You are on page 1of 20

Applied Economics

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/raec20

Doing well while doing good: ESG ratings and


corporate bond returns

Sebastian A. Gehricke, Xinfeng Ruan & Jin E. Zhang

To cite this article: Sebastian A. Gehricke, Xinfeng Ruan & Jin E. Zhang (2023): Doing well
while doing good: ESG ratings and corporate bond returns, Applied Economics, DOI:
10.1080/00036846.2023.2178624

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2023.2178624

© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa


UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.

Published online: 21 Feb 2023.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 363

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at


https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=raec20
APPLIED ECONOMICS
https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2023.2178624

Doing well while doing good: ESG ratings and corporate bond returns
a
Sebastian A. Gehricke , Xinfeng Ruanb and Jin E. Zhangb
a
Climate and Energy Finance Group (CEFGroup) and Senior Lecturer, Department of Accountancy and Finance, University of Otago, Dunedin,
New Zealand; bDepartment of Accountancy and Finance, Otago Business School, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
The relationship between ESG performance and equity returns has become a popular area of ESG; sustainable investing;
research, but the same is not yet the case for bond returns. In this paper, we explore whether corporate bond returns;
incorporating ESG factors, beyond emissions into the bond portfolio investment process leads to responsible investing
under or out performance. We find that ESG investing in bond portfolios does not lead to over or JEL CLASSIFICATION
under performance. In other words, you do not have to ‘pay to do good’. Further, in the period G11; G12
since the Paris agreement, Energy sector bond portfolio returns are positively related to ESG
factors. This finding aligns with the theoretical prediction of Pedersen, Fitzgibbons, and
Pomorski (2020), namely, that the ESG-return relationship should become positive as investors
become more aware of ESG risks and opportunities. Overall, we show that Bond investors can ‘do
well while doing good’.

I. Introduction warming target. Companies that do not address


The global climate change emergency has acceler­ climate change, by transitioning away from carbon
ated the transition to more sustainable business intense practices, already face increasing financing
practices in recent years. There is a vast literature costs due to new climate-related capital require­
exploring, empirically and theoretically, the effect ments and the general trend towards sustainable
of more responsible investment strategies on equity investing (Krueger, Sautner, and Starks 2020). In
portfolio returns, showing that these strategies recent year’s investors and portfolio managers over­
increase financial performance. However, far less seeing vast investments have been incorporating
attention has been paid to bond investments. In ESG factors, beyond pure climate change issues, in
this article, we show that investing more responsi­ their investment processes to manage risks and
bly in bond markets does not lead to under or over capture opportunities. This growth can be easily
performance. Further, since the Paris agreement, as seen in Figure 1, which plots the number of signa­
investors become more aware of sustainability tories to the United Nations Principles of
issues, incorporating Environmental, Social and Responsible Investing (UN PRI). Further, global
Governance (ESG) factors in the investment pro­ assets under management with ESG considerations
cess can lead to outperformance in the Energy grew from 22.8 Trillion to 30.7 Trillion USD, from
industry. 2016 to 2018 (GSIA 2019) and are projected to be in
Climate change has drawn investor and owner excess of 53 Trillion USD by 2025 using conserva­
attention towards ESG risks, opportunities and tive growth assumptions (Bloomberg 2020). This
impacts. Climate change brings with it many new raises the question of how do the risks and oppor­
opportunities and risks for companies and inves­ tunities of sustainability affect investment returns?
tors. Just in the Energy sector, investment of 2.4 There is a developing literature providing equili­
trillion USD per year is needed between 2016 and brium models of the relationship between ESG
2035 in order to stay in line with the 1.5 degrees of investing, investor ESG preferences/awareness and

CONTACT Xinfeng Ruan xinfeng.ruan@otago.ac.nz Department of Accountancy and Finance, Otago Business School, University of Otago, Dunedin
9054, New Zealand
© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built
upon in any way.
2 S. A. GEHRICKE ET AL.

4000

3500

3000

# of signatories
2500

2000

1500

1000

500

Figure 1. United Nations Principles of Responsible Investing (UNPRI) signatories. This Figure presents the cumulative number of
signatories to the UNPRI.

portfolio returns (Friedman and Heinle 2016; Pastor, of the assets is driven by the systematic risks asso­
Stambaugh, and Taylor 2020; Pedersen, Fitzgibbons, ciated with poor ESG performance (Jin 2018).
and Pomorski 2020). Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor Krueger, Sautner, and Starks (2020) show that insti­
(2020) show that, in equilibrium, green assets will tutional investors believe that climate risks have
have a negative alpha, while brown assets will have material effects on their portfolios, while Amir and
a positive alpha. The negative alpha for green assets is Serafeim (2018) show that investors are integrating
driven by investor preference for green assets, as ESG practices mainly for financial performance rea­
these can hedge climate risks. This exemplifies the sons. For example, higher emissions indicate higher
ESG risk premium hypothesis, namely, investors are climate risks such as regulatory intervention, carbon
willing to give up some return in order to lower their pricing, commodity price risk (fossil fuels are burnt
ESG risk1 Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2020) and create emissions) and technology risk (for
further show that the alpha of green holdings can example, cheaper renewable energy technology).
be positive, reflecting the ESG alpha hypothesis, There are currently mixed empirical results on
when investor tastes (and sufficient investments) the relationship between ESG performance and
shift to green assets, but this is counteracted when financial performance (Auer and Schuhmacher
we have vast dispersion in ESG preferences among 2016; Awaysheh et al. 2020; Revelli and Viviani
investors. Pedersen, Fitzgibbons, and Pomorski 2015; Van Beurden and Gössling 2008). Several
(2020) add an ESG unaware mean-variance optimiz­ studies have found a negative relationship between
ing investor to their model and show that the larger ESG performance and financial performance. Luo
the unaware investors proportional wealth the lower and Balvers (2017) for example, show that the
the returns to high ESG assets. Combining the theo­ negative screening of the worst ESG performers
retical findings of Pedersen, Fitzgibbons, and leads to outperformance in those excluded stocks.
Pomorski (2020) and Pastor, Stambaugh, and However, most of the recent literature documents
Taylor (2020), whether there is outperformance or a positive or non-negative relationship between
underperformance related to ESG factors depends on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) or ESG,
the dispersion of ESG preferences and the relative and financial performance (Busch and Friede
awareness of ESG risks by investors. 2018; Friede, Busch, and Bassen 2015; Margolis
In either the ESG alpha (outperformance related et al. 2007; Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2012;
to ESG) or the ESG risk premium (underperfor­ among others). Maiti (2020) shows that a three-
mance related to ESG) hypotheses, the performance factor model with market, size and ESG factors

1
show that during the start of the COVID-19 pandemic investors preferred low-ESG risk funds..
APPLIED ECONOMICS 3

outperforms popular asset pricing models and (2020) show that corporate bond returns, which are
therefore ESG should be incorporated in the more sensitive to climate change news, earn lower
investment decision process. Gao, He, and Li returns. This is consistent with the idea of higher
(2022) show that positive media ESG spotlight sig­ demand for bonds, which can be used to hedge
nificantly reduces firms’ cost of debt especially for climate change. Duan, Li, and Wen (2020) explore
firms with poor governance. Further, some studies the relationship between environmental perfor­
show that incorporating ESG factors into the mance of firms and their bond returns more
investment process leads to outperformance directly. They find a significant positive relation­
(Ashwin Kumar et al. 2016; Pollard et al. 2017). ship between lower carbon intensity and bond
In a recent study Bolton and Kacperczyk (2021) returns, in line with the ESG (carbon) alpha
found that stocks of companies with higher total hypothesis, rather than the ESG (carbon) premium
carbon emissions, but not emission intensity, hypothesis. Cao et al. (2021) follow a similar
underperform for the period 2005 to 2017. They approach to show that firms with higher emissions
further show this is not driven by divestment, as experience worse liquidity conditions. Henke
divestment activity is minimal and industry speci­ (2016) shows that 103 socially responsible bond
fic, but rather by investors pricing carbon risk. funds in the US and European Union (EU) have
Eccles, Verheyden, and Feiner (2016) show that outperformed a matched sample of conventional
a 10% best in class ESG screen, that is removing funds, attributable mostly to mitigation of ESG
the 10% worst ESG performing companies (more risks through screening. Bahra and Thukral
commonly called a negative screen), increases port­ (2020) show that ESG ratings are additive to tradi­
folio performance across a large range of invest­ tional credit ratings and can be used to enhance
ment approaches in developed and undeveloped bond portfolio returns. Jang et al. (2020) show that
markets. ESG performance leads to outperformance of their
Bond returns exhibit two important differences bonds, in a Korean bond market sample. Kumar
to stock returns, namely they have limited upside and Khasnis (2020) show that the impact of a credit
and are more exposed to downside risks (Bai, Bali, downgrade on bond returns is lessened if the ESG
and Wen 2019). Therefore, they will likely be rating of the firm is high.
affected more by the predominantly downside Some studies explore the relationship between
risks, such as stranded assets and increased finan­ ESG performance and credit risk/performance in
cing costs, that come with poor ESG performance. other markets. Henisz and McGlinch (2019)
The increased downside risk of high emitting and/ explore media controversies on indigenous land
or low ESG firms is also well documented in the claims and biodiversity as a mechanism for the
literature using realized returns (Jin 2018) and link between ESG and credit risk. Bae, Chang,
option implied measures (Ilhan, Sautner, and and Yi (2018b) and Bae, Chang, and Yi (2018a)
Vilkov 2018; Shafer and Szado 2019). Further, show that there is a relationship between CSR
Albuquerque et al. (2020) show that companies strengths and concerns with syndicated and private
with higher Environmental and Social performance bank loan spreads, respectively.
are more resilient to crisis by examining the In this study, we extend the work of Duan, Li,
COVID-19 pandemic, which caused a major global and Wen (2020) by examining the relationship of
downturn. Following a similar theory as in stock firms overall ESG, and specific E, S and
markets, only that the downside risks are even G performance, with bond returns, rather than
more severe, bond returns may be positively (ESG focussing on carbon intensity only. We analyse
alpha) or negatively (ESG premium) related to ESG this relationship using two approaches, firstly we
performance, depending on the awareness and perform portfolio sorts on our corporate bond
integration of these risks by bond investors. return sample by E, S, G and ESG ratings and
Many studies have explored the relationship explore the returns of high minus low (H-L) ESG
between ESG, at least the E component, and stock factor portfolios. We then calculate risk-adjusted
returns, but studies on bond returns and ESG per­ alphas to explore whether any ESG out or under
formance are still few in number. Huynh and Xia performance persists when we employ the well-
4 S. A. GEHRICKE ET AL.

accepted Carhart (1997) four-factor model. the Energy industry. The Energy industry faces vast
Secondly, we explore the predictive power of ESG political and societal pressure for their emissions.
factors for corporate bond returns, employing For the Energy sector, we find significant bond
a cross-sectional analysis with the well-established portfolio outperformance associated with company
bond return model of Bai, Bali, and Wen (2019). Environmental scores, in the post-Paris agreement
We find that incorporating ESG factors does not period. This shows that ESG risks and opportu­
lead to out or under performance in bond portfo­ nities are being priced in the Energy bond market,
lios and ESG factors do not predict bond returns. but this is a recent phenomenon and is likely driven
This shows that investors can create responsible by trends in
investment strategies in bond markets, without Our results show that incorporating ESG factors
having to pay a premium, but there is also no out­ into the bond investment process does not infer an
performance associated with ESG factors in bond ESG premium for more responsible investing stra­
portfolios over our sample period. This is similar to tegies. Our results are robust to using three differ­
the early results in equity markets as reported by ent ESG rating providers, Refinitiv, Sustainalytics
Hamilton, Jo, and Statman (1993). Therefore, and Bloomberg ESG disclosure scores and the aver­
investors can do well while doing good, as doing age of the three rating providers. This is important
good does not decrease returns, in their bond as recent papers have found that ESG ratings
investments. diverge significantly across providers (Berg,
Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2020) show, in Koelbel, and Rigobon 2022; Berg et al. 2022;
an equilibrium model, that high ESG stocks could Chatterji et al. 2016). This differs to the more
outperform if investors ESG preferences strengthen mature ESG investing industry in equity markets,
over the period analysed. Therefore, we study the which has driven a shift from the ESG alpha to the
sub-sample since the Paris agreement was signed, ESG premium, likely through increased awareness
arguably the most significant global environmental and demand by investors. Taken together with the
agreement to date. Again, we find that there is no results of Duan, Li, and Wen (2020) this suggests
significant under or outperformance of bond that bond investors can still enjoy a first mover
returns associated with ESG factors, even after advantage, potentially being ‘paid to do good’ and
this important piece of regulation. It seems that certainly not ‘paying to do good’, if they move to
bond investors are not yet concerned with wider a more responsible investing strategy, particularly
ESG issues, although carbon emissions do affect in the Energy industry.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol­
bond returns (Duan, Li, and Wen 2020). ESG
lows. We begin by describing our sample in section
risks seem to not be priced significantly in bond
II. We report our method and empirical findings in
markets, although these could be the most exposed
section III before concluding the paper in section IV.
to major downside risks.
Landry, Castillo-Lazaro, and Lee (2017) explore
the relationship, with some controls, between ESG II. Data
ratings and credit default spreads, finding that this
relationship is stronger in some sectors. Further, ESG data
Consolandi, Eccles, and Gabbi (2022), show that Weekly Refinitv ESG data from January 2004 to
ESG factors have more effect on equity returns in March 2020 is collected through DataStream. The
sectors where such risks are more material. To Refinitiv ESG database provides the Environmental
investigate if the more exposed Energy industry’s score (E score), Social score (S score), Governance
bonds might be pricing ESG risks and opportu­ score (G score), ESG score (ESG score), and ESG
nities we split the sample into bonds of firms in plus score (ESG+ score)2 Not all bond issuers ESG
the Energy industry, as defined by the Industry scores are updated simultaneously and as with
Classification Benchmark (ICB), and those not in financial reporting there is a lag effect from the
2
The ESG plus score is provided by Refinitiv and is the ESG score overlaid with their ESG controversies, which captures controversial ESG news for the target
company, so that the ESG score will be decreased if the company exhibits negative ESG news..
APPLIED ECONOMICS 5

reported data.3 Therefore, to make sure the ESG some of the concerns of the important measure­
information is available to investors at the time we ment errors related to materiality described by
are investigating performance, following Grullon, Yoon and Serafeim (2022).
Kaba, and Núñez-Torres (2020), we use ESG at the
end of year t-2 to examine bond returns in year t.
Bond return data
After incorporating this lag, our final sample is
from January 2006 to March 2020. The monthly bond returns data (RET_EOM) are
Panel A of Table 1 reports the time-series aver­ obtained from the Wharton Research Data Services
age of the cross-sectional ESG scores. We find that (WRDS) Bond Database. Although these data are
the average S score and G score are 60.00 and 61.37, available from July 2002, due to the availability of
respectively, which are higher than the average ESG data, we select the sample period from
E score at the value of 56.95. The average ESG January 2006 to March 2020. The WRDS database
score is 58.16, which is higher than ESG+ score, follows the cleaning procedures outlined in
as can be expected as the ESG+ score incorporates Asquith, Covert, and Pathak (2013) and Dick-
a negative adjustment when there are negative ESG Nielsen (2009, 2013) to clean TRACE Enhanced
news for the company. The correlation between
data. The WRDS Bond Database also provide the
ESG score and ESG+ score given in Panel B, is
offering date (OFFERING_DATE), offering
0.58, which means that ESG score and ESG+
amount (OFFERING_AMT), offering price
score are sufficiently different to motivate the
(OFFERING_PRICE), FISD coupon rate
investigation of the ESG+ score in this paper. In
(COUPON), numerical rating (RATING_NUM),
addition, we find that the E score and S score have
a high correlation at the value of 0.63. This reveals time to maturity in years (TMT), bond price at
that a firm with high E score tends to have high the end of month (PRICE_EOM) and total par-
S score. G score has a relatively low correlation value volume (T_Volume) variables. Following
with E score and S score (i.e. 0.16 and 0.23). (Bai, Bali, and Wen 2019), we further filter out
Several studies have shown that ESG ratings bonds that trade under $5 or above $1,000, have
provided by different companies are not well cor­ less than one year to maturity or have transaction
related and seem to diverge (Berg, Koelbel, and records that have trading volume of less than
Rigobon 2022; Chatterji et al. 2016), which is dri­ $10,000. Overall, our filtering criteria are consistent
ven mostly by scope and measurement divergence with Bai, Bali, and Wen (2019).
rather than the weighting of ESG indicators (Berg, Now we define the monthly excess bond returns
Koelbel, and Rigobon 2022). To make sure our (ExRet) as
results are not dependant on the Refinitiv ESG
ExRett ¼ RETEOMt RFt ; (1)
ratings we re-run all of our analysis using the
Bloomberg ESG disclosure scores and the where RF is the monthly risk-free rate (i.e. the one-
Sustainalytics ESG rankings, accessed through the month Treasury bill rate) obtained from Kenneth
Bloomberg Professional Services, and the average R. French Data Library via WRDS.
of all three ESG provider scores. Berg et al. (2022) Panel A of Table 1 reports the time-series aver­
have developed more sophisticated methodologies age of the cross-sectional excess bond returns. It
for combining ESG ratings, but this is left for future shows there are 487,132 bond month-return obser­
research as these methods are still in development. vations in our sample period. Moreover, we find
Employing more ESG ratings data providers and that the average excess bond return is 0.44% with
the relationship with bond returns is left for future a large standard deviation of 3.07%. The percentiles
research, particularly the ratings from TruValue from 1st to 99th vary from−7.34% to 8.45%. These
Labs, which employ dynamic materiality (Bala summary statistics are very close to those reported
et al. 2020; Kuh et al. 2020) and can address by Bai, Bali, and Wen (2019).

3
ESG information is collected by Refinitiv based on publicly available sources such as company websites, annual reports, and corporate social responsibility
reports or contributed by firms and then audited and standardized.
6

Table 1. Summary statistics.


Percentiles
S. A. GEHRICKE ET AL.

N Mean Median Std. Dev. p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99


Panel A: Cross-sectional statistics over the sample period of Jan 2006 to Mar 2020
Excess bond returns (%) 487,132 0.44 0.34 3.07 −7.34 −3.39 −0.66 1.48 4.49 8.45
E score 520,131 56.95 59.62 22.67 2.83 13.86 42.41 74.97 86.65 90.24
S score 557,251 60.00 62.56 18.02 17.19 26.55 49.18 72.36 86.11 93.94
G score 557,751 61.37 64.23 19.00 13.41 28.10 47.97 76.06 88.23 92.78
ESG score 557,751 58.16 60.53 15.47 18.45 29.32 48.79 69.47 79.83 86.25
ESG+ score 557,751 46.34 43.21 14.64 17.81 26.25 35.69 56.39 73.02 80.74
BETA_BOND 306,006 1.01 0.86 0.69 −0.07 0.20 0.51 1.37 2.29 3.22
ILLIQ 440,463 1.16 0.18 3.53 −0.65 −0.13 0.02 0.80 5.22 19.16
RET_EOM (%) 482,146 0.52 0.41 3.05 −7.12 −3.27 −0.58 1.53 4.51 8.44
RATING_NUM 471,290 7.31 7.04 2.64 1.35 3.36 5.73 8.98 12.05 15.53
AGE 557,810 4.90 3.23 5.45 0.03 0.15 1.33 6.65 16.48 21.76
SIZE 557,875 52.81 34.13 65.10 0.16 0.68 13.08 65.67 182.17 298.41
TMT 554,965 9.41 5.67 9.64 1.05 1.33 2.98 11.40 28.37 30.82
COUPON (%) 557,687 4.50 4.87 2.39 0.00 0.18 3.14 6.08 7.92 9.24
Panel B: Average cross-sectional correlations
E score S score G score ESG score ESG+ score BETA ILLIQ RET_EOM RATING AGE SIZE TMT COUPON
E score 1.00 0.63 0.16 0.74 0.32 −0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.35 −0.03 0.08 −0.03 −0.23
S score 1.00 0.23 0.85 0.43 −0.04 −0.02 0.00 −0.45 −0.04 0.12 −0.04 −0.27
G score 1.00 0.60 0.46 0.00 0.01 −0.01 −0.19 0.01 0.04 0.04 −0.05
ESG score 1.00 0.58 −0.02 0.00 0.00 −0.46 −0.02 0.12 0.00 −0.24
ESG+ score 1.00 −0.05 0.01 −0.02 −0.23 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.12
BETA_BOND 1.00 0.09 0.05 0.14 −0.05 0.09 0.51 0.15
ILLIQ 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.25 −0.13 0.19 0.15
RET_EOM (%) 1.00 0.03 0.01 −0.02 0.03 0.01
RATING_NUM 1.00 0.03 −0.18 −0.06 0.35
AGE 1.00 −0.09 0.16 0.53
SIZE 1.00 0.06 0.21
TMT 1.00 0.35
COUPON 1.00
Panel A reports the number of bond-month observations, the cross-sectional mean, median, standard deviation and percentiles for monthly excess bond returns and bond characteristics including bond market beta (BETA),
illiquidity (ILLIQ), bond reversal (RET_EOM, %), credit rating (RATING), bond age in years (AGE), amount outstanding (SIZE, $ million), time-to-maturity (TMT, year), and the FISD coupon rate (COUPON, %). ASSET4 ESG data
including Environmental score (E score), Social score (S score), Governance score (G score), ESG score (ESG score), and ESG plus score (ESG+ score) in year t are the value at the end of year t-2. Panel B reports the time-series
average of the cross-sectional correlations. The sample period is from January 2006 to March 2020.
APPLIED ECONOMICS 7

Bond characteristics data series analysis exploring the performance of E, S,


G, ESG and ESG+ sorted portfolios, in a univariate
For the bond illiquidity (ILLIQ), we get the daily
setting. We then examine the relationship between
bond price (PRICE) from TRACE Enhanced data
ESG factors and future return in a cross-sectional
file via WRDS. Following Bao, Pan, and Wang
regression, in both a univariate and multivariate
(2011) and Bai, Bali, and Wen (2019), we construct
setting.
ILLIQ as follows:
For each month, t, we form decile portfolios

ILLIQt ¼ Cov ΔPd;t ; ΔPdþ1;t ; (2) based upon each ESG factors (i.e. E score, S score,
G score, ESG score, and ESG+ score) in month
where ΔPd;t is the log price change for the bond t 1. Portfolio L contains stocks with the lowest
on day d of month t. ESG scores and Portfolio H contain stocks with the
The bond size in million dollars (SIZE) is highest ESG scores in the prior month. We calcu­
defined as the offering amount late the monthly equal- and value-weighted returns
(OFFERING_AMT) times offering price for each decile portfolio. After that, we also calcu­
(OFFERING_PRICE) divided by 1,000,000. We late high-minus-low (H-L) portfolio returns
calculate average size-weighted returns for all (RH L;t ) and their risk-adjusted alphas based on
bonds and for each month t as the market bond Carhart (1997) four-factor model as follows.
return (MKT_BOND). In line with Bai, Bali, and
Wen (2019), we run the following regression to RH L;t ¼ α þ β1 :MKTt þ β2 :SMBt þ β3 :HMLt þ β4 :UMDt þ et ;
estimate bond beta (BETA_BOND) using a ­ (4)
three year rolling window, as below4
where the market return factor (MKT), size factor
ExRetti ¼ αi þ BETA BONDi ðMKT BONDt RFt Þ þ eit ; (3) (SMB), value factor (HML), and momentum factor
(UMD) are obtained from Kenneth R. French Data
where eit is the regression residual.
Library via WRDS5
In addition, we calculate the bond age in years
Table 2 shows the average excess return of the
(AGE) using offering date (OFFERING_DATE), the
H-L portfolios and their risk-adjusted alphas, sorted
numerical rating (RATING_NUM) is to capture the
on the ESG factors in a univariate setting. We adjust
credit risk of bonds, the current bond return
test statistics using the method of (Newey and West
(RET_EOM) captures the bond reversal. FISD cou­
1987). From Table 2, we can see that none of the
pon rate (COUPON) and time to maturity in years
ESG factor high-minus-low (H-L) portfolios have
(TMT) are provided by the WRDS Bond Database.
significant out or under performance, as the average
Based on the time-series average of the cross-
excess return is not significantly different from zero.
sectional bond characteristics given in Panel A of
This provides the first evidence that incorporating
Table 1, we find that the average bond beta is 1.01
ESG factors in the portfolio formation process,
which is very close to one. The average bond illi­
therefore investing more responsibly, does not
quidity is 1.16. Furthermore, the average coupon
have to come at a cost, through lower returns.
rate, time to maturity, issue size, bond age and
Turning to the Carhart (1997) four-factor model
median rating are 4.50%, 9.41 years, and
alphas, we find very similar results. The E factor
$52.81 million, 4.90 years and BBB+, respectively.
equally weighted H-L portfolio alpha now becomes
significantly positive, at the 10% level, although the
III. Results significance dissipates for the value weighted
H-L portfolio. We can further see this represented
ESG ratings and bond portfolio performance
graphically in Figure 2, which presents
We now turn to our initial analysis of the ESG H-L cumulative returns over the sample. These
factors relationship with bond returns following results hint that there may actually be an opportu­
two approaches. The first approach is the time nity for outperformance when incorporating the
4
We require that there are at least two-years of data, i.e. at least 24 data points.
5
We also explore the bond market four factor model of (Bai et al. 2021), but for the reduced sample period ending into 2019 due to data availability, and our
conclusions are robust..
8 S. A. GEHRICKE ET AL.

E-factor in bond portfolio formation and maybe factors, confirming the time series results above. The
a more complex strategy can take advantage of only exception is the G score, which leads to sig­
this more directly. It is interesting to note that the nificantly lower next month bond returns, but only
market return factor (MKT) seems to be the most when the control variables are included. Here, the
influential driver of bond returns. Bond beta (BETA_BOND), Illiquidity (ILLIQ) and
Further, in Figure 2, ESG ratings, and particularly previous month return (RET_EOM) factors seem to
the S score, may provide outperformance during explain bond returns the most.
financial downturns as can be seen by the spike in Overall, these results suggest that over our sample
returns during the GFC. This would be consistent period, January 2006 to March 2020, ESG perfor­
with the results found in equity markets, that high mance does not lead to under or over performance
ESG (or at least E) performance companies are more in bond returns. This is an interesting finding, as
resilient during market downturns (Albuquerque discussed earlier, as it seems bond returns do not
et al. 2020) and exhibit lower expected downside exhibit an ESG premium or ESG alpha effect and
risk, as measured by option market indicators this may be due to the lack of ESG preferences in the
(Ilhan, Sautner, and Vilkov 2018; Shafer and Szado institutional investor driven corporate bond market.
2019). This could be explained by a lag in bond investors’
Next, we run the Fama and Macbeth (1973) awareness of ESG risk factors, or intention to invest
cross-sectional regressions as follows: responsibly relative to equity investors.

X
8
ExReti;t ¼ αi þ λ � ESGi;t þ γk � Xi;t þ eit ; (5) Post Paris agreement
k¼1
In an equilibrium model (Pastor, Stambaugh, and
where ESGi;t is E score, S score, G score, ESG score, Taylor 2020)) show that as the ESG concerns of
or ESG+ score and Xi;t are the control variables investors strengthen, green assets could outper­
from Bai, Bali, and Wen (2019). form. To test this hypothesis in bond returns, we
The results with Newey and West (1987) t-statis­ repeat the above analysis, but only for the period
tics are presented in Table 3 first without any control after the Paris agreement (December 2015 –
variables and then controlling for a comprehensive March 2020). The Paris agreement is the most
list of established bond characteristic return factors ambitious international agreement to combat cli­
(Bai, Bali, and Wen 2019). We can see that none of mate change in history (Diaz-Rainey et al. 2021).
the ESG factors significantly affect next month bond Diaz-Rainey et al. (2021) show that the Paris agree­
returns, on their own and when we control for other ment was more significant for the returns of the

Table 2. Full sample ESG sorted portfolio returns.


ESG score E score S score G score ESG+ score

H-L return α H-L return α H-L return α H-L return α H-L return α
Panel A: Equally Weighted Portfolios
−0.000592 −3.56e-05 0.00158 0.00178* 4.65e-05 0.000617 8.84e-05 0.000590 −0.00124 −0.000470
MKT −0.1110*** −0.0395 −0.117*** −0.0792*** −0.148***
SMB −0.0219 −0.0140 −0.0407 −0.00291 −0.0394
HML −0.0039 −0.0160 −0.0226 0.0249 −0.0160
UMD 0.0565* −0.0221 0.0342 0.0533** 0.0430
Obs. 169 169 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170
Panel B: Value Weighted Portfolios
−0.000421 0.000105 −1.72e-05 0.000399 8.23e-05 0.000631 −9.21e-05 0.000314 −0.00101 −0.000173
MKT −0.114*** −0.0768** −0.118*** −0.0604*** −0.120***
SMB −0.0490 −0.0249 −0.0570 0.00210 −0.0262
HML −0.0155 −0.000337 −0.0276 0.0244 0.0499
UMD 0.0555 0.0305 0.0400 0.0370 0.0362
Obs 169 169 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170
This table gives cumulative H-L portfolio returns and their risk-adjusted alphas based on Carhart (1997) four-factor model sorted based on E score, S score,
G score, ESG score, and ESG+ score, respectively. Panel A is based on equal-weighted H-L portfolio returns and Panel B is based on value-weighted
H-L portfolio returns. The sample period is from January 2006 to March 2020.
APPLIED ECONOMICS 9

Panel A: Equally Weighted

Panel B: Value weighted

Figure 2. Cumulative returns to ESG bond portfolios. This Figure plots cumulative H-L portfolio returns sorted based on E score,
S score, G score, and ESG score, respectively, from 2006 to 2020. Panel A is based on equal-weighted H-L portfolio returns and Panel
B is based on value-weighted H-L portfolio returns.

fossil fuel industry than some other significant significant outperformance, at the 5% level of signif­
climate policy events, such as the election of icance, in a univariate setting. Figure 2 shows this
Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency or his sub­ graphically, as the cumulative returns of the equally
sequent withdrawal from the agreement. weighted H-L E score portfolio starts to trend
In Table 4, we can see that the there is certainly no upward strongly after 2015. However, this outperfor­
significant under or out performance when ESG mance becomes insignificant in the value weighted
factors are used to create bond portfolios, even portfolio and when we incorporate the other bond
after the Paris agreement was signed. The equally return factors in the equally weighted portfolio.
weighted E factor H-L portfolio does display Again, we see the dominance of the MKT factor.
10
S. A. GEHRICKE ET AL.

Table 3. Full sample cross-sectional analysis.


ESG score E score S score G score ESG+ score
ESG indicator −0.000014 −0.000012 4.6e-06 1.1e-06 −0.000012 −6.3e-06 −0.000014 −0.00001** −0.000018 −4.7e-06
BETA_BOND 0.0028*** 0.0029** 0.0028*** 0.0028*** 0.0028***
ILLIQ 0.00015*** 0.00017*** 0.00015*** 0.00015*** 0.00015***
RET_EOM −0.24*** −0.25*** −0.24*** −0.24*** −0.24***
RATING_NUM 0.000034 0.000025 0.000048 0.000045 0.000066
AGE 0.000044 0.000017 0.000044 0.000043 0.000041
SIZE 0.00015 0.00016 0.00015 0.00012 0.000094
TMT 0.000059 0.000060 0.000059 0.000059 0.000058
COUPON 0.00016 0.00016 0.00016 0.00016 0.00016
Constant 0.0052*** 0.0015 0.0040*** 0.00092 0.0051*** 0.0010 0.0053*** 0.0015 0.0052*** 0.00082
Obs. 487,009 279,768 451,154 258,515 486,514 279,516 487,009 279,768 487,009 279,768
R-squared 0.004 0.247 0.005 0.260 0.004 0.247 0.002 0.247 0.010 0.247
Number of groups 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171
This table reports the average intercept and slope coefficients from the Fama and Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of one-month-ahead bond excess returns on E score, S score, G score, ESG score, and ESG+ score,
respectively, with and without control variables. The sample period is from January 2006 to March 2020.
APPLIED ECONOMICS 11

Table 4. Post-Paris ESG sorted portfolio returns.


ESG score E score S score G score ESG+ score

H-L return α H-L return α H-L return α H-L return α H-L return α
Panel A: Equally Weighted Portfolios
0.000878 0.000486 0.00442** 0.00320 0.000672 0.000523 0.000934 0.00112 0.000367 0.000847
MKT −0.0726*** −0.00356 −0.124*** −0.0671*** −0.197***
SMB 0.00641 −0.102 −0.00695 0.0131 0.0380
HML −0.124*** −0.155 −0.150** −0.0482 −0.139***
UMD −0.0662* −0.0774 −0.0660 −0.0279 0.00370
Obs. 49 49 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Panel B: Value Weighted Portfolios
0.00130 0.000830 0.00127 0.000897 0.000729 0.000734 0.00109 0.00123 0.00109 0.00150
MKT −0.108*** −0.121** −0.168*** −0.0476** −0.0609**
SMB 0.0155 −0.0253 0.0196 0.0272 0.0325
HML −0.166*** −0.175* −0.177** −0.0415* −0.0116
UMD −0.0706* −0.0702 −0.0472 −0.0543 0.00508
Obs. 49 49 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
This table gives cumulative H-L portfolio returns and their risk-adjusted alphas based on Carhart (1997) four-factor model sorted based on E score, S score,
G score, ESG score, and ESG+ score, respectively. Panel A is based on equal-weighted H-L portfolio returns and Panel B is based on value-weighted
H-L portfolio returns. The subsample period is from December 2015 to March 2020.

Table 5. Post-paris cross-sectional analysis.


ESG score E score S score G score ESG+ score
ESG indicator 7.8e-06 −0.000010 0.000021* 2.4e-06 2.2e-06 −8.1e-06 −6.6e-06 −0.000010 −3.6e-06 1.9e-06
BETA_BOND 0.0043*** 0.0043*** 0.0042*** 0.0043*** 0.0043***
ILLIQ 0.00016** 0.00019** 0.00017** 0.00016** 0.00016**
RET_EOM −0.20*** −0.20*** −0.20*** −0.20*** −0.20***
RATING_NUM −0.000088 −0.000069 −0.000087 −0.000078 −0.000070
AGE −0.000023 −0.000033 −0.000022 −0.000027 −0.000027
SIZE 0.00034 0.00031 0.00034 0.00030 0.00031
TMT 0.000036 0.000033 0.000037 0.000037 0.000036
COUPON 0.00016 0.00018 0.00016 0.00017 0.00018
Constant 0.0040 0.00061 0.0032 −0.00036 0.0043 0.00050 0.0050** 0.00061 0.0047* −0.00026
Obs. 192,367 115,918 189,226 113,713 192,085 115,770 192,367 115,918 192,367 115,918
R-squared 0.002 0.268 0.003 0.270 0.003 0.268 0.002 0.268 0.011 0.268
Number of groups 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
This table reports the average intercept and slope coefficients from the Fama and Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of one-month-ahead bond excess
returns on E score, S score, G score, ESG score, and ESG+ score, respectively, with and without control variables. The subsample period is from December 2015
to March 2020.

This shows there is some potential for outperfor­ Further, in Table 5 we display the cross-sectional
mance when incorporating Environmental factors, regression results, defined in Equation (5), for the
in line with Duan, Li, and Wen (2020), who show post-Paris agreement sample period
that bond portfolios outperform when incorporating (December 2015 – March 2020). The results are
carbon intensity. This shows that bond investors are very similar to the time-series analysis, the E factor
not incorporating other environmental factors, is positively related to next-month bond returns with
which are included in the E score, as strongly as some significance, at the 10% level, but only in the
scope 1 and 2 Green House Gas (GHG) emissions univariate setting. Once we add the control variables
intensity, as they are for equity portfolios where the predictive power of the E factor is consumed by
some studies have found significant outperformance the bond beta (BETA_BOND), illiquidity (ILLIQ)
(ESG alpha) and underperformance (ESG risk pre­ and previous month return (RET_EOM) factors and
mium), when incorporating ESG factors (Ashwin none of the ESG factors are related to under or out­
Kumar et al. 2016; Bolton and Kacperczyk, 2021; performance in the cross-section.
Busch and Friede 2018; Eccles, Verheyden, and These findings are consistent with our full sample
Feiner 2016; Friede, Busch, and Bassen 2015; Luo results, which showed that incorporating ESG fac­
and Balvers 2017; J. Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh tors in the investment process does not lead to under
2012; Pollard et al. 2017; Revelli and Viviani 2015; or over performance. This is still the case since the
Van Beurden and Gössling 2008). Paris agreement. However, there is some evidence
12 S. A. GEHRICKE ET AL.

Table 6. Energy and non-energy ESG sorted portfolio returns: equally weighted portfolios.
ESG score E score S score G score ESG+ score

H-L return α H-L return α H-L return α H-L return α H-L return α
Panel A: Energy industry
−0.000335 8.02e-05 −0.000247 −0.000419 0.00324* 0.00324* −0.000525 −0.000110 −0.000295 3.39e-05
MKT −0.0470 0.00329 −0.0361 −0.0717 −0.0490
SMB −0.0745 −0.0386 0.0360 −0.0873 −0.0577
HML 0.109 −0.0184 −0.104 0.0602 0.0718
UMD 0.211* 0.157 −0.133 0.187* 0.191*
Observations 170 170 168 168 170 170 170 170 170 170
Panel B: Non-Energy industries
−0.000277 −0.000362 0.000279 5.12e-05 −0.000320 −0.000423 −0.000801*** −0.000763*** −0.000521 0.000163
MKT −0.00786 0.00795 0.00556 −0.00652 −0.104***
SMB −0.00986 0.00470 0.00374 0.00315 −0.0216
HML −0.0348 −0.0563 −0.0163 0.00275 0.0266
UMD 0.0138 −0.00451 0.0198 0.0115 0.0111
Observations 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170
This table gives cumulative equal-weighted H-L portfolio returns and their risk-adjusted alphas based on Carhart (1997) four-factor model sorted based on
E score, S score, G score, ESG score, and ESG+ score, respectively. Panel A is for all energy companies and Panel B is all non-energy companies. The sample
period is from January 2006 to March 2020.

Table 7. Energy and non-energy ESG sorted portfolio returns: value weighted portfolios.
ESG score E score S score G score ESG+ score

H-L return α H-L return α H-L return α H-L return α H-L return α
Panel A: Energy industry
−0.000107 0.000270 0.000260 0.000233 0.00371* 0.00378* −0.000117 0.000235 0.000727 0.00100
MKT −0.0556 −0.0146 −0.0650 −0.0930 −0.0580
SMB −0.0723 −0.0208 0.0315 −0.0676 −0.0577
HML 0.0776 −0.0263 −0.147 −0.0166 0.0264
UMD 0.196* 0.101 −0.171 0.126 0.141
Observations 170 170 168 168 170 170 170 170 170 170
Panel B: Non-Energy industries
−0.000524 −0.000390 −0.000263 −0.000300 −0.000331 −0.000178 −0.000905*** −0.000896** −0.000479 −3.16e-05
MKT −0.0327 −0.0234 −0.0374** 0.0106 −0.0402**
SMB −0.0228 −0.00512 −0.0246 −0.00670 −0.0124
HML −0.0120 −0.0476 −0.0117 0.0253 0.0708
UMD 0.0116 0.0169* 0.0214 0.0105 0.0216
Observations 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170
This table gives cumulative value-weighted H-L portfolio returns and their risk-adjusted alphas based on Carhart (1997) four-factor model sorted based on
E score, S score, G score, ESG score, and ESG+ score, respectively. Panel A is for all energy companies and Panel B is all non-energy companies. The sample
period is from January 2006 to March 2020.

that incorporating the environmental score (E) is therefore presents the strongest case for incorpor­
starting to improve bond portfolio performance ating ESG factors in the portfolio construction
more recently.When we explore this relationship process to outperform the market (Diaz-Rainey
with the ESG scores from the other two providers, et al. 2021).
we get consistent results. Firstly, we explore the relationship between ESG
scores and bond portfolio returns for the full sam­
ple, as in Section 3.1, but separating firms into
Energy sector Energy and non-Energy industry entities. The
results for the equally and value weighted portfolio
To explore the previous results further, we analysed
time series analysis are presented in Tables 6 and 7,
the performance of the Energy and non-Energy respectively. Different to the previous subsections,
industry bond returns, by splitting the sample and we sort portfolios into two instead of ten portfolios,
applying the same methodology as above. 6 The as there are only 51 bonds per month on average
energy sector is most at risk of the most accepted/ for the energy sector. Interestingly, using value or
prominent ESG issue, climate change, and equally weighted portfolios, we find that over the

6
The industry is defined using the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) accessed through the Bloomberg Professional Services.
APPLIED ECONOMICS 13

Panel A: Equally Weighted Energy Companies Panel C: Equally Weighted non-Energy


Companies

Panel B: Value Weighted Energy Companies Panel D: Value Weighted non-Energy


Companies

Figure 3. Cumulative returns to ESG bond portfolios energy and non energy. This Figure plots cumulative H-L portfolio returns sorted
based on E score, S score, G score, and ESG score, respectively, from 2006 to 2020. Panel A is based on equal-weighted H-L portfolio
returns for all energy companies, Panel B is based on equal-weighted H-L portfolio returns for all non-energy companies, Panel C is
based on value-weighted H-L portfolio returns for all energy companies, and Panel D is based on value-weighted H-L portfolio returns
for all non-energy companies.

full sample the S score can lead to some outperfor­ that the result for the G score also found in the full
mance for Energy company bond portfolios. In sample analysis is driven by non-Energy
Figure 3, we can see that this seems to be mainly companies.
driven by the outperformance during Global Next we want to explore the post-Paris relation­
Financial Crisis (GFC) period. Further, incorporat­ ships as in section 3.2, but for the Energy and non-
ing the G score seems to lead to significant under­ Energy industry bonds. We first turn to the time
performance for non-Energy industry bond series approach, employing the portfolio sorts with
portfolios. These results hold with (Carhart 1997) the ESG factors, the equally and value weighted
model adjusted alphas. When we turn to the cross- portfolio returns are presented in Tables 9 and 10,
sectional analysis in Table 8, the significance of the respectively. We can see in the equally weighted
S score fades, but the G score still leads to signifi­ returns (Table 9) that the ESG and ESG+ sorted
cant underperformance for non-Energy industry Energy industry H-L bond portfolios exhibit statis­
bonds, only after incorporating the control vari­ tically significant outperformance, even when
ables from (Bai, Bali, and Wen 2019). This shows employing the four factor model, at the 5% level
14
S. A. GEHRICKE ET AL.

Table 8. Energy and non-energy cross-sectional analysis.


ESG score E score S score G score ESG+ score
Panel A: Energy Sector
ESG indicator −0.000018 −0.0011 0.000013 −0.00082 0.000075 0.00050 −0.000013 0.00035 6.8e-06 −0.0012
BETA_BOND −0.0041 0.0018 −0.0027 −0.0019 −0.0017
ILLIQ −0.00018 0.0049 2.1e-06 0.00045 −0.00017
RET_EOM −0.46*** −0.26*** −0.42*** −0.41*** −0.42***
RATING_NUM −0.026 0.0093 0.0026 0.00094 −0.032
AGE −0.00018 0.00011 −0.00015 0.00024 −0.00075**
SIZE −0.0050 0.00063 −0.0021 −0.0038 −0.0038
TMT 0.000046 0.00023 0.000044 −0.000032 0.000031
COUPON 0.0018** −0.0035 0.0016* 0.0021* 0.000099
Constant 0.0051 0.22 0.0042 −0.013 0.00073 −0.043 0.0045 −0.038 0.0039 0.28
Obs. 9,775 6,087 8,928 5,620 9,775 6,087 9,775 6,087 9,775 6,087
R-squared 0.048 0.623 0.051 0.679 0.043 0.623 0.055 0.626 0.045 0.623
Number of groups 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171
Panel B: Not Energy Sectors
ESG indicator −0.000014 −0.000014 5.1e-06 9.7e-07 −0.000013 −7.2e-06 −0.000014 −0.000013*** −0.000018 −5.8e-06
BETA_BOND 0.0028*** 0.0028** 0.0028*** 0.0028*** 0.0028***
ILLIQ 0.00015*** 0.00017*** 0.00015*** 0.00015*** 0.00015***
RET_EOM −0.24*** −0.25*** −0.24*** −0.24*** −0.24***
RATING_NUM 0.000024 0.000019 0.000039 0.000039 0.000058
AGE 0.000044 0.000018 0.000044 0.000042 0.000040
SIZE 0.00016 0.00016 0.00015 0.00012 0.000095
TMT 0.000058 0.000060 0.000058 0.000058 0.000057
COUPON 0.00016 0.00016 0.00016 0.00017 0.00017
Constant 0.0052*** 0.0016 0.0040*** 0.00094 0.0051*** 0.0011 0.0052*** 0.0015 0.0053*** 0.00090
Obs. 477,234 273,681 442,226 252,895 476,739 273,429 477,234 273,681 477,234 273,681
R-squared 0.004 0.246 0.005 0.259 0.004 0.247 0.002 0.246 0.010 0.247
Number of groups 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171
This table reports the average intercept and slope coefficients from the Fama and Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of one-month-ahead bond excess returns on E score, S score, G score, ESG score, and ESG+ score,
respectively, with and without control variables. Panel A is for all energy companies and Panel B is all non-energy companies. The sample period is from January 2006 to March 2020.
APPLIED ECONOMICS 15

Table 9. Post-paris energy and non-energy ESG sorted portfolio returns: equally weighted portfolios.
ESG score E score S score G score ESG+ score

H-L return α H-L return α H-L return α H-L return α H-L return α
Panel A: Energy industry
0.00503** 0.00497** 0.00595*** 0.00576** 0.00415* 0.00361* 0.00177 0.00102 0.00470** 0.00478**
MKT −0.0994 −0.0939 −0.0790 −0.0823 −0.125*
SMB −0.0249 −0.0365 0.00186 0.00225 −0.00636
HML −0.111 −0.123 −0.154* −0.193*** −0.125
UMD −0.0704 −0.0936 −0.00887 −0.0711 −0.0989*
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Panel B: Non-Energy industries
0.000297 1.27e-05 0.000314 1.03e-05 0.000502 0.000222 −0.000664 −0.000417 −0.000425 8.45e-05
MKT −0.0303 0.0238* 0.0180 −0.0271 −0.144***
SMB 0.00996 −0.0180 0.0131 0.0229* 0.0179
HML −0.0721** −0.0157 −0.0248 0.00213 −0.0775***
UMD −0.00823 −0.0180 −0.0131 0.00535 0.00461
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
This table gives cumulative equal-weighted H-L portfolio returns and their risk-adjusted alphas based on Carhart (1997) four-factor model sorted based on
E score, S score, G score, ESG score, and ESG+ score, respectively. Panel A is for all energy companies and Panel B is all non-energy companies. The subsample
period is from December 2015 to March 2020.

Table 10. Post-Paris energy and non-energy ESG sorted portfolio returns: value weighted portfolios.
ESG score E score S score G score ESG+ score

H-L return α H-L return α H-L return α H-L return α H-L return α
Panel A: Energy industry
0.00545** 0.00538** 0.00620** 0.00606** 0.00428* 0.00363* 0.00158 0.000716 0.00530** 0.00526**
MKT −0.111 −0.107 −0.0890 −0.108 −0.124
SMB −0.0332 −0.0407 −0.0207 0.0130 −0.0336
HML −0.124 −0.131 −0.177* −0.237*** −0.137
UMD −0.0970 −0.115 −0.0424 −0.0787 −0.119*
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Panel B: Non-Energy industries
−8.42e-05 −5.22e-05 −0.000556 −0.000597 0.000131 0.000231 −9.75e-05 −1.53e-05 0.000204 0.000286
MKT −0.0604*** −0.0430*** −0.0631*** 0.00767 −0.00626
SMB 0.00995 0.0158 0.00281 0.0114 0.00894
HML −0.0594* −0.0533** −0.0533 0.0159 0.00321
UMD −0.0103 −0.0105 −0.0277 −0.00222 0.00292
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
This table gives cumulative value-weighted H-L portfolio returns and their risk-adjusted alphas based on Carhart (1997) four-factor model sorted based on
E score, S score, G score, ESG score, and ESG+ score, respectively. Panel A is for all energy companies and Panel B is all non-energy companies. The subsample
period is from December 2015 to March 2020.

of significance. Looking at the individual factor only since the Paris agreement was signed in
portfolios we can see that this is mainly driven by 2015. Figure 3 gives us a graphical representation
the E factor, which is significant at the 5% and 1% of this result, for Energy company bonds the cumu­
level of significance for the univariate and four- lative return trends upward for the E factor
factor model results, respectively. The outperfor­ H-L portfolios.
mance is also somewhat attributable to the S factor, Turning to the cross-sectional analysis, in Table 11,
as portfolios formed on this have significantly posi­ we see some significance of the E factor in the Energy
tive returns at the 10% level, for both the univariate sector and still positive but less significant predictive
and four-factor analysis. For non-Energy industry power in the non-Energy sectors. When we incorpo­
bonds, we see that none of the ESG factors lead to rate established bond characteristics as control vari­
under or outperformance. Turning to the value- ables (Balie et al. 2019), the significance disappears,
weighted portfolios in Table 10, we find confirming but there is no significant negative relationship either.
results, the ESG, ESG+, E and S factors lead to These results quite clearly indicate that in the
outperformance for Energy industry bonds, even Energy sector, currently the most at risk sector to
when controlling for the four-factor model, but climate change, bond investment strategies may
16 S. A. GEHRICKE ET AL.

Table 11. Post-Paris energy and non-energy cross-sectional analysis.


ESG score E score S score G score ESG+ score
Panel A: Energy Sector
ESG indicator 0.000095 0.000044 0.000075** 0.000017 0.000062 0.000033 0.00011 0.000094 0.000099 0.000046
BETA_BOND 0.0031 0.0030 0.0034 0.0034 0.0032
ILLIQ 0.0014 0.0015 0.0013* 0.0018 0.0014*
RET_EOM −0.31*** −0.31*** −0.31*** −0.33*** −0.32***
RATING_NUM −0.00031 −0.00031 −0.00027 −0.00013 −0.00036
AGE −0.000024 −1.0e-06 −0.000025 −0.000032 −0.000019
SIZE 0.00059 0.00076 0.00068 0.00058 0.00056
TMT 0.00016 0.00017 0.00013 0.00022 0.00015
COUPON −0.00023 −0.00038 −0.00026 −0.000029 −0.00019
Constant −0.0011 −0.00020 0.00012 0.0018 0.0012 −0.000046 −0.0023 −0.0055 −0.0012 −0.00010
Obs. 3,647 2,477 3,647 2,477 3,647 2,477 3,647 2,477 3,647 2,477
R-squared 0.060 0.580 0.034 0.577 0.065 0.579 0.081 0.593 0.059 0.581
Number of groups 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Panel B: Not Energy Sectors
ESG indicator 6.0e-06 −0.000011 0.000020* 1.4e-06 1.2e-06 −8.6e-06 −7.3e-06 −9.7e-06 −6.2e-06 7.3e-07
BETA_BOND 0.0043*** 0.0043*** 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 0.0043***
ILLIQ 0.00016** 0.00019** 0.00017** 0.00016** 0.00016**
RET_EOM −0.20*** −0.20*** −0.20*** −0.20*** −0.20***
RATING_NUM −0.000085 −0.000066 −0.000084 −0.000073 −0.000066
AGE −0.000022 −0.000032 −0.000021 −0.000027 −0.000027
SIZE 0.00033 0.00031 0.00034 0.00029 0.00030
TMT 0.000035 0.000032 0.000037 0.000036 0.000035
COUPON 0.00017 0.00019 0.00017 0.00018 0.00018
Constant 0.0041 0.00063 0.0032 −0.00033 0.0044 0.00049 0.0050** 0.00053 0.0048* −0.00023
Obs. 188,720 113,441 185,579 111,236 188,438 113,293 188,720 113,441 188,720 113,441
R-squared 0.002 0.267 0.004 0.269 0.003 0.267 0.002 0.267 0.011 0.267
Number of groups 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
This table reports the average intercept and slope coefficients from the Fama and Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of one-month-ahead bond excess
returns on E score, S score, G score, ESG score, and ESG+ score, respectively, with and without control variables. Panel A is for all energy companies and Panel
B is all non-energy companies. The sub-sample period is from December 2015 to March 2020.

benefit from incorporating Environmental factors strengthens as investors become more aware of
and certainly do not face a loss of returns. In the ESG risks and opportunities. We argue that
future as more of the risks and opportunities of investors in Energy sector bonds, especially
climate change become more prominently accepted since the singing of the Paris agreement, would
and even realized, other sector bond returns may be more aware of these fundamental ESG risks
and opportunities and are therefore the first to
find similar outperformance when incorporating
account for this in their valuations of bonds.
E factors.
Overall, our findings show that bond investors
can ‘do well’, if not better, by ‘doing good’.
We wanted to explore whether green bond port­
IV. Conclusion
folios, with investors that are likely more aware of
Duan, Li, and Wen (2020) showed that incor­ ESG issues, would exhibit under or out performance
porating emission intensity data in the bond when incorporating ESG factors. Therefore, we
portfolio formation process leads to significant repeated all of the analysis for a subset of only
outperformance. In this paper, we wanted to green bonds, as certified by the Climate Bonds
explore whether incorporating wider ESG fac­ Initiative. Overall, we again found no under or
tors, into the bond investing process leads to over performance attributable to ESG ratings.
under or out performance. We find that this To ensure our results are robust to the diver­
does not lead to either. However, in the period gence of ESG rating providers (Berg, Koelbel, and
following the Paris agreement, Energy sector Rigobon 2022; Chatterji et al. 2016) we explore all
bond portfolio returns are positively related to of our analyses employing the Bloomberg ESG
ESG factors. This finding aligns with the model disclosure scores and the Sustainalytics ESG rank­
of Pedersen, Fitzgibbons, and Pomorski (2020), ings and the average of all three ESG scores. Our
that shows that the ESG-return relationship key finding remains the same; that is incorporating
APPLIED ECONOMICS 17

ESG scores in bond portfolios does not lead to Bae, S. C., K. Chang, and H. C. Yi. 2018b. “Corporate Social
under or over performance. Responsibility, Credit Rating, and Private Debt Contracting:
New Evidence from Syndicated Loan Market.” Review of
Quantitative Finance and Accounting 50 (1): 261–299.
Acknowledgments doi:10.1007/s11156-017-0630-4.
Bahra, B., and L. Thukral. 2020. “ESG in Global Corporate
We would like to acknowledge the Climate and Energy Bonds: The Analysis Behind the Hype.” The Journal of
Finance Group for strong support on this work and the Portfolio Management 46 (8): 133–147. doi:10.3905/jpm.
Otago University Research Grant that enabled this research 2020.1.171.
to be carried out. Bai, J., T. G. Bali, and Q. Wen. 2019. “Common Risk Factors
in the Cross-Section of Corporate Bond Returns.” Journal
of Financial Economics 131 (3): 619–642. doi:10.1016/j.jfi
Disclosure statement neco.2018.08.002.
Bai, J., T. G. Bali, and Q. Wen. 2019.“Common risk factors in
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s). the cross-section of corporate bond returns.“ Journal of
Financial Economics, 131(3): 619–642.
Bai, J., T. G. Bali, and Q. Wen. 2021.“Is there a risk-return
ORCID tradeoff in the corporate bond market? Time-series and
cross-sectional evidence.“ Journal of Financial Economics,
Sebastian A. Gehricke http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3251-
142(3): 1017–1037.
9275
Bala, G., S. Birman, J. Cardamone, T. Kuh, A. Salvatori, and
N. Stelea. 2020. “ESG Materiality Factors in the Fourth
References Industrial Revolution-Measuring Stakeholder Externalities
via Dynamic Materiality.” Working Paper, Available at
Albuquerque, R., Y. Koskinen, S. Yang, and C. Zhang. 2020. SSRN 3751058.
“Resiliency of Environmental and Social Stocks: An Bao, J., J. Pan, and J Wang. 2011.“The illiquidity of corporate
Analysis of the Exogenous COVID-19 Market Crash.”
bonds.“ Journal of Finance, 66(3): 911–946.
The Review of Corporate Finance Studies 9 (3): 593–621.
Berg, F., J. F. Koelbel, A. Pavlova, and R. Rigobon. 2022. “ESG
doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfaa011.
Confusion and Stock Returns: Tackling the Problem of
Amir, A. Z., and G. Serafeim. 2018. “Why and How Investors
Noise (No. W30562).” National Bureau of Economic
Use ESG Information: Evidence from a Global Survey.”
Research.
Financial Analysts Journal 74 (3): 87–103. doi:10.2469/faj.
Berg, F., J. F. Koelbel, and R. Rigobon. 2022. “Aggregate
v74.n3.2.
Confusion: The Divergence of ESG Ratings.” Review of
Ashwin Kumar, N. C., C. Smith, L. Badis, N. Wang,
Finance 26 (6): 1315–1344. doi:10.1093/rof/rfac033.
P. Ambrosy, and R. Tavares. 2016. “ESG Factors and
Bloomberg. 2020. ESG Assets May Hit $53 Trillion by 2025,
Risk-Adjusted Performance: A New Quantitative Model.”
a Third of Global AUM | Bloomberg Professional Services.
Journal of Sustainable Finance and Investment 6 (4):
292–300. doi:10.1080/20430795.2016.1234909. https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/esg-assets-
Asquith, P., T. Covert, and P. Pathak. 2013. The Effects of may-hit-53-trillion-by-2025-a-third-of-global-aum/
Mandatory Transparency in Financial Market Design: Bolton, P., and M. Kacperczyk. 2021. “Do Investors Care About
Evidence from the Corporate Bond Market. doi:10.3386/ Carbon Risk?” Journal of Financial Economics 142 (2):
w19417. 517–549. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.05.008 .
Auer, B. R., and F. Schuhmacher. 2016. “Do Socially (Ir) Busch, T., and G. Friede. 2018. “The Robustness of the
responsible Investments Pay? New Evidence from Corporate Social and Financial Performance Relation: A
International ESG Data.” The Quarterly Review of Second-Order Meta-Analysis.” Corporate Social
Economics and Finance 59: 51–62. doi:https://doi.org/10. Responsibility and Environmental Management 25 (4):
1016/j.qref.2015.07.002. 583–608. doi:10.1002/csr.1480.
Awaysheh, A., R. A. Heron, T. Perry, and J. I. Wilson. 2020. Cao, J., Y. Li, X. Zhan, W. Zhang, and L. Zhou. 2021. Carbon
“On the Relation Between Corporate Social Responsibility Emissions, Institutional Trading, and the Liquidity of
and Financial Performance.” Strategic Management Journal Corporate Bonds.
41 (6): 965–987. doi:10.1002/smj.3122. Carhart, M. M. 1997. “On Persistence in Mutual Fund
Bae, S. C., K. Chang, and H. C. Yi. 2018a. “Are More Performance.” The Journal of Finance 52 (1): 57–82. doi:
Corporate Social Investments Better? Evidence of https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03808.x.
Non-Linearity Effect on Costs of US Bank Loans.” Global Chatterji, A. K., R. Durand, D. I. Levine, and S. Touboul. 2016.
Finance Journal 38: 82–96. doi:10.1016/j.gfj.2018.03.002. “Do Ratings of Firms Converge? Implications for
18 S. A. GEHRICKE ET AL.

Managers, Investors and Strategy Researchers.” Strategic Henke, H. M. 2016. “The Effect of Social Screening on Bond
Management Journal 37 (8): 1597–1614. doi:10.1002/smj. Mutual Fund Performance.” Journal of Banking & Finance
2407. 67: 69–84. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2016.01.010.
Consolandi, C., R. G. Eccles, and G. Gabbi. 2022. “How Huynh, T. D., and Y. Xia. 2020. “Climate Change News Risk and
Material is a Material Issue? Stock Returns and the Corporate Bond Returns.” The Journal of Financial and
Financial Relevance and Financial Intensity of ESG Quantitative Analysis 1–49. doi:10.1017/S0022109020000757.
Materiality.” Journal of Sustainable Finance & Ilhan, E., Z. Sautner, and G. Vilkov. 2018. “Carbon Tail Risk.”
Investment 12 (4): 1045–1068. doi:10.1080/20430795. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3204420.
2020.1824889. Jang, G. Y., H. G. Kang, J. Y. Lee, and K. Bae. 2020. “ESG
Diaz-Rainey, I., S. A. Gehricke, H. Roberts, and R. Zhang. Scores and the Credit Market.” Sustainability (Switzerland)
2021. “Trump Vs. Paris: The Impact of Climate Policy on 12 (8): 3456. doi:10.3390/SU12083456.
U.S. Listed Oil and Gas Firm Returns and Volatility.” Jin, I. 2018. “Is ESG a Systematic Risk Factor for US Equity
International Review of Financial Analysis 76: 101746. Mutual Funds?” Journal of Sustainable Finance and
doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2021.101746. Investment 8 (1): 72–93. doi:10.1080/20430795.2017.1395251.
Dick-Nielsen, J. 2009. “Liquidity Biases in Trace.” The Journal Krueger, P., Z. Sautner, and L. T. Starks. 2020. “The Importance
of Fixed Income 19 (2): 43–55. doi:https://doi.org/10.3905/ of Climate Risks for Institutional Investors.” The Review of
jfi.2009.19.2.043. Financial Studies 33 (3): 1067–1111. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhz137.
Dick-Nielsen, J. 2013. “How to Clean Enhanced TRACE
Kuh, T., A. Shepley, G. Bala, and M. Flowers. 2020. “Dynamic
Data.” SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2337908.
Materiality: Measuring What Matters.” Working Paper,
Duan, T., F. W. Li, and Q. Wen. 2020. “Is Carbon Risk Priced
Available at SSRN 3521035.
in the Cross Section of Corporate Bond Returns?” SSRN
Kumar, R., and A. Khasnis. 2020. “Fallen Angels with ESG
Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3709572. Wings.” The Journal of Impact and ESG Investing 1 (2):
Eccles, R. G., T. Verheyden, and A. Feiner. 2016. “ESG for All? 26–38. doi:https://doi.org/10.3905/JESG.2020.1.007.
The Impact of ESG Screening on Return, Risk, and Landry, E., M. Castillo-Lazaro, and A. Lee. 2017. “Connecting
Diversification.” In SSRN. Vol. 28, Issue 2. John Wiley & ESG and Corporate Bond Performance.” MIT Sloan
Sons, Ltd. doi:10.1111/jacf.12174. Working Paper.
Fama, E. F., and J. D. Macbeth. 1973. “Risk, Return, and Luo, H. A., and R. J. Balvers. 2017. “Social Screens and
Equilibrium: Empirical Tests.” Source: The Journal of Systematic Investor Boycott Risk.” The Journal of
Political Economy 81 (3): 607–636. doi:10.1086/260061. Financial and Quantitative Analysis 52 (1): 365–399.
Friede, G., T. Busch, and A. Bassen. 2015. “ESG and Financial doi:10.1017/S0022109016000910.
Performance: Aggregated Evidence from More Than 2000
Maiti, M. 2020. “Is ESG the Succeeding Risk Factor?” Journal
Empirical Studies.” Journal of Sustainable Finance and
of Sustainable Finance & Investment 1–15. doi:10.1080/
Investment 5 (4): 210–233. doi:10.1080/20430795.2015.1118917.
20430795.2020.1723380.
Friedman, H. L., and M. S. Heinle. 2016. “Taste, Information,
Margolis, J. D., H. A. Elfenbein, and J. P. Walsh. 2012. “Does It
and Asset Prices: Implications for the Valuation of CSR.”
Review of Accounting Studies 21 (3): 740–767. doi:10.1007/ Pay to Be Good. . .and Does It Matter? A Meta-Analysis of the
s11142-016-9359-x. Relationship Between Corporate Social and Financial
Gao, H., J. He, and Y. Li. 2022. “Media Spotlight, Corporate Performance.” SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.
Sustainability and the Cost of Debt.” Applied Economics 1866371.
54 (34): 3989–4005. doi:10.1080/00036846.2021.2020710/ Margolis, J., J. D. Margolis, H. A. Elfenbein, and J. P. Walsh.
SUPPL_FILE/RAEC_A_2020710_SM8504.PDF. 2007. Does It Pay to Be Good. . .and Does It Matter? A Meta-
Grullon, G., Y. Kaba, and A. Núñez-Torres. 2020. “(19 C.E.). Analysis of the Relationship Between Corporate Social and
When Low Beats High: Riding the Sales Seasonality Need to Cite This Paper? Want More Papers Like This?
Premium.” Journal of Financial Economics 138 (2): Newey, W. K., and K. D. West. 1987. “Hypothesis Testing with
572–591. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.06.003 . Efficient Method of Moments Estimation.” International
GSIA. 2019. 2018 Global Sustainable Investment Review. Economic Review 28 (3): 777. doi:10.2307/2526578.
Hamilton, S., H. Jo, and M. Statman. 1993. “Doing Well While Pastor, L., R. F. Stambaugh, and L. A. Taylor. 2020.
Doing Good? The Investment Performance of Socially “Sustainable Investing in Equilibrium.” Journal of
Responsible Mutual Funds.” Financial Analysts Journal Financial Economics. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3559432.
49 (6): 62–66. doi:10.2469/faj.v49.n6.62. Pedersen, L. H., S. Fitzgibbons, and L. Pomorski. 2020.
Henisz, W. J., and J. McGlinch. 2019. “ESG, Material Credit “Responsible Investing: The ESG-Efficient Frontier.”
Events, and Credit Risk.” Journal of Applied Corporate Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming January:
Finance 31 (2): 105–117. doi:10.1111/jacf.12352. 1–49. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3466417.
APPLIED ECONOMICS 19

Pollard, J., J. L. Pollard, M. W. Sherwood, and R. G. Klobus. 2017. Van Beurden, P., and T. Gössling. 2008. “The Worth of
“Establishing ESG as Risk Premia.” The Journal of Investment Values - a Literature Review on the Relation Between
Management 16 (1): 32–43. Corporate Social and Financial Performance.” Journal of
Revelli, C., and J. L. Viviani. 2015. “Financial Performance of Socially
Business Ethics 82 (2): 407–424. doi:10.1007/s10551-008-
Responsible Investing (SRI): What Have We Learned? A
9894-x.
Meta-Analysis.” Business Ethics 24 (2): 158–185. doi:10.1111/beer.12076.
Shafer, M., and E. Szado. 2019. “Environmental, Social, and Yoon, A. S., and G. Serafeim. 2022. “Understanding the
Governance Practices and Perceived Tail Risk.” Accounting Business Relevance of ESG Issues.” Journal of Financial
& Finance 60 (4): 4195–4224. doi:10.1111/acfi.12541. Reporting, forthcoming. doi:10.2308/JFR-2022-010.

You might also like