PEOPLE V. PO3 Manuel Vigilla testified that on November 29, 2000, Whether or not YES.
r or not YES. A careful perusal of the testimony of PO3 Vigilla reveals a
MARAORAO they received reliable information at Police Station No. 8 of
the Western Police District (WPD) that an undetermined
amount of shabu will be delivered inside the Islamic Center
in Quiapo in the early morning of the following day. On
November 30, 2000, at around 7:00 a.m., he and PO2
Mamelito Abella, PO1 Joseph dela Cruz, and SPO1 Norman
Gamit went to the Islamic Center. While walking along
Rawatun Street in Quiapo, they saw two men talking to each
other. Upon noticing them, one ran away. PO2 Abella and
PO1 Dela Cruz chased the man but failed to apprehend him.
Meanwhile, the man who was left behind dropped a maroon
bag on the pavement. He was about to run when PO3 Vigilla
held him, while SPO1 Gamit picked up the maroon bag. The
man was later identified as appellant Zafra Maraorao y
Macabalang. The police examined the contents of the bag
and saw a transparent plastic bag containing white
crystalline substance, which they suspected to be shabu. At
the police station, the investigator marked the plastic sachet
"ZM-1" in the presence of the police officers. The specimen
was then forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
laboratory chemical analysis. When examined by Forensic
Chemist P/Insp. Miladenia O. Tapan, the 1,280.081 grams of
white crystalline substance gave a positive result to the test
for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug. Her
findings are contained in Chemistry Report No. D-1121-00.
herein glaring discrepancy which both the trial and the appellate courts
RESPONDENT overlooked. In their Joint Affidavit, arresting officers PO3 Vigilla,
should be PO2 Abella, PO1 dela Cruz and SPO1 Gamit stated that they
acquitted spotted two unidentified persons standing and seemingly
conversing a few meters ahead of them. "However, when one of
them noticed our presence, he hastily ran away heading towards
the Muslim Center leaving behind the other person and a
maroon-colored bag with ‘Adidas’ marking in the pavement." In
other words, the maroon bag was left behind by the man who
ran away. But at the trial, PO3 Vigilla testified during direct
examination that they spotted two persons talking to each other,
and upon noticing them, "one of them scampered away and was
chased by my companions while the other one dropped a bag,
sir." Presumably, under his testimony, the bag was now held by
the one who did not run away. Later, in another part of his
testimony, he again changed this material fact. When he was
asked by Prosecutor Senados as to who between the two
persons they saw talking to each other ran away, PO3 Vigilla
categorically answered, "[t]he one who is holding a bag, sir."
Such material inconsistency leaves much to be desired about
the credibility of the prosecution’s principal witness and casts
reasonable doubt as to appellant’s guilt for it renders
questionable whether he in fact held the bag with intention to
possess it and its contents. n every criminal prosecution, the
State must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
the crime charged and the complicity or participation of the
accused. While a lone witness’ testimony is sufficient to convict
an accused in certain instances, the testimony must be clear,
consistent, and credible—qualities we cannot ascribe to this
case. Jurisprudence is consistent that for testimonial evidence to
be believed, it must both come from a credible witness and be
credible in itself – tested by human experience, observation,
 common knowledge and accepted conduct that has evolved
through the years. Clearly from the foregoing, the prosecution
failed to establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant was indeed in possession of shabu, and that he freely
and consciously possessed the same. The presumption of
innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic
constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which
place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused
is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the strength of
the prosecution’s evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense. In this case, the prosecution’s evidence failed to
overcome the presumption of innocence, and thus, appellant is
entitled to an acquittal.
PEOPLE V. John Hilario was charged with 3 counts of murder Whether or not Yes. We find that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
HILARIO which, without counsel, he pleaded guilty. the delay in in dismissing petitioner’s petition
During the trial, Atty. Raul Rivera of the PAO took over appealing the for relief from judgement. The RTC denied the petition as it
representing the client in view of the death of the instant case found petitioner’s claim that his counsel did
latter’s counsel. The RTC subsequently rendered its due to the not heed his instruction to file the appeal to be
decision finding the accused guilty beyond defiance of the unsubstantiated and self-serving; and that if there was
reasonable doubt of homicide and sentenced him to 8 petitioner’s indeed such omission committed by the counsel, such
years 1 day of prison mayor and 14 years counsel de negligence is binding on the client.
8 months of reclusion temporal. officio to There was no basis for the RTC to dismiss the petition
Unassisted by counsel, Hilario filed a Petition for Relief seasonably file concluding
contending that he was already confined a Notice of that the claim of petitioner that
at the promulgation of the judgement Appeal, he instructed the PAO lawyer to file an appeal as self
. constitutes -serving and unsubstantiated. The RTC's dismissal
The RTC dismissed the petition for relief due excusable of the petition for relief was done with grave abuse of
to failure to perfect the appeal. Petitioner contends that he negligence discretion amounting to an undue denial of the
has no way to file the notice of appeal except by his lawyer to entitle the petitioner's right to appealas it did
who he had instructed to do undersigned not touch on the question whether the PAO lawyer was
. detention indeed negligent in not filing the appeal as it merely stated
However, no notice of appeal was filed by his lawyer prison that even if said omission
 in defiance of his clear
instructions. The decision was likewise received by his appeal
lawyer but the latter did not inform him of any
action taken thereon.
The CA also dismissed his petition for certiorari.
Petitioner contends that the negligence of his counsel de
officio cannot be binding on him for the
latter’s defiance of his instruction to appeal automatically
breaks the fiduciary relationship between counsel and
client and cannot be against the client who was prejudiced
PEOPLE V. DOCTRINE: "If the defendant appears without attorney, he
HOLGADO must be informed by the court that it is his right to have
attorney before being arraigned, and must be asked if he
desires the aid of attorney. If he desires and is unable to
employ attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to
defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring
attorney."
 Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the CFI of
Romblon with slight illegal detention.
 According to the information, he did "feloniously and
without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia
Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight
hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her
personal liberty."
 Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty to the
information above described.
 It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it
appears in the judgment, the offense charged is named
SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while in the body of the
judgment it is said that the accused "stands charged with the
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention."
er to pursue his should be considered as negligence, it is a well-
settled rule that negligence of counsel is binding on
the client
.
WoN the NO RULING: The judgment appealed from is reversed and the
accussed was case is remanded to the Court below for a new arraignment and
sufficiently given a new trial after the accused is apprised of his right to have and
the right to to be assisted by counsel. So ordered.
counsel?
RATIO:
 It was not prudent for the trial court to render serious judgment
finding the accused guilty of a capital offense, and imposing
upon him such a heavy penalty without absolutely any evidence
to determine and clarify the true facts of the case.
 It is expressly provided in our Rules of Court, Rule 112,
section 3, that: "If the defendant appears without attorney, he
must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney
before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid
of attorney. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the
Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable
time must be allowed for procuring attorney."
 When a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four
important duties to comply with: 1.) It must inform the defendant
that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned; 2.)
After giving him such information the court must ask him if he
desires the aid of an attorney; 3.) If he desires and is unable to
 In the information filed by the provincial fiscal it is said that
he "accuses Frisco Holgado of the crime of slight illegal
detention."
 The facts alleged in said information are not clear as to
whether the offense charged is merely "slight illegal
detention" as the offense is named therein or the capital
offense of "kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as
found by the trial judge in his judgment.  Since the
accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears
to have been presented by either party, the trial judge must
have deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded in
the information.
employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to
defend him; and 4.) If the accused desires to procure an
attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time
therefor.
 None of these duties had been complied with by the trial court.
 The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you
have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?"  Not only
did such a question fail to inform the accused that it was his right
to have an attorney before arraignment, but, what is worse, the
question was so framed that it could have been construed by the
accused as a suggestion from the court that he plead guilty if he
had no attorney.  And this is a denial of fair hearing in violation
of the due process clause contained in our Constitution.
 Our Constitution guarantees is that "no person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and
that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel."
 It must be added, in the instant case, that the accused who
was unaided by counsel pleaded guilty but with the following
qualification: "but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo."
 The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of this
qualification. There is now no way of determining whether the
supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the
voluntariness of the confession.
 Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's
information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that
the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the
court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of
the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the
accused.
 But above all, the court should have seen to it that the
accused be assisted by counsel specially because of the
qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense

DELGADO V. CA  Emma R. Delgado, herein petitioner, together with Gloria C.
Tortona, Celia Capistrano and Catalino Bautista alias Atty.
Paulino Bautista, the last named still at large, was charged
with estafa thru falsification of public and/or official
documents resulting in deceiving one Erlinda Rueda, a
Medical Technologist, in arranging her travel to the United
States.
All the accused (except Catalino Bautista) pleaded not guilty
upon arraignment and trial on the merits ensued. Herein
petitioner Emma R. Delgado was assisted and represented
by her counsel de parte, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco. On
December 13, 1973, the date set for the continuation of the
defense evidence, said Atty. Yco failed to appear despite
proper and previous notice. Instead, he sent a telegram
requesting for postponement on the ground allegedly that he
was sick. No medical certificate was however submitted.
The trial fiscal objected, believing that the motion was
dilatory because there had been numerous postponements
in the past at petitioner's behest. The trial Court sustained
the fiscal's objection thereto, considered Emma Delgado to
have waived presentation of her evidence, and considered
the case submitted for decision.
found to be capital by the court
WON petitioner is YES. We find the petition impressed with merit
entitled to a new
trial and Ratio:  This is so because an accused person is entitled to be
therefore, all the represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case filed
assailed orders of against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is
respondent represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense
courts should be presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal
vacated and set perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This
aside, because would certainly be a denial of due process.
her "lawyer," Atty.
Lamberto G. Yco, Ruling:  WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is SET ASIDE,
is not a lawyer. and a new one is hereby rendered, remanding the case to the
trial court for new trial.
Doctrine: – The mistake of counsel will bind his client. The only
exception is when the counsel represents himself as a lawyer
and is not one because in that case the accused is denied of his
right to counsel and due process.

Thereafter, a judgment of conviction was rendered by the

trial court and finds the accused Gloria C. Tortona, Emma R.
Delgado and Celia Capistrano guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex crime of Estafa thru Falsification of
Public and/or Official Documents. Each is further ordered to
pay, jointly and severally, said complainant moral damages
in the amount of P5,000.00, and one fourth of the costs of
the proceedings.
Accused Gloria C. Tortona did not appeal from the aforesaid
decision. Accused Celia Capistrano and petitioner Emma R.
Delgado appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issue
of "whether or not on the basis of the evidence and the law
the judgment appealed from should be maintained."

Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision

of the trial court.

On December 27, 1976, an entry of final judgment was

issued and on February 1, 1977, the records of the case
were remanded to the lower court for execution of judgment.

Believing that there was irregularity in the sending of notices

and copy of the decision as petitioner was not informed or
notified of said decision by her counsel on record, Atty.
Lamberto G. Yco, herein petitioner filed on February 17,
1977 with respondent Court of Appeals an "Urgent Motion to
Set Aside Entry of Judgment, to Recall the Records and Allw
the Movant to Personally Receive Copy of the Decision.

This motion was denied by respondent Court of Appeals in

its Resolution dated April 20, 1977.

On May 11, 1977 an Order was issued by respondent Court

of First Instance of Manila directing the arrest of herein
petitioner Emma R. Delgado and the confiscation of her
bond for failure to appear at the execution of judgment on
May 11, 1977.

On May 27, 1977, petitioner filed a Motion for the

Reconsideration of the Order denying her Motion to Set
Aside Entry of Judgments, etc., invoking as one of the
grounds therein, the newly discovered fact that petitioner
 came to know for the first time only on May 19, 1977 that
Atty. Lamberto G. Yco is not a member of the Philippine Bar.
Petitioner prayed that she be granted a new trial on the
ground that she was deprived of her right to be defended by
competent counsel.
On June 3, 1977, respondent Court of Appeals denied
petitioner's motion, hence, she filed the instant petition
before this Court.
The main thrust of petitioner's arguments is that she is
entitled to a new trial and therefore, all the assailed orders of
respondent courts should be vacated and set aside,
because her "lawyer," Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, is not a lawyer.
CONSULTA V Pedro Consulta was indicted for stealing a gold necklace
PEOPLE worth 3.5k owned by a certain Silvestre. He was convicted
by the lower court. Consulta raised before the CA the issue
that he was not properly arraigned and that he was
represented by a non lawyer.
PEOPLE V. On April 29, 1978, a body of a dead man was unearthed
CUISON from a well later identified as Rosendo Coronia Jr.. The
matter was reported to the police who later investigated the
surroundings. They saw a piece of bamboo and a big stone
near the hut not far from the place where the dead body was
unearthed and they learned that the hut was owned by
accused Federico Cuison. The prosecution presented
Patrolman Ano who testified that Cuison admitted to him the
killing. The lower court convicted Cuison and imposed the
death penalty. The instant case is an automatic review of the
death sentence imposed. Accused-appellant contends that
The SC ruled that Consulta’s claim of being misrepresented
cannot be given due course. He was assisted by two lawyers
during the proceeding. In the earlier part, though he was
assisted by one Atty. Jocelyn Reyes who seemed not to be a
lawyer, said “lawyer” withdrew. Even granting that Reyes indeed
is not a lawyer, the defective representation was cured when
Consulta was later on represented by a lawyer from the Public
Attorney’s Office.
WON the NO The trial judge, in arriving at the sentence of conviction,
conviction based made much of the alleged extra-judicial confession by the
on the accused. Xxx On this point, the manifestation of the Solicitor
extrajudicial General had this to say: "It should be stressed here that Pat.
confession Ano was also not telling the truth when he declared that
obtained through appellant verbally admitted to them while they were still in
threat and without Pangasinan that he killed his kumpadre Rosendo Coronia, Jr.
aid of counsel is Pat. Ano could not decide when appellant made the verbal
correct. admission: whether on the occasion immediately when they
found him inside a house at San Jacinto, Pangasinan or inside
the jeep during their trip back to San Mateo from Pangasinan.
the extra-judicial confession was secured by means of threat
and intimidation. During the investigation, a lawyer assisted
him but left when his confession was being reduced to
writing.
Pat. Ano himself admitted in his testimony that appellant, despite
their asking questions why he killed his kumpadre, merely
begged of them: 'ang sabi niya sa headquarters daw siya
magpapaliwanag'.; thus appellant did not make any verbal
admission at that time. Instead, he told the police investigators
who found him in Pangasinan that he did not kill his kumpadre,
and that he could not tell them the real culprits at that time
because Baltazar Vidania (who made the threat to kill him and
his family if he would squeal on them) was present, who came
along with the police investigators to Pangasinan. The truth of
the matter, therefore, is that appellant merely pleaded with the
police investigators who saw him in Pangasinan that he be
allowed to explain at the police headquarters in San Mateo,
Rizal, the reasons why he came to and hid in San Jacinto,
Pangasinan after he had witnessed the felonious killing of his
kumpadre XXX But when they arrived at San Mateo, Rizal on
that day, April 29, 1978, Baltazar Vidania was always seen with
the police investigators when the latter were questioning him.
Thus, appellant decided to remain tight-lipped regarding the
circumstances surrounding the death of his kumpadre. On
May 5, 1978 when he was being questioned by the police
investigators, he refused to admit having something to do with
the killing of his kumpadre. According to the appellant, police
investigators Pat. Ano and Pat. Garcia inflicted acts of violence
upon his body (binugbog), which caused him to make the verbal
admission that he killed his kumpadre. This is perhaps the verbal
admission referred to by Pat. Ano in his testimony. xxxAnd even
before the formal investigation could start, appellant saw
Baltazar Vidania inside the investigation room at the police
headquarters, together with the police investigators, and
Baltazar Vidania approached him and whispered to him that if he
would squeal or point on them as the killers of his kumpadre, the
three of them would kidnap him.

~ NO LAWYER WAS PRESENT DURING WRITING OF THE

EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION => INADMISSIBLE Besides
the presence of Baltazar Vidania, appellant had the misfortune
of being assisted by a lawyer whose interest was adverse to his
(appellant's) cause. Pat. Ano declared that appellant had a
lawyer by the name of Atty. Juan Moreno of San Mateo, Rizal,
during the investigation; that he saw Atty. Moreno and the
appellant talk to each other three times; that it was Atty. Moreno,
after talking to the appellant, who announced that they could
start the investigation; and that he was sure Atty. Moreno was
assisting the appellant during the investigation as the latter's
counsel. But Atty. Juan Moreno, testifying as a defense witness,
declared that he was the private prosecutor during the
preliminary investigation before the municipal court of the very
criminal complaint against appellant for the murder of Rosendo
Coronia, Jr. . xxx Despite this conflict of interest, Atty. Moreno
admitted in open court that he used to visit the appellant at the
jail of San Mateo during the time he was the private prosecutor
of the case against the appellant. Pat. Ano claimed that all his
questions asked of the appellant, which became the basis of the
latter's extrajudicial confession, were freely answered by the
appellant in the presence of Atty. Moreno. But Atty. Moreno
contradicted or debunked Pat. Ano's claim, saying that he (Atty.
Moreno) was present only before the formal investigation
started. He admitted having talked to the appellant who told him
(Atty. Moreno) that he (appellant) preferred to declare before the
judge in open court; hence, he left the investigating room.

He was not, Atty. Moreno maintained, present when appellant's

extrajudicial confession was being reduced to writing. Under the
foregoing circumstances, appellant then had no alternative but
to make his forced, but still qualified confession. Appellant's

PEOPLE V.
YAMBOT
PEOPLE V. Accused was charged with raping his children, one by and
NADERA maricris. The record shows on
the arraignment, He pleaded not guilty but later on,
after the prosecution presented
evidence, he pleaded guilty. When Oleby’s direct
examination was already done, counsel
did not conduct any cross-examination on the ground that
she thinks Coleby was telling
the truth. Counsel also did not present evidence. The
accused was then found guilty
Accused was charged with raping his children, one by and
maricris. The record shows on
the arraignment, He pleaded not guilty but later on,
after the prosecution presented
evidence, he pleaded guilty. When Oleby’s direct
extrajudicial confession lacks the details of the killing of the
victim as well as the burying of the latter's dead body. Even the
joint police affidavit or report of police investigators Pat. San
Jose and Pat. Ano is absent of these important and necessary
details. By itself, the extrajudicial confession does not provide
the reasons and circumstances to convince a magistrate with an
impartial mind to conclude that appellant is guilty of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt." A confession of that
character, to repeat, is not deserving of any credence. The
reliance of the trial judge therefore on such an alleged admission
was misplaced. XXX where the confession is involuntary, being
due to maltreatment or induced by fear or intimidation, there is a
violation of this constitutional provision. Any form of coercion,
whether physical, mental or emotional thus stamps it with
inadmissibility. What is essential for its validity is that it proceeds
from the free will of the person confessing."
Whether or not the No. The cavalier attitude of accused-appellant’s counsel, Atty.Manolo
accused, Elagio A. Brotonel of the Public Attorney’s Office, cannot go unnoticed. It is
Nadera, was given discernible in (a) his refusal to cross-examine Oleby Nadera; (b) the
proper defense by manner in which he conducted Maricris Nadera’scross-examination;
his counsel. and, (c) his failure not only to present evidence for the accused but also
to inform the accused of his right to do so, if he desires. Only faithful
performance by counsel of his duty towards his client can give
meaning and substance to the accused’s right to due process and to be
presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Hence, a lawyer’s duty,
especially that of a defense counsel, must not betaken lightly. It must
be performed with all the zeal and vigor at his command to protect and
safeguard the accused’s fundamental rights. Atty. Brotonel, as counsel
de oficio, had the duty to defend his client and protect his rights, no
matter how guilty or evil he perceives accusedappellant to be. The
performance of this duty was all the more imperative because the life
 examination was already done, counsel of accused-appellant hangs in the balance. His duty was no less
did not conduct any cross-examination on the ground that because he was counsel deoficio.
she thinks Coleby was telling
the truth. Counsel also did not present evidence. The
accused was then found guilt
Accused-appellant Elegio Nadera, Jr. has four children by
his wife Daisy, namely: Oleby, born on October 2, 1982;
Maricris, bornon March 16, 1984; March Anthony, born on
January 8, 1986; and Sherilyn, born on September 27, 1987.
2 On September 22, 1991, Daisy left for a job in Bahrain,
and came home to the Philippines for vacation only in July
1993. She then left again for Bahrain in September 1993
and did not return until September 12, 1995. 3 On April 28,
1996, Oleby and Maricris, assisted by a neighbor,Lita
Macalalad, told their mother that they had been raped by
their father, herein accused-appellant. Thereupon. They Yes. The case got remanded to the trial court for a new trial. No. Bernas was
went to the police authorities of Naujan and filed a complaint not properly and effectively accorded the right to counsel.
against accusedappellant. After preliminary examination, on
I. THE ACCUSED WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS. A. THE ACCUSED WAS
PEOPLE V. June 6, 1996, four informations charging accused-appellant DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT COUNSEL
BERMAS with rape on various dates were filed in the Regional Trial
Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro.
1. The trial court did not observe the correct selection process in
Dr. Cynthia S. Fesalbon, Medical Officer IV of the Oriental appointing the accused's counsel de officio;
Mindoro Provincial Hospital, who conducted the medical
examination of both complainants, submitted a report on the 2. The Public Attorney could not give justice to the accused;
result of Oleby and Maricris’ examination. Daisy Nadera, a. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of illegal
arrest;
accused-appellant’s wife, also testified for the prosecution.
b. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of invalid
Her testimony focused on the dates of births of her children
filing of the information;
and the fact that she was out of the country when the
c. Negligent in not moving for a preliminary investigation;
alleged rapes occurred. She testified that she and her
d. Negligent in not pointing out the unexplained change in the case number;
daughters filed a complaint for rape against accused-
e. Negligent in not moving to inhibit the judge; f. Negligent in her conduct at
appellant after discovering his hideous acts. Thereafter, her
the initial trial.
children were subjected to a medical examination. 17 On
August 12, 1997, the prosecution formally offered its
documentary evidence and rested its case thereafter.
Accused-appellant did not present any evidence in his
defense.
Rufino Mirandilla Bermas was charged of the crime of raping
her 15-year old daughter Manuela Bermas while she was
lying down on a wooden bed inside their house in
Paranaque. (Date of crime: 3 August 1994)
 According to the prosecution’s account, Bermas was
armed with a knife, removed Manuela’s shorts and panty,
placed himself above her, inserted his penis in her vagina
and conducted coital movements. After satisfying his
satisfied his lustful desire, he threatened the victim with
death if she reports the incident to anyone.
 9 August 1994 – Manuela was medically examined at the
NBI. The findings are: o No evident sign of extragenital
physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time
of examination; o Hymen, intact but distensible and its orifice
wide (2.7 cm. In diameter) as to allow complete penetration
by an average sized, adult, Filipino male organ in full
erection without producing any hymenal laceration."
 The defense proffered the testimony of the accused, who
denied the charge, and that of his married daughter,
Luzviminda Mendez, who attributed the accusation made by
her younger sister to a mere resentment by the latter.
 Bermas vehemently denied that he has ever committed the
crime of rape on her daughter. – o He told the Court that he
could not do such a thing because he loves so much his
3. The Vanishing Second Counsel de Officio
a. He was not dedicated nor devoted to the accused;
b. His work was shoddy;
4. The Reluctant Third Counsel de Officio
5. The performance of all three counsels de officio was ineffective and
prejudicial to the accused.
B. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY
AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE AND TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT.
C. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE HEARD
AND FOR WITNESSES TO TESTIFY IN HIS BEHALF.
D. THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED WAS INVALID. E. THE ACCUSED WAS
DENIED THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT `SCRUTINIZE WITH EXTREME CAUTION THE
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE, MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS AND THEREFORE
ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF RAPE BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT."  There is merit in the appeal enough to warrant a remand of the
case for new trial.  8 August 1994 – Manuela, assisted by her mother Rosita,
executed a sworn statement before SPO1 Dominador Nipas of the Paranaque
Police Station stating that she had been raped by her father, Bermas, in 1991,
1993 and on 3 August 1994  signed and filed in accordance with Section 7,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
 The Second Assistant Prosecutor, issued a certification to the effect that the
accused had waived his right to a preliminary investigation.
 3 October 1994 – day of arraignment – Bermas was brought before the trial
court without counsel. The court assigned Atty. Rosa Elmira C. Villamin of the
Public Attorney's Office to be the counsel de officio. Accused forthwith
daughter and his other children. o He even performed the
dual role of a father and a mother to his children since the
time of his separation from his wife. o Manuela might have
been motivated by ill-will or revenge in view of the numerous
scoldings that she has received from him because she
frequently comes home late at night.
 Luzviminda, Bermas’ married daughter denied that her
sister, Manuela was raped by their father. o Manuela did not
come home in the night of 3 August 1994, and that, she is a
liar. o The concoction of the rape story is probably due to the
resentment by the latter of the frequent scoldings that she
has been receiving from the accused. o She was told by the
previous household employer of Manuela that she is a liar. o
She went on to testify further that she does not believe her
father raped her younger sister.
 2 May 1995 – The trial court found the case of the
prosecution against Bermas and ruled out the defense
theory of denial and supposed ill-will on the part of Manuela
that allegedly had motivated the filing of the complaint
against her father; found Bermas guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the
DEATH PENALTY, to indemnify the complainant in the
amount of P75,000.00, Philippine Currency, and to pay the
costs.
 Automatic review = SC
pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial was waived.
 19 October 1994 - The prosecution placed Manuela at the witness stand.
She testified on direct examination with hardly any participation by defense
counsel who, inexplicably, later waived the cross-examination and then
asked the court to be relieved of her duty as counsel de officio. Her request
was granted. o Atty Villarin mentioned that she could not give justice to the
accused (because as a lady lawyer…. [she did not finish her statement]).
 Atty. Roberto Gomez was appointed the new counsel de officio. While Atty.
Gomez was ultimately allowed to cross-examine the complainant, it should
be quite evident, however, that he barely had time, to prepare. o Atty.
Gomez asked for 10 minute recess before his cross-examination, maybe to
prepare. o But a ten minute preparation to cross examine the complainant
upon whose testimony largely rests the verdict on the accused who stands to
be meted the death penalty if found guilty, is far too inadequate. He could
not possibly have familiarized himself with the records and surrounding
circumstances of the case, read the complaint, the statement of the
complainant, the medico-legal report, memos of the police, transcripts and
other relevant documents and confer with the accused and his witnesses, all
in ten minutes.
 The prosecution abruptly rested its case after the medico-legal officer had
testified
.  The reception of the defense evidence was scheduled for 12 December
1994 and was later reset to 09 January 1995.
 When the case was called on 09 January 1995, his counsel did not appear
(without notice of withdrawal). The trial court appointed another lawyer as
counsel de officio, Atty. Nicanor Lonzame.
 Atty. Lonzame requested to reset the hearing to 16 January 1995.
 16 January 1995 - Atty. Lonzame himself asked to be relieved as counsel de
officio [because there is a PAO lawyer present in the court] but later,
reluctantly, retracted. o Atty. Lonzame mention that he was appointed
because the PAO lawyer (during the previous hearing day) was not around

.  Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva took over from Atty. Lonzame, who had
ceased to appear for and in behalf of the accused.

 The Court finds that Bermas has not properly and effectively been
accorded the right to counsel. So important is the right to counsel that it has
been enshrined in our fundamental law and its precursor laws.

 Even prior to the1935 Constitution, the right to counsel of an accused has

already been recognized under General Order No. 58, dated 23 April 1900,
stating that a defendant in all criminal prosecutions is entitled to counsel at
every stage of the proceedings, and that if he is unable to employ counsel,
the court must assign one to defend him

 The 1935 Constitution has no less been expressive in declaring, in Article

III, Section 17, that: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.

 Except for a proviso allowing trial in absentia, the right to counsel under
the 1973 Constitution, essentially, has remained unchanged.

 Under the 1987 Constitution, a worthwhile innovation that has been

introduced is the provision from which prevailing jurisprudence on the
availability of the right to counsel as early as the stage of custodial
interrogation can be deemed to be predicated. The rule, found in Sections 12
and 14, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, states Sec. 12. (1) Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Sec. 14
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.

 The constitutional mandate is reflected in the 1985 Rules of Criminal

Procedures which declares in Section 1, Rule 115, thereof, that it is a right of
the accused at the trial to be present in person and by counsel at every stage
of the proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of the
judgment