A RESEARCH REPORT

Prepared at
THE ARMORED SCHOOL
Fort Knox, Kentucky
.
COPY 1~

-- pJJO Cjo-fy

?t<'. / :$',#..,_,;, ~/"'j

 A RESEA~.CH REPORT :PREPARED BY
..
BY
COMMITTEE 38 - OFFICERS ADVANCED CLASS
"
THE ARMORED SCHOOL
1951 - 1952

CAPI'AIN STE&"EN H ffiftITH

CAPTAIN JAN3S R BOOTH /

CAPI'AIN ROBERT H HARRINGT ON

CAPTAIN GLE!T\lfl"lOD W FLINT

CAPTAIN Cl~ARLZS C ROSS

FORT KFOX 1 K:3:NTUCKY

•
MAY 1952
..
 FOR.EWARD

Probably no subject has received more attention with less

unanimity of opinion than the need for lightly armored vehicles in

Mechanized Reconnaissance Units . The subject is confused by the

lack of a clear concept as to what is expected of the personnel who

are to ride in such vehicles. Are they to fight or' observe from the

vehicle, or are they to ride to the vicinity and observe on foot?

If we ar!'lor the vehicle at all, men will tend to use it as an

r.
armored fi ghtinr, vehicle and will not ordinarily dismount for re­-

connoitering. If we do not armor it some, the crews are vulnerable

J
to any weapons or she 11 fra~ment . Ar>nor protection less than 1/2

inch seems inadequate and is not considered worthwhile to most re -­

oonnaissanoe peo9le ,

In o.n effort to solve the problem, we·have teamed together,

- in platoons, light tanks, an a.rMored squad personnel carrier, un­

-
armored l/4-ton -
trucks and u full-track ~ortar carrier . The British

have leaned towards platoons made up of armored cars only to do the

job . Perhaps the answer is to tea~ li6ht tanks , with their fight­­

-
in~ ability, with li$t ar~ored full-track personnel carriers for

more mobility, such as the Br en Gun Carriers. This study by Re -­

-
search Committee Number 38, of The Armored School, provides much

needed additional thou~ht on this important subject.

BRUCE C. CLARK
i''aj Gen USA
 PREFACE

As originally conceived, this study was to have been

concerned with the question of replacing the light tank in recon­­

•
naissance units with an armored car . To this end, we, the authors,

had selected u title, agreed upon a tentative outline, and co"!l..'Tlenced

work.

We had nttempted to approach the problem with open, unopin­­

ionnted !:linds . ­
b.s the study progressed, however, we found it in­

creusin~ly difficult' to avoid reachin g conclusions which, properly

speaking, should have been arrived at only when the bulk of the re­­

search had been completed , •ie r ecogniz ed that much could be found

not only to favor the retention of the li~ht tank, but also to favor

the adoption of an armored car. fithin a month 's time, however, we

felt that the study could r esult in little of positive, practical

value . Yle were by then convinced tho.t the armred car should not

r eplace the li~ht tank, and we believed, therefore, that our r eport

would probably dissolve into a mere review of the old armored oo.r ar­­

guments (with fn.cts) and would end with the negative recom.'Tlendation

that no changes be "!'lade .

As a consequence, o. con~ittee policy meeting wns held . At

this meeting we decided to reorient our res earch radically. The new

.mission we set for ourselves was to prove or disprove the pre:e1ise that

some sort of lightly ar!'l.ored vehicle is needed to r eplace the 1/4 --ton

truck in reconno.issance uni ts. A corollary mission wa.s to be the de ­

velop?nent of military characteristics for such u vehicle. The study

which follows is the result .

 We have been grently assisted in our work by many of the

officers assigned to The Armored School and to Arrey Field Forces

Board Nr 2, and we are particularly indebted to Col Theodore T

King, Chief of General and Special Purpose Vehicle Section, Army

• Field Forces Bonrd Nr 2. We were also nided considernbly by the

hundreds of officers and enlisted men throughout the world, on ac­­

tive duty and in retirement, who answered the quostionnairos we sent

them nnd who, in many cases, ndded exceedingly valuable nnd lengthy

CO!lt~ents.

T}{E AUTHORS

iv
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Ch a.ptor

1 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY•••••••••••••••••••••••••

2 Bl1.C!{ GROtm'D ••••• • ••••••••••• . ••••• • ••••••••••••••••

Rocnnno.issanoo Uni ts in ,..r rld ·1o.r II
-
Po st-Wo.r
............
Dooi si "ns anr. Aoti 0ns • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 8
Di soussi on • . . • • • • • . • • • . • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • 20
• 3 ARH0RED RECONN:J SSANCE ORGliNIZATION ••••••••••••••• 25
The l'la.toon ••.•••••.•••.•.•.......•...•.••••.••. 26
Tho Cn!"lpon.y •••••• • •••••••••••••••• •• • • •••••• •• •• 33
The Batt"'..linn •.••.•..•...•.•..•.•• . ....•..•...•• 33
The Re r i ment •.•...... . . .. .•................•.•.. 37
Discuss i nn •. ...........•...........•......•..• • • 38

4 .MmO:IBD RECONNAISS 'J1CE DOCTRINE ••• • ••••••••• • •• • •• 40

Missi rn ......................................... 41
Socuri ty .. . ....................................• 43
1ieoonna.issn.n.oe •.•••.•.••••••••••..•••••••••••••• 47
Offensivo Aot i on ••• • ·••••·· • ·•••••••··•••·•·•••• 53
Defensivo Acti nn •.••.••••.. . ••••••.••• • .••••.••• 56
Discussi<'n ••.. . •.••••••.••••••••• • ••••...•..•••• 58

5. AID'ORED RECONNAISS1',.NCE UNITS IN ?OST-- ;'{f,.,R TRJ..INING. • 60

Bo.sic Trninin;9 Tha.se ••••....•••.. • ••••.•.. • . • ••• 61
t.Ttlit tr ain in~ •....... . ....••.......... . ..... .. .. 62
Field Exercises nnc1 ?funcuvcrs •••••••••••••• • •••• 63
Discussil')n •......••. •.• .. . .......•.•.• •. • .••. • •• 68

6. ARMORED RECONN1'.ISSANCE Ul'ITTS IN TEE KOREAN WArl. •••• 70

Rcc onnnissunce Pl c.t oon, Tnnk Datt nlion •••••••••• 70
Roccnnnissnnce C0m~:my, Infnntry Divisi0n •• •• ••· 74
Discussion •••••••·•••••••••••••••••••·•••• ••· ••• 83

DESIRABLE AND PRkCTICJIL LI GIIT RECON'?~AISSANCE VEHICLE 85

Nntive :mr F~rei""l'l Devolorments ••·•··••·••· • ·•·• 85
Milito.ry Charncteristic ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 98
Com,romisos unf. Cnnsicer~tirns •·••••·••••·•••••• 101
Di souss 1 on ...................................... . 105

8. CC!iCLUSIONS AND RECO?f'~ITl-'.TIQtTS . ......... ........ . 109

T3I ~I OGW~J1lY • • • • • • • • • • . • • • . . • • • • • . • • . . • • • . • • • . • • • • 110

APPEl'IDIXES

I 0rGaniznti nnnl Ch~rts •••·•••••••••••••••••• 115

II Em:,loyment r,f Mechnnizec: Cc.vnlry Grnups in
ETO •• 118
III Ve hicle Chnrnoteristics Chnrt ••·••••••••••• 120
IV .Analyses of Questi 0nnn ire •••••••••••••••••• 121
V
 SEC R

Is there o. definite r e quirement for a lir,htly armored vehicle

to r eplo.ce tho unarmored 1/4-- ton truck in tr S Army reconnaissoncc

—— particularly in the scout section o.nd support squad of the

units ---

r e connn.isso.nce pl o.to on? If so , who.t a.r e tho Most dosiro.ble flnd

practi c al military cho.rncto ristic s of such o. vehicle?

These que stions state the substo.nce of the prob l e~ with

which this study is concerned .

---- so"!le­
It is o. problem '.lbout which the r e is diso.gr ecme~t --- ­

— ::tmong into r esb ,d o::'ficc rs.

times vio hmt - -- It is a proble!"l con­­

-
c e rning which even the hi~hest-leval policy confere nces nnd boar ds

ho.vo freque ntly r everse d one o.nothcr 1 s de cisions . It is a probl em

which ho.s existe d a ve r since "forld 7fn:r II , but for v1hich no comp l ete

solution has y ut been r eache d ~..nd s at isfactorily i mpl emQntod. It

would appear that th G hour grows late .

Tho cho.pte rs that follow a r e arr anged so o.s to present tho

problem clearly :md show tho procossos by which a solution wo.s

r oncho d. Cho.pte r 2 r eviews the r oconno.issance troop us it op0 rntod

in World Wo.r II , with po.rt icu l a.r r efer ence to difficulti os encoun­­

t e r ed with its coMbo.t vehicle s . This chaoter n lso tr~ce s the per-­
•
tinont de cisions !"lade nt the l"l'\jor oostwnr oquipmnn t confor cncGs.

Boen.use of the tr e mendous ir.fluonce tlny exe r t on e quipmont r e quiro ­

!ttmts, cor.sidor ntion is givon to o.r ""lorod r oconn'l.iss,..nce orgonizo.tion

(in Chnpte r 3) nnd dootrin:3 (ir Chflptor 4) . Ch ~pt ors 5 :1nd 6 de a.l

C
 ­
with op0ro.tions of o.r '1'lored r oconnuissuncc uni ts under present orgnn-

1zo.tions and with pre sent equipme nt . The former discusses operations

-
in pea.cc -time or ZI training; t he lo.ttor , ope ro.tions in the Korean

i.ro.r . -
Both point out se rious we aknesses of the 1/4-ton truck o.s o.

scout se ction ve hicle . the 7th oho.ptor , which is tho most technicnl

in nature , compa r e s certnin existing (or possible ) r oconno.issanco

vohiolc s, give s dc s ir nble and pra ctic o.l milita ry chara cte ristics

for n lightly armore d roconnnissnnce ve hicle , and discus6e s com­­

pro:nisos v1hich r,ight bo nocosso.ry. In the fina l cha pter, the study' s

conclusions nnd its r ecommendation o.ro pre sente d.

Inforno.tion for this r c soo.rch wo.s go.thcr cd in three wo.ys .

Extensive use w~s ~&de of o.vnilab l c documents. Personal inte rviews

wo r e hold with m~ny of tho office rs a.t Fort Knox who nr c exports in

r econno.issanco o.nd/or deve l opm~nt ~utters . A r a.ther comprohensive

— some office rs
qucstionno.ire wa s sent to a l "lost a. thousand pe rsons-to

and enlisted men dir e ctly by nruno , to othe r s through the ir units.

It is be lie ved that the nu jor limitation of this study is a.

limt o.tion which affe cts o.11 studios of mutte rs in curr 0nt progr e s­­

- — thnt is, th0 f act t ho.t o. cub-off

sion --- - d",t c !'lust be e stablishe d

for tho purpose of writing tho r e port , whe r e as tho situ ation con­­

tinue s to chem.go . It is th ou ght , however , tho.t thn conclusions and

tho r 0co!ll!'londution pre sented in Chuptcr 8 a r c none --the -le

- ss va lid .

2
 CHAPrER 2

BACKGROUND

Any col'tpr ohonsivc study of current problems of vehiculnr

equipment for r c connuiss(lllce units must include n surv~y of condi­­

tions which the so uni ts fncod during Vforld Y..'n r II. It nlso must

t r a ce tho more important officinl postwnr findings on rcconnnissmice

..
vehicles o.nd must survey the r osulto.nt action.

Tho necessity for considering the 1:rorld Wa.r II s i tua.tion

should be appnront. This war is the nost r e cent oxrunplc of l nrgo ­-

sco.lo moclorn com.but ove r "typicnl" terrain. In it were C!'\ployod the

iMmodintc predecessors of present r c oonno.issancc orgnnizntions . Ovor

its bnttlofi elds fought many ~c hicle s which a.re still standa rd issue .

Its lessons pointed the dovo lopmont of nuch of tho present 0quip!'\ont,

doctrine and orgnni zo.tion.

Tho only Wor ld Vfor II operations which ho.vo boon studied in

this rcsourch ur o those which occurre d in tho European or Mcditcr ­

ro.n0o.n Th0utcrs . It was f olt th~t here could be found the lessons

most upplicnblo to n third world conflict .

1'hc r ouson for SU.'71-ri~rizing postwar decisions und o.ctions on

r c connnisso.noo vohiclo s also should be clcur . To ho.v~ u thorou~h un­

derstanding of tho present situa tion, one must be acquainted with th r

events thnt pro ovdcd and co.used it .

Roconnaisso.noo Units in World Wo.r II

US Army rcoonnuissanc c c lements which saw notion during

World i/o.r II. worn, for tho :::1.ost purt, orguniz f'.'d into one of tho

3
 followins units :

co.vulr y reconnai ssance troop , mechanized

cavalry roconno.i ssanco squadron , mocho.ni zed

c avalry group, mochnnizod

In this s •'J ction considorution will bo given only to the first

of tho nbovc, for its difficulti e s wore tho difficulti e s of mechan­

ize d co.vnlry reconna issance in goncro.l .

Tho c a va lry r P,connaisso.nco troop , mo cho.niz e d , consiste d of

five office rs and 138 e nlisted ~on (or, in tho c o.so of the troop in­­

t ogr .:i.l to the infuntr y division , of six office r s und 143 onlistod

men)1 It hnd c. troop heudquo.rtc rs with tho usual h o::i.dquartors s e c ­

tion; ~o.int cnan co s 0 ction ; and ad ministr a tive , ~ess and supply se c ­

tion; Md it h o.d thr oe platoons. :i!:'l.ch pbtoon wus fu r th,Jr di vidod

/ into o.n a rmored cur s e ction ru1d u scout s e ction . The former wa s

e quippe d with three o.r!'1.orc d o:-1rs , tho l o.ttc r with six 1/4-- ton trucks2.

Tho a r mored car in us o wa.s tho M--8 , u lightly o.rmorcd, 6 x 6

v ehicle , weighing somcwh~t ove r e ight tons o.nd h n ving n ~aximum sus­­

tuino d speed of o.pproxirn~t c ly 55 miles par hour n.nd a. cruising r:mgc

of from 200 to 400 :1ilos ulon~ roads , or fro'!:1 100 to 250 miles cr oss­­

oountry . Its cross - country nobility, however , wa s decide dly limit e d .

Its prirnnry weapon was the 37n~ o.ntitank gun , by use of which the
11
vohicl0 was considered co.p:tblo of !!lob ilo defense a.g'linst li,;htly

o.r nor o d veh icle s nt rnn gos not e xcee ding 400 ya.rds" . In addition ,

co.ch M--8 nountod n caliber .30 !'l tchine gun nnd , in so:-1e cnse s , n
3
c a libe r . 50 ant iaircraft n~chin0 gun QS we ll . Two r adios wor e

ct:1rriod, tho SCR 506 and tho SCR 508 . Ao cordin~ to FM 2-- 20, Co.val ­

ry Rc conna.isso.ncc Troop i~ooh anizod , tho o.r"lorod co.r wns not des igne d

4
for offensive combat but was to be considere d the bo.sio com:'1n.nd nnd

communicution vohicle of the unit .

The 1/4-- ton truck of the scout s ,Jction was not designed for

offensive coMbat either . It wus inte nde d to function us the basic

reconnuissnnce vohiclo of tho unit. Hnlf of the six 1/4- tons of tho

- :nounted ca.libor . 30 light r1n­-

s e ction wore e quipped with p,3dost:1l-

chino guns. The othe r h':l.lf curried 60r,_'l\ ::,ort11rs~ An SCR 510 wo.s

provided for e~ch of the n~chin~ gun jeeps~

. Unfortuna.t o ly, th~ o.bovo - nontioned orgnnizo.tion Cllld equip­­

:-i.ont wore bo.sod on who.t proved to be n fulso premise . It h::,d been

thought thnt the troop would be C!"lploycd primarily in rcconno.issnnce

o.ctivities nnd tho.t o.ny combo.t involved would be incidonto.l there to .

h.s sto.ted b1 FM 2-- 20:

The Co.vo.lry Rcconno.isso.r.co Troop, Mcch~nizod , is organized ,

equipped, nnd trained to p3rform roconn·dssf\ncc nissions. Other
type s of ~issions o.rc ~ivcn only in tho furthornncc of o. recon­­
nnissc..ncc mission. Co!"lbo.t is enga.god in only to the e xtent nc­­
oossnry to accomplish tho o.ssignod ~ission4.

In o.ctual practice , however , it wns found th,1.t roconnc..is ­

snnce units wore receiving few pure roconno.isso.nce missions nnd

woro pnrticiputing fr equently in co~bo.t . Distant r eoonno.issnnce . u

cnvnlry function in previous wars , was now being ncco~plishod in

lnrgo l".1".Kl.sur n by 0.ir uni ts ; '?.nd nuch of tho close und bo.ttle r e con­­

naisso.nco conducte d wns being nccoJ'l'lplished by infnntry and armored

units in contact with the ene:ny-1 Tho reconnuisswco officer s who

t e stifiod before the Advisory Po.nol on Arnor in 1949 concluded thct

only 41. (o.pproxi;.1ate ly) of th o J'l'lissions which had b8en assigned to

thoir units ho.d been reconnaissance·missions . These wi tnesses stated

5
that upproxinatc.ly 55% of the !'tissions h o.d boon of'f::nsive (or

defensive ) in chc..ro.ctor nnd o.pproximo.tely 4 1% security mssions~

By tho close of the wn.r there wo.s wid .:::sprcc.d o.cccptnnce of

the fact thnt riechnnizod cavalry r econnu.iss unco uni ts 'Ne r o porfor n­­

ing consistontly. missions for which the y ho.d not been de signed or

e quipped!

The Cook Boo.rd report')<;). th1t:

•• • co!!lbut e xperi Ance in the current war h c..s dc'!:lonstrutcd

that the: existing m0chm1ized e cvo.lry R0conn:1iss:mce units h :ive
been r equired to pe rfor!:1 fre quently every for r.1 of offensive and \..
defensive combat •••
11
It nddod tho.t, Equip~ent nt pre s e nt provided ho.s not ::i.lwo.ys b een
7
sui t'.1.ble for t he nission11 •

In tho pub licnti on, Co!"lbG.t Opo r o.t ion Do.tu, First Army,

-
Europe, 1944-1945, it is stnt e d thnt i t wo.s unsound to be li e ve that

c'l.vulry could obtain its inform:1tion 'Vi tr.out fi -?htin g nnd th'l.t the

orga.nizr1.tion and oquip!110nt of r c conn:iissnnce uni ts "bc.se d sole ly up­­

on r e quir0ner.c ts for r oconno.issnnce :ussions wn.s prove d e qually un­­

sound 11 !3
The Roport of ;•,.r ..,y Fi e ld Force s Advisory Pn.nel on h r.,or ox--

press e s ."'loro ·,x ".otlv the situc,tion which e xisted. It st o.tos:

In the per forT" :::i.nce of c.11 !".\issions , di vision·t l r e con nnis­­

s :mco units c.l ..,o s t without e xception found th?.t tho nr "! orcd
ou.r, M--8 o quippod with n 37:n"l gun 'lnd its co:,ipn.don 1/4 ton
truck, 4 x 4 , wer e un·,b l e to c, ffccti ve l y ove r c~!'!!O the type of
resist.lJ!CC which pln.t oon nor!inlly oncounto r c d ,

The M--8 nrl"'lore d c nr is no longer in use in the U S Ar,:,y.

-
The 1/4-ton truck, howov c r, is ---- ru:d still i n tho scout section

of tho r oconn'.l.issnnco p l· ttoor. . It is we ll, then, to OX3.!'l'lin6 b ri of­­

ly tho m!'l.jor diffi culti os oncountorud by rcconnuissa.nco uni ts in

World vrur II in their use of t his vohicl e .

6
 -—
As a. scout vohiole, one of the j eep's M~jor dof0cts was --­

o.nd is - - - its tot a l la.ck of armor prote ction. It wris found thc.t be -­

cause of this shortcoMing, it w~s frequently o.b ~nconod , or its crew

W'\S 1 os t , or 1·t wr1s oth.arwis"

. un ,ble t o CO:-'!p1 t:it o l·t s ::-1ss1on
· · lO. Com-
­

r.mnts of two goncr n l office rs who l •:ld nr!".orod units in co!'lbc.t in the

European The'\to r nr e en lightening . ~

1~lujor Goncro.l Hol"'les E Dc.ger, who l e d Conbr,t Co:,."1:md B of

the 4th Ar~orod Division and l e.t or co:-innnded the 11th Armor ed Di v i -­

sion, h,1.s st o.t od the fol lowing:

I
Only r cflson we used it (1/4 ton) for roconna.issnnce co!"lb nt
o.ction wc..s because we didn't h c.vc enough li p.;ht tnnks or urMorod
c ,'.rs, but did h r-,ve boys with guts enough to fight in even a
''bnby cnrri ngc 11 • • , Mobile r oconnrdssr\nce so csson ti c.l to Ar-­
-
"lor c d Units 11 p"l.irl tho r ent 11 in ''forld Wnr II, but lost too rm.ny
bodhis for l e.ck of ~,r nn."li:m t :1nd r\r:1.or on the j ee p!- 1

-
Brigadier Gene ro.l TB Tho"'lpson, who com:-'lcnded one of the

co:-ibut C0!:'.."'1::mds rf the 7th Ar ~o r ed Di,:ision, h::-,s written '~bout the

1/4-- ton truck i.r: those words :

V,c lost :in.ny vehicles fro n surprise fir e whi ch could hi:i.Vf:I
been o.v oided by li~ht 1.r·1or . Mos t l oss e s 1:r.'Jr e due to n'-~chine
gun fi r 0 • •• In MY opinion , no "X~or on 1/4 t ons caused gr eat
dclny "..nd destruction o:· ve:hicli::s o.nd low.;ring of ,or "\l e •••
''7o didn 't get th r i nfor rin.tion we should h ".VO h ud . This, in my
opinion, was duEi to loss of '".Or"lo b 0c·.usc of high losse s in
non nnd vehi c l cs! 2

-
Othor diffi culti os cnc0unte r e d i n using the 1/4-ton truck in

r econnuissnncc pl'ttoons ste"'l:.ed , for th-:: !'los t p~rt , fro:, this vehi­­

cle's 1 \Ck of tr ·1.ckcd cross-- country nobility '.nd fr o,, the ~unner in

which t he lii?ht l"l·.chino gun w:1s ;1ounted en it . 'l'he pcd0 st::-.l nount

­
use d gave thf• vehicle too hi~ a silouott e , forced th o gur.nor to ox­

pose hi:'1sclf oven further th tn whm sitting , and r10.do firing t o the
0

fl~r.ks n.~d r eo.r (or, when ~oving , firing i n nny direction) ve ry ~wk--
10
wo.rd .
7
 For furthe r co~~ents :::i.bout this vehicle , see Appendix IV•

Postwar Decisions and Actions

General Boo.rd , US Forces , ~uropean Theat e r. S~ortly o.fter

the fi ghti ng i n Europe ca:-ie to en end , the Genorn.l Board, U S For ces ,

Europen.n The11ter , r e ported its findi ngs on tho ~.nny ~ ilitury subjects

it had just studie d. A un ique featu r e about tho h earing s of this

board was the f:.:.ct thnt they wore conducted in the fornor conbat

theater by and with officers who !1nd been "l.cti ve participants in the

war and o.t a tine when '.'lC'iories wor e still very fre sh.

The s ection of the bo:ird which studied nechnnized cavn.lry

units was under the chrdrnnnship of Br i gn.di0r General J A Holy.

A~ong the "trends supporte d ru1d a.dvocatod 11 , it listed the need for

an i~proved ar nor ed cn.r , r athe r thnn t o.nks , in the nochn.nized cn.vnlry

t r oop. I t a lso s tat ~d :1 roquiro?-ont for providing t ho 1/~- ton truck

with ~ightly nr!"orcd windshield and side wi n~s for protection ago.inst
3
"fr ontal or noo.r front:11 sn~.11 o.r·,s fir e" ;- Neithe r of these " trends"

ho1•rover, was included in the SU!:l.""1ary of r e c o!"l.""1<:mdctt i or;s published in

this secti on ' s report, d".ted 27 Novo:1.ber 19115.

That portion of t he Gonor a l Boar d which cons i der ed the info.n­­

­
try d ivision also concluded tha t the r eoonnui ss::i..,.~ce troop l acked suf­

ficient stre ngth (o.r:1.or o.nd fir e power). Itsr eco!:.~r,1,rn.ded solution wus

-
not to chon~e the vehi c l es but mer oly to ~ivc tho info.ntry division u
14 _/ j
-~chnnized cav~lry r eoonnu issnnce squ~dr on r nther than u t r cop. _/

i~r!"'or od Equipl"lent Bonr d ( Robinett Boo.rd). Alth0up..;h it filed ~

its r ep0rt i n I)ecer1be r 1944 , discussion of the Ar :1o r ed Equipnent

Bourd ( Robinett Boo.rd) is i ncluded in this section on postwar de ­

cisions bec'\use its findino;s influenced the fi rst i""portnnt equipment

8
policy report published ufte r tho end of tho war . (See fo llowing

sect i on on the Cook Boru-d . )

The Rob i nett Boord wus convened by its ch~ir"'lnr., Bri gndier

Genor o.l P"lul M !{obine tt !l.t Fort Knox , K,:mtucky, i n the fr,ll of 19~4 .

Its pur pose , n.s delinonted by the Co:!l!"l.c.nding Go1,ernl, Army Gr ound

Forccs,wus to review :-.o.t e rie l and oqui pncnt in which The Ar •10r ed

Center had pri~1ry interest nnd to ~ukG r ecol".l!:!endat ions for the e li­­

i:ri.nn.tion of i te!;ls or f or their r otnntion with :-:odifications or with-­

out cha.ng0 . biilit o.ry chur o.cto risti cs w0rc to be r econ"'londed for r e ­

plnce1:10nt equipnent .

Trucke d r econno.i ssance vehicl es wer e within the scope of this

bonrd ' s study, but whee l ed rnconn"liss,mce vehic l e s wer e not~ .As :1

consequence , no consid~r'.lt i on wa.s i;;iven to the 1/4-- ton truck us a

16
scnut vehic l e , wd no :-:or.tior. w·' s ~:-.cle of providinp: it with c.r !Tlor.

A."1on~ tho r ecoTt":lcnded :'ilitnry ch".ructe risti cs wer e those for

u v o r y li ght t c.nk. This vehicle 'IT~s to h:we nsup,,rior cross - country

nobi lity and liT•ited crew (two to throe r:on) for r oconna.issru:ice ,nnd

for support of ·1irbornc c,p0r o.tions " . I ts ar::innent wc.s to consist of

. : .............................................. ....
.... ............ ...............................
7
a. gun of ut l ea.st 20"".".! rmd of one or nor c cnliber . 30 !".D.chine guns~

- track
Milit ury chn.r:1oteristi cs wur e u l so given for a. full-

r oconnni ssancu vehicle , which was to bo ccpub l c of oper a ting i n

"oxtrcnely wot t e rruin" und was to hnve 11

mruci:iun c r oss-- country

ability" . 1·/ith o. c r ew of six ~~on , it wns to wei gh not nor e thnn six

tons and wo.s t o h nve a mrucinu.ri sustnined speed of 40 ~i l es per hour.

Both u culibcr . 50 r.1.nd u caliber . 30 ~nchine gun were t o be nounted .

Ar ~or wns to be sufficient to protect ng~inst s~nll n.r~s fire at 200

18
ya.r d s.

9
 Ar~ Ground Forces !:quip:"lect Review Bon.rd (Cook Boe.rd) .

While the Robinett Boar d wo.s neeting nt Fort Knox , sini l o.r gr oups

were functioning o.t other brar..ch school s , prepc ring studie s on the

~o.ter iel nnd e quipncnt of prino.r;r interest to thoir arr.1 or service.

Tho report fron e..ch was forwnrded to the Ar,:ry Ground Force s Equip-
19
ncnt Review Board {Cook Board) fo r use inc ~oro i ncl us i ve survey.

The Cook Boe.r d hnd been est nbl ishcd by the Cornunding

Genorul, Arrry Gr ound Forces , in c o:'.lplin...~ce with n 1/:0.r Depnrtl"",ent

I.5onor:.mdu!"'. ordering u study of " wo!.'.pons und the ir related pri::ie

Movers ona tr,msport vehicle s for use in the Post Wo.r Ar:-ry" . It

net during the period J n.nu f\ry - June 1945 under the l e ader ship of

its chuirr1on , }5o. jor Genern.l Gilber t R Cook •

.l\...<;ong its ~Emera.l conclusiN1s , the one s nost pertinent to

the question of the need f or a li ght ly ~rmorod vehicle by r econ­­

nn.iss:mce units wore thG f o llowing :

VTco.pons o.nd equipnc!;t for th,1 ground forc e s ;1Ust be the best
i n the world . Only if t his is so will ,·m be n.blo t o koe p down
our cusualtios and to prcver.t usoless loss of life .

A wcnpon or a. piece of equi~ent should be deve l oped fnr a

specific purpose nr.d ~ust r epresent the b est possible ~olution to
tho needs of tho user. Purtirll solutions and sub-- stnnd ci.rd ~~ut or ­
i ol can only r e sult in unnece ss nry loss of life nnd !"lflterinl in
CDr.'\bO.t.

Incroo.s o s fr.._ fir e powe r und dcstructi ven n,ss of woo.pons \"Jill
!'"lo.kc nocoss a.r y or. ir.creo.sed use of o.r ,or protection for both per ­
sonne l and vehicles during tho next wo.r .

Spe cific deve lopr.1cnts r e com....,end included o. new li ght to.nk

Md now full-- trnck vehicles f 0r r econno.issn.nce units . The light

tnnk wus not the ver y li ght (or ~ id 6 o t) type propos e d by the Robin ­

e tt Bon.rd . but wns one of the 25 --t on clo.ss . - track

Or.e of th~ full-

10
r econno.is:knco vehicles sur,fested wns to be o. r epb.ce"')ent for the

ur::i.ored cnr und was to ho.ve cor.1p:1.r a.b l c cruising range ond sil ont op-­

e r ntion. - r r:10r od personnel carrier .

Another W'.ts t o be a li ght ly-a A

-
third we.s to bo u 15-:-.-i::i.n a.r -,ored co:r.'.llld vehicle . No r econnondntion

-
',mde for a vehicle to r epl ace the 1/4-ton true~~

Har Depnrt ,,ent Equipnent Boo.rd (Stilwell Boa.rd). The Vlo.r

Doport~ent ~quip::icnt Boo.rd (c:llled the Stilwo ll Bourd ufter its

chni r !:l.nn , General J oseph ·:! Stilwell) net during the winter 1945 -

1946 t o 0 stnblish un up--to-- date j?O licy guide for equipping the

Ar ny. In tho conduct of its wor k , it r eviewed cnreful ly the Cook

9
Bn(l.rd Report ::l...'1d interviewed !"l(ll'!y highly quo.lifiEJd offi cers~

In n. discussion of the prircipl es of devc l opr:i:mt , it noted

tho desirfl..bility of kcepin~ to n :-.ini,,ix, the ve.ri ous i t ens of eq11i p­­

:-.:er:t . It stutcd r..l so , however, thn.t 'iilito.ry r c·scn.rch should be en­­

couro.god to depo.rt fro!"l the convont io:r.~-:.l .:m e should "not be restrictE:d

bccf'.use of the existo..ucc of o.n obstensibl c co~11:'C rci::.l counterpn.rt 11 ~l

.fl.Mong its specific r e conri.end:,;tions wo.s one for a :ii dget t ci-!.k.

So:iewhc..t s i:-ti. l c.r to tho.t o.dvocn.t cd by tho Robinett Bourd, the r c ­

qu ircnont pr oposed by tho Stilnell Boa.rd was for u vehic l e to bo

11
used for li:1itod range battlefield r cconnn.isso.nce n.nd in the i niti::.l

pho.ses- of an airborne ('per o.ti on 11 • It was to weigh npproxi!"lato ly 12

tons, c;:u-ry n crew of throe !'10n , h::we exce llcnt cross-- c0untry !"lobil i ty,

o.nd :1ount o.uto!:'lntic woo.pons "c ap.'.:l.bl e of' destr oying pers onne l and
2
lightly nrnored vehicles 11 :

In contrast to the 0pinio11 of the Gener a l Bon.rd , U S Forces ,

Et1r opcnn Thonter, this board indi cc.tcd tho.t the o.r"lorod car wns so

s c riouslJ' defic i ent in cross - country ;1obility and fire PO'tJe r tho.t it

11
 23
should b0 rcplt,cod by the M- 24 light tonk. (In roviewing this

repor t , Ar!'l.y Ground Fo r ces concluded that there was no nood for

either o. wheeled or u t r nckod nrnor ed cnr . The War Depurt~nt ,

however , ;1odified the finul report by o.dding n requirc~ont for on

24
"ur:.ored cur for roconno.issnnce.11 . )

On the question of an ur!"lored 1/4-- ton truck, the Stilwell

Boo.rd ngnin differed fron the General Boord, US Forces , European

Thenter, which hnd proposed o.rnored windshield ond wings only. The

Stilwell Boo.rd stated its findings in the following words:

There is o. roquirc~ent for u light , wheeled, pnrtinlly nr­­

nored truck of the o.pprnxino.te size of the present 1/4-- ton t r uck
for use by reconnniss'l!:cc elc~onts; o.nd by con;10.nders, linison
officers, and others whose duties require then to be habitually
nount0d in exposed vehicles. This vehicle should provide side
o.rnor nnd pnrtiul ovcrhcn<l urnor cupo.ble of protecting against
s!"lo.11 ::ir!'l.s fire and she 11 frng:.onts, with nr;1orcd floor for ::i.ine
protection. Mo.xi:,un cross - country cnpo.bilities, notivc power,
trnction , o.nd flot~tion o.ppronching thnt of _the current 1/4--ton
truck nre desired . Provision should be included for nounting u
. so cnlibcr ~nchino gun, radio , and for currying o. crow of three
!7en . 24

(In the report on its Project Nr 1169 , dntod 22 August 1947 ,

Arny Ground Forces Board Nr 2 provided the !7ilito.ry ch~ructoristics

for this vehicle. — - or 3

Included was n crew of 4 ~on --- !70n und n

nediu~ rouge radio -—-

-- u ~uxinu!7 speed of not less thm 60 !7iles per
26
hour, and n gross weight of not over 5 , 000 pounds.)

The Stilwell Board pointed out thc.t reconnnissance units , if

given lightly arr1orod 1/4- tons, would be able to extend the effective­­

ness of their !70tor reconnnissnnce nnd would have u suitable vehicle

to take over those fornor ur!"'orcd CC\r !'liss ions which the light tank
7
could not effectively execute~

12
 The Ar .... orod. Conference , The next i!'.:1portant board study of

r econno.issnnce vehicles was conducted by the 11.rMored Conference ,

which net o.t Fnrt K11 ox , fr on 13 to 23 Mo.y 1946. Its purpose, a.s

outl ined by Mo.jor General Hugh J G:lffey in his sp0ech of wolco~o ,

wo.s to :::lllke n. co!"1pr0hensi ve survey of i.'.inediate und future needs in

.
o.r!"l.or c d equipnont , t ec,u,iquc,
,..._. · 28
· t ion.
nn d orgnnizn
111
Ono of the nt~cndo. qucsticns wo.s , !iho.t is the r equirenent

for on urnored c-.r (track or wheel , g uns, etc)?" The "'1.e!'lbcrs of the

conference reached nn nl-ost uno.ninous solution to th is question .

They concluded tho.t the o.r·1or cd car then in use wn.s unsntis­­

fo.ctory , but tho.t devclop~ent ~hould continue with the view of pro­-

viding a better ono , either wheeled o r tracked. The require;10nt they

-
drew up included light ar.:.1or (enough to protect ago.inst s::1ull-ur!"ls

fire , artill e ry frngr,onts, ond ~inos) , o. crew of four nen , n range of

300 nil cs , quietness of oper o.tion , high rond speeds , [U,d o. gun of

approxirw.tcly 75r1:1. in size .

In further nnswer ing the SQ"'le o.gendo. question, the confer ence

stated thnt n "li ght ly ar::iored , radio equipped co.r for 1i11ison a.nd

Messenger purposes , incorpornting tho operuticino. l charo.cteristics of

1 29
tho present l;t.l: - ton vehicle, should be doveloped 11 •

Project Nr 1189, "Mili to.ry Cho.ro.cteristics for nn Ar!"!orod

Ca.r". In i ts report of Project Nr 1189, <luted 25 October 1948 , Arny

Field Forces Bourct Nr 2 listed substontio.lly the sa.:-ic :1ilitury

cho.ro.cteristics for o.n nr~ored cnr (o.pproxi~o.tely 20,000 pounds in

weight) us were r eco!"1f'16nded by the Ar~ored Conference . (See pre ­

ceding section.) Tho report stnted , however , that !"!Obility, fire

power, nnd o.r::ior protection were in conflict and tho.t the n ilito.ry

13
 cho.ro.ctcristics given actunlly represented o. "conpromise of dubious

prncticnl o.ttnin::i.ent'' . It suggested thnt, instend of o.tto!ipting to

build such n v0hiclo, o. tenn of two vohiclos should be nccopted to

do the requir ed job . One of those should be the light tnnk. Tho

other should be o. "light nr!,ored o r scout cnr" weighing npproxi ­

~o.toly 8 , 000 pounds (16 , 000 at.the ~ost) , h~ving nobility equnl to or

superior to thnt of the light tnnk, ~d !"lounting, o.s nrnn..~ent , ~ul­­

tiple nnohine ;;uns . Its nr'10r should provide protection fr 0:!1 nll--
. 30
nround s!"ln.ll-- o.r!7S fire a."ld light o.rti 1lory fro.gnents.

(Depo.rt~ent of the Arny did not approve the !"lilito.ry charcc ­

teristios for o.n nr~ored cnr o.s given in Project Nr 1189. With re ­

gard to the pr0posod substitute "light arnored or scout cn.r", how­­

ever , Arny Field Forces reco~~ended that weight be stated us being

"nrit grenter thnn 16,000 pouncs" o.nd tho.t the :->ultiple ,..,_a.chino guns
31
consist of 2 co.libcr , 30 1 s nnd 2 caliber . 50 1 s, rountod cooxio.lly.)

Arny Field Forces Advisory Panel on l1r~or (Ho.r~on Boo.rd).

Another i!7portnnt doo~~cnt of recent yea.rs is the report of the Arr~

Field Forces Advisory Panel on Ar~y, do.tod 18 Fobru~ry 1949. Under

its chnirncm, Mn,jor Genernl :.rnest N Ha.r;1on, tho boo.rd which prepared

this report hnd the -1.ssion of dro.wini; up on n.uth0ritutive policy

— pnrticul~rly us conc0rncd its doctrine o.nd

stato;1ent on o.r~or ---
32
its equip::-iont requir0!'!9nts nnd developnonts .
J
N10ng the v.:1.rious itens of equip::-ient (or proposed equip!"}(')nt)

considered by this board, were the nidget tonk; tho heJ.vy a.nd light

ur~ored co.rs; :ir.d the light, pnrtially o..r'."lor0d truck.

Concerning the nidget tnnk, which ho.d been :irlvoco.tcd by the

Robinett ~nd Stilwell Bon.rds, the Hr.u-~on Boo.rd oxprcssed th~ belief

l4
thnt no genornl use c0uld be foreseen for such a vehicle c..nd th:1t
3
there wns no current devol opncnt r oquired~

The bon.rd conclu<1ed thnt nei thor the infnntry nor the nrnorod
34
division h ~d need for nn ur~ored cur :1ounting n co.nnon . It stnted
11
further thnt it was i:1prn.cticnl at thnt ti!"le to !'10unt n suitable gun

0n an ar;1ored c-i.r within the weight lir;it ::i. tions of 16,000 pounds" .

'ilith reference to tho nultiple -i"..chine gun "light or...,ored or scout

cnr" proposed by Amy Fi e ld Forces Boar d Nr 2 i::1 its r eport of Proje ct

Nr 1189, und supporte d, with ::1od ificntions, by Arny Fie l d Forces (see

pre ceding section). the Ho.rr.on Board felt that devolopnent wns un­­

warranted. It did, however, reco~~cnd thnt study shoulrl be continued

with the view of producing o. 20 , 000 pound, adoquntoly :1uncuvoro.ble,

wheeled nrr;orcd cur, nounting u gun of 76::i.r; or lnrgor . This vehicle

-
would boa substitute, n0t for the l/4-t0n truck, but for tho light

— nnd only in tho o.r~ored cnvulry regi~ent or, possible in air ­

tr.mk ---
5
borne units~

In its reco::t'lendutions f or n light , pnrticlly nr,orod truck,

it followed the thoughts of the Genera l Bonrd, US Fo rces, Eur 0penn

Theater . As stated in the Hnr:1on Bonrd r eport :

There is o. requirc:-ient for n lightly nr"'lored 1/4--ton truck

which will rotnin the co:'lplete n.gility of tho present 1/4-ton -
truck, chie fly by li::i ting the a.I""\Or to a. shield o.nd wings pr o­­
tecting th e driver ' s co~po.rt~ont • •• developr.cnt (of this vehi ­
cle) should be pursued to conclusion . 36

Conbined Conference on J\r r1or . Shortly o.fte r the final

meeting of the Hnrnon Boo.rd was held , the Conbined Conference on

Ar:1or wns convened. Attended by r e pro scnto.tivos of tho United

Sto.tes, the United Kingdon , o.nd Cuna.do., this body net fron 17 to

24 Murch 1949 . Its purpose wo.s to plnn for the stondnrdizn.tion of

15
ns :ruch of the nr;1ored cquip~ont of the pnrticiputing no.tions ns

secned pro.cticnl.

,:\:'",ong tho rec O"'l."'lCnd·,tions no.de by this confer en oe , were the

following:

1. The United Stutes nnd the United Kin~don sh0uld continue

to develop the light to.nk and tho light nr~ored car , respectively.

2. Tho United KingdoM should continue to produce the FV 701

(n scout our) •

3. Tho United Stutes should consider nooeptnnce of the FV

701 ns its light reconnniss~.ncc vehicl e .

4. The Ur-itcd Kingdon should continue to plo.n the develop-­

!'1ont of a tracked roconnaissanco vehicle .

5. The United Stntcs should dovolop 1 -

light nrnored 1/4-ton

truck (o.s visunlized by tho Ho.rnon Boo.rd) for use in the interin

period .

6. The United Kingdo~ should undcrtnke rosoo.rch nnd develop­­

nent of the long-- ter!'1 o.r~orod cur .

7. Both tho Ur itec states and the United KL~gdon should un ­

dortnke research nnd duve lop:,,.m t of o. gtm to :-10et the require~nts of

37
the long-- ter~ ~r~ored cnr .

Arny Equipncnt Boo.rd (Hodge Boo.rd) . In 1946 the Stilwell

Bonrd hnd recon.~cnded tho.t si:ii.lnr bonrds be convened periodicnlly

to review pro,i;ress no.de in equip!"10nt dcvelopnonts nnd t0 ::iodify or

revise , o.s necessary, the bnsic guide it hnd estnblishcd for equip­­

ping the Ar:-w~ 8 It was in l ine with this suggestion thnt the Ar~y

Equipr.cnt Board (Hodge Board) was orgnnized. Unrer the lcnrlorship

of its chnirmnn, Licuteno.nt Gencr nl John R Hodge, meetings w0re held

16
fro!'l Jnnuo.ry to Mnrch 1950.

A dominant considerntirm cur ing these !'lCOtings was the linito.­­

tion on funds then a.vnil nbl0 to tho A:tey. - Po.rtioulnrly i !'lportunt wo.s

tho fa.ct thnt the budget for research nnd devclop!'l0nt was being re­­

duced repeatedly. As o. consequence, tho Hodge Boo.rd report wo.s fo­-

9
-
cused pri!"l..'\rily on short-ter:1. roquire'.".lonts~

The following quotations fron the published report illus­­

trate sor.:c of the bonrd's gener al thoughts pertinent to this study:

Inprovor.ont of tncticnl or battlefield ~obility of Ar!'ly

oquipnvnt is n :,ost prossu:,.g requirc~~rt. The ~obility nust be
obtained without l oss in fire povror.~0

Stability of design nust be o::iphnsized. Mndifioatfon or re­­

plnoonent of existing nilitnry itons should be no.do only when de­­
finitely required to porf0r :1 a. ooribat ;1ission nnt possible with
nvniln.ble ito;15 or when the change will si!'.!lplify design, fo.cili­­
tnte production, provide :.nrl-.:od ir1provc!'lont in pcrf0rno.nce or r e­­
-
sult in over-all eo0nony 41 0

Consi~oration shnuld be given to nuking the :,ruci:"!Un prnoti­­

cnble use of OO'"'l'~croi:clly nvnil'\ble itens. It is desirable th~t
the stnte~ent of ~ilitnry characteristics r equire nini~un !"'lodifi­­
c::ition of oo"'neroinl types . However, when use of CO!T'eroinl types
W"uld significantly docrense oonbat effooti ver.c~s , ro.dicnl depur­­
turo fr o~ coT.erciul desir.ns r.rust be accepted. 4 G

With r,eference to the '.:lidget ta.nk which the Stilwell Bo:i.rd

had pr0p0sod, the Steering C0!"1.9ittoo of tho Hodge Board noted thnt

there hnd been no dovelopncnt . It reco;'..~cnded, howovor, that the r e ­

quironont be retninod, rost~ted ns follows:

Thero is u requiro:1ent for a. very s!"'lnll o.r :--ored oonbnt vehi•­

ole possessing effocti ve urnunent ::m.d nobility and !"'lonouver­­
o.bility for use in Pho.so I of Airborne operntions und for use in
gr o~d 00:.1bo.t.

(Tho bonrd report onitted it.)

Tho roquire!'l0nt for an nr:,orod co.r likewise W(\S de leted .

The require:-ont for n light, partially ar,ored truck wns

17
worded as fol lov1s:
There is o. roquirencP-t for n light, wheeled, partinlly
nr~ored truck based on~ stmid~rd 17~--ton truck chassis for use
by reconnaissu.11ce elor1ents and by co:1....,anders, lio.isor. officers,
und others whose duties r equir e then to be hnbitunlly :1.ounted in
exposed vehicles. Provisi on should be included for !"\C'untinf a
3
~a.chi~e gur., n r arlio , and fnr cnrrying n crew of three non .

(This wording wns approved by the Depo.rt'."lOnt c-f the Arrry with
44
the addition on the end of, "including drivor" .)

Project Nr P•- l430, "Study of Suitability of Truck, 1/4-ton,

-

6 x 6, Arnorod, T 60 11 • In conpliancc with o. letter fr o!"'I Office of

Chief, Arny Field Forces, d,1.ted 30 June 1949, Army Field Forces

Boo.rd Nr 2 initintod Project Nr P-- 1430, "Study ""f Suitability of

Truck, 1/4--tor. , 6 x 6, Ar!:lored., T 6011 • Its conpleted r eport was

dntcd 12 Octobor 1950.

In the body of the report, it w~s notod thut in 1947 the

then Arny Ground Forces Bonrd Nr 2 had dovel""ped ~ilitnry chnrnc­-

teristics for n lightly ar..ored 1/4-t on truck in its Project Nr

1169. These h~d boor. based on rcco~~ondnti on s ~a.de by the Stilwell

Boo.rd. (See earlier section of this chapter . ) I~ June 1948, o.ctuo.l

develop:::ent of a vehicle (tho T-~60) to ~eot these chn.ro.cteristics

had been initintod; c.nd , thnugh pr ogress wo.s slowec. by shorto.go of

45
funds, tv;o "1<"0k- ups h~,d fir,ally been co:.ploted.

Those we r e studied by Boo.rd Nr 2 • Neither wns cnr.sidercd

suitnble, h cy1,1rover -- chiefly beco.use o f the r eco:1.."'lendo.tion '"'to.de by

the Ho.r nor.. Boo.rd nnd the Conbi:-1ed Cor,fercr.ce on Ar"'."lor tho.t o.r :'!lor bo

restricted to wir:rlshie l d and wings , ::md bcoo.uso 0f the roco!'l:lendo.­­

tion "1.~de by tho Hod~e Boru-d , tho.t tho vohiclo bo b~sed on the stund­­

nrd 1/4-- ton truck cho.ssis. -

(The T-60 hnd o.l1- - :1.r 0und ur ...,or nnd wo.s

not bnsed on tho stand•., r d 1/4-- tor. truck chnssis.)

18
 Report of Project Nr P - +430 concluded thn.t tho M•38 jeep wo.s

suitnble "to fu l fill (the) requine:1ent for o. lightly nrriored 1/4-- ton

truck without :'!Orlifion.ticn e:xceP,t for c.rlditio!" of o. kit" (o.r'"'tor ed

windshield, wings , nnd s0nts ). It roco~cnded ter~in~.tion of tho

. 46
-
T-60 pr oJect .
47
(1'fork on the T-- 60 wns ~irecto<'I terninatec o.c. 30 P.ugust 1950. )

US Ar~y Policy Conference on Ar~or . The US Ar'!'JY Policy

Conferonce on Amor :-,et n.t Port Monroe fro:-:i 16 to 20 October 1951 in

order to review tho report of the 19~9 Co!tbined Cor feronco on Ar--:ior

0..'1rl to "discuss , r uvisc , anti estnblish n cleo.rly defined U S frny

policy on Ar!'li~ 11
•

Tho cocforcnce noted thut, a.lth0ugh the Co~bined Conference

ho.d reoor.l!'lo?:dod tho.t t11o U S rlovelop o. lightly o.r..,orcd l/4-- ton truck

fnr possible use ns the shrrt-- tern, li~ht rcc~nr.nissQnce vehicle,

work on such vehicle h:1.d been tcr"'linn.tcd ns bein6 unsntisfnctor y .

It noted further thnt the United Ki ngdon scout co.r FV 701 hn.d not

boon received in th is country for tostir.g.

C0~clusions dro.wr. wero thnt o. need existed for both o. heavy

roconnuissn.nce vohic le (oi ther u light tnnk or nn ar ...orod oar) o.nd

a light rco0nnnissanco vehicle . Co~corning the lnttor , tho follow•­

ing wns stutcd:

At present , the light roc on~~issnr.co vehicle is tho truck,

1/4-- t on . This vohiclo sco~s quite suitable f0r the rolo except
for tho fact thut it provides no prntoction of uP.y sort for the
crow nr,ui~st ono~y fire . Tho l ~ttcr is <lc sirnblo but upponrs
unntto.inuble without serious rle trino•1t to the :'li'bility chl'l.rri.c­­
teristio . It is possibl e that the United Kingdo~ develop!"lCnt
of tho FV 701 will point the way to a better light reconnuis­­
sunco vehicle . This vehicle should be t e sted n.nct evuluated in
4
oo~po.rison with the truck, 1/4-- ton, prior to at ~~pting dovel­­
op!"lent of another vehicle to roplo.ce the lntter .

19
 1'.ddi tinno.l reco::l!,Emcnti ,:,ns woro thnt tho Uni tod Sto.tcs devo 1-­

op nn ic1.proved light tank and ur.dertak:o resoo.rch for an ur!"'lored cur

. t er1"'1.
f or the 1r. ' d 49
. or 1 ong-- t Br:'l pcr10 • "'

Tripnrtite Conforenco on Ar:.lor o.nd Bridging. Four do.ys

after the close of the U S Arr-iy P0 licy Conference on Ar"'lor , the

Tripartite C0nfercnc c on ;,rn.or nnd Bridging convened . Ir, sessions

during tho period 24 - 30 October 1951, this !"10Cting hnd o.s one of

its objectives tho r eviewing of tho report 0f tho Combined Confer­­

ence on ~rc1.or (1949) fl.l1.d the sugr.o sting of approprio.to revisions to

tho.t conference's r ooo~no~dntion s . Rcprcsontca o.go.in were the United

Stntes, tho U~ited Kingdom, ::u1rl Cru-10.dc..

Agc.i!'. nnted were the need f or both o. henvy nr.<1 o. light rooon­­

na.issf.ll'!ce vehicle; o.nd a.go.in sto.tod wus tho face that "develofr.1ont of

-
on ar:1orod l/4-t0n has not proven prnctico.l :l.i'1d hc.s been t c r..,ino.ted" .

11.nong the reco;1.~enrlntions wns one thnt the Un ited Stutes o.nd
11
Cnno.da. cor,sider tho FV 701 scout cur n.s n possib le solution t o their

roquironents for n li~ht rcc or.nuiss~m ce vehicle"~O

{The rec ords of ;.rny Field Forces Boe.rd Nr 2, as of Februnry

1952, incHcnted tho.t dolivory of coc1.plotc FV 701 with spare pnrts

would be Mnre by nid--y oo.r 1952~~

Discussion

­
,\.s h ns boon pointed out ir. this ch:.i.pt or • both the 0rgo.nizn.­

tion nnd tho equipncr:.t nf U S r ecnnno.issun ce uni ts in tfo rld Wo.r II

proved t o be unso.tisfnctnry. Ir. pnrticul:i.r, the 11 -8 a.r!'lorcrl ca r

m,_n tho 1/4-- t on truck (with its C":'pl ot e l e.ck nf nr!:l<'r protection)

wore nnt equnl t o what wo.s required nf tho'.'1.

20
 -
Nu:1erous high-level oo:,fer~nces ht:.V<;} boon held sir.co tho WDr ,

with the a.in of estc.bl ishi~g r.n<l revising equip!"!OLt policies nnc r e ­

quiro~r.ts . Ir. the ~c.ttcr 0f r oconnniss~.r.ce vohicles , policy -- us

tlctcr,-iincd (0r r oco!T.lonacd) by thoso oonfcr0rcos -- h~.s fluctuutcrl

consirioro.bly.

Definitely esto.blish ~d ut tho presor.t ti'ic, however , is tho

f•tot thnt this country r-,oons b<"'th n hco.vy and n lir-;ht r eccmr:1iss::mcc

vehicle and thn.t it hll.s en s'\tisfc.ctory light or.a . ,\lso e stnblishec:l

is the f~ct thnt tho pr Gsont 1/~- t~n truck cc.'1Tlot be converted i~to

­
n so.tisfnctnry light rcconn~.issnncc vehicle without "se ri 0us dct ri­

nort to tho ,.,0bil ity chn.rnctoristic" .

NOI'ES FOR CHJ..PJ'ER 2

l Lt Col i'illi-:..:1 T Bi r d 11 C0r.siclerc.ti ·ns f<'r E'ipl0Y!:lent of

Moohnnized Cr.vn.lry" , The M1litc.ry Rcviow, XXIV, Nr 10 (Jc.nuC1ry 1945),
p 73.
2 !:ujor !Inwnrd C Borv , "E~·plr>y::t0;;;'1t of the Cnv\lry Rccm.n'.lis ­­
snncc Tr oop , l\Ioch!'.rizod , in Po:2otrntion 'UlC sicplcitr..tion" , a. student
!"!<"!"l.ogr nph (F0rt Kr.ox : Tho I,r•1orcd Sch0nl , 1 948 ), B_:> 2 , 3 0 •

3 FF 2--20 , C:.v:ilr;v Rcconr.nissmcc Tr<"' 1p ncchruiizod ('"o.shirg­­

t0n: Govorrt!1,;r.t Printing Office , 19.,,4), p 4 .

4 Ibid, p 2.

5 Report 0f Ar":T;{ Field Forces l.dvis ory Po.ncl on Ar!'lor t o

tho Chief of Sta.ff, Unitea Stutes Arrry, o. r eport prepared unac r
chnirl"lo.r.ship of }f:ij0r r.cnor :"tl EN Hnrnon (Ft ~nr.roc : Arniy Field Forces ,
18 F 7bruo.ry 1949), Tnb V, p ~ .

6Ibid , APncx B, Tnb 2, p 1.

7 Report of Boar d of Officers Conver o~ t0 Stilley the Eouip·wnt
r,f the P0st 17:J.r Ar '!"'!Y, n r cpr-rt 9r0pr,rt-?. unaor the ch·1.ir!"l:u:shi p " f
M:1.jor Gcncrnl Gilbert R Cook (Wa.shir'Gton : Ar ny Grnund Forces , 20 June
1945), .\..nnex F , p 1.

21
 8 Co!ibo.t Operation Do.to., First Ar!iy, Europe, 19~ 1-1945
(Governors Isla.~d: Hondquo.rters, First Ar:.y, Nove!iber 1946), p 68.

9 Re ort of Ar~y Field Forces Advis ory P~~el on Ar:.or to the

Chief of Stuff, United tn es A.rnv Mor.roe : roes,
18 February 1949), Ta.b V, p 5.

lOApPencHx IV hereto.

llMo.jor Genera.l Hobes E Do.ger, in reply to questionr.o.ire .

12 Brigndier General T B Tho'.:lpson, in reply to questionnaire.

l3study Nr 49, Hcchnnized Cavalry lliits, The Genern.l Boo.rd,

US Forces European Theater,~ report prepnred under direction of
Tho General Boo.rd, U S Forces ~urnpco...~ Thea.tor · (Nover1bor 1945), p 18.

Hstudy Nr 15, Orgar.iz.ntior., Equip!:!ont, o.nd T1tctica.l E:iploy­-

:.ent of the Infnntry Division,/ a. report prepo.red under directio~ of
the General Boo.rd, US Forces, Europcun Theo.tor (Decenber 1915), p 12.

l5Rcport nf the Ar~ored Equip"'lent Bonrd, o. report prepared

under chnirnc.nship of ~rigndier General PM Robinett (Ft f1,nx,
8 Doce~bor 1944), Annex 1, p 1.
16-2;_,
Ib. d pas s1~.
·

17Ibid, Pp 70 - 72.

18 Ibid, p 88.

l9Report nf the Ar!"'lorod Confer en ce (Ft Knrix, 7 June 1946),

Po.rt D, Section III, p 1.
20Report of Bonr d of Officers Convened to Study the Equipmnt
of the Post Wo.r Arny e'lo.shirq~oi;: Ar:iy Grrnmd Forces, 20 June 1945) ,
pa.ssin.

2lwo.r Department Equipnont Board Report, a. report prepo.rcd

under chuir::io.nship of General Joseph Vv' Stilwell (Washir:gton: Vfnr
Department, 29 Mny 1946), pp 5, 6.
22Report of the Arny I:quipnent Boe.rd , o. report prcpo.red ur..der
chuirn~ship of Lt Gei:ero.l John R Hodge (Ft Monroe: Arny Field Forcos,
8 Murch 1950), Ap::,endix F, ItenNr 32.

23wnr Depurt!:".ent Equip:-tent BnC1.rd Report (Wo.shingt on: '.,'lo.r De­­

po.rtri.ent, 29 ~lny 1946) , puss i r:i.
24Ro ort o!."! Pr0,joct Nr 1189, }!ilitury Chn.ro.cteristics for on
Arriored Cur Ft Knox: Arn.y Field orces Roa.r d Mr 2, 25 October 19 8 ,
ppl, 2.

22
 2 5vfa.r Depnrt~er.t Eauip::ient Boo.rd Report {"Nashingt,m: 1.'far Dc ­
pnrt!'lOnt, 29 Mo.y 1946), p 35.

26Re ort nf Project Nr 1169, J,, <ili to.ry Cho.racteristics for

-
Truck, 1/4-ton, ype, 1 ~ tly Ar ~ore nox: Arny r oun orces
Boo.rd Nr 2, 22 August 1947), W 1, 2.
27Ibid, p 18.

28Report of the Ar:1orod Confer ence (Ft Knox, 7 June 1946),

Part A, Section III, pl.
29Ibid, Po.rt B, Section II, passi::i.

30Report on Proje ct 1189, 11ilita.ry Chur o.cteristics for on

Ar nor od Cur (Ft Knox: Ar-:,.y Fie•ld F orces Boo.rd Nr 2, 25 October 1948),
passim.

31Roport of Ar Fioldf Forces Advisory Pano1· on Art10r to the

Chief of Sta.ff, Uniterl r':"Y Ft Mor.r oe : Arn y Fie l d Fo rces,
18 February 1949), To.b IX, pnssi-;;'
32 rbi r1, Tnb B, pa ssil'l.

_ , To.b IV, p 2.
33Ibid

34_
Ibic'I, Tnb II, p 8.
3 5Ibirl
_ , To.b B, I n cl 1, p s.
36Ibid , Tab IV, pn.ssin.

37"Review of Roco"'l~endo.tions Mo.c~c at Co:!bir.ed Confe r en ce on

Amor, 17 - 24 Mo.rch 1949 11 , o.n unsi~ed l ette r, fnt ed 13 Octob e r 1951.

38wo.r Depo.rtnent Equi p:1ent Board Report (VfoS:hington: Wo.r De ­

pnrt!"lent, 29 Mo.y 1946), p 8.
-
39Report o f the Ar:'!y Equip"'1ent Boa.r d (Ft Mnnroe : Ar:ty Field
Fnroes , 8 t.Inrch 1950), pp i - 4 .
40rb~d
__;:_, p 7 •

41~, p 9 .

42Ibid , p 14.

43Ibicl, pc.ssin .

44 ,trr,y Equipnent Dev e l op'.'"lont Guide (Wo.shingt on : Depnrt,ent

of the Arryy, 29 Dcccnber 1950), p 31.

45Report of the Arl"',Y Equip;1ent Bonrd (Ft l~onr oe : Ar;1y Field

F0rces, 8 Murch 1950), Apponrlix F, Ite!1 41.

23
 46Ro - ~
Nr P-1430, Suitability of Truck, 1/4-ton
6 X 6, Ar10~ ox: Aro.y iol Forces B~nrd Nr 2, 12 Ooto--
ber !950), p0.SSJ.!"1e

47orcl'1nnco Technical Con.':1ittoe .Meetings (1950), Ite!!I 33386.

48Ropnrt 0f US Amy Po ljcy Conference on ArMor (Ft Monroe:

Ar~y Field F0roes, 20 October 195l) , p 1.
---J
49Ibid , Annex M, Appendix III , po.ssb..

50Roport of Tri parti to Conference on Ar..,or unrl Bridging (Ft

Monroe: A'r!"ly Field Forces, 30 October 1951) , Annex J, Section III ,
pnssin.

51 11 Rep0rt of Visit to Roynl Arrrtored C0rps Cnnference, London

{Colonel Logn.n C Berry)" , o. letter to CG, Arr1ored Center , Ft Kn0x, Ky.

24
 CHAPI'ER 3

ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE ORGANIZATION

Two closely interrelated lessons were learned by nechanized

cavalryr:ien during World War II . These lessons were fundamental, in­­

volving basic doctrine and organization.

The first lesson oonoerned mission and how to accomplish it .

During training for combat, ~echanized cavalry units were taught that

they would acconplish their primary mission -—— reconnaissance -—— by

steo.lth and infiltration. Combat proved this to be wrong . The major­­

ity of missions o.ssi gned included reconnaissance but were primarily

of o. security nature. Flank security and covering force operation~ ,

involvin~ offensive and defensive combat, were the Missions most fre­­

quently nssi.~ed . "Sneak an~ peek'' wns out. The cavalry usually hnd

to fight to accomplish any nission .

The second lesson concerned organization. The small tmits

that were called upon to perforri these ::iissions were woefully i 11--

-
orgnnized and ill-equipped for the tasks o.ssir-ned. There were no or­­

ganic mediuri tnnks, infantry, a rtill ery, or engineers . Consequently,

when t~e co.vo.lry reconnaissance group (squadron), mechm1i1.ed wus r,iven

a nission, it was often necesso.ry to attach some or o.11 of the above

troops to the cnvo.lry unit .

This "bee fine up" of co.valry rec onno.issance uni ts resulted in

their effective use o.s economy forces, enabling then to relieve infan­­

try and o.r~ored units needed elsewhere. The 4th Cavalry Group, some­­

tirn.e s known as the "light umored brigade" of the VII Corps (ETO)

received as permo.nent attachrents the 759th Tnnk Battalion (L), the

25
6:55th Tank Destroyer Batta.lion, nnd the 87th Armored Fie ld Artillery
l
Bntto.lion. Engineer companies were habitually o.ttached and occo.sion-­

o.lly infantr y o.nd mediu!ll tank uni ts wore plnced under group c omnnnd .

Attachments, however , offered only o. pnrtio.l solution. The

proble!:l lo.y in the ha.sic organization of the reconnaissance uni ts

the!llSelves. The platoons , where the fighting is done , did not have

the necessary tools for th~ assiisned job .

The Platoon ~

Caval ry r econno.issonce plntoor., mechanized . The platoon is

the basic fighting uni~ . The World Wo.r II reconnni ssance platoon

possessed rnpid road mobility, heo.vy a.utoma.tic firepower, ond ex­­

cellent means of com~unication . The platoon, consisting of thr ee

armored curs, three machine gun 1/4-- ton trucks , and three morto.r

-
1/~-tons , wo.s either employed as u unit or as three teams . Each

t eam consisted of un nr:!!Ored cnr , a l!tlohine gun jeep, and a. mortnr

.~ 2
Jeep.

There wore several weo.knesses in this organization .

these wns firepower. Thou@1 the !!lo.chine guns afforded heavy automa­

- o.r:norod car did not

tic fire power , the 37:Tlr.1 gun nounted in the H-8

provice sufficient punch to knock out enemy o.r~or . The 60!'1!!1 nortar,

too, was l imited by its runr;o and burstinr, rr~dius .

-
A second weakness was c r oss-country mobility. Highly mobile

on tho roads . the platoon could maneuvor cross-- country only under

ideal conditions . The o.rmor cd co.r nnd tho jeop simply could not cope

with difficult terrain .

-
Another i!llportmit fa.ctor wus the noo.rly toto.l la.ck of protec-'-.., '\

tion to personnel. Tho armored cur offered little , tho joep none . \\

26
 -
Armor-type missions wore assiGncd ::md o.cco~plished, but cnsuo.lti es

were h i gh .

-
Not the least of tho defects wo.s the lo.ck of riflel"ten .

During World ·wa.r- II , ouvo.lry often fought on foot . In order to pro­­

vide oven o. baro minimum of r iflemen , the vehicles and some of tho

crew--served woupons had to be left behind.

. ~
Ir ►, <,.

Todo.y1 s rocon-­
------------------
The present roconnnisso.nce plo.toon (fig 1) .

nuissnnce pl:.i.toon is the nnswer to !!lO.ny of the weulmosse s of its pre ­

decessor . It posse sses b o.lnnced fire po\·!er , more mobility, more o.r!".lor

protection , nultiplo ~co.ns of com.~unico.tion , o.nd o. flexibl e orgo.ni­­

zo.tion . -
It consists of one officer o.n.d thirty-eight enlisted men or ­

go.nizod into n plntoon h 0Qdquo.rtc rs , ~ tank section, u support squo.d,

o. rifle squo.d, ,ma o. scout section. The plt:,toon is nor!!lnlly e!!lployod

us c. unit .

•• • ••

-.m~r.~\ ~ t)t([~~Nl
kl;Lt. ..\
.:.~ \)~!/ .
'l.. I j

3
Figure 1 . Reconnn.issc.nce Platoon .

27
 The platoon headquarters is nothin~ noro thun the lieutenant,

his driver , his jeep, and his radio,

The tank section consi sts of two light tanks with a five- - man

crew, normally commnndod by the platoon sergeant . The stn.ndo.rd ve­­

hicle is the ~ew M--41 lit,ht gun tonk mounting a 76!111ll gun. Most units ,

however , are sti ll equipped with the M-- 24 light to.r.k (75Ill!ll gun ). The

to.nk section is o. po.rtinl solution to the problems of firepowor, Mo­­

bility, and a.rnor protection . The 76!!l!ll gun is oupnble of stopping

o.11 but the heaviest armor; the t nnk affor ds good cross - countr y mo­­

bility nnd protection against ~a.chine gun f i re o.nd shell fragments .

The support squad consists of five men, o.n 8L'l1Ill ~ortnr , o.nd

two 1/4-- ton trucks nnd trailers . Normall y employed as part of the

base of fire, the ~ortur adds considerably to the firepower of the

platoon. The squad suffers from n lnck of cross - country mobility ond

o.r::1or protection when mounted . ",Then trnilers a.re lor,ded with n!'l!lluni­­

tion, going is very difficult off the roa.ds .

The rifle squad consists of ten mon mounted in an armored

personnel cnrrier . Crew--served wc~pons i nclude a heavy machine gun ,

BAR, :md 3. 5 inch rocket l nunchor . Functioning ns part of the tunk­-

infnntry tenm, tho squad fills a vital slot, previously absent f r oM

r e connnissnncc platoons .

-
The scout section consists of two scout squads , ench contain­­

ing six non, n light machine r,un j eep, and n radio j ee?• Each crew is

cn.pnble of operation in nny co~bintition of f r or.i. one to four vehicles .

Normnl operation is by sqund. Functions of the section include mount­­

ed and dismounted reconnnissnnco, security, pioneer , nosscngor, nnd

traffic control duties .

28
 · The present rcconnuissnnce plutoon is o. tre~endous improve ­

'!!10nt over the rcconnuisso.nce pl atoon of Wor l d Wor II . It is , essen ­

tially, n minio.turo combined urns tusk force, contnining nr~or , in­­

fantry , reconnnisso.nce , and indirect fire support clements . There

sti 11 rema.in , however, wenknesses in orgunizntion o.nd equipment.

One of these is found in tho lo.ck of cross-- countr y mobility

nnd lack of protection to personnel of the 1/4-- ton truck. The 1/4--

ton is o. superior menns of t r ansporto.tion; it is , however, not n

coMba.t vehicle . Noverthcloss , the personnel of the roconno.issonce

— the scouts, the norto.rmcn, :md tho

plntoon who ride this vehicle~

phtoon lender -—— o.re forced to use the jeep for just thnt -—— o.
/
combo.t vehicle .

The scout section is the work horse of the platoon. It is

the job of the scouts to find tho ene~y nnd , once found , to hold on­

to hi:n. "hen tho plntoon is !'llOvin.;, the scout section provides tho

point and flrmk v ehicles . hen the pln.toon is ho.lted , the scouts

ngnin opornte to tho front nnd flunks . The r econnQissance plntoon

is o. security force for large r units; the scout section is the se­­

curity force for tho platoon.

Often the first to r e ceive fire , the scouts hnve the protec ­

tion of "God a.nd on OD shirt". In a.dditian, the jeep cunnot stay

with tro.cked vehicles cross-- country. The innbility of wheeled vohi ­

clos to negoti~te difficult terra.in ofton onuses the pl~toon to be ­

ccmo r oa.dbour.d . More fnvorc.b lo r:nrenues of c.pproc.ch sometb1es cannot

be used , ond maneuver is restricted. In the opinion of mo.ny officers

a.nd men (seo Appendix IV), there is a. dofini te need for :1 vehicle po­­

seessing good cross - country mobility and offering some protection to

the crew.
29
 Tho support s qun.d docs not need ns much prot(;ction o.s the

s c out section; however , mor tnrmen die , too. The primn.ry need in u

~ortar carri er is a. vehicle tho.t can co.rry o. good loo.d of o..~nunition

nnd still maneuver off t he ronds . The present jeep--tro.iler nrr nnge •­

ment is unwieldly nnd of'ton entnils hand--carry of mortar and nmnuni­­

tion somo distance to u suita.ble position or f orces cho i ce of a less

desirnblo si to . 11-Jhen oporo.tint; nwa.y from the co:npuny, the squo.d cc.n

depend only upon the run.'!luni t i on thr.t it cr.-.n cc.rr y .

All conbo.t units r equir e tho highest type of leo.dorship. Tho

reconnn.issnnco platoon lender, too , must be we l l forward whore ho cr.n

best contr ol the 9lntoon. He needs o. little protection nnd ho needs

o. vehicle tho.t cnn go with the J'llnneuver clement . True , he cnn ride

a. tank , but often he will become so engrossed i~ fighting his own

tnnk that he loses control of the platoon. Good pl atoon loa.dor s

should be kept nlive . 'fe lost too m'lny r ccon officers , tool 114
111

In n.nswer ton questionnaire , Mnjor GS Yeiter , former Com­­

manding Officer of Rcconnuissnr.ce Company, 13th Ar mored Regiment ,

1st Armor ed Division, Afr ica. nnd Italy, sto.ted:

With the now tnnk-- infnntry concept , coupled with the bnse of
firo- - m!'..nuovoring force principle of enploymcnt on the offensive ,
-
the to.cticnl use of the 1,/,1-ton is li~itod; the type --vehicle
should be ge~red to the full t r acked , light armor protected,
henvior nrMod tnuks nnd armored personnel carrier s which ure
now an inte~rul pnrt of the reconnnissnnce platoon.

In onswer in~ the snme quostionnciro , SFC Willin~ D 0' Mnlley,

who served with the 7th Reconn~isso.nce Co~pnny, 7th Infantry Divi sion

in Korea. , snid:

M:nny of our co.su'lltios wer e in jeop-- lod co lumr.s ••• Tho best
dn!Tllled f'ie;hting men in the world should ho.vo the best equip!!t)nt
his tax money, his fo..":lily' s tnx :noncy, and hi9 friends ' tnx money
co.n buy.

30
 This questionnnire wns designed to poll e x perienced recon­­

no.issonce men to determine their reo.ction to r e plnc ing the 1/4--ton

truck vn th a. light amored vehicle (s ee A.9pendix IV) . A substanti nl

mnjority, especio.lly a mon g tho se with comb nt r e connn isso.nce experi ­

ence, were in fnvor of the new vehicle . There were , however , so!'l.e

in favor of r o tninin~ the 1/4-- ton .

Some objected to rcplncing the joop with a light nr mored vo­­

hiclo becnuse of the c ost of dev e loping n new r e ccnnnissn.~ce vehicle .

Othe rs st nted that reconnniss:mce units r e pre s ented o. very smnll por ­

tion of the c ombo.t troops . The que stion of cost will be discussed

e lsewhere ; howeve r, tables of organization refute the stnt emcnt thnt

r oconnnissn.nce tr oopers nro n tiny minority, l ost a~ong the l egions

of o.rmor o.nd infantry Or). tho bnttle fi e l d.

Tho r e conno.issonce plntoon is no str '\ngor t o our c o!Tlb nt

units . The sepurnte rooonnniss n.nce plntoon is found in tho follow-­

ing orgnnizntion:

1. Tunk Bnt tnlinn , Infantry Division

2. Tank Bntto. li on , Airborne Division
3. Tru1k Bnttn li on , Ar~orcd Cavalry Group
4. Hoc.vy Tonk Bo.tt o. li on , Ar '"10r od Division
5. Hcdiul"l Tnnk Batte.li on , Armored Division
6. Ar m r cd Inf:mtry Bette.li on , Ar !'.lored Division

'lhe plntoon is :>. ls o organic to the following:

1. Rec onn~issunc e Co:"p,u1y, Inf:mtry Division

2. Reconnaissnnc e Compnny, Airborne Division
3. Rcconno.i sso.nce Company ,
Reconna.issnnco Batto.lion , Armored C!'l.v.nlry Regiment
4. Reconnaissance Compo.ny, Rec onnni ss unce Bntt n.lion, Armored Div.

Viith one exception , o.11 reo onna.issa.nce plo.toons are orgnnized

identically. The one e xcepti on is found within the r e conn o.issonce

compnny, nirborne division. Bec a use of the a irlifting r e quirements,

31
l /4 •t on trucks nountini; 75M.."il :re coilless rifles c.ro substi tutcd for

the light tnnks of the bmk section, nnd thr ee o.ddi tiono.l 1/4 - tons

nre used in lieu of' tho nr m0r od per sonnel currier of the rifle squo.d.

Ther e :::.re 213 r econno.isso.ncc pb.toons in the Type Fi e l d

Army (nine infontry di visions , thr oe o.r'.'lor cd di vi s ions, three o.rmored

cuvo.lry gr oups , f'our o.rmor ed co.vo.lry regiments) . This is nearly one­-

-
half (two- fifths plus) tho number of to.nk plo.toons in the Typo Fi eld

-
Ar ny o.nd n little better thrui one-fourth the number of rifle plo.toons .

The number of c Ol'!lbo.t jeeps (rec onno.iss O.."lce plo.toon only) to to.ls better
I

-
thnn one -half (three- -fi f'ths) the amount of combo.t heo.vy nnd ~edi1.1-~

tanks (tank plntoons on ly). Reconno.issruice pb.toon personnel toto.l

- irds of the str ength of tonk pl o.toons , one- fourth the strength
two-th

of rifle platoons . Hnlf the personnel of the pl o.toon o.re mounted i n

1/4-- tons .

The following figure (fi g 2) comp'.lrcs vehicular n.nd per sonal

strenGths of r oconno.issnnce pl~toons , to.nk plntoons, nnd rifle pl o.­­

tnons only. T~nk figures do not include light to.nks or tonks other

than those or ganic to the her.vv or medium t {'.nk platoon .

TYPE FIELD ARNY:

Total Platoons: Total Co!!lbut Vehicles:

Rcconno.isso.nco 213 Combo.t 1/4-- tons 1491

Mediu!!l/1feo.vy Tank 504 Combnt Tn.nks 2520
Info.ntry Ri f l e 837 (mod f>. hvy)

Toto.l Personnel :

Rec onnn.isso..ncc Pl o.t oons 8307

R0conna.iss nnce 1/4 - t on Crows 4047
Me di ur:/Honvy Tnnk Pla.t oons 12600
Infnntry Rifle Plntoons 33425
(Tho Ar~or ed Cuvnlry Group i s fi191rod on n. bnsis of three tank
battc,lions for this compo.rison) . 5

Figure 2 . Combo.t Platoons, Type Field Army.

32
 The Conpony

The main differences between the cuvulry roconno.issnnco

troop , moch[).nizod , of 1forld 1•Tnr II n.nd the present reconno.issnnce

company are found in the platoons . /~s did its predecessor, the re ­

connuissunce compnny contains three reconnuissnnce platoons nnd a

company hendqunrters . The conpnny Oo!m!lunder is mounted inn 1/4-- ton

or u light tnnk . The compuny consists of five offioor s, one warrant

officer, c.ri.d 157 enlisted men . There are seven light truiks, five

-
armored personnel c:u-rier s , twenty-five 1/4-~ton t r ucks, two 2- i/2..-tons ,

:md ono 3/4--ton truck.

The reconnnissnnco co~pany is organic to the:

1. Inf:mtry Division
2. Airborne Division
3. Roconnaissonco Battalion, Armored Division
4. Rcconn::i.isso.nco Fnttulion, '~rnored Cnvalry Regiment

All reconnuissnnce comp~nics ure nearly identical. As pre ­-

viously noted, there are no li~ht tanks in the airborne reconnais­­

sance cor.ipnny, In addition , both the co!!lpnnies of the infantry e.nd

I
airborne divisions ure augmented by one lieutenant and seven enlisted

nen in the ccmpnny headquarters . This officer is provided for lio.ison

with the headquo.rters to which the CO:'lpo.ny is assigned or attached .

The reconnaissance co~pnny is the largest reconnaissance agen­­

cy of the infantry nnd airborne divisions . Arr.10red divisions , bec'luse

of their greater opero.tive range, require the employ::i.ent of an organic

reconnnissunce bo.tto.lion.

The Bnttnlion

The co.valry 1:oconnaisso.nce squo.dron, mechanized, Postwar re -

orgo.nizo.tion of the reconnaissance batto.lion created o. fur !'lore po­

tent force than the wartime Model . The ca.vulry reconnaissance

33
squadron• Mech::i.nized, of World War II wo.s o. good orgnnization . It

possessed the henvy o.uto!natic fire power , ro.pid mobility, f.llld good

co:'l'!lunications :-ieo.ns of its r eccnno.isso.nce troops pl us light o.rmor

o.nd indirect fire support. It wo.s a. self-- sufficient orgc.nization in

rego.rds to logistics o.nd ud:ninistrntion . It wo.s not self-- sufficient

tactically. Though circumstunce often f6rced it to do so , it could

not properly fight arnor . Nor did it contain suffioien riflemen .

The squadron of the co.vo.lry group consisted of a. heo.dquo.rters

and service troop, o. medical deto.chment, three r oconnnissn.nce (A, B,C)

'\ ~
\ '<
troops, one o.ssa.u lt gun (E) troop, o.nd o. light tonk (F) oompo.ny~ The
~\
squadron assigned to the ar~or ed division had '.).U o.dditiono.l reoonno.is-­ \
/' ~.,. . .
s:::mce (D) t r oop. A
The reconnaissance troops were often assigned independent \
missions . This was especi::llly true in the cavalry squadron , armored

di vision. Tho troop, when oper ating alone, w::i.s usually o.ugmented by

o.ttnchnents fro~ the o.sso.ult gun troop o.nd the light tank co~pnny.

Eo.sy t r oop supplied the assault guns . ­

Tho troop wo.s orgc..n­

izod into o. troop hcudquortors and three platoons, eo.ch platoon con­

sisting of two motor cnrrin.~es M--8, mounting o. 75!ml howitzer . 7 The

plo.toons were habitu:::i.lly a.ttached to reconnuissunco troops a.nd used

in a direct fire support r ole . Exceptionally, the six guns were em­­

ployed in battery, providing either indirect or direct fire support .

Fox Company wa.s organized us the stnndnrd light t nnk company

with throe pl:1.toons nnd a company hoadquo.rters . There were two light
8
to..~ks in the heudquo.rters section und five per plntoon. By the end of

World ~'fo.r II , the M--24 wa.s in gener al usu 6e ; however , !'lost of the

fighting was done fron the M--3, M--5, and M-- 5Al light tn.nks. These

34
earlie r mdols nounted a crew of four a.nd iave exceller.t ~echanicnl

perforno.nce , though their 37!"1r.l gun wo..s of little use against enemy

a.rr.ior. They were extr emely vulnerable to anti tank fire . E~ployment

as a unit w~s considered desirable , but platoons were often employed

with the advance guard or were nttnched to r econnaissance troops on

independent !!lissions .
I
The present r econnaissance bo.ttalion (fig 3) . Toda.y' s

battalion also comes in two models: those organic to the ar mored

cnvalry regiment and those assigned to the o.rrnored division .

~~.
y

Figure 3. Reconnaissunce Battali on Armored Cavalry Regiment9

The reconno.issnnce bnttulion , a r !!lored cavalry r egi !'lent is a

mor e powerful version of the c avalry squadron . It is not self-- suffi ­

cient, having no organic a.Q~inistr utive or loGistical support . De­­

pending on the situation, the bnttulion receives either dir ect logis­­

tical support fro!tl r egiment or an nttachment of supply, :naintenn.nce ,

35
nnd medical ele!Tl.ents.

The regi:nenta.l bo.ttalions consist of 42 officers o.nd warrunt

officers end 716 enlisted men organized into n headquo.rters compnny,

three r econnaissance companies (A,B,C; D,E,F; r,,v ,I) , one howitzer

company (unlettered), and a !lledium tun], company (unletter ed) . The

bntta.lion m~y opero.te e ither independently or o.s pa.rt of the r egiment.

The reconnn.issance bo.tto.lion, armor ed division , because of the

-
manner of employ-raent , r epresents a deporture from conventiono.l bo.tto.1-

ion organization. It coPsists of a hoo.dquarters und service company,

10
n medical detachment, nnd four r oconna.issnnce (A,R,C,D) co~pnnies.

It contains no other co~bo.t or fire support e l ements, no r does it

usunlly r eceive combut a.ttachments from division . It is, however,

cupable of independent notion bccrmse of tho flexibility of the r e ­

connaisso.ncc CO!Tl.pn.ny. The battnlion ho.s organic logistical and o.d ­

!!linistrutive support.

­
As the security fo rce for the division , the battalion ope r­

ates ove r highly extended frontures . For this r eo.son, simultaneous

action b ,: the ontir0 bo.tto.lion is rurfl . Thus , the bntto.lion com­­

mander r.10.y control his c omp-mies but wi 11 ,1o r'.'!'lrilly .lOt a c~ieve con­­

centr ation of effort •

The r e connnissu.r..ce co~panie s of e ither batt~li n~ ~r e cupuble

of performing independent missi ons. The divisionnl co~pn.ny will

rarely h '.lve comb~t attuchrnents; the rogimcntnl compnny is llble to

opernte without them.

The howitzer c ompnny differs fr om etss ·1ult run co'llpnnios in

that it primnrily provi des i ~diroot firo support . It ha s un a rtille r y -­

type 0rganizntion with n firing battery of six motor c n.rr ia.r-es M-- 37

36
(l05r.t"1 hN•1itz ~,r )~ 1 The c 0r:1prmy norM',lly fir Gs i n r)cttcry, thou ,·h it

may be o:nployed , by plntoons, in -~. dire ct fir e r o l e .

The n edium t ::mk cornprn:y pr nviro s the SundP,y punch for the

b::i.ttnlion . It h o.d th e s t cmdru-d :nedium t ank org;·:niznti on of two t :mks

2
in the c ompn."ly headqu·,r t e rs , fiv e in ea.ch of the three plnt oons ~ Vin­-

t o.~e of the t 11.~ks in uso varies ; howev e r , th 3 m,)dium i;un t ::,nk (90mrl)

is st~:nclar d . Dcsir<1.blo omploymcr.t is by compnny.

The Ro giment

c uv n.lry gr o up, m9chnnizod . Th e wo.r timn cnvc. lry g r nup wo.s o.

t 0.cticn.l heo.dqun.rters with "bvo o r g nni c squadr ons plus nny nunber of

o.t t o.chmon ts t o incl ude armor, inffl."lt r y , o.rtille ry , n.nd engineers .

Minus de t o.chmon ts , stre n,;th W'ts 88 office r s noel wa.rr nnt offic e r , 1438

men .

Armored o flvnlry r eg: inont . ThE; r Ag-iment is the l a r gest r c c on­­

naissmce ~~a s 0 curit~ unit . Both t nctic~l "Ucr arlmir.istrat i v e , it is

fl pot 0ct forco 0f n•:.).I' ly t;oricc tho str 11'\g;t h of its pr ede ce ss or , the

c n.valry ::,;r ou p .

The r o~imc.nt ccn sists of 182 offi ce rs and wo.rrmt off i ce r ,

2721 !110n, or gc1.niz ad i n t o n h e ad qua rte rs compuny, a sorvic J 00:npn.ny,

a medica l dotn.chmont, ~nd thr00 bo.tt~li ons .

13

In the Type fi o ld ArMy thrre is on0 r 0gi mcn t por c orps plus
11
a r er;i ment undo r dir 3ct n..rmy contr ol . The r n is no n ormul" omploy­

mont . It ~uy opcr ut 0 as u unit or us smulle r dct n chnen ts . It may

be f orMed int o an RCT or functi on without uttach~onts . It is ~s ­

pocin.lly we 11 sui t cd f or a"'lployr'l ,nt 'l.S rui o c or.omy f or co f or the c o r ps .

37
 Disc.ussi on

Great stride s h a.v e been !!lrlde i n cr.v e,lry or grmi z n.tion since

World Wo.r II. Lr ~or ed r e c onnoi s s mic e un i ts of t odny , fr om p l a t oon

t o r ogi rnent , n r o we ll b,.., l tm c · d , oxtr 0:'1ely fl exib l e c ombi ned o.r ms

t on.ms c n.p~ble of h oo.vy fir e and r ,.i.pi 2 maneuve r.

Tho vulne r ability und l·, c k of cr oss - c f'l ur.tr y ".'lobility 1--f the

1/4 —
- t on truck , h owev e r, c nnsti tuto n se rious wen.kne ss i n t he or gani­­

- - t he r eormrrn.iss unce plat oon.

za.tion o f t he bi1sic f i ;:.h tinh unit --

Ninn y c or.1bnt --e x pc ricncecl. c n.v u lr:yr:i".)n f oo 1 t ho.t the u se of such u thin ­-

­
s k i nned vehicle is not c r.n sistcnt vrith t h e ag;gr c ssivc s pirit noce s ...

s ~r y i n nn ~r ".'lor ed unit. This rc f ~ct c ~n be overc ome b y the ~dop­

ti rm of a. srmll, li i:;ht ur !"!or od v ehicle c :1pa.b l e o f movinr; off the

r oads r.md st~ppi ng s~o.11 a r~ s fir e . The 4047 ~en of the fi e ld o.r my

wh0 ri rie t he jeep int o c onbu.t r epr esent c.. pot i::nti "l l r,f ~~40, 470, 000

worth o f li fe i n sur a.n c~ n l onc .

­
If we will ur :,or the othe r h 'l lf cf our o.r !'Tle:r ect r e c onna.is-

s unce pL ,t oons , we wi 11 cr eut e Cl fi r;hti ng force t ho.t c !l!l li ve ori.

t he b o.ttle fi•J l d , c0l!'plc t fl l y qu nlifh,d f 0 r its major r o l e 0f s0 curity

nnd r e c onn •1i s s :mc e .

NOTES FOR Cl!APTER 3

1 Aft er Acti on Re port, 4t h c avalry Gr ou p , Dec c~ber 1944

2 T /o&E 2-27
- , 15 Sept orribcr 1945
3 T/ rn:E 17-- 57N , 23 J o.nu·ll"y 1% 8

4 St nt 0non t of '-fo..jo r Gener a l Hol !'10s E Dnr~e r, for mer CG, CCB,
4th Armor ed Di v i s ion o.nd CG, 1 1th Ar Mored Di visi on , ET0, i n r eply t o
qu0 sti onne.ire .
5 Lotte r, CCAFF , sub j f'l ct: "Typo F i e l d .PJ':.ry-11 , 1 July 194 9.

38
 -
6 t/O&E 2-25~ 15 Sc pto~be r 1943.

-
7 T/O&E 2-28, 15 Soptonber 1943

8 T/O&E 17-17,
- 15 Se ptenbcr 1943
9 T/O&E 17-55,
- 7 October 1948 ) ~ , f\cQ.

10 T/O&E l 7-45N,
- 14 }!ny 1948......._ ~ /\Y
11 T/O&E 6-167N,
- 25 June 1 948 , with chnngo 1, 13 October 1950

12 T/O&E 17-27N,
- 21 Jo.nun:ry 1948, with chrmp;e 1, 7 Mny 1948

13 T/O&E 17-51,
- 7 October 1948

39
 Cf{A.Pl'ER 4

ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE DOCTRINE

Tho l essons of World War II clearly domonstr o.tod n neod f or

chnngo in tho concept of oa.vo.lry. This docs not men.n, h owever, that

doctrine was fo.ulty. · Doctrine rnro.ly ch{Ulges, only techniques.

Bnsic o uvulry doctrine h ~s r emained constant down thr0u2jh

the nges . All tho gro nt Cupt uins: Alexo.ndo r, Hnnnib~l, c ~e snr,

Gust'\vus Adolphus, Fr odorick, Napol eon, Lee , 11nd Patton employed

cavl\lry sil"li l nrly. Their t n.ctics anrl techniques vnried wi. th the

ti!lle s, but they used their rnrunt od :trm f or much tho s n!'le purpose .

The Numidinn onvalry was the most effective o.rm in Hnr.:ni­-

bnl1s urmy. Ho use d his c uvnlry de cisive ly; In oonpnris on, Roman

CLtV:::tlry ·w·'.s initi r..lly infe ri or. Aft e r a. few lessons from Honnibo.l,

h owever, Rome e!llpl 0yod moun tod tr oops in the f oll owing m::mner :

Durir:g the infa.ntry oombo.t, the onvf'.lry, usua lly on tho flank,
wus operating against the ~no~y's c nv ulry nnd his fla.nks. After
o. vict ory, tho c :1v £',lry nnd tho ve litie s (li'..;ht inf::tntry), supporte d
by the oxtrnordinnrii (re serve ), t 0ok u p tho pursuit. If dcfea.ted ,
the sa.'!lo tr oops with the trio.rii (thir d line tr oops -— votornns)
cove red the withdruwo.1 . 2

Some i:'11e!'l ty c enturie s lr·,ter "Le s Grmds Cavo.licrs" c,f N!l.poloon

were organized o.nd employed thus:

The c ~vulry c on siste d of r egi monts of f our squ~dr 0ns of 160

mon oo.ch. Rogimonts wore clo.ssifi od ns curr nssiors, huss'\rs, dra­­
goons , '1.nd chn ssours. Tho cuirnssi c r reg imen ts were 0f the h onvy
t ype , intended f or tho b a ttle fi e ld. The hussa rs were !:lore lightly
nr!'1Cd and wore used for outp0st duty. The dra.gnnns , o.rmod with
c nrbinos rmd buynncts, c0rro s pondod t o the line infantry an~ f ought
on foot . Tho ch usse urs wor e tho c ountorpo.rt of the light infantry
nnd were 'lrr.tod with tho c :\rbinc wi th<'ut the bnyonot. Th o c uvn.lry
thr ouGh out the w"..l's wore most v ~luub le on r oc onnniss a.nce work. 3

A fi e ld mnnunl of t odrty mi ght C<ln t 11in si!'.lilar wordinr:;. It

doc s not tn.kc t oo much i m~ 6in.ti on t o r ou~hly cla ssify our medium 'llld

40
heo.vy tahk bo.ttalions o.s cuirassiers, a r mored info.ntry as dro.goons,

reconno.iss:mce companies o.s hussars, und ar mored cavalry regi~ent o.s

ch a.s seur s •

Fire and maneuver is not new to warfare. The toumo.ns of

Genghis Khan used their ~obility, fire power, o.nd shock action to

sweep Asia and Eastern Surope . Mobility? During the Mongol advance

into Hunbary, Snbutai'~ advance ~uard covered 180 ~iles in three days

o.bainst liGht resisto.nce, in a strnnge land deep in snow. His flank

guard was o.n a rmy 30,000 strong. This covering forc e met and defe ated

two superior forces, captured four i mportont cities including Cracow

and Breslo.u, and overro.n Southern Poland, Southern Silesia, and Moravia.

In doing so, the Mongol "security f orce 11 covered 400 miles in less than

o. month over poor r oads and adverse weather conditions! Try that with

o. co!:lb o.t c cmno.nd 1

1
/fe ho.ve our A:neriou.>:1 examples. There is Stuart, who maneu­­

vered in " l\r :md style", o.nd Forrest, who could nove with :;ren.t rapidi­­

ty; nnd ther e a ro Buford, Shcrido.n, und ·11son, who taur,ht their Men

to dis~ount n.nd neet Confederate ~ability with fire power. We have

the Sioux, the Cheyenne, nnd tho Apo.che, who huve been ter:ned the

6r eatest li~ht c o.vnlry of them all.

And, fin ally , we have the armored divisi ons and cavalry

groups of 1for ld Yfo.r II which joined with the infantry to produce the

basic combat unit of today -—— the tank-inf..mtry

- team.

Miss ion

Vlorld Wur II, then, did not revea.l fn.ulty doctrine. It did,

however, point out misplaced emphasis und method. The emphasis wns

on reconnnissnnce ; the method —— stealth;

41
 MISSION. The C'.l.valry '.Reconno.isso.nce Squadron, }~echanized ,
is orgfUlized, equipped nnd tro.ined to perform reconna.issance
missions. Other type mis~ions nre given only in furtherance of
a reconnaissance mission unless no other troops a.re available
for other type operations for the division or other lo.rger unit.
Reconnaissance missions are performed by employment of infil-
tration tactics, fire, and maneuver. 5 ~I'\ ., r 1
•
I).-..-
-
_
J
\

Today, tho emphasis is on security; the method —

- - combat:

GENERAL. a.. The rer;iment mo.y be e"!lployed on security,

li~ht combat, or rec~nno.issunco missions for the ool!Ullr..nd to
\
which it is a.ssi;ned or attached. The situation confronting
the hir;her commander will dete rmine the best employment of
the regiment •
b. The regiment is nornully employed on missions comple­­
menting that of the najor cC!llr.1tmd. The accomplishment of these
missions may require that the regiment en~ago ~n offensive, de­­
fensive, or dolo.ying actions. Exumples of • ·•

This doctrine appli es equally to the platoon, the company,

and the battalion. Nor is this definition of mission a. mere play

on words . A study of the combnt employnent of cavnlry groups in tho

ETO revealed that u mininrum of time was spent on pure reconnnisso.nce

(see Appendix II). The avero.ce time spent on e~ch type mission by

c"l.valry .r ;roupi' in ETO is shown in fii;urc 4 .

Co~bnt Time (percento.ge)

OFFENSE ll . l

DE~TSE 30.7

RECON1'kISSANCE 3. 3

SSCURITY 26.4

SPECIAL OPERtTIONS 28.5

Figure 4. Combo.t TiMe Allotted to Type Missions ., Co.vo.lry Groups in ETO.

It should be noted , however, that mere classification of a

mission does not tell the entire story. A typical mission, such o.s

flank security, will require that rcconna.issoncc be performed while

42
the unit is engaging in offensive and/or defensive combat . Further ­—

more, the viewpoint is oft en contingent on the level of correnand.

What may be a very personal life-or-death

- - matter to a platoon leader

"llight be ter~d nn "attack" hy the battalion co!l1!\a.nder and "security"

by the corps commander .

Security

Vlhnt , then, is security? Security is defined as a.11 measures

taken by n col!Illond to protect itself against ennoyanoe, surprise , and

observation by an enemy. Security missions include flank guard, ad­­

vance guard , re9.r guard, covering force, filling n gap, counterrecon­­

naissance , supply route and rear area. security, and anti-- ai rborne se ­-

ourity.7 Flank security is the mission most frequently assigned . These

missions may be accomplished bv attack, defense , delay, reconnaissance,

observation , nnd patrols.

Security forces base their movement or di sposition on that of

the main force they are securing. Extended frontages are the rule.

Normally the main body is provided security by three echelons .

Soourity detachment. The first, or near est echelon, is the

security detachroont, consisting of ndvnnce , flank , nnd r eo.r r,ua.rd,

outposts, nnd loco.l security eleMents of tho mo.in body. Armored

c~vnlry units below regiment~l size usu~lly provide fla.nk and rear

security. Tho mo.in body nor~nlly provides its own advnnco guo.rd ,

outposts, Md loco.l security .

Covering force . The next echelon is tho covering force

which operates beyonrl the security deta.ch!llOnt. Tho armored co.vnlry

regiment is often employed a.s a covering force for a corps, while the

reconnnissa.nce bo.tto.lion or company may net in this ca.po.city for a

43
div:lsion .

Aviation. The third echelon of security i .s provided by the

Air Forco, either by performinb distnnt reconn~issance or by provid­­

ing nir cover for the ground unit .

Employment of the pl~toon. The employment of nrmored r eoon­­

naissance on security missions varies with the size of the main force ,

size of the zone or fronta~e , cmd the enemy situation. Method. of em­­

ployment , however , is gener ally tho srune for all size reconnaisso.nce

units . For this renson , the employment of the platoon as po.rt of the

r econnaissance compcny on a flank security mission might be considered

typical .

If the situntion is static , flank security will be accomplished

by defensive action . The platoon in the defense will be discussed

elsewhere in this oho.pter.

If the situation is mobile, flunk security will be o.ccom­

plished by one of two methods . The first technique is to block suc­­

cessive avenues of approo.ch into the rods of advance of the main body. ·

Tho platoon will estnblish a stronG point from which it will give

early warning of nn enemy o.ppronch. Depending on enemy strength, the

platoon will them def<md or deln.y from the position . Co.re must be

exorcised to prevent being flanked or by-—pnssed. Tho position must

be fur enough out from tho main a.xis of nd,~nce to allow the main

body time and space to react to the enemy thre~t . All-- around se ­-

ouri ty must be main tuine d.

The str ong point must cornrno.nd the uvenue(s) of approach. De­­

tails of tho organization of the position will be discussed under De­-

fensive action . It should be noted, however, thnt ofton in this type

44
mission; pl atoon strong points will not be mutunlly supporting. It

then becomes nocessnry for the scout section to provide security by

establishing OP1 s nnd/or pntrols between plntoons n.nd to nn adjacent

compCl!ly or open flank. Tho purpose of the patrols nnd OP's is to

mnintnin friendly contact nnd to warn of enemy infiltration between

strong points .:md o.round exposed flnnk~. These rrensures nre in addi­-

tion to normal locnl security.' If terrain conditions prohibit or re­­

strict vehicular movement, dismounted patrolling should be instituted.

Two or four riflemen should be sufficient for local rear se­­

curity. If observation to the front is limited, it my be necessary

to establish nn outpost in front of the position. Listening posts

will be mD.intnined nt night. V'lh.cn n security detachment is approached

­
or in danger of being cut off by tho enemy, it will pull back to pre­

pared positions in the strong point. In order to provide communica­­

tions nnd fire power, outposts, patrols, ond OP1 s should, whenever

possible , consist of n scout sqund. A listening post might be four

men nnd n radio or telephone. Unless distonce between platoons is

prohibitive, a snvinG of scouts may be accomplished by using one pa­

trol between strong points .

­
However, tho distance factor mny require both platoons to pa­

trol the nren , meeting somewhe re ne ar the center. The scout section

mny be augmonted by rifle~en, oithor dismo\.lllted or riding the sup­­

port squad vehicles, for this work. It should be emphasized, though,

thnt the number of personne l nvnilnble for security is limited . Com­­

mon sense must be used to preserve tho integrity of the strong point

ond to prevent such dispersal of the plntoon thut it cannot be ns­­

sernbled r ~pidly.
 Usually the responsibility for n flo.nk s0curity unit is fr om

the shoulder of t he ponetr nt ion to the r eo.r of tho l ou0 ing bo.tt o.lion.

If tho fl:mk security force boco~os over- -extended , it boco:ras inco.p­­

o.ble of performing th0 mission . It must thon be r e lieved ~t the r onr

of the flo.nk by o.nothor unit or tho.t por tion left open.

As the o.dvnnoe of tho mnin body progr esses, tho str ong points

nro displo.ced forward. ~ifhon the r oconno.iss:mco company is oper a.ting

nlone, this is usually done by loo.p--frogging pl~toons. The r onr plo.­­

toon pulls out . moves in 0() lumn pnst the forwn.rd plntoon, o.nd sets up

o. new strong point. If moro than one comp:my is securing a.long tho

-
s/'\11\e a.xis , displo.cerent is o.ccompl ishcd by l eo.p-frogging compnnies.

Pla.toons then move in o. co:np-iny colU11111.

The second method of flank security in o. mobile situn.ti on is

by moving in colunn on nn o.xis pnrnllol to the :no.in body. This meth­

od is usod when the mo.in booy is moving rnpidly and a good pnro.llel

n:xis is nvn il:\blo. Normo.lly the compnny will move o.s n unit on one

a.xis. This is profor ~ble to moving pl ~toons independently on one or

mor e axis .

In using ei thor method , tho column must provice its own s e ­­

curity while mving. -

A good , o. 11-o.r ­
ound for!Ili..1.tion for the l oc.d plo.­

t0on would be scout soction loo.ding , providing tho point o.nd immedi­

c.to lntoro.l coverage ; pl:l.toon l oo.dor e ithor betwoen scout squo.ds or

following the section; tank section f ollowed by rifle sqund; support

squo.d bringing up the r ear. A pl atoon m:lking n bound nl one might

plo.oo n scouts quad on the tai l of the colUI!ll for r eo.r security. Any

number of vnrintions nrc fonsib l c , depending on spocinl situ~tions . A

mor e doto.i l ed discussion of column for mntions wi l l be found in the noxt

46
bending of this chapter, Reconnaissance.

Aotion to.ken by n displo.cing plntoon on encountering an

enemy force will depend on str0ne;th and composition of the enomy,

the situo.tion, o.n0 the requirements of tho mission. Tho plntoon mny

be ordered to o.tto.ok, conto.in, or dolo.y. Contact must be mo.intnined;

however, the platoon may be r e lioved of this responsibility by llll• ·

other unit and directed to bypo.ss the enemy strong point. The notion

of the plo.toon must be consistent with the o.ooomplishment of tho

miss ion.

E>cceptiono.lly, the platoon or oompo.ny mny be required to per­­

form security missions over extreme frontage. If so, the mission will

bo o.ccomplishod by establishing o. series of observation posts a.nd by

mobile po.trollin~. The platoon will be onpo.ble of only the most li­­

mited offensive nnd defensive notion in such o. situo.tion. For all

prnctioo.l purposes, it must be considered o.s o. warning force only.

Reoonno.isso.nce

Reoonno.issu."loe is o. <l irooted effort to obto.in information of

8
the enemy, terro.in, woo.ther , or resources. The informo.tion gained,

when cvnluo.tod nnd interpreted, providos o. bo.sis for tnotico.l o.nd

strategic operations .

Counterrcoonno.issnnco includes measures to.ken by a c0mmnnd to

scroon itsolf from enomy rooonno.issa.."lcc. It is closely related to ro­­

connnisso.nco nnd security. All complement ono un0ther . Given ono o.s

o. mission. n unit will usu:\lly ::~lso execute tho others. The basic

differonoo is thnt while security and c ounterrcconnnissruice forces

bo.so their movement on the mnin force beinc protected, o. raconnais­-

snnce force bnsos its movement on that of tho oneey.

47
 The roconnnissnnce mission most often assigned un urmorad

reconnaissance unit is that of gaining enemy infor mation. This in­­

formation includes composition , disposition, strength , location, iden•­

tification , orgunization , movements , attitude, equipment, supply,

morale, ahd condition~ Of th0so , the first f0ur listed might be con­­
sidered most vital.

Reconnaissance is accomplished by observation, fire , maneuver ,

and offensive action. Those methods aro listed in an :iscending .order

of both effort nnd effectiveness. Combc.t, while certainly the most

hazardous, is usually necessary in order to gain the information

needed. Reconnaissance by offensive action will necessarily include

the other throe methods .

Reconn~issance may be classified as:

1. Distant. Distrui.t reconnnissa.nce is the Gathering of informa­­

tion beyond the i!!l.'llodio.te striking range of ground forces. It is usu­­

ally performed by nir but inn fluid situion could be accomplished by

an armored ca.vnlry regiment .

2. Close. Close reconnaissance is the gathering of infor~ntion

of the area of t~ctical operations . ­

It bogins us enemy contact be­

comes imminent o.n~ continues after contact until the enemy main body

or position is loco.tad. This role usu~lly fnlls to nrmored roconnnis ­

snnco uni ts .

3. Bo.ttlo . Bo.ttlo reconnnissancc is the gnthering of informo.-­

tion of the i!l'!'llcdiatc bnttlefiold by units in close conto.ct with the

enemy. This includes po.trols, OP•s, listening posts, nrmy o.ir obser­­

vo.tion, and a.ir photos. All cn:nbnt o.r!Tl.s engage in bo.ttle rcconno.issnnce .

48
 The three typos of reoonnniss::mce n.re:

1. _Route. Route roconnuissance is conducted over roo.ds, road

nets, tr qils, streams, nnd othe r routes of udvn.nco . It will include

information of the enemy, trafficnbility, und location of obstacles

such o.s bridges, mines, roo.dblocks, nnd other defiles.

2. Zone. Zone raconno.issnnoe is conruoted over !l?l nssii:::ned

zone of 11dvn.nce nnc1 includes inform~tion of the enemy, terrain, :md

weather found within the zone~ Rooonno.issanoe is as thorough as

possible; however, the time available o.nd size of the zone mn.y per­­

mit o overnge of the main roo.d net and key terrain foo.tures only.

Zone reoonno.issnnoe is the type mrst frequently performed.

3. Area. ­
Area reocnnnissanoe is a. sea.rob f"r s peoifio infrrmo.­

ti r n in a definite area. It includes a th0r~ugh recrnnaissanoe f0r

nll information within the requiremants of the mission. The area

may be seoured and held for future use by the higher command.

Reoonn1,.isscmce missions o.ssin;ned should be specific. The

reconnaissance unit conrnn.nder must be informed of the definite in­

­

formation desired. A general ~ission will usually proruce only

general inforI'lntion. Comm::m<lers. should consider the c n.po.bilitios of

reconno.issnnoe units. ­
Figure 6 may be considered o.s a guide in ~eter­

mining the width of zone th~t can be covered effectively by :u-mored

9
reconnnissnnoe units.

D1emotmted · Mounted
Wi dth of Zone Width of Zone
(miles) (miles)

Reoonno.issunce Plo.toon 2 (1 mnin r oo.d und

lnterinl routes)
Roconn~issa.nce Compru1y 2 5 (3 main roo.ds o.~d
lnteral routes)
Reconnnissunce Bo.tt~lion -
10-20
Armored Cnvo.lry Regiment 30-50
Figure 5. Width of Zonos, Rooonnaissnnoo Units.
49
 Armorod reconnnissnnce units m~y be assi~ned zones of

grenter width, but effectiveness decronses with incronse in width

of zone•

The nctual reoonnniss nnce is oo nf.uoted by tho platoons. Pl n­­

toons normnlly oporo.to unr'.er oo:npany control on different :'.xe.s . Tho

pl::l.toon is best employed us n unit on ono route. It is cupnble of

covering two ro'"\ds, but this is unrlersirnble o.s its combat power be­­

ccrnes dissip~t ed .

The platoon normally opero.tos mounted, with scouts employing

n combinution of dismounted o.nd mounted r c connniss::mce. Method of

operntion is not fixed, but will be consistEnt with mission, zone,

ond time . The gonl of any r econnaissance mission is r~pid trans­­

mission of portinont, timely, complete c,nd 'l.cour nt e informr.tion .

Initi nlly, t}ie platoon will move out in c0lumn. The forma­­

tion previously discussed under Security (scout section, tank sec ­

tion, rifle squad, support sqund) provides o. goor solution to an un­­

develop0d or unknown situation. Tho scouts secure the mnin axis nnd

lateral roar'.s, tho tnnks ~nr. riflomc-n urc behind the platoon louder

for rnpid employment us n t cnm, nnd tho support sqund provides fire

support nnrl r ear security.

The scout section should move well nhond of the platoon in

order to provide security o.nd nn uninterrupted udvunce . The greater

the disto.nce , the better; however, tho scouts should be in visual

contact with the plntoon l ender. The point squar wi 11 move by

boun~s unless the situntion is fluid nnd speed the essence . Ono

jeep moves f r om one observation point to the next, covered by tho

-
second 1/4-ton. The second jeep then moves forwnrd nn~ joins the
50
 -
100.d 1/4-ton, As tho second vehicle a.pproa.ches, the lend jeop moves

out a.go.in, and the cycle is ropeate·d. The length of the bound will

de pend on the cover .me concealnent nvo.ilo.bl o .

There are two schools of thought rego.rding the basic, but

—
vital (a.t lea.st to the scouts), question of which vehicle r~oes first­

the radio or the machine gun jeep. -

If tho rnnchine gun l/4-ton leads,

it h~s no automatic weapons cover, but the section does have a mo.chine

1;un With its most forwnrr. vehicle, If tho ro.di0 joep leads, one may

lose a radio but on0 has the cover of o. mo.chine gun which may be able

to shoot the lend vehicle out , of a tight spot. ­

Eithor way, both vehi­

cles arc very vulnera.blo. A possible solution would be to mount a ma­­

chine gun on both jeeps. A grea.t mnjority of persons answe ring the

que stionnaire (s oe Appendix IV) were in fo.vor of this. Quite a. few

fnvorod nt lea.st one .50 caliber mo.chino gun. The ndvanto.ges of two

guns are obvious; however, with the present vehicle, thero would be

nn n!l1!1luni ti on supply nnd storo.ge prob lo!n. This pr ob lem should not be

passed over o.s ninor bocnuse it involves only six men and two vehicles.

It is a very important pr '>b lem of the platoon which is out getting

vital information for the hishcr com~rui~er.

Lo.ter'\l routes nre roconnoiterrod by the other scout squad•

This squn.rl will n.oto.ch itse lf fro?'l the column, rapidly check the ro.'la ,

o.nd return to its pl.nee in column behinf the point scout squn~. ­
Nor­

mally the squnn wil l ~o only fnr enough to provirlo locnl flunk se­­

curity, but it mny be r oquirod t~ ~o f arther bec nuse of the impor­­

tnnce of tho roi,:-) or tho rcquir oments of tho mission . Tho a.'ll0unt of

l nternl covcr1igo will ~epond on the r!lto of '1.r.vance of the platoon

:m1 the onomy situution.

51
 Tho plntoon l ender is well forward in the c olumn, e ithe r

behinct tho sc out s ection or between squur1s. He must be where he can

crintrol bnth the sc ,.,ut s nnd thl) r omo.inr1o r o f the platoon. He should

no t bo s n f ur forwurd thut ho bccnmos involver! in tho uctinn of the

scouts uncor fir e , or so f o.r t o the r oo.r thr\t he c r.nn ot observe the
Rcti on nt n ll.

Th6 t ~nk s e cti on is tho most f orwurd e l ement of the mo.in body

of tho plntoon. It is usua lly behind the sc<'uts ::mc1 the pl11t0on

l euder, but may l oad if tho column is moving in the fnoe of smnll

arms fir0 . Thv t ~nk se ction shnul c be cnpnbl e of supporting the

scrut section by fire . The tnnks shnuld them se lve s be mutuo.lly sup­­

prrting us well. A good distance between t anks is 75 yards . This

pnsition of t he section in the c olumn rru:tke s thu t anks r0ndily avail­­

nb l e to fire or muneuver on the enemy.

The rif l e squo.<l f oll ows immediate l y bohinc the tank se cti on .

Tho squn<l usually r emains mnunted in its carrie r unless called upon

t o augment dismounted po.trollini; bv the sc ')uts. In a fi ght the rifle­­

men mnnouver \dth '\11~ tanks, operating in the ar 9ored peesonnel 04rrier,

mounted 0n the tnnks, ~ismquntod , or in nny combination ()f the three.

Tho sup~ort squn<l brinGs up th0 r enr . It will usu ~lly pro­­

vi<le r onr security; h0wever, ~ sc out sqund mny aot ns r ear P;Unrct if

e nemy ncti on fr om th~t ~ircction is pr obable . The mortnrmen must be

r eady f or i m.~cr. i nt o a c~i0n t o su?oort any c l ement of the platoon .

Upon r oc oiving fire 0r ~the r o,.,nt ~ct with the enemy , c l e ­

ments of tho plat oon will tnko c over, r ocnnnoiter, r cpn rt, t.nr. net .

Tho pl nto/'ln lonc1er will /;<' f orward nnd m;:ike n pe rsnne l r oc 0nno.issnnce.
He wi 11 !n:l.ke n quick dee is i on o.ne f 0rmulnt c. a s imp l o plnn. It mny be
52
nece ssnry t o c ct ut onco. The c:ompf.lny c onmr.ncer must be notifi ed a.s

soon ns possible. Ho wi 11 e ither r end.er the c'l ecision or a pprrive the

c ourse r oc ommoncer by tho pl nt ron l ea<lor. Acti on must be b ol e nn<l

nggrossive , rct;nr rll oss of whcthor tho plnt orn uttnc!cs, c t"lntains, or

rlel nys. Conto.c e;nincd must be maint uined .

Rec onna issance is n 00ntinu0us process. Though n o l onger oon­

sir.or od ~ primnry missi on rf armored rec nnnnissance units, it is

hnbitunlly c 0ncuctod e ithe r in oonjunctinn with nnother mission or ns

an nssiGned j ob. ~ooonnnissnnce pr ovi~es the inf0rmnti 0n needed f or

tho commander' s de cision r.m d is part c·f the n oce sso.ry s ocurity of the

co:nmand .

Offensive Action

Offensivo notion is exocute <l by armored r e or nnnissonco units

~
whe n employed ~s eo 0n O!!ly f orcos m~kin g s econdary ntta.oks, or when ne­

cosso.ry t o c oc"!!lplish missions such ns security, r oc rnnnissance , or

10 ■
~ef e nso . During pursuit nr ox pl ~it ntit"ln by l ar ger f orce s, armored

r oonnnniss ance units mny bo usod ~s fl nnk security or n~vnno o cove r­

ing f orces t o r cg:\in conta ct with tho ono!ny. Coor r: innt cd nttncks are

n nr mo.lly mnfo bv th0 r cgi Mo nt nr bntt o.li ~n. The r ~c 0nno.issunco c omprmy

or pV1.t o,,n wi 11 ofton lo.unch l oc:ll flttncks in or ~o r t o connuct r econ­

no.issnnoc or ~r ovi ~o se curity.

Empl nymcmt of the plrtt con. Tho pl r!t rnn !'llO.Y o.ttuck o.l0ne f'r

in c0njuncti0n with the c rmp'llly. Whe n n.ttr.ckinr; with :)thcr pl o.t cons

of the crmpnny, it ~ny pr ovi no the bnsc of fire, be pa.rt of the man­

euver e l e:nent, or furnish ;:,; lom,;nts r- f bnth. The cnmpany base of fire

may be augmented b y medium t o.nk fir e , indiroct fire support fr om the

h owitze r cnmp4ny, unr: artillery. Whon o.ttflckin~ n l nno , the pl ~t onn

53
provides its own bnse of fire on~ mane uver c l ement. Often it will

receive n o o.<lditi on o.l fir o sup~ rt. Tho plo.t oon nttnckin ~ al one

while on ~~gec in r co ...,n no.isso.nec mission might be c r nsi dcr ed typic nl.

Conrluct of the o.ttnckj Enemy onntnot is n ormally made by

the sc ')uts up0n observo.tion nt tho ene my or, more like ly, upon r ece ipt

of fir e fr om the ene my f orce . The pl nt oon will h o.lt onn t o.ke c over.

Tho pl nt o')n l on~or goo s f 0rwn11d irrmed i at e ly t o make porsonn.l r ec on-­

no.i S S'.ll'lOO •

Ho will bo confr onted with a.ny numbe r of situo.ti ons which r e­­

quire a. quick r.ccision. In o.n en ~ngement such as this, tho first

unit t o r ea.ot will often be the most successful. If tho ene my is

superi or in stren gth nn il fir epower, or is in o. str ong positi nn, tho

pb.toon will contnin, do l a.y, ">r bypass. Given o. g...,n<l chance 0f suc­­

ce ss, h oweve r, the plc.toon should o.t ta.ck . If the ene my is not set

f ~r it, an immed i o.t e o.tta ck is usually tho most ef fe ctive . The ?lo.­­

-
t oon ·Nill simply nttnck front a lly, tho t unk-info.n try t o~m jumping off

fr om cc-lu.'lll'l., tho scnuts nnd mortar firing in pl ace . Surprise will

bo gninor. , but r e sults mny be r. is~ster ous unless the pl ~t ocn is we ll

tr ninoc. the men r c·\ct t o the si tunt ion r ~.pi c1 ly, rcnr'l tho plan is

simple o

If tho ene my is in pnsiti nnp tho ntto.ck wi 11 be convontirnril.

Ti!!le is still imp0rtnnt, ns tho ene my !'lr,y r e inforce ; but the pl at oon

will n ">t rush into the ass '.l.ult. The pl n.t rirn l enr.er will m::i.ko n mr1r o

dc liboro.t e r ec onnaissnnoe 'lllc1 r eport t o the c'llllp:my OC"mmander., If

shr ul rt bo given fr f'm n v'lll t nGe p~int.

54
 N0r!no.lly tho m~mouverinr clomont will be tho tnnk socti 0n ::mrl

tho r iflo squ 'ld. The scrut soot irn nnd the supp')rt squo.r will prC'vide

n bri.so ~r firo with thoi r mr•rt ·::.r , ml\ohin-c gun , r-..n r. smn.11 nrms fire .

The pl o.t 'lcm lcnror r,·'8s with tho r>ccisive clc!'lont , usu".lly tho Mnnou­­

vor f or ce . Tho plnto0n sor~e'Ult will c"mm~nr. the 0thor f orce .

The plmi of ntt 'lck sh 1ul rl bo simple but sh"ul r be executed

nh~r ossive ly. A sin~lc envo l ')rnent nr n fr r nt nl nssnult with c0n­­

tinu"us firo 'lD tho "bjoctivo shrul ~ bo cmpl "yo<l . Fnncy. c rmplic~ted

mnneuvers will t ond t 0 crnfuso nnr. ~isp<.:rsu tho pl o.t "nn . The torro.in

will usu~lly be thP r.eci r i n~ fcctrr fnr meth0r o.nc <\Xis of o.nvance .

Tho rifle squ~d will r oroin mnuntec: in its onrrie r during

pri.rt nr o.11 of tho mo.nouver if th~ r oute o.ff or cs c 'lver or concenl.mont.

It will c ismnunt f'lr tho o.ssoult. Tho cnrrior driver mny mnn his mn­­

chino gun for o.drliti nnnl fire su?,nrt curing tho finnl nssnult. Tnnks

and riflemen usunlly g0 in tosether , plncing n heavy volume of fire

'lD tho objective t ~ oompensnto f or liftin~ of the b~s e of fir e . Rc­

or ganiz nti on 0f the 0bj ectivo is cxeoutod immodi nt ely. The pl'ltnon

mo.y pursue but will usuri. lly limit this t 0 pursuit by fire .

If torrnin is n0t suitcrl fnr tnnk maneuver , the riflo sqund

'J.Drl tho sc out sectinn 1"10.Y be om::il0yoa in a <'.i smn'lmtcd nttnck under

cr,rm,nnrl r.f tho plr\t nrn lenrler, Tnnks :m,1 mnrtnr give fire suppnr t ,

with tmks pr opo.r orl t n nis pl 'lce f"rwnrd t r, th<' objective o.s riflemen

m..'1.sk fire .

Exceptionnlly, the scc-ut soctir•n or n scout squn<' m:iy bo OI'l­ ­

pl oyorl as flank security for the mri.nouver e l ement! Such empl oyment,

hrwavor, r oducos tho effectiveness of ~i the r tho assault 0r support

0oh0 l C'n o.nc1 wrulf. pro~o.bly be used "nly when the pl c.t oon is o.tto.oking

65
against very weak r esist:mcc .

Tho very nature of the missi 0ns ~ssign cd the r econnniss!"Ulce

platoon requires he.bitunl off'ensive Mtir-n . Often the ncti c,n is si­
—

!lli l nr to n sm~ll meetini; eni:;ngement wher e the "fo.ste st mon 0n the

drnw" wins.

Th& pl ntoon s h~ul~ bo omplnyed within its c aonbi litie s. It

is not rlesicno~ f or slu~gin ~ m~tches with onemy nr:nnr nr nssault nn n

f nrtified pos iti0n. It is cap:1ble nf r e.pie' rleplnymont 'Ul<l nggr essive

noti on :igainst pe,.,,plo its own size .

Defensiye Act i on

Like offensive notion, the def ense is crnf.ucted by nrmorerl r e ­

oonnaissl\?lce units whe n en5n~e<l ns eo,.,,nnmy f orc es or is nssumed in

conjuncti on with other missions. Se curity missi ons, ea pecinlly, often

require defensive notion . Armorect reoonnnissnnco units will en~a~e in

two types of def ense,

Mobil e def ense. Mobil e ctef ense is tho 1efense nf nn a r oa or

position in which m~nouver is l" mpl )yed t o s0izo the initint ive from
1

the enemy! 1 It is chnrncte rized by n series of str nng points nnd a

mobile r ose rve . Th& m0bile r e se rve is tho key tn this type of de­

f ense . Fr ,:int:lr,e s are usur, lly broflrl. Ne attempt is made t o C"lVOr th e

entire fr nnt, but r o.thor key t e rr a.in o.nr m::i.in a.venues of nppr n'lch a.r e

helr' . Armor ed r c or,nnn.i ssnnce uni ts ar e woll suited f or mnbil o fe ­­

f ensc becruiso of their m0bility :m~ fir epower.

Sust ni nen defense. Sustnined def ense is the de fense of rm

l'lr eo. or position thnt is or go.nized t o stop the enemy in frnnt of the

p0sition , r epe l him if the position is r onohen , or ejoct him fr om the

position if n penotr ~tion if m~0e12
. The mo.in line nf resistnnce is

56
c overed by fir e . Depth is provided by a. support at c ompnny l ove l nnd

n reserve at higher levels. Armored reconno.issnnce units nre c ~po.ble

of hr>l c' inh upprnximn.tely tho srune frontn.r;e ns like infnntry units.

Bocnuso f"lf their 1':lck nf rifleroop, h • wever , the y rl0 not hnve the stny­­

ing nbility nf the infantry.

Employm,:mt 0f tho platoon.-- In the mobile defense s tr ,.,n g

-
p,.,ints ~re usu~lly plntoon•size; nnrMn lly nre not mutually su pporting .

The plo.to,.,n of the nrmored co.vD. lry :rogi~nt will usuo.lly r e c eive fire

su p?ort fr 0m the h nvdtzc r com?.:1ny cmrl may have morlium t nnk ond nrtil­­

l e ry support. ­
This su !:)00rt mo.y nr mny n ot be ava.i lnble to othe r r e con­

naissance platoons . The platoon •M.y also be cmplnyod as part r f tho

mobile reserve. -
It will then assumo tho c ounter-ntt~ck r ole.

The platoon str nn~ print is set up as the str0n1?; p0int dis­­

cussed unrler Flank s e curity. H0wever, being of n more permrmont nn­­

ture , po si tirms a nd 0bstncle s will be o.s extens ive o.s pnssib lo. Su p­

p l emcn t nry 'md nlterna.te (woapr-n s) prsitions Will be prepared. Avail­­

able minus will be l o.yert , ~.nd r o~cblocks will be c ontructod,

The str rmr.; pf"lint is built around the tank s e cti,"n o.n~ the

rifle squnn , which nr go.nize th~ c nmmnn~ ing terrnin. The supp0rt squo.d

will be a little t o the r eo.r, in firin r; pns iti on, The pl nt or-n l eo.CTer

will c stnblish u c0mr1r,nc' OP in the vicinity 0f those e l e~nts, ­

SC"me­

thin .,; Nsomblinr; finnl pr otr:ctivo fires wi 11 exist in .front of the

pnsiti on . Mo_rto.rs r f ::if' j nc ent plnt onns :md ru-ti lle ry, if o.v:l.ilabl e ,

will attempt t 0 oc, ver nt l ea.st o. porti on of the gnps between units.

Security will be furnished b" the scout s e ction . The scouts

will c sto.blish nocossnry pntr ols, out p0 sts, listening prsts, nn~ OP's

57
ns discussed under Flo.nk security. They ma.y he aur;mented by rifle:n0n,

but, n~o.in , the strnn~ point must n ot be woo.konod by cis!X)rs i on of

effort. Whe n forced t o pull bnok tn the plutnon position by enemy

notion , tho scruts will occupy previ nusly propnr or. l.)0Sitinn in the

strong point.

The plntoc-n will hole the str 0ng point t o the limit, with­­

rlrnwing only f'\n or<ler . It wi 11 be prep,.'\rod to suppr rt tho cr,un ter­­

nttnck of the mobilo resGrve by fire. It muy a ls o be required -— on

order -— t o shift its p.-,sition t o nir another pl atoon un~er nttnck.

The plato on should be g iven one nvenue of approach t o rlofend.

It mo.y be nssi1;ned twn or three. If it cannot c over the o.~ditiono.l

avenues by fire, it will prepare one or t.vo nrcitional positions.

Tho platoon will hold the center position, plncin~ a n OP (scr ut squad)

on O"lch of tho fla.nkinr; pC'siti0ns. It will then be prepare~ t o mnve

i rn.wci nt e ly t 0 whichever bec omes the threo.t oncd position.

The r cconno.issnnco plntoon is e mployed in tho sustained de­­

fonso ns pcxt of the compnny in much the sUI!\O mnnnc r ns the rifle ?ln­­

t oon. Differe nces in cm?l nyroont are cr nsistont with tho differences

in f'\ r r,uniznti ("\n nnct equip!'!lont. Tho principlos ar e thu s nme .

Discussi on

Arm0r cd r e connniss encc dnctrino —

- any d"ctrine -—— is n

highly C'Jntr nvorsial subj c.:ct. This is n et booc.uso doctrine is in­­

C')nsistcnt, but bec nusc it is sub j cot t o intorprc t ~ti rn. If d ('C­­

trine is sub j ect t i~ interpr ot o.ti 0n, then tho npf)licnti"n of c1.ootrine

— nr t '\otics -— is t n u ,~r o'\t rlcgr ce deponrlont 0n the situ:J.ti<m

uri c~ the pers onc.li ty of the com'.llunr-or.

58
 Thero are those mi0 favor u return to the arm0red cnr :--.nd tho

p~ificiplos ~r steo.lth nnc infiltr ction . Others wnnt uneven henvier

nrgnnizn.tion with !'lnr,:, tonks nnd infnntry. Smne will c'ism01.mt r.m<l

oporo.te ('\n f,)ot ., usin~ vehicles fr,r tr--.nsportntion only.

Despite pros o.nd c nns, tho emphnsis t0dny is on security cx­­

e outecl by nr;gress ive a.ct i on. ­

The bnsic unit, the r oconnniss :lllce plu­

tn ·n, is exp 1ctc:;d t o fi~ht in nccomplishin.; its missi0ns. Its tac ­ -

tics a.re th1) fir e nnc> ~~ r,f tho tnnk-infnntry

- team.

If tho platoon is to bo omplr,yod on oombn t missi0ns requiring

mobility, fircp0wer ., i:md nrmor ., the n the men wh,., r i ~ fi rr,h t in this

tnnk--inf:mtry terun must possess these same chnraoteristios.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4

1 Bri :~uricr Genernl Willfom A Mitchell ., rfr rlcl's Militnry

History (Hnrrisburg , Po., Uilita.ry Service Publishing Co, 1931)., p 78.
2 Ibid; p 77

3 ~ ; P 347

4 ~j p 238 - 240

-
5 FM 2-30, Cav('l.lry Roc0nno.i ss --.nee Squ~dr on ?~echnnizec., 28
Aurust 1944; p 15.
6 FM 17-95,
- Tho Armr.r er C 1Vlllry Rcf i!!lcnt und the Jl_rmored
Co.vo.lry Rcconn~issnnce Ba.ttclicn; Supt c~bo r 1951; p 58,

7 _
Ibid·, p 113-
- 115
8 _
Ibid·, p 158

9 Ibid· p 169
- ·
1 0 ~ ; p 174

- 1 1 ~ ; p 223

12 ~ ; p 223

59
 CHAP.l'ER 5

-
ARMORED RECONNAISSA.N'CE UNITS IN POST-WAR TRAINING

In the fall of 1945 the first chan~es began to occur in the

policies for the training of reconnaissance personnel. Until 1945

'
the be.sic traininr, phase of reconno.isso.nce training for new per son-­

nel and the doctrine for :nechanized cavalry opero.tions stemmed fl-om

The Cavalry School at Fort Riley, Kansas. Fort Riley had, during

the war years, trained all meohanized onvultry troops, including tank

crewnen for the c nvnlry units.

September 1945 saw the first uni ts of mechanized cavalry

from Fort Riley arrive at The Armored Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky.

These units were elements of the 13th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squa­

dron, a training unit complete with office r and enlisted cadre.

This move was the forerunner of the oentr aliz ntion at The Armored

Center of all armored training. The squadron headquarters and Troop

A were the first to arrive , ond the new unit wus placed under the

2d Training Regiment, Ar~ored Replacement Center. Plans and opera­­

tions personnel had also arrived and were assimilated by the center

plnns and training section. 1

As the need for replacements ste~d ily increased, due to

overo.scs requirements and the relensinG of wartime personnel, the

tro.inine; wns intensified and another squadron wa.s formed. The 19th

Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissnnco Squadron followed the load of the

13th Squadron, in that officer and enlisted cndre were furnished

primarily from Ft Riley, Knnsns.

The newly orgnnized unit wns filled by basics as they wero

sent to Ft Knox , nnd in less than a month the new squadron wns in
60
n full tro.inir.r, sto.tus .

Tro.ininG continued in this fashion; o.nd by the surrmer of 1946,

pro.otico.lly nll of tho trnining of reconnnissance crewmen wo.s being

conducted o.t Fort Knox , Kentucky,

Tho Armored Replo.ce~nt Tr~ining Center wns absorbed with

•
the orgnnizo.tion o.nd o.ctivo.tion of the Third Armored Division o.s a

trnininr, division nt Fort Knox . Units within this division contin­­

ued to trnin reconno.issance crowmrm nnd nre still doing so o.t this

writing.

Thus, in effect, the tr o.ining of o.rm0red reconnaissance crew­-

men from basic individual s i~ be ing co.rried out on o. large sea.le and

on o. bnsic cycle system at Fort Knox, Kentucky only. Mechanized

cavalry training, as such, has, consequently, been done away with.

Bo.sic Training Phnse

The initial training thnt the reconnaissance orewnen re ­

ceive is divided into severnl pho.ses . The first pho.se is tho.t of

bnsio soldi erin g, strictly following the bo.sio subjects required

for o.11 new soldiers . This type tr o.ininr: is p;iven to a ll b us ies

ree;ardless of branch or service. In this phr..se the moo to become

specialist a.re selected :md, upon completion of the pho.se, nre chan­­

neled into schools or othor further tro.ininG r e lo.tive to specialist

quo.lific ntion.

The sec ond phnse for the r econnaissance crewmen is the ad­­

vanced individual training phase . Here, ns in other branches, th e

tr uinin g t nkos on n br oude r sc ope nnd minor basic tactics ere intro­­

duced . The training in this phase bogins the ~ctunl i:i;roomi.ng of the

61
crcwm.-m to dotormine what position he will be best suited and

qualified for on completion. The tool s nnd equipment to be used in

th 0 r f'lconno.issm-ico units ~o introducer. to the crcw~.:-.n , a.nd ho lec.rns

to opera.to and mo.intnin them. Vihon the crowman ho.s completed this

ph~se , he is roa.dy to join a. roconno.issanco unit ns a. filler , a.s a.

mow.bar of o. -;roup to undergo further tro.ininc;, or .ls o.n oversoo.s re-

plncoiront .

Unit - Tr~ ing

The unit tro.inine; phc.so of any tro.ininr pro~rnm is of vital

importnnco . This is os~~ci~lly true of tho reconno.issc.nce unit .

Tcrunwork must bo empha.sizcd o.nr1 effected. This mn.y be nchiovod only

throu~h nn effective one detn.ilod tmit trn.ininG [ha.so .

Section training is ~ivcn only onoue,h ti~ to dovclop

wcll-- tra.incd crows . Since the plo.toon is usuo.lly tho smo.llcst
torun of combine<! n.rms within tho bc.tto.lion , it is tho ba.sic unit
for a.11 training. Consequently, platoon tr~ining should be cm­­
pho.sized nnr. shoulc1 be o.llocc.tC;d c.s much timo a.s possible in or­­
-
der to develop co.ch plntoon into n woll-coorrino.ted a.nd hif",hly
efficient comho.t te~m. Compnny tro.inin~whioh should result in
-
tho development of wcll-ooordinntcd comp:'.Ily to~ms, usually re ­
ceives the SLcond la.rGost ~lloc~tion of time . 9~ttnlion tro.in­ ­
in~, a.s such , roc~ivos tho leQst ~J!lount of time. If tho com­­
ponio s nre we 11 tr ::i.ined rmd tho bdto.li on sto.ff h:-.s been wcl 1
trn.inod dur in r; th.0 comp~ny tr -:.ininr; pc r icd , b~tt-:lion tr n,inin6
wi 11 consist !llflinly of tr -:i.inin•~ thv comp-·,niLs to work tncothe r.2

Unit tr".inin,; of r e oonn.iissnnco units from the c.;a..r ly pnrt of

19~7 until 1949 Wf'.s compur~tivcly ineffective . Units wore suffor­

-
in;; from r'l;nd turn-over ­
of ?Orsonnel, un~ n. sto.bilizc<l ori;anizo.­

tion wo.s ho.rd to fine. Those most successful in this tr'linint; were

units in the ovorse:1s a.rolls , whore, fo.irly effective unit training;

pro7c.ms were possible .

Uni ts within the Zone of the Interior v,urc loss succossful

in tho conrluct of their pro~r'.l'!ls . Tr['.ininr facilities wore reduced,

62
and the strength of most units limited tho effectiveness of o?orc­ ­

tiohs in field exercises.

The 3d Armored Cn.vo.lry Rcr;iment (Ligit) at Fort Meade, Mo.ry­ ­

lo.nd, did conduct some effective unit tra.inin3 nnd po.rticipo.te in

vo.luablo field exercises . The only o.ctive armored division, tho 2d

Armored Division, wo.s not so forttma.te , in that its organic rccon-­ '-.

no.issoncc battn.lion, the 82d Ba.tto.lion, ho.d been de --activnted.

(This battalion wo.s ro --activo.ted, however , in January of 1949. )

In 1949 most of tho units reached o. more stabilized orv,o.ni ­­

zo.tion . Forsonnel wcro primo.rily rc 6ulcr army. This factor alone

did much to increo.so the ~rofessiono.l o.ttitudes nnd effectiveness of

tho reconno.issnnce units . Equipmont boca'!!O nvailo.hle in sufficient

runounts to co.re for tho needs of o.11 the Zone of Interior units nnd

tho mo.jority of the ovorsco.s units .

The 82d Roconnnisso.nce Bo.tto.lion of the 2d Armored Di vision

furnishes nn excellent example of a rcconno.issn.nce unit being reo.c­

tivatod under tho present organization nnd equipment tables . Tho

bo.tta.lion bogc.n rebuilding -its or~imizo.tion in Ja.nunry 1919 n.nd by

Ho.rch 1949 hn.d tho equip:,ient onc1 personnel for its hoo.dquo.rters o.nd

four lettered oom~o.nios .

Field Exercises o.nd Honeuvers

Vl'"e sha.11 consider the trninini:; of tho 82d Reconno.issonco

Do.ttnlion in order to o.rrivo nt certain conclusions concernine; field

opcr~tion of ~~c scout sections . ­

A normo.l basic o.n~ advo.ncoc inni­

vir.unl trninin5 phase W'.lS completed by tho 82d with no 1.musunl or

unoxpocted difficulties . Tho plctoons and companies then begon

tro.inin.c; on the unit bnsis with the viovr of successfully completinG

63
tho t ests to be conducted in September 1949 by Arrrry Fiold Forces .

(The results of tho AFF tests provide excellent exnmples of co.pu­­

bilitie s and limi tn.tions of tho uni ts :md will be r eforrcd to lo.ter

in this chapter .)

In February 1950, tho 2d Armored Division wns prepo.rcd to

conduct division--scnlc field exercises r-.nd munouvors. Tho 82cl. Ro­­

c onn~issnnce 3nttnlion wo.s r epresented in eo.ch exercise either ns n

bo.tto.lion or llS c. r e c onnr.iss~ce c0?npr.my o.tt~ched to o. unit. Excep:

when tho bo.ttnlion opcrctcd ns ~ unit, it provided the Ar,gressor

forces —
- normully of comp:my size .

Tho exorcises provided unit tr o.ininG for the bo.tto.lion in

both the offense nnd the rcf onsc . From thommuy bo found mnny ex ­

cellent examp les tho.t directly indicnt o cort~in fo.cts of L~portonce

to this study c oncernin(~ tho opera.ti cm of the scout section.

The ex amples r e l ated below conce rn the scout s e ctions of the

82d Rcoonnuissnncc Bo.tto.lion durin ~ the period Fobrunry to Juno 1950.

Eo.ch cxnmpl o :n~y be appliod in principo.l, h owever, t o :my armored r o­­

c onnnissonc0 scout soction.

Mo.chino p.;un b l nst e ffects . Compnny C, 82<' Reconnaissance

Dnttulicm was oporri.ti n.; us nn Aep;r essor force durinr, the bo.ttnlian

t est of the ( 1st Arm0red InfMtry Bo.ttnlion. Durin, tho first do.y

of net ion , the conpc.ny he.-: been ~c lt1yin-· :.1.lon~ n ,.i ven ::lXis . The

de l o.yinc positions ho.cl been outpostod nl on~ the r oute by the scout

section of the 1st Plntoon. The mission of this section wns to open

- ton
fire with the . 30 c nlibcr m:1chinc r;un from the mount in the 1/4-

tlnd t o fire end f -ill be.ck int o the dcluyinc position, the purpose

bei ng to ho.rro.ss th o nrmor od infnntry nll a.lonr, the r oute .

64
 Ni~nt found the com~o.ny in o. defensive position o.lonr, hif;h ,

wooded gr ound propo.ring to ootmter the cominr, infantry o.tta.ck. Out­­

post listoninG posts wore sot up , utilizinc tho scout sections of nll

tho plo.toons . As the infantry movod rlismomitod into the c"efonsivc

o.reo., the listcnin& posts of the 2d o.n~ 3d Platoons withdrow and re­­

ported tho o.tto.ck wo.s on tho wn.y. Tho umpire infor!llOd the c ompnny

cornm::-.nder ln.ter th::i.t tho scout section outposts from the 1st Platoon

huc1 boon cnpturod b·, th0 o.dvnnce c l ements of the inf::mtry. This

uppoo.r od to bo unusuo.l , in tho.t tho r r.dio ct the listcninc post w:is

-
not used o.t c.11 to wnrn the compuny.

The next morninc the section l co.dor wo.s questioned by the

company c orronnndor. Tho section lc o.rler stntoc thnt the firing of

blank o.mmunition fr om the pocc stc.l mount in tho 1A-- ton hrid impo.red

tho h1.. :irinv o~ his non to such n.n e xtent thnt they di d n 0t h .:-,o.r the

infantry closinr, until too l nto ovon to fl* o. mosso.Ee by rndio . 3

Umpire e ffects . Followinr; c. critique of n comprmy test ,

seve r r~l typico.l sta t ements we r e overhe ard conc<--rning the pl o.y of

tho problem. It seems that <"urin 1~ tho e xercise , tho op., ninE:"; sto.te­­

mcnt by o .ch ump ire on the vc.ri ous situ ntions o.s the y hc.rl prcsonted

the!'lsc lves w:.-,s : - ton o.ppcured , it W"..s t aken unde r

"As tho l or...d 1/~-

fire by the Ar-:r cs sor o.nrl h:-..s been knock(;d out". ?fany crewre.on of

tho scout se ction ~~rived a t tho i re~ thnt in o.ctunl comb nt , onch

ti!!lc contuct with the e nemy wo.s m-ide • the l c,nd sc out j eep wc.s lm ocked

out . Furthe r, if anyon0 p;ot out , it wus strictly luck. This co.used

such r e mc.rks us , "Vfu on I l ocve this outfit , I ~m thr ough with the

scout soc ti on . Tho.t outfit is sure donth 11 , 11

·;11,y should I stick my

-—
ne ck out — I I m r.;oinr. t o ret in 'l tn.nk crew" .

65
 A problem revclopcd . Good men who could rend mo.ps o.nd or,er ­-

nto ns excellent scouts would tnke no interest nt o.11 in the section,

:md mD.ny ha.d to bo shifted to other duties .

Failure to receive initial cont~ct reports . During r oute

rcconnnissruice operations , nn umpire a.lwa.ys rode with the l end scout

1/4--ton. On initinl contr,ct with roc.d blocks and enemy pos i tions ,

tho umpires would require the lend crew to nbnndon its vehicle inmo ­

dio.tely for cover or be out of the problem us c. cc.sua.lty. This no•­

tion (which wo.s roo.listic) mennt thut the l ender of the unit, in or ­

der to deter mine whut ho.d been enc0untorod, had to move forward with­­

out proper information , for when tho lend crow wo.s forced f r om its

vehicle, its radio boca.mo useless o.s o. meetns of warning tho rest of

the unit .,

Stops wore taken to p~rtio.lly solve this lo.ck of communica­­

tions which resulted from nbn.ndoninG vehicles . Tho company communi­­

cations sections rewired the hondsets of the sc0ut ro.dios , provid­­

inr; o. ten foot lon1-; k.i l wire with plur; for ea.ch . This cna.bled the

crewman to t ake cover 0ut of t~o vehicle nn~ still wa.rn his unit of

unemy crmtnct. 4

" Buddy--system" outpost . The composition nf tho crow (throe

men) in the scnut s e ction presented :m obstnclo in the use of the

11
buddy- systcm11 of outpost in~ • ffhcn the soction !'llO.ns observo.tion

posts nnd outposts by vchic lo crew, it bccomos nc cessf'.ry to disr c ­

go.rd the dcsira.blc system of pnstin~ individuo.ls in ~ir s . This

syste m hns been proven to bo much more efficient thun thut of ho.ving

ono men stondin6 o. tour on post by himself.

Che unit solved this problem by nuQ!lentin~ the scout section

66
with four extra. mm from the o ompony he::-.,1qunrtors . This 0nc-.b l od
11
tho scout section to orc;nnizo its nut post system on the buddy11 style .

-
Di smoun tcd pntr01ing. Many reconnu issoncc plntoon l eo.rlors

f0und themse lves fucod with n problo!ll cc-ncerninr.; pntrolinc. In si­ ­

tuations of n dofonsi vo nnturo , the pl::-.toon wns s evo r n.l t e rrain fcn­

turos from the company. Normnl A:,;:·rossor positions nnd dolo.yinc; po­­

sitions were or :;o.ni zod "\round the tank section c.nn the. infuntry squad,

l ee.vine; only tho scout section or porti ons thereof to p0rform tho pn­­

trol r cquir on~nts .

Considcrinr, tho situation nbovo , tho platoon l cn~cr wo.s fncod

with on o.ctunl m..".n e horto.Go • It is dcsiro.blc to l c--.vo tho driver

-
with thf) vehicle ; tho mo.chino .i;tms sh ould ccrtcunly l'io !!lo.nned in tho

dc f 0nso ; :md the scout scctinn l ancer is needed t o control the pos i ­

tions nnd fires of his wee.pons . This l c"lvcs out of the entire scc ­

ti nn , ~ t ntnl o f only seven men t o p0rform nll pntrol r e quirements .

The -:nc.npo•ver shortri.re wo.s further f ol t in tho est o.blishmcnt

of r --.c1io r o l o.y stati ons utilizinr; the scout r~,dios . i'fhen tho r ~d i o

1/4-- ton wo.s sot up as n r c l ny stv.tion fr om o.n ob s e rvati on po st ., it

could pr ovi de itself with little or n o l ocnl security. Ono crowmo.n

was r equir e<! to tend the r ·1dio cnnstc.ntly. Tho ~nor cmpb.ced tho

. 30 ca.libcr much ino Gun on tho 6r ouni :!ll<l manned it. This l oft enc

riflomo.n t.o perform tho l oc n l S\:!Curity for thu e ntire sto.tion . It

bcc 'UllO r eadily npp~ent tho.t this sto.tion set- - up coulc not be mnin­-

tnincd f ur ox tender. pcri ods of ti mo .

Unstable {';un plc.tform. Company tests ori ~innlly cn<led with

o. comp::my firing phuso in v.hich ull woo.pons of the cnmpo.ny took pnrt .

To :;ot t o the point., tho scout sectirns were to be used o.s part of

67 -
the b~sc of fire to support the mc:.ncuvcr end o.ssuult by tho tmik­-

infantry t enm.

Ono compo.ny nttemptod to fire tho scout section from do ­

filo.dcd positions , with tho r,uns firin~~ from tho podcsto.l mount.

This proved to be entir e ly unso.tisfo.ctory. Accurncy even on urea.

tori:;0ts wo.s so.dly l .!ckinr,. For o. susto.incd perion of firing the

entire crew '.)f throe was occupi ed in servicing the gun . ­

Cho mem­

ber wo.s required to propo.re the b exes end h:md them to the second

crowmnn, who nt this time wo.s serving as lo ::dor • The r-unner was n.c­­

tun.l ly cngnr,od in firin½ the ~un .

This mutter concerned the bo.tto.li0n corrtnt'..nder to the extent

tho.the ho.do. bo.tto.lion SOP propnred den.line with the employment of

tho i:;tms in the scout section.

The bo.tto.lion cornmo.nder directed tho.t for rcconno.issnnce

missions only the lend mo.chine r,un would be in tho mounted firine;

position . Tho other t;uns would be 0n tripods on tho hoods of the

-
1/4-tons , to be cmpl0yed only from r,rountl firing positi om or, in

emer ccnc i es , from the hoods•

Discussion

Rolo.tod ~bove c.re certain bo.sic oxn.mplos of incidents tho.t

hn.vc occurred in exercises o.nd maneuvers. Similo.r incidents will

have o. definite effect on the combo.t efficiency of any unit.so

oq;nnizod ond equ ipped.

The maneuver is desip.;ned to test combo.t efficiency of men

nnd equipment. Deficiencies which ure broucht t o li ~ht durin~ mnn­­

euvors should. if nt nll possible, bo corrected prior to combat.

E.fficiont und conservntivo utilizo.tion of personne l in

68
future conflicts is of utmost i~porto.nce. Our army will n eoossnrily

ha.ve to be equipped with superior oqui pmcnt t o overcoioo our poton­­

tinl onemy.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 5

1 Co.pta.in Jo.mes R Porto., Interview, former execut ive officer,
11 11
Troop B , 13th Mechnnized Co.v::i.lry Reconnnissoncc Squo.dron.
2 FM 17-32,
- RooonnuissQ,noe Ba.tta.lion, Armored Division, Unit
Trninin 6 , Mo.rch 1951, p 3lO.,
3 Ca.pttiin O S Severson, Interview, former s..- 2, 82nd Rcoon­­
no.issanoo Ba.ttulion, 2d Armored Division.

-
4 Ma.jor Eric Kobbe., Interview, former S-3, 6th Medium Tank
Ba.tto.li0n, 2d Armored Division.

69
 CHAPI'ER 6

ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE UNITS I N THE KORE.AN WAR

The oper a.ti on s of United st,1.tes nr mor ed r e conno.issonce uni ts

­
in Ko r en wnrrant c ons i rlera.tion in' this r e s e n.rch, for in the se opera­

ti ons rno.y bo found tnn~ible n.pplication of tho present or e-nn iznti on

ot armor ed r c c onna.issance in comba.t. This discussi 0n will empha.sizc

a.vniluble r e search on the subje ct and will include the r e sults of

inte rvie we with c omm.':llldcrs of various r c cmnni ss anc c plo.toons nnrl

c omp ani es which h nvc opora.ted in Korean c::i.mpni r,ns. This oha.ptor is

c once rnc<l with the two type units n ow 0;:c r c.ting in this wnr. The s e

­
ar e the r e c onn uiss:mce pl o.t oon o f tho tank butto.li:-m and the r e con­

n o.issnncc c rr.npnny of the infontry c:ivisi on. An a ttempt will be mude

to emph nsizc the use of the j eep in Qr mor ed r e c onna.iesnnce o pe~ations

in Kor en , with tho thou$t in mind of (\n impr ov~c vehicle to truce its

place .

In or de r to point out thc. diffe r ,mce i n toohnique of oper a ­

tion bot ween the two menti oned r c c onnniss nnoc or gani zo.ti ens , this

cho.pt e r will be di virled int o two s e ctions, one f or c~ch unite

Rcconna.issonce Pla.t oon, Tank Bnttalion

­
Dur in~ the e n.rly rays of the Kor crui. wo.r, o.. typico.l r oc onno.is­

snnce pl:1.toon woul<i ':Jc cmpl flye<l o nnstnntly on str ni r-.J 1t r e c 0nn11.iss M ce

mi ssions . The pori:nct c r cmbr a.cin~ PUSAN nnd MASAN ho.ct num0.r ous r oo.d

n e ts, s omo traffico.bl0 unrl others me r e ly f oot po.ths. In or ~er t o de­

­
t e r mine just h ow ~Qlly of tho se r oute s wer e uso.b l o , n r oute r e c onna is­

sa.nco h o.<l t o be initint ed c.nd the r e sults r oc or ded . Missions of this

­
type wor o mot ed out t o the r e o 0nn~i sscncc pl atoons by t a.nk battnl­

i ons. The work wns done by the sc out nnd support squnds of the
70
pl o.t oon . Usua lly the r oute w0ulcl be botwoc·n or noo.r fri en d ly units .

Oocnsion n l fire fiivits wor e encounte r e d whon tho onomy, by infil­­

trntion, h nc ente r ed tho lines. J eops in this t ype of o pe r a.tion

wore oxco lle nt. A f e w were l 0st t o mines onn smr.i. 11 o.rms firo, but ,

by and l nr ge , boc a uso 0f tho c ompnr o.b l e "lir;ht" action, this v ehicle

pr ov en ndo qut,1 . Tho r oroinrlor 0f tho p l o.t oon wnuld n fton be used

in o. dof onsivc s ecurity r ol e such as n r ond block. The t nnk s oction

would f nrm tho nuclous,ond thr> rifle squa.d , its cl ose s e curity.

In Sopt ombor 1950 tho North Koro m line s we r e crumpled by

-
o. s e rie s of t ~n ~ci ous o.rmnr ed-infa.ntry co lurrn thrusts . Cbo nf the s e

wns "Tnsk Force Do lvin'', c om.l!l!llldvd by Co l <mo l Wol bnrn G De lvin.

This t a.sk f orce b lu~r,oon~c thr ou ~h the st out North Kor e ~ rle fonsivo

w'. 1.11 o.t CHINGU rmc 00ntinur~ n 0rth un~ w•.:: st t o N4.M'flON ­
nnd ulti-

m~t c ly t o tho strnt 0r ic hi r~wny junction nt YONGMOL . This tllllk

o.tto.ck wos hi o-, hly succe ssful -md P•'n c tr o.t ed t c n depth of s ovor e1l

hunc1r od milo s . Tho r e connni s sonco pl r.i.t 0e·,n W(.l.S uscrl continuo usly n.s

the conn~ctinr file between tho ntt ~ckinr oo~pnny ruid the m~in b ody .

It wn.s use d t o link u p with 2d Div ision on the ri ~ht of tho ntt nok.

The rifle sque1~ wo.s u sed e xte nsive ly in r vmr>vin~ minns . The j eeps

­
wcro n ot n h ~~cic~p on this oooc ssi on beo~use of the clos e pr ot e c­

tion of tho t anks . Choe the en e my lino wo.s rupturo n, tho ~oti on wns

on0 ~f cx pl oitnti on, with little r 0 sistnn co onc0unte r c d. ­

c u sun l­

tio s in the e ntire ,,pcr nti on W'}r e f o,v br.th in ve hicle s nnc' in me n.

In Oct ober nn<l November t his s ·.mc pl at non wa s used in much

t ho s niro vmy . The 8 9th Medium ~flnk Buttn.lion wo.s utto.ched t 0 the 1st

Cnv o.lry Division until 17 Octobe r nnr. th,, c a pture of PYANYANG . This

onntinuoos ntto.ckin~ i n c olumn with clo se pr ot ooti on of tanks wns

71
very s e cur e . After PYANGYA1TG, tho bnttnl i on wo.s ntto.cho d · t o the Bri ­-

tish 27th Bri r:o.rle nnd oontinuod a tta ckin~ n orth to SONCBON, -8 'llile s

s nuth of tho Ynlu River . All nurin ~ t his pori0rl , tho roc onnaissonoe

pl o.t o 0 n wa s used t0 fo ll ow the a ttnckin~ c om'>l'l.ny, l oc ~t o an n ssemb ly

ru-cl\, initi r1lly s o curc it, then c;ui <le the hutto.lion into it o.t the

e n d of the <lay . Afte r tho service c l ements h ~rl clos ed , the scnut

se cti on would be r e lieve d r,f its s e curity missi on o.n~ woul d b o used

t n (;Ui~o the su r'>ly trucks u p t r, the line c ompanie s .

Durinr; tho f o ll"'winr withnr o.wl , this t ype missfrn cho.n t~ed ,

in th o.t the pl o.t o'ln be come c r,noom crl more in s e curity missions; how­

ev e r, few v e hicula r c~sualt i e s r e sulte d .

In the• c ounte r-offe

- nsive , 1st Lt Min or Pee ple s , when inte r­
­

vie wed , s ni <l thut h e , o.s pb.t oon l '.Hlrlcr r-f th o r e cronno.issance pln­­

t o0n of tho 8 9th Murlium Tonk Rattali <'n , fr e que ntly pcrf"'roc d ll<!;~r "! s ­

sivo r e c onnaissance missi <'n s . On thc s0 ncc n ssi nns, which were

a.cr oss the Ha n Rivor, he W".lul<l be ''beef e d u p" with the o.ss aul t r;un

pl at 0on, which was oqui pj?Od wtth l'llOc.ium tanks . He utiliz ,;<l b0th his

own a r mor cc p:irs nnn', l co.rrior nnrl thos e nf tho o.sso.ult ,;un pl 'lt oon

t o c o.rry riflomon . His two t o.nks wor e us£;d ns C'. so cti0n; ho , n.s

t e~m co!'l?ll:l.I11or r nno in on 0. Bein~ without nny othe r sunport, ho

l e ft his j oops bock in the r ear rn this type mission t o nv <' i f

othr•rwise ce rt a in l0ss of thorn . Liouteno.nt Peeples f E'els tha t tho

j eeps sh0ul n be r epl a ced with ·m :irmnr cd tr o.ck ve hicle which wr-ul<l

·i vo or ot 0ction n~ninst s :11D.ll nrms fire in this typ:i security missi on .

1st Lt Roy B Sr.i_• th, pl a t r.nn c nmmam1cr of tho r e c onnr.issonco

pl nt 00n of tho 72c Medium T~nk Butt~ li on r.urin ~ the e arly p,u-t nf tho

Knr e nn wo.r , st 0utly def en d s tho j eep ~s nn exce lle nt vohicl0 f nr

72
r o ute r e conna.issonco . Ho expe rimented succe ssfully with ~rmor pl a.­­

ting his jeeps. Lieuten'lnt $mi th s n id, "My unit plnced nne shoet

of o.rm0r in lie u of winr1shi o l c'l s 0n tho j eep. This s n.vcc'l mMy lives

I 1 "'.ll sure , anf a ls o o.ch i cverl the psych,.., l ohicu l eff8ct of some protec­­

ti on ."

In April 1951, 1st Lt Cri.rr oll }forotnn succooilen Li nub:mnnt

Smith 'lS pbt onn leo.r.er nf tho 72d Trmk R'1ttn lion . Li.,utonnnt

Mnroton 1 s opinion of tho j eep is not a. fo.vnr o.ble ~nc . He claims

th11t tho v ehicle is t no r on.n-- bounc'! ., He commented, "My cpini ons

w0r e crent od in ::in o.r cn where the r e we r e rice pnrlc:ys and n P r ond-s.

-
Po ssibly tho 1/4-ton would be bett6r in un urea. with ~0od rond ne ts.

-
lil•weve r, n 0 1/4-ton w0ulrl be as s i:.tisfuct nry us a. full-- tr11.cke rl. v ehi­
­

cle . " He furthe r emphasized tho.t the j eep is vulne r able t o mines .

H0 insis t ed thn.t a.11 th e v ehicle s in the r c c00no.issance phtnon

sh0ulrl h 'lvc e qua.l mobility. AS it is , the j eep must be d iverted

fr om thn c o-:mn0n r r,uta of o.ovf.lD.ce in the r o c nnnuissnnce pl nt oon t eo.m

in mounted o.cti0n .

1st Lt Billy D Hu r:;hf' s, r e c onn nissance pl ut nnn l ea.tier 0f the

73rl Hoo.vy Tn.nk Bntt:1.linn in K0r,,n., s ::-.i c1 , "Yc u ve ry se l ~0m lmnw when

ynu o.r c rn in ~ to hit the 0nemy ~nf his first burst cun ruin y0ur

scout snction." In his ex p<:ri once Li eu tenont Hughes stctec. th ut

his sctJut scotinn r ismounterl very s0loor.1 fr om its vehicles .

Gonero.lly sp e kin g , o.s br c u ~ht out in the quc stionno.irc s

fillerl out und by inte rvi ews with c nmb •i.t expe ri onccd r e c onno.iss nnce

pl a.t n0n l eo.rlors of t onk bo.tto.li nns in the Korea. war , the use of the

p l nt oon varied dir~ctly with the type o.cti on. In the poriMcter de­­

f onsc suoh as existed o.t PUSAN - MASliN durinr, tho surrmer of 1950,

75
the empl oym:.mt of tho r e conna.issnnce p l "lt oon nccentcct r n uto r ccon­—

nnissonce . -
Tho l/4-ton truck wo.s o.dc quo.to , thnu~h o. few wore l ost

t o Minos o.n(l sm-:i. 11 a r ms fire . This type cif n.ctinn , h owev e r , wo.s ex­­

-
po rienco,1 by n.11 c omb;it units m0unted in 1/4-ton trucks . In the m,r

offense fr om September - November 1950, the j eep wa.s usod us a ~ui do

v e hicle , v e ry s o l rlom l o ft tho prntc ctinn of tn.nks, ::-.n il was n <- t n s e r ~

­

i ous hm1<1icnp boco.usc of its snr1ll a rms fire vuln0 r c.bility a.nil l o.ck

of mnbi lity.

In tho Chino s e Cn!ll1l1Unist Fnrce s intervention phase nnr. the

UN withclrnwr,l, tho j eep wa.s n 0 t us ed in the forwa r d o.reo.s bec•1uso of

its l nck n f ru-mor pr ot e ction .

In Jrumo.ry 1951, whe n the UN c r. un t o r-- offensive st o.rted nnc1

heavy r o c onnnissruico wo.s in or der , then j eops of tho r o c onno.issance

p l 1 t onn would intonti0no.lly bo l e ft in th o r e ar . · rt wa.s r eo.liz od

tha.t it W'l.s f 01ly t o ::vlvmico int o tho ext ensive rof cnsi ve positions

" f the Chino so in a j ee P•

Roconna.issnnce Com~ony , Infantry Division

Pe rs onne l , oqui pmont, a n c1 tr ~i nin;-; . Re c onno.issnnco c nm­-

p:mi o s o f tho infantry divisi r n which <''..)·1r nt cd and a.r e n e w opera.ting

in Kor en wore or e:nniz()f mrl c qui pPod in o.cc ordnnco with r/o&E 7 - 57 N.

Tho lir;ht t ank used was the M- 24. Tho armo r ed per sonnc 1 c nrr i or

used wu s tho M- 39 . B0th 3/4--t on trucks nnr. 2-- 1/2-ton

- trucks wer e

use<l in lieu of t ho M-~39 when the l atte r wa s unuv o.il ab l o . Tho 25th

Rco onnu issance Comp~ni h nd three add ition a l t a.nks o.ttached t o it .

The s e wer e light tonks and we r e a cdoc1 , ono each , t o the three line

p L i.t oons • Tho 7th Rc c onna.issnnco Com rui. mn<lo tho INCHON invo.si on

with medium tonks in lie u of the li r·:ht t nnk, H- 24.

74
 Replacement trainin ~ was rlnno o.t the plo.toon lcvol . Usuo.lly

r epl acements would be r ece ived in lnr~e lots . Rather than hold them

in c0mpany headquarters, it was policy to "give them n home" in tho

pl atoons as quickly as poss i ble. This wnuld mix the ol d men with

tho now and would mnke for bette r c ontrol . Training was directe<l by

division whenever the compnny wo.s r e lieved from a mission in excess

of 24 hours. The gr nvest tro.ininf. mission wo.s tho.t of mGnto.l condi­­

ti0ning. Usually r eplacements would be proficient in the use of in­­

nividuo.l weapons but they would not hn.ve the sor fousness onrl pr ofes ­-

sional euso r,f tho veteran r e quired in the norvo --wro.cking work o.f

o.rmorod rec onnaissance.

Because of the almost c ontinu ou s oper ation of reconnaissance

c ompani e s, tr ~ining wo.s cnlculatod riGht o.lor.g with rest and mo.inten­­

o.nce . It became the policy in the 25th Roconno.issnnoe Company to

keep , whenever possible , one plo.toon in o. r eserve co.po.city f or this

purpose . The sequence of operati on ''rest" wo.s, first, mo.intenunce,

then messin~ o.nd r est, then tr o.ininr,. The tro.inin~ would be in wen-­

?Ons f or the most port. During Februo.ry 1951, one of the three pla­­

t oons wo.s l e ft off the line for this purpose when possible. It tnok

until 25 Februo.ry to ~ive the entire c ompnny n cay 0r two of r e st,

but this was fina lly accomplished .

Operations. O?ero.tinns of the r e connaissance compani e s gen-­

cro.lly fnll int o defensive nr:e rutinns ond offensive operntions. -------_J

Service with the r e c onno.issona,e crmp::i.ny fi e-htinr; in the

offense in Korea was particul arly so.tisfyinr t o the uvero.ge American

solcier . Thero was n iveat latitude of action afforded the se parate

c ompany. This freed om of action socmod to extend clear cown t o the

15
squo.d l e ve l . Incl :ivirluo.l initia.tivo wo.s dis plnycd o.t its be st .

Usuo.lly tho 25th Divisi on in tho offense o.ssii:;ncd its r e c onno.is­-

snnoo c nmpnny the indopcn dont missi nn of orot~otin~ n rlivisi on flank.

The t c ohniquo uscrl fro m the c ompany c 0nmnnrcr's stnnf.po int w.is flex ­

i bl e . First , -. plan wo.s rlov c l opo d bnscd on the f.ivisi on orde r .

Mo.p r c conno.issnnce pr ovidc<l the basis . Che ckpoints we r e p l ottorl in

the n r on 0f r e s ponsib ility o.s o. means nf c ontr 0l . Tho or~or would

be v o rb:i l t o the pl ~t oon l eo.rlo rs. This orr.o r woulc' doo.l primnrily

with the missi"D, the othe r o,sscntin l s beinr stun do.rd oper ntinr; pr 0-

c cdure . The c 0mpr..ny W" ulc. :-cn c r -.lly move in c olunn in Kor eo. booouso

of limited r onrls ::md n o cr oss 00untry pot e nt i n 1 . Tho l oa.rl pl o.t oon,

s ometime s r e inforced with o.11 su pnort squo.ds , would t o.kc the initio.1

nb j e ctive ; them the r tho r pl nt onns w" uld "lcnpfr o;" t "l t n ke succed­-

in ~ ob j e ctive s . Depth wo uld be obtnincrl by rlr oppin~ off sc 0 ut squo.d s

on important t or r o.in f cnturc s , keopinr, c omnunico.tinns c ontnot with

them ~t o.11 time s . The compnny tr nv o llc d in five mnrch units , the se

being the thr ee pl :it ocms , tho c nmnKmd r-;r riu p , o.n,, the tr uins . The

c cmmnnd g r ou p c 1r.sisted of c omr rmy h co.rqunrto r s . The tra ins con ­

sister of tho ndminist r o.tivc , me ss , o.nd su pply s c ctims. This type

of opor a.ti r,n w0ul~ DPli'l"l.l ly bo initi::l.toc n.t cfo.wn onr! woulcl en r! l ut e

in the o.ftc m crm , <~epcndin r, 1'n the situati on . ­

By <'r..rkne ss tho c 0m­

-
p::my wr ulr be o st nblishcd in n. perim0tor-typo c1ofcnsc . The de sirabl e

l oc·1.ti0n w,ulr1 pr r-vi c'!c mnxirrum fic-ltis of fir e o.nr ots c rv::i.t i ,.,n nt the

e x pnnso of c r,vc r onc1 c nnco::.l m( nt . This vi0 l 'lti0n of t c chniqu0 in

the ni ~ht position r e sulte d fr om the f nv orit o t nctic nf th~ Chine s e ,

The l o.rrcst nttuok wus 0x perionccd 26 N~vembor 1950 o.t UNSAN,

76
North Korea.. As u pa.rt of T:::tsk Force Wi lscm , the 25th Rec onnn issnnce

Compnny wo.s surr ounrlod by nn c sti•~nt e d r e inforce d bntta.lion of Chine s e

Cmmmm.ist Force s . .Muny brn.vo men wer e l nst in this b utt l e .

j eeps we r e l ost bcc nuse of the ir inc.bility t o withstnna tho e ffe cts -
Many

~
0f smo.11-urms fire o.w~ mort o.r fir e .

Thor c nfte r, Cn.p t a.in So.mue 1 R Mc.rtin, wh o w::ts pl c.t or,n l ender ,

ex :.;cutivc offic e r, nnd comp'l.Ily c ommander of' 25th Ro c onn::iissc.nce C0m­­

pany, e stnblishe d tho pr 0cedurc r-f "dry runninr, " the c ompnny in its

de ffonsivo ni P,ht positi ons . Be f or e any thnu:;ht wa s give n t o the lux­-

uries of f eed ing or r e st, n ll p l o.t oons w0uld be thor 0ughly che cked

and assi giod thoir r es pecti v o s ect ors of' fir e au.rin g the nii:;ht. This

pr ocedure pr oved its worth nn mnny occu ssions.

Durin g the Chine s e intc rventi cn pha s e , UN nrmie s h e l d a ir

supr oma.cy ; the r c f'or c , nnrma.l bl ack out W f'..S r e l nxed f or this r oas on

onrl o.ls n bec ause o f tho cxtr omc ly trcn.chc r ous r nuc1.s . One mnrning

in J a.nua.ry 1951, the oompnny h o.c~ the miss i "n of fillin g in the e;c.p

bet ween the 25th Divis i nn nnr the 1st cav a lry Division . Bl ackout

dri vinr, wa s inten rled . Hrwove r, the l end pl nt oon , c ommo.n rlecl by 1st

Lt Willia.m Ila'ft"• SU(~r,en l y st nppe:d . (Lie utonnnt Hnn-'s j eep h c.r' v"'rrcd

su<lc:only n.nc' ove rturnen , t ho r e sult 0f pnor r 0ric1 s one' l u ck of visi -­

b ility. ) Ta.ctic nl con r iti ons permittinr,, the r eaft e r, when in

o.11 drive r s we r e instructcc t o turn t he ir lir,hts on.

Ch 29 July 1950, the 16th Rocon no.issnnce Company 0f tho 1st

-
---
C:iv o.lry Divisi ->n w..s or rer orl t n n.tta ck tho tr-wn of CHIRYE in s ~uth

Kor ea. Cnmmnnded by Capt a in Harve y, th~ compnny, r o inforcea with

s 0mc South Kor ocm tre ops , ente r on. tho t r•wn ::mr~ succe ssfully n.ttuckod

nnr. dc str 0yod n sma.11 Nnrth Kor e ,n h o l c' in;; f'orco . The North Korcnns .,

77
 -
h owe ve r, c ounte r-ntt~cked fr om the hi gh ~r 0unn surr nunr. inr, the

village, utilizing o.ut omntic fire onr. mortars. Cn sun ltie s were s e •

ve r e a.nr1. inclu ,~crl Co.pt a.in Harve y. Tho j eeps we r e a.bonron ed, us ~­-

l e ss, 'o.fte r be inr k:nt, ckc c. nut by sma.11 nrms fir e . The unit with-­

r.r~w aft er t e n o.ci ous fi ghtin~, getting out 0f the r oo.n.bl ock with

tanks anrl the armor ed pe rs onne l carrie r s .

Majo r Gene r a l H0bnrt R Gny, commo.ndin,; *gen er a l, 1st Cnv o.lry

Divisi on , f or 8 months in K~r co. , in answer t o the que stionna ire s ent

by this c ommittcf1 , s nys thnt tho j eep is an unsntisfo.ct ory v e hicle

11
fr om which t o fi ~ht. Ho comme nts , A ve ry mobile ctnr dopcn rla.blo

vehicle -—— but a ff or d s no nr nt oction ond in n o wo.y can ho c onsir.or od

o. suitable v e hicle fr om which t 0 fi r,ht. 11 Tho Gene r o.l !DSW8ren in tho

-
affirmative whe n a sked if he beliov on. thnt the 1/4-tnn truck in the

sc0ut se cti on of the r e connaissance c omrnny shr ulr be r cp l nccrl by a

~
now lir,htly-nrmor erl ve hicle . Ho o. ls o be lieve s th o.t the support squn d
..,
sh r ulo b e mr unted in on a rmor ed vehicle .

On 18 J anua ry 1951 tho 3d Rec onn cissnnce Compnny, on divi­­

sion or der, r e connoite r ed n0 rth in S outh Kor ea t o inclu(1 C the t own

- .
of KUNJANGJ1lNG-NI The unit b o;CU.."10 cmgo.r;cd in n f ight with e leme nts

of a r o liof butte.li on 0f Chi ne s e which i n filtr o.t ec. int 0 the 'It.own

from tho hi ~p hills surr0undin ~ it. The onomy fc str oy ed s ev en

-
1/4-ton -
trucks , throe 1/4-ton trnilors. o.nc1 two 8 1.n:un mortars. The

3d Rc c onno.iss onco Company inflicted sev e r e c nsuo.lti e s on the onemy.

Howeve r, this e xamp le i llustr o.t e s the maj or dif.ficul ty onc0untc r ed

with the "thin s kinne rs" of the pr e sent or gnnizo.tir n of a.rmnr cr. r c ­

c onno.issance .

In April 1951> the 3 d Roc onnuissonce Compnny r cc ommc n rlod o.

78
chnn~e in the T/O&E 0f tho rec onn~issunce pl ntoon, su~;e stin~ three

light t:mks inste:..rl nf two. In tho r oconnnonrlut i on , the f ollowing

wn.s sto.t ed:

In most instc.ncos tho r ec onnuisso.nce ncti0n cxporie ncor by

rcconnuissoncc compani es in Kor en. hn.s been heavy. The 1/4-~t on
j eep i s n ot pructicn.l in this action nnrl must be l ~ft behind in
protected nrous or in l oct1.tions whe r e it ccn obtain c ove r . Il­­
lustr ~tin~ this nre the 3rl Reocnnuissonce Cnmpnny' s fii uros on
-
vehicles l ost rluo t 0 enemy action , M- 24 tonks , one ; 1/4-ton
j eeps , t on . It is ossentin l thut the fire power in r e c onnnis­­
snncc c ompany be both mobile end ~rmor pr ot ected.

Defensive oper ations r.o n ot npproci nb ly chnngc the rcnerul

opo ro.ting t ochniquc r f the r c,c,,nnn.issance c omplUly. Its r ol e sti 11
is thut <.'f security. / / \
Fr om 27 November 1951 until 5 Junut\ry 1951, the 25th Recon­­

n nissmicc Cr.mpnny wns o.lmost c ontinuously nttnchc'1 t o the c overing

-
f prcc of the 25th Infantry Division. This f orce wr.s the 27th Roi;i -­

ment:i.l Comb::i.t Te::un, c ornmon<:e1~ by Brigllrli or Gener a l i10.chaelis . Tho

89th Mcrlium T::tnk Bo.ttn.lion, which wus ntto.chod t o the 27th Infontry

Ror,imcnt, normn.lly oontrollcd tho 25th Reconnaissance Compmy in

this typo Ppc r atirn . The 89th wn.s c ommnnf'.'ed by Colrncl Wel born G

Dolvin.

Durinr-; this type missic-n ( pr nvi r'inc; security f vr the c0ver­­

inc f orce), the 1/4-- t ,ns were mc,rc "in the wuy" thc..n offootivo o.s

fil'"htin--; vehicles. In November 1950 the 25th Reconnaissance had

t en M- 24 tunks o.nrl -
twcnt~six jeeps. Durinr the ne xt three months ,

o.p.:_:>roximntc ly t en j eeps w9r 0~ l ost t o enemy o.cti C'n , c rmpr.ir crl t r one

M--24 trmk . Tho gr cut0st l oss in 0n 0 ~cti on occurred on 5 Jnnuc:.ry

1951 ·.i.t SEOUL. The 25th Rcc onnf\issnnco Company wn.s f' r r.orcrl t n rlc ­

f onn SEOUL while the 89th Tank Batt o.li on o.ni~ tho 27th Infantry
Re giment t "ok u p 1, l ockin~ ?Ositir,ns in lino with tho 29th British

Brir,o.do . Two pl ct 0ons we r e s e nt nut, on e t o the we st t o tie in with

the British. This, the 1st Plnt ncm, wa.s ooll?!lnn,._cr. by C!"\ptoin Samuel

R Martin . Tho 2c Pl ~t o0n wo.s s e nt n orth nn tho KAESONG r n,'lc~ an rl W,'ls

c nr.mo.n.-lcr. b y 1st Lt Willi'llll Ho.rr. Tho thiri' wo.s n r c~c r cc committe d

nt 0430 the ne xt morninr; 'l1'l the r o•id t o ILSANI t 0 c 0nt•,ct the en emy

which wo.s on ;':,'t ?inr; tho 1st Bnttu li on ., 27th Infontry Rog imont. 1st

Lt Arthur F LClFr.nrl mov e r. this p l -i.t 0on in c 0lul!Dl, his sc " ut s c cti on

l o o.dinr,. This W'ls a very difficult 0p.1r ati"n , o.s it proclude r. dis­­

mnunto~ r c c r.nnnissnncc , since the entire city wo.s brimmin~ over with

fri~ht enoc1 r o fu,,ccs nT!l<'ni:, whom mi r;ht h ~vc boon o nc my. The only c on­­

clusive t e st or pr onf wo.s -i.ctu~l firin , . Tnwcrd s the cutskirts of

SEOUL, Li-,uti"ln"lnt LQF•1nc n 0ticcd u r crl fl::tp- on t np of o. hill t o his

rip;ht fr ont. Tho fl8€; su~nonly r.r nppod t o the rr•"'Und nn<l il'llllc0 iutc ly

his plntnon W '\S -

hit by r'ev c.st ctinr; cr "ss-!'irc of a ut0ma.tic woo.pons,

firin,' fr om h r-use s on ½nth si i:os ,., f tht: r oo.cl . Ho quickly withr1r cw

his tank s e cti on nn"' 0:,0noc1 U i3 f'Il tho h 0uso s, killin ;; sc o r e s of the

snJ::tkin r; Com.'llUllists. -
Ifowevc r, the cr 0ss-firc h a.d tnkcn a t oll of

six j cops, two tr :7.ilo rs, an<: 0 n e 8lmn mo rtor . The men wh o survived

fled t o the, hir.h r r nu:nrl , fi ,,.htinr ,1 is'"1" untc,~. His pl --..t 0rn was then

~r nor o~ t o pull bnck t ~ the c r ~pnny, o.s tho entire r o~imcnt wa s

withc!r awinf t " th 0 othe r si ~o ---f t ho H-m Rive r nn~ tho r c c onnc.is­­

snncc c nmpr..ny h nr. c o mpl ot or its mi ssi 0 n in SEOUL. Roc nve ry of

the l ost ve hicle s c nulr~ h nvo ~,cen <: ff<.ctoc'I h o.cl the r e boon ti.r:10;

hnweve r, l n.ck ,· f time nnd thr r1 i vis i on plnn pr ov ontcrl this .

­
The f oolinl" th::i. t the j eer, is ino.rlequtc f 0r an -u-mor c~ r o c0n­

n niss.m cc miit is nr-. r,,cd u p:m by the m:::.j 0 rity " f office rs nor

80
enlisted men wh o h o.ve been in c omb·1.t wi_:!;h one of the se uni~ s in

Kor ea. The answers to this oomni ttoo • :s quosti onnf.l.ire c.r e inrlic~tive

of this, c. s wer e thnse t c the que stionn~irc put out by AFF Obse rver

Te o.m Nr 5 , June - July 1951, which nskei:1. r c connuissnncc c nmpany

commn.n~ors un~ r cc onn::iissonoe pl nt oon loaners tho f oll nwing:

QUESTION 4: Is tho rec onnuissnncc pl o.t oon nr r,unizcn nn <l

e qui pped t o perform the ~issi on o.ssiqie<l t o it in Kor ea~

ANSWER: Yes , with two e xcepti ons: (1) A full- - tr ::tckod

nrm0r e<l scrmt vehicle is (1e sirn<l . (2) Sup;:--nr t squo.r shoulr1
-
be mountc~ in ful l tra ck~<l v ehicle s simi l a r t o tho M-39 with
pr ovisi ons ma.to f or firing the mort ar fr an that vehicle .

QUESTION 5: Docs a r e quirement exist f or o. li ~ht full

t r ack r c c onnn.i ssmicc vehicle ?

AN~NER: Ye s, r e c onnm.ssnnce pe rs onnel be lieve tho.t o.

vehicle si~il ~r t o the British Br en Gun Cur r i e r c nulct be
e ffoctivflY utilized in tho scr ut secti on of r c c nnno.isso.ncc
pl o.t 0on .

Some c omments in r eply t o t his Co!Tl!Tlittee 1 s quo stionn~ire

nre i:;iven be l ow.

Capt a in J e ffe rs on de R Cupps, f or merly of tho 24th Re con --

En emy fire is n or mc.lly r c c c i vorl b y the l e~f vehicle which

is usua lly a sc out j eep. Th or o we r e time s when the c ompany h nc
t o c~ rivo thrr u ,71 on emy fir e t o oxtric:,t c itse lf fr o!'!I p0 sitions
which wor e unten ubl e -—~ the j eeps wer e very susceptibl e t o
t his fir e .

Capt a in Capps f ee ls thn.t nll combat 1/4--t on trucks shoul n

be r opl nccd by n v ehicle simil nr t o the Br en Gun Currier.

1st Lt Berno.rd L Keye s , 7th Roc onno.issnnce Compu.ny, s n i d

that the j eep c 0ntributed t on l uck ~r nr,r~ c ssivcn e ss in his scout

s ectinn bee n.use it h o.ti n o n.r mor pr 0t o cti on . He c or.:rnonted , 11

Mon

wi 11 n ot st n.y with the v ehicle ~n fir e tho m'l.chinc vun. " I

M/S ct Kenneth E Tr :iinhnm, f'ormer 1st se;t one'. p l at oon s et,

81
7th Reconnaissance Company iµ Korea, in addition to sayin~ that the

jeep was an unsatisfactory vehicle in reconnaissance platoons, said,

"It doesn't have enou,;h power to pull itself acr oss country when

loaded. "

Major Robert Hutchins, who was S-~4, 70th Medium Tank Batto.l­­

ion, co!ll!Tlented:

It is my opinion that jeeps are no good in "no-~man ' s-land"

Too many are abandoned and left
tured by the enemy because of a
or mortar, A little protection
r,ood ~en and vehicles .
- .
to be hit or destroyed or cap­-
few rounds or small arms fire
would be a trememdous sav.ing in

1st Lt Horace S i"lhitfield, Company B , 89th Medium Tank

Batto.lion, in commentin~ on the com.~ittee ' s idea of roplo.cin~ the '\

jeep with a. new lir,htly armored vehicle, said :

There is a definite need for this (new) vehicle . 1r1e should

not have "horse anrl bu;~gy" scout vehicles when we a.re developini:;
so rrio.ny new vehicles in the reconnaissance pl':1.toon.

Brihadier General Venna.rd Wi lson, former ussistnnt division

commander, 25th Infantry Division in Korea, commented us follows:

a . Throw;hout this questionnaire, it is implied that a more

efficient, o.~~r essive and hi ~her mor~le unit can be produced by
-
oroviding an over -weir.hted , slur,r-ish , ar~or--protected 1/4--ton
truck, co.pub le of en?lll?ini; in o. fire fi ght . A reconnaissance
unit does not depend on a singl e vehicle. It is composed of a
number of different tyres .

b . ~e had one of the worla 1 s finest vehicle s in the old

je ep. ne now h:>..ve o. new one, with two batteries o.n0 waterpr ol)f­­
in s • Althou~h some of its r efinements are r,ooc , the r e is no need
for the r,rcat mo.jority of improvements. It is cefinitely mor e
sluggish and complicated. We a.re fixinr, up 100% of the vehicles
to rooet the need of 2% of our ope r a tions . It is a foolish waste
of money.

c. No one v ehicle can do the work of the platoon. The

li~t tank is the best fightin~ vehicle . The very li(;ht jeep
is the best sc outin~ o.nc'! li1;ht transport vehi clo -— it shoulrl
not be converted to u h a lf- - bo.k:ed fi r;htin ': vehicle . The M--39
pers onne 1 co.rrier is o. fine vehicle to move o. squad of mon •

82
 but is subje ct to mecho.nico.l f o.ilurc — o. 2- 1/2-
- -ton truok is o.
e;ood substitute. Either the j eop or the 3/4- -ton truck is suit­-
ab l e f or th0 fir o sup:,o rt pl c iront.

d. Ylhen thP. above r,r ouping of vehicles works o.s a. t orun, it

c 3n ~o anywhe r e . It is not nece ssary t o wate r proof eve ry vehi­­
cl e -—— tho tanks will r;et thr. other s throu;i;h . If you cannot
cr oss your to.nks , there is n ot '!TIUch uso in ho.ving j eeps th:::i.t can
~o under wo.ter.

c . Thr our;hout this que stionno.iro, there is tho implio o.t ion
tho.t th~r o is a ~r c:::i.t distinction between tho sc outing c l o?nCnt ,
tho ~ismountod r ifle squad , nnd tho fire sup~ort c l e ment . Tho
ta.nkors usuo.l l y r e mai n with tho tanks . Tho other s o.rc a l l dis­­
mounte d mombcr s of the pl atoon , ond h ave t o t o.ke the ir turns at
all types of missions . A pl o.t oon is divisib l e int o two s e cti ons ,

7
but shoulc not be O()nsi der e d a.s bein- divisible into smo.lle r
gr oupings .

Discussi on
The r e is n o doubt tha.t the best r ooonna.issnnce is done dis-—

It ccr t o.inly i s not the our po se of this committee t o im-

~ly tha.t sc0ut crews should habitua lly r 3mo.in i n the i r vehicle s .

It is evident , howovor , th:::i.t t oo much cauti on c o.use s l oss of vo.lu­­

au l e time , while t oo little o~uti on co.use s unne ooss o.17-,voste il:l

li vc s ::mrl vnluo.bl e c qui pm0nt . Che s oluti on t o tho pr obl e m is t o

l eave the 1/4-- t ons bohi n ii und t o t rike f orwo.rn only tho tanks and

t ho per sonne l C'1I'riors . It is bclicvca tho.t :i much bettor s olution

- tro.cked a.r­-
w0ul d bo t o f!;ive tho r e oonnai s so.n oc pl at oon f our f ull-

mr r ed vehicle s ( possH ly simi b.r t o the Bren f~un onrric r) t o r c­-

pl nce tho j oops . - mOJl support

Tho pl o.t oon ooul~ then motmt the fivc-

- .
sqund o.nd 81mm mortar in nn M-39 Hnd such cho.nr.es boon mndc in

re oonnaiaannce units in Kor ea, much of the i r l oss of vehicles t o

enemy noti on c ould hnvo beon pr cv 0ntod fill~ pl nt oons c oul rl hnve boon

kc?t intnct .

The frimo.ry mission of r e c onnni s scnce uni ts is r e cogniz ed ~ ~

83
~
now, mor e tho.n ever , a s he in f!; one of se ouri ty. When J~ajor Gene r o.l

J oseph Br ndl cy joined the 25th Ini'antry Division ut CHON.AN in Jnn­­

uv.ry 1951, ono of his early ins pections of units was that of the

division's r econnniss:m ce oompo.ny. This unit wns r eorgroiizin ~ its

entir e 3d pl at oon, which hue been r c~uced to n othin~ but the bullet­-

rirlrlen ta.rllcs of tho tank s ection rlurin~ the act i on ut SEOUL on the

5th of Jnnunry. The men we r e wnrkinf~ furi ously, 24--h nurs ur0unil

the clock, r,etting the pl nt onn buck in shape . The Gener a l r omnrked,

"It's n nice outfi t (the r e connnissanco c nmpnny), but still n

little t oo •thin skinned ' t o d" the j oh."

Tho ma j ority of r oc onnniss::mcc men a,:;rce thnt r eoonnnis-­

snnce units need sufficient armor pr ot e cti on t 0 r educe the l oss

s ol di e r s wh o hnve l enr ned that se curity is somnthinr which must b —

fO\.l~ht for.

NOTES FOR CHAPI'ER 6

1 Ro~ort Army Field Forces Obscr v~tion Team Nr 5, June -
July 1951, n r eport prepared by Army Fie ld Fo rce s (Fort Monr oe ,
Virgini a , 1951), Annex 4Al, Qu,~sti0ns 4 nnd 5.

84
 CfilPl'E~ 7

DESIRABLE .AND PRACTICAL LIGHT RECCIJNAISSANCE VEHICLE

As has boon pointed out in pre ce ding chapte rs, the j eep is

in many wo.ys uns o.tisfa.ctory a s a. r e c onno.issnnce ve hicle . Primarily,

- ountry mob ility, unrl armor pr ot e ction.

it lucks cr oss-c Who.t sho.11 v,e

do ? Wh at do we wo.nt? Wh a.t SJ11:11l r e conna issance v e hicle s h ave been

built? How good nrc the y? ­

And finally, wha t a.re the practical con­

sidora.tions o.nd tho possibility of US r e c onno.issance units gettin~

a. good -vehicle f or tho sc out ,md su p~ort squo.rls, This cho.pt er will

discuss vari ous v ehicle s that h o.vo boon b uilt. Char a cte ristics of

a new r econna issance vehicle will be pr e s (~nte r.. The p ossib ility of

i:;ettin.c; this ve hicle ond vari ous j_)r o.ctica.l c nnsirera.ti ons will b e

d iscussed .

Na tive o.nd For e i pn Deve l opments

A number of diffe r ent v ehicle s h ave been pr od uced in the

wei •1it and size suita ble f or use by the sc out t:Uld support squads of

r e c onna issance unit. The f oll owinr. is o. ~iscussion of the suit a­­

bility of s eve ral 0f these (f or a. c ompariscn of cho.r o.cte ristics of

tho s e v e hicle , s ee Appcnc ix III).

- on , 4 x 4, M38.
Truck, Utility., 1/ 4--t The j cop (fi~ 6) is

the pr e se nt st ond ard vehicle f or r e c onnuissnnoc tm.its. This v ehicle

is quiot ond h a s suffici ent r rurn;c. 'Ihc j eo~ is a.mall but will 11cc om­­

modut e an ndc qua.t o cre w. The j eep r e quire s little mainte n ance , is

-
n r o l,o.tivo ly l ov,-cost ­
vehicle , an~ pr or1uoti on f aciliti e s a r e :iv nil­

-
ub l o .1 This v chiclG, h 0wcvc r, is rletioic nt in r,r mor ruid cr oss-country

mobility. Tho pertestu l m0unt f 0r the m..~chine ~un is uns ntisfo.ot ory.

Stor nec s p'"lce is limit er' , Mrl a tri l c r must be used f or tho support
85
squad vehicle. This results in an oven r r eater r ecucti on in mobility.

­
The re port nf the Army Equipment Board, 1950, states n re­

quirement for nn nrmnred jeep:

There is n r equirement for u li~ht, wheeled, pnrtinl ly ar­­

mored truck bused on~ sta.nnurd 1/4-ton - truck chassis fnr use
by reconnnisso.nce elements and by commnnrtcrs, lio.isrn office rs,
and othe rs whose duties r equi r e them to be habitually motm t ed
in exposed vehicles . l',-ovisions shoulr be inclucer. for mount-
ing ::i. machine gun , a rar.in, an<~ for carryinl!'. n crew of' three m9n.2

-
Any nrmored body or ur mn r ;:irotoction kit on the 1/4-ton

truck chassis will result inn further ~ecrense in mobility.

The Tripnrtite C0nfer cnco 0n Armor and Bri d~inf, October

1951, stutcs tho.t:

A li~ht r econnnissnnce vehicle is r equir er . This vehicle

- on truck. Deve l opment on the
is, n.t present , the st r;,.nc.nr <l 1/1-t
nrmoro,~ 1/4. --ton truck h a.s not proven prnctic~blo :m<l hus teen
terminntofi.3

The f ollnwinz is u statement by Army Field Forces Bour d Nr 2

- c-n truck r e quirement:

conce rninri: the 1 /4 -t

As ori~inully oonoeivea, this vehicle wns to r epl n.ce tho

hnrso ::mr; tho motorcycle with siclecnr, t0 pr ovir~e cornmonr1ors
with hi :;hly np:ilo pcrs nnnl tro.nsporh1ti 0n capab l e of nccompony­
-
ing f0ot tro ops on off-the-r - oo.rl !llovornents. The vehicle provod
s o successful that au rini:,: nnr. a fter Wrrlr1 "./la.r II muny nrri tionnl
duties wor o nssie;nc~ it. As n r esult , the vehicle ho.s so ~rown
in size, wci:ht , unr' in re iuiron mw'.ificL:.tions th'"lt ngility nncl
outsta.nein~ perfor mance chnrncteristics h nvr. been c0mprnmiscr.. 4

For further fet ~ils, see A~pon~i.x III.

Tracked Jeep Mn.rk I. This vehicle (fi ~ 7) wa.s 'built in

1943 a.ncl 1944 by ~7illys--Ovc rlaw~ Motors , Inc. It wr-.s bui lt for

- - ­
the Co.ni:vliun 1:.nrl Rr i tish Ar:'!li as, tr pr0virlo o. sm'.111, full-truck-lny­

-
in ~, twn-mnn vehicle in the wei,:·ht cb.ss of thf-l j ocp , but possessing

-
the o/ldi ti onnl features of li~ht nrmnr, ir.ipr ove,, crnss-country per ­

-
f ormance, built-in rnrio cquipm•.:nt, '.l!lr: extr emely l ow silh0ue tto.

86
$ ' .

Fir;uro 6 . Truck, utility , 1A t-n , 4 :x 4 , l,!- 38.

87
. -
,;
Fi":Urc 7 . Tr n ckcd J eep

88
e ·
'
'
.I
This vehicle wns clesimod f or the f ollowin~ r ol e s;

1. ~-swopt a.rons and soft terr ain.

Inte rc ommunic~ti0n over hullet

2. Armed r e c onnn issonce.

3. Enf>o.r-ement of unnrmor eo tr oops.

4. Airborne oper ati ons unf1 other s pecinl opcr o.tions.

This ve hicle wns not pl a ced in pr oducti on, and the r e sults

of t e sts we r e not 0bt uine<l . ­

Tho tru ckon j eep inc o r c'.)0r •\t ed the stund­

-
nrd 60-horsopowor ­
j oop on g inc :.:md a.s muny othe r jeep parts as ? ra.c­

ticuble. One m0del ,-,f this v e hicle would flon t nnd c -.ul n he pr o­­

polled a.cr oss rivers by the tr uck.

This vehicle would surmount vertica l obst a cle s 0 f 22 inche s

-
nnd crnss trenche s 3-1/2 f eet wirle . Armor protecti ,.,n 0.1;0.inst srna.ll

u rms bull um.munitinn nt sh ort rnnre s ~d a.~ninst .303 inch s olid

O.!'!ll!IU.11iti0n ::i.t n r::m ,,:c of 250 ya.rris wa.s ;-r nvir1eci . ­

The grnuna pr e s­

sure wns 4.3 p.s.i; tho r an ~c , 200 milo s. 5

A r edos i r n of this vehicle c onsirlcring US r e connnisso.nco

dnctrino :.md inc r r r0r nt in;; the 1:J.t0st :::i.ut omotivo deve l 0pmonts mir;ht

'">r r vi ne o. hir:hly s o.tisfuct ory r e c onnai ssunce v ohicle . The m<H~ifi­-

6
c~tions mi ~ht incluce :

1. Pr r.visions f or a. three-- man crew with r ac1 i o.

2. -
Mrir e poi,w.;rful eni;ino , such ns tho 72 h. p., VJillys-Ove rlond ,

-
six-cylinc'l.cr, -
''F"-hoo.d cnci nc .

3. A trunsrnissi nn thu.t wnul rl. e n 'J.b l ,J the vehicle t n turn o r r und

within its own l cn r th, such ns the l'l'90 transmission.

4. -
A o ontinunus-bon~ tr Qok like tho.t 0f the h alf trnck, or on­

other impr ovec. track, r'esi ,"1led t o ;.>r ovirlc quie tnes s, rlc croas od weip.:ht ,

and l ow ~0tmd pressure •

89
 5 ~ Skn.t o-typo 0r oth er ,sui t r.blo mo.chine r:un m0unt t o r r cvi rle

3608 fir e .

Th e trnoke d j ee p woulrl. pr oviro on e xce llent r oc onnniss t.J1ce

ve hicle in m..'Uly r e s pects . It is que sti on ublc whothor r oom f or o.

t hr oo-- mo.n crow nn~ ndequa.te co.r~n s pa.co coul<l be attained with out

s a.crificin- tho pre se nt small size o.nc'l li$t woi r,ht . J.hinte nonc o

untl c ost would excoorl that of n whee l e d v ehicl e .

For furthe r dcto.ils , s ec Appen dix III .

- on , 4 x 4 , XM 195.
Truck, Li f ht Utility , 3/4-t This v e hi-­

-
cle (fi g 8) wns <lcsir n cc. t Cl r e place the M- 37, 3/4-tnn truck nn~ the

-
M- 38, 1/4-ton truck f or cor t a.in ov e rloarl o.ssif11ments . The 3/4 - ton

truck wo.s be li eved t ') h uve e xce ssive v0 lumctric carro c up~city in

~r n,orti0n t o its wci ~ht c nrryi nr, c upn.city. Army Fi e l d F0rce s

Bc -u-d Nr 2 lists tho f cllnwin, a s ~ f e w of tho cve rl onr. nssi ~nments

-
of the 1/1-ton truck for which tho XM 195 sh• ulc' m'\kc o. h i ghly s o.tis -

f a ct ory r epl '\cement: 7

1. Artille ry f nrward ob se rve r s ections.

2. Mo.intcnanco s e ctions .

3. Cormm.nror s' vehicle s which c a rry r ud i o s , pr ot ,)ctivo o.rmrunont,

and crews (nnt tho c orrmanc~--w•J o.pnns v ehicle ) .

4. Cl oso su p:,ort we n."ons .

s. A much rnnr o suitab l e chnssis f or li ",htly n.rrn<"-. roc UP.ht ve hi­­

olo kit applica tion .

6. Fr nnt line am~ulo.noo .

7. Prime movor f or a i r b orne antit ank p;uns .

-- The XM 195 is only slir;htly l 'l.r p;er thnn the 1/4 - t on truck ,

1'ut it nff or d s c0nsirlcr ::i.b le !"'lnr o r ooM f or cre w r.inr' oqui;-'J'llont . The

90
. \,,.... .....

Fi -;uro a. Truck, lir:ht utility , 3/4-- t cn , 4 x {. 1 _;,m 1 95.

91
I

l
:nobility of this ve hicle is su:xirir r t o th'lt of the j eep. 8

It is beliovoc thnt this ve hiclu . b e c nuso of its hiqi oowe r­—

wei;r)'tt r /).ti o , larr,e ti r e s. rmr sturdy c onstruction, would carry o.

li~ht ormo r kit much more s ntisfnct nrily thnn the j ~o p. This ve hi­­

cle nlso offers qui etne ss , specrl, ronrc , low mninteno.ncc , c..nd r e lo.­­

tivo ly l ovr c ost •.--

This v e hicle is pr esently bo in ~ t o stod by Army Fi <' l c Force s . ­-

For furth er rlot o.ils, s oe AIJponr.u III. -

Br en Gun Carrie r. l'ho vo rsi on of this vehicle th nt wo.s

-
stur i or' is lm0wn by the Conncio.n Army o.s tho Unive rs o.l C,1rrier, T-16

(fir, 9) . - Inte rviews with 1faj <'r G0r r1 1"1Il W Bruce , Jfc.jnr Cc· cil A ?t ills,

a.ncl Cnpto.in J 0hn S W:ilrlie , aJl of the C::tno.ilinn Army, inr1 icc..te thnt

t h is ve hicle is v e ry pn pUb.r nnr. is sim;_:,l o , r oli:ibl e , anr1 ine x pen ­

sive .- It nff0r d s pr o t e cti on 0.1;0.inst smc.11 -:.r:"ls nnr ­

exce ll ent cr0ss­

c ountry mobility. It h o.s a rruigo nf 160 mile s , but tho s peed is

9
"Illy 30 rn. o. h.

This vehicle is used f or 11 wido vnric ty of pur po se s . -• Tho se

use s inc lur.o : won.pons c nrr i 0r, C"mnllnr. ro.rli o vohi clo , pers onne l

currie r , fl ame t hr owe r, an r' fr r nt lino c a sua lty OV'lCU'lti <'n .- · -

The . 303 inch Bren i l.m c rm bo mounto<l in the fr ont ? lo.to

on,1 tho Br on r un or a . so c alibe r l!lll.chino r un oo.n bo n Nmted m a

pede sta l mnunt . Tho on r ino is p l o.c od in the r e nr ce nte r of the

v ehi c l e .- Tho rlrivo r nnr. c 0!Tl'lm1<'o r rirlo ­

in the fr onP of the vchi­

ol o o.n,:l f nur men can rinc in tho r 1.; cr, ti"o nn o:ich sire nf the

en ";inc .

Tho Br on Gun Carrie r h o.s "- v e ry l ow silh" uc ttc . The h eo.1s

nf tho po.ssan ~ers oxtonr ~bove tho arm nr r r ot octi" n while ririn~

92
lit -

Fir ur c 9 . Dr on Gun Currior

93
- '

l
..
,.
omnforto.bly, but provisions or o mo.,:ic f or d rivin ~ and firinF bohind

tho nrmor pr ot ootion .

Tho tro.ck is unso.tisfo.otc,ry f or r cconnnisso.noo purpose s o.s

it is quite noisy nn d is oft on thrown .

Mo.ny man , in comments on tho quostionno.iro , montic-ne rl tho

Bron Gtm Co.rrier o.s o. vehicle the y th~u ~)lt woul~ be o. good r oconno.is­

snnoo v ehic l o .

F or furthe r details , soe .apponrlix III .

FV 701. This vehicl e (fie 10) h c.s r e c e nt l y boon de sir ned

by tho British Army f or use '1.S o. scout oar. It wus f o\lllr t o be

hi ~hly so.tisfnct ory with the principa l exce ption of the tur r e t which

will to r cdos irne<l.

Tho FV 701 is nrmerl with o. . 303 inch Bren machine e;un with

360° tr a.verso , 47° o l ov'lti on , and 12° dopr cssi nn . The o.rmc-r r r c ­

t e cts a.;o.inst smo.11 urms fire to include f r ontal o.tto.ck by· . so

c a l i ber fJ' o.t 250 yarns . Arnnr r,r oto cti0n rives c rmpl ot o imnnmity

—
fl- om rlruno.~e t ~ tho hull fl- 0m th•J o.tto.ck by n f our-pnund J'Tlino nnd

crow pr0tPcti0n o.i,;ninst the mv.x imum mine tho.t will nr,t over turn the

vehicle .

Tho vehicle ~r ovi r>es f or o. crow 0f two men. It h ~s a speed

of 60 ~ . p. h . nnr r-m ·c of 250 miles. It is c qui~ped with o. serni­­

o.ut omatic tr~smissinn with five spoods . Th e transfer r r r-vi dos

f or wo.rd o.n~ r everse . Tho t ostin;,; nrcnoy r o?ortod th·:tt this vehi c l e

h o.d surprisin,:,; Mobility for u wheeled ve hicl e nnd possoss od superior

10
r oo.r.ubility.

The FV 701 is cnmpo.rn.blc with the n• 195, 3/4-- t nn truck.

The y h~ve up~r oximut c ly tho s~mo en~inc power onr. ove r u l l f.in¥Jnsi on s .

94
Fir ure 10. British Sonut Cc.r, FV 701.

95
e ·
If tho X}t 195 wore e qui ppod with n li,;ht n.r mor kit, thoy wnul d ha v0

a.pp- r-.xim.-it c ly the s ~ s peorl , rnnr;e , unf porfcrm:mcc . Tho F'V 701

woul d be n. little hen.vi e r, but woul~ o ffer hotte r a rmor pr ct o ction.

'rhe XM 195 vmul<1 h nve more orvw nnc st0rn6e spa.co.

The Tripartite Ccnfere noo on Armor nn<l BriCginG, Oct ober

1951, reo onmonrfod tho.t the t1Un1 tcd Sto.tos unr C'.:Ulado. c C'nsidcr tho

FV 701 scout onr ns a pr' ssible solut i on t o thoir r equirement f or o.

li;jlt r oconno.issance vohiolo 11 • 11

For furth or de truls, soo A??Cndix In.

-
ArMororl Cnr I T-13. This v ehicle (fir 11) will be r e ferred

t n o.s tho tro.okless tr..nk. It w·,s b uilt anrl tested prirr t o ¥7"lrlc

-
Yfo.r II-. It is pr esently boini:; o" nsi <lo r eil by various nr;onoie s be ­­

c o.uso cf the qualities "If the suspcnsirn system.

­
The tr 'tckloss tunk is r.vmtiC'n'.Jd here bec ause nf its susrcn­

sinn system. -
The vehicle h a s f r•ur wheels 0n each sine·. The two

fr nnt whools nn co.ch si rlo steer r-.nrl the thr oe r ec..r whee ls on ea.ch

si<le r rivc. Tho ctrivin~ wheo ls nro chain driven. ­

This drive per­

mits the tr unsmissicn of powe r :il cn.~ tho sic'o "If tho hull instco.c

of rlr,wn the center . This _;;rC'vi,~cs incroc.sc<l r norn Mrl low silhouette·.

The r eport of test of t his vehicle stntec that this vehicle

had sp0cd u~ to 80 :n.j~. h ., obst acl e oressin,- a.bility superirr t 0 tho

lirht t nnk, ..md the abi lity t 0 ne~ntio.tc r 0u ,•h torro.in nt twice the

spood nf the li :-r.ht tmik.

The sus~nsi~n systeM C'f the trnckl css t::ink: r e quires s C"J!lle

impr nv emont-. In pr ovomonts n re needed in stcerinr 1.mro r oertnin c 0n­

12
r'i ti0ns rm~ in muc1 I:l()hility.

It i s bo liovcrl th·,t o. susronsi , n system of this typo oo o.

96
J' .....

Firurc 11• . Trackle ss Tc.nk

g·:
•
•
small o.tmot orl r c c onnnissnnco v e hicle mir ht pr ovirc tho nr.vanta r os
of both wheels nnr. trucks. Such n sus j10nsi0n mi~ht ~rnvice s ;:ood,

rnngo , quie tne ss , o.nf sufficie nt mrbilit,y.

-
Utility Ve hicle , Tr .,cke r.., Infc.ntry , T-55. This vohiolo

(fir, 12) is mo of o. frunily of v ehicle s pre s ently b oinr <leve l opoc .

The s e ve hicle s ~r o kn')wn n.s · "Ontns" vehicles onr ire rlivirlef into

two ~on c r n l r,r nups:

1. Info.ntry onrric r type vehicle t n. c"..r ry six t o t on J11Jn or

v urious infuntry woc,pnns with ne c ossi.ry crews .

-2. Infantry o.ss : ult typv vehicle ., an assa ult ve hicle l!l')unting

-
one t o ei$t b ntto.li ,•n llllti-tank wco.pnns .

The s e v e hicle s ::u-e ox ~ ctoc. t o h o.ve the f o llowinr, cho.r n.cte r­­

istics:

l. Low c 4'st.

2. Uobilit-y. Suporhr mrbility ruir1 n r;ility. Gr om,.d p ressure

n r t t o excoerl 4 ~ . s.i.

3. Low we i r:ht. To t o.l woi r-ht n ot t o e xceed 12,000 11:-s .

4. Suspcnsi on. Full tr~ck.

5. Cruiain~ R!lll~o . Mininurn, 150 mile s .

6. Spec<l . M::-.xiMum, 35 m. ~.h.; susb'-incd , 25 m. " . h.

7. Ar m ,r • At l onst 1/2 inch.

-
The T-55 c,.rric s o. r1rive r nnr" fi vc rifle!OOn¼ 3 This ve hicle

or o. s li,htly diffe r e nt v e rsi0n mi ,~ht r r ovi r.o an e xce lle nt vehicle

f or the r e c r-nno.issonce pl at oon .

For furthe r ~ct o.ils, s oc APi::Cn GiX III.

Milito.ry Ch:ir o.ctc ristics

An i r.ocil r e oonnn.iss:mce v c hiclo shoul rl bo a ve hicle which

98
is uscrl wide ly in s0roo f orm f or use s other tho.n r e c nnnaiss ,.m cc . It

sh1i uicl be s utisfabt nry f or uso by both the sc 0ut ::m e su;Jport squads.

O~ini ohs diffe r c ~nsider ubly us t 0 oxa.ctly whut this vehicle shnuld

be , ~
(See A~p0ndix IV, Anulyse s 0f Questionna ire , IV-3, question 14.)

It is bo liovcd that u vehicle f 0r the scout o.nd su'r'lrt

squads of r e connllissance units should have gener a lly the f ollnwing

chnr actoristics,

Spood. A t op s peed f orwnr d of 50 m. p.h. un r'. a. susta ine d

-
minimum s pcod o·f 2-1/2 m. p.•h. is r e quired • .

Rllllgo . A r o.n,,:e on impr 0ved r ends c.t 30 m.. z,.h. of 200 mile s

is rc quiro<l.

Ma.neuve r ~bility. Tho maximum ~ossib l c pr 0visi 0ns f or nriving

the vehicle t o the r ~a.r shr ulc be pr ovi r.oc. Tho vehicle shr ul d

e ither be c a.publ e of turnin ~ a.r ound quickly or tho driver should h ave

sui t ubl c visi on, steerinp; c ">ntr ol, c.nrt s:;earin r: 11va.il·,bl c f or <lriv­­

in;r, backwar ds ut s peed s up t o 2 5 m. p.h.

Mob ility. Except for vertica l obstuclos unc' trenche s, mo­­

bility sh0ulc' bo e quo. l t o thnt of the lif;ht t nnk. ·

Armor. Full pr ot e ction sh0u l r. be uffor r.ed tho crew n~uinst

sma.11 ilrl!lS nt short r an~e s. Some ?r ot c cti0n sh0ulr be pr nvir'ed

~go.inst mine s nnr. ~ound burst artille ry. The tn..'Utimum possib l e

pr ot ection, c 0nsiste nt with other re sircc cha r a cteristics, shoul d

he pr ovi~od f or the vitul opar ntin~ c 0Mp0nonts of tho ve hicle .

The crow need n ot be c ompl et e ly pr o t e cted while ri din~ c0m­­

f ortubly. The crew shoul ct be ·1b l e t o drive tho veh icle mirl fire the

mnchino ~un fr om c pr 0t e ctod , t hcu~h n 0t noc os sc.r ily c nmfort~bl e ,

position.
100
 l

• Armament. Prnvisi<•ns sh nulr'. be mr1.de fc,r mountinr u run.chine

gun or mnchine i;uns thnt co.n be fired a. I!linimum of 120° to on.ch side

of cen tor with 15° de prossfon and 45° 0 l ovn.tion. All-uround fire

shoul~ be provitled, if possible.

Crew. The vehi cl0 shnulr: ca.rry, c 0mfrrtably, not loss th nn

throe men.

Accessibility. Tho crew must bo ab l e to !"lnunt anr. r.ismount

tho vehicle ra.,i~ly. Tho ~ossible sr,oed of dismountin~ should be

)
on tho orr1or of thn.t of small uno.rmoroc! military vehicles.

Size. Tho vohiole sh0uld be ~s smnll as possihle. Tho

height should nnt exceed 65 inches a.n<l every effort shoul~ be made

to reduce tho prnfile.

Stowa.Ge Spa.co. The mrucmum possible st r.wo. ~e spn.ce, st own.r.;o

b0xcs, braokots, nnr tie•0n fc..ci litios sh(' Uld be ~rovi<led inside <1nd

•
0utsi<le the vehicle •

Compromises anc Consi0cr ~tions

Any military vehiclo is a. _c om1:-r0misc of <losircd charr,cteris­

tics. Also, the n.ecision to r1csif':n l'lnr1 0 ui10 o. pn.rticular milito.ry

vehicle must be b :1.sed up0n n. number of prc.cticn.l c onsiderations.

These compromises nr0 hi~hly interrolaten . A disoussirn of s0me of

the comprmnises , ruid onnsidera.ti ons rohtive to this subject is r:iven

Suspension system. .An improvec: r oconna.iss unoc vehicle is

• visualized a.s beinG either f , ur-wh oe lec, multiwhc c l er , or full-

tracked.
.
Very little is known c..s t c the, ?rncticn.bility nf ---.pply-

inp; the multiwhoele rl., trc.ckless-t a.nk type suspension t n u smn. 11 ur­

morof. vehicle. A full-trucked vohic l o wouln h c..ve many ar1vnnto.ges

over the four-wheeled v ehicle . It woulr. h1.vo much better mobility

over mud., sond , vortioa l obstucl e s, '.lnc rlitcho s. -

A full-tr r:.okect

vehicle w0ulr he more m'Ulcuver o.bl e ; with the l o.t e st trnnsmissinns,

the vehicle o oul n turn arnunf. within its rwn l c na;th.

-
There are ., hf'wever, some nisnrlvr.nta.rcs to the ful 1-tr 1.cked

vehicle. The., tr '.'l.ck 1:nrt susponsi r n will o.rlr~ t o tho siz e , woi r;ht.,

o.nr c 0 st. The fu e l onnsum~ti0n of ~ tr , ckec vehicle will be hi~per

then tha.t 0f :::.. si!'!lilar wheel ed vehicle. This will r osult e ith er in

r educed rnnr:e n r furthe r incre :.""csoc~ size., nir:ht, o.nd c ost. The f ac­­

t ors of speed., n0is e l eve l., ~nd m~intc n nnce Will f '.lv or tho whee l ed

vehicle. But it is believed tha.t if sufficie nt o.ttontir-n is dov0tod

­
t o r'esi~n und ~ev e 1 -.pmont, those f rtct ors can be b r ou~t within o.oco pt­

able limits.

-
A f our-wheeled vehicle omi ea.sily j_1r ovic1e tho ~esirc~ s rocd

one. r nnr;o. Sa.tisf.:i.ctory mobility h 'ls n n t hcen o'!-,t,ined frrun this

type sus pons i on.

Size. Size is nnnther f oo.ture 0f the sc out vehicle which

must be c omr,r omisc~ . It is rc sir ~r.l c thc t this v ehicle curry a.t

lenst u crew n f three ma n. Cnnsir'c r ·.b l o r n.di 0 equipmr-:nt must c.lso

l-e _;,r ovi r:cd f or. A rn-'.chi no r-un must be rnl'"lun t od :--.n tho vchi o l o , C\lld

the ~ or must be .1.bl c to firu this r;un fr om r-.. pr0tcctec. rositi nn

thrr-u ch a. wir1.e ore. The sorut vehicle nrust o. ls r c ~.rry ;_:,e.rs on.-il nrms

nnd oquipr.iont, ommunition , mine s :7.n 'l dcmo litinns, mine rlot cct ors,

ma.~s, 2i 0n -,"Or t C'o l, water, r ntinns, G.Dr.: other equi :1rnont r oquirc:d by

tho missi on.

A vehicle that will p r ~vi fc this much s pn.co with nrmor ?r o­­

t oction a.nr. cnmf ort mi ~ht ho unsuit1b l c in other r e s pects. It mis;ht

102
be s o bii; nnr'. hcrn.vy thct the profile , s j_)oed, r nn r:o , 0r mribi lity

would be uns c.tisft..ct C'ry.

One c omrr omise w(>Ul<: be t o rec~uce tho cre w t 0 two men. This

W" Ultl r,r ;;vi<le cmly two men t o rlri v o, fir-.: the ma.chino ,:un, o.nr: n rier­­

at e the r o.0i o in tho sc ,,ut v ehiclei. The use cf n two-- mun vehicl e

wo uld r equiro either thr~c vehicle s per sc nut squo.<l 0r f owor men

o.v::ti l a.lll e f or <lismnunb;d w0rk. A tvrn- m::n vehicle wnulr. pr 0ha'1ly bo

uns ::tti sfo.ct(' ry f o r the s u ;:-r0rt squa.c •

It is bolio-vec. thn t crircful c.c si F:n c r,n pr ovi rlo c. s o.tisfn.c ­

t ory sc out vehicle with 'l throe-- ma.n crew.

Co st. If the c~es ir~.~bility of r cphcinr. the jcc.i_) in the re ­

c onno.issuncc pl o.t oon with 11 li:,-,htly a.r rnorcd c ornba.t ve hicle were t o

be nccopt ed a.s ::-, f a.ct, the r e W'1ulf still bo ,2r n cticu l c nnsir'e rdi ons

t o face . Tho c ost of ne si c:nin;· ~nr -.r o"'.uoinr such u v ehicle woulc

r epr e s ent c nnsi r'cr o.b l e monay, manpcwcr, r a.w mn.terio.ls, r.rnc1 pr oduction

f ncilitie s. If t he s e vehicles wor e ~uthrirized only t'1 the ~ec onno.is­­

sance pl a t oon o.nd nn the be.sis nf six ;::er ;:, l ....t 0~n, ther J woul<l be

o.ppr oximate ly 1,000 per Type Fie l d Army. This is~ smo.11 number of

vehicles frnm ::t pr ortucti0n stcmdpoint. J,.lso, n.s this ve hicle would

bo a new v chic l o in the su;_:, ;ly syst em, it wnulr. pr e s e nt l or;istic o.l

p r obl ems onr cost .

­
Tho c 0st 0f surplyin~ o. lirhtly a r mor ed , highly rrnbilo voh i­

clo t o r o~l uco the jeep in r c c onn~issc.nce units mi.:vit n " t he hi[gl

vmcn o.11 tho r e sulti llf; s :1vinr-s n.r o o oJnsi t1cr oc . Mo. j nr G S Yo itor

pl noec this c onment on his quc sti0nnniro :

Nn o.rmy ye t h us ~eve l 0pcd o. s o.tisf~ct0 ry r e c 0nno.issmice ve ­

hicle . We cnn, -" lnd we sh, ul rl , rlo it. If r o c onnc.issmce C 'ln be
o rmductcct :,r rperly, the s :wini;s in li"'7c s nn-1 e quipment will fnr
e xceed the qu8stion ~h l c e x pense anr c 0mplic Qti ons.
103
 Somo " f the s nvini;s tha.t mir;ht be ro o.lizoc by oqui;pin~ r e ­

c onnuissanco units with nn im;ir,·,vorl vohiclo u r c listocl. belaws

1. Rcrluced vohi ck ·me. e qui pment l osse s in r e c onnuisso.ncc uni ts.

2. Ro<'lucer~ h 0s p itn lizo.ti0n, diso.bility pnyme nts, life insurruice

pnyments, nnc. pcnsinns.

3. ­
Snvintr,s in pers onne l on(' mo.tcricl in wits othe r thr:n rec on­

naissance units ~uo t o the increased eff e ctivene ss of r e c nnnn iss nncc

units nn missirns r f r e c onn::ussr.i.ncc on~ s~curity, n.no o.s e c 0n omy

f orco s.

The r e ure n nunbor ~f c ompromises thut co.n be rode . All

of tho s e c~ulrl pr rvi rle u l e ss e ffe ctive r oc 0nn uisso.nc0 vehicle than

the one rle scribod , b ut or1ch wnu l d r epr esent c. r eduction in c ost.

A ve hicle coulc~ l,o r!cv o l ni'.)Cc. thc.t is sutisfactnry f or other

r equirements us well o.s r e ccmno.issruice . ­

Such othe r use s m.i~ht in­

­
clude commnnr>ors' v a hlclo, we n.pnns cru-rior, pers onne l cru-ric r, o.ir­

borne rind othe r s peci a l r ol e s, nnf. r.un mr•unt f or r e c r,illo ss rifle s.

Ji.rmor pr otection kits or s peci n.l nrm0r ed c uhs c riul <" be np­

plicd t o the cha ssis nf soma smnll r,on e r o.l ru r ~os e vohiclc . It is

be lieved thnt nn o.r!n0ret~ c-:th W"ulc'1 be m0r o sutisfact cry thnn an nr­­

m0r pr nt octinn kit. l\n o.rm0r en c ah sh0ulc~ pr r,vi r.e bett e r r r otec­­

ti on with l ess increo.sc inwo i '·ht :mr; l oss ofm ohility. The use of

li r,ht wei "'ht mct&ls in tho urI'lor cd kits or o.rmc-,r od htv' i os mi ,·,ht pr 0-­

vi ,lo c s oluticn . Thcso "!"Dtn.ls a r c cx•~cnsivo c..ncl in short SU:'"ly

C"mpri.r od t o tho dcm11.nr:s frir them, but th,,ir use mi 0ht bo justified

by othe r savinrs . Sf>IUEl plo.stics mi ·'.ht pr nve t o be suito.ble .

A vehicle o f this type th~t ~nothc r c 'untry is pr n<lucing

mir-ht do . Such ::i. vehicle o .-ulr' be pr ,;curod 11

—
f\s-is" r r with slirht

104
ch=mi;c s f nr US rcconn~isso.nce m1its. '!his wnulrl r o~r c s e nt ec on omy

in c'osi::n , r r <"'rlucti "n f uci litie s ~ ,, mnn- riowc r . Ex 'lrnpl e s of such o.

ve hicle w •ulc. be tho Tlr e n Gun Cnrrior or tho FV 701, if it is ""ut

int " pr 0r~uctinn in Grent Brita.in.

Discussion

A listinr of s ome "f th0 r.o siro.blc cho.r c ctc ristics nf n

li~htly nrmor od r c cmn~issnncc ve hicle h ~s been r ive n . The c on­­

flicts c.nc limitnti ns which the s e ch::.r 'lctc ristics .t'l nce on eo.ch

othe r ha.ve been rl iscusse<l . The ;:-r ~1.ctico.l c (1nsi 11cr ~tic ns and s o!lP

possib l e s nluti ,....ns h 'lv e boon ;>r e s c n tcr. .

V1lha.t o.ro tho r co.s nn nbl c s riluti0ns t " this pr oble m?

'Iho f ollowin~ is n discussi cn 0f ~ossib l c ve hicle s which

wnuld pr nvirte nn impr oved r o c onnuissr..nce vc~icle . The ve hicle s n r c

discussed in the 0 r ccr which the y me- st n ~o.rly s ntisfy the cho.r c ctor ­

istics stnt c d ubnvo.

Ve hicle A. This v e hicle W" ulc. be u full- - tro.ckec' vohiclc 0r

vr" ulrl h o.vo tho tr o.ckle ss t r1nk type nf sus i_:'C nsi 0n . It woulr b e o.

c 0rn:1l ct c ly n ew dcsirn nnr. w~uld s a tisfy a ll tho chnr 'lctc ristics

sta.tod nb ,~vo , -
It mi r ht he simi lnr t ,, nny of the fu 11-tr'.lcked ­
vehi­

cle s dc scril">od o.b we , but w-..ulc' incor :-,-!' r-. to nll the ln.te st ::..ut0mo­-

tivc devo l opm::mts.

Consi<lcr nb le e ffort W" ulc bo r e quire d in the <'e si'"n ru1c' do­­

v o l n2ment of this vehicle . The do sioi of a. hie-h s peed tr a ck with

e ffici e ncy, re li~,bility, .'.Il'1 ­

quie tne ss ·1f 0rcr :1ti •n w..,ul r1 lie n mc.­

j "r pr ob l orn. The do sip;n c- f the mnohino ;;un m,~unt w0uld o.ls c- pr e s ent

pr ob l e ms .

105
 ­
This vehicle wnuld be a v e ry vo.lun.ble vehicle f or r e c onn o.is­

s::mcc units ~.n.r'I othe r uni ts e n p1.;.-;cc1 in lTl/'l b ile wnr f o.ro or inv0l ve d in

flui rl situa ti nns. -

Tho c ost ~f this ve hicle mi !~t we ll be: off-set by

the suvine; in lives and mo.torie l which c :--ulc~ be e ffe cte d . A s uvine;

is visua lize d in r e c onn o.issnnce units :md o.ls o in othe r units o.ss o­­

cio.ted with rec nnnnissnnco units s o equi i:>fe c. .

Vehicle B. This vehicle woulr1. bo o.n c.,:o.:1t ntion f o r use by

r e c onnuissonce units of s ome v ehicle rc si~o<l f or an°tho r ~iurpos e .

1m c:x:nmp lc n f the type of v ehicle which mi rht be sui to.b le fM this

pur p0s o is tho Ont os •

If tho Ontr,s is 3.cce p tcd un<l :::,lrl.ce:d in pr 0~ucti0n, it is

f e lt thc.t c onsi ,ler c.ble c ,nsir.cr i:. tion sh0ul rl be r;iven t o o.dnptin g

this vehicle f or rcc onnn issnnco units.

Ve hicle c. -
This v ehicle wo ul(~ be o. f 0 ur-wheo l er> vehicle .

It w0uld h nv c mnny of the de siro <l ch~r ncte ristics, b ut nf tho two

muj or f enturo s nc sirod , nrm0r f\nr moJility, mobility woul~ be s o.­­

crifi cod .

The morility of the j eep ~rn1 the Xli 195 is n ''t sntisfo.ctC1ry

f or r oe cnna iss r.. nce work. If t o sts t' f the FV 701 in the U S inc ic:c,t e

tho.t tho Ill0h ility r, f this v.:;hiclc is su pori 0r t o thnt ,,f tho j eep ,

perhaps this typo o f vehicle would be the ½ost c nmp r omisc . Tho rlo ­

-
sire<l char a cte ristics woulc be furthe r c ompr omised be n two-rnnn crew.

Vehicle D. This v e hicle w0ulc! be b us ed nn the cho.ssis nf

-
tho stmifar n lir ht truck with the most cr ~ss-c0untry mot ility. This

cha ssis w~ul~ be p r 0virleG with a s pcci nl ru-mnr pr 0 t e ctir n body or

n.rrnor kit applied t o the stnndo.r cl. bor'y. Pr0 t o cti r,n w0u l d be pr ovic ed

106
 nga.inst smo.lt nrms fire with the lcust ~ossiblo recuction in vehicle

mobility,

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 7

1 iU'. Field Forces Bourd Nr 2 Re pcirt o f Pr oj e ct 1466, Test
of Truck, 1 :r t nn , 4 x , I - 8 , c, report propa.ree! y 1.rmy 10
F orces B0nrd Nr 2 (Fr rt Knox, Ko ntucky: J:.FF Br Nr 2 , 1951) , ~x.ssim.
2
Rcp0 rt of Tho Army Equipment Be-a.rd, 1950, I t om Nr 5 (Fort
Monroe, Virg:inic. , 8 Hc.rch 1950) , p 29 .
3 Tripn.r tito CPnfe r oncc 0n Arm0r :me~ Brif.rinr, (Fort Nonroe ,
Virginin , 24 - 30 Oct0bcr 1951), Annex 2 (Se cr et )
4 Ltr, Arrrry Field Fo rces B00.r ~ Nr 2, AKCV, 12 Decomher 1950 ,
11
suc,ject : "Review of Li e:ht Vehicle Rcquircmonts . , .? 2.
5 Willys-- Ov-crl::md Spe cific·1tions n f Milit0.ry Vehicle s Inclucl ­-
in e; 1/4 ton Type , Lr mnroc'! C ..r • nnn 6 x 6 11.mbu lo.nee , o. book of vehi -­
c lc s recif'icdi ons p r o po.rod Sy tH liys-Over
- fom1 P r brs , Inc (T ol edo ,
Ohi o ), T J Murk I .
6 Notes nttnchcf to qucsti0nn~iro submitted b y Col nn ~ l TT
King, Chief, Gcncro.l unt' Spccia. l Pur pos o Ve hicle Section, krmy Ficltl
Force s Bour<l Nr 2 , F nrt Knox, Kentucky.

7 Op cit, Review n f Li~ht Ve hicle Pcquircments , p 3 .

e. 8 Army Field Force s B0a.r ~ Nr 2 , Renert of Pro ·c ct 1598, Te st

of Truck, Li,ht Utili y, 3, 4 t 0n , 4 x (, XJ.: 95 , n. ro ;:,ort ~,rc pnre.
by ;\rmy Field F0rce s Board Nr 2 (Ft Knox, Ky, not published to date)
passim.
9 Dr uf't C~na~' i c.n J.J:my Equipment Policy Sta teme nt, Univcrso.l
Ca.r rior , attached t o ltr , Office of tho Senior Sti:.tnr"!.).r r~i znti on Rc.,re­­
sent a.tivc , US Army Hea.dqunrtcrs , 8710--13 -- 1 (DWD- -4) ottowo. , Cunndn,
19 Oct nbcr 1951, subje ct: "Draf't Cnnur.i c.n 1.rmy Equi pment Policy State ­
ment, Universn.l Cu rrier, Pc.rt I , Betck,,._r oun,1 • 11

10 RJ~c User Tri:i.ls Ro:70rt Nr 1 User Trinl - FV 701 (Sco- ut

Cnr) , n r c~ort o f tho use r tri o.ls ~r Sc0ut C::u- FV 701 , c ~rri ed nut
oytho Ri,C use r tri n ls t ea.m nver tho :x;.rinr' 16 - 28 Au:-:;ust 1951
(Gro '1.t Brita.in) , Item 24, App "C" (Se cre t) .
11 Op cit, Tri p:1rt i t o Confcronce nn Ar!"or ~rl :Rr i drin;;.

12 Rcrort o f Armnrod F<,rces Bour,~ '"'T 0j e ct Nr 110 Whee l en Ro ­

c onnn.issnnce Vehicle ns Submitted by Tro.ckless Tnnk C0rpor a.tion , et
r cp0rt l)ropnrerl by The Ar:nr r e rl Forces Boa.rel. (Fort Kn0x, Ken tuck.y:
The 1,rmored Force Doc.re , 3 A:)ril 1941) , passim.
107
 13 Army Fie l d Force s Lia is on Rc;:nrt r, f Ch i e f of Army Fie l d
F Clrcos, ORDMX-L, - Minuto s 1· f c..nfc r c nce nn Pr opos oc Gun, Infru1try,
-
Anti - T·-.nk , Se lf Pr npc llcf. nnr~ Six-Hroi Pc rs "nnc l Corri Gr h c lr ri.t Do­­
tr0it Arscn c.l., 20 July 1951 (C r n.f'i. r.cn ti r.l) .

e.

108
 CHAPI'ER 8

CONCLUSIONS AND RECONJ'l.ENDLTIONS

Committoo Number 38 00nclurles thntr

1. - on truck is uns~tisfr.otnry f er tho so ~ut squo.c s ,..f

Tho 1/~-t

rcc onnoiss nnco units.

2. The r e is a r equirement f c,r ~ sme ll ve hicle f or r oconnais­­

• snnco units :_"r 0vi<1 in -: :-ir ::-t.... cti "n arc.inst s l'.!l!lll r,rms fire anr mine s

nnc! ;_)r ovi rlinr: hi :h m11b ility.

3. A num!Jer r f v e hicl~s c r o pr e s e ntly bo in ~ dev o l o;_)ed in this

c c,untry on<". n lli"'~ O"witrios which c "'ul r' bo c..aart er1, t o 1:r ovi rlo a. ro­

conno.isso.nco ve hicle supori cr t n the 1/~-t 0.n truck.

Committe e ?Ium:ier 38 r c c c,?Trnc nc s th~t /1.rmy Fic:lr Force s ini­­

ti ut o o.ction t o r r 0vidc !l. vohiclt. f or r oc ('\n no.issruice units i ncor p,,r­

n.tin·· t o the maxilllUl"l :1ossib lt: e xt ent tho !Ililit?.ry ch '1.r u ctc ristics

listed in Cho.:,tor 7.

109
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Report of the Armored Equipmont Boa.rd, o. r eport propetred under chair­-

manship nf Brig Gonornl •Po.ul M Robinett (Ft Knox., Ky, 8 December 1944)

Report of Board of Officers Convened to Study the Equipment of the

-Post Wor Army, o. r eport •:,-,r ope.red under tho chairmanship of Maj Gen
Gilbert R Cook (Washingt on: Arrrw Ground Forces, 20 June 1945)

Stugy Nr 49, Mechanized C!l.valry Units, a. r eport prepared ® rler

direction of the General Boo.rd , US Forces, Eur opean Th e!l.t e r
{November 1945)

Study Nr 15, Orgnn iznti on,. Equi pment, nnn To.cticnl Empl oyment of
the .Jn(ontr_y.~yi§t2n, o. report propo.red unre r d irection of the
General Bnar<l, US Forces Eurrpoo.n The~t e r (De c ember 1945)

Wnr Dep~i~~t- ~q~JPm~~~- B.2~rc: P,-._e_p9_r t, o. report prepared under

cha irmanship nf Gen J oseph W Stilwell {Wa.shine;ton: Wn.r Depnrtme nt,
29 Mlly 1946)

Ro port _of th_E! Armored Conf13re~9~__ .(Ft Knox, Ky, 7 June 1946)

Rcp'?rt nf_ ~ .1!1..Y f"i.el<l _Forces 1. 0.visory Pnne l on A!ID.9J" _to Chi~f of
_S_tnff. United _..§t1?:~~U!'.l_!l1',_ n re :,ort pr op~r er. rmc>or ch~irmc.nshi p of
Mo.j Gen Erne st N Ha rmon (Ft Monr oe , Vn, Army Fie l r. Fhrces , 18 Fob­­
runry 1949)

_go port _nf_ ­

~ho_Army E~ui;:mcnt_ Bor-.rd , o. r e port pre po.r od unr.er cho.ir­
mnnship r- f Lt Gen J ohn R Hodr,o (Ft M:mr, 1 0 , V'l. , Army Fielr. Force s,

e. 8 March 1950)

,!.-.I'my ~<ill~_E_rOOn_t_ J?ovelopment Guide (1'fo.shi ngtc-n: Go·vernmcnt Printing

Office, December 1950)

}Le_port of U S Ar my P0_li CY. _Co~fe r ep.co "'n Armor (Ft Monr oo , Vo. , Army
Field F orces, 20 ~t ober 1951)

_!1?P_o r~_ ?f J!'ipa.rtito Cr.nf e r ence on Armor nn~ Br!.9~iE_g (Ft Monroe ,
Vo., i,rroy Fiolc~ Forces , 30 October 1951)

_Ro port of Pro j oct_ ~r_ J..12., . Wh~e l e11_R:?.<? ~.no.i s~0;t1ce_ _y.9J:tX~l~ .. . ''\s
.: _S]:!2.­
mi ttod by Tro.ckless Tnnk Cor'Jor n.ti nn. {Ft Knrx, Ky: Ar mored F orce
Boo.r d , 3 April 194 1)

,R~.EQ!:l.,_o_f fyoj~c.t Nr 1169, Military Chnr ncte rist_ics f or _'!'ruck, ll1: .

.!.~- T~z Lie;b,t Wi...Z:!119!'~d . (Ft Knox, Ky: Army Grnund Force s Brord
Nr 2, 22 August 1947)

_Re_?ort Proje ct Nr ll§~ilitnx:y __ Ch€'.ru cto ristics_for an Armore<1 fnr .._

(Ft Knrnc , Ky : Army Field Forces Bo·1r rl Nr 2 , 25 October 1948)

110
 -
Report of Project Nr P-1430, St_ucy of _Suito.b_ili ti _Qf ..1t.u.¢k.-U4- t.rm..,
4 x 4., Armored..,_ T- 60. (Ft Knox, Ky: Army Fie l d Forcos RMril Nr 2,
12 October 1950)

Roport of Pr 0j oc_:t Nr 15~8~ Military cti~t--~t_o;:_5=._stic~J'S-r c.n t.~~d

Q~:t-• (Ft Knox , Ky: Army Fie l e F orces Bonrc :Mr 2 , 17 April ~ 1951)

~Q;:>or~ 2LPr_0joct ..Nr 15~_.Tost_Q.f_ 'l'.r.uc~~JJ.eh.Ltltility,._~~

,L l3..,_~L!._95. (Ft Knox , Ky: Army Field Forces Bnnrd Nr 2, n ot pub ­
blishocl tf'l dat o )

11'...!'J~ct R~or~s _nf J?ct~i~.!::i:-~~~~l, ~es~-:,rch nnrl Evnlu 'ttion Division ,

- ~ {Center Lino , Mich: Detrrit Ar ­
f C\r _O.u...QJ:.~~!.. J_~gJ._n__rJO ~Q.YQ,We.r. J..94§.
sonc.l, 30 Nnvomber 1948)

Orrln~ce Technical Co!lUllittco Meetings (1950 )

"D2 v ol2pzoont Pnlicy., Tr cnt:!s_._'lnrl _Ito?nS in the Fir-htinr Vehic l e CJnss­

os" , n shr•rt tvpec p:.1.por (Ft Kn0x, Ky: Arey Fie l r: F orce s Bo n.rd Nr 2 ,
28 Soptember 1948 )

Lotter, Army Field Fe.roes B0nrd Ur 2, AKCV, sub j e ct: "Revie w of

Li iz;ht Vehicl e Roquiromonts", 12 Doo&m!Jer 1950.

11 Review
of Rec ommonr.o.ti 0ns Mnde nt Combinec! Coni'e ronce on Armor ,
17 - 24 Mnroh 19•~9", an unsigned l e tter do.tee 13 October 19 51.

-
Wilqs-Overlnncl Spacifioati'.'ns of Militc.r:y Vehiclo ~inclurlinr; 1/4--
ton TXj?8..,_;1rm,.,r ed C--r.i__mi" 6 x 6 A."!lb ul::moe . (Tolodo , Ohi n : Willys­
Over lone~ Mot ors ., Inc. )

Letter, Office of tho Soni "'r St~da.r <lizo.ti"n Repr esent--.tive., US

Army Hqs., 8710-- 13-- 1 (DWD- 4) , s uh joct: "Drn..f't Ccnndinn krrrry Equip­­
!IIOnt Policy Stntement, Universnl Carrier" , Ottnwe., Cnnnno., 19 Octo­­
ber 1951 with attnchor1 " RAC User Trinls Ro:-('rt Nr l", F'V 701 (Sc out
Cnr) , 16 -- 28 Au;ust 1951.

Lotter , Office Chie f of 11. rmy Fiol0 Forces, sub j e ct: "Type Fi e l rl
1~rmy11 , 1 July 1949.

~\rmy Fie l d Forces Linis0n Rc".lort , Office Chief nf .ir rey- Fiold F0rce s .,
ORDMX--L, sub j e ct : "Hinutes nf Cr-nfor ence r n Pr ''JC'sec Gun, Infantry-, ·
-
Anti-Tonk , Solf Fr po lloc nn<' Six- - J,t'ln Pe rs onne l Ca. rrior helr. nt De ­
troit 1~rsena.l, 20 Jul y 1951 (C0nfir'entinl)

U~E 6-- 16~1., 25 Juno 1948., with ohc.nse l, 13 Oct ober 1950., JlID.t.ze r
Compa.nz~r!llorecl CnvnlI_'.yJeconna.issonce nc.tta.lion,

.T/~E 2-- 25. 15 Soptemhe r 1943 , C'l._vnlry Rocmnn.issance Squadr on ,

Meohpni ZQ~,.
111
 1L.e>!s~_.?.:21_,_J.5 September 19f3 , _Ca~ l..rx. Re~onnniss,..nce Tr" " r .
Mochanized. -----------------

TloS;E 2-~
- 15 Soptomber 1943, A~[o.ult Gun TrO('J. Cnva lry Rcconnnis ­
sanoe Squa~ron, _Mocho..nizerl~ ~~

- . 15 September 1943, Light Tn.nk Cornpnny. C;wnlry__B.oonnnnis­ -

T/<Yt.E 17-17
sance Squncron., Moohnnizec . — —-

T/~:E
- - l7-~27N 1 21 Ja.nu~ry 1948, with chnnge 1 , 7 Mo.y 1948 , Mccium
·T_nnk Compnny 1 Armorec Co.vnlry Reconno.isso.nce BJ.tto.li on,

U<YcI:: l7-45N, 14 Mo.y 1948, Reoonncds~mco Bnttnli0n , Jlrmf'lrod Divisir,n.

r

T/~ 17- -51 , 7 October 1S48 , Ann}ro~ c~vo.l~y Rec i mont (Li~!!!.)~

!l~ ~
17-55, 7 October 1948, with chnn~o l, 20 June 1950, Ar.m.Q_rod
Q_qvo.lry Roconno.issnnco Bo.tt~lion, --------

T/~ 17-57N, 23 January 1948, Recqn_q;:i.issonco Com,p111y,

f!i~--2O, Co.vo.lry Rec onnnissanco Trnor,, Mechnnized , 24 Febr uary 1944 .

FM 2-3~_ Co.vo..lry_Rec cnno.issance Sg_undr,.,l_h_}.fochanized, 28 flU';Ust 1944.

~!- 1,7_:_2_2.,_ Roconno.isso.n_ce Plo.tnnn a.nr Roc or:nc.isso.nc~Cnm2._ll!!L Mo.y 1950.

- 17-35L_Reoonn~issance
FM - Bo.ttnlirn, A~mored Di_vi§..lrP , Varch 1951 .

;FM_J7-
- 1OO a Armnr e0~bisi 1'n -1f:I!.c.!.j~C1:nb'3.t
- Com,'Il,.~ Decembe r 1 949 .

F!!._17 - 9.§~o Ar:n!:?,_l'ed .C:"3vn lz:;y Rur,iroont i.~i:::.11t} nnc1 'Ihc Arm"lred Cnv­-
e. nlry Roconn:1.iss!llloe B~tt~li"n , SG,?tc!ll")er 1951 ------------- ~~

Cnmbnt Or,ornti~n Dr.to., First Army, Cur~:'lO , 19~~-1945.

- (Govorn0rs
Islnnf. , NY: Honfquo.rtors , First 11.rmy, 18 November 1946 )

Armor C0mb'\t Lesson Bullotin Nr 1 , Hoo.f.quo.rters I, US Corps, 28

Feliruo.ry 1951

- Docomoer 1950.
Wo.r Di~ry, 1st Cnvnlry Division, July-

-
After Action Re;orts , ~th Cc,vo.lry Group , Juno 19•~~-Mo.y 19,;1;5 .

Monthly Uo.rr ntive Summary, 3c! Rec onno.isso.nco Cr,:npr.ny, April 1951.

Report of Army Fiolc FC1rcos Observer Too.m Nr 5, June-- July 1951.

Quosti onno.ire , ;>r•J po.rod by Co!ll!Tlittee Nr 38 (i\l'!llorod Officer 11.dv'\llced

-
Clo.ss, 1951-1952), Resoo.rch anc1 3v~luc,tion Division , The Ar!ll')rod
Scho ol, Ft Knox , Kentucky

112
 11
-
Committee Roport Nr 15, 1949-1950, Co.v:1lry Group as on Eo("ln"my
Force (4th Ca.v Gp, 19-30 Dec'~·~)", a. rE1soa.rch r e~c,rt (Ft Knox, Ky:
-
The Armored School, 1945-1950).

-
Committee Roilort Ur 17, 1949-1950, "0r,oro.tion of Co.v Ren Sq Into­­
gral to the Ar!lld Div", a research re port (Ft Kno:x, Ky: The Armored
-
Sohoo l, 1949-1950).

-
Co. ptain Kenneth T Barnaby-, Jr, "Modifica.ti"ln of 1/4-Ton", Armored
-
Co.valry Journo.1, July-Au~ust 1946. ---------- -

Cnlone l Lor.cm C Berry, "Re;:,0 rt of Visit t o Royo.l Armoured C0.rps

Ct")nferonce, Lon~nn", o. letter to the Contnnnding General, l.rm0red
Center, Ft Knox, Kentucky

Lieutenant Cobnol Willio.m T Bir~ , "C onsir1 orr.iti0ns fnr EmploymJnt

of Mechonized Ca.v'llrJ,r 11 , The '•fil ita.ry Ravi~, Vol XXIV, Nr 10, Janu­­
ary 1945.

Mnjor Howo.rrt C Bl"ne , "Empl oyment of tho Co.va.lry Reconno.issonce Troop,

MochMized, in Fenetrntion and Ex nl ('litati on", n student mnnn,,., r ilfh
(Ft Knox, Ky: The .Armored Scho" l, Arril 1948).

Mo.jor Wen~oll M Br onr.us , "18th Co.vulry Roc r-nno.isso.nco Squn~rcn in

the !.rdennes 0ffensive 11 , a sturent mon ogrr.rh (Ft Kn0x, Ky: The l,.r­­
m0red School, February 19·.i:7)

Mo.jar D"nnlrl H Cnwles, "A Reoonnnisso.noe Troop in ,;.tta.ck", a. stu~ent

mono~ o.ph (Ft Knr x, Ky: The Armnre~ Scho"l, Mo.y 19~8).

1st Lieutenant Willbm Grillis, persono.l interview.

C~ptnin Rich~rd H H'U'rin~t0n , :x:,rsrn~l inte rview.

Colonel Hc:mi l t on H Hr-wze , "M:-l ile Gr 0 und Tr '"'O ;.JS 0 f the Future",
Arm0red Co.vo.lry J nurnr.1, Vol LVI, Nr i~ , 25 July 1947 •

Mo.jor Karl P Keisor, Jr, "Whnt Vehiclo Sh r uld Replo.ce tho Armored
Car in tho Mochanized Cn.v!llry Squo.rlr on 11 , u studont m"nnr.ra.fh (Ft
Knnx, Ky: The Armored Sch0ol, Fobrua.ry 1947}.

Maj or Eric Kobbo , persono.l interview.

Brigadier Gener u l Will hm A Mitchell , 'Wrirl r1 's Militnry History

(Harrisburg , Po.: Military Service fu b lishing C'"'mpruiy, 1931) .

-
Mo.jor Brt>oks O Norman, ''Mechonizoc Rooonno.issrmce fr "m D-D!ly to
St Lo", a. stur.ent m('lnoe:ra;ih (Ft Knr>x, Ky: The Armored Schr'vl,
March 194: 8).

1st Lie utenant Minnr Pee:,l e s, person'll intorviow.

Ca?tnin James R Fhrt~, persono.l inte rview.

113
Cnptaiz, 0 D Severson , personnl intervie w.

Col one l 1
'ullin.l'll S Tri .?l et, "The Jnr:,11 , The Infantry J 0urno.l, Vo l 66 ,
1950.

Liouteno.nt Colone l J ay C vlhi tehea~, "Cnvnlry - - Empl oyment r.f Mech• ­

anized Reconnaissance Elartents '', Tho Mili tn.ry Review, Vril XXIII,
Nr 2, U::iy 1!¼3. ------------------ ~------ ------

114
 A~DIX I - A
ARMORED CAVAf...RY REGIMENT (LIGHT)

EB
SUMMARY OF >~AJOR EQUIRfENT SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL
Air plane, l iaism .....
Carr iage , motor, 105mm howitzer
.
. ••
8
6
Co l onel. . . . . .. . . .. . .. ..
•
Lieutenant Colonel .
• • 1
4
. ... . . . ... .. .
. . . . .. . . . .•• .••
•
Carrie r, personne 1, armored • 97 Major • • 12
Tank, light • • 72 Captain • • • • • • • • .
• • • • 40
• • •
51 Captain or Lieutenant . . . •• 8
Tank, medium• • • • •
Truck, 1/4--ton . • • • • • •
• •
. • • • 327 Lieutenant. . ..
•
• •
• • • •
•
... •
• 86 ~
Total Co!111lissioned • • • .- . •
Truok, 3/4 ton, ambulance • • • • • 6 n
Truck, 3/4 ton , weapons carrier • • 37 151
-
Truck, 2 -l/2 --ton , cargo • • • • 119
• •
Truck, 6 ton, heavy- wrecker • • • • 3 Warr ant Officer • • • • • • • • • • 31

Carbine, ccJ. . 30. .. . .

Vehicle, tE.nk r eoovery.
• • •
• • •
Gun , machu:e , cal .30, heavy. •
•
• •
• •
8
1026
27
First Se r geant . •.
..
Master Sergeant • • • •
.
• • • • • • .. 20
76
• • • • •
Gun ,. maohire , cal • 30, light • •
. . .• •
Gun , machir.e , oa.l • 50, HB
• • 84
56 Sergeant. • •
.
Sergeant, first class •
. .... . • • • • •
•
216
561
• • • • • •
Gun , submachine , cal . 45 . • • •• 495 Corporal. • • • • . .. • • • • • • 594
Launcher, rocket, 3 . 5 inc!i• • • 130 Corporal or Private, first class . 537
Mortar, 8lrr•m. • • . . . . .. . •
• •
• 27 .. .
Private, first clo.ss • • • • •
•
• 423
Pistol, automatic, cal . 45 .. •• • 723 Private 1 • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 77
Rifle , automatic, cal . 30 • • •
Rifle , cal • 30. . . . . •• •• 30
818
Private 2 • . . ...
• • • • • • • 117
• • • •
Total Enlisted • • • • • • • • 2721
Aggregate . • • • • • • • • • • 2903
 APPSND-IX I-B
RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION, ARMORED DIVISION

A
EE
SUMMARY£!'~ EQUIPMENT SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL
Carrier, personnel, .nrmored .. •
Tank, ligit • • • • • • • • • •
• • 28
• • 30
Lieutenant Colonel. • . •
Mo.jor • • • • . .. ..
• • • • • •
..•.
• • •
l
2
Truck, 174-ton.- • • • • • • • • • • 117 Capto.in • • • • • • • • • ~ • • • 10
Truck, 3/4 ton, o.rnbu lance • • • • • l Captain or lieutenant • • • • • • • l
• .
~
Truck, 3/4 ton, weapons carrier 6 . .
-
Truck, 2-1/2 . . • • 26l
ton, cargo , •
• • Lieuteno.nt. • • • • • • • • 21 r-1

Truck, 6 ton, heavy wrecker • • • •

- -...tank recovery. • • • •
-Vehicle-. 2
Tot~l Commissioned • • • .•• 35

Carb ino , cal ,30. • • • . . . . • 331

Gun, machine, cal ,30, heavy. •
• •
• Warrant Officer • • .• • • • • • • 9
• • 12
nun, :mo.chine., oo.l .30, light. . .
. . • 30 Fir st Sorgonnt. • • • • • • • • . - 5
Gun, Mohine, cal .so, HB
Gun, submachine, cal .45.
•
. . .. 17
• • Master Se~geant .• • • • • • • • • 21
• • 104 Sergeont first class. • • • • • • • 59
.. . . .
Launcher, rocket, 3.5 inch. • • • 36
. . ...
Sergeant, • • • • 149
Mortar, 81nm. • .. • • •. ..
Pistol, nutomatiti, cal .45, • •
• • 12 Corporal. . • •
• • • • • • • •
• • • 191
• • 151 Corporal or Private, first class. 164
Rifle, o.utomo.tic, co.l ,30 • • •
. . • • 12 Privnte, first olo.ss. •.. • • • • 119
Rif le, OE,l -30. • • • • • • • • 263 Private . . . . . ... . .• • • • 82
Total enlisted • • • . • • • • 790
Aggregate. .• •.• • • • • • 834
 APPENDIX. r.-c -
RECONflIAI SSAMCE CCMP.ANY

....

.. ..
reo,
~

SUMMARY OF MAJOR EQU!tl!ENT . SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL;

Carrier, personnel, armored • • • • 5 Cnpto.in • • •

Lieutenant. •
. . .. . . . . . . . 1
4
Tank, li~t • • • • • • • • • • • • 7 • • • • • • • • • t---
Truck~ 174 ton. • • • • • • • • • • 25 r-i
r-i
Truck, 3/4 ton, weapons carrier • • l Total Colll!llissioned • • • • • • 5
-
Truck, 2-1/2 ton, cargo • • • • • , 3
Carbine, c:il .30. • • • • • , • • • 58 Wurront Officer. • • • • • • • • • l
Gan, mo:ehine, cav-.Wt ·h'eav,y-,•·" . • • 3
Gun, :machine, cal .30, light , • • • 6 First Sergeant • • • • • • • • • • • l
Gun, muchine, onl .50, HB • · • - •• • 3 Muster Sergeant • • • • • • • • • • 4
Gun, submachine, cal .45 • • .- • • , 17 Scrgeont first clnss • • • • • • • , 13
Lauucher, rooket , 3,5 inch. • • • • 6 Sergeant •• , • • • • • • • • , •• 31
'Mortar, · 81mm. • · • • • • • • • • • , 3 Corporal • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 33
Pistol, aut omatic , oal . 45 • • • • • 35 Corporal or Private first class •• 41
Rifle, automatic, cal , 30 , • , • , 3 Private first class • , • • • • • • 21
Rifle, co.l ,30. • • • • • • • • • • 64 Priva.te 1 • • • • • • • • • • • • ~ 10
Privo.te 2 • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3

Total Enlisted ..• • • • • • 157

Ag [9'0 gate , • . • • • , • • • • • 163
 APPENDiril
COMPARATIVE RECORD OF COMBAT EMPLOYMENI' OF r.ECHANIZED CAVAIRY
GROUPS n.r THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, 194/4-19/45*

Grou
Total Combat I
Da Considered !
cial Op¼
.,.___
S I
I
i I
2d 294 29 9.9 1 112 1 38.1 I 8 '
I
2.1 II 118 40.1 27 9.2
3d 211 22 10.51 119 ! 56.4
I
l 8
I 2.8 I 44 20.8 l
II
18 8.5
I'
I
I '
4th 306 66 , 21.6 ; 65 , 21.2 10 3.3 96 31.4 69 22.5
6th 305 !
53 117.4 :
I 52 117.0 ! 0 0
I
I 36 11.8 164 53.8
I
11th 146 1 I
I •
7 1 70 :47.9
I
l 0 0 I
I
34 23.3 41 28.1

14th 149 14 i 9.4 , 19

.
1
12.8
I
I 1 I
.6 ! 14 9 .4 101 67.8

15th 308 14 I /4 .5 1 15
I
4.9 I 22 7.2 ·j 152 49.3 105 34.1 ~
r-i
I ; I
'
16th 59 7 111.9 , 5 8.6 0 li 0 3 5.1 44 74.4
.
101st 87 16 ;18.4
I
! 33 !31.9 9
!
, 10.4 16 18.L. 13 14.9
102d 326 14 l 4.2 1 110
I
,33.7 6
I
I
1.8 71 22.0 125 38 .3
I . !
106th 305 45 14.7 79 ,25.9 13 Ij L. .3 ' 133 43.6 35 I 11.5

113th 312 35 !
11.2 160 ·151.3
I I
16 5.1 I 39 12.5 62 19.9
• I
115th 58 ' 0 0 'I 40 169.0 ·! 2 3.4 2 3.4 14 24.2
TCYrAL DAYS 2866 316 I 95 i 758 878
1 879
I
I

II j
PERCENl'AGES . TCYrAL ,1 1.1 30.7
3.3 26.4 28.5
100% I I
. ——
*Command and Staff Department, The Armored School, CS 13 .460 ''The Armored Cavalry Regiment
(Light)", a unit of instruction. (Ft Knox, Ky: The Armored School, 1951-1952)

• - -
NOTE: 1. This tabulntion is based upon the method of execution by cavnlry groups of missions assigned
by higher headquarters. The mission assigned und the operation executed wore not the saroo in
all cases, i.e., n corps mission of security may have been oxocutod by nn offensive operation.

2. Offensive combat includes attack , exploitation , o.nd pursuit. Defensive combat includes posi­
tion defense, wide defensive frontage, nnd delaying action. Security includos frontal and
flank security (both moving and stationary), blocking, maintaining liaison and contact, and
filling gnps . Security operations were usually executed by offensive or defensive combat.
Special oper ations include mobile reserve, rear nren security, and Third Army Information
Service (6th Cnvnlry Group). Reconnaissnnoo missions normnlly involved security and were
execut ed by offensive combat.
 AP.PENDIX III
Yfil!lCLE CP..ARACTERISTICS CHART

VEHICIE I GROOS WEIGIIT ICP.EW ! AP.MAMENT ARMOR PROTECTION

,--------.1-----,----.....-----------------
HP / TON . SPEED RANGE HEIGHT
m. .h. miles
IEIDTH WIIYI'H , TURNING RADIUM l
inohes inches inches 1 feet
: Truck, 1/4 I1 3,460 lbs (in­­
I
-
! 30 cal MG or 50 1 none
______

34.7 60 225 54 133 20

- ton, 4 x 4, eludes 800 lbs cal MG on pedes1
-
; M-38 1
I payload) tal mount ~
-
I .
~
.!T~acked - - f 4,500 . lb~
!Jeep I
none : Front, ¼4
to 1/211 ;
sides 1 4"; bottom
.26.6 200 49 116 9
-
. I 1
3/16 11 ; protection
i I i against small arms ,
• i
i
' ball ammunition -at
j short ranges, and 1

1 Rgainst 303 solid, j -

.
1

~ · I ammunition at 2500 I ii
I .r. 235- ➔-- 60
-~ 4i Vehi~le not
-
;T;u:~ -
' ""
l-;,200.{bs (i~- ­ -
; ::.
- --- ' ---------—
-- -
— --
129.2 -r6o
- -—
I. 168
—
68
--------- _

light I eludes 1500 lbs I standard, I . j•

!utility, payload plus350 j none on test I I

t
i
!3/4 ton,
{4x4 XM 195
:I lbs crew weight 'r : vehicle I I
j
I i
I .I
_ , l~-~7~1 ~---, 9~00- ;_~~----- 1;- ·- -'...1~m-,
,t !
Br~wnin~, .5-0 ~:· A·P··;· 250 ;a~; I 60
...... — - -

. 1 (Brit:tsb'- ’ '
!scout Car)
rI !i -
Air-cooled
-
verse, 360°;
Tra-- I .303 in AP' point
ij blank; hull damage, I
1· 250 73 148 71

1
i
L
l' 1 Elev11tion, 47°; 4 lb mine
I Depression 12°
I
-~v:rs;i · ..
arrier,
!9~88-;-;~-; (in---
I eludes 2,085
- ·-=-;rBre~- ~un and/or
-
a .50 cal MG
·,;m~;l Arms - •-·-. 17.2
. -- .. J__.·-- .... -
I 30 160 63 83 - - -

. -lf, (Bren i lbs payload)

run Cmier}i
I I |

_,____ ~ ·-- ---· .. . . -· - . -- ··---· -- -- - -- . ... I

!. - . . - --·-· - -·- . !
I
l
:
 RESE~RCH MID EVUlJATION DIVISION
THE "lU,DRED SCHOOL
Fort Knox , Kentucky

QUESTIONN1'.IIIB

It is request€:d th"t this qucstionnniro be completed t1nd returned to

the Rr.,sc,,rch "Ild Ev... lu<>tion Division , The A.rmorcd School, Fort Knox~
K,mtucky, A.TT:~ : Committee Nr 38 . It is desired in connection with resc..,rch
concerning tho necessity of producins" lir;J:ltly "~mored vehicle for use
in reconn,.iss~noo units -- ~~ p" rticul,,rly in the Scout Section nnd in the
Support Squf"Ja of the R"1con::i.,. issqnce Comp"'ny.

It is requtsted th.,t you Pn.swer nll questions you feel you con nnd th"'t
you include ,,ny comments y<.u m"y h"'ve .

1. Frc,m your ex_rnrienco i'1 or vbserv.,tion of tho Reconn,,issrnce Compnny in

ccmb"t , ,,,p 1 roxim.... tcly ,"h"t pf.rcent"r;e of the missions pssigned them v.ould
yi:-u s-.y were the followin,,-;:

ViURID W!tR II KORE.A

ETO pncific
A • Mobile scree nine - Jo %. %
h. St... tiot11'ry screening % % %
c. /l.cvrinco 3U" rd -'
-;. %
°
~
,-}. F 1,, nk f'.U" rd % f. %
e. Rccr-nn~ issnnce 7o % fa
r. Offons ive % - 7~-l° f,,
g. Defensive
~

I• ,
•,-1
. Yo
h. Del'lyinr.; riction % - I~ %
i. Filli nr " rf'~,..>
. t % ~I
/0 %
j. Other (specify) : ;1o % _ %
(Notes each oclur:m need not tot"l ex'lctly 100%).

2. From your experience in or obsorv0 tfon of the Reconn-..issPnce Cornppny in

comb t, how much use would you sny they mnde of the followines
0

D• R-cco:on,, iss .... ncc by fire ( )Hribitu"lly; ( )Often ; ( )Seldom ; ( ) Never ;

b. 11,.)untod pntr,~ ls ( )H.,bitu ... lly; ( )Often; ( )Sddcm; ( )Nt'ver

-
c. Dismc unted P"trr1 ls ( )H.,bitu" lly; ( )Often; ( )Scl!'!om ; ( )Never
G.. Disrao unto d scout. :saction ( )H,., bitu,. lly; ( )Often; ( )&...: l-4um; ( )Never

Comm~rrts 1
3. Vth<>t is your- opinion of the {-ton
- truck as si tnctici3l vehicle in the
Reco nne is sp nc e Comre ny'l
(Please plAce i> mi>rk in one of the two boxes in eech of the ~roups A
below.) W
( ) Gener.:, lly Sl'ltisfPctory
( ) Gene rP lly uns"' tisfAotory
Comments:

( ) Sufficient mobility
(()) Insufficient mobility
Cornrte nts :

( ) Sufficient orot~,ction to personnel

( ) Insufficient protection to personnel
Comments:

( ) 3atisfActory vehicle from which to fig.ht

( ) Unsatisf?cto ry veh ic lo from which to fi 6 ht
Commt!nts:

( ) Sufficient stoware oopAcity

() Insufficient sttwq 6e cap~city
Corrments,

Gencr81 Comments:

2
 4. Do you believe thpt the -i,--ton truck with pedestA l mount is " S'>.tis ­-
fActory :un pl--tform for the .;o cflliber mAchine &1n7

( ) Yos
( ) No
Comments ;

5. Do you believe thAt the cross - country performP nee of the ¼-

- -ton truck
is satisf1>ctory for cross - country oper~t ion with the lit;ht tA nk And
the Armored personnel c«rrier?

( ) Yes
( ) No
Co1!11Tlents :

6. -Do you believe thPt A mAchine Gun should be mounted in e<>ch vehicle

of the Scout Section of the ReconnAiSSA nee Comp,,ny?

( ) Yes
( ) No
Cormnents:

7. Do you believe thAt the .50 c9liber mnchine gun should replece the
.30 c~libcr ro<>chine gun in the Scout Section of the RcoonnAiSsAnce
Compn ny1

.. ( ) Yes
( ) No
( ) In onv- -ha lf of the vehicles of the Scout lection
Comnents i
8. Do you 1::eli0 ve th 0 t a definit...e incrG<1se in ttJ_rAle "'nd "r;gressiveness
could be .;" inod in the Sct..ut Section of the Roconn"' iss"nce Comp~ny
by providing th1,t unit with fl vehicle l!lffording more protection th"n
- -ton truck '?
the ¼-

( ) Yes
( ) 1{0

Com.ents s

9. How BADY m·en per vehicle do you believe sh-0uld be in the Scout Section
of the Reconnti iss<1nce C0Tll}i:1ny'1

( ) 2
( ) 3
( )4
( ) Other (specify) ,
Co!lrn·"'nts :

10, n• Do you bt)lieve thnt tht> n]:iplication of nn "l'mor "kit" to the ¼-- ton
truck would provide a _a<>tisfactnry vehic l e for the Scout Section 1>nd
Support SquAd of the Reca.-inn iSS" ncd Comv,ny-?

( ) Yes
( ) No
- -ton truck is S"tisfactory with( ut '-'rmor
( ) PNsent -t-

b. If your O 11sw0r to Que{;tfon lOe · Vl!¼S 'tyes", ,-1.'l<it were your reasons
for th11 t A nswer?

11
c . If your l'lnswer tc Q.uestion.. 10A W'As llo 11 , f;,r ·vhich of th.e following
reP.sons did you 11nswer in thAt m,n nner s

( ) ThJ weight .:> f the <>r.11or "kit" Added to ths> t of personnel And
~tow~ 6 c needr-d for._ missions assigned to recorm,, issnnce units
-
;r:,ul1 f;') ~Ve!"l•)nd -!;he vehicle thPt its cross-country mobility
,., ·, ·.1ld t,., i..ns ,. t- is f .. .;to ry
( ) (' th · ·r ( s l'f-' " Hy) :

4
 Comments i -

11 . Do yQu bolif".lve th'lt the {.._ton truck in the Sc;ut $ectinn r,f the
Rcc6n.--i<1.iss~noe Comp,. ny should bo repl Pced with. r1 . now. l~q.~tl y-,.rmor ed
vehicla'?

( ) Yes
( ) No

Coriments :

12. If the ¾_-ton·t'ruck wen> rctpl.Poed by. '" new light l y - ormored vehicle in
the $CL ut Secti0n, oo you br.31i "!V<:' it sh•)uld ,.. lso be reploced by the
S"mc :vc:r1 icle in th.i Support. Squ--d'?

( ) Yes
( ) No.

Corl\l·,ents : - -

13. ~
If the t.-ton truck were rci;locod by " r-ow lL-htly- ,.,rmcred vnhicle in
the Scr,vt Sectioni-•nd Suprxrt Squ... r , do y1.u :Jlirv it should ..,lso
bo r(:pl"ced by the snmc v··hicle for comoand use i:>1 - the Rcconn<liSsr>nce
Cnmpony7

{ ) Yos
( ) No
•
Cc,mmc-nts ,

Cl,rr.!'li tt.,e Nr 38 <'nvisions O new vehicle to rcpl,,ce tht'! ¼-- trin truck in
tho l{cc,,Ln<>iss,,nc< Co"ll.p"ny. It would be sm-ill , mobile , "~•d lightly-

5
 "

•
 c. .~nor - - Cor.i,.:cnt: - : 1

,.

•'.
.
;

- () l2J'> trsvursc to en.ch side of frqrrt center of vehicle is satis—

7
f ..-0tor;y;:- .
( ) 360° ·trc.v.:rse is nocess:iry
-Co:rr:.ents:

15~ T!ie vehiclG described above ~ould be expensive- ·to develop, in t~t it
· ould be :,;., co. iplutc.lJ new conb~.t irchiclc incorpon.ting few conponents
of existing r.ilit •1·y ..:nd. civilbn vehicles. The adoption of a nev: :.md
co:-:olctely d.iffvrent n.i.lib.ry ch.1.esis t.,-ould. cor.plico.te prt.-sent lo6istio­-
al problems. Do you bclicvv, nev~r-the-less, - - that the .::.dva.ntnges to be
gc:i!lcd by producing such u v~niclc would justify the expense ~md logis­ ­
t ic--Q co~,,plic.).tions involved?

Co.:-!T-ent s:

, ,,.
...o. Of the vchicul'.1.r nnd nc.rsonncl losses which occurred due to enemy
~ct.ion ¾.--inst troc-ps- riding in thG 4 ton truck .:md which you lmow
3.bout , v,h t pc.rc1.,;nt _ge do you bL.lit:;vc would mve occurr~d had the
vehicle irt usu be;en of thu type described abovt3 rathwr tm.ll the
stand3l·cl 4- -ton truck?

Vehlculur Losses

75)-o .:'j,'"'o"G'% would hav.-.. occurred ruzywey

5<1,ti> - •75% would bavc occurred ruzywey -
25~ -. 50"fa. '"ould r..avl, occurred anywa,.,.
0%_ - - 25% would mvo occurred ar.ywcy

7
 \

Personnel to s se s

75$ ~ 100$ would have occurred anyway

50$ - 75$ would have occurred anyway
25$ - 50$ would have occurred anyway
0$ - 25$ would have occurred anyway

The fo llo w in g question does not p e r ta in to the main to p ic o f t h is questionnaire

hut i s asked fo r the purpose o f o btain in g supplementary inform ation.

17. a . Do you b e lie v e i t would be sound to rep lace the lig h t tank in the
Reconnaissance Company with an improved -type armored car mounting a 76mm
gun?

( ) Yes
( ) Ho

b . I f your answer to Question 17a was 1,Yesn >fo r which o f the fo llo w in g
reasons did you answer in th at manner:

( ) Increase in speed
( ) Quietness o f operation
( ) Ease o f maintenance
( ) Ease o f production
( / Greater range
( ) Other ( S p e c ify ) :

Comments:

b . I f your answer to Question 17a was "N o ", fo r which o f the fo llo w in g
reasons did you answer in that manner :

) Decrease in cross - country m o b ility

) Decrease in armor
) Other ( sp e cify )

Comments:

a m iis t s u t iv e questions

IS . I have had combat experience in the fo llo w in g u n its?

CGMSaT
THE&TER UNIT (S p e cific Designation) GaPkCITY
------------ ,------------------------------ * I '

.................f ■■ ir " 1/ 1 ' ,,n " U UM ' MIJI 1 , r $ 1 f l " "5 1 $ -v !rni 1m • m

S
 19. Fa;.riliarity with .:nd/or experience in reconnn.issai:.co units, which has
not been listed above, is as follows:

20. To what eA-tent do you authorize CoC!littee Nr 38 in its research report

to associate your name with your cnswers and cements on this question­­
naire?
1
( ) I authorize the association of oy name with all m:i.swers and cor.nrents
I have r:iade herein.
( ) I authorize the association of my nrune with all mswers and cements
I have ::ndc herein except the following;

() I do not :mthorize the a ssoci~tion of .::zy- naoe with any of the answers
I rave r-.ad.e herein.
illld co::inents
() Other (specify):

(NOTE: The desires listed above will be followed scrupulously.)

(Grado) (Arm or Service)

(Present n.ssit:r.1cnt :md address)

9
 APPENDIX IV

TABULATION vF QUBSTiuNNLIRE
...
-- -
TYPE
' QUESTION //-3

UNIT PLACE
2
SERVED SERVED ­
SATIS- ­
UNSATIS- MUBILITY MOBILITY PR<.iTECTIO~ PRCtTECTiliN OK FOR
IN 1 FACTuRY FACTORY UK NOT UK OK I NCII' OK FIGHTUJG

• CAV GRP El'u 26 5 25 6 8 23 8

uR REGT vTHER 22 5 23 5 6 22 6
.. I

UXHER ETO 37 15 36 ~6 9 43 14
- --- I

RECON KOREA 36 25 38 23 5 54 12
.
UNITS - LITHER 18 3 15 5 2 I
I
19 6
-
NuN ETO 33 14 33 16 5 44 5

RECUN KuREA 28 18 28 17 1 44 9
I
UNITS 0THER 6 2 6 2 0 8 0
--
GEN OFFICERS 12 4 14 2 2 14 3

--
T vTA!.S 218 89 218 92 38 I 271 63
' I
126

L
 ---
-- ...

#4 #5 f,6 =/1=7 1/=8 #9

INuT vK F<.,R STvWAGE STtiWAGE ¥ES m.1 YES NU YES NO YES NO IN½ YES NO 2 3 4
¥IGHTING vK NOT OK

23 13 16 17 14 17 12 28 3 2 10 18 23 8 l 20 8

21 15 13 18 11 13 14 23 6 4 17 7 18 10 2 23 2

37 9 44 25 27 22 28 44 8 6 30 16 42 10 2 34 12

46 16 45 32 28 17 43 54 7 8 28 24 56 4 l 45 14:

15 7 13 14 6 15 4 l4 8 2 12 6 15 4 0 17 3

1,
43 14 34 29 19 18 32 45 3 6 14 26 42 7 0 30 17

35 9 38 29 18 14 31 35 12 8 17 22 41 3 2 27 10

8 2 5 5 2 0 7 7 l 1 l 5 7 0 0 5 2

13 6 10 9 6 9 7 14 1 3 9 4 ll 4 0 9 4

241 91 218 178 131 125 178 264 49 40 138 128 256 50 8 210 72

...
 . ~

#=l0a #=11 #=12 #13 #1,ta

-
YES NO NOT YES NO YE:S NO YES NO 65 INCHES CWLD SHuUID
HEEDED OK INCREASE . DECREASE
12 16 3 16 14 21 9 22 9 17 0 10

6 16 6 13 14 15 13 20 8 15 0 11

9 37 2 33 19 37 16 26 28 37 0 l4

5 55 1 53 5 45 14 43 14 45 1 ll

4 14 2 11 5 8 12 12 8 12 0 6
- -
7 36 i 5 10 9 27 23 31 17 30 2 13

2 34 6 35 11 29 14 j6 17 28 1 8

0 9 0 7 l 7 2 7 2 6 l l

2 12 2 12 4 19 1 14 l 9 0 2

47 229 27 220 82 208 104 201 104 1!19 5 76

.~
 ...

#=t4b :/l:l4d :/l=l5 ,ffl6a

2 3 4
I
120°
OK
360°
NECESSARY
YF,S NO 75% --
100%
50"/o --
75%
25% --
50%
I o% --
35%

1 17 9 9 18 13 17 9 8 lO 3

0 26 2 7 21 l~ 12 2 3 8 l

1 37 15 14 35 33 19 13 13 l6 3

l 40 16 12 46 44 l2 l2 l5 l3 l5

0 17 3 5 15 13 7 4 6 6 2

0 27 17 13 31 35 lO 6 n l6 8

l 28 12 n 34 27 l7 4 6 16 10

0 5 5 1 8 7 l 0 l 2 2

0 10 4 6 6 9 5 6 l 2 ' 2

4 200 83 78 ·· 214 195 100 56 64 89 46

I I
 #16b l
I
I 75% - I 5afo -- 25% - 0 % - -
NOTES

lOOII! 75~ soolo 25cfo 1. Questionnaires were recorded inaccordance

6 3 lO 9
with following :
I
a. If experience was in recon unit in Korea
1 2 5 5
-
and non-recon unit in ETO, carried in

~ 11 9 13 Korea.

I
b. - econ unit in Korea but in
If in non-r
I 6 11 l4 20 ·
recon unit in ETO , carried in ETO .

3 1 8 4 o. If in re con unit in both Korea and

ETO , carried in Korea .

5 5 13 1l
d. -
If in non-recon unit in both Koren
3 4 lO 12 nnd ETO , carried in Korea.

e. -
If in non-recon unit in combat but in
- l) l 1 2
recon unit not in oanbat,. carried in re con.
2 3 2 4 2. 11
ETO" a.no "KOREA" , as used. here , r efer only

to service in those areas during combat.

35 <11 72 80
 -
.AP~IX IV-C
.AliALYSIS OF Q{ESTIONNAIBE
A total of 850 questionnaires of the type show in Appendix
IV-A
~ herein were mailed or given to reconnaissance and arzrored units

and to qualified individuals for conpletion. At the time the tabu­­

.. lation of answers was closed• 311 had been returned. (approximately

,'
fifteen were received subsequently but are not included. in this stuey.)
~any of the returned -questionnaires contained comnents of

con~iderable value -—— in fa.ct, throughout the various c~ters of

this report rosy be found munerous qua.tations from this source. Also
- . of value were lettem which, in some cases, were sent to the cGmmittee
in lieu of COIIpletcd questionnaires •
.Amng those con:ments -.ibich \'lere most f roq_uently rep~ated. but

which are not reflected in the tabulation nor quoted in the chapters,

the following is the substance of tho IOOst pertinent: \

],. Acy new vehicle developoo to replace the ¼-ton
- truck in
reconnaissance units IIUst retain tho ¼-ton 1s ease of
disnxnmting, mst provide excellent vision, and nust
give protection from mines.
2. If a new light r0connaissanco vehicle wore developed, it
should be fumi.shed to the support squad provided the 81-­
mm mrtar could be fired from it.

J. lf tha ¼-ton
- truck wore replaced by a now vehicle for
reconnaissance, reconnaissance units should retain a few

127
 "
¼-tons
- for liaisoti and administrative
- uses.

4. Tb.; Britisb Bren: Gun Carrier might --well be used to re­

­

place the ¾-ton t~ck as a light reconnaissance vehicle.

In looking at the tabulation, one finds a conflict between
I

the answers to the first part of question 3 and those to questions 11

and 15. In question 3 it is asked, tf\rlhat is your opinion of the ¼-ton

-
., truck as a tactical vehicle in the Reconnaissance Corrpany? 11 , and the
first sot of choices is between "Generally satisfactory". and "GcneDally
unsatisfactory11 • Only 'cf/, .of the ans\oJ'&rs to this were "Generally un­
satisfactory". In question: 11, on the other hand, 8~ of the answers
indicated belief that 11 the ¼-ton
- truck in the Scout Section of the
Reconnaissance Conpaizy" should be replaced with a ~ lightly-arnx)red
-

vehicle"; and in question 15, 6@, believed that, even considering

the expense and logistical conplications involved in producing the

proposed new vehicle, its nood justified its production •

.An e.xplanation of this conflict lies probably in the psycho­

logical error of placing question 3 at the beginning of the question­­

naire, unprecedod by an explanation of the general probl0ID. Men tend

to be creatures of habit; and an initial, cold reaction usu.ally is i:m

favor of the status quo. As the persons answering the questionnaire

continued through it, they were required to start thinking and were
sho\olll what the committee was thinking, and the trend shifted decidedly

in faYor of the new vehicle (qu~stions 11 and 15).

128
 dotmrl.Htse N~ 38
.ARMORED OFFICERS ADVANCED CUSS
THE ARMORED SCHOOL II

Fort Knox. Kentucky

12 January 1952

Dear

, This Committee is studying the possible need for a lightly armored

vehicle to replace the .!.-ton
- truck in reconnaissance units, particularly
in the scout section an! the support squad of the reconnaissance platoon,
Information obtained frcm experienced military personnel will in­ ­
crease the validity of this report. It would be greatly appreciated if
you will complete the attached questionnaire and return it at your earliest
convenience in the inclosed self-addressed
- franked envelope.., so that it
can be used durin€ the preparation of a report to be written next month.
Respectfully•
I

l ~f
I • __,

~:-re~ !
.....__
....._. .>, V. A.
l ""' - J J' V
l
I. ~
I~ l\
2 Incls STEP H. SMITH
Q}lestionnaire Captain, Armor
Envelope Committee Cha.irma.n
r
.. i
'

•
r
...

..
>

l
 -----·- ------ ◄ ¥ C £ 1
t

BEAtQUARTERS TEE ARMORED SCHOOL

Fort Knox, Kentucky

AICBB-E
- 12 Januaa-y 1952

- SUBJECT: The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle

in Reconnaissance Units

•
TO:

1. A research conunittee of the .advanced Class is studying the

possible need for a lightly armored vehicle to replace the t-ton
- truck
in reconnaissance uni ts, particularly in the scout section and the
support squad of the reconnaissance platoon.
2. Information obtained from experienced military personnel will
increase the validity of this report. It would be appreciated if the
attached questionnaires could be completed by the commissioned and non­­
commissioned personnel of your command most experienced in reconnaissance
operations or otherwise best qualified to answer the questions.
3. Request the completed questionnaires be returned as soon as
possible.
• 1
FOR THE C01lMANDA}lT:

J;iV/YY·
I J 12.11 ) '
h A.-\..
Incl U THC&S J . ROGERS
Qµestionnaires Colonel , Armor
Secretary

•
I .(
0 11 3

•
---
: F 2
 ESEARCH LIIRAAY

iiii~filll1ii
11 1111111

\ -
#0

JAN l 3 lS86

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