other
purposes the marks are separate.
The association of a trademark with another trademark is also deemed to be
associated with all other trademark associated with the latter mark.
In short, a trade mark registration is an asset and the proprietor can sell it on to
another person. A person could hold multiple trade marks -each one is a separate
asset. However, some may be very similar to each other. If the trade mark owner
has three similar trade marks and assigns one of them to someone else, it means
that there are now two different traders with similar trade marks. A consumer may
buy a product from the assignee thinking that it is actually from the original
proprietor/assignor.
We want to avoid this – so where you have multiple similar marks, you may be
forced to associate them. That way, you cannot assign one/some and create
confusion in the marketplace.
Are there any benefits to association of marks? (Keep this question in mind when we
do s 27)
A trade mark may be made up of a number of elements, some of which on their own,
may not be capable of distinguishing. However, when used in combination, it may
form a whole which is capable of distinguishing.
A disclaimer indicates that the registration does not cover a certain element of the
whole trade mark. It may relate to part or all of the matter and it will show in the
register that the proprietor has no rights in the exclusive use of the disclaimed
matter.
(d) Limitations
18 In South Africa we also have “admissions” which are in effect a type of disclaimer. They are usually
used where descriptive words are used or there are misspellings/phonetic equivalents/abbreviations.
They state that the registration does not stop others making bona fide use of the matter to describe
their goods/services.
19 Other examples (not prescribed) are Judy’s Pride Fashions (Pty) Ltd; Estee Lauder.
20 See Smithkline Beecham Consumer Brands (Pty) Ltd v Unilever plc 1995 2 (SA) 903 (A) – not
prescribed.
- to use the trade mark in relation to the goods or services in respect of which the trade
mark is registered
- to prevent other persons from registering the trade mark or a confusingly similar mark
in relation to the same or similar goods or services (s10(14))
- to prevent other persons from infringing the trade mark (s34)
- to license the use of the trade mark (s38)
- to transfer (assign) the trade mark (s39)
- to hypothecate the trade mark by a deed of security (s41).
Duration:
A trade mark registration lasts for 10 years from the date of lodgement of the
application at the TMO (s29).
It may then be renewed for 10 year periods on application by the proprietor (s37).
There is no limit to the number of times that a trade mark can be renewed – as long
as the requirements are met, it will endure!
Remember TASTEE COOKIE? Keep it in the back of your mind for this section and
let me know whether it would be registrable.
Reminder:
In order for a trader to register a trade mark, the mark must meet the requirements in
s 9 and (not be excluded by) s 10. The registrar will look at these grounds and
possibly reject the application because it falls foul. Similarly, at this application stage,
a third party could oppose the registration – again based on s 9 and 10.
If the mark is registered, s 9 and s 10 may nonetheless pop up again – this time
when there is an application to make a change to the trade marks register (where
the mark is reflected).
The change could be on the basis that, again, that the mark did not meet s 9 and 10
when it was registered or that it was okay when it was registered, but subsequently
no longer meets s 9 and s 10! Sometimes the change that is being applied for is to
remove the mark completely (expunge it from the register) and, other times, it is less
severe, for example leaving the registration but wanting a disclaimer to be added.
NOTE ON CASES: The prescribed case list is on Vula and linked to this Lecture
Guide. The cases referenced in here with * are prescribed; and ** are
recommended/additional reading.
In sum, it provides that at the time of application for registration, the trade mark must
be capable of distinguishing the goods or services in respect of which it is registered
from the goods or services of another person.
This applies generally or where there are limitations imposed upon the registration,
in relation to use within the limitations.
How do you determine whether the thing you want to register is a trade mark?
How do we go about making the call on whether the trade mark is capable of
distinguishing within the meaning of the TMA.
*Beecham v Triomed 2002 SCA [20]: first ask whether the mark is inherently capable
of distinguishing the goods and services of one proprietor from those of another; if
not, then ask whether the mark is capable of distinguishing by reason of its use (to
that date at which we must test the mark).
Think about what we require of the mark. Simplistically, the trade mark must serve to
enable consumers to make a choice about whether to buy item X (eg a cola soft
drink) from trade A or from trader B. The registered trade mark must enable the
consumer to distinguish between the various sources of the product.
-usually when it is descriptive of the products being sold – for example, the word
COLA is not a good choice for a trade mark in the cola example above. Neither is
“SOFT DRINK”. Both could be used by all the traders to describe their product. In
short – such a descriptive word is not inherently capable of distinguishing.
So, what happens when you want to register a mark that is not inherently capable eg
ROCOLA or RolaCola or COLA SOFT etc? Are you excluded from registration
under s 9? Not outright –you still have PRIOR USE as the basis for showing that the
mark is capable of performing the distinguishing function which we need from a trade
mark.
You will come across various terms: acquired distinctiveness, secondary meaning,
acquired through use, etc. It simply means that if you can show at the time of your
application for registration that the mark you have been using to date, has, through
your use of it as a trade mark, actually become capable of distinguishing your goods
(eg cola) from those goods (also cola) of other traders, then it is registrable.
You would have ACQUIRED DISTINCTIVESS through PRIOR USE of the mark.
Read
*Cadbury v Beacon (SCA) – what is the question to be decided?
*Die Bergkelder Bpk v Vredendal Koöp Wynmakery and Others What does it say
about when a mark is inherently capable of distinguishing?
Let’s look at a few types of marks and their possible effect on whether the mark
is capable of distinguishing. Note that we are simply focusing on s 9 now.
Laudatory epithets21
These are words etc that extol the virtues of the product. They are usually not
inherently capable of distinguishing. You would need to prove acquired
distinctiveness.
eg. best, fantastic, great, special…
Invented words
The mere fact that a word is invented does not of itself mean that the trade mark is
inherently distinctive - it remains a factual test. However, it does seem arguable that
invented words are more readily also inherently capable of distinguishing.22
Descriptive words
As discussed above, descriptive words are usually not inherently capable of
distinguishing – you need to do some work to acquire distinctiveness.
GOOGLE
“MEGABURGER”
**Pleasure Foods (Pty) Ltd v TMI Foods cc t/a Mega Burger and another 2000 (4)
SA 181 (T)
** Quad Africa Energy (Pty) Ltd v The Sugarless Company (Pty) Ltd and Another
(Case no 1176/2018) [2020] ZASCA 37 (9 April 2020)
Geographical terms
Using a geographical term (eg a place name) to actually refer to the geographical
origin of the goods/product is likely to not be distinctive.
Section 43(2) of the 1993 Act provides for the registration of “Geographical names and
other indications of geographical origin” as collective Trade Marks.
Colour
Can a single colour be distinctive? What are the challenges here? When do you
think it can or cannot?
Slogans
These are probably not normally be inherently distinctive and require proof of capacity
to distinguish through use as a trade mark prior to the application for registration.
21 For additional cases on this see Estee Lauder (“Beautiful”); Pleasure Food (Pty) Ltd; Distillers
Corporation (SA) Ltd v Stellenbosch Farmers Winery; First National Bank of South Africa v Barclays
Bank. Not prescribed but simply if you want more examples.
22 Not prescribed – just for illustration – “Maizena” Corn Products Refining Co v African Products
Manufacturing Co 1922 WLD 163; Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[See Heublin Inc v Golden Fried Chicken (Pty) Ltd 1982 4 SA 84 (T) – not
prescribed, just for fun]
Containers
A container can be registered as a trade mark for the goods/contents. In this case the
container mark is not a trade mark in respect of the container itself.
Containers may struggle if their characteristics are purely functional – but in some
cases, it may be quite easy, for example where the design of the container is crafted
specifically for that product. Example?
Read Die Bergkelder Bpk v Vredendal Koöp Wynmakery and Others [paras 7-11] –
this case deals with the challenges of container marks.
Note that if an applicant trades in containers and wants to register the shape of those
containers, the application is in fact for a shape mark! In other words, if your product
is glass bottles and you want to register the shape of those bottles as your trade mark,
then you would not be registering a container mark, but a shape mark. See the next
section!
Shapes
Shape marks may also pose a challenge. See Beecham v Triomed (on s 9).
What about the shape of a Kit-Kat? Is this capable of distinguishing?
Good to know but not prescribed: ** Prior to the current Act, one could not
register a shape as a trade mark. You could register a container though. Have a
look at AW Faber-Castell (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Schwan-Stabilo Schwanhauser GmbH &
Co 1981 – how did they try to get around this?
➢ Marks which are excluded on absolute grounds (in other words, any
application would be excluded on this ground – for example, a mark which is
inherently incapable of distinguishing)23
➢ Marks which are excluded on relative grounds (in order words, marks which
are excluded only when you compare them to other marks)24
➢ Marks which are unregistrable because of the conduct of the applicant (in
other words, it’s not the mark’s fault but the person’s!)25
If the mark does not meet the definition of “trade mark” and all the associated sub-
definitions, then it is not registrable.
The aim is to preclude the registration of marks not used for trade mark purposes
and which do not perform the function of a trade mark. (See Beecham vTriomed
SCA).
Example: if you wanted to register a smell mark but are not able to meet the
requirement of “graphic representation” or “use”, then you would fall foul of s 10(1).26
- a trade mark shall not be refused registration or removed from the register by virtue
of s10(2) if at the date of the application for registration or removal, it has in fact
become capable of distinguishing through use. This means that if the mark has
acquired a secondary meaning as a result of prior use, it will avoid the exclusion and
will be registrable.
“substantially” was not sufficient to meet the graphic description requirement. The SCA held that it
was sufficient although the mark fell down on the distinctiveness aspect - the insufficiency and
ambiguity rendered the mark non-distinctive.
(a) S 10(2)(a) A mark which is not capable of distinguishing within the meaning of
s9
Section 10(1) – discussed above- provides that things which do not meet the
definition of a trade mark, are excluded.
Here we are looking at whether the mark is actually capable of distinguishing.
This one can easily be confused with s 9 and s 10(2)(a) – in many instances, the
types of marks mentioned here lack inherent distinctiveness. HOWEVER, do not
merge the provisions. The aim here is to preserve the rights of other traders.
(See Discovery Holdings v Sanlam 2015 (1) SA 365 (WCC) [84]: “ Section
10(2)(b)…is not concerned with distinctiveness, but served a public interest and
seeks to preserve the rights of other traders”.)
Marks which serve the purpose to designate characteristics of the goods or of the
mode or time of production etc are excluded. Note that the list of characteristics is
not closed – “other characteristics” leaves it open.
See (and on disclaimers): Cochrane Steel Products (Pty) Ltd v M-Systems Group
(1272/2016) [2017] ZASCA 189 (13 December 2017)
**PepsiCo v Atlantic Industries (983/16) [2017] ZASCA 109 (15 September 2017)
For the same reasons as above, a sign that has become customary in the current
language or in the bona fide and established practices of the trade will not be
registrable.
These are sometimes referred to as generic terms. This provision applies to all signs
– including shape, colour, configuration, pattern etc.
This section must be read with the section 10 proviso that a mark shall not be
refused registration or removed from the register by virtue of s10(2) if at the date of
the application for registration or removal, it has in fact become capable of
distinguishing through use. This means that the mark must have acquired a
secondary meaning as a result of use.
S10(3) A MARK IN WHICH THE APPLICANT DOES NOT HAVE A BONA FIDE
CLAIM TO PROPRIETORSHIP
A person who has bona fide appropriated the mark first for use in relation to
goods/services as a trade mark can claim proprietorship. Factors that may be
considered in determining a bf claim to proprietorship include honesty, breach of
confidence, and sharp practice. It would not be bona fide to register a mark knowing
that someone else has a better title to it – ie to simply block the other person.
Bear in mind that since trade marks are territorial, the fact that X has or uses a trade
mark outside of SA, does not preclude a trader in SA from claiming the mark. The
only exception is the case of well-known foreign marks under s 35 of the TMA – we
will look at those a bit later in the course.
We know that one can apply to register a trade mark even if you have not yet used
the mark. However, you must at least intend to use the mark as a trade mark.
And that intention must be bona fide – in other words, you must intend to use it in
relation to the goods which are being registered, as a trade mark. Simply using it as
ornamentation is not enough.27
27See South African Football Association v Stanton Woodrush 2002 (2) SA 236 (T)– not prescribed
but skim it to fully understand how this provision works.
NOTE:
• It is possible to register where the mark does not consist exclusively of the
shape, configuration, colour or pattern, etc. Such marks would not be
captured by s 10(5).
• The s10 proviso which applied to s10(2)(a),(b) and (b) does not apply to
10(5). This means that it is not possible for you to overcome an exclusion
here based on prior use.
In short, you cannot register marks which are protected under s 35. The provision in
s 10(6) mirrors what is in s 35.
A male fide application could be where the applicant had an improper motive for
applying – for example, to limit other traders in the industry or to block someone from
entering the market.
South Africa is obliged under Art 6ter of the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, 1883, to protect armorial bearing, national flags and the like of
the Convention countries. Generally, if you want to register one of these as a trade
mark, you would need to prove to the registrar that you have the consent of the
competent authority of the Convention country in question.
It seems that we want to stop you pretending that you have some sort of State power
which you can wield.
There are Regulations published that are to be read with the Act. If the Regs say
“NO”, then it is “NO”.28 Of interest though, is the regulation which allows the
Registrar to refuse to register a mark which has things like “patented”, “registered”,
“registered trade mark”, ©, ®, “copyright”, and such things which indicate some form
of registration.29
28
This means that in real life you need to go check the Regs. Just know that you need to know them if
you practice eventually.
29 Ref 10(1).
The main purpose seems to be to protect the public. There are FOUR categories of
trade marks which are excluded from registration under s 10(12).
(i) The most common is its use by competitors who do not have a registered trade
mark but who have been using a trade mark which would be compromised if the
applicant is successful.30 Such an action may arise out of a resemblance to an
unregistered mark, or even a sign that is not actually a trade mark per se.
However, in order for a trade mark to be rejected on this basis, the mark/get-up
against which it is being compared by be shown to have acquired a reputation in the
marketplace. This reputation is akin to that which is required under the common law
action for passing off (which we will do next term!). In addition, the comparison to
determine whether the two marks are similar enough to cause such
deception/confusion, follows the same principles as for s 10(14) and the infringement
provisions.
(ii) Deceptiveness in this context could also arise where the proposed mark would be
misleading as to the origin of the goods, for example, the inclusion of a device such
30 Note that unlike s10(14) the likelihood of deception or confusion is not in relation to a registered
trade mark specifically, nor is it limited to certain goods and services.
as a maple leaf may deceive people into thinking that your sugar syrup is maple
syrup from Canada.31
Read: Roodezandt Ko-operatiewe Wynmakery Ltd v Robertson Winery (Pty) Ltd &
another (503/13) [2014] ZASCA 173 (19 November 2014). (also for s 10(14))
Groot Constantia Trust v DGB (Pty) Ltd Case 52287/2013 Gauteng HC 2015
This is straightforward – if the trade mark contravenes South African law, it will not
be registrable. What about these marks? Would they be registrable?
Issue: What should the SA approach be in deciding whether the mark is likely to
offend? Should there be limitations read into the section? Would the “reasonable
person” come in here?
We do not have case law on this in South Africa but the sentiment is that this is not
only applicable to majority groups.33
31 eg Mc Glennon’s Application 1908 RPC 797 – mark comprising of a shamrock held to be deceptive
in that it suggested the goods manufactured in Ireland when they were made in England.
32 See for example Schultz v Butt 1986 (A)
33 According to HALLELUJAH Trade Mark 1976 RPC 605 a trade mark may nevertheless be refused
registration in the exercise of the Registrar’s discretion “if registration would be reasonably likely to
offend persons who might be in a minority in the community yet be substantial in number”. In BASIC
TRADEMARK SA’s Trade Mark application 2005 RPC 25 (AP) 611, application was made to register
JESUS as a trade mark in various classes. In refusing registration, it was stated that: “The power of
Section 10(13) relates to marks which because of the manner in which they have
been used pre-registration, would post-registration cause deception or confusion.
Usually it is because the expectation of the public would not be met. An example
would be “bare licensing” which would lead to the mark losing its capacity to be a
marker of quality or character.34
The conflict here is with a registered mark (unlike s10(12) which may refer to an
unregistered mark). In other words, X wants to register a trade mark but there is
already a similar trade mark on the register for the same/similar goods and the effect
of this would be that consumers will be confused/deceived.
Note the following exceptions to this, namely:
- where the proprietor of the registered trade mark consents to the registration of the
later mark, or
- where there is honest concurrent use or other special circumstances in terms of s14
of the TMA.
See Adcock Ingram Intellectual Property (Pty) Ltd v Cipla Medpro (Pty) Ltd [2012]
ZASCA 39 (29 March 2012)
Dinnermates (Tvl) CC and Piquante Brands International & another 401/17) [2018]
ZASCA 43 (28 March 2018)
This section is similar to s10(14) except that it extends the ground for refusal to an
application for registration (whereas s 10(14) says that a registration already exists,
this one says an application already exists).
Thus a prior application will be in the same position as a prior registration.
a trade mark to produce a reaction inevitably varies according to the nature and intensity of the
perceptions and recollections triggered by the relevant mark.”
34 See Moolla Group Limited and Others v The Gap Inc and Others 2005 6 SA 568 (SCA) par [41].
Section 10(16) provides that s10(15) will not be a ground for refusal where the earlier
application is in conflict with the existing rights of the person making the later
application.
This is not the easiest provision to understand but it could arise where the later
application claims a common law right. Have a look at Turbek v AD Spitz [2010] 2 All
SA 284 (SCA) for an example of the application.
Just like s 10(14) and s 10(12), elements of this provision are best understood when
we do infringement. Section 10(17) mirrors the infringement provisions in s 34(1)(c )
The ground for refusal may fall away if the proprietor of the registered well-known
mark consents to the registration.
Remember, you are starting from the position that you have registered your trade
mark.
1. S23 AMENDMENTS
2. S24 RECTIFICATION
3. S25 ALTERATIONS
4. S26 REMOVAL OR VARIATION FOR BREACH OF CONDITION
5. S27 REMOVAL FOR NON-USE
You need to review the five grounds. If you were a proprietor, when/why do you think
you would request these changes?
Here the matter may be before the Registrar or the Court (s 24(2)) as the case may
be. There are two broad categories of rectifications under s 24.
• Category 1 provides for interested persons (ie third parties such as competitors) to
apply for changes to the register.
• Category 2 provides a similar opportunity for the Registrar to voice its concern.
Category 1
- third parties – “any interested person”35– may apply for an order to make, remove
or vary the entry on the registrar in the case where:
Here the interested person is concerned that something should be added to the
registration, usually a disclaimer or other conditions. By not adding it, the proprietor
would be entitled to greater rights than what ought to be conferred by the
registration.
Generally, third parties would use this provision when they want a disclaimer (or the
like) added to the register. Notice how this brings us back to s 9 and 10?
(b) an entry was wrongly made in the register (namely, at the time the
application was received originally)
We know that there is a pre-grant examination to make sure that the mark complies
with the law. Sometimes, the validity of the registration is only called into question
after the fact. Here, the argument is that the trade mark should not have been
registered at the outset – because it didn’t comply with the law in place at the time.
In other words, …OOPS!
This means that the applicant (who is usually wanting the trade mark to be removed
from the register on this ground) has to show that there were grounds for refusal of
the registration at the time of the application.
For marks which were registered under the current TMA, this inevitably means using
s 9 and 10 as they would have applied to the trade mark “back in the day” – ie when
the registration happened. If, for example, you claim that the mark was not
distinctive, then you would need to show that this was the case at the time of the
registration happening, and not at the time of your application for the removal.
HOWEVER, where the applicant relies on s 10(2), there is a little thingy you have to
look out for. Any ideas based on what you know about 10(2)?36
35 Who is an interested person? An interested person will be someone who is affected in some way
by the registration, in other words, they are not bringing the application frivolously or maliciously. A
trade rival or possible future trade rival or someone who wants to register a similar mark in the same
class, would fall into this category. See further Stanton Woodrush.
36 See also AM Moolla Group v Gap 2005 (6) SCA 568.
Rectification on this ground relates to trade marks which have become invalid after
registration – ie facts which exist at the time of the application for rectification.
In other words, there was nothing wrong with the trade mark at the time it was
registered, however, since then, something has happened which has resulted in the
mark falling foul of the law.
Here the claim is that the trade mark must be removed/expunged from the register.38
[Note that this provision can be used to remove the mark even if the original
registration was valid in terms of the 1963 Act. The continued registration is tested
against the current TMA (1993 Act).]40
37 For self-exploration – See Mars Incorp v Cadbury Swaziland 2000 SCA on how to apply this
provision- specifically the issue of s42 of the 1963 Act which provided that insofar as trade mark
registered in Part A of the register were concerned, they were taken as valid in all respects after 7
years. The issue is what happens when such a mark is challenged under the 1993 Act.
38 If you only want an amendment such as a disclaimer or a condition, then you would use s 24(1)(a)
Here the trade mark was used to name a new hybrid grass: “Hence it seems to me that the word
‘Ronpha’, standing by itself, only meant at most a grass associated with the name of the respondent as
an originator or producer and, naturally, a seller of it. It did not, standing by itself, indicate that that grass
was to be distinguished from the grass of other sellers who may have obtained their supplies from the
respondent and then cultivated ‘Ronpha’ for sale, . . .”
The issue is that if it is possible to ask “is this your Ronpha or my Ronpha” then Ronpha cannot be a
trade mark. But if we both cultivate grass of type Ronpha and I call mine Zumpha you call yours
Oompha then Zumpha could be a trade mark used to distinguish my Ronpha from your Ronpha.
Simple!
Also: Luster Products 1997 (3) SA 13 (A) - Shatterprufe had been registered in 1942. Was application
for expungement for lack of distinctiveness. Held that when it had been registered it met the
requirement for distinctiveness (acquired distinctiveness). In the expungement application was found
that was capable of distinguishing at time of the attack.
40 Die Bergkelder v Vredendal -SCA referred to the seven year clause. At par [14] Harms JA stated
that if the mark is not capable of distinguishing in the trade mark sense under s10, then it is liable to
be expunged unless it has in fact become capable of distinguishing. Here the container mark had
been registered in 1977. The court held that the mark was not capable of distinguishing under s10.
- gives third parties the opportunity to apply to have an error or defect corrected.
This provision gives the Registrar locus standi to apply to the court for rectification
under s 24. This would happen
-where the Registrar is satisfied that an entry has been secured mala fide or by
misrepresentation
-where the Registrar is satisfied that an entry was wrongly made or wrongly remains
on the registrar.
3. S 25 ALTERATIONS
The proprietor may apply to the registrar for leave to add to or alter the trade mark in
a way that does not substantially affect its identity. It seems that the effect should
not be to increase the scope of the existing registration. Example?
Note that the proprietor has to advertise the proposed alteration – this gives
interested persons41an opportunity to object
Where the proprietor does not operate within the confines of the registration, any
interested person or the registrar can make an application for the trade mark to be
removed from the register or for the registration to be varied in response to the
proprietor’s use of the trade mark.
Off we go to s 27…
41See above for who would be an interested person (not just any busybody neighbour). Note that the
procedure for advertisement of the altered mark and an opposition period is set out in the
Regulations.
A. There are three grounds based on non-use which can be used to remove
the trade mark from the register (s27(1)(a), (b) and (c). There are also
limitations/things to know about each of the three.
B. In applying the provisions, a key issue for the courts has been the meaning
of “use” in this context.
A. There are three grounds based on non-use which can be used to remove
the trade mark from the register (s27(1)(a), (b) and (c). There are also
limitations/things to know about each of the three.
The interested person applying for the removal has to show two things:
• the absence of a bona fide intention to use the mark at the time of registration
AND
• that until three months before this application to have the mark removed,
there was still no bona fide use. What is this three month period about?
But note that there are two additional things to bear in mind:
1. You cannot use this provision to remove a trade mark that is claiming protection
under s 35 of the TMA44. Since it is possible for s 35 to protect well-known foreign
marks even if they are NOT registered under the TMA, this limitation on s 27(1)(a)
42 Note also that s27(1) seems to leave a general discretion in the hands of the registrar/court by the
use of “may”. In the McDonald’s case (which dealt with equivalent section under the 1963 Act) the
AD held that the court retains a general or residual discretion not to expunge where exceptional
circumstances are present.
43 What is the difference between continual and continuous?
44 S 27(5)
could only actually apply where such mark has also been registered – in other
words, where the registered trade mark also meets the requirements of s 35.
2. Although the applicant for removal bears the burden of proving that the mark was
registered with bona fide intention etc, the onus of proving that there has been
relevant use of the trade mark rests upon the proprietor (s27(3)).
S 27(1)(b) – registration is all good but no bona fide use for a continuous
period of five years subsequently
This one looks tricky but it’s not. Here there was the intention to use the mark at the
time of registration, so you cannot rely on s 27(1)(a) but you have subsequently
failed to make bona fide use of the trade mark.
Like s 27(1)(b) there is that three-month period just before the application is made
during which any use you make, does not count and won’t bail you out of this mess.
But note that there are three additional things to bear in mind:
1. You cannot use this provision to remove a trade mark that is claiming protection
under s 35 of the TMA45 – remember, these are the well-known marks of foreigners
who claim protection under the Paris Convention.
Since it is possible for s 35 to protect well-known foreign marks even if they are NOT
registered under the TMA, this limitation on s 27(1)(b) could only actually apply
where such mark has also been registered – in other words, where the registered
trade mark also meets the requirements of s 35.
2. Although the applicant for removal bears the burden of proving that the mark was
registered with bona fide intention etc, the onus of proving that there has been
relevant use of the trade mark rests upon the proprietor (s27(3)).
3. Have a look at s 27(3) – this provides an exception from the rule that 5 years non-
use can be used to remove the mark. The proprietor may rely on ‘special
circumstances in the trade’ to justify the non-use of the mark.
The proprietor must show that the failure to use the mark was in fact due to those
special circumstances. Furthermore, the special circumstances must be such that
they affect others in the trade as well – in other words, that sector. It cannot simply
be that the proprietor’s personal circumstances rendered it impossible to use the
mark.
Also, it will not be sufficient to show that the special circumstances existed when the
non-use would have occurred regardless of the circumstances.46
45 S 27(5)
46 For interesting but not necessary reading on this see McDonalds TPD case where McDonalds
claimed that a reason for its non-use of its trade marks in South Africa at the time, was politically
S 27(1)(c)- that the trade mark proprietor has dissolved/died there has been a
two year period since during which there has been no attempt to assign the
trade mark to a new person.
Here we are dealing with a trade mark which is an orphan in the sense that its parent
on the register (body corporate or natural person proprietor) is no longer in
existence. If, after two years after such demise the trade mark is still hanging around
on the register, an interested person can apply to have it removed because it has
been abandoned. In such case, others are free to adopt the trade mark47and to try to
register it, or perhaps just use it in their business without the fear of infringement
under the TMA.
However, if it turns out that although the trade mark has not been assigned to a
successor-in-title (remember, the trade mark is an asset in the proprietor’s estate)
but that such a successor-in-title has actually been using the mark or intends to use
it, then the application to remove it from the register on this basis, may not succeed.
B. In applying the provisions, a key issue for the courts has been the meaning
of “use” in this context.
Firstly, recall that we looked at what the “definition” of use is – in other words, “how”
does one use a trade mark, is s2(2) and s 2(3) of the TMA.
Assuming that you have managed to overcome any practical issues on how to
use/apply your mark to your product, the more fascinating question relates to
whether what you are doing with your trade mark is “bona fide use in relation to the
goods or services” for the purposes of s 27.
Let’s say that you have a registered trade mark for the word GORP, registered
in Class 25 for clothing. Would the following instances meet the “bona fide use
in relation to the goods or services” and save your mark from removal for non-
use under s 27?
You use the word GORP on the sleeve of all your clothing items, but it is
barely visible.
You use the word GORP only on swimming gear such as swimcaps and
bathing suits.
You haven’t started manufacturing clothing yet but in anticipation you leave
plastic pens branded with the word GORP at the tillpoints of all sports clothing
stores, along with a flyer telling people that “GORP IS COMING TO TOWN”.
motivated trade sanctions. The comments from Southwood J are obiter because the matter didn’t
have to be decided.).
47 Subject of course to the usual registrability requirements.
(a) The use must be relevant use of the mark as a trade mark.
The use must be in relation to goods or services for the purposes of distinguishing
the goods or services of one person from the same kind of goods or services
connected in the course of trade with any other person. It does not matter that the
use is not extensive.
(b) What if the use to which the trade mark has been put does fall not squarely within
the goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered?
Read *Arjo Wiggins Ltd SCA?48
- the appellant had proved use of its registered trade mark in relation to carbonless
copying paper but sought to defend its registration in respect of “paper and paper
articles” [paras 19, 20]
“At source the difficulties spring from the incontestable fact that Arjo proved statutorily
relevant use of its trade mark on ‘paper’ – admittedly a sub-set of paper, but paper
nonetheless, since in the description of the traded goods ‘carbonless’ and ‘copying’
are merely attributes qualifying a commodity, and that commodity is expressly
protected by the registration sought to be expunged. It is therefore not surprising that
an attempt to draw lines within the commodity occasions both conceptual and
operational difficulties.”
(e) Use of an associated mark may be equivalent proof of use [s31 (1)]
What does this mean? This is where is becomes useful if marks are associated – if
a trade mark registration is under threat for non-use but that registration is
associated with another one, and there is relevant use of the other one, then you can
rely on that use to keep your mark safe!
48 Read the case and extract the approach of the SCA. Considerations: Given the use to which the
trade mark has been made, is it commercially nonsensical to retain the registration? Are the
goods in relation to which the use has been made commercially different from the goods or services
in respect of which the registration exists? What if the use covers only some of the goods or
services in respect of which the trade mark is registered? The courts seem to say that one must
have reference to the objective nature of the goods and not the purpose for which it was
intended. The test is that of the notional reasonable man - ie how would such a person describe the
product? Thus, one must avoid the red tea caddy approach. One should also not limit the goods to a
specific age/image.
49 For more on s 27, see The Gap Inc v Salt of the Earth Creations (Pty) Ltd and others [2012] ZASCA
(f) The use of a whole of a registered trade mark which includes the use of the trade
mark in question, may be considered as use [s31(2)].
It is possible that a proprietor has registered multiple trademarks over different
aspects of the sign.
TM 1: ESCOWGO
TM 2: ES GO
TM 3: GO
You haven’t used TM 3 for many years but you have used TM 2. An attempt to
remove TM 3 on the basis of non-use will fail if you can show that you were using
TM2 which encapsulates TM3.
(f) Here is another provision to save you from being attacked for non-use.
Let’s say that you produce clothing under the GORP label but you do not intend to
sell those goods in South Africa. You only export the clothing. Technically, it looks
like you have not made use of it in SA – ie you haven’t used GORP to distinguish
your products from others in the course of trade. However, under s 64, use of the
mark for export is deemed to be use of the mark within South Africa.
50
This case covers a lot of things! Section 27 is one of them. It also deals with s 35 marks. Don’t be
overwhelmed by the length of the case. Read it lightly, especially the part about s 35, and focus on s
27 on non-use
E. INFRINGEMENT
TMS s34(1) = the right to stop others from doing the THREE THINGS in s 34(1)(a),
(b), and (c).
Section 34 applies to all trade marks on the register, regardless of whether they
had been registered under the 1963 Act. So, the fact that you got onto the register
under the old Act does not mean that we use the old Act to determine infringement.
The current TMA applies.
1. SECTION 34(1)(A )
Section 34(1)(a) provides that the rights acquired by registration of a trade mark shall
be infringed by –
the unauthorised use in the course of trade in relation to goods or services in
respect of which the trade mark is registered, of an identical mark or of a mark
so nearly resembling it as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion.51
51Have you checked that this what’s in s 34(1)(a) or are you just taking a shortcut and trusting me?
Go check. Don’t trust anyone with something as important as legislation – because if you get it
wrong, it just looks VERY BAD.
This is a bit obvious – but the defendant’s use of the trade mark must be
unauthorised.
1.2. Use in relation to the goods or services in respect of which the trade
mark is registered
The use must be in relation to the same goods or services for which the mark is
registered.
If your trade mark GORP is registered for clothing (Class 25) and I use GORP to sell
laptops, you will not be able to rely on s 34(1)(a).
We have to ask what use could you make of the mark based on your
registration – in other words, what is the notional use which you could make of
your registration. If face masks are clothing then even though you are not
selling face masks, you could sell them under the registered trade mark if you
wanted to!
We know that it must be use in relation to the same goods but is this any use in the
course of trade in relation to the same goods?
Read Verimark and Die Bergkelder – what does Verimark say about the use?
In that case Verimark USED the BMW trade mark in the course of trading in the
same goods (car polish) for which BMW had a registration
– so it looks like it meets s 34(1)(a)? Right? BUT…What was the key thing that
should characterise “use in the course of trade” in these circumstances?
1.4. identical mark or of a mark so nearly resembling the registered trade mark
as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion
Now that you have established unauthorised use as a trade mark in the course of trade
in the same goods, you still need to show that this will likely result in deception or
confusion. If this is absent, then there is no infringement.
First thing: the Act does not require that you prove actual deception/confusion – we’re
talking about a probability or likelihood (of course if you lead evidence of actual
deception/confusion it would strengthen your case but it is not a given).
Second thing: to understand how we make this comparison, we have to look to the
courts. The following are key to understanding how the courts have approached this
part of the enquiry.
➢ Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd is probably one of
the most often-quoted cases in this regard. Read it but skip over all the
procedural elements and jump straight to the issue of how to make the
determination (note also that this case looked at infringement under the old
Act):
‘In an infringement action the onus is on the plaintiff to show the probability or
likelihood of deception or confusion. It is not incumbent upon the plaintiff to show
that every person interested or concerned (usually as customer) in the class of
goods for which his trade mark has been registered would probably be deceived
or confused. It is sufficient if the probabilities establish that a substantial number
of such persons will be deceived or confused. The concept of deception or
confusion is not limited to inducing in the minds of interested persons the
erroneous belief or impression that the goods in relation to which the defendant’s
mark is used are the goods of the proprietor of the registered mark, i.e. the
plaintiff, or that there is a material connection between the defendant’s goods
and the proprietor of the registered mark; it is enough for the plaintiff to show that
a substantial number of persons will probably be confused as to the origin of the
goods or the existence or non-existence of such a connection.’
➢ Bata Ltd v Face Fashions CC 2002 (1) SA 844 (SCA) which approved the
concept of ‘global appreciation’ as follows:
‘A similar approach was adopted by the European Court of Justice in Sabel BV
v Puma AG, Rudolf Dassler Sport [1998] RPC 199. At 224 it was said that the
likelihood of confusion must ‘be appreciated globally’ and that the ‘global
appreciation of the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the marks in question,
must be based on the overall impression given by the marks, bearing in mind, in
particular, their distinctiveness and dominant components’.
➢ When making the comparison, one must also consider the following:
➢ Note that the comparison is limited to the marks alone – neither side may rely
on extraneous matter. In other words, the fact that the defendant’s goods are
distinguished from those of the proprietor of the mark by matter extraneous to
the mark itself is irrelevant for purposes of infringement, eg on labels etc.
It is about comparing the mark that the defendant used with that which is
registered.52
➢ One can take disclaimed matter into account when comparing the marks
(although this does not mean that use of a disclaimed element in itself
amounts to infringement.
52 National Brands Ltd v Blue Lion Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd - ROMANTIC DREAMS infringement of
ROMANY CREAMS?:
‘It is important to bear in mind, particularly in a case like the present one, in which the packaging of the
respective products has been reproduced in the papers, that the likelihood (or otherwise) of deception
or confusion must be attributable to the resemblance (or otherwise) of the marks themselves and not
to extraneous matter …Similarities in the goods themselves or in the form in which they are presented
might form the basis for an action for passing-off, but that is not what is before us, and for the present
purposes they must be disregarded.’ (at 567E-F)
‘The unauthorised use of a mark which is identical or similar to the trade mark
registered, in the course of trade in relation to goods or services which are so
similar to the goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered,
that in such use there exists the likelihood of deception or confusion.’
This aspect is the same as 34(1)(a) and probably means use a trade mark per
Verimark v BMW.
Although this section differs from s34(1)(a) in that it refers to a mark ‘similar ‘ as
opposed to one ‘so nearly resembling’ the registered mark, the approach to making
that determination is regarded as the same – so the same principles mentioned
above apply.
2.4.‘that the use is in relation to goods or services which are so similar to the
goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered so that in
such use there exists the likelihood of deception or confusion’
53Personally I think that this provision is generally open to confusion given the way in which it is
drafted and the way in which the courts consider it…
** although you may be tempted to say that goods which are similar should include
goods which are the same and therefore one could ignore s 34(1)(a) and just use
34(1)(b) for both, you should stop in your tracks. You have to pick your lane. The goods
are either the same OR similar.
The test is whether the goods and services are so similar to the goods and services
for which the trade mark is registered that in use of the same or similar trade mark
on them, there exists a likelihood of confusion or deception. The public must be
misled into believing that the similar goods or services are connected with the
proprietor of the trade mark.
Have a look at these cases to shed light and then we can chat about them in the
forums.
Danco Clothing (Pty) Ltd v Nu-care Marketing Sales and Promotions (Pty) Ltd 1991
4 SA 850 A @ 851
New Media Publishing (Pty) Ltd v Eating Out Web Services CC 2005 5 SA 388 (C)
Mettenheimer v Zonquasdrift Vineyards 2013 ZASCA 152
➢ What are the factors which the court looked at in *Danco to determe that the
likelihood of deception or confusion amongst a substantial number of persons
had been established ? (@860)
➢ New Media Publishing (Pty) Ltd v Eating Out Web Services CC and Another -
regard should be had to both the degree of similarity between the respective
goods and the degree of similarity between the respective marks.
- at 394: ‘There is, it seems to me, an interdependence between the two legs
of the inquiry: the less the similarity between the respective goods or services
of the parties, the greater will be the degree of resemblance required between
their respective marks before it can be said that there is a likelihood of deception
or confusion in the use of the allegedly offending mark, and vice versa. Of
course, if the respective goods or services of the parties are so dissimilar to
each other that there is no likelihood of deception or confusion, the use by the
respondent even of a mark which is identical to the applicant’s registered mark
will not constitute an infringement; also, if the two marks are sufficiently
dissimilar to each other no amount of similarity between the respective goods
or services of the parties will suffice to bring about an infringement.’
➢ It appears that the closer the similarity between the goods ,the greater the
difference that is required in the marks, if one is to prevent infringement. It
seems that it is the combined effect that seals the deal.
This section protects (prevents the dilution of) the selling power of a mark as well as
the advertising value of a registered well-known mark against what is commonly
referred to as dilution. It thus recognises that a trade mark functions as more than
simply a badge of origin. There is no deception or confusion as to the origin, but
the use erodes the selling power through the dilution of reputation and/or
distinctiveness character.
Here the trade mark is typically used in relation non-competing goods or services;
the distinctiveness and uniqueness of the trade mark is blurred and thereby diluted.
The classic example is this:
“‘If you allow Rolls Royce restaurants, Rolls Royce cafeterias, Rolls Royce pants and
Rolls Royce candy, in ten years you will not have the Rolls Royce mark any more”
Frank I Schechter 1927 “The rational basis of trade mark protection”
See Constitutional Court at par 41: “When one considers the origins of the anti-dilution
doctrine in the law of trade marks, it appears that its initial target was to avoid blurring.
But the law has advanced to include protection of a trade mark against tarnishment. I
should now explain that the dilution of a trade mark appears to occur in two ways, by
blurring or by tarnishment. Blurring takes place when the distinctive character or
inherent uniqueness of a trade mark is weakened or reduced. Tarnishment occurs
where unfavourable associations are created between a well-known registered trade
mark and the mark of the unauthorised user. In a case of tarnishment, the object of
the protection appears to be the repute, the good selling name of the mark.”
• Blue Lion at par [12] ‘The word “similar” as it is used in the section has its
ordinary meaning, which is “a marked resemblance or likeness”.
Here it appears to not be restricted to trade in the goods for which the trade mark is
registered but simply trade generally. In other words, any type of goods/services. To
interpret this otherwise makes the whole purpose of the section pointless.
This is a clear shift away from (a) and (b) which required that the use be as a trade
mark in relation to the same or similar goods respectively.
In (c) it seems that the use need not even be trade mark use (ie for the purposes of
distinguishing in the trade mark sense – for example, the use of SAB on T-shirts was
not for the purposes of distinguishing T-shirts but rather to make a statement.
This does not mean that trade mark use is excluded – it simply means that the
section is broad enough to include non-trade mark use.
[eg Verimark (Pty) Ltd v BMW AG [2007] SCA 53 (RSA)]
What makes a trade mark “well-known” for the purposes of the TMA?
Whether or not a mark is well-known is a question of fact.
Section 34 does not offer any assistance. However, the term does come up in s 35,
and s 35(1A) provides some guidance in so far as the term is used in s 35(1).
Triomed at 556B-D:
“The meaning of well known…has not been considered in the context of s34(1)(c ) of the Act
but has been dealt with by the Appellate Division in the context s 35 of the Act. In
McDonald’s Corporation v Joburgers Drive-Inn Restaurant and Another…it was held that
“well known” in the context of s35 of the Act means a reputation such as that required for the
common law of passing off. Such reputation must extend to a substantial number of
members of the public or persons in the trade in question. In my view the interpretation given
to the expression in the context of s35 of the Act in the McDonald’s case could appropriately
be applied to the interpretation of “well known in the Republic” as this expression appears in
s34(1) (c ) of the Act.”
Note that well-known does not mean that everyone in the country must know of the
mark – rather we focus on the specific sector in question and check whether the
trade mark has a reputation among a substantial number of that sector.
This of course raises further questions, like how to decide the scope of the sector!
Read: Safari Surf Shop v Heavywater 1996 All SA 316 (D) – what did the court say
about this? To whom should knowledge of the trade mark extend?
See also Truworths/Primark – re s 35.
Now that the first four elements are there, there is a split – the plaintiff must show
either unfair advantage (blurring) or detriment (tarnishment).
Note that these are not the same and you need to be clear about which leg you are
relying on.
TASK: In Laugh it Off SCA what was the key basis for SAB not being able to prove
infringement?
Infringement does not hinge on the consumer being confused or deceived. In other
words, the consumer knows that the infringer is not the source of the product and
that there is no connection between the infringer’s product and the trade mark
proprietor – there is no diversion of trade.
This should make you pause to reflect on the purpose of this provision!
• “In order to succeed the owner of the mark bears the onus to demonstrate likely
substantial harm or detriment which…amounts to unfairness” - not mere discomfort
etc. SAB failed to establish likelihood of unfavourable association, likelihood of loss
of sales or reduced commercial magnetism.
“Therefore, on its terms the section has internal limitations. It sets fairness and materiality
standards. The section does not limit use that takes fair advantage of the mark or that does not
threaten substantial harm to the repute of the mark, or indeed that may lead to harm but in a
fair manner. What is fair will have to be assessed case by case with due regard to the factual
matrix and other context of the case. A court will have to weigh carefully the competing
interests of the owner of the mark against the claim of free expression of a user without
permission.
. . . The exercise calls for an evaluation of the importance of the purpose, nature, extent and
impact of the limitation of free expression invoked against claims of unfair advantage or of
likelihood of material detriment to a registered mark. In sum, in order to succeed the owner of
the mark bears the onus to demonstrate likelihood of substantial harm or detriment which, seen
within the context of the case, amounts to unfairness.”
• Note that the Supreme Court of Appeal had found that there was dilution in that the
message was likely to create in the minds of consumers a particularly unwholesome,
unsavoury, or degrading association with the registered marks and that anyone who
has seen the T-shirt would not be able thereafter to disassociate it from SAB’s trade
marks. This was rejected by the CC:
“In my view, the inference of material detriment made by the SCA hinges solely on the meaning
it has attached to the impugned publication on the T-shirts. Even accepting that meaning, as
evidence it is at best scant and unconvincing as an indicator of substantial economic harm to
the respondent’s marks. It is appropriate to observe that the mere fact that the expressive act
may indeed stir discomfort in some and appear to be morally reprobate or unsavoury to others
is not ordinarily indicative of a breach of section 34(1)(c). Such a moral or other censure is an
irrelevant consideration if the expression enjoys protection under the Constitution. Of course
freedom of expression is not boundless but may not be limited in a manner other than authorised
by the Constitution itself such as by the law of defamation. The constitutional guarantee of free
expression is available to all under the sway of our Constitution, even where others may deem
the expression unsavoury, unwholesome or degrading. To that extent ordinarily such meaning
should enjoy protection as fair use and should not amount to tarnishment of the trade marks.
[footnote omitted]”
• From Webster and Page Law of South African Trade Marks par 12.25:
‘In Laugh It Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Finance) BV t/a
Sabmark International the Constitutional Court commented that it is trite that, under our
constitutional democracy, the requirements of section 34(1)(c) ought to be understood through
the prism of the Constitution and specifically that of the guarantee of freedom of expression.
The court criticised the two-stage approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal, in which the first
enquiry was whether there was infringement in terms section 34(1)(c) and only thereafter
whether such infringement is excused by an assertion of freedom of expression, stating:
The two-stage approach advocated by the SCA in effect prevents an understanding of the
internal requirements of the section through the lens of the Constitution. The injunction to
construe statutes consistent with the Constitution means that, where reasonably possible, the
court is obliged to promote the rights entrenched by it. In this case the SCA was obliged to
balance out the interests of the owner of the marks against the claim of free expression for the
very purpose of determining what is unfair and materially harmful to the marks. It is to that
task that I now turn.
The Court then considered section 16 of the Constitution and concluded that
We are obliged to delineate the bounds of the constitutional guarantee of free expression
generously. Section 16 is in two parts: the first subsection sets out expression protected under
the Constitution. It indeed has an expansive reach which encompasses freedom of the press and
other media, freedom to receive or impart information or ideas, freedom of artistic creativity,
academic freedom and freedom of scientific research. The second part contains three categories
of expression which are expressly excluded from constitutional protection. It follows clearly
that unless an expressive act is excluded by section 16(2) it is protected expression. Plainly,
the right to free expression in our Constitution is neither paramount over other guaranteed
rights nor limitless. As Kriegler J in S v Mamabolo puts it: “With us it is not a pre-eminent
freedom ranking above all others. It is not even an unqualified right.” In appropriate
circumstances authorised by the Constitution itself, a law of general application may limit
freedom of expression.
. . . It is so that the anti-dilution prohibition under section 34(1)(c) seeks, in effect, to oust
certain expressive conduct in relation to registered marks with repute. It thus limits the right to
free expression embodied in at least section 16(1)(a) to (c) of the Constitution. We are however
not seized with the adjudication of the constitutional validity of the section. We must assume
without deciding that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic
society to which our Constitution is committed. That in turn impels us to a construction of
section 34(1)(c) most compatible with the right to free expression. The anti-dilution provision
must bear a meaning which is the least destructive of other entrenched rights and in this case
free expression rights. The reach of the statutory prohibition must be curtailed to the least
intrusive means necessary to achieve the purpose of the section. Courts must be astute not to
convert the anti-dilution safeguard of renowned trade marks usually controlled by powerful
financial interests into a monopoly adverse to other claims of expressive conduct of at least
equal cogency and worth in our broader society. [footnotes omitted]’
34(2)(a) Bona fide use by a person of his own name, the name of his place of
business, the name of any of his predecessors in business, or the name of any
such predecessor’s place of business
(i) This exception does not apply to a juristic person whose name was registered
after the date of registration (application) of the trademark. In other words, if the TM
that you are being accused of infringing was registered on 1 June 2018, and your
business/juristic name which happens to be the source of the infringement, was
registered on 1 June 2020, you cannot rely on 34(2)(a) to dodge infringement.
54 See for example Ninos Coffee Bar 1998 3 SA 656 (C) 674.
55 J Goddard & Sons v RS Goddard & J Mentz & Co 1924 TPD 290 (corresponding section under
1916 Act) held that where a person with knowledge of prior use of the same names by another, uses
his own name in circumstances which are likely to cause deception, such use cannot constitute bona
fide use.
34(2)(b) use of any bona fide description or indication of the kind, quality,
quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin or other characteristics
of his goods or services, or the mode or time of production of the goods or the
rendering of services
• If you need to use a word/term to describe your goods or services and it turns
out that the same or similar terms are registered TMs, you will not be
infringing is your use is bona fide and consistent with fair practice.
However, if you are using that term in a trade mark sense – in other words
to distinguish your goods versus describing them, then you are on shaky
ground.56 As soon as it looks like you are actually trying to deceive or confuse
consumers into thinking your product is that of the TM owner’s product, you
are heading out of this defence.
See Plascon-Evans Paints (Pty) Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at
644 (dealing with corresponding section under the 1963 Act), per Corbett JA:
‘without attempting to give an exact definition of what constitutes a bona fide description for
the purposes of s46(b), it seems to me that what the legislature intended to safeguard by
means of the provisions of the subsection is the use by a trader, in relation to his goods, of
words, which are fairly descriptive of his goods, genuinely for the purpose of describing the
character or quality of the goods: the use of the words must not be a mere device to secure
some ulterior object, as for example where the words are used in order to take advantage of
the goodwill attaching to the registered trade mark of another’
Read: Tri-ang Pedigree (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Prima Toys (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 448 (A)57
Standard Bank of SA v United Bank Ltd 1991 (4) SA 780 (T)
56
Because, remember, the plaintiff has the registration ie the right to use it as a trade mark – you
don’t.
57 Tri-ang Pedigree (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Prima Toys (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 448 (A). Tri-ang was the TM
proprietor of FIRST LOVE. It marketed another doll, under the trade mark BABY FIRST LOVE. Prima
Toys brought a trade mark infringement action based on their registered trade mark BABY LOVE.
Although the court accepted that the word “BABY” was descriptive of a doll it went on to state:
‘Section 46(b) protects any bona fide description of the character or quality of the goods. ‘Baby’ as used
in BABY FIRST LOVE was not being used to describe the character or quality of the doll. It was used
as part of a trade mark.’
s34(2)(c) the bona fide use of the trade mark in relation to goods or services
where it is reasonable to indicate the intended purpose of such goods,
including spare parts and accessories, and such services
What would not constitute bona fide use under s34(2)(c)? Possibly if:
-it is done in such a manner as to give the impression that there is a commercial
connection between the third party and the trade mark owner;
-it affects the value of the trade mark by taking unfair advantage of its distinctive
character or repute;
-it entails the discrediting or denigration of that mark
s34(2)(d) The importation into or the distribution, sale or offering for sale in the
Republic of goods to which the trade mark has been applied by or with the
consent of the proprietor
Your registration of the TM does not entitle you to control the individual items which
bear the TM if you have applied the TM or given permission for it to be applied, to
those items/goods.
Why? Once you put your goods on the market, your trade mark right should not
allow you to retain control over it. This goes back to the purpose of TMs.
This means that goods which are legitimately on the market under your trademark,
regardless of where the TM was applied to those goods, can be sold, imported, or
distributed without your further permission as TM holder.
You cannot claim infringement if someone imports goods bearing your TM if the TM
was placed on the goods by you/with your permission. They are, therefore, genuinely
branded goods. However, if the goods have been altered in a way that renders them
no longer genuine, then the defence will not apply.58
58
The parallel importation of ‘grey goods’, even if made by a licensee, is not infringement. The goods
must be ‘genuine’ goods. If the goods have been altered in a way that renders them no longer
genuine, then the defence will not apply.
depreciated after the affixing of the trade mark and before their sale by the
respondent.’
-Television Radio Centre (Pty) Ltd v Sony Kabushiki Kaisha t/a Sony Corporation
1987 2 SA 994 (A) at 1013- depends on whether the goods can be considered not to
be genuine goods because they differ.
‘To sum up: the recorders imported by Television will not work at all in South Africa unless
converted. Conversion requires operations of a technical nature which are not insubstantial.
Even after conversion, the recorders perform less well than may reasonably be expected of
new machines. In these circumstances I agree with Mr Bishop that the recorders converted by
Television must, for purposes of this appeal, be regarded as machines different from those
imported. It follows therefore, that the recorders sold by Television are not the 'genuine
goods' which were marked by Sony with its trade mark. The sale of such recorders bearing
Sony's trade mark constitutes, in my view, an infringement pursuant to s 44(1)(a) of the Act.’
Meaning of ‘utilitarian’?
Cointreau et Cie SA v Pagan International 1991 4 SA 706 (A) at 712-713:
‘According to the Oxford English Dictionary ‘utilitarian’, in what appears to be the most
apposite adjectival sense, means ‘of or pertaining to utility’; and the relevant meaning of
‘utility’ seems to be: ‘the fact, character or quality of being useful or serviceable; fitness for
some desirable purpose or valuable end; usefulness, serviceableness’.
And at 714D
‘It must be recognised that in many instances a container feature cannot be categorised as
purely functional (or utilitarian) or purely non-functional (or non-utilitarian). Thus, for
example, a container may have a very unusual and distinctive overall shape or be equipped
with a uniquely ornamental stopper. The overall shape is not wholly non-functional (or non-
utilitarian) for it does serve to hold the contents of the container, but on the other hand because
of its unusual and distinctive shape it cannot be classed as purely functional (or utilitarian) and
the same is true of the ornamental stopper. In these circumstances the issue as to whether the
feature is functional (or utilitarian) or not becomes a matter of degree.’
This defence will only apply to the use of features which serve primarily or
predominantly functional or utilitarian purpose.
The defence only holds if the use is in the form in which the mark is registered and
for the period during which your TM is registered. The defendant will argue that he is
merely using his right the to trade in terms of the registered trade mark.
DEFENCES:
The defences which could be raised are:
a. Denial of Infringement
b. Counterclaim for rectification or removal of the trademark on the basis that the
registration is invalid
c. Saving of Vested Rights s3659
d. Estoppel, Acquiescence
c. The s34(2) grounds
59 Prior Use s36(1) see previous lecture note and the TMA – nb section!
Proprietor of a registered tm cannot prevent the use or object to the registration by any person of an
identical or similar mark where that mark has been used continuously from a date prior to the date of
first use or registration of his mark. Aim is to protect vested rights in unregistered tms; is only
available to proprietor of unregistered tm who started using it before the date of registration of
registered tm. Where the proprietor of the registered tm has also used the mark prior to registration,
the proprietor of the unreg mark may have to prove he used it first.
McDonald’s: ‘it would be enough for a plaintiff to prove that the mark is well known as
a mark which has its origin in some foreign country, provided that as a fact the
proprietor of the mark is a person falling within sub-section (1)(a) or (b). (15D)
Note that the mark must have been well-known at the time the second user adopted
the mark.
Example: Person X in Italy has the trade mark GORP-Italia for clothes which is
famous around the world. X does not trade in SA. A South African registers GORP-
Italia for clothes under the TMA and proceeds to use this trade mark in their clothing
business. If X wants to enter the SA market, it will find that the mark is already being
used for clothing.
To make use of the s 35 protection60 X needs to show that GORP-Italia was well-
known in SA as the mark of X BEFORE the South African trader started to use the
mark. In other words, X must show that at the time the South African appropriated
the mark, local consumers already knew of GORP-Italia in SA as the mark of X
(even though X was not trading here).
HOWEVER, if X cannot show this, then s 35 cannot help.
Read: AM Moolla Group Ltd and Others v The Gap (2005) 6 SA 568 SCA – to get to
grips with this!61
“To conclude: A local mark, validly appropriated, cannot lose its value or protection simply
because someone else’s reputation overtakes its business. Although the marks in contention
may at first blush appear to be imitations or reproductions of the respondents’ marks, the
crucial point is that when any reproduction or imitation took place, it was not of a ‘well-
known’ mark but of a mark not well known within this country. As we have seen, there is and
never has been anything wrong with the reproduction or imitation of a mark that is not well
known. Salt of the Earth was the first proprietor of these marks in South Africa and became
the proprietor at a stage when the respondents’ marks were not yet well known.”
AND NOTE that s 36(2) vests the rights of those who made bona fide use of the
mark prior to this provision coming into effect (31 August 1991) – You must review s
36 – make sure that you understand its effect!
60
(for example to apply to remove the mark under s 10(6))
61 Can you think of any examples in SA?
S 36 VESTED RIGHTS
Section s36 vests rights in two instances – review this section on your own. It is
IMPORTANT – and it will come up again when we do passing off.
/end/