Analytic Philosophy's Critical Interest and Its Uncritical Character

People know that the solution to the problem of life lies in the elimination of
this problem.

-- Wittgenstein

Philosophy has become so empty and superficial that philosophy itself thinks and is
convinced that it has discovered and proved that there is no knowledge of
truth; . . . The renunciation of the knowledge of truth, which from ancient times
has been regarded as the most despised and worthless thing, is extolled by our age
as the highest spiritual victory.

- Hegel

From the very beginning, there has been such a question: what is the difficulty of
analytic philosophy? Or to put it another way: what are the limits of the validity
of analytic philosophy? Do the methods and methods of analytic philosophy reflect
deeply on themselves?

As a basis for early philosophy of science and analytic philosophy: does the
"scientific" reductionist approach possess a critical reflection on itself? Or,
from the perspective of the form and content of philosophical theories, does the
relationship between analytic philosophy and "social issues and life issues" show a
tendency to break? So, does this constitute a test for analytic philosophy: how to
avoid arbitrariness in the interpretation of textual materials. Therefore, in order
to avoid such arbitrariness, we need to pay attention to an ancient intellectual
history problem: the relationship between philosophy and philosophers. But our
attention still needs to add one more item, which is the view of "no personal
reason" derived from a modern (modern) history of thought. "No personal reason" can
be expressed directly as: there is no possibility of any connection between
philosophy and philosophers; that is to say, any investigation of the relationship
between philosophy and philosophers in the context of intellectual history
Pointless. Perhaps we can speculate and ask: Is analytic philosophy affected by the
extreme influence of the modern view of "no personal reason"? It is especially
worthy of our attention, in the case of the early analytic philosophers Russell and
Wittgenstein, what will happen to the broken relationship between philosophy and
the lives of philosophers and the social environment in which they live? Did the
rupture and separation achieved by the common state of "separation of man and
technology" in modern times also lead to great existential pain and spiritual
danger for early analytic philosophers? And in our reading study, in Russell and
Wittgenstein, have we ever experienced this kind of "pain and danger"? So, is this
extreme pain and danger itself a distorted expression of the connection between the
extremely "impersonal rational" form of philosophical theory and its philosopher's
life?

We know that analytic philosophy, both in its thesis and in its superficial form,
declares that it does not consider "meaningless" "metaphysical problems" and "life
problems" at all. However, in Russell, one of the founders of analytic philosophy,
we find that: as a philosopher, there is a certain tension between Russell's
philosophical aspirations and his philosophical form of logical language analysis.
Therefore, does the sharp distinction between "exact thought" and "other fields"
like Ulan Eide exist in Russell? And in "The Development of My Philosophy", Russell
said: "Before I die, I must find a way to tell the essence of who I am, which I
have never said. Over--this thing is not love, not hate, not pity, not contempt,
but the essence of life, this thing is violent, comes from afar, and combines the
immensity of inhuman things with that terrible relentless power brought to life..."
Such an expression would not be surprising to the so-called "metaphysicians", but
it comes from the practice of extremely formalized analytic philosophy and the
admiration of mathematics, the archetypal model of early analytic philosophy For
Russell, is there a metaphysical pursuit of life here, or Russell has regarded
philosophical thinking itself as a way of life interest: "When I was young, I hoped
to find religious satisfaction in philosophy... When I think of mathematics, I feel
reverence..." So, do we see an unreconcilable tension? In the metaphysical impulse
of the analytic philosopher as a person (interest in philosophy as a way of life)
and analytic philosophy's "refusing metaphysics" requirement for its own content
and form? Does the tension between the two, or this irreconcilable tension, make
the philosophical career and life of the analytic philosopher often a painful
experience? So, do we agree with Alan Ude that "Russell's career was a triple
failure"? And can we feel a kind of "helpless consciousness", just like we feel
Hegel's Christian "distressed consciousness"?

The rejection of metaphysics by early analytic philosophy actually came from

methodological reflection and criticism; however, this methodological reflection
and criticism unfortunately led to the consequence of "emptiness and shallowness"
in content. Similarly, in the period when Kantianism was rampant, Hegel said:
"Abandoning the knowledge of truth, which has been regarded as the most despised
and worthless thing since ancient times, is praised by our times as the highest
spiritual victory. ". In fact, Hegel attributed the proliferation of intellectual
ways of thinking and indifference to the "content" of philosophy to the "hardships"
of the times, which "made people pay too much attention to the trivial matters of
daily life" and made "the spirit of the world too busy in Reality, too rushing to
the outside world, and not anxious to return to the heart, to turn back to oneself,
to roam around in one's original homeland.” However, it is quite ironic that what
happened after Hegel was It’s a different scene: When positivism and analytical
philosophy, which advocate intellectual science and empiricism, emerged before the
First World War in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the capitalist world was
experiencing a period of prosperity and development . This time, contrary to
Hegel's optimistic and progressive vision, what happened in the era of prosperous
and developed world economy was not the return of the "world spirit" to its
"original homeland", but the irreversible "economicization". "Or "home economics"
(economics is home economics). The more people do not need to worry about material
things, the more people "pay too much attention to the trivial matters of daily
life". Therefore, under such a social background, it was not Hegel who "sublated"
intellectual philosophy, but was "abandoned like a dead dog" by the latter.
Analytical philosophy with a critical interest has completely lost its original
critical character because it has not absorbed Hegel's positive achievements and
has become the expression of a technological and domestic modern ideology.
Similarly, Russell also commented on the arrogance of Hegel’s vain attempt to serve
as the final encyclopedia of truth. The brave defiance of the “authority of truth”
occurred in a strong rebellion against the rule of rationalism in modernity,
although this This rebellion itself also takes the form of a precise rationalism.
However, the emergence of analytic philosophy, which attempts to make philosophy
something worthy of "pure logic," is by no means a "pure logical" event in itself.
Due to the need to criticize Hegel's dogmatism, analytical philosophy has not fully
absorbed Hegel's decisive criticism of the intellectual way of thinking from the
beginning, and thus has not broken through the intellectual way of thinking that
has been modeled on modern mechanistic natural science since Descartes. After the
storm of criticism, analytic philosophy still needs to rethink itself and re-
examine the "rejection of metaphysics".

Just like Russell, at the beginning of analytical philosophy, it was indeed a kind
of exploration of thought worthy of the name of "philosophy" full of "humanistic
spirit" and social critical interest. But why is it that after Russell, analytic
philosophy has become increasingly technical, specialized, and scholastic, thus
ignoring the care and interest of analytic philosophy in humanities, society, and
politics? Overwhelmed and weakened by such methodological interests as the
requirements of the ideology, analytic philosophy is less critical in terms of
philosophical "content" - the subject matter of vital human life affairs - and
uncritically becomes Haberma's The ideological complicity of modern science and
technology that Smith criticized.