SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 125356. November 21, 2001

SUPREME TRANSLINER INC., FELIPE SIA and NOVENCIO FLORES, petitioners, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, GLORIA BRAZAL and minor LOTIS BRAZAL, represented by her
father, NOEL BRAZAL, Respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition seeks to annul the decision 1

dated September 21, 1995, of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. No. 39784, and its resolution 2
dated June 18, 1996 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioners Supreme Transliner Inc. and Felipe Sia are the registered owners of a bus driven by
co-petitioner Novencio Flores. On September 24, 1990, the bus collided with a passenger jeepney
carrying private respondents Gloria and Lotis Brazal. At the time of the incident, the jeepney was
owned and registered in the name of Marcelino Villones and driven by Reynaldo Decena.

As a result of the collision, private respondents suffered injuries. They instituted Civil Case No.
SP-3312 for damages against petitioners based on quasi-delict and against Villones and Decena for
breach of contract. Petitioners, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against Country Bankers
Insurance Company, insurer of the Supreme Transliner bus.

During the trial, Gloria Brazal testified that on September 24, 1990, she and her daughter Lotis
were on board the passenger jeepney when the Supreme Transliner bus hit it, causing them
injuries that required medical treatment.

Decena and Villones testified on their own behalf and presented Luzviminda Malabanan and Sgt.
Nicolas M. Roxas as witnesses. Decena recounted that on September 24, 1990, at about 2:00 P.M.,
he was driving a passenger jeepney bound for Candelaria, Quezon. On board, the jeepney was
about fifteen passengers, including private respondents Gloria and Lotis Brazal. Upon reaching
Sampaloc, Sariaya, Quezon, a Supreme Transliner bus coming from the opposite direction,
suddenly appeared on a curved portion of the road and overtook another jeepney, which it was
then following. Thereafter, the bus collided with Decenas jeepney.

Petitioners presented Novencio Flores and Moises Alvarez, the Manager of Supreme Transliner.
Both testified that the passenger jeepney was running very fast when the accident occurred. On
the third-party complaint, petitioners showed that they already submitted the required documents
for insurance claim and that Country Bankers Insurance Company promised to settle the claim, but
did not.

On October 28, 1992, the trial court rendered its judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding that the plaintiffs [have] established by preponderance of evidence the
allegations of the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered:

ON THE COMPLAINT:

1. Ordering the defendants Felipe Sia, as registered owner of the Supreme Bus, and Novencio
Flores primarily liable for the damages of the plaintiffs and directing them to jointly and severally
pay plaintiffs the following:

a. The amount of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) by way of actual damages;
b. The amount of P10,000.00 by way of moral damages;

c. The amount of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees.

On the third-party complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the third-party defendant to
pay the third-party plaintiffs any and all amounts that they have paid to the plaintiffs by reason of
this decision provided it does not exceed P50,000.00.

Third-party defendant is also ordered to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.3cräläwvirtualibräry

The trial court declared that Flores was negligent in operating the bus, while Sia failed to exercise
the diligence of a good father of a family in the choice, supervision and direction of his employees.

On the third-party complaint, the trial court found that Supreme Transliner had insured the bus
with Country Bankers, paid the premiums for the period covering the accident, and made an
insurance claim by notifying the insurer and submitting the required documents. However, until the
filing of the complaint, Country Bankers had not acted upon Supreme Transliners claim. The trial
court ordered Country Bankers to pay third-party plaintiffs an amount not exceeding P50,000.

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals where they maintained that the trial court erred in:
(a) pronouncing them liable to private respondents; (b) awarding the amount of P25,000 as actual
damages; and (c) finding Sia solidarily liable with driver Flores. Country Bankers Insurance
Company filed on July 5, 1994, a manifestation and motion wherein it stated that it had already
settled its maximum liability under the policy, and therefore prayed for its exclusion from the case.

On September 21, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, decreeing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED subject to the Manifestation and Motion filed by
third-party defendant as discussed in the text of herein decision.

Costs against defendant-third party appellant Felipe Sia and defendant-appellant Novencio C.
Flores.

SO ORDERED.4cräläwvirtualibräry

The Court of Appeals found that there was competent and preponderant evidence which showed
that driver Novencio Flores negligence was the proximate cause of the mishap and that Felipe Sia
failed to perform the required degree of care in the selection and supervision of the bus driver. It
also found that the actual damages representing the medical expenses incurred by private
respondents were properly supported by receipts.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied. Hence, this petition, where
petitioners raise the following issues:

ARE EVIDENCES (SIC) IN THE RECORDS OF THE CASE BUT NOT OFFERED BY A PARTY LITIGANT
BE CONSIDERED IN THE LATTERS FAVOR?

II

ARE EVIDENCES (SIC) ADDUCED BY A CO-DEFENDANT BE CONSIDERED AS EVIDENCES (SIC) OF

THE PLAINTIFF AS AGAINST THE OTHER DEFENDANT?5cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision which was
mainly based on the evidence proffered by their co-defendants Decena and Villones. Petitioners
contend that this evidence, which proved their liability for quasi-delict, could not be appreciated
against them because the same was not adopted, much less offered in evidence by private
respondents. Neither did Decena and Villones file a cross-claim against them. Consequently, in
accordance with Section 1, 6 Rule 131 and Sections 34 7 and 35 8, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
said evidence was placed beyond the courts consideration, hence they could not be held liable on
the basis thereof.

Private respondents contend that Philippine courts are not only courts of law but of equity and
justice as well. The Court of Appeals, being a court of record, has to appreciate all the facts and
evidence before it in determining the parties rights and liabilities regardless of who among the
litigants actually presented the same. Further, they point out that the issue is being raised for the
first time, thus it is highly improper to nullify or reverse the Court of Appeals decision based solely
on a completely new and foreign ground.

For our resolution are the following issues: (a) Who has the burden of proving herein petitioners
liability? (b) May the evidence presented by Decena and Villones be considered in determining
preponderance of evidence against herein petitioners?

Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law, which is preponderance of evidence in civil cases. 9 The party,
whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof to
obtain a favorable judgment. For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one which is not a denial
of an essential ingredient in the plaintiffs cause of action, but one which, if established, will be a
good defense i.e. an avoidance of the claim. 10cräläwvirtualibräry

In this case, both private respondents as well as the jeepney driver Reynaldo Decena and its
owner Marcelino Villones claim that the bus driver, Novencio Flores, was liable for negligently
operating the bus. For private respondents, the claim constitutes their cause of action against
petitioners which said private respondents must prove by preponderance of evidence. At the same
time, the same claim is a matter of affirmative defense on the part of Decena and Villones who are
impleaded as co-defendants of petitioners. Therefore, both private respondents as well as the said
co-defendants had the burden of proving petitioners negligence by the quantum of proof required
to establish the latters liability, i.e. by preponderance of evidence.

On the second issue, we rule in the affirmative. The evidence presented by the jeepney owner and
its driver, Villones and Decena, forms part of the totality of the evidence concerning the negligence
committed by petitioners as defendants in quasi-delict case. Preponderance of evidence is
determined by considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, culled from the evidence,
regardless of who actually presented it. 11 Petitioners liability were proved by the evidence
presented by Decena and Villones at the trial, taken together with the evidence presented by the
victims of the collision, namely herein private respondents Gloria and Lotis Brazal.

We find petitioners reliance on Sections 34 and 35 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court misplaced.
Petitioners cited these rules to support their allegation that evidence by Decena and Villones
should not be considered in private respondents favor since the latter did not adopt much less
offer them in evidence. Nothing in Section 34 requires that the evidence be offered or adopted by
a specific party before it could be considered in his favor. It is enough that the evidence is offered
for the courts consideration. We find, moreover, no pertinence in petitioners invocation of Rule 35,
on when to make an offer, except to indicate to us petitioners reliance on inapplicable technicalities
that betray the lack of merit of their petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision and resolution dated September 21,
1995 and June 18, 1996, respectively, of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-45137. September 23, 1985.]

FE J. BAUTISTA and MILAGROS J. CORPUS, Petitioners, v. HON. MALCOLM G.

SARMIENTO, District Judge, Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch I and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

CUEVAS, J.:

In this special civil action of Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, petitioners assail
respondent Judge Malcolm G. Sarmiento’s denial of their Motion to Dismiss filed in the nature of
demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 808 for Estafa entitled "PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
FE BAUTISTA, MILAGROS CORPUS and TERESITA VERGERE", pending before the defunct Court of
First Instance of Pampanga-Branch I.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

An information charging Fe Bautista, Milagros Corpus and Teresita Vergere with estafa was filed
before the sala of Judge Malcolm G. Sarmiento. The third accused, Teresita Vergere, was granted a
separate trial. To prove its case, the prosecution presented during the trial the private
complainant, Dr. Leticia C. Yap, as its only witness. Thereafter, Petitioners, believing the
prosecution failed to prove their guilty beyond reasonable doubt, moved to dismissal the case by
way of demurrer to the evidence.

In an Order dated June 3, 1976 respondent judge denied said motion. 1 The Order
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Fe Bautista and Milagros Corpus, Accused, through counsel, filed a ‘Motion to Dismiss’ (Demurrer
to Evidence) to the information charging the two accused for Estafa. The other third accused
Teresita Vergere an granted a separate trial.

The grounds alleged in the Motion to Dismiss are as follows: First, the information alleges that the
two accused received jewelries from Dr. Leticia C. Yap on April 19, 1975 on consignment. The
defense’ contention is that the jewelries were received by the said accused by virtue of purchase
and sale. The defense overlooks the other allegation in the Information specifically alleging: —

‘That these pieces of jewelries should be sold by the accused on commission basis and to pay or to
deliver the proceeds thereof to Dr. Leticia C. Yap if sold, and if not sold to return said jewelries.’ . .
.

‘In spite of represented demands made on the said accused, said accused failed and refused and
still fails and refuses to return the jewelries or deliver the proceeds thereof to the damage and
prejudice of said Dr. Leticia C. Yap in the total amount of P77,300.00.’

The meaning of consignment is not a sale.

‘It means that the goods sent by one person to another, to be sold or disposed of by the latter for
and on account of the former. The transmission of the goods."cralaw virtua1aw library

Agency is within the foregoing meaning by Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (Vol. 1, pp. 619-620).

The offended party testified that the accused acted as her agents for the sale of the jewelries.
Second ground, that the prosecution failed to establish the prior demand to prove misappropriation
on the part of the accused. Exhibits B and B-1 are documentary evidence to establish demand
through Atty. Gorospe made by the offended party prior to the filing of the case. This letter of
demand was subsequently made after several previous oral demands were made by the
complainant on said accused.

The Court believes that the prosecution established a prima facie case of Estafa alleged in the
Information against said accused on the evidence presented so far on record.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby denies the defense’ Motion to Dismiss and orders the
trial of this case for the reception of evidence of the accused on July 9, 1976 at 8:00 o’clock in the
morning.

SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library

Accordingly, a motion for reconsideration was duly filed 2 but was likewise denied "for lack of
merit." 3 Hence, this petition.

Initially, it is necessary to point out that the remedy of certiorari is improper. The respondent
Judge’s order denying the petitioners’ motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to the
evidence is merely an interlocutory order. It cannot, therefore, be the subject of a petition for
certiorari. What should have been done was to continue with the trial of the case and had the
decision been adverse, to raise the issue on appeal. 4

The rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, however, admits an exception. This is
when the questioned order is an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. 5 But, even granting
petitioners the benefit of the exception, still certiorari would not lie. For, as would be shortly
explained, there was no arbitrary exercise of judicial authority.

It is the contention of petitioners that respondent Judge lost jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of
the case and that he was in duty-bound to acquit them, considering his findings in denying their
motion to dismiss that." . . the prosecution established a prima facie case of Estafa alleged in the
Information against said accused on the evidence presented so far on record." Petitioners further
argue that in a criminal case, conviction can be had only upon proof beyond reasonable doubt and
not on a mere prima facie case.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Since the denial of the motion to dismiss was anchored on a finding of a prima facie case, a clear
understanding of the term and its implications is in order.

"A prima facie case is that amount of evidence which would be sufficient to counterbalance the
general presumption of innocence, and warrant a conviction, if not encountered and controlled by
evidence tending to contradict it, and render it improbable, or to prove other facts inconsistent
with it, and the establishment of a prima facie case does not take away the presumption of
innocence which may in the opinion of the jury be such as to rebut and control it. Ex parte Parr,
288 P. 852, 855,106 Cal. App. 95." 6

There is no denying that in a criminal case, unless the guilt of the accused is established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal. Put when the trial court denies petitioners’
motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution had
established a prima facie case against them, they assume a definite burden. It becomes incumbent
upon petitioners to adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima facie case
against them. 7 This is due to the shift in the burden of evidence, and not of the burden of proof
as petitioners would seem to believe.

When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, as in the case at bar,
the burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It remains throughout the trial with the party
upon whom it is imposed — the prosecution. It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to
party depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the trial 8 This burden of going
forward with the evidence is met by evidence which balances that introduced by the prosecution.
Then the burden shifts back.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

A prima facie case need not be countered by a preponderance of evidence nor by evidence of
greater weight. Defendant’s evidence which equalizes the weight of plaintiff’s evidence or puts the
case in equipoise is sufficient. As a result, plaintiff will have to go forward with the proof. Should it
happen that at the trial the weight of evidence is equally balanced or at equilibrium and
presumptions operate against plaintiff who has the burden of proof, he cannot prevail. 9

In the case at bar, the order denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss, required them to present their
evidence. They refused and or failed to do so. This justified an inference of their guilt. The
inevitable result was that the burden of evidence shifted on them to prove their innocence, or at
least, raises a reasonable doubt as to their guilt.

Petitioners, likewise, assign as error the order of respondent Judge directing them to present their
evidence after the denial of their motion to dismiss. By doing so, they contend that respondent
Judge would, in effect, be relying on the possible weakness of the defense’ evidence, rather than
on the strength of the prosecution’s own evidence in resolving their guilt or innocence.chanrobles
law library

We find petitioners’ aforesaid submission utterly devoid of merit. Such a procedure finds support in
the case of Arbriol v. Homeres 10 wherein we held that —

"Now that the Government cannot appeal in criminal cases if the defendant would be placed
thereby in double jeopardy (Sec. 2, Rule 118), the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of the
evidence after the prosecution has rested terminates the case then and there. But if the motion for
dismissal is denied the court should proceed to hear the evidence for the defense before entering
judgment, regardless of whether or not the defense had reserved its right to present evidence in
the event its motion for dismissal be denied. The reason is that it is the constitutional right of the
accused to be heard in his defense before sentence is pronounced on him. Of course if the accused
has no evidence to present or expressly waives the right to present it, the court has no alternative
but to decide the case upon the evidence presented by the prosecution alone." (Emphasis
supplied).

WHEREFORE, finding the order complained of to be well-taken and there being no grave abuse of
discretion that attended its issuance, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against
petitioners.

The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga where this case is now assigned, is
hereby ordered to continue immediately with the trial of Criminal Case No. 808 until its final
disposition.

SO ORDERED.