Russian-Ukrainian Church Turmoil Driven by Political Ambitions

With less than six months to go before Ukraine’s presidential election, the country’s unpopular
leader, Petro Poroshenko, has set himself the ambitious task of dismantling the canonical
Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is an autonomous part of the Russian Orthodox Church, and
creating a single national church out of the many Christian denominations in his country. His
initiative may or may not win him extra points at the March 2019 poll, but it has already
exacerbated frictions with Russia, re-opened old confessional wounds in Ukraine and now
threatens to divide Orthodox Christians worldwide.
Poroshenko’s efforts rely on a fragile marriage of convenience with a major ally who is likewise
trying to boost his political clout at Moscow’s expense: Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of
Constantinople. Propelled, according to Patriarch Bartholomew, by requests from “the honorable
Ukrainian Government,” his patriarchate’s Holy Synod on Oct. 11 decided to restore the
legitimacy of two Ukrainian clerics leading shismatic churches not acknowledged by Moscow or
any of the other 13 autocephalous Orthodox churches. By doing so, the Synod de facto
delegitimized the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is closely tied to its Russian
counterpart. The Moscow Patriarchate has called the act an “illegal intrusion” into its “canonical
territory.”
While Poroshenko and Patriarch Bartholomew have cast the church split as a struggle against
undue Russian influence in Ukraine, this simplistic narrative does not address either what critics
describe as the president’s radical departure from Western notions of separation of church and
state, or the consternation that the ecumencial patriarch’s actions have stirred up among the
world’s other Orthodox churches.

Ukraine’s Orthodox Christians

Church name Ukrainian Orthodox Kievan Patriarchate (UOC Ukrainian

Church (UOC MP) KP) Autocephalous
Orthodox Church
Number of >12,000 Just over 5,000 ~1,200
parishes (plus ~250 (plus some 60 monasteries)
monasteries)
Head of Metropolitan Onufry Filaret (“patriarch” until Makary
church October 2018)* (“metropolitan” until
October 2018)*
Relationship Head of church is Founded in 1992 after Split off from the
with Moscow elected by the Synod Metropolitan Filaret Russian Orthodox
of Bishops of the (Denisenko) of Kiev split Church in 1917
Ukrainian Orthodox from Moscow and anointed
Church, with the himself the patriarch of
blessing of the Kiev; the Russian Orthodox
patriarch of Moscow Church anathematized
Filaret in 1997
Relationship Recognized as the sole Unrecognized before Unrecognized before
with global canonical Orthodox October 2018; afterward, October 2018;
Orthodoxy church in Ukraine by Filaret reinstated as hierarch, afterward, Makary
 all 14 autocephalous under the authority of reinstated as hierarch,
Orthodox churches, Patriarch Bartholomew  under the authority of
until October 2018 Patriarch
Bartholomew 
* The Holy Synod’s decision says merely that the two are “restored in rank” without specifying
that rank; for Filaret, that is no doubt still being negotiated.

Church Matters as Presidential Campaign Strategy

In early 2018, Poroshenko unexpectedly declared that Patriarch Bartholomew would soon issue
a tomos (the Greek term for an official church document) on independence, or autocephaly, for
the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. He described the issue as “critical” for Ukrainian statehood,
and urged the Ukrainian parliament to support his appeal to the patriarch, which it did in April. 
Poroshenko’s timing is not hard to explain. Church unity is an issue whose time has come
because presidential elections will take place in March and Poroshenko is very far behind in the
polls, hovering between 6 and 12 percent as of September, compared to 10-19 percent for
frontrunner Yulia Tymoshenko, a former prime minister. It has been obvious since 2015 that his
political course has little appeal in eastern and southern Ukraine. His electoral base, such that it
is, lies primarily in western and central Ukraine, which is also the regional base of the Kievan
Patriarchate. Even there, however, he is running third, at best.
Thus, Poroshenko’s only chance for re-election is to make it to the run-off round, and he can
only hope to do so if he first wins decisively in the west and center. In this part of the country he
could plausibly take votes away from his key rivals, Tymoshenko and former Defense Minister
Anatoly Hrytsenko, by promoting a more nationalist agenda. His rivals are reluctant to do so,
because they are also trying to appeal to voters in the east and south.
As an electoral strategy such an approach makes sense: According to a recent poll, 54 percent of
Ukrainians nationwide support autocephaly, with the number going up to 68 percent in the west
and 58 percent in the center; only 19 percent nationwide oppose the measure.
Nonetheless, for the nation as a whole, the strategy is a risky one: Over half of respondents
among parishioners of the canonical Moscow-aligned church oppose autocephaly, while 28
percent support it. Any dramatic change in the religious status quo could provoke public
demonstrations in the hundreds of thousands, which both the Kievan Patriarchate and
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church have shown themselves quite capable of organizing.
Accentuating their division during an election year might seem ill-advised, but Poroshenko
seems convinced that this is the only strategy that gives him any hope for re-election.

Is Constantinople’s Glory Fading?

It is clear what Poroshenko stands to gain (or lose), but what does the ecumenical patriarch gain
from this alliance? Simply put, a chance to prove his relevance to the Orthodox world. Since the
Moscow Patriarchate’s own autocephaly in 1589, its size and influence have waxed, while
Constantinople’s have waned. This has spawned a pattern of conflict that has expanded over
time.
In the current dispute over jurisdiction in Ukraine, the ecumenical patriarch makes four points in
support of the Synod’s decision. While the first three concern primarily arcane matters of
canonical jurisdiction, the fourth argument, meant to cement the others, smacks more of
geopolitics: “Since Russia, as the one responsible for the current painful situation in Ukraine, is
unable to solve the problem, the Ecumenical Patriarchate assumed the initiative of resolving the
problem.” (Moscow disputes all these assertions, arguing, among other things, that the right to
appoint hierarchs in Kiev was granted to it in perpetuity.)
For now, we do not know how the other Orthodox churches will respond to the Holy Synod’s
October decision. So far eight patriarchates (Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, Moscow, Serbia,
Bulgaria, Poland, the Czech Lands and Slovakia) have voiced serious concerns about
Constantinople’s actions. Given their seniority, the objections of the three most ancient
patriarchates—Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem—will be the most influential in determining
how the Orthodox world interprets these events. 
Meanwhile, Patriarch Bartholomew’s decision to assert personal control over his Ukrainian
jurisdictions thrusts Constantinople directly into Ukrainian politics, since now he alone will
appoint (and remove) the leadership of the church. Since the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox
Church does not recognize his authority to do so, the Ukrainian government will presumably
have to step in to enforce Constantinople’s decisions.
A Merging of Church and State?
If the government in Kiev takes steps to enforce the authority of the ecumenical patriarch, this
will not only have implications for the daily life of the Orthodox church in Ukraine, but will
profoundly alter the nature of church-state relations.
Last month, Poroshenko intimated that he would like to see the passage of controversial
legislation that would give the state an extraordinary degree of power over church affairs,
including the approval of leaders of religious organizations. Two such bills (draft
laws No. 4128 and No. 4511) were proposed in 2016 by Ukrainian nationalists, who have long
found it troubling that the majority of the country attends a church whose head resides in
Moscow. But they were tabled in committee last year, after being roundly criticized as violating
the separation of church and state guaranteed under the Ukrainian constitution.
By claiming the right to determine which religious organizations are legitimate and which are
not, the president is also warning all religious organizations to toe the government’s political
line. It is certainly no secret that the cardinal sin of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the eyes of
the government has been its refusal to support the war in eastern Ukraine, which Metropolitan
Onufry openly calls a “fratricidal conflict” and a “civil war.” With the establishment of a new
church around the Kievan Patriarchate, Ukraine will have a de facto state church, and the fate of
the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church will serve as a poignant lesson to others about the dire
consequences of opposing the political establishment.
Filaret, the hierarch of the Kievan Patriarchate previously unrecognized by the canonical
Orthodox churches, has been a major voice in this effort. Among religious organizations, his
patriarchate was the notable exception that did not oppose legislation strengthening government
control over church affairs. He expects that a new, unified Orthodox church independent of
Moscow will become the church of the Ukrainian nation. Once it does, the “imperial” or
“colonial” period, as he puts it, will finally be over and history can be re-written, with far
reaching geopolitical implications: “Ukraine was never, is not and never will be part of Russia.”

Worsening Relations with Russia

Poroshenko has presented the struggle over an independent Ukrainian church as part of his
country’s battle with Moscow and what he sees as its persistent colonial ambitions in Ukraine.
Last month, in his state-of-Ukraine speech to parliament, he said that autocephaly for the
Ukrainian church would be “the fall of the Third Rome, Moscow’s most ancient claim to global
hegemony.” In May, he convinced three ex-presidents—Leonid Kravchuk, Leonid Kuchma and
Viktor Yushchenko—to issue a statement supporting his initiative: “We are convinced,” the
statement says, “that the unity of the Ukrainian people, the strengthening of which will in large
measure result from the autocephalous orthodox local church, will become an insurmountable
spiritual fortress in the struggle with Russian aggression against Ukraine.”
Russia has responded vigorously. A day after Constantinople’s decision to reinstate the two non-
Moscow-aligned clerics, Filaret and Makary, Russia’s Security Council discussed the matter at a
meeting led by President Vladimir Putin. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters that
“Russia will defend the interests of the Orthodox” in Ukraine if developments there “take the
course of illegal activities.” While Peskov insisted that such a defense would be diplomatic and
political in nature, such language has made Ukrainians understandably nervous in light of
Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and military intervention in Donbas, where more than
10,000 people have already died as a result of the conflict.
The key political problem for Kiev in this context will be what to do if violence erupts during
attempts to transfer church property from the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church to the newly
established national church. If the current pattern holds, the Russian government will blame the
Ukrainian government and demand international condemnation. The Ukrainian government will
blame all violence on Moscow and its “fifth column” in Ukraine. And Western governments
will, for the most part, accept the latter explanation and be done with the matter.  
There is also a real danger that the Ukrainian government will make the mistake of
turning Metropolitan Onufry into a martyr for religious freedom, and a galvanizing symbol
for Russophile Ukrainians, whose numbers are now higher than at any time since April 2014. It
is an ominous sign that he has been added to the Myrotovrets (“peacekeeper”) website, a semi-
official resource set up by advisors to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which Ukrainian financial
and government agencies use to identify “bandits and terrorists.”

Prospects and Consequences

Patriarch Bartholomew has sent two envoys (exarchs) to Ukraine to negotiate the following
complicated dance: first, the recognition of Filaret’s Kievan Patriarchate and Makary’s Ukrainian
Autocephalous Orthodox Church as canonical churches by the ecumenical patriarch; second, the
relinquishing of their current independence, followed by integration and the acceptance of
oversight from the ecumenical patriarchate; third, and finally, the granting of autocephaly to this
newly constituted local Orthodox Church. Each of these steps would under normal circumstances
take decades and the results should then be submitted for the approval of all the other local
Orthodox churches. Filaret, however, insiststhat it be done before the presidential elections next
March. (Ukraine’s Greek Catholics, initially part of the plan, have rejected any participation in
it.)
For Filaret, too, there are tempting financial and political benefits to be considered. Speaking to
the Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. in September 2018, he estimated that two-thirds of
parishes would join the new “Ukrainian church.” When this happens, he said, “the Moscow
Patriarchate will no longer be the largest in the world … and will not have so much influence.”
Attempts to create a new church, even if successful, are likely to further complicate efforts to re-
integrate Donbas (and Crimea, if ever that becomes a possibility), since the canonical Ukrainian
Orthodox Church is the only institution that has a presence throughout all of Ukraine, and is thus
the only public institution that, in the words of Metropolitan Onufry, “holds the entire country
together.”
Perhaps the only thing we can be certain of is that Poroshenko and the patriarchs have unleashed
a process that will add considerably to the overall messiness of Ukrainian politics, and leave
much bitterness in people’s hearts, long after the politicians and patriarchs are gone.
https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/russian-ukrainian-church-turmoil-driven-political-
ambitions?fbclid=IwAR1mJotymI4gsd1EGliCL9ELBA6yQ1CsmMPVxjAkNLshg0xh0u9c6ou-
yCc, 19.10.2018.